To my son  Karan
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My study explores a way of looking at the unity of thinking and making in the context of architectural design. Questioning the prevailing conceptions of this unity that take a linguistic model of representation as their model, this study proposes the phenomenal unity of experience as a basis for understanding the act of making architecture as a way of thinking in and of life. What is outlined in a critique of the prevailing views is that the unity of thinking and making in architecture is not an indiscriminative unity of these two moments on a holistic conception of making architecture as an effective tradition of thinking. On the contrary, this study suggests that architectural making should be understood as the unity of two distinct moments of reflection that cannot be reduced onto each other without waiving the agency of the maker in a tradition of making.
CHAPTER 1
PROLOGUE

When we make architecture, there is a sense in which we operate on the basis of some fundamental beliefs and intuitions. When we perceive some quality in a certain space before it is built, when we see the intervention on a site before it is constructed, our judgments are based neither on free floating ideas nor given methodologies. They are quite specific for each new act of design and different between projects, but strongly connected in the temporality of our thinking in making architecture. This is being soaked into a medium of intentionality, defined to the degree that it allows continuity of thought over different actions, undefined to the degree that there is always the possibility of new and unpredictable making.

Six o’clock in the afternoon. I sense her again. On my right, slightly outside of my visual cone. But there. Certainly. I reach to the camera with utmost silence. She shouldn’t be disturbed. Set the aperture to F 3.5, the shutter speed to 1/500”.

I stop whatever I am doing, reach to the camera . . . and play with this afternoon sun whenever she cares to visit my room. Can I draw her? I don’t know, have never tried. She is so elusive . . . I catch her at about 1/500” . . . But I feel I know her. I can even call her by a name: Nadja? I took tens of pictures of her. My room is about 3m x 4m . . . The pictures look all the same. Only very slight differences perhaps . . . But I get to know her in the very act of taking the picture . . . and in the slight differences . . . almost unrecognizable nuances. There is something in this. I recall Le Corbusier’s or Siza’s sketches . . . drawing the same thing over and over again . . . with very slight differences perhaps . . . but the same thing. As if the thing comes to talk only in the very act of drawing, as if the mind/eye/hand remember(s) only when construing the very lines of each new sketch that which does not give itself by mere looking at the previous ones . . .
or, as if each slight difference reveals something of the thing . . . it is wrestling with an idea . . . yet to be born.

I don’t know where she comes from. It is others’ problem . . . psychology, philosophy, sociology? I have to take these pictures . . . play with her. I am sure They can serve her head on a golden plate . . . after the autopsy.

Is she . . . ? But who speaks of reality, this-ness, or that-ness? My problem is she . . . here, now. As she appears to me. She doesn’t ask from me any more than this . . .

True that myth brings us the lost qualities . . . Nadja, say . . . But it seems also true that one has to see these on his own. Otherwise it is only one story leading to another without touching to the ground . . . without an object. Similar to what Gadamer said about metaphor: it should give way to the reality it speaks of . . . I don’t think the source/origin is myth. Myth is an expression of what still is, or at least should be, available to us now. The source is lived experience, and its immediate meaning . . . or, just its immediacy, how it is . . . Hence myth is also a secondary language, or language itself, depending on how you take language, upon a lived source, the object of experience . . . not really different from philosophy, science, or religion for that matter . . . as a second order language.

True that the way she is is not a figment of my mind/eye. Something in the pictures points beyond them. But she is a construction anyway . . . an interpretation . . . what is made available through F 3.5 at 1/500” . . . zoomed in, zoomed out . . . framed. Pictures reveal something of my mind/eye too . . . Whatever shows itself in the lived experience, its immediate meaning . . . is not available outside our interpretations of it. Hence the lived experience is already an interpretation. It is not that what is emerges in the work. It is not ‘aletheia’ . . . intentionality is involved.

Agency is there . . . F 3.5 @ 1/500”.
What does all this have to do with architecture?

Being in touch with things?

“Santha Sophia, the rays of the sun at the cosmic hours.”

“Some light! In 1911, I had noticed something like that in a Roman grotto in Tivoli—no grotto, here at Ronchamp, but the hump of a hill.”

Alvaro Siza’s statement that “architects do not invent anything, they transform reality” (Siza 1986, 12) appears in writings by Kenneth Frampton (1995) and Robert McCarter (1991) in discussions of architectural tradition. I believe that this highly powerful statement can also induce another dialectic parallel to its insight for understanding the indispensable role of tradition in the production of architecture. What I have in mind is that ‘architecture transforms reality in the lived / experienced architectural work’ and this always involves an interpretation of life as mediated by architecture.

Vittorio Gregotti underlines an “act of knowledge of the context that comes out of its architectural modification” in relation to the questions of site. This kind of an engagement with the physical context can be observed, among many others, for example, in the work of Le Corbusier (especially the later works), Alvaro Siza, Morphosis, and sculptor Richard Serra. In such works, something potential in the site finds embodiment in the work. The work becomes a kind of measure; it selects and orders the latent forces of the site, brings forth a constellation that is not there before the work. A potentiality becomes actual with the work’s insertion and mediation. The work points to something about the site interpreting it in its specific intentionality. The site is imagined from a particular point of view.

The site becomes what it is with the work’s insertion. We cannot easily say that the site was there and what is done is appropriate, in accordance with the conditions of the site, as this
would be overlooking the fact that the site would be a different site with another interpretation by another intervention. In my view, the site can only be a multiplicity of possibilities, all of which require a certain intentional act to be realized, hence what is realized with the architectural intervention cannot easily be understood as a smooth flow from, a going along with an original condition which was only waiting to be realized as such. The relation between the site and intervention is not an easy dialectic where the intervention yields to a certain determination of the site, where an authentic siteness emerges. On the contrary, the intervention constructs its own site, a contingent possibility out of a multitude of other ones, and does it only because it is first of all self-referential in terms of establishing a system of its own interpretative mechanism. The act of intervention is a simultaneous understanding of a set of possibilities and sublimating them into the structure of a medium, knowledge of which is a specific sense of judgment that comes from one’s understanding of a tradition of making, hence to this extent, independent from the immediate conditions of the site. This particular understanding of the site emerges only with the work, through the work, even to the maker, as it is the very act of thinking the architecture-to-come. This act is not a representation but an intervention, a mediative intervention. The self-referentiality of the intervention is the emergence of a “brute meaning” out of a “sheer presence” of an artifact that only comes to speak because it holds together as a “woven texture.” This self-referentiality is what makes possible a specific interpretation to raise above habitual ways of seeing, to project out of a multitude of other possibilities and hold on its own transforming a contingency into a true possibility without necessity.

Analogously, we can say that architecture is an ‘act of knowledge of life that comes out of its architectural modification’. Imagined life situations find embodiment in architectural works. I want to emphasize this ‘imagined’, because the life that finds embodiment in the architectural
work is always an interpretation, offered as a possibility by the architect. It is not a re-
presentation of something existing, but a presentation of something latent in the multitude of
other possibilities in a life practice that can only emerge with a particular intervention in the
medium of architecture. Architectural making is the very act of seeing such possibilities and
constructing them into lived architecture only where they can exist. As in the site analogy, it
would not be accurate if we think that such possibilities are there before the work and it is only a
matter of representing them in an appropriate architecture. Such intervention in the world of our
experiences emerges out of a specific unity of thinking and making in the production of
architecture.

Gregotti emphasizes the mimetic and the constructive moments, in a way reminiscent of
Theodor Adorno, in the clearing of and sitting in a site:

Before transforming a support into a column, a roof into a tympanum, before placing stone
on stone, man placed the stone on the ground to recognize a site in the midst of an
unknown universe: in order to take account of it and modify it. As with every act of
assessment this one required radical moves and apparent simplicity. From this point of
view, there are only two important attitudes to the context. The tools of the first are
mimesis, organic imitation and the display of complexity. The tools of the second are the
assessment of physical relations, formal definition and interiorization of complexity.
(quoted in Frampton 1990, 524-525)

The last two can be taken as implying the two moments in the making, that of the empirical
impulse of what to do given the conditions at hand, and that of the constructive instance of how
to do it in a material medium. As a single act of thinking and making, the architectural act bares
the unity of mimetic and constructive instances in the form of an interpretation of life in the
medium of lived architecture. This dual-poled unity is also what is coined by Frampton as the
‘double hermeneutics of architecture’: architecture “addresses itself to the social” within the
parameters set by architectural tradition. Frampton also refers to Gregotti’s emphasis that “the
material” of architecture lies in the social relations “even though the professional tools required
by architecture as a discipline can only be found within [architectural] tradition” (Frampton 1995, 26).

This polarity is beyond the conceptual space of traditional form – content dichotomy in its didactic Platonic form, as the unity of the Idea and its visual, perceptual appearance. When the singularity of the act is recognized, form, what is perceived is already content. The content is what is formed in a specific medium. However, the duality of the two poles of interpretation still recognizes two distinct moments of thinking which are not reducible to each other. Rather than a distinction between what is experienced in its perceptual existence and its ‘meaning’ in a larger space of other meanings (that of Essences for Plato, the history of Geist in Hegel, or the Horizon in Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*), the analytical distinction between the mimetic and the constructive moments points at the critical distance between a material medium as field of forming meaning in the common space of culture and the individual act of meaning intention 10. It is the distance between the possibilities of forming meaning in a medium and the intended meaning in the singularity of a work, emerging from an interpretation of a life situation at hand.

The intended meaning is an interpretation in terms of what to do, and as such it is not a given ready to be realized in architecture. Like the site analogy, what to do is one contingent possibility of the condition at hand which is never a pure given but always exists as a multitude. Understanding the condition at hand means to understand and frame what to do through an act of interpretation, hence itself needs the thinking of the architectural intervention; what to do in life, like on a site, only comes with how to do it architecturally. Its presentation itself is the act of intervention, a making that unifies a viewpoint. This may sound like a far-fetched conception issuing from a modern ideology of architectural making; however, if we consider that even a site, which is much more concrete in its physicality than our actions, meanings, and experiences in
life, cannot be taken as a mere given and that it will be different sites with different interventions, then we should also see the agency in the making of architecture as an intervention in life: a life which is always larger as to its possibilities than what is already done, said, thought, meant, experienced.

1.1 A Wall on Which You Sit

A wall on which you sit and talk endlessly, a wall behind which you hide, a wall under which you rest in the shade. What is to design here? What is it that we design? Sounds like ‘phenomenology of life’, as we hear in theories of architecture, at first glance. But it is not: a wall that doesn’t think your image… a wall that obsessively asks questions poking you at its disquiet . . . a wall that spreads on the interior of a house like a virus and divests its Houseness (thingness) making it another house: Merz . . . If you accept the former, you must accept the latter. They are at the same distance from reality whatever it is.

The meaning is a take on reality independent from its full-fledged confirmations in effective histories. If there emerges a hermeneutic knot around the object, then perhaps it shows that it indeed has been within the possibilities of reality. Indeed it is the very discontinuity that makes the meaning more valuable . . . a discontinuity that comes from the impossibility of a confirmation from the reality as we know it . . . not unlike the difference of the text in the hermeneutic circle . . . Indeed the text is valuable to the degree that it is discontinuous with ‘our reality’. This is what makes reading a text a dialogue between ‘I and Thou’, otherwise the relation is one of a monologue where either both sides confirm their stance in the unity of an already shared prior meaning, or, and which is worse, they confirm their respective prior stances in the imputed non-sense of the other.

Muses 11 . . . it is one thing to say that we should stay the course, another to say ‘you won’t make sense if you don’t stay the course!’ . . . and who knows definitely what the course is all
about? It must be a project between 'I and Thou'. Plato banned the poet, not because he wasn’t making sense, just the opposite, he was making sense, but not the approved one . . .

If reality is only apprehensible in our expressions of it in cultural work, then I do not think there is any other authority than the dialogue between 'I and Thou', as any effort to show a higher seat of justification will only be pointing at another work: some order of things as they are reified in another work. When architectural making is realized as a moment of constructive dialogue in the larger space of culture in terms of offering imagined life situations, one is already beyond a formal / structural ideology that takes architectural making as a species of forming artifacts upon their internal figurative determinations on some received model of object figuration. Thinking life in and through architecture is beyond thinking an object in its making as an isolated condition of formal or spatial configuration; it registers the background of life experiences that the object, as a made artifact, should think, interpret, generate, respond to in its existence in the public realm of common experience. But this does not mean that some such life exists fully determined prior to architectural object, and all architecture can do is to represent it appropriately. The mimetic instance of making architecture is a moment of interpretation, and as such it is an act of agency that should be acknowledged in the making of culture. For example, Juhani Pallassmaa recognizes the intentionality of architectural form by registering the experiential dimension beyond object’s internal logic of formation. Thus, he underlines the background of life that manifests itself in its mediations by architecture. All his ‘images’ are events of life, and all are about what can be phrased as ‘being in touch with things’: a knowledge of life that architecture cannot do without, if it wants to be relevant for culture at large and vital for the functioning of public realm as a continuous making of common meanings.
It is not that we can respond to all that he writes as images of life events via making architecture. Being in touch with things is more like understanding the space of existence of architectural work in life and interpreting a set of conditions into lived architecture out of a multiplicity of other possibilities. And this should not mean that there is a given set of conditions to be known and responded to and they are waiting for the appropriate interpretation. Many events like the conditions mentioned by Pallassmaa can emerge only through the work and there is always the possibility of new things to be in touch with. Hence, when he steps from the intentional background of architecture in life to explain where these images come from and how they are effective in consciousness, he moves into a general problem of phenomenological/hermeneutical tradition of thinking in architecture.  

It is the way meaning is tied to an existential source beyond our agency, giving us what is possible and what is not to make significant architecture. Returning to the site example, the problem is that this way of thinking claims the site is given as idealized in some effective traditions in life and architecture, and the possibilities for intervention that are found in a set of significant traditional gestures are taken as the only way for meaningful architecture. The site is taken as a sacred site handed to us, with its own possibilities and binding conditions beyond our acts of interpretation; as it is claimed, it is not that we make the site, we are made by it. There are deep problems in this view of taking life as a given and making architecture an appropriate representation. What is deemed as given can only be a given in one or another form of life reified as a practice in some tradition or language; thus, it is itself a contingent historical construction in an effort to make sense of human reality. To think otherwise is to cancel ourselves as agents capable of action and constructing a common world through constant dialogue. The mimetic impulse in the making of architecture finds its conditions of satisfaction in the event space of
life, in the dialogue between 'I and Thou'. It is about ‘interpretation of life’, ‘life thinking’, ‘being in touch with things’, but all this requires the acknowledgement of making architecture as a unified act of interpretation of life in architecture, without waiving the moment of agency in the construction of common reality. We need to see this common space of life itself under construction rather than given, existing prior to work as an ultimate arbiter of architecture.

1.2 Life Imagined / Thought

The imagined life situations offered by architectural work should be differentiated from what Dalibor Vesely calls “typical life situations.” 15 In an apparent similarity Vesely emphasizes the role of architecture in revealing a knowledge of life. However, his focus is the representation of a life practice in its unity in the architectural work. While this can be a valid way to pursue the meaningfulness of architecture in a traditional society, the framework of late phenomenology and hermeneutics leaves some key questions unresolved, the solutions of which require an ethical / normative position on individual agency, hence the mediative power of architecture. What is advanced in Vesely’s view is that architecture can only be a representation of a larger space of culture if it is to be meaningful at all.

Vesely’s concern is the unity of life and architecture in a seamless continuity of meanings which are also articulated and refined in the natural language. While it is important to see the unity and continuity of meanings at various levels of articulation in culture, there might be an inherent problem of taking everything that is produced as culture within a common space of general significances. In “Figures, Doors, and Passages”, Robin Evans (1978) reads architectural plans in terms of a daily practice, he interprets the life situations presented in architecture. What finds embodiment in these architectural plans is a contingent/historical everyday practice. Thus, Evans sees the same unity of life and architecture that Vesely underlines. However, Evans sees architecture more in the form of an intervention, a making that enables certain conditions, rather
than representing some existing social / cultural meanings. He emphasizes that his way of reading the plans does not imply a kind of behaviourism or functionalism in terms of established significances. The tension inherent in reading architecture in terms of life situations without reducing it to the behavioral or functional norms/codes of the society can be released if we see that architectural work is not the unmediated, direct representation of some code of life but a presentation of it in the medium of architecture. Hence, it is always an interpretation from a mediative distance. Support to this idea can be found in Evans’ Projective Cast (1995) where he emphasizes architecture as “supplementing” the existing cultural codes with a “compensating image” rather than merely reflecting them.  

Life as such takes place only in an architectural setting, and even if there are some well established significances in a life form, none of these can give one an architecture without a translation into the language of space and form. Architecture is a distinct thinking and making, within the unity and continuity of culture, and it cannot be reduced to what informs its making. As this would be explaining a particular intervention on a site by the site itself bypassing the intentionality of the intervention, which presupposes that the site was already waiting to be intervened as such. One can justify the intervention by what it does with the site of course; but, when we see that the site itself becomes what it is only with the intervention, this kind of justification recognizes the specific intentionality of the work of architecture beyond the life prior to it. As in Gregotti’s insight, a knowledge of life comes out of its architectural modification which is not available prior to this articulation. Architecture interprets life in its own medium. Evans’s reading of the plans in terms of the life in them points to the impossibility of discussing architecture merely in architectural terms or merely in terms of the codes of social life; that is, neither there is an end to the question whether corridor type or
multi-doored rooms matrix is better ‘architecturally’ nor there are latent architectures in the formation of life that are ready to be extracted by a hermeneutics of tradition or life.

Evans’s understanding differs from Vesely’s position as follows. In Evans’ readings, the unity of meaning in the architectural work is a function of the artifactual coherency, the ‘ambiguous precision’ to rephrase him, of the architectural object through which a life situation emerges, whereas Vesely roots it in a unity of life prior to the articulation in the architectural work. Even if this sounds like the trivial ‘chicken / egg’ question, the unity of life or the unity of architectural object, the views represent two dominant ideologies on the relation between reality and its expressions in culture. The apparent triviality of the question comes from the fact that life takes place in architecture and inevitably architecture becomes a presentation of a way of life. However, to take life as a stabilized condition prior to architecture makes architecture a mere representation.

In Vesely’s view, architectural unity of meaning is a secondary one depending on the unity of cultural codes. Hence what emerges in the architectural work as to its experience and meaning is a representation of an established unified ethos, and architecture’s communicative power is rooted in this unity of ethos behind it. Related to this is the idea that the language of architecture derives from a structure of archetypal spatial situations sedimented in the essential conditions of human nature. Accordingly, Vesely’s point is that architectural object becomes meaningful to the degree that it accords with the primary symbols of the essential spatiality of human nature. His frame, as I summarized it to this point, does not answer how the architectural object represents the historical cultural meanings, from where it gets its unity of meaning in the first place, while its communicative structure also derives from primary spatial conditions. His underlying argument is that this relation lies in the intrinsic continuity of different aspects of human
practice. The unity of traditional ethos embraces both the communicative spatial/formal conditions of the architectural object and the cultural meanings embodied in it. For Vesely, human life takes place in the larger context of a structured universe, which he calls the tacit world, and in the traditional unity of culture, this tacit world 17 is the grounding condition of all human commerce. Culture as participation in the cosmological order of universe as it is revealed in the authentic experience of myth takes this world as it is given and builds its symbolic structures, languages, traditions in a continuum.

Thus, in this framework, the conditions of transmissibility of meaning become dependent on what it is 18 in its accord with already existing meanings. However, the mediative distance and power of architecture lies precisely in the discontinuity between the meaning that emerges in its experience and our pre-existing meanings. As Paul Ricouer put it, art can disturb and rearrange our relation to reality. 19 But in Vesely’s view this is not a possibility As artwork, in order to communicate, has to refer to the reality as it is, as it has always been. For him artwork’s potential to communicate lies in the continuity of its reference to a commonly shared world reality of which is self-evident. Any deviation from the truth of the world as it is handed to us, and as we live it in a way of life, would be emancipated representation, which for him is also what Martin Heidegger called “the forgetfulness of Being” (Vesely 2004, 189).

Of course there is an inherent dilemma in saying that architecture interprets reality and it brings some new meaning that does not exist before. We do not want to say that we ‘invent anything’, as in Siza’s insight; however, we do want to recognize the possibility of new meanings emerging in architecture as new ways of seeing reality, hence the transformation of life by architecture. A solution to this dilemma may lie in what Arendt underlines as the inherent plurality of public realm, the common world:
The reality of public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common denominator can ever be devised. For though the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no more coincide with the location of another than the location of two objects. Being seen and being heard by the others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position. (Arendt 1958, 57)

This is a difficult philosophical problem, a precise theoretical solution of which is outside the scope of this study. And the problem with Vesely’s frame is not whether its theoretical underpinnings are true or false, but the actual interpretative possibilities it enables. What I want to be able to do is to recognize the possibility of meaning in individual works of architecture however singular and discontinuous they might be within general cultural meanings of their context. In other words, I want to be able to recognize the possibility of meaning in the works of Coop Himmelblau and Kurt Schwitters which Vesely debases, by experiencing their work in an openness to what they may say before I judge them as to what I believe in my moral practical life.

1.3 Reality Imagined / Made

Vesely’s position reveals a possible danger of reifying a justificatory layer of life in the themes, techniques, or forms of architectural tradition as bearers of essential meanings which is inherent in similar discussions of cultural symbolism, symbolic representation. However, the unity of thinking and making in the architectural act, the concrete meanings in architectural experience, the corporeality of metaphors, should not suggest a continuity of life in architectural tradition at the level of forms or techniques, or even themes. What should be inherited from tradition in its larger sense of the unity of life and architecture is the way of this unity, not its concretized historical manifestations. Thus, instead of seeing architectural tradition as an effective tradition of life representing essential meanings, we should grasp it as the regulative
background of our judgments of making for possible new ends in view in the form of interventions rather than representations.

Vesely’s prioritizing of “praxis”, “latent world”, over architectural meaning, hence his understanding of ‘architecture as a medium of representation’ issues from an understanding of the necessary dependence of language upon a life practice, where architectural form and space are like words and their power to communicate is dependent upon a knowledge of their references. Just like words without a language, or sentences that do not refer to anything in a context of meaning, architectural space and form do not have any power to communicate beyond the general significances of established life practices. This view naturally produces a negative critique of any architectural work that does not fit into the established ways of life as understood by the critic. But beyond this critique which can only be an ethical critique, that is, ‘the life you offer does not fit to my preconceptions of how to live,’ Vesely makes his point in such a way that any making that does not refer to life as we know it becomes meaningless. He pursues the meaningfulness in the continuity of references that are reified in the languages and traditions, which he thinks are all built upon a given ground what he calls the latent world. He makes all culture a representation of an ultimate reality.

His argument starts from the embodiedness of our experience, and its dependence upon a given world, which can be called reality as we experience it. But he then collapses the world of language onto this reality, and from the reality of our perception he moves to the reality of its mediated form, the world given in the languages of culture, thereby making reality an effective tradition. When Vesely collapses the world of culture on to the reality of our perception, he also collapses individual intentionality onto the collective consciousness of language. Thus, he gives the common denominator which, for Arendt, cannot be fixed in a reified form outside the
individual interpretations of the common world that we all share but does not exist anywhere outside of our takes on it. ²³ He sees this in the unity of the total language of the latent world of which natural language is the most refined and articulated expression. ²⁴

The most concretized form of life is the language we speak in which we think, through which we experience a world in the habituality of daily life. In its stabilizing function, language gives us a world, but we also know that our relation to reality is larger than what is given in the language. We see this when we experience a new significance in reading a poem, in seeing an artwork, when a new meaning shows itself which was not within our prior horizon of meaning; we see something new, unknown to us before the work, our world enlarges. And it is not always only an expansion within the familiarity of our prior world: as it happens, sometimes the new insight experienced can occasion shifts in our beliefs and desires, arranges a new reality, when it opens up not into a new significance within the possibilities of our prior world, in the familiarity of our uncritical language, but into a new horizon itself. Our understanding new meaning is not always a fusion of horizons in the form it is given by Gadamer in *Truth and Method*, sometimes it is a Gestalt switch where the prior world as we know it is altered radically. Not that our reality shatters in such a case, it is our take on it that changes. Upon the same reality there might be different constructions, each being specific interpretations; and even if reality can be apprehended only in our expressions of it in the languages of culture, it is still always larger than our takes on it. Only this mismatch can explain the possibility of Gestalt switches if we do not want to call these changes in our conceptions of reality, world, ourselves the forgetfulness of Being, a fall from a more authentic state. For example, when Maurice Merleau-Ponty speaks about the space of our experience as a “fabric of brute meaning”, he does not also make it a historical effective tradition, collapsing the reality and the world given in languages, traditions. ²⁵
In his view, no representation is valid forever, and he takes such constructions as contingent takes on reality: “a particular case, a date, a moment in a poetic information of the world which continues after [them].” When reality and expressions of it in culture are collapsed ontologically without leaving an epistemic standpoint for individual intentionality, language (the most elusive of all cultural works) goes beyond being the house, it becomes the prison: ‘the iron curtain’ of consciousness. 26 Vesely’s latent world is such an iron curtain rather than a fabric of brute meaning where different takes are possible.

I do not imply that in our normal mode of being we constantly shift between different worlds in a schizophrenic flux of unstabilized meanings. What I intend to point out is that the world given in language, how and whatever it is, is constructed and reconstructed within our dialogues with each other. If reality is the site of our existence, the world of languages, the world that is the expression of reality, is an intervention, a contingent historical informing, which is always under construction. And we come to know not only the reality but ourselves in the dialogue of culture in which we participate as making and acting agents of a world rather than representatives of something higher than ourselves. Participation in the collectivity of a world is not being a receptive member of a group ideals of which are rooted in some existential rock-bottom beyond one’s understanding, it is participating in the making of those very ideals. Only then one can speak of a proper understanding as the measure of participation in culture. Beyond this constructive communication between individuals, any hypothesized reality in some reified form of languages and traditions is a top-down restriction to the freedom of the dialogue between 'I and Thou'. ‘Culture’ is not a representation of some ultimate reality, it is a construction that is always made and remade. The stabilized forms of collective consciousness as they are reified in languages, institutions, traditions, that is, the worlds, the expressions of life forms, are only
contingent moments of a continuous dialogue between individuals who make collectivity what it is in the first place.

Even if we come to learn a world by being born into effective traditions of life as they are expressed in languages, reality itself cannot be reduced to an effective tradition as such, as this would be canceling out any possible moment of individual reflection in the holistic structure of a world: an order of things where there are no other possible things beyond the possibilities of an already existing taxonomy. Effective traditions are particular ways of life in and through which there is a common world shared in the generals of a language. If we think that, because reality can only be apprehended in its expression in the commonness of a world shared by others, we have no access to a reality beyond what we can share with others in the commonness of language, we would also be saying that all what you can meaningfully think and see can only happen in the established contexts of collective meaning. Any thought or seeing has to be meaningful in a context of dialogue to be a thought or a seeing that can be understood by the other. All linguistic meaning is a function of the relations between general terms of a language which have a certain network structure. Thus, any radically different thinking or seeing that shifts the relations between generals will not make sense as there will not be any common object that can start and maintain a dialogue. Moreover, any such radical thinking itself is not possible at all as it will not make sense even to its thinker, it is not thinkable.

Such is the view if we take reality as an effective tradition, and collapse it with the common world that we share with others in the commonness of language. Even if we say that, rather than thinking language as giving the reality in the form of a common world, it is the reality itself that is mapped, represented in the language of the common world, we would still be having the same problem of the impossibility of individual reflection. Again, as language is a system of
generals with certain relations (think about the very idea of dictionary, all words lead to other words, they weave the texture of an order of things), all the common world given in the language can be is a collection of particular instances of some general significances. Any word, to be a meaningful attribute at an instance of seeing or thinking, of a particular experience, can only be uttered if such thought or seeing can be brought under the general significance of the word. Thus, every thinking or seeing is a thinking-as or seeing-as, thinking or seeing something as something already given in language. It is this generality what makes possible the stabilizing function of language, securing the ‘commonness’ of the common world that we share in speaking a language. The recognizability of a common object in a text, the reality that the text speaks of, as Gadamer has it, depends on this generality principle: an order of things codified in language. Hence what I can think, see, and say is meaningful to the degree that it accords with the common world given in language, as much to myself as to the others. When language is taken as the mode of pre-understanding with which every understanding must conform, I and Thou become two nodes in a network, they are no longer individual agents, but signatures in Derrida’s terms, of a language, like beacons signaling what the language has to say. When all commerce between 'I and Thou' is reduced to the model of language, meaningfulness becomes a function of the worldly significances as they are given in the generals of language, thus fixing the shared world only to the particular instances of generals. The mediative representation that Vesely advances as the necessary condition of participation in culture is such beacon model of agency where one can only make sense if s/he refers to a reality known to the other prior to its utterance in the familiarity of language. Thus, any possible mediative intervention, which may inform reality differently from existing interpretations becomes ‘forgetfulness of Being’, taking the path of ‘divided representation’.
The linguistic model of understanding is based on a shared order of things and its respective articulation in forms of communication. Thus, one of the challenges to this model has been the experience of the modern work of art.27 It is not insignificant when Gadamer set out to formulate his understanding of hermeneutic commerce on the model of language, he started his dialectic with a critique of the idea of aesthetic experience as it is elaborated after 18th century. In his effort to show that understanding only happens in a shared objective world rather than as a species of empathy between same minded beings, he took the model of language in *Truth and Method* as the ground of such objectivity. I will return to Gadamer’s thinking frequently, however it is worth mentioning here that what Vesely takes as the model of participatory communication, despite his references to Gadamer, is not the true insight of hermeneutic experience. Gadamer himself developed his conception of modern art in his later writings28 explaining his idea of hermeneutic experience on much sounder grounds by expanding the conditions of objectivity beyond the order of things handed to us in language to the way we order things in space and time; thus, he expanded the conditions of sharability of meaning from a linguistic order of things to the way we order space and time as objective conditions of our phenomenal experiences.

The problematic account of the significance of the modern work of art on the model of language is beyond any conception of what language may be. It is not a matter of asking whether language maps reality as it is or it is an illusion created by us, it is the very nature of language as a system of generals that is the source of the problem. If we can apprehend phenomena in terms of their moment of ideality as they are taken into the collective consciousness of a language, then there must be a layer of spatio-temporal distinction where other seeings are possible, hence these must also be sharable in principle to the degree that we can share experiences as we use
language. To reduce all perception as perception of a universal, all seeing to a seeing-as cuts short of this possibility: abstract art becomes meaningless, worldless.

John Dewey, who shares as a philosopher many of the insights of the philosophers of the linguistic turn like Heidegger, Gadamer and Ludwig Wittgenstein, speaks freely about aesthetic experience, without falling into the reductionist view that takes linguistic symbolism as the sole participatory ground between ‘I and Thou’. His conception of “what is done” and “what is undergone” in terms of “expression” and “expressed” in the work of art carries the same duality of the mimetic and constructive instances in the single act of making in architecture: the dual aspect of the possibilities of forming meaning in a medium and the individual act of meaning intention. For Dewey, our commerce with reality happens at a much lower ground of phenomenal experience before the idealized meanings of language, and as such we share a common experiential ground which also is the common ground for participation in higher levels of cultural dialogue which are sedimented around certain interests, contexts of idealizations, be it moral-practical or scientific. Thus, beyond general meanings of such cultural dialogue, the experience of artwork is a ground of communication of intentions that are embedded in the work in its making as an objective condition that stands in the common space of phenomenal experience at the same distance to its maker and any observer. The relation between “done”, as the work of art as to its spatio-temporal existence, and “undergone”, as the aesthetic experience as perception beyond a recognition in general significances, as Dewey underlines, has a directness about it, unlike the second order arrangement of reality via linguistic sign. In linguistic sense, done is in a system of signs that stand for things (which are not present themselves), hence undergone is a second order affection, by the competence in a language, in a representational system, and its code. Knowledge of linguistic sign comes in a holistic structure of other signs
which together map a world, and when pursued to its extreme logicality, no sign can stand for a perception that is independent from it. Derrida marked this in a rather dramatic way in his reading of experience in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology: “there never was a perception” (Derrida 1973, 103). Every particular is a particular to the degree that there is a general under which we bring it, hence the world in the language, the things that are named, the order of things as they are named in the language is a system of second order representations. When Dewey speaks about aesthetic experience, the thing, the event, is not brought under such significance, and it is still something we share as a common object we experience and are affected similarly. It does not mean that we feel the same in experiencing a work. This is a different matter altogether and even linguistic significances has no binding condition as to what happens to us in our thoughts and emotions when we hear a word, a sentence. The point is that experience of spatio-temporal unities, beyond known significances, depend on our general skills of relating to world and as such we can share them in their singularity as objectively as when we talk about our experiences as particular instances of generals in the idealized languages of rule (the network of relations between generals) based cultural dialogue.

Ernesto Grassi’s understanding of the notion of ‘work’ gathers all that can be said about the human creativity and communication in the making of common world: “Inventive and metaphorical activity lies at the basis of work, be it material or intellectual effort through which we strengthen our existence” and it is realized in “common sense through which we continually transform reality in the human context” (1980, 99-100). It can be said that genuine work is always an imaginative act out of the spontaneity of human mind in confrontation with concrete situations. We live in concrete situations and there is always new constellations of phenomena ‘to be in touch with’ which requires new syntheses of imagination that cannot always be
explained on the basis of some general rules acquired through traditions and languages. Our set of meanings are always under construction in response to new events, things that we come across; thus, it is always in the making through our acts of making sense. For Grassi, “the concepts through which we come to understand and ‘grasp’ each situation come from our ingenious, metaphorical, fantastic capacities that convey meanings in the concrete situation with which we are confronted” (100). This view that our concepts are in constant formation and change in the living body of language is also underlined by Gadamer in *Truth and Method*. Beyond the metaphorical flexibility of language, there is an original act of seeing in particular situations which initiates an expression into the familiarity of language that also transforms the general rule of the language by the addition of a new particular. However, this process happens in established contexts of meaning in language, as there has to be some general significance to bring the particular under even if this very act also modifies the general. The exception to this is the moment of poetry above and beyond the general metaphoricity of language. The poetic utterance cannot be subsumed under a general significance: it is not within an established context of meaning. Transcending the contexts of meaning, the poetic utterance stays with its intentional object; what is said, is only possible within the poetic utterance as a single case of context of meaning in itself. Poetic metaphor is getting a hold of a particular situation in its own rule; thus, its communication depends again on an original seeing, but this time without a context of meaning prior to the utterance. Even if the general metaphoricity of language and poetry issue from the same ground of participation beyond language – that of a layer of experience prior to language, the possibility of poetry shows that our imaginative capacities to see and apprehend things is beyond the general significances of language or the contexts of meaning that are established in effective traditions. If the general metaphoricity of language can be explained by
the judgments of phronesis, as done by Gadamer, as fusion of new particular and old conception, the moment of poetry can only be explained by judgments of taste which are more like Gestalt switches in our experience. And it is important to see the continuity between these two senses of judgment of a particular. Our everyday communication with others and daily commerce in concrete situations depend upon our ability to bring new particulars under general significances. Each such moment is an act of phronesis, and each involves a certain ordering of phenomena beyond the general principles, as there is always a genuine act of confrontation – of course if we are attentive to the things and events around us – with what is seen, perceived, experienced. Utterance of a new sentence, and its possibility of being understood by others, is dependent upon seeing the new occasion in its newness which, even if within the possibilities of the language, is still a new phenomena that is ordered into a new significance. The difference between the new phenomena and old conception is bridged by an imaginative act. But we also know that in the experience of poetry, there is no such old conception that the poetic utterance transforms. Poetic utterance says what it says beyond any such context of meaning, and it still makes sense to us, as we see its intention in the reverberations of its images, even if we cannot name it beyond the moment of its utterance in poetry. The poetic metaphor liquefies the contexts of meaning in the language and brings forth a new imagistic synthesis, even through bizarre operations on the known phenomena. It is precisely this imagistic quality that emerges in the poetic metaphor that shows us the layer of first-person experience on which we can pass judgments beyond acts of phronesis, beyond contexts of meaning. Such judgments, through which poetry makes sense, relate to lived experience directly beyond the known significances and are products of imagination, spontaneity of mind that enable new seeings, new relations. These judgments are sharable in principle to the degree that we share our experiences in using a common language.
This level of lived experience is what Dewey sees as the ground of aesthetic experience; and far from being a private act of pleasure as it is mostly deemed, aesthetic experience emerges from a common ground of relating to world beyond reified significances and contexts of meaning of effective traditions. This level of lived experience is also the ground of genuine work which is a participatory act of an agent, as the unity of subject and object beyond what is already done, said, and experienced in the making of culture.

1.4 Thought and Made

Dewey’s account of the unity of expression and expressed, done and undergone in the singularity of the work of art, registers the communicative dimension of aesthetic experience beyond established contexts of meaning. Similarly, in the unity of the architectural work, we can make a distinction between the made and the thought as an analytical and ethical distinction in the unity of architectural experience, in the unity of the phenomenal experience of the architectural work which is the communicative instance in a manifold of other experiences and judgments.

Any experience, as it is always part of our whole reality (the unity of consciousness in the broader sense of ‘self’), is a continuity of experiences and judgments. The basic experience of seeing something and understanding it as something extends into the claims its meaning has upon our moral-practical life (this is why Gadamer emphasizes Erfahrung instead of Erlebnis as the experience of the work of art in Truth and Method); hence, any architectural experience is not simply an aesthetic experience when this is understood as an isolated condition of a private act. In the unity of our consciousness, it is informed by our whole set of meanings. However, within this unity, there is still a specifically architectural dimension that cannot be reduced to anything else that may be part of the unity of the experience of the work. It is this specificity and distinctness of a way of making that also gives impetus to Evans’s conception of the relation...
between architecture and its context of symbolism in his Projective Cast (1995). The distinctness of architecture that the made and thought dissection aims to grasp in the unity of thinking and making is a matter of analytical and ethical precision if we are to understand architecture’s contribution to the making of culture without making it a mere act of representation on the model of linguistic symbolism.

Artifactuality – the madeness – is the first mark of intentionality. 32 Finding an object and understanding that it is made rather than natural: how do we know this distinction if the object is not anything like we know of? If we think that this task is not very difficult, to say that something is made, it must also be obvious that there is a meaning relation between ourselves and the made object which is different from a natural object. We see the traces of intentionality in the madeness of the object and try to make sense of it. 33 The object level of being made with certain intentions is the first level of significance in a work’s life of meaning. It is the first level of the experience of meaning, the significance that emerges out of the way something is immediately in the consciousness, even if you know nothing about its origin: you see the mark of a specific intentionality at work in the way the object is made.

The thought does not exist outside the made, the made is the thought, the object of thought. As such the work is the unity of subject and object. The object as it is made with certain intentions is the exteriorization of the subject. The work as a common object between 'I and Thou' is only possible if the object gives way to the subject, to the thought embedded in it in its experience. The made is an imaginative constellation of lines, surfaces, colors, things, events. The common aspect of the works of art is that this new constellation extends out beyond itself, to say something, to bring forth an experience; but hearing this means you first have to see the constellation, to decipher it, to see the new constellation in the way it sets things. Things or
events, as you know them, won’t help to understand the new constellation that emerges in the object. Apprehending the new predicative act in the work is beyond prior contexts of significances, one has to make the imaginative connections, to re-enact the original seeing, to see what the work says in its own unique context of meaning. This is the constructive act on the side of the beholder, *how the work is what it is*. 34 This is also what Gadamer would say in his later writings, "every work of art only begins to speak when we have already learned to decipher and read it" (1986, 48).

Thus, even if art and architecture are embedded in the common life and carry, respond to, make issue of general significances, common meanings in the collective consciousness of public, this is never a simple representation like the relation between a word and its meaning or a descriptive sentence and the case of its utterance, even if new. The distinction between the made and the thought as to its analytic dimension registers the made as a product of a medium of thinking and making which has a tradition of its own beyond what historically informs its making. The made, beyond the contingent historical thought embedded in it, is a function a material medium of forming meaning which has its own logic in the way it stands in the public space as an object of common experience. Evans, along with Immanuel Kant, Dewey, and Adorno, recognizes that “art does not transmit meaning without modifying it. The significance of art does not lie in the meaning it is said to convey, or the meaning it is meant to convey, but in its *alteration of meanings that have been constituted elsewhere*” (1995, 37, original italics). It is this significance that requires an analytical attitude in considering art and architecture as traditions of making.

If the work is a moment of exchange in the continuous dialogue between 'I and Thou' in the making of culture, the way it stands in the common experience is that of a “woven texture
that holds together” beyond common significances, and this internal coherence in the experience is a function of the material medium in and through which the thought realizes itself, as the thought itself does not exist prior to work, thus cannot be the unifying principle of the experience of the work as a general significance for the other that is known prior to the dialogue. If the work cannot stand on its own right (the self-referentiality of the work of art, which I also underlined in the site analogy above as the self-referentiality of the intervention), it is not ‘readable’.

Therefore, the crucial moment in the hermeneutic circle of understanding, in the case of the work of art, is to see this internal coherence, the unity of the madeness that guides the other in the ‘reading’, in the experience. This is a textual unity of a new artifact that cannot be apprehended through pre-understanding of some known texts. ‘Suspension in disinterestedness’, which is a much misunderstood key moment in the judgment of taste in Kant’s philosophy, and also the key for Dewey’s notion of perception beyond recognition in the aesthetic experience, is in fact about a deeper interest to see and hear the other in his/her otherness. 35 It is the need for holding one’s own point prior to work.

If the analytical dimension of the distinction between the made and the thought registers the material medium of the made as having a life of its own beyond what informs its making, the ethical dimension registers the thought itself in the making, which informs the artifact. The ethical point is the necessity of being able to judge the relation between the made and the thought to understand what really is the thought before judging the made directly within moral-practical orientations. It is about the openness to the work, hence to the other, as the made stands in the experience. Openness to the work is to be able to appreciate the thought in it in its otherness. 36

1.5 Poiesis Today

A sequence of words, a sequence of images. All known significances. Metaphor, poetry upon know significances. Even if new meaning emerges, even if there is a new experience, can
this also account for the possibility of talking on a series of lines, something purely
compositional, like doodles. Is there a known significance here or just a sense of space,
temporality, rhythm? There is a modality here perhaps, and the talk is possible upon the
emergence of a dominant mood against which the configuration is judged, like “make this line
thicker” . . . without such a dominant quality, as some systemic quality, talk on abstract
configurations does not seem possible.

Memory of some way of making or doing may be added to this, still not as known
significances, but as a sense of appropriateness, like ‘memory of architecture’, the tectonic,
repetition, order, a sense of ordering different hierarchies, demarcation, space making, structure,
etc.

In one strong sense, we are still in the domain of abstract as what emerges out of certain
configurations is modalities, moods; a series of adjectives. Not necessarily the ‘what’ of a known
significance, like ‘here is a door’, ‘this is a wall’, ‘this is a column’. So what? It is not ‘what’
they are, it is ‘how’ they are, through which we experience spacing, marking: ‘The invention of
our gestures.’ 

The space does something to you before you know its elements. This should be
the irreducible worldliness of architecture.

A typical reference for the unity of thinking and making in architecture is the original
notion of techne as poiesis, techne as aletheia where a significance idealizes itself in the object
through its making. The object made carries the conditions of such significance as its making is
handed down by an effective tradition in the continuity of a life practice. In this original notion
of techne as poiesis, the thinking of the object to be made is also thinking in a domain of
meaning which is defined within a tradition of making of certain type of objects in the unity of
culture as a whole. Hence, making the object is thinking a significance and vice versa, in the broader universe of meaning that unifies a culture.

The core of the idea of double hermeneutic in the making of architecture today lies in the fact that we do not have a ground like the traditional unity of binding significances and their articulate expressions, neither in architectural forms nor in life codes, hence we do not have a direct source on which we can work both the architectural forms, organizations and their significances as they are established in a unified way of life. If making as techne meant thinking the well-established significances in the continuity of an effective tradition in the original meaning of the term, today it cannot carry the same unity of thinking and making as we do not have such a language of architecture and it cannot be invented either.

The unity of thinking and making in an act of double interpretation as a condition of making architecture today recognizes that not only how to make, but what to make is within the operation of architecture (recall how Kahn understood the idea of institution and program), as the interpretation of life cannot be understood as an unproblematic mimesis of a life tradition. This is not to deny the continuity or commonality of certain life contents that find embodiment in architecture, rather it is to say that these conditions are to be rethought, hence reformulated in each act of design. It is also to recognize changing historical conditions with the possibility of new experiences and new expressions. In other words, it is to emphasize the freedom within a tradition of making beyond its concrete manifestations, hence rather than ignoring continuity and commonality, it is to accept them but not to see them as the sole condition of making sense, it is to go beyond continuity and commonality of themes and mimetic impulses to understand a notion of tradition as a medium of thinking and making always open to new experiences and hence always carrying the possibility of new expressions in its intentionality.
I should underline the double aspect of interpretation in architecture and interpretation in life because the unity of thinking and making in modern condition cannot be understood as a simple phronesis in life or in architectural tradition. In a recent lecture at the University of Florida, Alberto Perez-Gomez underlined the unity of thinking and making in architecture in terms of phronesis in the lack of a binding tradition of organic making, as in the sense of original techne. He also showed this way of thinking as a way of going beyond taste, as a way of grounding experience of architecture in common life. The poetic imagination in the unity of thinking and making in architecture cannot be simply explained in terms of an act of phronesis as this itself would not recognize the problem of form making in architecture. Main body of the philosophical discussions of experience, perception, meaning in phenomenology and hermeneutics had issued from an encounter with natural sciences seen as the sole model of knowledge in the modern world and with the extensions of this model of objectivity in the philosophical tradition itself. What is justifiably advanced in this tradition of thinking is that there is an underlying level of experience in our relation to world long before scientific claims on knowledge and objectivity, and it is this level of relatedness to the world is that which enables in the first place the possibility of scientific knowledge through a series of abstractions and logical operations. Thus, most of the philosophical articulation of the notions of experience, perception, and meaning are expressed in relation to our day to day perception and daily commerce in life in the familiarity of our world in terms of knowledge. Seeing something existing and making sense of what it is in terms of a general significance, even if connected, cannot be a full-fledged model of form making in arts where recognition of a general significance is not an aim beyond particular experience. While the former always sees what is done, made, hence realized in the common space of experience, the latter realizes something that does not exist before. Hence the
seeing in the making, in the process of making, cannot be fully understood on the model of seeing something done in terms of a significance, simply because it does not have the multiplicity of possibilities of the not-yet-done that encounters the maker in each act of making. The poetic imagination in the making of architecture cannot dispense with the judgment of taste as a performance of imagination beyond mimicking the reified forms of what is already done, made, said, or experienced.

If phronesis is an imaginative judgment, it is also always within a given context of meaning with its own articulated forms. Judgment of taste, as understood both by Kant and Gadamer, is phronesis without an established context of meaning, where a particular spatio-temporal unity can be judged on its own terms as bearing its own rule in itself. Such particular condition becomes its own context of meaning in its uniqueness beyond established contexts of general significances. If everyday life is a context of phronesis in the making of architecture, the making itself, as it is realized in forms, spaces, etc. in an architectural object that is experienced, involves judgment of taste as we do not have a context of generals for architectural forms as would be the case in a stylistic system, an iconographical system of elements, a vocabulary of forms, a language of types both in the sense of vernacular and classical. Of course, memory is involved in thinking form and space but this is already embedded in the very idea of aesthetic experience. The ground of memory in aesthetic experience is not the retrospection of known significances in certain contexts of meaning but a more liquefied field of experiences, not all of which are explicitly available in the consciousness as articulate significances, that can enable even the most bizarre imagistic operations as in the case of a poet’s unfamiliar use of known images.
Thus, to conceive architectural making on the model of phronesis without establishing the double aspect of its simultaneous thinking of life and thinking in the architectural tradition would be establishing unified contexts of meaning prior to work: *What is proper to do architecturally at a given situation*. But as I underlined above, it is these very contexts that are in the making in the dialogue of culture, they cannot be given from above. Hence a work that goes beyond established contexts of *what is appropriate to do architecturally* will possibly be deemed as ‘formal play’, ‘subjective’, ‘aesthetic pleasure’ as Vesely exemplifies with his comments cited above. This is again putting a bind on the dialogue within a hermeneutic horizon of contexts of meaning where with general significances come their criteria of possible interpretations. The moment of assessment must always be the actual experience of the work, and one has to see its claim on its own. Whether it is going to hold in one’s self as to the unity of her/his overall web of meanings or not is a different kind of judgment and cannot be set as *the* communicative layer of a dialogue.

If we are to understand architecture beyond a model of language as representation – also beyond any non-linguistic sign system as all forms of signification, representation, suppose a structural field of signification on the model of language, which is a network of generals – then, if one side of the double interpretation is a phronesis of a life condition, the other side inevitably involves judgments of taste about certain spatio-temporal unities that will be imagining that very life as a lived architectural phenomenon. Where what to do is not given in an effective tradition of culture, one has to interpret the life situation at hand with a sense of appropriateness first of all to understand it architecturally, and its translation into lived space, given that we are not thinking with forms with established meanings or within typologies, has an aesthetic dimension where a series of judgments on the unifying qualities of architectural object has to be sustained over the process. Even if we think that known forms and typologies are part of our thinking, still we have
to animate them as part of a living phenomenon, which is always more than the phronesis of a general significance as the transformation is more than a particular application of a universal principle. Any thinking on the model of language has to accept something like a dictionary of elements, forms, types, where buildings become cryptic entities (try to see a word and imagine the possibilities of understanding its meaning by just looking at it) which can only refer to other buildings. 46 Our relation to built form is not like words which would be the case if we knew them on the basis of other forms (dictionary). Architectural form does not represent, it performs spatio-temporally by organizing first-person experience. And our first-person experience is not an effective tradition that can be reduced to the model of hermeneutic commerce on the model of language where all seeing is reduced to seeing particulars under known generals.

There is every sense in making the ethical claim that architecture must be about life. But to give that life before the work in some existential conditions, or to reduce life to known significances from some contingent historical life practice, 47 beyond our constructive dialogue in making our reality, terminates the value of making in architecture as a mediating capacity. This view also forgets a larger sense of participation in culture beyond the exigencies of our interests in moral-practical orientations which are sedimented in life in the forms of languages and traditions. 48 To know what life is as it is reified in one’s consciousness may become a blocking rather than an enabling condition of a dialogue, and as such may run the risk of missing the real ethical dimension of aesthetic experience as an openness to the work, hence to the other. 49 What is missed in the phenomenological thinking in architecture is the communicative power of judgment of taste that can unite 'I and Thou' beyond the familiarity of shared meanings and binding contents. To say ‘have an almond in your flower’, to recall Gaston Bachelard, is one thing, but to add ‘and the almond must be such and such, because it is the truth of our
condition\textsuperscript{50} is another. Actually, what I have been calling Gestalt switches in the experience of the work of art, comes to a broader notion of fusion of horizons which indeed releases the linguistic, existential hinge of known significances on our phenomenal consciousness.\textsuperscript{51} Dewey in reply to T.S. Elliot’s “the truest philosophy is the best material for the greatest poet” underlines that:

Just what the ‘truest philosophy’ is, is a matter of some dispute. But critics of this school do not lack definite, not to say dogmatic, convictions on this point . . . they are ready to pronounce \textit{ex cathedra} judgments, because they are committed to some conception of the relation of man to the universe that flourished in some past epoch. They regard its restoration as essential to the redemption of society from its present evil state. Fundamentally, their criticisms are moral recipes. (319)

\section*{1.6 Truth in / of the Work}

Even though the unity of thinking and making requires us to see that deeper truths of human condition find embodiment in the works of art and architecture, it is important not to lose sight of the necessity that the truth \textit{of} the work – rather than the truth \textit{in} the work \textsuperscript{52} – should be apprehended in its immediate particularity in its experience before it is reflected upon in terms of general significances of culture. I believe that this is the core of Giambattista Vico’s insight into the truth embedded in cultural works as he emphasizes the interdependency between philosophy and philology in understanding culture.\textsuperscript{53} Instead of deducing the immediate meaningfulness of architecture from general truths, we have to see the unique significance in the experience of architecture.\textsuperscript{54} And this requires in the first place a judging and understanding the work in terms of what it architecturally does on the world in its concreteness and particularity rather than directly in terms of general truths, reified at some moment in culture in another work, bypassing the architectural experience.

It is true that the work is an utterance, an offer of an experience that reaches out of itself and becomes a claim on our overall web of meanings. However, this is only possible because of
the unique symbolic structure that enables a singular meaning to emerge in the experience in the first place. Even if such transcendence is the key for a work of art to become the cultural object it is, the specificity of art lies in the fact that this transcendence is only possible as a function of the immanence that reveals itself in the particular experience of the work. It is dependent on the immanent apprehension of a particularity in its own textural existence, which is a unique structure of experience. This immanence is the key to the dialogue between 'I and Thou' that establishes itself as an imaginative reflection on a particular, hence the meaning that emerges is immanent to the conditions of this dialogue as part of a life lived together. In the stratification of our overall consciousness, the poet and the philosopher, even if they speak about the same thing, and even if what they say respectively merges in the final analysis, stay at a distance from each other that also qualifies the respective meaning of their work as different in kind as to their relation to the plane of lived phenomena. 55

The dialogue in the case of a work of art is initiated by the failure of seeing-as, rather than the pre-understanding of some reality in a familiar language, hence seeing is enforced by the immanence of a unique texture that holds on its own with its claim to new meaning beyond habitual ways of seeing. When Arendt says that “art is reification of thought by thought”, the value of her view lies in its recognition of the constructive effort that is the thinking of the object to be made, the thinking in the making of the art object, as the appropriate symbolic structure for the thought that can only emerge in such particular form in the concreteness of a particular experience. If each tradition of making in culture is also a specific way of thinking about life, and works in a particular medium, we must recognize the mediative power of agency that works on life through a medium: the individual who participates in the making of world and life, the common world, through the effort of thinking and making within a shared medium of common
experience. As Ernst Cassirer emphasizes, "the particular manner in which the work of art is expressed belongs not only to the technique of construction of the work but also to its very conception; Beethoven's intuition is musical, Phidias's intuition is plastic, Milton's intuition is epic, Goethe's intuition is lyric" (1960, 205).

Instead of thinking the immediate meaningfulness of architecture with some meanings cultivated elsewhere, we perhaps may look at how architecture mediates and realizes them in its own unity. The unity of life significance in architecture is a function of its constructive instance as the work stands on its own in the common space of experience as a phenomenal event. Thus, the idea of new experience through individual expressions advanced in this study is not a never-to-be-satisfied greed for newness, which eventually is part of consumption mentality, but a will to do better. It is the reflection of a normative stance that is not satisfied with how things generally are in order to approximate more to how they should be, to keep the agility and sharpness of thinking, “the aspiring mode” of Steven Holl, beyond the inertia of established ways of seeing things, to be in touch with them once again as how they are in the concreteness of here and now:

Architecture must remain experimental and open to new ideas and aspirations. In the face of tremendous conservative forces that constantly push it towards the already proven, already built, and already thought, architecture must explore the not-yet-felt. Only in an aspiring mode can the visions of our lives be concretized and the joy shared with future generations. 56 (Holl 1996, 16)

Notes

1 Le Corbusier 1964, 18.

2 Le Corbusier quoted in Pauly 1989, 129.

3 Gregotti addressing the New York Architectural League in 1983: “Indeed, through the concept of the site and the principle of settlement, the environment becomes the essence of architectural production. From this vantage point, new principles and methods can be seen for design. Principles and methods that give precedence to the sitting in a
specific area. This is an act of knowledge of the context that comes out of architectural modification. The origin of architecture is not in the primitive hut, or the cave or the mythical ‘Adam’s House in Paradise’.” (quoted in Frampton 1990, 524-525)

4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty identifies a level of perceptual significance by this term (1961, 161). See also section 1.3.

5 Gaston Bachelard 1958.

6 Hans-George Gadamer uses this term for unity of meaning emerging in the work of art: "a woven texture that holds together" as something that 'stands' in its own right (1986:142, 1989:38).

7 “Mimesis in art is the prespiritual; it is contrary to spirit and yet also that on which spirit ignites. In artworks, spirit become their principle of construction, although it fulfills its telos only when it emerges from what is to be constructed, from the mimetic impulses, by shaping itself to them rather than allowing itself to be imposed on them by sovereign rule. Form objectivates the particular impulses only when it follows them where they want to go of their own accord. This alone is the methexis of artworks in reconciliation. The rationality of artworks becomes spirit only when it is immersed in its polar opposite.” (1970:118)

8 “Architectural practice has little choice but to embrace what one may call a double hermeneutic, one that, first, seeks to ground its practice in its own tectonic procedures, and second, turns to address itself to the social and to the inflection of what Hannah Arendt termed ‘the space of public appearance’.” (Frampton 1995, 26-27) See also Chapter 3 below.

9 On another occasion, Gregotti speaks about ‘empirical conditions’, rather than ‘social relations’: “architectural design as a critical dialogue with empirical conditions”, “I am convinced that the structural character of architecture, precisely because it is an artistic practice, lies in the organization of empirical conditions as design materials for a project” (Gregotti 2000, 25). Note also Adorno has the same conception of ‘artistic practice’: "The artwork is not only aesthetic but sub- and supra- aesthetic; in that it originates in empirical layers of life, has the quality of being a thing, a fait social, and ultimately converges with the meta-aesthetic in the idea of truth, it implies a critique of any chemically pure attitude to art.” (Adorno 1970, 269)

10 “All language, whatever its medium, involves what is said and how it is said, or substance and form.” (Dewey 1934, 106)

11 “The self understanding of Greek poetry begins with Hesiod's poem in which the muses appear before the poet and make their promises to him: they are capable of telling both much that is false and much that is true.” (Gadamer 1986, 143)

12 “The artistic dimension of a work of art does not lie in the actual physical thing; it exists only in the consciousness of the person experiencing it.” “Its meaning lies not in its forms, but in the images transmitted by the forms and the emotional force that they carry. Form only affects our feelings through what it represents.” (Pallassmaa 1986, 449)
For example: “… how about the sound space created by drops of water falling occasionally in a dark, damp vault, the urban space created by the sound of church bells, the sense of distance that we feel when the sound of a night train pierces our dreams, or the smell space of a bakery or sweet shop?” (Pallasmaa 1986, 453)

“The richness of a work of art lies in the vitality of the images it arouses, and – paradoxically – the images open to most interpretations are aroused by the simplest, most archetypal forms.” (Pallasmaa 1986, 449)

“The most comprehensive and perhaps most important architectural experience is the sense of being in a unique place” “Part of this intense experience of place is always an impression of something sacred: this place is for higher beings. A house may seem built for a practical purpose, but in fact it is a metaphysical instrument, a mythical tool with which we try to introduce a reflection of eternity into our momentary existence.” (Pallasmaa 1986, 452)

See Vesely 2004, 368-383 where he develops a conception of typicality of life practices.

For Evans architecture unites floating beliefs, themselves multiple and uncertain, in an ambiguous precision (See for example Evans 1995 43-44). He writes: “The architecture of Sant’Eligio is not an architecture that reflects a culture in its fullness but an architecture that supplements culture’s incompleteness with a compensating image” (44). Evans’s readings in Projective Cast are illuminating, even in the existence of well established iconographical systems, the constellations of architecture endow the iconographical elements with new significances, they interpret them in architecture, and it may be possible to say that a knowledge of iconography here will not secure the architectural readings, one has to see the “woven texture that holds together”.

Tacit world as an overarching condition of meaning and perception, not unlike Gadamer’s idea of horizon, but Vesely’s is much more encompassing than Gadamer’s linguistic horizon of meaning: “well structured, with a clear sense of meaning, unity, and wholeness” lacks explicit articulation though, tacit, “constituted spontaneously in a direct response to the natural conditions mediated by cultural tradition, the latent world is the primary source and measure of objectivity” (Vesely 2004, 378).

“The attempt to identify meaning within a particular mode of representation – architecture, sculpture, or language – and then try to understand how each may be related to the others remains problematic. Such an approach does not give us access to the world where all representations have their origin and find their fulfillment, where there is room for similarity and identity, but not the autonomy of the individual arts. The meaning of any work of art that we are trying to understand ontologically and as a part of its setting is always situational. In other words, it is not the representation but what is represented that matters – and what is represented is always a world that the work of art reveals and articulates, at the same time contributing to its embodiment.” (Vesely 2004, 96-97)

Ricoeur writes on the relation between fiction and reality: “Because it is a world, the world of the text necessarily collides with the real world in order to ‘re-make’ it, either by confirming it or denying it. However, even the most ironic relation between art and reality would be incomprehensible if art did not both disturb and rearrange our relation to reality” (1983, 361).
Vesely writes on Coop Himmelblau while he is criticizing a notion of aesthetic experience: “The concentration on private experience, imagination, and fantasy appears to contradict the very nature of architecture which is always open to a shared public culture.” “The main precondition for taking such an approach is a full emancipation from historical precedents and the continuity of tradition”. He sees their work as an introverted dialogue ignoring “inherited culture” and he identifies this attitude he sees in a general increasing of autonomy of art and architecture and their separation from everyday reality (37). He also mentions his work as “self-referential” and “autonomous” on another occasion where he speaks about emancipation of art and architecture from what he calls “natural world” (356).

Vesely writes on Kurt Schwitters and Merz in similar tones and finds his work akin to what he calls “Deconstruction”. He takes Merz as pure style without any mimetic content that relates to world (361-362). However it is evident that Merz is not what Vesely takes it to be as a pure stylistic notational device, actually it is about memory and a commentary on many ideals of Scwhitter’s time and society, that is, it is embedded in its context in ways different from what Vesely would accept. See also Dickerman 2005 on Merz and memory, and Foster 1996 and Gibson 1996 for the mimetic component in avant-garde works which are mostly understood as nonsense play.

“Communication itself has no identifiable origin. It takes place in a world that is already to some extent articulated, acting as a background for any possible communication or interpretation. Most important, communication is always a dialogue between new possibilities of representation and the given tacit world, described in modern hermeneutics as an effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte) [ref. to Truth and Method]. The tacit world is never fully accessible to us. Always to some extent opaque, it can be grasped or represented only through its symbolic manifestations. At the same time, and partly because of its tacit nature, it is a source of identity and relative stability of meaning over time. Meaning is preserved in the continuity of reference to primary symbols, or hierophanies, which are as a result always symbolically present in the tacit world” (Vesely 2004, 215). Compare this with Arendt’s understanding of human language, as cited in section 4 below, which for her is a condition of communication of self-conscious agents with a specific view on reality rather than a common species language devised for species survival.

Arendt sees ‘I and Thou’ relation on the basis of a common object, rather than a ‘common nature’, and underlines the plurality of interpretations of subjects, hence for her the common object of dialogue cannot be given as fixed in any one perspective. In one sense this comes close to Gadamer’s critique of early hermeneutics of Dilthey, in that communication happens as a dialogue on common reality shared which seem to base Vesely’s argument, but Arendt’s difference lies in the emphasis on plurality and possibility of individual reflection beyond what is commonly deemed as correct, appropriate, or true. The minimal equality for communication is not part of Gadamer’s project in Truth and Method which is emphasized by Arendt as a necessary condition of communication between subject who are distinct in their views of reality.
24 See Vesely 2004, 76-77 for Lebenswelt as a totality of possible references, also 82-83 and 61-62 for an extension of this argument to space. 338 for latent world as the link between language and world and the situatedness of language, and 70-71 for his idea of total language.

25 “Art draws upon the fabric of brute meaning” and “only art does so in full innocence to hold the world suspended” (Merleau-Ponty 1961, 161). "The language of painting is never 'instituted by nature'; it is to be made and remade over and over again. The perspective of the Renaissance is no infallible "gimmick". It is only a particular case, a date, a moment in a poetic information of the world which continues after it" (175).

26 Jaakko Hintikka discussing Heidegger’s conception of language writes: “there are thinkers for whom language is a universal medium of communication and understanding. By universality, I mean – or, rather, the philosophers of this persuasion mean – not anthropological or ethnic or linguistic generality, but inescapability. On this view, language is as it were the omnipresent medium between us and the world. Each of us is as it were a prisoner of one’s language. Language is an iron curtain between me and the world. I cannot peak behind it and express in language its relations to the world. Language is a bad servant, but a good master” (2000, 487).

27 Bernstein (1992, 1-16) explains the 'alienation' of modern art: "although the history of art up to modern age appears to licence the claim of art's cognitive potential (for example, religious art re-presenting the truth of Christian metaphysics), the modern experience of art does not; on the contrary, modern experience of art, it is argued, is precisely the experience of art as cut off and separated from truth, as silenced, as disrempted from all that would give it significance" (1992, 4)

28 See section 3.3 below.

29 See Rorty 1979, 5-7.

30 See Dewey 1934, 50-61.

31 See also Frank Sibley 1959, Denis Dutton 2000, and Stephen Davies 2000 for similar discussion of aesthetic experience as a way of relating to world even before any conception of art as an embedded practice in a life-form.

32 Erwin Panofsky writes: "when confronted with a natural object, it is an exclusively personal matter whether or not we choose to experience it aesthetically; a man made object, however, either demands or does not demand to be so experienced, for it has what the scholastics call an 'intention'" (1955, 11). I do not think there is any aesthetic intention per se but Panofsky has a point on the intentionality at work in the object made, a moment of significance as the result of a mediative act of making. Making something always involves a particular task at hand in a particular medium. Panofsky’s qualification may only come into play if we, like Dewey, are to think that just a making in itself without any particular set intention is the case, where the intention is immanently in the making without an end in view other that the particular experience of a spatio-temporal unity. Hence what Dewey calls aesthetic experience is already a hermeneutic experience, albeit not upon general significances known prior to the experience of the work. I think also when Roland Barthes (1970) discusses his idea of ‘third meaning’ that he sees in Eisenstein stills beyond
language and any possible system of signs, he is also underlining a moment of significance that comes from the mediative act of making.

32 Giambattista Vico’s insight that we can understand what we make. Hence even if the made belongs to a different horizon from ours, there is still something shared in the madeness of the object.

33 See also Susan Sontag 1964, 216-222 for the priority of experience of the work as to its posture of how it is before what it means.

34 Gadamer expresses a similar idea when he makes the distinction between ‘creation’ and ‘work’: “the work of art transforms our fleeting experience into the stable and lasting form of an independent and internally coherent creation… the manifestation in question in a strange way transcends the process in which it is originated”, as a self-sufficient creation, it “demands to be apprehended in itself as pure manifestation” (1986, 53, 126).

35 “Although [Joseph] Beuy’s ideology is more than problematic to me, what matters is whether it hijack the works, or whether the works stand on their own, formally: whether, in order to appreciate his work, I ought to believe the myth he constructed around himself, or whether its aesthetic qualities resist even the cruelest political and psychoanalytic deconstructions of the myth; whether I am supposed to buy into the symbolic meanings he gave to fat and felt, or whether I can look at the works the way an atheist looks at the Memling Madonna.” (Duve 1996, 450-451)

36 “Since great poets have had different philosophies, acceptance of their [moralists] point of view entails that if we approve the philosophy Dante we must condemn the poetry of Milton…” (Dewey 1934, 319)

Dewey in reply to the comment that “the value of experience is not in the experience but in the ideals which it reveals” underlines that “the value of experience is not only in the ideals it reveals, but in its power to disclose many ideals, a power more germinal and significant than any revealed ideal, since it includes them in its stride, shatters and remakes them. One may even reverse the statement and say that the value of ideals lies in the experiences to which they lead.” (321-322) He also emphasizes “the moral function of art itself is to remove prejudice, do away with the scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils due to wont and custom, perfect the power to perceive” (325).

Bachelard when he speaks about “the wealth of imagined being” writes: “with regard to images, to attract and to repulse do not give contrary experiences… but images do not adapt themselves well to quite ideas –above all to definitive ideas” (xxxvi).

37 See section 3.1. below for Jacques Derrida’s comments on the possibility of architecture as thought itself beyond representation.

38 “There was a time when the knowledge needed to produce architecture could be encapsulated in the lessons derived from the experience of the trade. The general, cultural, and social framework of this practice was never called into question; it was solidly established… Architecture [then] resembled the beautiful work of the potter…”
constituting the proof of a perfect fit between the conditions of the material and wisdom that is implicit” (Sola-Morales 1995, 141).

39 Note that this is precisely what Christian Norberg-Schulz wanted from modern architecture: formation of types and coherent stylistic system on the basis of recognizable form (See 1965, 156, 206-207). Also note that this recognizable form is a common underlying idea in Vesely’s ‘typical situations’; Norberg-Schulz writes "meaning in architecture is accomplished when the work of architecture reveals the spatiality of the life-world" (1986:197). When Norberg-Schulz moved from his scienticism of Intentions in Architecture to a Heideggerian view, the linguistic account of architectural form turned from conventional symbols to deeply rooted symbols, keeping its core premises of communication on the basis of recognizable form. See also his 1974, 432-434; 1983, 437-438; 1986, 26, 42.

The same idea of typology on the model of representational function of architectural form is also shared by Karsten Harries, see his 1997, 99, 119.

40 When Gregotti speaks about “simplicity as a logic of communication”, he underlines that architectural making today is also “a radical rethinking of the reasons behind the organism and its public and contextual role” (1996, 85-86).


42 He understands the notion of aesthetic experience as a consequence of collapse of traditional unity of life after Enlightenment and sees it as private ‘aesthetic delight’ like Vesely and Harries (See 1997, 16-25) as an isolated condition from daily life.

43 I think this is a common problem, to take form as an alien entity to what is formed as a human significance, that shows itself almost in all the writers in the phenomenological tradition in architecture.

44 “Kant rightly characterizes such taste as sensus communis or common sense. Taste is communicative; it represents something that we all possess to a greater or lesser degree. It is clearly meaningless to talk about a purely individual and subjective taste in the field of aesthetics. To this extent it is to Kant that we owe our initial understanding of the validity of aesthetic claims, even though nothing is subsumed under the concept of a purpose.” (Gadamer 1986, 19)

45 See Dewey’s account of aesthetic experience and its relation to memory in section 3.4. below.

46 This is the account given by Harries when he writes: “Works of architecture represent buildings. Representing buildings, they denote a building type” (1997, 99). See also Marco Frascari’s similar linguistic view in section 2.4. below.

47 I think this is what Vesely is doing when he shows the idea of fragment as the possibility of meaning today.

48 Dewey speaks about an all-encompassing unity in the aesthetic experience without making it a function of a linguistically articulated reality of general significances: “the work of art operates to deepen and to raise to great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole that accompanies every normal experience”. “We are, as it were,
introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences". “When egotism is not made the measure of reality and value, we are citizens of this vast world beyond ourselves, and any intense realization of its presence with and in us brings a peculiarly satisfying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves” (195).

For example Harries gives an account of kitsch in moral terms. He relates art to “a standard of truth and morality” (1968, 74)

Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in confronting the Hegelian prophecy about the end of art, asks whether modern art represents such truths or not; “truth that is decisive for our historical existence” (700).

In The Relevance of the Beautiful, Gadamer points out to the same communicative capacity of artworks and suggests that "art unites us in its communicative dimension" (1986, 39). He also highlights the Kantian emphasis on the element of form in that artworks should be constructed actively under the regulation of their formal articulation (1986, 27). Thus he reformulates a main concept of his Truth and Method: "what I described as aesthetic non-differentiation clearly constitutes the real meaning of that cooperative play between imagination and understanding which Kant discovered in 'judgment of taste'." (1986, 29) See also how Gadamer acknowledges the moment of Gestalt switch: "Certainly it is true that there is something like a sudden instant of understanding here in which the unity of the whole formulation is illuminated; we find this phenomenon both in relation to the poetic text as well as the artistic image." (Gadamer:1989:48) "Something can only be called art when it requires that we construe the work by learning to understand the language of form and content so that communication really occurs." (Gadamer:1986:52)

I think Richard Etlin (1999) in his humanism falls into this equation referring to Hegel’s view of art which for Hegel “only fulfills its supreme task… when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of the mankind and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit” (9). Etlin’s ‘aesthetic value scale’ from low (fleeting play, decoration) to high (deep spiritual insight) I think is missing the very idea of aesthetic experience itself as Adorno saw the problem in Hegel’s thinking (Adorno 1970, 356). Gadamer also sees the same problem of top-down truths in reference to Hegel’s idea of beauty as "the sensuous showing of the idea", he undelines that "the idea, which normally can only be glimpsed from afar, presents itself in the sensuous appearance of the beautiful; nevertheless, this seems to me to be an idealistic temptation that fails to do justice to the fact that the work speaks to us as a work and not as the bearer of a message" (1986, 33).

“Philosophy contemplates reason, from which we derive our abstract knowledge of what is true. Philology observes the creative authorship and authority of human volition, from which we derive our common knowledge of what is certain.” (Vico 1744, S138, 79) See also: “The philosophers should have used the philologists’ authority to certify their reasoning, and the philologists should have used the philosophers’ reasoning to verify their authorities” (S140, 79)

Vico: “It is an error to apply to the prudent conduct of life the abstract criterion of reasoning that obtains in the domain of science” and “in the conduct of life, fools, for instance, pay no attention either to the highest or the lowest
truths; …learned man lacking prudence derive the lowest truths from the highest, whereas the sage truly derives the highest truths from the lowest.” (quoted in Etlin 1999, 93-94)

Grassi writes in reference to Vico: “The historical aspects of the realization of the mind are never eternally valid, never absolutely ‘true’, because they always emerge within limited situations bound in space and time”. He says they are probable, verisimile in Vico’s terminology (Study Methods). Note that this is also the point of philology for the truth of the work which is “true only within the confines of ‘here’ and ‘now’.” (1980, 10)

See also Holl 2007, 10-18
CHAPTER 2
LIFE IN LANGUAGE

It is important to see that Frampton’s and Gregotti’s conception of architectural making today on the basis of a double interpretation is a normative stance: architecture “can’t [shouldn’t] simply mirror its own problems, exploiting its own tradition.” Indeed it can. For example, returning to the site analogy, one can simply ignore the site, be deaf and blind to its possibilities. In such a case, the relation to the site will still be there, but only as an accident, not as part of the intentionality of architectural act. Similarly, one can ignore the experiences, life situations offered by the architectural object and concentrate on the internal figuration of some system of relations that obtain between architectural elements. This time again the architectural object, as a lived, experienced object will inevitably offer certain life situations, experiences, but not as part of its intentionality, only as accidents. When put this way, it is easily seen that this scheme may become an oversimplification, because, this kind of a contingency can be part of the intentionality of the architectural act. However, there is still a difference between acting on such contingency, as perhaps Bernard Tschumi does with his idea of event, and ignoring it completely, as Peter Eisenman claims in his writings promoting his work as “theoretical objects”. The important thing to see is that the conditions of informing the architectural object in its making, cannot be separated from thinking the conditions of its informing back in public realm as a common object, if architecture is to interpret reality revealing a knowledge of life in its architectural modification.

A notion of ‘thinking the object-to-be-made’ is not by itself sufficient to understand the unity of thinking and making without further specification of the nature of the object and its conditions of existence in the public realm as a common object. One can think the making of an architectural object within some given vocabulary of formal / spatial types when architectural
tradition is understood as a body of elements, themes, forms, or techniques with certain significances not unlike a language, or one can think a broader domain of life experiences in forms and space beyond any learned tools of making architecture from the tradition. The former is what Gregotti sees as “exploiting the tradition.” Similarly, Daniel Libeskind (2004) remarks on “buildings that are about their own making.” This kind of object thinking can only be possible if we think that architecture is some kind of language with its own possibilities, originally distanced from us as agents in the opaqueness of history, and that its forms and techniques as they are handed down to us by the tradition has some kind of self-efficacy that we can contemplate as we learn in the tradition but cannot alter or modify by going to the original sources, or without running into the risk of subjectivity and non-sense. The latter sense of thinking life in forms and space beyond any learned tools of tradition is about the phenomenal consciousness of being-in-space, which an understanding of architecture as object figuration with an internal logic cannot fully comprehend. The way architecture is a common object in the public realm is not the way a sentence is a common object in the public realm, but this basic premise of the modern project, that we have a direct relation to lived space unlike our ability to speak and understand language as a second order codification of reality as idealized in the opaqueness of history, is missed by a main body of thinking on architecture after the 1960’s. Both phenomenology and structuralism ³ takes the former sense of thinking the sufficient condition of thinking in architecture. Phenomenology sees a kind of continuity of references in life in the traditional ways of making architecture, structuralism makes this an accident of history stripping the sense of relevance altogether from making architecture.

2.1 Eternal Logic

Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky’s seminal essays on ‘literal’ and ‘phenomenal’ (1963, 1971) can be seen as an attempt to articulate an immanent content in the object, in the thinking of
the object (that is made, formed). The immanent content that Rowe and Slutzky aimed at showing pertains to Gestalt principles that are thought to be deeply embedded in the human sensory apparatus and perception: the principles that are thought to structure our perception and endow immediate meaning to our surroundings by organizing sensory data, thus a kind of formal language that translates into phenomenal experience. We may think that what Rowe and Slutzky were attempting was a formal explanation that differentiates rigorously between different experiences as they are regulated by different organizational/formal unities. Such reading will not be assigning a pure formalism in the structuralist sense, in the sense of taking the logic of formation of an object as a necessary internal determination before the conditions of its experience.

However, in their readings, the line between a formal/visual sensitivity, a rigor in seeing in terms of different experiences emerging out of different formations and a formalist/structuralist conceptualism where object formation is taken as an end beyond the principle of experience, seems to be blurred. Dewey makes a similar distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘phenomenal’, but he also adds ‘spatial’ as part of the physical if the properties of objects as to their internal logic of formation are taken in isolation “from their entrance into (the) interaction which causes an experience” (1934, 163). Even if Rowe and Slutzky set out to distinguish between ‘literal’ and ‘phenomenal’, they seem to lose control over what this phenomenal might be as they conflate the intentionality basis of the object under scrutiny. There is a shift in their readings from a formal sensitivity to a formalist conceptualism where the object is stripped of its conditions of experience and judged purely in terms of its inner determinations as an isolated construction beyond its intersubjective intentionality in a context of experience.
When they discuss picture planes in terms of phenomenal and literal transparency, they have a point on the level of actual experience between some of the cubist paintings, but I am not sure this also translates into a commonality between purist examples and the cubist ones in terms of the way they construct the space of experience on the picture plane. Purist paintings keep the unity of object and space: they do not have the cerebral tone of cubism where the object is dispersed by an independent principle, as if it never has achieved such unity, almost like a commentary on the illusion of experience ("there never was a perception"). The cubist experiment starts with a cerebral impetus that comes from the tradition of painting and representation and diffuses the visual field according to this premise, whereas purist examples start from and keep the unity of vision, objects and space. The former comments on vision from the standpoint of the narrativity of picture plane in terms of classical representationalism, the latter looks at another way of abstracting lived space on the picture plane without the polemical overtones of cubism in the tradition of painting.

Purist paintings are volumetric, they do not celebrate the flatness of the picture plane, they take it as a mere given, a tool to work with, and construct their volume, following a principle of continuity of object contours, and their implied relations. There is constant play of framing and reframing, measuring and being measured. The vectors of these paintings are that of the object profiles. It is these profiles that activate the picture plane and they also construct an implied volume that is beyond a notion of space between figure and ground. This play of vectors as object profiles is not the field of cubist paintings. Cubist examples celebrate the flatness of the picture plane; the space is only suggested as a possibility out of a series of discontinuous shifted vectors. Even if such vectorial organization constructs possible fields of figure and background, they do not have the intention to achieve the volumetry of the purist counterparts. The
discontinuity of vectors, counterbalanced by the memory of the objects, then create the Gestalt formations. But the vectors themselves are independent of the objects, only dissolving the object into an independent field of possible visions.

The same problem of isolating a principle of organization from the level of actual experience is also evident in their reading of plans in terms of the transparency principle they propose on the basis of Gestalt formations. Of course inherent in the idea of painting as an activated surface is a presentation of space as a potentiality which points toward different possibilities of concretization but may not specify or define them; so far it is understandable to compare plans and paintings. But beyond some organizational logic of elements as pertaining the possibility of constructing space, plans and paintings diverge as for their context of experience. And the paintings that Rowe and Slutzky analyze construct space vertically, as vectors merging in a layered verticality; the space they imply is sectional / elevational rather than planar. If we take these plans as simple line drawings without direction or scale, as abstract organizations of vectors (and fields) that may relate to actual lived space in multiple ways (scales, orientations, etc.), then their relation to the paintings as argued by the authors can be justifiable as notational entities. But this is ignoring them as plans and reducing them to pure formal organizational systems isolated from their possibility to organize perception and from the way they relate to world in terms of spatial-formal differentiations. The space that plans generate in the vertical is experienced differently from any notational possibility they may have in other dimensions and orientations. 4 Le Corbusier himself warns us against the illusion of taking plans as symbolic planes in themselves ignoring the intentionality of architectural space in its context of experience.5
The problem in their readings is not that they use a method of formal interpretation in an inappropriate way, but that, if it is also applying to the plans as notational entities, then there is a disjunction with the principle of experience. That is, it is not about experience per se, hence can be applied at various levels of spatial – formal organizations which are not directly the content of lived experience.

Purist paintings relate to Le Corbusier’s architecture in a way different from how Rowe and Slutzky take the principle of phenomenal transparency as a way of constructing space. The way the purist paintings explore the construction of space in experience is the way Le Corbusier programs the architectural promenade with specific spatial events, with insertion of ‘objects’ into an a priori system of structure that acts as a neutral frame of reference, a background for the parallactic events of movement and vision which are regulated by precise arrangement of plastic elements that reflect, deflect, echo, etc. vectors of movement and vision. One cannot ignore the formal similarities between Le Corbusier’s own paintings and his plans, but I do not think it is about the sense of construction of depth as Rowe and Slutzky outlined. The formal similarities seem to be more about the use of contour as a notational tool, but the paintings and plans differ to a great extent in their programming the contour. In paintings, the contour is a device for measuring the referential space between vertical elements, relations of which give the sense of depth and a constructed volume. In plans, these very contours become devices for controlling movement and vision horizontally, thus a device for achieving a correct placement of elements that then become a set of vertical relations in the architectural promenade of lived space. The sense of depth in Le Corbusier’s architectural work comes from a dialectic of bodily and visual promenade, a sequence of hiding and revealing, framing and measuring which all happen in the three dimensional, ‘literal’ space as we live through it. Objects, openings, what you see what you
do not see, what is implied what is actually there, etc., the plans control these, unify the elements horizontally almost like critical moves on a chessboard. It is a common knowledge that Le Corbusier explores this promenade through his perspectives, making many drawings for each project, as if he is doing a story board of a certain cinematic experience. His purist paintings examine the same idea of vertically experienced space by collapsing the moment of perspective onto contour relations between elements.

Thus, this event of movement and vision in the space we live, the parallax, as it temporally constructs objects and space in the phenomenal consciousness of being-in-space – which indeed is the literal space, must be more than entertaining a pattern on the wall in terms of a ‘duck-rabbit’ type of aspect seeing of a Gestalt diagram. The multiplicity of a duck-rabbit reading comes from the fact that the readings are exclusive temporally, hence they do not yield one object but multiple objects, aspects. The multiplicity of readings of an object in a sequence of parallax is about a synthesis of an object from multitude of points of vision and its relation to other objects, hence the overall spatial matrix (space and things in space as its makers). The richness of the lived space in Le Corbusier’s architecture comes from his careful planning of such events, where indeed certain objects are elevated to the level of a ‘plastic event’ which you live and live through, rather than a sculpture or an ornament you see from a distance.

If the cubist experiment, among many things, was a commentary on vision as synthesis, its propelling force emerges from the encounter with the tradition of classical painting as representation. The picture plane as a semantic unit in itself keeps its autonomy in the way it is activated by vectors that deviate from the logic of objects as we synthesize them in our vision, deferring them to a mnemonic moment, whereas the purist examples morph the picture plane in accordance with a logic of objects in vision as they construct a volume of relations in
themselves. The objects in the former are only hypothesized while the latter concretizes the objects as sheer forces in vision. The constructional principle that derives from the way we order space and time in the purist examples is not part of the cubist agenda and I think this is why Ozenfant and Le Corbusier were critical of cubism as ‘carpet design’.  

Both the purist and cubist experiments may be about layering, stratification, multiple planes of fore and background when these are taken as tools of construction: all what is counted in Rowe and Slutzky’s idea of phenomenal transparency as ‘constructed’ space. But they do things beyond the principles of construction as such, and they stand quite differently in our experience. Even if some structural principle may be there as a tool of construction, it is not part of our experience as it is. It regulates different phenomenal consciousness of space in the way it is used, as to the overall intention that unifies the work. Hence such principles of construction, and all Gestalt principles for that matter, can only be tools rather than aims in themselves. The visual significance of what we see happens at a different qualitative level than its possible mechanical sources in our perceptual apparatus. Gestalt principles, if there are any immutable laws as such, can be about how we reveal intentions, how we systemize intentions, but they cannot be the intentions. Making architecture cannot be explained as making good gestalts: they can be there, as any appropriate way of doing something, but a pure formal structure cannot start to speak without certain qualitative contents it gives shape and structure in the experience. Even if there are rules of perception, these cannot go beyond a sense of tools to use, like perhaps a basic grammar of revealing spatial intentions, which indeed has been a main concern of modern project and is what we still aim to start with in early architectural education. But tools are not ends, even if there is a particular way of perceiving the world, it is what we begin with as some neutral ground, and indeed valueless to a degree before it operates, or rather, we operate with it
on something to make a significance, hence, it is not yet within the idea of ‘mediation’. Even if there are rules to perception, this does not mean that there are also ‘good Gestalts’, ever valid truths. When there is no interpretative context, a mediative context, there cannot be ‘content’, not even a formal content as Rowe and Slutzky would have it, hence no possibility of judgment, whether good or bad, appropriate or not. If there is no intentional mediative context, nothing can be intended.

Here is a rectangle with golden proportion. So what? What is it that you do with it? A rectangle with certain proportions is not any different from another rectangle with other proportions without a context of significance it orders, it cannot be its own context as it is.

Intellectualization of form: Rowe and Slutzky’s reading of the spatial sequence of Le Corbusier’s League of Nations carry the same overtones of intellectualization of the moment of construction and re-enactment in experience. Looking at the paintings, the visibility of relations between elements directly pertains to a depth that is represented in its absence. In the architectural promenade, depth is not read as a relation between elements, as in a representation in its absence; rather the elements relate to each other in the literal continuum of three dimensional space to construct a volumetric matrix that creates certain tensions of implied and concrete enclosures throughout the promenade, which are not read, but felt dynamically. (This is what James Stirling sees in Ronchamp, the effect of space, rather than a reading of its construction, and when he says there is not much left for the intellect to entertain, he looks for something to read \textsuperscript{8}).

Le Corbusier’s spatial events are not a discourse that is revealed by a reading intellect. They take place in the literal space of things that I am in / through, and they act dynamically shaping the visual and mobile gestures of my body, not through an intellectual pleasure of seeing
reading thinking, but simply in the immediacy of a lived phenomenon of sense of enclosure, scale, directionality, etc., all that particular make up of phenomenal consciousness of being in such and such a space. This does not happen as reading, it is more immediate than an intellectual pleasure of reading an order from a distance mediated by some calculus of element relations.

Constructive moment and re-enactment in experience: the representational moment of the promenade, if we take the construction principle that Rowe and Slutzky advance as a premise, is its dynamic effect on movement and vision as revealed intentions through forms, and not a representation of space, but an intervention in the gestures of body. And this happens at another level than reading an order, you do not read the relations between eyebrows, nose, mouth, eyes to see a gesture, it happens to you in the immediacy of an effect. As such, it is not a mediated intellectual grasp. Our relation to architectural space is not a second order cerebral response through representations of constructed elements, but a first-person relation to a spatio-temporal unity that regulates certain experiences with distinct phenomenal qualities. “Intellectual ordering of form during design” must be about thinking the object in a context of experience, hence we cannot say that it is the same idea of re-enactment of the observer, his/her experience.

Intellectual ordering of form must be about thinking the very qualitative terms of such re-enactment in the experience. One designs the spacing between eyebrows, nose, mouth, eyes, to induce a gesture, and this is intellectual effort, but it is so to the degree that the face of the gesture, in its experience, happens in the unmediated space of phenomenal consciousness, the gesture is there before you read the relations intellectually and interpret them as constructed elements. The process of making and observing in experience cannot be reversed on the same terms of what is constructed and what is re-enacted in the experience. Intellectual ordering of form is constructing the very immediacy that the event happens in the experience.
Thus, it is hard to locate an idea of Erlebnis in Rowe and Slutzky’s account other than something’s being constructed. The way their argument is elaborated cannot differentiate the priority of one Gestalt over another, the conceptual clarity they are after gets blurred. The question to where such a conceptual clarity belongs is not easy to answer. Such pure structural formalism is a long distance from an idea of form lived as spatio-temporal event in life. Pure object formalism in terms of isolating constructional properties has not much to do with lived experience as Dewey warns. And it is also hard to take it as a generative principle beyond the experience principle, as the very terms of the analysis contradicts the context of experience.

It is not a matter of the acclaimed idea of dropping a notion of meaning in common space of public realm as irrelevant to the formation of experience through the making of object: it seems they might be dropping the experience itself. Of course, dropping a notion of symbolic meaning as understood through the reified forms of representation in architectural tradition is a gain on the side of form exploration in terms of not conditioning the act of making with prior judgments of what is doable and what is not. In addition, it secures the sense of self-referentiality of the formed object as experience on its own terms, which indeed is a necessary condition of art object to stand on its own without becoming a message of some sort. But ultimately there is an essential link between form and experience beyond object formation as an internal logical space which Rowe and Slutzky seem to forget in the name of overt meaning as message.

Rowe’s formalism can be perfectly legitimate when it is a way of defending form making as a field of exploration in itself. Dewey also speaks about experience of form as an end in itself: “The man who pocked the sticks of burning wood would say he did it to make the fire burn better; but he is nonetheless fascinated by the colorful drama of change enacted before his eyes and imaginatively partakes in it” (1934, 5). There are things we do just for the sake of doing
them, but they happen in certain contexts of experience and they are valuable as such because of these contexts in which they become qualitative experiences in the first place. Dewey talks about the experience of the object and not its structural formation as an independent entity from any context of experience, unlike reading some deep structures of perception, which itself is beyond the experience principle, into experience. Object form by itself, the way it is structured on an a priori level of formation isolated from the conditions of experience cannot account for such contexts of experience. In art making, the object’s end in itself is a certain quality of experience, which is its phenomenal significance as experienced and Dewey also points at ‘conscious meanings’ in experience. I think the experience of art object at some point must go beyond the pleasures of ‘multiple readings’ of Gestalt formations.

Taking form making as a theoretical endeavor has its problems. There is good architecture, purely judged in terms of formation of an object in itself as a systemic unity, but this sense itself is a residue that belongs to a background memory of what architecture can do on the world, hence then there is always ‘better’ architecture when it really does something on the world, going beyond its own contemplative mode of being an ordered object to a performative mode of generating Erlebnis at the level of lived space. Theorizing form as an entity in itself isolates the constructive instance from the mimetic impulse, or collapses the mimetic onto a structural field of formal possibilities which become explanatory in themselves. Rigor in seeing is different from any conceptual determinism on form making, be it some ultimate geometry of mind’s structuring capacity, Gestalt principles, or ‘divine orders’. This way of seeing form as its own possibility derived from some higher principle beyond agency of making cannot see the experiential intent which is always a historical mimetic impulse, and ends up with abstract oppositions between organizational systems like Wolfflinean categories of form.
2.2 Space of Language / Language of Space

Erwin Panofsky’s reading of Gothic cathedrals (1951) in terms of scholastic mind set is a good example of revealing structural / constructional attitudes in the making of artifacts. What he finds in the Gothic examples is “a visual logic exposing the ‘reasoning’ just like the formal division of [Scholastic] treatises” (53). He looks at the system of construction and the relations between different elements in the cathedrals and reads them as a reflection of a “common mental habit” (20). He also acknowledges that such a mental attitude is not a reflective component in the mind set of the builders but it is operative at a deeper level of being exposed to a certain way of thinking and living. The underlying historical attitude in Panofsky’s reading is that there are certain relations between different modes of cultural production that are operative at a structural level in terms of a common attitude towards world and life, a way of thinking that shapes works from different fields beyond the intentionality of their authors / makers as when this intentionality is to be understood in terms of the imminent content of the work as part of the dialogue between 'I and Thou' in the common space of culture. As Henri Lefebvre justifiable criticizes (1974, 257-262), Panofsky bypasses the lived experience of Gothic cathedrals, and what it might have meant to their builders and users, and abstracts from what Lefebvre calls ‘social space’ a set of formal principles that can be internally decoded in terms of a mental habit of making. This isolation of architectural work as an object in itself as a pure construction is an extension of Heinrich Wolfflin’s structuralist formalism that seeks to find an internal and objective logic to art forms as a closed system of intentionality and not very different from what Rowe and Slutzky undertook in their transparency essays. Rowe and Slutzky aim to connect such a self-efficacy of form to eternal principles of Gestalt, Wolfflin writes a history of form in terms of its own developments on the basis of basic structural principles, Panofsky, not satisfied with a self-history like Wolfflin’s, historicizes the form through Alois Riegl’s notion of Kunstwollen as
epochal artistic will. In all there is the notion of perceptual form as an independent universe of discourse. What Panofsky exemplifies is once the formal can be isolated in itself, it can then be tied to other manifestations of culture, at a ‘clinical’ level of reflection. 14 He paradoxically merges the Wolfflinian tradition of form with the historicity of changing mimetic impulses, still keeping the domain of form intact from these mimetic impulses by translating them into a mental space of language of form as an inner structural determination.

This structuralist view of form is what gives impetus to Manfredo Tafuri’s understanding of architecture on the model of language. Apart from his Marxism, his view of architecture as a language exemplifies a common sentiment to impute discursiveness to architecture at the level of formal vocabulary. According to Tafuri, architecture lost its organic role in the making of society after the dissolution of the traditional unity of life around the 18th century. 15 As he sees it, what remains as architecture after such a collapse between life and architecture as an organic whole is a language that has lost its ground of meaning. No more able to perform its traditional symbolic role in the unity of life, as there is no such unity anymore, 16 all efforts to make architecture must be renounced for the sake of a pure linguistic play which will at least be able to reflect the paradox of modern life in its muteness (with the help of the critic of course 17). This is of course a very oversimplified summary of his views, but his conclusion is that we must renounce architecture. However, it is never clear in his writings whether this claim is a conclusion after a long historical analysis or was an a priori a premise. This point is more important than the claim itself, because, as one of the key figures in architectural theory of late 20th century, he set the justificatory stage for architecture as text and nothing but text. 18 The structuralist view of architecture that he inherited from Panofsky (among other sources like Roland Barthes 19) isolates the form as language in itself, but it never establishes the possibility of a language for
itself. The mental space of the symbolism of a language is inevitably tied to the larger space of culture. Even if Panofsky registered a clinical relation between Gothic architecture and Scholasticism outside the symbolism of architecture as a cultural artifact between 'I and Thou', he nevertheless starts from a language that says something beyond itself. His is an abstraction from an architecture as social space in Lefebvre’s terms. Tafuri takes this view of the mental space of language and devolves it upon itself to cut off any possible mimetic impulse in the name of a critique of modern society. Thus, he sees in the work of Aldo Rossi the appropriate critique of society, a muteness that keeps the memory of the unity of that language which has lost its unifying ground in life. 20

Tafuri voided language of architecture from its traditionally possible meanings in accordance with his Marxism. 21 However, this ideological stance, having been taken as an epistemic standpoint, helped in the creation of the illusion that architecture can really be only text without any meaning, hence indeed with any meaning. A syntax voided of its semantics is open both to non-sense and every sense: thus the “non-classical objects” of Eisenman with no meaning whatsoever (as he claims in his writings 22), or John Hejduk’s ‘architecture of everything’ with every possible narrative. 23 When Tafuri rejects the possibility of Erlebnis of form without the unity of Erfahrung, he shares the same position with Adorno: the muteness of a self-referential object as a critical stance in culture. Hence, rather than being an ontological isolation of language as in Eisenman’s case, Tafuri still takes language as a condition of communication, as an epistemic tool rather than an absolute barrier with its internally closed structure.

This unity of life and architecture as language also appears as the main theme in Lefebvre (1974), even though he sets out to show that architecture cannot be understood in linguistic terms.
of reading and writing, as a critique of the prevailing approaches based on semiology at the time of his writing. His critique of such approaches that take the representational character of language as a model for understanding built environment actually issues from a deeper linguistic model which takes language, the representational space for Lefebvre, the manifest cultural work, as ontologically determined by an underlying life form. While he takes architectural space back to a larger field of collective intentionality as to its production, at the same time he loses any possible critical distance between individual consciousness and collective intentionality.

Lefebvre’s overall critique, like his particular critique of Panofsky, targets any partial understanding of space in terms of specialized forms of knowledge. For him, space is social morphology and architectural space is only a representation of a larger social production. Thus, he recognizes that, being part of a larger system of culture, the lived space of architecture is a common object in the dialogue between 'I and Thou'; a common object in what Vesely calls the “communicative space of culture”. What Tafuri traces back to 18th century as the modern collapse of the unity of modes of production, Lefebvre sees as a more recent development with modern art and architecture: “The fact is that around 1910 a certain space was shattered. It was the space of common sense… Euclidean and perspectivist space have disappeared as systems of reference, along with other former ‘commonplaces’ such as the town, history, paternity, the tonal system in music, traditional morality, and so forth” (1974, 25). What he does is to merge a critique of understanding the representational character of architectural space on the linguistic model, that the space is not read but acted in, lived through, with a critique of all architectural making by assuming that all architectural making is representational in character and has to follow the space of common life practices in the larger space of culture. Like Heidegger, which he refers to at one point on the intentionality of art, Lefebvre sees the only possibility of
intentionality in an idealized collectivity. But he never asks the question whether there is still an idealized collectivity as such to produce space in a seamless continuity and unity of life practices shaped around a traditional common understanding. His social space, as the morphology of a unified life, is indeed a limit case that is only viable as a theoretical construct in the multiplicity of modern life.

In one sense Lefebvre’s argument about the relation of space to the lived experience is valid. However, it is his sense of lived experience that is problematic: he is embedding this into a collective Erfahrung making Erlebnis of space a function of this Erfahrung. The space becomes embedded in conventions of a life practice and this is why he cannot see design as a possibility as his view does not acknowledge the possibility of Erlebnis beyond Erfahrung. And he meets with Tafuri on the same nostalgia of the unity of life and architecture. Tafuri recognizes the possibility of intentionality at the level of making architecture, but he does not accept it as the possibility of a real intervention. Because he sees architecture as mere ideology as representation (of utopia); Lefebvre on the other hand, critical of all linguistic models of representation on the surface, returns back to deeper linguistic model at the level of the collectivity of life form and makes artistic or architectural presentation of space a representation of what already lies in the collective taxonomy of society. His social space is a non-reflective, collective mode of production of significance in the opaqueness of collective consciousness beyond individuals and what art or architecture, as languages of society, can only do is to represent the already developed and established order of things without a possibility of intervention in the world of experience.

2.3 Two Tales of Language

This relation between how architecture relates to the larger culture and life has been a main theme of most of the theoretical reflections after 60’s under the question of meaning of in
architecture with the critique of so-called failure of ‘functionalist’ modern architecture. Most of this research on the significance of architecture in a larger context of life and its relation to culture revolved around a model of representation that takes language as its explanatory ground. Michael Hays identifies structuralism and phenomenology “as militating against the received models of modernist functionalism and the positivist analyses that had emerged in the guise of behaviourism, sociology, and operations research in the 1960s. Against these, structuralism and phenomenology each projected questions of ‘meaning’ into a structure of sheer relations among architectural elements within a field of signification.” For him, they both drop “the common sense conception of architecture as a vessel of meaning filled from outside” and both “install a code of intrinsically and irreducibly architectural elements or phenomena that are related within a generalized system and that individual building / project partially instantiate”. In both “architectural signification is autonomous at a distance from reality but an architectural concept is still a concept of something; and idealized or total system of architecture is still a kind of map of reality” (1998, xiii).

Structuralism and phenomenology are part of the same traditionalism (architecture as Architecture: note Hays’s point, ‘not a vessel’) that takes language as a model for the unity of thinking and making in architecture. 28 Structuralism takes language at the level of code 29 and attributes a self-efficacy to form taking formal articulation as information in itself, phenomenology takes language at the level of life form and makes code contingent upon a shared system of signification. Hence in both, thinking the code, that is making it, is already thinking: the two sides of the architectural object, its mimetic and constructive instances are collapsed under some general system of thinking, hence the indiscriminative unity of thinking in the making. They both take the traditional representational role of architectural form in the unity
of culture as a starting point, and cannot go beyond the idea of form as figuration. “A Gothic cathedral, for example, is the City of God on earth” (Perez-Gomez 1983, 13). This tradition of representation in architectural form is a common starter for both groups.

Traditionally, making architecture is, for example, making the house of God; architecture is one with its form, its use, its meaning: the organic unity of traditional form. There is no designing the house of God, it is made as the maker knows it in an effective tradition. Here there is no separation between what is done and what is thought. There is no representational distance between the medium of forming meaning and the individual meaning intent, no distance between what is expressed as a cultural significance and its expression as an articulated cultural object; and this happens in the unity of a life practice where there is also no distance between the maker and the user. Hence, it is talking the same language in the unity of a life practice, a language-game as Wittgenstein calls it. When the traditional unity of life shutters, there remains a language of architecture but not the game. Phenomenology tries to recuperate what is lost in the figuration of architectural form in terms of its reference to life and tradition, structuralism celebrates a language voided of sense and meaning. The former takes the representational distance as the space of communication of binding meanings, the latter terminates it in the internal logic of formation of the object as a self-sufficient entity.

The continuity of reference or its discontinuity in the figuration of the architectural object is the difference between two ways of thinking. Both sides think architecture as a language. On the one hand there are those who say that there is nothing like the organic unity of form in traditional life in the essence of architecture as an autonomous language, all past has been the repression of architecture by human beings, hence it is time for architecture to be what it only and really is. On the other hand there are those who say that this is all there is to architecture,
architecture as a specific field of representation is nothing but a making continuous with the overall collective intentionality hence within the unity of a life form. The former drops the questions of relevance and making sense in public space of life beyond representation, the latter seals them onto a hypothesized collectivity in the representation of cultural narratives. It is the same model of architecture as language either in the form of collapsing architecture to shared meanings, values, the truth in the language, or in the form of an independent discourse, nothing but language. Both parties drop the question of subject and Erlebnis as one sees it only as a possibility of a collective Erfahrung, the other sees it as an accident of a historical Erfahrung which is itself accidental under the determination of hidden / repressed social, psychological, or material conditions.

When the symbolic distance of the work is made a factor of the learned tools of tradition, and when the tools and ends are collapsed onto each other in the organicity of a language, it becomes either context, thus collective content, dependent, or it becomes empty, ready to accept any semantic content. Hence the work is bound with a type of self-sufficient symbolic structure. Neither in phenomenology nor in structuralism there is the recognition that it is this very symbolic structure of the work is under construction in its making.

Architecture interprets life, just like an architectural work interprets its physical context in its intervening act… something potential in the site finds embodiment in the work. The work becomes a kind of measure; it selects and orders the latent forces of the site, brings forth a constellation that is not there before the work. A potentiality becomes actual with the work’s insertion, mediation. The work points to something about the site interpreting it in its specific intentionality. The site is imagined from a particular point of view.
Suppose that the site is only visible, available to us through our constructions on it. Phenomenological tradition tells us that we should build according to existing constructions to achieve the unity, to communicate, for meaning. Structuralists tell us that there is no site, only our constructions, hence anything is possible, there is no meaning, as there is no site. However, our experience tells us that none is convincing… we want to say that even though the site is not visible outside of our constructions, we have access to this enabling condition, glimpses of it in the singularity of artwork. The constructions are the cultural work, the site is reality… it is always in the making. We act on it with the work made and some of our constructions hold some do not, but there is no ultimate judgment beyond the individual work that is the claim to reality between 'I and Thou'.

Object thinking in architecture on the model of language either relies on tradition’s effectiveness or ends up with rejecting the traditional significance by ‘decentering’ it with other possible significances. Both sides of this thinking can be exemplified by examining the writings of Marco Frascari and Eisenman.

2.4 Language Unified

Frascari’s notion of the unity of ‘techne of logos’ and ‘logos of techne’, or ‘construing’ and ‘constructing’ is intended to underline the unity of thinking and making in the architectural act. As he sees it, the unity of construing and construction emerges out of an overarching conception of phantasia. In one sense, this notion is not different from what Frampton calls the ‘double hermeneutics’ in the making of architecture (meaningful architecture), and this affinity is already registered by Frampton himself when he refers to Frascari, especially in his analysis of the work of Carlo Scarpa. However, Frascari’s idea of symbolic making in terms of the unity of techne and logos, unified by phantasia, the unity of intending meaning in a medium of making, is based on a structuralist understanding of the
relation between geometries of architecture and their meaning evolved in time in the unified space of cultural narratives.

The unity of thinking and making in Frascari’s model of original poiesis, techne as aletheia, bears the conditions of a system of ends and means collapsed onto each other: the idea of language as its own possibilities. 37 What is advanced in the notion of techne as aletheia is that the symbolic nature of the making has not only its source but also its end in the symbolic structure itself, in an effective tradition of making. When Heidegger makes the origin of the work of art the thingness of the thing that emerges in the work, he makes it a function of the totality of meanings housed in language, in the horizon of Dasein, bypassing the mediative act of the maker; or rather, making the mediative act of the maker a tool for the thing to show its thingness as it is – as it always has been – in the authentic symbolic structure of Dasein’s being. Thus, Frascari’s “non-trivial” architecture bears the unity of formal configurations and their collective meanings as they evolve in the history of collectivity.

As all thinking already happens in language. What you can and cannot think is already determined within the significances that are already revealed in language. When we think, we think in language, we think what is already given in the language; when we think, we think in the architectural constructs. In order for a significance to come into being, the formal constructs of architecture, which are themselves meaningless for Frascari, but acquired meaning in time through convention, 38 should be in the reciprocity of the tradition of architectural forms. 39 Just like the possibility of intending a meaning in natural language (end) depends on the recognition of the physical form of the sign (tool) in the overall structure of a system of other signs, 40 which are also meaningless in themselves as singular physical entities, be it a sound or a mark on a surface, but only gain meaning in certain relations to other signs which only together as a system

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of signs can hold a field of reference, the non-linguistic achievement of language which is ‘meaning apprehended’ between interlocutors.

While such thinking in linguistic terms may be relevant, but only as a metaphor, for an architecture like Carlo Scarpa’s, where a live tradition of form making is evident, when Frascari melts Scarpa and Stirling in the same mold of meaning through convention, he also comes to the limiting point of the linguistic view of thinking and making. If one cannot see the difference between Scarpa and Stirling on such model of thinking as making, then there must be a problem somewhere in the model itself. The mimetic instance is born into architectural intuition, not in terms of forms with meanings, but as a vague idea of a possibility of forms that will enable a new interpretation to be realized in a new configuration: as a possibility that emerges out of a sense of appropriateness seated somewhere in the memory of making architecture which is itself seated somewhere in the memory of our phenomenal experiences. Rather than thinking with the particular architectural forms acquired from tradition, the effort is on finding these very forms within a particular unity which is new, and this always supposes that our architectural intentionality is larger than what is already done in architectural tradition. Our thinking proceeds as a series of judgments that give shape to new particulars in an effort to realize a particular architectural interpretation of a given situation (site, program, life, etc.), hence what is handed by the tradition is a set of tools to make use of to grasp this particular which is in principle given beyond any tools that we know of.

If we pursue Frascari’s model of language, as a metaphor, it is possible to say that Scarpa returns back to language and re-invents it, where Stirling merely uses it to construct a play upon a set of iconized significances. In Scarpa, the forms are alive, it is a new episode in a living tradition, where Stirling re-arranges words of a dead language without any significance. Stirling
cannot re-vitalize the language; Staatsgalerie $^{41}$ becomes a “thinking machine” $^{42}$ chewing architectural corpses with no possible semantics. The very possibility of Scarpa’s architecture itself is a testimony against the model of language for the unity of thinking and making. In architecture, as in all art forms, form making is not based on a knowledge of a conventional symbolism, its source lies deeper in the perception and memory which cannot be reduced to the history of ‘sign’, in a background of lived experiences that make up the self as in Dewey’s thinking, $^{43}$ and it is possible to re-vitalize forms of tradition in life with mediating acts on their modality through how they stand in one’s phenomenal consciousness. In language, the words have a much longer distance from such a phenomenal source (if it ever existed), they are reified forms of consciousness separated from their source in experience in an established network of other symbols constructed upon convention and contract, their source intuition, if there ever had been something like this, is totally absorbed in the network, they do not come with an intuitive seed that will enable a re-vitalization for words. Imagine that we have an access to the relations between letters in words, hence words and their original source of signification, and that we could construct new words to relate to new things not like using the established significances of other words, like from ‘differ’ and ‘defer’ to ‘différance’, but directly by using just the letters like tones in music, say ‘hnthesykkls’, and imagine that you could understand this as I intended. $^{44}$ Meaning is a relation to other words, architectural forms carry the intuitive seed in themselves, they operate in the experience unlike words, even in the absence of any system of forms.

Scarpa’s work is meaningful to the degree that we can see the cohesiveness of intentions even if we have no idea of his stories $^{45}$ about his forms, and Staatsgalerie cannot achieve any such meaningfulness no matter how much familiar its forms are. Scarpa’s architecture is not
‘non-trivial’ because of the fables in them, but because there is an original seeing through the forms themselves that enable metaphorical transformations in the first place, which cannot be explained by the existence of the narratives. When such narratives become part of the making of architecture, the problem is not the verifiability of a reading of the narrative, but that narrative itself is dependent upon a seeing of relations between elements as they occupy the consciousness in their own spatial modalities, even before one attributes literary meanings to them. There is an overall textuality of the text, the madeness of the spatio-temporal unity of architectural object, that Frascari tends to forget for the individual ‘words’, ‘themes’ in it reducing the meaningfulness of architecture to the possibility of a literary insight. The problem, to be more precise, is the idea of the conventionality of meaning, and taking form meaningless in itself, which limits the possibility of intending meaning by form making, forming meaning in the making of form, to a level of cultural associations evolved in time bypassing an original sense of phenomenal significance in the experience of spatio-temporal modalities.

Even in the case of allegory, as relevant meaning, literary meaning by itself says nothing about the quality of the work. Because it is the Inhalt; a story can be the same for two different works, still there will be the difference in each work’s respective modulation, mediation of the story and their respective Gehalt as the unity of narrative and object beyond a mere reading. This can be a relevant way of understanding of cultural symbolism in a society where there is a commonly shared iconography. But even iconography in this sense is in need of spatio-temporal judgments beyond recognizing the literal significances as part of a common language to differentiate between different works to see the Gehalt beyond Inhalt. It could be said that this view itself comes from a modern mind set where one can talk about a sense of quality beyond the binding literal meaning of the work in the collectivity of a traditional society. It could be said
that interpretation of cultural significances in traditional architecture all happen within the criterion of possible interpretations of these cultural significances as the recognition of them depends on this very criterion. But it is precisely the point I intend to make; if we can talk about interpretation of cultural significance in architecture, it has to depend on some experience of spatio-temporal modalities beyond the generality principle of the linguistic existence of these cultural significances. 48 When, for example, Vesely talks about the spatial unity of Baroque interiors, he is bypassing our apprehension of this unity by making it a “secondary manifestation of a deeper unity that can not be grasped through aesthetic experience” (218). 49

When Frascari makes metaphorical, allegorical conversions between different media of expression in culture the key to meaningfulness of architecture, 50 he is basing his understanding on the possibility of representational significance of architectural compositions. This conventionalism on the phenomenal experience beyond recognition of general cultural significances is an extension of the idea that we do not see, but only see-as in a horizon of meaning. 51 It is the same conventionalism when Gadamer overlooks in *Truth and Method* any possible sense of quality in spatio-temporal unities which are not particular instances of general significances. It is the same conventionalism when Norberg-Schulz and Vesely understand the concept development in natural languages as the model for meaningfulness of architectural forms. But it is also the same conventionalism that declared non-representational modern art as worldless, meaningless, abstract and impossible to communicate 52 which anyone with a sense of the possibilities of form and space making cannot take seriously. If we can see a text in a painting, in a piece of sculpture, in an architectural object, if we can hear a text in a piece of music, 53 all such intuitive imaginative translations must have a source in our phenomenal
experience of the world which cannot be reduced to seeing or hearing particular instances of
general significances in the contexts of familiar languages.

When all intentionality is collapsed onto language, that is, when seeing is reduced to
seeing-as, hence all perception to recognition, and when language is made the model for all
human commerce, it is inevitable that the communicability of meaning will be dependent upon
*what it is* in an established context of general significances, hence in every individual utterance,
there will be a field of tradition (the dictionary), as the arbiter of meaningfulness, an established
context of possible meanings as this view sees all commerce between 'I and Thou' in terms of
generals known prior to each of the sides, and in language such generals are the words,
physicality of which has nothing to do with their meaning. Hence, between the word and the
utterer, there is the context of meaning, hence, a set of other words, that regulates meaning
intention. When geometry or cultural narratives are brought into the meaningfulness of
architecture, it is the same distance that is brought between architecture and its experience, that
must be bridged by some “higher nexus of ideas”; architectural forms become word like entities,
bearers of “transcendental meanings.”

A general notion of perception underlies art and language in its metaphoricality even in its
descriptive sense. The economy of thinking sediments the world around general significances.
This process in the language indicates a constant process of renewal of meanings and evolving
contexts of meaning that are broadened by new additions. However, the moment of poetic
metaphor is without a prior general significance, without that ‘cosmos’ that defines the task at
hand in Grassi’s terms. Poetic metaphor defines its own task by an imaginative act on the basis
of a broader sense of memory.

The word only occurs in the area of a concretely active task that is to be carried out and
never has validity as an expression of an abstracted isolated object. This insight proves
once again how the word is in no way that which isolates and abstracts sensory appearances. These appear to us as objects, in the concrete urgency of life, to be given meaning in order to incorporate them in the context of a task in some particular cosmos. (Grassi 1980, 113)

This last, “a task in some particular cosmos”, is what Gadamer examines as phronesis in an effective tradition. The concept formation in language that Gadamer focuses on *Truth and Method* (Norberg-Schulz and Vesely refer to this view of meaning through convention) proposes that the moment of new significance, the new judgment, is always on the basis of a prior significance, which indeed starts the hermeneutical circle, hence the original significance is kept, even if enlarged with the new particular judged under a general significance of an effective tradition. While this might be the case for effective traditions, which are discursive in nature, as a set of generals shape a life form, the logic of concept formation as such pertains to the descriptive language. Gadamer’s project is to show that descriptive language is metaphorical, as the moment of shift between the new and the old is an imaginative leap, as the general is never given in full, and always new particulars are brought under generals which in turn reshapes the general, which transfers the generals from a determinative state to a regulative state. And this project is integrally linked to the idea that language is an evolving body of knowledge, and indeed the one that is truly human; science can only be a secondary representation upon what is already taken into language as a general significance. The problem of *Truth and Method* in terms of its bias on art is in the way Gadamer makes this linguistic account of meaning an overarching view in all human commerce when he defines understanding between 'I and Thou' as a commerce if and only if it takes place in an established language of general significances, in the effectiveness of generals transmitted through traditions of meaning. Thus the hermeneutical circle starts only with our pre-understanding of the significance of the text, the reality the text
speaks of. He makes all judgment of particulars context bound. Phronesis becomes the sole model for the experience of the work of art.

What Gadamer does not acknowledge, or perhaps gets lost under the main objective of *Truth and Method*, is the possibility of judgment beyond contexts of meaning. A possibility of commerce between 'I and Thou' beyond known significances, a hermeneutic circle that does not start in the familiarity of a language, in the familiarity of a worldly significance, without a pre-understanding of the reality as it is handed to us in an effective tradition.

What Dewey says about the transcendence in perception, the conscious meanings that are “drawn from which is absent” cannot be Gadamer’s ‘general principle’ in the phronesis in a context of meaning, as it would be a recognition for Dewey, cutting short of perception which for him is the unity of the intentional object in the experience. This moment of meaning in the experience should come to a spontaneous act, even if memory is involved. It is the significance of what is at hand, beyond general significances, that we apprehend in the experience, and as such it is an act of ‘internal’ phronesis without a context of interpretation where all the contexts of interpretation are at work in the memory. Spontaneity is at work, memory is effective, but not in terms of the work of imagination between new particular and an old general.

The point of phronesis is to be able to judge the new. But when Gadamer refuses the general metaphoricity of language as a model of understanding in art in his later writings, he is already beyond the problem of concept development of language as the sole model of meaningfulness of experience. He drops the moment of recognition. If it is phronesis that enables us to judge the new in established contexts of meaning, it is judgment of taste that enables us to judge new particulars beyond such contexts, new instances without generals, that we encounter as artworks which hold their rule in themselves. Thus the poetic metaphor cannot
be dropped, as an idea, a mental image, what it brings forth is only possible with it, it is beyond known contexts of meaning, even if it uses known significances, it is the first person knowledge of these significances rather than their point of generality. Poetic metaphor draws upon the plane of “brute meaning” beyond language.

2.5 Metaphor

When poetry makes use of metaphor, it makes use of first-person knowledge of things as we apprehend them in our experience. Hence, it draws upon a field of experience, which is the language of image, the language of space, to make a significance that is not visible, in the descriptive language of contexts of daily discourses, before its utterance in the poetic metaphor. By juxtaposing distant things as to their particular qualities apprehended in first-person experience, poetic metaphor achieves a new significance. Along with the tendency to understand every communication on the basis of language, it could be said that such language of image and space are themselves known through familiarity within a system of representations: by being exposed to a certain kinds of things, types of things, along with their associated meanings which are embedded in them in time. While this may be one way of understanding the notion of image as a collective entity, in the familiarity of lived culture, our relationship to lived phenomena cannot be reduced to this way of understanding the language of image and space. When Ricoeur examines the poetic metaphor in terms of a new predicament in language, he pursues the question of new meaning in terms of a semantic innovation. Such semantic innovation, which also innervates the descriptive language itself, can only be possible if the poetic metaphor is preceded by an original seeing. 

Like the site analogy I have been using, poetic metaphor is an intervention in our experience of the world rather than a representation of something already existing, and waiting to be articulated. New meaning in art happens differently from new meaning in descriptive language. A new construct in descriptive language is a new particular
brought under a general significance when the occasion arises within a context of meaning. Wollheim underlines that “a mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on the appropriate occasion, and other speakers can understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them” (59-60). It can be said that poetic metaphor is not only a new utterance in the language, but it is also its own occasion. It occasions the significance it points at within itself, beyond established contexts of meaning, as the significance is not “read off,” but experienced in the multiplicity of reverberations between juxtaposed phenomena. This is also how art contributes to the making of our world, as it offers new objects of intentionality, new contents in the form of new experiences rather than representing already existing significances. Poetic metaphor, to express what it says, relies on our first-person relation to things as they are phenomenally apprehended by us beyond their general significances in our language. Even if it depends on the possibility of our seeing and hearing of its reverberations, we cannot easily say that they were there and poet simply appropriated them in language. This would be reducing the imaginative act of poet to the possibilities of language. In poet’s hands, language is a tool to reveal and express an original seeing which is not within the possibilities of the prior state of language.

And if the poet uses the language of known images to express what is not-yet-seen, or not-yet-felt, and expresses them in the familiarity of the words of a spoken language, architecture has the power to create those very experiences which the poet only has access through his imaginative operation on the significances of the words. Thinking with known images in the words is poet’s job: to express meaning by using the power of images, of the things, events known through first-person experience. Architecture creates those images that the poet thinks through words. If poetry is using a language of images, architecture is constructing that language again and again in the act of making lived space.
When a story is to be written in architecture, there is still an act of original translation into language of form, language of space, hence the language of phenomenal consciousness of space. Even if we do not know the narrative, there is still something we see and feel in the experience of architecture: the comportment of the object as a made thing on a site with a certain way of housing the body. There are certain relations between components, parts of a work, that are supposed to be apprehended in order to judge the work as a unity. Architecture cannot receive its power to communicate from the narrative, it is the narrative itself that needs architecture to be ‘visualized’, ‘lived through’. Architecture might said to be more significant for a community if it tells a collective story as such, but this cannot account for its original power to make things visible in its own modality as a lived spatio-temporal event by itself. The lived space of architecture does not have to issue from general meanings embedded in the collectivity to be an experience of a significance in its own right. Even if meaningfulness as such cannot be attributed simply to the individual making, as also is the case with poet, as it always is born into and sits in a larger space of culture, to say that architecture needs a narrative to become non-trivial is depreciation of architecture’s own formative powers, to create images by the way it orders space and time, and life in its phenomenal existence, which cannot be reduced to a representational existence. If we are to understand architecture as metaphor, and if we do not want architecture to drop away as the bearer of a message, we have to acknowledge the distance between the reference, the message, if there is to be any, and how architecture mediates it. The unity cannot be that of the reference, but how it is interpreted by way of its emplotment in architecture.

Thinking with known images in architecture is putting a distance to what we experience bodily through language again, through literal significances. To phenomenally make sense of what we experience precedes how we transfer it to a language of familiarity, either through the
familiarity of our own body with its anatomy or the familiarity of a cultural narrative. Thinking in the making of architecture cannot be understood analogous to the performative dimension of the first person, bodily knowledge of things and events used in the known images of poetry. 

Architecture as lived phenomenon is already this performance. When we see such familiarity (bodily or cultural) as the only tool to make architecture meaningful, understandable, communicable, (nontrivial in Frascari’s terms), it reduces architecture to a representational tool, cutting its own power of phenomenal affect, on the model of language making architectural form and space as meaningless as words in themselves before they gain significance through the knowledge of a more familiar thing. If metaphor is a transference between two different domains of experience, it is between language and experience, not between body and architecture as body is already registered in the very experience of architecture before any introduction of bodily metaphors (my arm, my leg, my head) in the process of making sense, phenomenal awareness is already bodily awareness. The metaphors of body are first of all an expression of an original sense of being embodied, they are themselves a product of an original experience. The phenomenal consciousness of being in space is also as such, an original experience; it does not need the body Gestalts to make sense. This latter can only come into play if we reduce architectural experience to a reading of architecture as figure, like a sculpture. Body Gestalts can only be tools for analogy to express architectural experience in the familiarity of the language of body in the spoken language.

If we are, like Dewey, to think that every new experience, take on world, brings its own forms of expression, we have to acknowledge a larger field of consciousness than what is given in the familiar forms of traditions and languages. Only then we can see poetic making as an act of agency, rather than a function of language as a system without subjects. Language continues
to perform its stabilizing function even in its metaphorical use in poetry, but here the justification comes from the experience itself rather than established meanings. The synthetic moment in the language of metaphor is the experience of new relations, new objects which are not possible in a prior stabilized state of language. It is a moment of spontaneity. The poetic metaphor is able to liquefy the existing meanings only because it is itself based on an original seeing.

Thus it is one thing to say that the unity of architectural work as a spatio-temporal experience is the unity of a unifying idea, another to say that this unifying idea has to be a known significance in the collective consciousness of society in order for art or architecture to make sense. Such view also cuts short of the great achievements of pre-modern architecture, making them mere texts, articulation of some ‘higher nexus of ideas’ as to their experiential qualities. If tradition is to be understood in the sense Gadamer understood in *Truth and Method*, that only a live tradition \cite{gadamer} can keep the possibility of significance, taking the articulation of cosmological meanings as the sole ground of past architectures cuts our relation to tradition and makes our experience of spatiality, order, scale, etc. a mere subjective experience. When, for example, Le Corbusier saw a poetry of forms, masses, surfaces, a promenade architecture in the Acropolis, overlooking perhaps all what George Hersey wrote about the particular symbolism of orders, this cannot be a moment of illusion.

### 2.6 Language Deconstructed

On an other register, we find the same conception of architectural configuration as representation in the writings of Eisenman. His notions of ‘conceptual structure’ \cite{eisenman} (‘theoretical object’ as Hays calls it \cite{hays}), ‘non-classical architecture’, \cite{eisenman} and ‘rhetorical figure’ \cite{eisenman} bear the same condition of unity of thinking and making in figuration, the same parameters of logos of techne and techne of logos, but this time in Eisenman there is no binding logos: thinking the form and
forming the thought emancipated from the unity of a traditional / structural horizon of the formed and the thought.

When Eisenman proposes his ‘rhetorical figure’ against ‘metaphorical’, it designates the classical figure. His effort is to dislocate this metaphorical into a rhetoric of anything. Thus, he mainly questions this classical sense of metaphoricity, but he still operates with the same notion of architectural form as bearer of meaning in its figuration, rather than its spatio-temporal performance: bearer of meaning as a figurative object rather than bearer of meaning as lived phenomena through occupation. 72 Eisenman, for Hays, “characterized a ‘post-functionalist’ position that would recognize architecture’s epistemological status” (1998, 234). This is the same epistemological status that comes with the thinking within figuration that Frascari speaks about as ‘theory of image’ based on ‘imaginative universals’, “an understanding of architecture as a system of representational knowledge resulting from technological signs” (the unity of techne and logos in the technological sign) (Frascari 1991, 106). Eisenman dislocates the ‘universals of recollection’ with the arbitrary origins. Another comment that Hays makes on Eisenman’s position is that his is “a research (that) discovers the new in the given ‘language’, immanently, through an articulation and redistribution of its elements” (1998, 234). Note here the network of architectural vocabulary as a language which also underlies the “thesaurus” of Frascari, thus Eisenman’s ‘post-humanism’ is the post of Frascari’s humanism. The move is from deeply rooted symbols to arbitrary symbols, or pure symbols symbolizing themselves.

Eisenman’s idea of self referential, conceptual, rhetorical architectural form is based on the possibility of some a priori mechanism of forming meaning through geometrical operations. Because any such self-referentiality needs a base language to operate within in order to avoid becoming a total senselessness, a case in which there would not even be an object or a process.
The condition of the unity of object depends on such existence of a base language which Eisenman sees in ‘classical figuration of object geometry’. In a system of signifiers and signifieds, he traces the signifier back to its most inarticulate form, by which he thinks it is possible to eliminate the burden of all prior signification as all the relations between the signified and the signifier has been arbitrary. He finds the clean slate of architecture as language in the Platonic form. As he sees it, all “humanist” architecture is a modification of such primary forms under different and arbitrary narratives (function, history, etc.). Thus his proposed methodology takes the Platonic form as the given, he strips this as a unit in a primary language (of architecture), and re-writes the language with different modifications of this primary unity: a clean slate of an empty signifier that can be charged with new signifieds through new operations following the structure of new narratives where such narratives are translated into architectural object by basic syntactic (formal) operations thought analogical to the structure of the narrative. The platonic form and the way the object is fragmented becomes an analogy for the accompanying narrative of the process, thus making architecture becomes a kind of writing a text.

If it is the tradition of figuration that Eisenman sees in the architectural form, then this is still a writing in its representational sense, a writing in the sense of the Pyramid. Hence he is deconstructing the Pyramid, rather than making the Labyrinth. Derrida saw the difference of architecture from language in the difference between the possibilities of representing thought vs. making thought itself (clearing of a path, creating it rather than discovering); the possibility of thought in architecture in new makings without the representational moment of a system of language. In a recent writing Eisenman refers to an interpretation of Derrida’s thinking that sees architecture as the “locus of metaphysics of presence” and says that questioning this
metaphysics has been central to his work. 76 But what Eisenman takes this to be is the classical sign, the traditional unity of organic form in the collective consciousness that sees ‘church as the house of God’, the representational dimension of form that Frascari, Vesely, Bandmann see as the way for meaningfulness, the unity of the thought and the thing in a ‘wider nexus of ideas’. This is the ‘hyle-morphic monument’ that represents in its presence the invisible, the idea 77; architectural object as a linguistic entity, a mnemonic device, a placeholder for what is absent, thus the representation of thought. But this is not the performative possibility of architecture as ordering space and time “imminently”, as Derrida has it (1986b, 570), rather than through representations.

The muteness, that Eisenman promotes in his writings, of architecture in the larger cultural space, an architecture that represents nothing but itself, is still operating within the metaphysics of Architecture, as handed down by an interpretation of the classical tradition. The idea of taking architecture as merely language means taking it as the residue of a prior rhetoric, as a logic of tools with lost ends, a logic voided of rhetoric. This is attributing a self-efficacy to language, an Absolute of language. When a logic of communication becomes its own logic, when a logic is stripped off from its possible rhetoric, a logic to reveal intentions becomes the intention itself.

The paradox of a language that is representing itself devoid of its rhetoric is the engagement with the ghost of an Absolute in the logic of form, 78 the metaphysics of the Pyramid. Even Derrida urges architecture to engage, with the reality institutionalized in the language of metaphysics, for another take on, without the domination of a prior idea. 79 But to do so requires a new kind of writing, which again for Derrida, is performative writing, writing of space, one that thinks space, spaces through events, in the event space of life. One that thinks experience, a thinking of the Labyrinth, that engages with the subject in its ‘imminence’. There is
no trace of a higher system here. Nothing is presented by something in its absence. No higher reason that presents itself in the making of architectural form, in the form of the Pyramid. Architectural form as such orders space and time directly, unlike words, or any other symbolic apparatus on the model of language (the so-called ‘non-linguistic sign’), that order reality only on the basis of a holistic order of things.

Thus this performance is not the non-representational object performance that ‘writes itself’, which Eisenman advances, it is has nothing to do with standing for something or standing for nothing but for itself by itself. It is a performance in the event space of life before any question of representation.  

The internalizing of language, as Eisenman proposes, as its own possibility is the modernist autonomy of Adorno, the degree-zero that Derrida sees to be on the same side of what he calls ‘the metaphysics of presence’.  

Eisenman’s idea of ‘reader’ is not the ‘other’ in the dialogue of culture, he does not propose an agenda for architecture in the making of world and life. There is no “promised event” in life, the promised event of Eisenman’s proposal is a pure reading of a unity which is nevertheless mute, thus the only possible judgment of the ‘other’ is ‘I see it’, or ‘I do not see it.’ Which would inevitably be followed by ‘So what?’. Something is holding together or not, an internally closed system that tells the ‘other’ how it is made. “The activity of reading is first and foremost in the recognition of something as a language (that it is)” (1984, 534); but then this is all there is to it, that something is. And that something is not offering you anything other than its own readability. The ‘other’ is not Eisenman’s concern, there is no “pledge” in Eisenman’s writings.  

The arbitrary origins of Eisenman are not there to break loose from the circle of signification, on the contrary they are there to show that such logic of form is inevitable, which falls back to the justification of an
earlier rhetoric of the Pyramid: the immutability of the language as a self-referential, self-propelling system outside agency, outside subjects.

Eisenman’s ‘conceptual’ architecture opened up the imagination of many to the possibilities of architectural form, and appropriated at the level of processes of formal articulation. But it is precisely the unacknowledged architectural decisions that make his design work what it is beyond the methodologies introduced in his writings. Object thinking and participating in a traditional symbolism are two distinct problems that are collapsed onto each other in Eisenman’s writings. When Eisenman rejects ‘the humanist subject’ as a source of architectural form, this foregrounds an unwillingness to participate in the traditional project that promotes some common and shared ways of appropriating architecture. But object thinking in isolation, elevating a way of making into discourse itself, cannot be drawn as a conclusion from this. When Eisenman rejects the subject in thinking architecture, he is also rejecting the very idea of architecture as a lived phenomenon in the name of cultural symbolism of form making. Understanding making architecture as object thinking in an isolated field of discourse and rejecting the traditional symbolism of architecture in a larger space of cultural meanings are not logically connected.

Form making as cultural symbolism cannot be identified with the phenomenal experience of architectural space. The latter is the way for any intention, whatever that intention is, from whatever source it may come from, to be part of architectural thinking, as only then it can be revealed in its turn by the architectural object in the communicative space between 'I and Thou'. Architecture cannot think without the spatial experience of architecture. Discursive relations that remain between the elements, which are not effective in the experience of the work as a lived phenomenon, cannot be part of architectural object. Similarly, relations that are there from God’s
eye view, relations that only cryptical sections can reveal cannot be the language of architecture
as lived spatial phenomenon but architecture as the Architecture of the Pyramid, a metaphysical
game of language: architecture as drawing, architecture as model in the hand, on the table. At
some point, when thinking isolates the object into its own structural conditions, this is not very
different from the visual relations between marks of a musical score on the paper. The possibility
of hearing today is bypassed in the name of a critique of past melodies of cosmological
significance. If there is a language of music, it resides in the phenomenal space of hearing. An
architecture that thinks object in isolation from its conditions of being experienced simply
overlooks for architecture what hearing is for music, that dimension of experience in / through
architecture

Even a ‘reading of form’ as Eisenman would have it, is not possible if the relations are not
part of the experience of architecture, however structural they may be in the construction of the
systemic unity of the object. When Eisenman opposes ‘sensuous’ to ‘conceptual’, it may come to
an easy consumption of form as retrospective association, but not the experience of relationality,
systemicness as they are revealed in architecture as part of a spatial / temporal Erlebnis. If the
conceptuality as such is not the conceptuality of ‘this is a square’, ‘this is a circle’, where the
manifold of form is brought under a concept (which is not different from ‘this is a man’, ‘this is a
cat’, ‘this is a church’), but a kind of unity which indeed is a residue of a memory of making
architecture, then we may also claim for its returning back to a more effective state of doing
something on the world as a lived phenomenon beyond its internal logic of formation.

The question raised to Eisenman by Richard Hill (1999, 232-240) is that how such
intentionality of form is architectural above and beyond art, that is architectural form beyond
simply any art form. Hill’s answer is that it is not ‘specifically architectural’, it is like any art
form. Hill seems to have in mind the second parameter of participating in a shared project of ‘architecture as useful/beautiful object’. I think he is missing what is architectural, and indeed what is essentially architectural, in Eisenman’s work. They are not any form, art form, but they are essentially architectural forms. There is a memory of architecture which is deeply rooted in the form making, in the logic of form in Eisenman’s work. Whether such logic is carried into a rhetoric of space is the problem in object thinking. There is a residue of medium, on the paper, in the model that takes a life of its own. But if such logic does not return to a rhetoric of space, if it does not think space but takes object as a discourse in itself isolated from its conditions of being experienced as a lived phenomenon, then it is doomed to its own logical space of making.

Architecture really becomes a discourse devolved upon itself, living in its own internal relations. If thinking gets caught in the pleasures on the paper, on the desk, in the logic itself as a faint memory, forgetting its rhetoric, the possibility of bringing it back to life as lived architecture, it seems it is likely to drop the Erlebnis of space from architecture. Without discussing experience of space, which indeed is occupied space that Eisenman rejects as the human dimension, it is not possible to talk about architectural intentionality. When this dimension of architectural space is bypassed, architectural making is reduced to object thinking, an open syntax with any possible semantics. Thinking an object in hand, on the desk, looking at it from God’s eye view, is sufficient to understand its logic of formation. Architectural object becomes a logic without a spatial rhetoric other than its accidental relations to lived space of architectural phenomenon.

The significance of architectural object lies in its possibilities of being experienced as a lived phenomena. Its internal logic of construction, if it is isolated from the conditions of its experience, can only become a texture for a narrative that is analogically embedded in the object, which is what Frascari is arguing for in his idea of the unity of techne and logos or what
Eisenman promotes with his notion of architecture as a theoretical enterprise. Architectural intentionality as lived phenomena is bypassed in this account of significance as representation of an idea in the figuration of the object.

Notes

1 Gregotti: “In the course of (the last) thirty years, during which the obsession with history emerged and developed, the belief has taken root that architecture cannot be a means for changing social relationships; but I maintain that it is architecture itself that needs, for its very production, the material represented by the social relations. Architecture cannot live simply by mirroring its own problems, exploiting its own tradition, even though the professional tools required for architecture as a discipline can be found only within that tradition.” (quoted in Frampton 1995, 26)

2 Cultural work is always a common object between ‘I and Thou’ in the common space of experience. See Cassirer 1953, 86; 1944, 32; 1960, 98 where he emphasizes the work’s role in the making of culture.

3 See section 2.3. below.

4 McCarter points to the same difficulty in Rowe and Slutzky’s readings of plans: “The question of whether these attributes, so evident when examining the plan as a surface (drawing) not unlike the painter’s canvas, are equally present in the experience of actually inhabiting these spaces when built, is not addressed by Rowe and Slutsky” (1993, 84).

5 “Man looks at the creation of architecture with his eyes, which are 5 feet 6 inches from the ground. One can only consider aims which the eye can appreciate and intentions which take into account architectural elements. If there come into play intentions which do not speak the language of architecture, you arrive at the illusion of plans, you transgress the rules of the Plan through an error in conception, or through a leaning towards empty show. ” (1923, 177)

6 In “After Cubism”, Le Corbuiser and Ozenfant (1918) wrote: “What is the difference between the aesthetic of a carpet and that of a cubist painting? There is no difference between the aesthetic of a carpet and a cubist painting.” (in Eliel 2001, 135)

7 Actually this is the very point of criticism Le Corbusier and Ozenfant launched on the cubist painting. After discussing how cubist painting is “ornamental” as they see it in its constructional principles, they write this: “In any case, it must be admitted that this return to the elements of art, to simple sensation – in the guise of pure form, pure color – was necessary. There was too much literature in painting; but let’s not mistake the means for the end. The tool is ready: using the raw elements, we must construct works that make the intellect respond; it is this response that matters.

To summarize:

Having demonstrated that pure, raw sensation is but a means to great art, we allow that there is an artistic hierarchy:
Pure sensation: ornamental art.

Organization of raw sensations – pure colors and forms: superior art.” (139)

I think when they mention the response of intellect, it is the experience principle beyond a formation of Gestalts as ends in themselves.

8 “The sensational impact of the chapel on the visitor is significantly not sustained for any great length of time and when the emotions subside there is little to appeal to the intellect, and nothing to analyze or stimulate curiosity. This entirely visual appeal and the lack of intellectual participation demanded from the public may partly account for its easy acceptance by the local population.” (Stirling 1957, 66) Also note that when Rowe and Slutzky reconstruct the promenade of Leage of Nations, their hypothetical subject is a “man of moderate sophistication” (1963, 53)

9 This phrasing is from a commentary text by Bernard Hoesli on Rowe and Slutzky’s approach to form (Hoesli 1997, 60-61).

10 Ulrich Franzen writes on Rowe and Slutzky’s essays in the educational context of form exploration: “At a fully developed level the same type of inquiry, using a trained eye without recourse to irrelevant ‘meaning’, is demonstrated in the well-known study by Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky” (1999, 9).

11 See the explanation hinge in Dewey’s example and Rowe’s account of guilt mechanisms in form making when he speaks about modern experiment: “what you said was not what you were indeed doing, what you said was only a pretext for what you were doing” when technological and social revolution never arrived… “with this failure, if it became obvious that theory and practice were disrelated, it could also become apparent that theory itself was never a literal directive for the making of buildings as it was an elaborately indirect mechanism for the suppression of guilt: guilt about the products of mind –felt to be insignificant, guilt about high culture –felt to be unreal, guilt about art – the most extreme anxiety to disavow the role of private judgment in analytical or synthetic enterprise. In the end, what is understood as the theory of modern architecture reduces itself to little more than a constellation of escapist myths which are all active in endeavoring to relieve the architect the responsibility for his choices and which all alike combine to persuade him that his decisions are not so much his own as they are, somehow, immanent in scientific, or historical, or social process.” (Rowe 1972, 81). Also note: “mid-twentieth century architect’s capacity to indulge his mostly trivial moral enthusiasm at the expense of any physical product” (83).

12 Note that Dewey’s overall aim in his Art as Experience is to underline “the source of art in human experience” as he puts it. (1934, 5)

13 Which is also the problem Wilhelm Worringer (1908) faces when he uncritically opposes abstraction and empathy, making the systemeness of geometry a revelation in itself. He is unable to account for the mimetic impulse in the very idea of abstract geometry. When he writes on abstract as “forming a whole for imagination, abstraction from the contingencies of perception, enjoying the object in its own necessities… not like empirical perception, but reproducing the object as a whole for imagination”, is not this the very same thing he rejects in ‘empathy’: ‘self-enjoyment in the constitution of the object’? If pleasure is not of the ‘idea’, that is intellectual,
conceptual, ‘spiritual’ in Worringer’s terms, then there must be some other moment of unified imagination, and if it
is not intellectual (Worringer says it is not), whence is this unity? He cannot see that both abstraction and empathy
issue from the same kinds of judgments of taste in the aesthetic experience as to the unity of object as it stands in the
consciousness and they only differ in the substance of their mimetic impulse. Note how Dewey sees this way of
theorizing form as a self-possibility: “But unfortunately, aesthetic theory has not been content with clarifying
qualities as a matter of emphasis in individual wholes. It erected adjectives into nouns substantive, and then played
dialectical tunes upon the fixed concepts which emerge. Since rigid conceptualization is compelled to take place on
the basis of principles and ideas that are framed outside direct aesthetic experience, all such performances afford
good examples of ‘cerebral revery’.” (1934, 224)

14 I am using ‘clinical’ in the spirit of Carl Jung’s insight: “interest is diverted from the work of art and loses itself in
the inextricable chaos of psychological antecedents; the poet becomes a ‘clinical case’…” Bachelard quotes Jung in
the context of analyzing the poetic image beyond its intentionality (1985, xxxii).

15 As he sees it with dissolution of organic form what remains is a language that has lost its meaning bed, its
semantic / rhetoric base, the unified life-form that gives substance to language. He writes on the crisis of the
traditional conception of form in 18th century, arising from an awareness of the problem of city as an autonomous
field of communicative experiences and the disarticulation of form and the inorganic nature of structure: “The
formation of the architect as ideologue of the ‘social’; the individuation of the proper area of intervention in the
phenomenology of the city; the role of form as persuasion in regard to the public, and self-criticism in regard to its
own concerns; the dialectic –on the level of formal investigation –between the role of the architectonic ‘object’ and
that of urban organization: On what level, and with what sort of awareness, do these abstract constants of the
modern means of visual communication become concretized in the currents of Enlightenment thought?” (1969, 6-7)

16 “Renouncing a symbolic role, at least in the traditional sense, architecture –in order to avoid destroying itself –
discovered its scientific vocation.” And he identifies two paths of thinking: “typology and science of sensations,
arquitectura parlante” which for him, instead of being solutions to the deeper problem, “accentuate, through 19th
century, the internal crisis of architectural culture”. He sees this development as a “the definitive loss of organic
form” with inherent dangers (1969, 9).

(11) Laugier, Piranesi, Milizia, Quatremere de Quincy… writings of these, contribution to the architectural debate…
“precisely (the) notion of control over a reality lacking organic structure”

17 To make “the mortal silence of the sign” speak (Tafuri 1974, 146).

18 “Today, he who wishes to make architecture speak is thus forced to resort to materials devoid of all meaning; he is
forced to reduce to degree zero every ideology, every dream of social function, every utopia residue. In his hands,
the elements of the modern architectural tradition are all at once reduced to enigmatic fragments –to mute signals of
a language whose code has been lost” (1974, 146).

19 See Tafuri 1976, 171-225.
On Aldo Rossi, Tafuri writes: “to circumnavigate the central point from which the communication springs forth, without being able to draw from that primary source”, because “‘center’ has been historically destroyed… source has been dispersed into multiple streams, each without beginning or end” (1974, 155).

Tafuri closes the possibility of Erlebnis without the unity of Erfahrung. Even if he sees the possibility of new meaning through form, his austere Marxism restrains him to accept the possibility of a new way of life in architecture. Note when he writes: “useless to hand light matches to a man who is freezing. The instancy of form is nothing but such a ‘match’: the time consumes it rapidly, **without offering an Erlebnis to redeem the suffering**” (1974, 156). Or when he comments on the “non-linguistic residues in Stirling’s and Kahn’s work” which for Tafuri are “aspects of real world that have not been converted into form” (1974, 153). He sees in Rossi’s work a “freeing architectural discourse from all contact with real –from all incursion by chance or by the empirical into its totally structured system of signs”, an “absolute presence of form (rendering) ‘scandalous’ the presence of chance –and even that expression par excellence of chance, human behaviour” (1974, 153).

Frederic Jameson, when he writes on Tafuri’s critique of architecture, sees Tafuri’s adherence to ‘mute form’ as a closure of his own Marxist ideology and as a strong cultural pessimism (1982)

See section 2.6. below.

See Jeffrey Kipnis 1992.

He also refers to Bauhaus and Le Corbusier.

He quotes Heidegger, “a rose does not know that it is a rose”, when he speaks about Venice and says that it does not have the intentional character of an ‘art object’: “One is tempted to say, in fact, that the appearance of art, a short time prior to the appearance of its concepts, implies the degeneration of works: that no work has ever been created as a work of art, and hence that art –especially the art of writing, or literature –merely heralds that decline. Could it be that art, as a specialized activity, has destroyed works and replaced them, slowly but implacably, by products destined to be exchanged, traded and reproduced ad infinitum?” (1974, 74). And this is how he bypasses the intentionality of design act: for him Venice is not a work of art, “because it was not planned in advance”, it is “a place built by collective will and collective thought” and their relation to “the productive forces of the period” (1974, 76).

He sees social space as a totality of actions of people, action groups, knowledge, ideology, hence as a totality of all possible modes of production. It becomes something like ‘the whole life’ where there is no more a demarcation between ‘life’ and ‘space’. But this can only be a mode of theorizing from God’s eye view, there is no possibility of individual action which is never the totality of meanings and forces like an act of God but always an individual interpretation from some specific viewpoint. Thus he leaves no room for individual reflection.

He writes on Tuscany, about some constructed landscape elements: “their arrangement was evocative of the laws of perspective, whose fullest realization was simultaneously appearing in the shape of the urban piazza in its architectural setting. Town and country –and the relationship between them –had given birth to a space which it
would fall to the painters... to identify, formulate, and develop”. “These artists ‘discovered’ perspective and developed the theory of it because a space in perspective lay before them, because such a space had already been produced” (1974, 78-79). Note what he is saying is that space as such comes into being by itself, like life, a totality of things, events, actions, and only then there is something to describe for the artist and architect. It cannot be designed, that is, no intervention is possible in this total space of life, what can be done in art and architecture is representation. The space becomes a given like Vesely’s latent world, the common denominator that Arendt rejects as a given beyond dialogue. Lefebvre cannot see the role of making in art and architecture in this dialogue, he recesses them to a representational mode.

28 Even if Hays says that “the path they weave ended around 1983”, I think there is still some residue of thinking left from these discussions (think about the idea of generative device, the daily terminology of studio where syntax, vocabulary are common words, or think about how we talk about the phenomenal aspects of site in terms of some genius loci). While all such research produced invaluable pedagogical tools to teach architecture, it also helped reify a kind of discourse in our language that attributes an immanent thinking component to the architectural object itself either in terms of its own logic of formation or in terms of how it relates to a tradition of making place reifying certain gestures as significant in themselves beyond the moment of subjective apprehension of these relations in the concreteness of a possible here and now as a lived phenomenon.

29 See Richard Wollheim’s explanation of two senses of language as life form and its written and spoken code (1968, 101-137). I think that structuralism takes the system of codes as a given, phenomenology takes the life form.

30 Vesely’s discussion of fragment as referring to a known significance in life is an extension of this understanding. Also when he comments on Coop Himmelblau’s work as lacking a historical precedent, he is looking for the same continuity in tradition this time.

31 “To say that a work of art has a meaning is point to something, to some arrangement within a wider nexus of ideas that transcend the material and formal organization of the work of art. The realm of artistic is transcended in that the work of art comes to be understood as a metaphor, as a representative, as the material emanation of something else.” (Bandmann 1951, 19)

This is the model of representation that is not questioned. Phenomenology takes architectural form significant only if it carries some meaning from the broader space of culture in the way it sits on the ground, shapes its forms, etc. becoming a metaphor for the life as it is in the collective consciousness of society. Structuralism eliminates this metaphorical hinge in the formation of the architectural object and introduces rhetoric of formation upon any narrative. See also section 2.6. for Eisenman’s comment on architecture as the stronghold of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ as he interprets the idea in Derrida’s thought.

32 Here are some views expressed by authors of different views. Note that they meet at the moment of language, and it is evident that examples I cite here can be multiplied in numbers if we open an architectural theory book like Kate Nesbitt’s or Michael Hays’s:
Eisenman: “Previously, there was assumed to be an a priori language of value, a poetry, existing within architecture. Now we are saying that architecture is merely language.” (1984, 537, endnote 24) “We have always read architecture. Traditionally, it did not induce reading but responded to it.” (1984, 537, endnote 25)

Rhetorical figuration “begins to acknowledge the fictional quality of reality and the real quality of fiction. Culture, history, and ultimately architecture are not fixed and merely additive, but are a continual process of reiteration and simultaneous dislocation which every moment modifies the previous instant of meaning and structure.” (1987, 181)

“At this point [ sometime in the early 20th century] in the evolution of consciousness, something occurred: reason turned its forms on to itself and thus began the process of its own undoing. Questioning its own status and mode of knowing, reason exposed itself to be a fiction.” (1984, 527)

Tafuri: “We fully agree with Eco, in fact, when he states that semiology reveals pitilessly ‘the false acts of freedom’, the mitigated infractions of the codes and too many cases in which, rather than freely using language, we ‘are spoken’ by the language itself.” (1976, 210)

Eco, quoted by Tafuri, writes: “But every type of information has to rely on zones of redundancy. One can only transgress the code within certain limits, always retaining some degree of respect. Otherwise, instead of communication we would have noises”. Tafuri continues: “Eco, summing up the most rigorous results of the recent studies on artistic communication, finds himself in total agreement with Gombrich, on one hand, and with some results of Norberg-Schulz on the other.” The references are Gombrich’s Art and illusion, Norberg-Schulz’s Intentions in architecture. (1976, 224, endnote 88)

Rowe: “Unless a building in some way or other evokes something remembered, it is not easy to see how it can enlist even a shred of popular interest. The ideal of order based on upon public understanding, if it is to be insisted upon, requires some suppression of both experimentalist and futurist enthusiasm” He comes to this statement as follows: “how to be intelligible without involving retrospection?… except in terms of retrospection, in terms of memory upon which prophecy itself is based, upon recollection of words with meaning, mathematical symbols with values, and physical forms with attendant overtones, it is difficult to see how any ideal communication can flourish.” (Rowe 1972, 81)

Norberg-Schulz: “A language which offers a new word for every new situation is no language. Meaning presupposes the repetition of a limited number of elements and relations which however should allow the combinations necessary to cover all important life situations” (1965, 155)

“That an independent, that is, meaningless form has quality is an absurd statement.” (156) “Such isolated forms (‘fancies’) are certainly possible but remain meaningless” (156, footnote 105)

“The words ‘extension’, ‘delimitation’, ‘standing’, ‘resting’, and ‘towering’, refer to modes of being-in-the-world in terms of spatiality. Although the possibilities are infinite, the modes always appear as variations of archetypes. We all know some of these, as column, gable, architecture, dome, or tower. The very fact that language names these things, proves their importance as types of images which visualize the basic structure of spatiality.” (1983, 437)

“[The] natural language [of space] has its foundation in the way human beings exist in the world, embodied and mortal, under the sky and on the earth; it is bound up with experiences of rising and falling, of getting up and lying down, of height and depth.” (1997, 125)

33 This is rather a blunt way of putting what is actually called ‘humanist subject’. But even a cursory reflection on the so-called humanist subject will show the untenability of the notion as individual subject, as the problems put forth under this question of subject all lead to other systems of thinking which are always reified in traditions and languages beyond the subject. A possible critique of those systems cannot be identified with the critique of individual intentionality, as this would be the paradox of anti-humanist thinkers, who are subjects, like Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, etc. The paradox of the anti-humanist nihilist still writing books to tell what he thinks.

34 It is not clear whether this issues from a Hegelian understanding of history, hence ‘now is the time’; or, from a more transcendental view of language as a universal structure of intentionality closed upon itself under its own logic.

35 Hays claims that phenomenology and structuralism differ on subject. For him structuralism: “liquidates the subject”, making it an “effect of signifying system”. Phenomenology: “relies on concepts like consciousness and presence and tends to privilege the signified over the signifier, interiority over exteriority, subject over system”.

I think this is not accurate. If structuralism liquefies the subject in the system of signification (the codes, signs), phenomenology liquefies it in the life form as a binding condition between individuals. The former makes the subject a function of the systems of signification, codes, etc., the latter makes it an effect of tradition, hence in both the individual intentionality is bypassed via structures of meaning beyond subject, the structures of language(s) or the collective intentionality. ‘Death of author’ is also the idea that it is language that speaks us, language is the house (prison) of Being. In both agency is dropped. Both accounts are beacon models of agency.


37 “Techne belongs to the notion of poiesis, which reveals or discloses aletheia, the truth, and goes hand in hand with episteme or scientia”. “No construction without construing, and no construing without construction. This is exemplified in the process of making of architectural details. A triglyph is the embodiment in stone of a wood technology, which as Hersey has pointed out, already was the embodiment of a bone technology… The decoration of a Doric temple is a construing in stone of the elements of a wooden building, whereas the construing of a cosmological order is constructed in Renaissance villa… Non-trivial buildings are always devised with this chiastic quality. They are thinking machines…” (Frascari 1991, 117)

38 “Initially without meaning, the signs of the metamorphosis of the constructed space acquire significance through convention” (Frascari 1991, 37).
As Frascari sees it the way the detail works is the way geometry is meaningful, a matter of perception: “Such signs, that is, the details, acquire a meaning by virtue of which they become a vehicle of knowledge through a long process of association and comparison and through a set of geometric relationships.” “An empirical theory that regards all perception of space as depending upon conventions and takes not only qualities, but even details as nothing more than signs, the meaning of which are learned only by experience. These conventions are the basis for architecture understood as existence, form, and location of external objects” (1984, 504-505). Note here the echo of the idea of sign as understood by Tafuri in reference to Eco: “conventions that tie a meaning to perception” (Frascari 1984, 506)

39 “Each building refers to others in an endless chain”, “thus architecture weaves culture” (Frascari 1991, 22-23)

40 “The... poetic procedure of invention through an anatomical and philological decomposition of historical structures, followed by a hermeneutical reconstruction...” (Frascari 1991, 66)

41 Stirling writes on Staatsgalerie expressing his view of architecture as a problem of vocabulary: “to evoke an association of Museum... and I would like the visitor to feel ‘it looks like a museum’... casually monumental is diminished by deliberately informal.” “In addition to Representational and Abstract, this large complex I hope supports the Monumental and Informal, also, the Traditional and High-Tech.” (in Hays 1998, 318)

42 “Non-trivial buildings are always devised with this chiastic quality. They are thinking machines.” (Frascari 1991, 117)

43 See section 3.4. below.

44 Even in James Joyce there is always this reference to other words.


46 Frascari refers to Vico, but I think there might be other ways of reading Vico which will not end up with making Staatsgalerie as ‘meaningful’ as Scarpa’s architecture. See section 3.4. below.

47 “Such signs, that is, the details, acquire a meaning by virtue of which they become a vehicle of knowledge through a long process of association and comparison and through a set of geometric relationships.” “An empirical theory that regards all perception of space as depending upon conventions and takes not only qualities, but even details as nothing more than signs, the meaning of which are learned only by experience. These conventions are the basis for architecture understood as existence, form, and location of external objects” (Frascari 1984, 504-505).

“...the detail expresses the process of signification; that is, the attaching of meanings to man-produced objects. The details are then the locii where knowledge is of an order in which the mind finds its own working, that is, logos.” (Frascari 1984, 500)

“Techne is reflection in action embodied in details...the process of architectural signification” (Frascari 1984, 512, footnote 3)
“The detail is the unit of architectural production, the minimal units of signification in the architectural production of meanings” (Frascari 1984, 500)

48 The ‘higher nexus of ides’ that Gunter Bandmann (1951) underlines is a level of ideas that are articulated in linguistic forms of cultural reflection. This is why they are called ‘cultural meanings’ in the first place.

See also the linguistic hinge in Vesely’s explanation of symbolic meaning: “There is no doubt that visible reality is also the most important domain of symbolic representation. The mediating role of imagination and its ability to cross the boundary between visible and invisible reality brings it close to the classical definition of symbolism – the visualization of the invisible. It is only under certain conditions that visible phenomena acquire the status of a symbol, which is a special manifestation of meaning, acting not in isolation but as a nucleus of a broader symbolic field.” (2004, 85)

“The same body of meaning is clearly interpreted differently in painting, sculpture, and architecture, and the differences are inevitably reflected in the nature of a particular representation and its mode of visibility. In examining the particular modes of representation, we find not only what is specific and unique to them but also what they share in common and what can therefore serve as a ground for communication between them.” (2004, 85-86)

“The process of mediation found its fulfillment in the hierarchy of representations, which is most explicitly reflected in the hierarchy of the arts. Architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music, and indeed philosophy, each have certain possibilities of articulation, determined by the conditions of their embodiment. In philosophy or poetry, it is possible to speak about the idea of world unity or move into the domain of metaphysics or theology. In painting, this is impossible. Painting always depends for its articulation on the iconicity of verbal language and thought. It has to create its own iconicity, informed by the content that has already been articulated through language.” (2004, 92)

See this relation between visible and invisible in Frascari, among other references, e.g., (1991, 116), when he writes about translation between cultural media as substituting “a signifier with another signifier for the same signified”. (1991, 112)

49 Vesely’s view relies on the embeddedness of a representational system into a life practice, hence the unity of architectural object is dependent upon the unity of the cultural narrative in the continuity of an ethos. This is in line with the conception of architectural form acquiring meaning via convention and contract in time. The point of analogy hinges upon this conception, as the analogy is the source of meaning where the relation between the cultural narrative and architectural form is based on a social contract, a shared framework of interpretation evolved in time through convention. Metaphorical space translates the cultural narrative into an organization of architectural forms figuration of which makes use of established symbolic structures. Hence architecture is read before experienced as spatial performance. For Vesely, any such possible spatial experience, if it is to be meaningful, is only a secondary phenomenon upon a knowledge of the cultural text which grounds the analogical operations in the figuration of architectural object. Outside the cultural narrative, outside the analogical network that maps the cultural narrative into architectural object, the architectural form is mute as it is devoid of sense in itself. Its sole condition for carrying
a meaning charge is to refer to an ideality in the communicative space of culture, to exist within the holistic structure of a system of representation. In this view, there is no possibility of access to the architectural unity beyond its narrative content. The Erlebnis of architectural unity is but a disconnected self-enjoyment, without a possible merge into a larger Erfahrung as the immediate perceptual unity is something like an illusion (his idea of aesthetic experience) without the knowledge of the cultural narrative. See his conception:

“Analogy opens the horizon of communicative space, which is structured by resemblances, similarities, metaphors” (2004, 155)

On Guarrini, Sindone Chapel, his interpretation is mostly an iconographical reading: “quantitative entities and their qualitative meanings.” (2004, 199-200)

On another Baroque example: “the striking visual unity of the space”, but “the visual unity of space is only a secondary manifestation of a deeper unity that cannot be grasped through aesthetic experience. We can comprehend it as we can unfold, while we listen, the meaning of a polyphonic musical composition based on a text”, thus the unity is the unity of the cultural text, cultural narrative, that exists before architectural space, the iconography of the church. (2004, 217-218)

He underlines ‘allegory’: a fully developed visual discourse structured by metaphors… depends on the presence of the articulated, ontologically structured world.” (2004, 222)

50 “In any field of human inquiry, a crucial question is that of translation. How do you translate something into something else? How do you substitute a signifier with another signifier for the same signified?” (Frascari 1991, 112)

“Tropes: Buildings are passive structures in which the quotidian art of living well finds infinite expression. In them lineaments of construction and the harmony of building elements trace the tropes of human habits that are elicited by a figurative imagination. This is based on topical thinking, an interactive procedure that produces a knowledge based on images and figures, an eidetic process… A powerful conceptual tool, a trope is a playful interpretation that relates forms (eidos) that would otherwise never be associated.” (Frascari 1991, 119-120)

“Architecture is [then] a technological expression for the metamorphosis of signs that are understood as unique. Misplaceable free meanings constitute these signs but architecture by transforming them into a built framework of events and places [the moment of metaphorical transformation into architectural form] changes them into stable and unchangeable representations whose meanings are transmittable and assimilable.” (Frascari 1991, 22)

51 Dewey’s account of the difference between recognition and perception may help to understand this. Recognition is “perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely” where as perception is “a series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective fulfillment”. Thus recognition is a “falling back upon a previously formed scheme” (Dewey 1934, 52). When Frascari refers to learned associations, or when Frampton rules out fine art architecture similarity in forming meaning and underlines the ‘slow’ evolution (transformation) of architectural forms (in architectural tradition), or when Norberg-Schulz and Vesely refer to the concept development in language
as a model for understanding the question of meaning in architecture, and also when metaphorical thinking, analogical reflection is emphasized as the way of meaning in architecture, there is the component of ‘recognition’ that is shared by all these accounts. Rather than looking at the freedom of experience to develop in its full potentiality under the guidance of the object, the relation of the object to the experiencing subject is set within a network of known significances. Hence the object becomes a token of a general idea, meaning, notion that is already at hand in a life practice.

Dewey’s view is that understanding experience itself is the only way of understanding aesthetic experience as aesthetic experience is experience in its full integrity: “For it is experience freed from the forces that impede and confuse its development as experience; freed, that is, from the factors that subordinate any experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself.” (1934, 274)

The difference between perception and recognition also hinges on the difference between seeing and seeing-as. For Dewey, if there is a seeing-as, it already is a recognition before perception, hence the object is subsumed under a known significance, and the experience of the object fades into this known significance before making its full claim as a phenomenal event. Seeing is forced when there is no ‘easy’ seeing-as, the object resists to be subsumed under learned associations, and the question of experience as a phenomenal discriminative capacity only then begins.

52 Just to note one example: “Abstract structures and their implied meaning by their authors… do not communicate.” (Vesely 2004, 24)

53 “The visual unity of the space is only a secondary manifestation of a deeper unity that cannot be grasped through aesthetic experience. We can comprehend it as we can unfold, while we listen, the meaning of a polyphonic musical composition based on a text.” (Vesely 2004, 218)

54 The invisible and geometry: “Prior to 19th century, the architect’s concern for mathemata was never merely formal… Architectural intentionality was transcendental, necessarily symbolic. Its mode of operation was therefore metaphor, not mathematic equations.” (Perez-Gomez 1983, 7)

Perez-Gomez’s reference for ‘symbol’: “symbol as an ‘appresentational’ pair that relates the finite and mutable with the immutable and eternal, lived reality with ideas. Symbolization is thus the most fundamental operation constituting meaning in human existence, the basis for the perpetuation of culture.” (1983, 328, endnote 16)

Geometry and mathematics as meaning and value, the poetic content: “transcendental dimension of meaning in architecture” (12). Art as a form of metaphysics: “metaphysics into matter” (10). Traditional theory as “underlined by metaphysical preoccupations often implicit in the mathematical rules themselves”

“Geometry descended from the heavens and lost its sacred character as a result of the epistemological revolution brought about by Galileo’s speculation during the first decades of seventeenth century. The ‘spatiality’ that referred to the immediate network of intentions relating man’s embodied being with the Lebenswelt, and that followed for the apprehension of his place in a hierarchical order, could now be replaced by geometrical space.” (10)
The idea of *mathemata* in Vesely and Perez-Gomez: Even if this has been a mode in architecture, its possibility is dependent on a larger shared world view, a common understanding, a belief network which enabled the possibility of architecture articulating cosmological meanings in its construction. But this does not mean that form as ordering elements in space (and in time) acquires meaning only through such association. This is a very limited understanding of meaning as representation in its linguistic sense. Something representing something in its absence, hence the need for an articulate system to achieve the unity of a meaning system.

The difference between geometrical judgment of spatial relations and a judgment of form in the experience of the work of art is that geometrical figures depend upon a general network of meanings, either in the form of pure spatial concepts of modern geometry, or the cosmological meanings of traditional / metaphysical geometry, to be apprehended as demonstration of a significance, whereas aesthetic form achieves its unity not from a general significance prior to it, but upon the particular intentionality at work in its construction of space. The similarity is that they both issue from the same source of perceptual and spatial apparatus which is the basis of our shared intentionality, the commonality that enables us to communicate in Arendt’s terms.

Geometry, understood as ordering space, whether by geometrical concepts as pure spatial concepts (Galileo’s geometry as “descent from heavens”), or cosmological concepts (metaphysics), is a different form of judgment, and purely descriptive as the construction of geometrical figures is rule based upon spatial intuition. There is not a ‘good’ or ‘beautiful’ circle, a circle is a circle whether it is ‘just a circle’ or ‘the circle of life’. Geometrical configurations cannot hold value judgments by themselves because they are rule based, even if such rules are dependent upon the common spatial intuitive base we share as part of our perceptual apparatus. Hence, the question of appropriateness of a geometrical figure in some context of meaning is dependent upon an intuition of its spatiality and determined to the degree that there cannot be any discussion of a particular configuration beyond the general rule under which it is subsumed.

Geometry as an example field of Vico’s dictum verum ipsum factum (Kunze writes on Vico and geometry to explain that truths are demonstrable because they are our creation, 1987, 86-88): I think to take Vico’s insight on geometry as a meaning model in architecture, as explaining the question of meaning in architecture in terms of ‘higher significances’ as done by Frascari is misleading. Vico’s insight into geometry shows the analogy between geometry and art as to their potential to be shared, as relating to the mechanisms of intersubjectivity, and human communication on the basis of shared intentional structures which also secures the common ground of experience. The way we understand geometry, and art, metaphor are similar in that all use a special knowledge that is intuition (both temporal and spatial), the phenomenal consciousness of a certain spatio-temporal order, but the way they treat their objects are diametrically opposite in that geometry immediately moves beyond intuition into a realm of concepts and the geometrician dwells here, while we all the more stay with the object itself in art without subsuming it under general significances. Even if geometry as such carried meanings as part of a cosmology, there is still this move from the concrete figure at hand to its concept, meaning, as a general spatial organization, hence the perceptual figure in its concreteness is only a representation of a general idea, a general image, and its value is only of a particular demonstration.
To a certain extent, Gadamer's treatment of art in *Truth and Method* is one-sided precisely because he uses the example of art to make a point of more general significance. (editor Robert Bernasconi (Gadamer 1986, xii)) The same point is also made by Janet Wolff (1975:127) and Paul Crowther (1993:35). Gadamer’s concern in *Truth and Method* is to show that language is knowledge, hence his idea of experience is bound with this project. This is evident when these two quotes below are compared in terms of Hegel’s insight into Erfahrung. In *Truth and Method* Gadamer writes:

“Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground the fact that experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different from all moral knowledge, and indeed from all conceptual knowledge – but still knowledge, i.e., conveying truth?

This can hardly be recognized if, with Kant, one measures the truth of knowledge by the scientific concept of knowledge and the scientific concept of reality. It is necessary to take the concept of experience (Erfahrung) more broadly than Kant did, so that the experience of the work of art can be understood as experience. For this we can appeal to Hegel’s admirable lectures on aesthetics. Here the truth that lies in every artistic experience is recognized and at the same time mediated with historical consciousness.” (1960, 97-98)

Later in reference to Hegel who defined beauty as "the sensuous showing of the idea", Gadamer writes that "the idea, which normally can only be glimpsed from afar, presents itself in the sensuous appearance of the beautiful; nevertheless, this seems to me to be an idealistic temptation that fails to do justice to the fact that the work speaks to us as a work and not as the bearer of a message" (1986, 33).

Dewey writes: “Interaction of a living being with an environment is found in vegetative and animal life. But the experience is human and conscious as that which is given here and now is extended by meanings and values drawn from what is absent in fact and present only in the imagination”, for him there is always this ‘gap’ between present and past in the experience that passes what he calls the threshold of consciousness, hence, “all conscious perception involves a risk; it is a venture into the unknown” (1934, 272). See also section 3.4. below for a further discussion of Dewey’s view of the symbolic distance in terms of memory and imagination.

Gadamer asserts the singular meaning in the experience of artworks in later context: "metaphor disappears when the intellectual insight which it serves is awakened" and he suggests that metaphor cannot provide an account of poetry. (1989, 46)

“The poet, in the novelty of his images, is always the origin of language.” (Bachelard, xx)

I think this is also what Bachelard has in mind when he underlines “the psychological action of a poem.” (1958, xxiii)

“Here expression creates being.” (Bachelard 1958, xxiii)
“We see or experience the emotion in the work of art, we do not ‘read it off’.” (Wollheim 1968, 60)

The resonances are dispersed on the different planes of our life in the world, while the repercussions invite us to give greater depth to our own existence. In the resonance we hear the poem, in the reverberations we speak it, it is our own. The reverberations bring about a change of being.” (Bachelard 1958, xxii)

Wollheim underlines that “art is not iconic in the strongest sense”. In a linguistic sense, “a work of art would threaten to be little more than an assemblage or compilation of pre-existing items” (Wollheim 1968, 61). For him it would be to ignore art’s contribution to human experience if it is held that “it merely appropriates, or annexes to itself, feelings, thoughts, attitudes, that are already in existence.” (Wollheim, 101)

See also Frampton 1995, 10-12.

Grassi, in reference to Cicero, underlines ‘topics’ as points of departure, as “the places where the arguments can be found” and that they are a matter of invention, places for invention (1980, 42). If these are acts of productive imagination, then there is newness involved, an imaginative leap through which a new take on reality emerges. This is also what must underlie Kunze’s idea of rhetoric place (1987, 90). If topics are a matter of invention, then the linguistic account runs into the problem of ‘sign’: modify the sign, but how far, in what direction? The qualitative dimension of phenomenal consciousness cannot be accounted for within the linguistic scheme where every particular is understood in terms of a general. When we see something, we apprehend the qualities directly (all the aspects most of which are not in my language), linguistic expression is a second event on this, metaphor happens here, to delineate an aspect from another known and translate it here, to say what indeed you see before saying it. Grassi quotes Vico: “Topics is the theory of original vision, which is the source of ‘ingenious’, i.e., rationally non-deducible forms of teaching and learning. Topics finds and collects…” (1980, 44-45) The first assertions that are know without further inquiry and reflection are in need of ‘imaginative / rhetorical language’ to be communicated, from the thing, from the phenomenal awareness to language. Thus “every fundamental speech must be pictorial” (Grassi 1980, 60). The linguistic expression of metaphor is an expression of genuine seeing, an experience in Dewey’s terms.

I think Theador Lipps account of projection of body states to architectural configurations (as referred in Scott 1914) as the ground of architectural experience is misleading. We do not read architecture, we experience it bodily. Hence the phenomenal consciousness of space cannot be reduced to a seeing of a sculpture from a distance and making sense of its gesture in the familiarity of our body language. Inhabiting space marks a distinction, it is not what you see and makes sense, but what happens to you in being in space.

“Just as we may say with Kant, “there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience”, so we can say that knowledge of place begins with the bodily experience of being-in-place.” (Casey 1993, 46)

Stravinsky writes on the search for ‘origins’: “A living illusion is more valuable than a dead reality” (1947, 25) “Imaginary voyages into the ‘origins’… never anything exact can come… does not make us better acquainted with music.” (1947, 27)
68 A conceptual form for Eisenman is that which leads from its perception immediately to a concept of its formation: “A conceptual structure is that aspect of visible form, whether it is an idea in a drawing, or in a building, which is intentionally put in the form to provide access to the inner form or universal formal relationships. In order to approximate a conceptual intention, the shapes which are perceived would have to contain a structure within their physical presence which would have the capacity to take the viewer from the sense (immediate) perception to a conceptual attitude, and at the same time requiring of this structure a capacity to suppress the possible primacy of a sensual response.” (Eisenman quoted in Hays 1998, 522)

69 Hays explains Eisenman’s conception: “architecture represents the very process of ‘architecturing’: that the effort to represent the inner logic of the object in the object itself is made not because of some preordained decision to exclude other considerations but because of the felt consequence of a historical evolution crucial, if not unique, to the discipline of architecture itself. This evolution, which began with modernism, fuses the practice of architecture with the critique of architecture and replaces the functional object with a theoretical one” (1998, 235). The move here from ‘functional’ to ‘theoretical’ is in fact the same move from ‘functional’ to ‘poetic’ in Frascari.

70 “A ‘not-classical’ architecture is no longer a certification of experience or a simulation of history of reason, or reality in the present. Instead, it may be more appropriately described as an other manifestation, an architecture as is, now as a fiction. It is a representation of itself, of its own values and internal experience.” (Eisenman 1984, 531)

71 Eisenman: dislocating the traditional interpretation of architectural elements, so that the “figure can be read rhetorically as opposed to aesthetically or metaphorically” (1987, 177). “Postmodernist impulse in architecture quite rightly restored figuration”. “When its figural sign was rhetorically based, as in the case of Graves, it was done within and accepting the traditional and elemental vocabulary of architecture (i.e. columns, beams, walls, doors). It assumes this to be natural”. Thus it is “merely another kind of classical or traditional figuration” (1987, 179).

72 “In architecture only one aspect of the figure is traditionally at work: object representation. The architectural figure always alludes to –aims at representation of- some other object, whether architectural, anthropomorphic, natural, or technological” (Eisenman 1984, 530). Note how he sees this as the sole ground of object formation in architecture: “Thus, Le Corbusier’s houses that look like modern steamships or bi-planes exhibit the same referential attitude toward representation as a Renaissance or ‘classical’ building. The points of reference are different, but the implications for the object are the same.” … “architecture ‘as is’ vs. architecture as a message” (Eisenman 1984, 525)

But Le Corbusier sees architecture in all kinds of things, for example when he makes a roof from a crab shell, is this representation of the crab?

73 “What is being ‘written’ is not the object itself–its mass and volume–but the act of massing.” The object signals its reading through ‘traces’. It becomes a “partial or fragmentary sign… (signifying) an action that is in process”. “Trace is unconcerned with forming an image which the representation of a previous architecture or of social customs and usages; rather, it is concerned with the marking –literally the figuration –of its own internal processes.
Thus the trace is the record of motivation, the record of an action, not an image of another object—origin.” (Eisenman 1984, 533)

74 I am using the Pyramid and the Labyrinth in reference to Bernard Tschumi’s 1975 essay “The Architectural Paradox”: “Should I intensify the quarantine in the chambers of the Pyramid? Shall I sink to the depths where no one will be able to reach me and understand me, living among abstract connections more frequently expressed by inner monologues than by direct realities? Shall architecture, which started with the building of tombs, return to the Tomb, to the eternal silence finally transcended history? Shall architecture perform at the service of illusory functions and build virtual spaces? My voyage into the abstract realm of language, into the dematerialized world of concepts, meant the removal of architecture from its intricate and convoluted element: space. Removal from the exhilarating differences between the apse and nave of Ely Cathedral, between Salisbury Plain and Stonehenge, between the Street and my Living Room. Space is real, for it seems to affect my senses long before my reason. The materiality of my body coincides and struggles with the materiality of space. My body carries in itself spatial properties and spatial determination: up, down, right, left, symmetry, dissymetry. It hears as much as it sees. Unfolding against the projections of reason, against the Absolute Truth, against the Pyramid, here is the Sensory Space, the Labyrinth, the Hole. Dislocated and dissociated by language or culture or economy into specialized ghettos of sex and mind, Soho and Bloomsbury, 42nd Street and West 40th Street, here is where my body tries to rediscover its lost unity, its energies and impulses, its rhythms and its flux…” (223, all italic in the original)

When Tschumi wrote about the Pyramid and the Labyrinth in 1975, he was outlining an architectural agenda that aimed at going beyond architectural form as a discursive entity in itself independent of its mediative relation to the event space of life. Writing very much in the spirit of Lefebvre, Tschumi distinguishes between “space as pure form” and “space as social product” in that essay. For this latter he writes: “the sensual architectural reality is not experienced as an abstract object already transformed by consciousness but as an immediate and concrete human activity—as a praxis, with all its subjectivity” (227). Spatial praxis: “it is personal and requires an immediate experience. Opposed to Hegel’s Erfahrung and close to Bataille’s ‘interior experience’, this immediacy bridges sensory pleasure and reason…This immediacy does not give precedence to the experiential term however. For it is only by recognizing the architectural rule that the subject of space will reach the depth of experience and its sensuality. Like eroticism, architecture needs both system and excess.” (227).

The promise of the Labyrinth I see in these statements is that it is a unified experience but its unity is not conferred by a prior idea or articulate representations. It is about the unity of an original act of seeing as being in space, as judgment in the immediacy of here and now. However, I think Tschumi’s own architectural work do not live up to the promises in his own writings about the nature of spatial experience as he developed his conceptions in subsequent writings after this early essay. Because, I think the immediate experience of space cannot simply be understood in terms of a practice of space as a social phenomenon if it does not acknowledge the formal mediation. See section 3.2. on Tschumi’s work.
“Let us consider architectural thinking. By that I don’t mean to conceive architecture as a technique separate from thought and therefore possibly suitable to represent it in space, to constitute almost an embodiment of thinking, but rather to raise the question of architecture as a possibility of thought, which cannot be reduced to the status of a representation of thought.” (Derrida 1986a, 144)

“The introduction of visual conventions, this immanent metaphysics, has become so natural to architecture that Jacques Derrida said that architecture was the locus of metaphysics of presence. The acceptance of this idea has rarely been questioned. But it is precisely the questioning of presence that has made Derrida’s work important for architecture. Since the late 1970s, the question of the metaphysics of presence and the hegemony of the visual have been central to my work.” (Eisenman 2006, 203)

Taking architecture as “foundational metaphor” can only start a process of thinking which can go like Eisenman’s if it does not go beyond this hyle-morphic representational moment. See Wigley 1988.

Eisenman writes on the classical conception that it “[reduces] architecture to an ‘added to’ or ‘inessential’ object by making it simply an effect of certain causes as origins… as something ‘added to’ rather than something with its own being –as adjectival rather than nominal or ontological” (Eisenman 1984, 531). Note the Hegelian overtones of this thinking that cuts across the unity of object and subject.

“We should not avoid the issue: if this configuration presides over what in the West is called architecture, do these folies not raze it? Do they not lead back to the desert of “anarchitecture”, a zero degree of architectural writing where this writing would lose itself, henceforth without finality, aesthetic aura, fundamentals, hierarchical principles or symbolic signification, in short, in a prose mode of abstract, neutral, inhuman, useless, uninhabitable and meaningless volumes?

Precisely not. The folies affirm, and engage their affirmation beyond this ultimately annihilating, secretly nihilistic repetition of metaphysical architecture.” (Derrida 1986b, 574)

Derrida on La Villette’s folies: “Without nostalgia, the most living act of memory. Nothing, here, of that nihilistic gesture which would fulfill a certain theme of metaphysics; no reversal of values aimed at an unaesthetic, uninhabitable, unusable, asymbolical and meaningless architecture, an architecture simply left vacant after the retreat of gods and men.” (1986b, 574)

“The aim of reestablishing architecture in what should have been specifically its own is not to reconstitute a simple of architecture, a simply architectural architecture through a purist or integratist obsession. It is no longer a question of saving its own in the virginal immanence of its economy and of returning it to its inalienable presence, a presence which, ultimately is non-representational, non-mimetic and refers to only itself. This autonomy of architecture, which would thus pretend to reconcile a formalism and a semanticism in their extremes, would only fulfill the metaphysics it pretended to deconstruct.” (Derrida 1986b, 575)

“A divided line at the edge of meaning before any presentation, beyond it” writes Derrida on what he sees in La Villette (1986b, 581). See also section 3.2. below for further discussion of Derrida’s thinking on architecture.
Representation and performance in architectural form: Eisenman’s interpretation of Libeskind’s Chamber Works is that they are to be approached as a kind of writing, in line with his own paradigm of textuality. But when you look at the drawings they are not ‘self-explanatory’ texts as Eisenman’s, they do not carry the burden of a prescribed logic of formation, transformation. Their self-referentiality is of an other order, and they actually are not open to ‘reading’ of any sort that Eisenman has in mind (a structure in itself, that includes the logic of its own making, hence the readability). Eisenman’s frame is not helpful to answer why to call these drawings architecture; as a writing, but what kind of writing that deserves to be called architecture which does not even refer to a formal logic inscribed into them, that holds them together, that determines their texture? They are not about architectural form as Eisenman understands it in its figurative sense, the sense of the memory of architecture that gives life to these drawings is more about the making of space by architectural form, that is, they are not about figuration of architecture, at the level of sign, but they convey the memory of line as it structures space and its possibilities, what indeed may be the grounding of ‘figuration’. They are performative rather than representational, the marking and spacing, the ordering of space and time by ordering things in space and time. Figuration in Eisenman’s sense is an abstraction upon such marking and spacing, which does not have a representational role in itself. It does not represent, it does. Hence Eisenman’s logic of ‘architecture as’ vs. ‘architecture is’ takes the classical tradition of form as figuration as its grounding, missing a more original sense of making architecture as rhetoric of space (see Evans 1984).

81 The aesthetic autonomy of the art object is the formal autonomy in Adorno. Eisenman writes about the same unity of perceptible form, because in the case of language, as utterance of sound or marks on a surface, we cannot tell the difference between non-sense and noise. It is only formal relations that can induce such a possibility, and language of form, as ordering space and time, can only be meaningless in the conventional sense, but it cannot purge off its unity to become even the non-sense it is. And it is non-sense in this sense of conventional representation that Derrida criticizes as being on the side of metaphysics of presence.

82 “For it was necessary to speak of promise and pledge, of promise as affirmation, the promise that provides the privileged example of a performative writing. More than an example: the very condition of such writing… the provocation of the event I speak of (‘I promise’ for example), that I describe or trace; the event that I make happen or let happen by marking it… The performative mark spaces is the event of spacing.” (Derrida 1986b, 580)

83 The other, “the one through whom the promised event will happen or will not”, “the other in the magnetic field of attraction, of the “common denominator”, “the other (who is) only called to countersign the pledge, the engagement or the wager.” (Derrida 1986b, 580)

84 Eisenman’s proposed paradigm: arbitrary origin – motivation – process – and no end in view prior to process. A writing and reading on a logic of traces. A formal logic unfolding the making of the object: Within all this smooth narrative, where are we to locate the qualitative hinge that characterizes his work? How is one to decide one configuration over another in the process, whence comes the sense of appropriateness when the process starts from an arbitrary origin, which he only demands to be ‘methodologically viable’? What is this ‘methodological viability’ if not an anticipation of some formal procedures which cannot be explained by the arbitrary origin?
Even if there is not a ‘predetermined’ path, origin and end, there is still something that depends on judgments beyond the internal conceptuality of formation of object as a thing in itself. The end that is the result of the operation is what holds the operation together, thus it requires judgment, not necessarily by way of a preconception as to what it should be, but at least where to stop, and whether the result is satisfactory or not, and satisfactory in what terms. Eisenman writes as if all the intentional objects of such judgments are under the systemic control of an operation beyond memory and subject, hence can be dropped; ‘the author is dead as is the reader’; moreover, a main theme underlying his arguments is that it is these judgments that one should do away with. The assumption is that the whole set of judgments bear the methodological transferences of the generative narratives, even if not all of them are recognized as such. However, this logic begins to weaken if we consider this: yes. break the line, but to which direction and in what way? Fragment the Platonic solid, but again in which way, in what manner? Say a square, a cube is conceptual. A deformation of a square, a cube is also conceptual. ‘Deformation’: how to choose one deformation over another? They are conceptual to the same degree, hence the choice cannot be based on ‘conceptuality’. Another parameter must be there. Anticipation of an overall unity of architectural object that indeed guides the judgments at different levels of the process of formation of the object, which cannot come from the operations themselves. Many of the formal decisions are not explicable on the basis of generative analogy. At least, if this were the case, the architect’s hand would not be recognizable across different projects; or when recognized, that would be a series of tokens of one and the same idea. The former contradicts with our own experience of Eisenman’s work, the latter contradicts with his own written argument. See also Evans 1985 on the disjunction between Eisenman’s work and his written texts.
CHAPTER 3
LIFE IN SPACE

Representationalist / linguistic thinking of phenomenology and structuralism paralyzes architecture in a vicious circle between truth in language vs. nothing in language, but language: reality in the text or nothing beyond the text. However, there is a real domain of phenomenal experience beyond any sense of representation in form that we learn from architectural tradition, by making in architecture. The constructive instance has its own logic that comes from the artifactuality of space making, it is not simply molded onto any ‘image’, ‘vision of the world’. Still, it is a tool without established ends. The ends have to be redefined, hence the tools are tools insofar as they are open ended, and not open ended within a context of meaning, they are open ended to redefine these very contexts of meaning. As Gregotti states, the constructive moment is “an instrument to realize an architectural vision of the world that precedes the material essence of the specific object” (1996, 55).

Frampton refers to the unity of thinking and making as he reads it in Frascari on his interpretation of Scarpa’s work (307-308). Frampton’s idea of double hermeneutic, while it can be read similar to Frascari’s thinking, points out a greater potential, when tradition is seen as a medium of reflection, leaving free the possibility of life thinking beyond the techniques and procedures reified in forms. ¹ Both Frascari and Frampton cannot fully account for the second sense of thinking life through making architecture as both seem to assume the relevance of the significances that are traditionally valid in architectural form emerging out of an organic unity of life and language. Frascari’s structuralist viewpoint sets the limits for his argument. In Frampton, there is the problem of understanding form and space making as ‘abstract discourse’ beyond the moment of a tectonic reflection. Even if his examples and readings of the works in the book go beyond his official introductory passages, the tone of his discourse of tectonics undermines the
priority of the spatial intent which I think is the core of life thinking in architecture and sets a sense of architectural tradition that goes beyond the specificity of a medium of thinking and making becoming a reified way of making with certain techniques and procedures with certain themes in mind. This latter is also evident in his comparisons between art and architecture.

It is the spatial unity of an architectural object, and the way we live it, that is the context of meaning, in which also details, materials, structure come to speak. Otherwise it would be thinking that these elements will be significant on their own even as objects at hand, without the context of a unifying whole, without a texture that holds together. If tectonics is about weaving a texture, it cannot be its own idea, it cannot generate itself without a unifying conception of a spatial matrix. Architectural space cannot be without the tectonic moment of proper construction, but this does not mean that there are conceptual or visual boundaries for appropriate construction. The ‘tectonic’ cannot be an idea for space. It is the spatial idea that controls the rest, gives sense to them; there is something like the materiality of space itself, the madness of the spatial matrix. Even if this is only visible in a tectonic form, that is, it has to be constructed, assembled; the substantiality of space is more than its construction into form, it is the thought of space that gives its materiality, its ‘sheer presence’ is not the worldliness of its materials, details, but it is worldly as it is imagined as a lived experience even before it is materialized in tectonic form. The structuring of space as a lived experience cannot be reduced to its moment of realization in tectonic form. Forms of architecture, as Le Corbusier understood them, are not about an “abstract discourse”. Architecture is more than a discourse, it is thinking space through forms which is about interpreting life in space.

While Frampton’s research on tectonic form served as a timely call for appropriate making, his argument of tectonics and tradition runs the risk of becoming overly didactic through
possible inattentive interpretations of these notions. Clay Eicher exemplifies such a didactic argument against the idea of performative space and plastic form by taking these as mere ‘image’ and ‘effect’ outside the ‘essentials of making architecture’ which for him are building type, structure, construction technique, function, details, materials, the internal logic of ‘box’. Eicher criticizes Frank Gehry’s work as “random, sculptural composition . . . not architecture”, “not self-explanatory”, without “logic or system” (2003). Basically he says that he cannot see architecture in Gehry’s work. I think this way of thinking sets superficial oppositions between concepts like image / effect / form / art vs. tectonic / structure / type / system / materials / architecture without really addressing the problem of space making beyond a limited understanding of architecture as a self-sufficient tradition. Beyond ‘techne’ or other forms of traditional thinking, there is “a vision of the world”, as Gregotti puts it, to be realized in architecture which is forgotten in this way of creating oppositions on what can only be operative concepts. Eicher construes buildings as ‘plots without images’; tools are made ends in themselves and there is no ‘being in touch with things’ beyond what is deemed ‘worldly’ in the learned tools of making. The ability of rethinking life through the medium of space making is bypassed.

It is not so much the emphasis on making as the way making in architecture is understood as a species of an obsolete idea of techne which is taken as thinking life itself through reified forms of tradition. Igor Stravinsky’s idea of poetic making in music as speculation, for example, designates an open-ended making, an intervention in the human experience. His discussion of natural sound vs. music underlines the constructive, hence the mediative, instance in the making and points to the intersubjective value of construction beyond descriptive rules, form giving. If music is ‘hearing through constructions and reconstructions’, architecture is
‘seeing and living through constructions and reconstructions’, and as such we cannot give any condition as a justificatory ground before seeing the particular intentionality at work in the architectural object. Seeing and living through constructions can only be about life thinking in architectural making, otherwise it is a blind making in a tradition that is learned but not interiorized.

3.1 Image as Quale

It is hard to see how in Eicher’s view architecture can have a connection to culture at large, other than perhaps the narrow possibilities of the ambiguous idea of ‘function’. Any emphasis on lived experience as in Ignasi de Sola-Morales’s weak architecture for example would become ‘set design’ for Eicher: a strict either Disneyland, Las Vegas or the internal processes of the box, without leaving any other option for thinking. Probably Le Corbusier too will be out of his equation of self-referential architecture for the most part with his idea of ‘plastic events’.

Eicher misses any possibility of “authentic image making” as underlined by Gregotti. He misses that ‘image ≠ Kitsch’. Performative space is removed from his discussion altogether which is about image making in a deeper sense of qualia, being in the space, the phenomenal consciousness of what it is like to be in such and such a space. Gregotti also recognizes the notion of image as advanced by market capitalism, however, he also sees that there is a deeper sense of image making as the condition of thinking in the making. The image as Erlebnis of being in space is the condition of the work to become a dialogue between ‘I and Thou’. Architecture interprets life in its own intentionality transforming reality in the lived experience of being in the space. It imagines life from a particular point of view as it mediates body and vision, our embodied experience, through its unique forms. This qualitative image of occupying a spatial matrix temporally is the core of the process of life mediation: having a flower in the
almond, it is about having a take on life, to bring about a state of mind in the experience of the work (*the subject the image constructs*). 

This interpretation of life in architecture can be explored through the idea of image given by Bachelard and Gregotti. Both understand the notion of image as the seed of poetic making where the poet or the architect intervenes in the world of experience with an offer. Another important junction of the two authors is that they both take image as an independent condition from the language of its expression. However their respective conceptions do not fully correspond, and the emphatic differences between the two seem to provide a good field of observation on the possible relations between an idea of image as the core of thinking process and its expression, and its relation to overall background of consciousness.

For Bachelard, the poetic image is a “sudden salience at the surface of the psyche” (1958, xv), “a flicker of the soul” (1958, xxii). The image precedes the construction of the plot of the work, and the way Bachelard speaks about this relation between the image and the work as it is constructed in language emphasizes the independence of the image from the language of its expression in the poem. However, even if Gregotti speaks about image as a new condition, hence independent from existing forms of consciousness as they are reified in the language of making, he emphasizes the moment of construction as part of the realization of image. Thus the way the image is realized in the architectural work needs interpretation. Image is what thinking seeks in the making in architecture. Even if it is the unifying conception that precedes the work, it is only possible, even for the author, as it realizes itself in the language of the work. Yes, perhaps “a flicker of the soul”, but the soul only finds it in the work after hard work of “calculation”:

The mental effort of balancing the six essential colours, red, blue, yellow, orange, violet, green. This is work and cool calculation, when one’s mind is utterly stretched like that of an actor on the stage in a difficult part, when one has to think of a thousand different things at a time within half an hour. ... but I’d like to see a drunkard before his canvas, or on the
stage... Don't think that I would ever artificially work myself into a feverish state. Rather remember that I am engrossed in a complicated calculus, which leads to the quick production of one rapidly painted canvas after the other, which has, however, been calculated at length beforehand. And so, if they tell you that it is done too quickly, you can reply that they have looked too quickly. (Vincent van Gogh writes in a letter to his brother, quoted in Gombrich 1991, 126)

Even if the image is that “vision of reality” that interprets life, it is medium bound, and cannot exist apart from the process of making. The priority of the act of making comes from the fact that the image can only be seen, heard, understood made sense of, even for the author, through the constructive moments of its formation into the work. 18 Thus the interpretation of reality as a distinct offer emerges in the new work as the unity of image and plot / architectural object where the work becomes its own explanation, a self-referential expression, which can reach out only then and say what it has to say in its distinctness. The work’s ‘sheer presence’ is the function of the image it holds, its mimetic instance, but this image itself is only possible through the moment of its construction. 19

Nadja? I took tens of pictures of her. My room is about 3m x 4m... The pictures look all the same. Only very slight differences perhaps... But I get to know her in the very act of taking the picture... and in the slight differences... almost unrecognizable nuances. There is something in this. I recall Le Corbusier’s or Siza’s sketches... drawing the same thing over and over again... with very slight differences perhaps... but the same thing. As if the thing comes to talk only in the very act of drawing, as if the mind/eye/hand remember(s) only when construing the very lines of each new sketch that which does not give itself by mere looking at the previous ones... or, as if each slight difference reveals something of the thing... it is wrestling with an idea... yet to be born...

Ricoeur’s idea of emplotment, constructing a narrativity through the plot has this sense of objectifying the image. 20 Similarly, when Arendt’s takes making in art to be the “thought that
reifies thought” (168), it is the same sense that is underlined of making available an image both
to one’s self and to the other in a common object of experience. It is not that the image is there
and realizing its expression comes after, the process of molding into an expression through
constructive acts of developing an experience is the very process of the birth of the image in its
clarity. A subtle, indefinite intuition that you understand more and more in the act of making it.

This critical distance between the image and its construction in the work is also the
distance between the work and the language and tradition of its medium. The symbolic space of
the work, by which it becomes what it is on its own terms and stands in the communicative space
of culture as a new offer, is always under construction in poetic making. This space is not set
within a field of symbolism, the poetic work is the very construction of this symbolic structure
particular to the moment of its image. Thus, it is the symbolic space of the image that is made in
the making. And this is why seeing-as as the model of perception in Frascari, Perez-Gomez,
Vesely cannot be the explanatory scheme of our relation to the work of art as it cannot recognize
the newness of the symbolic structure, what Ricoeur calls the new predicative structure, the
semantic invention which comes from an original seeing beyond established contexts of
meaning.

Then in a sense no art work is symbolic in the allegorical sense, it is always a new
language, even if the elements are familiar, even if the elements are of a familiar language. In
its internal artifactuality, madeness, textuality, those familiar elements resist to a familiar reading
as would be the case in descriptive language. Hence the hermeneutic problem of understanding
has different bearings in the case of poetic language and descriptive language. The liquefied
meanings of the familiar language in the poetic needs a ground which is not the common ground
of meanings of the descriptive language, discourses, language-games, where the relation between
words and reality is direct, non-problematical, defined in the overall unity of the web of familiar meanings.

Secondly, there is another difference between the explanations of Bachelard and Gregotti which again might be an emphasis shift. For Bachelard, the poetic image is without a past. Gregotti’s “the thought that… interprets, remembers” (1996, 99) may come close to a sense of deep recollection. Even though Gregotti speaks about imagination as constructing “new pieces of reality, thus modifying and enriching the world of our experiences”, rather than as a “mere recollection of images” (100), his text does not provide a full understanding of what his take on the ontological grounds of image might be, a ‘flicker of the soul’, or a ‘deeply rooted recollection’ (opacity of life world, collective memory). My interpretation here is that both may come to the same idea with a nuance in emphasis. 22

Kant’s discussion of genius and judgment of taste might be helpful here to make my point. Kant proposes genius as a capacity that gives its rule to the artwork, rather than promoting an individuality above and beyond common space of culture as sometimes misinterpreted (it is an epistemic point hinging on the possibility of individual reflection), it indicates the exemplary significance in the work of art which bears its formula in itself: a state of purposiveness which cannot be subsumed under a definite rule of a known significance. 23 Taste on the other hand is the necessary judging capacity for the work of genius, it is the constructive capacity in the common space of experience. Hence there is a complementary act between genius and taste in the making of the work in which the image emerges; thus the work is the work of productive and reproductive imagination in unity.

By taste the artist estimates his work after he has exercised and corrected it by manifold examples from art or nature, and after many, often toilsome, attempts to content himself he finds that form which satisfies him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a thing of inspiration or the result of a free swing of the mental powers, but of a slow and even painful process
of improvement, by which he seeks to render it adequate to his thought, without detriment
to the freedom of the play of his powers. (Kant 1790, 175)

Taste, like the judgment in general, is the discipline of genius; it clips its wings it makes it
cultured and polished; but, at the same time, it gives guidance as to where and how far it
may extend itself if it is to remain purposive. And while it brings clearness and order into
the multitude of thoughts [of genius ], it makes the ideas susceptible of being permanently
and, at the same time, universally assented to, and capable of being followed by others.
(Kant 1790, 183)

In this equilibrium between genius and taste, it is only in the work that the image emerges. The
work constructs the image, and image is only available in its constructed form in the common
space of experience. Whether it is a ‘flicker of the soul without a past’ or deeply rooted in
collective consciousness does not make a difference. If it does not emerge in the work, it is a
figment of the mind of a subject. If it emerges, whence is not important; it is beyond subjects as a
common object between them. Image is an act of spontaneity of imagination that is grounded in
the memory of lived experiences but cannot be traced back to a known source. If it emerges in
the work, it emerges both for the maker and the other in a common space of experience. And as
such, whence is not important. What is important is not to set a condition prior to the work, in the
sense of giving the common denominator, in Arendt’s sense, for the common objects of
collectivity, and to realize the individual contribution of poetic making in the world of
experience. There cannot be a ground of legislation, like archetypes, tradition, collective
meanings, precedents, etc. to be held top-down to judge the work prior to the claim made in its
experience. All such grounds of justification can only be explanatory frameworks after the event
which is the work and its experience; they are themselves schematic abstractions from prior
works that has held a place in the consciousness. If we live in concrete situations here and now,
we should keep our openness to work, thus to world and reality, which may catch us in a most
unreflective 24 moment and ‘re-arrange’ our reality as Ricoeur would have it.
3.2 Social Image

The image as the condition of architectural work to become an interpretation of life is beyond understanding the formation of architectural object in terms of recognizable form. However, architectural form is an indispensable condition for the image to emerge as a conditioning of life in and through architecture. In contrast to Eicher’s use of the term, Hays uses ‘effect’ positively in his commentary on the work of Tschumi, emphasizing the intention of creating certain experiences and communicating expressive contents. However, similar to Eicher’s critique of form, Hays’s emphasis shifts to the idea of what he calls “practicing space” (2003, 214) beyond architecture as built form.

If taking architecture as a vocabulary problem, architectural significance as recognizable form, has been a common starting ground for both structuralism and phenomenology, Hays’s comments on Tschumi’s work exemplifies another tendency to reduce architecture to the event space of life as simply policy making at the level of programmatic diagram without considering the performative dimension of architectural form at the level of phenomenal experience. Hays qualifies Tschumi’s work as “machine for effect – with built form deployed almost reluctantly, most efficiently, minimally, and non-rhetorically as possible.” 25 The “non-rhetorical” here in this statement can only be in opposition to an idea of architectural form as rhetorical figuration, as in Frascari and Eisenman, which takes architectural object as discursive in itself. 26

An architecture of effect as spatial practice cannot dispense with the idea of form, if it is still to be an architecture that thinks life in space beyond thinking an abstract idea of ‘social space’. The notion of ‘social space’ in this view may indeed not need architectural thinking at all as it designates a level of human relations and social events that are mostly independent of the phenomenal characteristics of built space beyond a social code (for example ‘church’ as a social / behavioural code) in which they take place. The event space of life as to its social codes is
larger than what architecture can offer as built space. Even if thinking life in architectural space involves thinking this larger space of human relations and social events, this latter, when its thinking is not also brought to the level of reflection on phenomenal experience of built form beyond policy making, is not by itself sufficient to make architecture. Policy making in programming can not be all there is to the intentionality of architectural object. Planning at this level still needs certain decisions on the actual built form which indeed require a certain rhetoric of spatiality above and beyond a rhetoric of form making. When Hays, in line with Tschumi’s own thinking, understands “experienced space” as “more than a concept or perception, (as) a process, a way of practicing space, an event” (2003, 214), he does not make a viable distinction between perception and practice of space. An idea of event, if detached from the idea of perception of built form hence architectural space with an artificial, epistemic surgery in the name of social space, will be thinking in terms of a received Erfahrung as it will be thinking through a collective ‘retrospection’ as Rowe uses the term in a very specific sense of remembrance, habitual seeing (1972, 81). In one sense, this idea of event cannot go beyond ‘eating pastries in a Gothic cathedral’ without ever becoming an architectural event.

When Evans reads a historical way of life in the plans and understands this as a way of conceiving the way architecture ‘encompasses everyday reality’, we should add that occupation of architectural space is beyond the level of organizational diagram of plan, or a layout of programmatic elements. The way architecture interprets life should be beyond this level of planning relations, beyond giving some order to social relations and possible events at a purely diagrammatic level of organization. Life in architecture not only translates into a system of relations on a plan but into spatial character at the level of lived space. It is only by an affirmation of such a performative possibility of built space that architecture can be grasped...
beyond space as practice, use, function, etc. as to its intervention in life which is beyond an abstract notion of social space and also beyond representation and symbolism when these are understood as architectural form as recognizable significance.

Architecture cannot dispense with the idea of form making as rhetoric of space, even if everything at the level of policy making in terms of programmatic relations, if possible at all, is set, there is still the problem of form. The meditative interaction happens at the performative level of space, because you cannot order space and time, hence ‘events’ in space and time, without ordering ‘things’ in the first place in space and time: placing, marking, spacing can only happen as form as it orders space and time. Events, whether you understand them as social or spatial or both, are not simply programmatic abstractions but are lived phenomena at the level of people and objects, at the level of movement, vision, light, etc., all the constituents of experience at its basic level of ‘being somewhere in some situation’. None of these parameters can be thought, not even to mention a precise ordering, without thinking and ordering form. If architectural form has any significance in life, it must lie in such a performative sense of making space. It is in this sense that architectural form orders reality directly, unlike any semantic device or symbols of known significances. There cannot be any phenomenal experience apart from the objective conditions of modulation of things in space and time, thus of space and time, out there in the world and as such it is always of objective conditions of form that interacts with movement and perception even before any question of known significances. Phenomenal consciousness of form that interacts with body cannot be reduced to the consciousness of an intentional state that identifies things in the world as contents of beliefs like ‘this is red’, ‘this is a tree’, ‘this is a church’. It is more a happening in the immediacy of here and now even before we ‘know’ what it is that happens through empirical and linguistic association. It is this level of
exchange and interaction in space and time through an ordering of form that architecture has the capacity to intervene in life and in the world of experience. If there are meanings that are recognized through association in a life form, there is also this level of significance of lived experience through nothing but perception alone in which memory operates differently from mere association. Thus it is the level of experience that Dewey underlines; architecture mediates life through offering such experiences through the way it orders forms, thus space and time in the continuity of everyday life.

And perhaps this is why Tschumi’s architecture does not even rise to the level of lived event as it falls short of the formal mediation. He finds the event space of life sufficient to make architecture, the event space of life as he explores in cinema, photography, dance, etc. To avoid the rhetoric of form making in a representational sense, Tschumi drops the rhetoric of space making through form itself. Parc de La Villette, for example, cannot become the spatial event of its “promise” as Derrida reads into it, in fact only through which the rest of the intervention in event space of life could have been ‘inscribed’. A non-rhetorical form (in my sense of rhetoric, of space making, rather than Frascari’s or Eisenman’s sense of figuration of form), “machine for effect” as Hays calls, does not work even at an operational level without descending to the performative level of lived phenomena. His so-called machines are too generic for the sake of avoiding form in the cerebral spacing of programmatic relations, they do not offer room for the qualitative event of lived space in their pure ‘marking’, ‘spacing’ of Lefebvre’s social space. If thinking life events has an ordering of space and time as its condition, such ordering of space and time has in turn ordering forms in space and time as its condition. Hence thinking experience in architecture should be thinking the forms of things that interact with body, movement and vision, at different scales through their qualitative charges in the consciousness.
A cerebral diagram that sets an overall gesture (a Duchampian gesture) cannot yet make architecture. Architecture needs a qualitative resolution at the level of experience: diagram’s decent on to the world of lived phenomena. We cannot rely on the memory of photography, cinema, or any sort of literary phenomena in the event space of life to make architecture beyond architecture’s own possibilities to materialize space; social events may never even happen in the way they are planned in a diagram of relations.

3.3 the Beetle

The unified gesture of thinking and making embedded in architectural tradition embraces thinking both the object-to-be-made and its conditions of existence in the common space of lived experience. Without thinking this latter, architecture is not able to interpret life at the level of its intentionality. However, it is to be thought in the particularities of the object-to-be-made. Thus it is always a topical event of thinking with the particular contents of phenomenal consciousness. Interpretation of life through architecture is not only about the space the architectural object makes, but also about seeing the possibilities of life situations in that space. The thinking of the space is inseparable from what it is like to be in that space. The phenomenal consciousness of architectural space is the key to the possibility of intervention in the event space of life.

Architectural space, with its particular qualities, mediates and transforms daily practice. It brings forth a new constellation of experiences, events that dissolves the discursive bonds of pre-existing meanings and expands them in an unbounded intuitive field; it transforms these meanings through an architectural mediation. It is important to understand this process of transformation in the spirit of Hannah Arendt’s insight: “the meaningfulness of everyday relationships is disclosed not in everyday life but in rare deeds” (1958, 42). Thus, the phenomenal consciousness of architectural space in the continuity of daily life is such a ‘rare
deed’. Architectural work has the freedom and unpredictability of action in this mediative distance to the codes, significances, necessities of everyday life.

The image in architecture, as an image of life in and through forms of architecture, is a multitude of ‘spatial quale’. As such, architectural space is an intentional object as a construct of imagination, as a “phenomenological fact,” 37 hence it depends on the priority of non-contractual intersubjective experience. The beetle in the box is beyond any signs of a descriptive language: 38

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. -Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might imagine such a thing constantly changing. -But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? -If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as something: for the box might even be empty. -No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (Wittgenstein 1958, 100)

Understanding the notion of significance of an experience beyond linguistic terms is a difficult path, and Wittgenstein has a point: we do not have access to other’s experiences. However, we also want to acknowledge that we share experiences: the non-linguistic achievement of language as bringing forth experiences as we talk about them, as we do something together according to our common experiences even beyond contexts of meaning. For example, we are looking at a sketch, and you say ‘make this line thicker’, ‘see that?’ Even if there is nothing nameable here, there is something in the sketch that becomes more clear perhaps by making that line thicker, and we both see it, we share an ‘aesthetic nuance’ 39 as we are minded in a certain way through the way we experience the relations of the lines in a sketch. The mapping between the poetic metaphor and the reality it speaks of is similar to this: beyond the learned rules of ‘language-games’, there is something shared as we talk.

The gift of structuralist and phenomenological thinking to architecture has been first to introduce and then to problematize the question of meaning on the model of natural language. If,
say, ‘beetle’ is the word we overtly use when we experience *beetle*, then the divide in architecture has been between *no beetle in the ‘beetle’* (that is, “there never has been a perception”: all there is to us is language), or *the beetle is only in the ‘beetle’* (that is, “language is the house of Being”: all there is to us is language). Neither side can see experience of the subject beyond language. Structuralism makes it a function of language and cancels it out. And when structuralist thinking couples with Marxism or psychoanalysis, it looks for factors beyond the beetle, the repressed material, or causal material or psychological factors beyond the consciousness of the utterer; it makes its givenness in the language an accident of history. Phenomenology and hermeneutics make it a function of an effective history, hence a function of language that houses such history as a tradition, and charges it with a significance beyond subjects and their possible takes on the beetle. The beetle becomes given in tradition from above as a reified entity in the collective consciousness. Both ways of thinking reify the linguistic entity, either as a function of some other factor (and criticism becomes finding these other factors, distanced from the dialogue between 'I and Thou') or as an ultimate significance that binds individual subjects as a determination of who they are and what they think (hence the conditions of interpretation, the possibility of beetle as part of a dialogue becomes dependent upon the existence of such a collective significance). For phenomenology and hermeneutic traditions, if the word beetle is not there, or if what is meant by the utterance is highly different from one’s prior understanding of it, the interpretation, hence understanding is not possible. This is what Vesely exemplifies in his comments on Coop Himmelblau and Kurt Schwitters. A top-down approach to the possibilities of significance – the possibilities of how you can interpret the beetle, or may be just how yours is, or even you have it or not – issuing from what that meaning should be, blocks the possibility of seeing the individual, particular significance in the work.
Becoming an ultimate seat of judgment, it judges what emerges in the work beyond collective significance as subjective fantasy without any possibility of being shared.

But probably this is understanding language only in its descriptive sense and collapsing thought to the possibility of its expression in language, ignoring the unity of consciousness as the seat of our experiences, on which also descriptive language rests. 40 Wittgenstein speaks about linguistic meaning, he does not have an argument for the beetle itself. 41 While linguistic meaning is a common object, thus independent from subjects and their experiences (you cannot mean beyond the dictionary), language in its descriptive sense is not the sole possibility of exteriorizing thought or experience, to make individual reflection common beyond what is already common in contexts of meaning.

Gadamer only speaks about the beetle in the familiar language of collective beetle talk in *Truth and Method*. The common term in a shared language is the condition of possibility of dialogue, thus understanding other’s experience. In his later writings he registers the possibility of sharing our experiences in new forms of art beyond known significances and representations:

At the very start I pointed out how the so-called modern age, at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century, had emancipated itself from the shared self-understanding of the humanist-Christian tradition. I also pointed out that the subjects that previously appeared self-evident and binding can now no longer be captured in an artistic form that would allow everyone to recognize them as the familiar language within which new statements are made. This is precisely the new situation as I described it. The artist no longer speaks for the community, but form his own community as far as he expresses himself. Nevertheless, he does create a community, and in principle, this truly universal community extends to the whole world. In fact, all artistic creation challenges each of us to listen to the language in which the work of art speaks and make it our own. It remains true in every case that a shared or potentially shared achievement is at issue. This is true irrespective of whether the formation of a work of art is supposed in advance by a shared view of the world that can be taken for granted, or whether we must first learn to "read" the script and language of the one who speaks in the creation before us. (Gadamer 1986, 39) 42

The possibility of new experience in the new language of an artwork defies the linguistic analogy, as language operates with physical signs that are placeholders for references. Hence a
new language is not possible without a prior language and a new statement is only possible in a prior language. No new sign is possible to refer to something new. But artwork does not refer by using placeholders. Even when it has reference, a representational content, still the work is first and foremost a specific performance in space and time; it does its reference beyond referring to it: an imminence, 43 an internal presence in its factuality beyond its referent. The experience that emerges in the unfamiliar language of the work of art also shows that spoken language itself depends on a larger field of consciousness and experience. The possibility of metaphor that liquefies the meanings in certain contexts and transforms, transfers qualities of first-person experience between distant things indicates a non-discursive plane in our experience of the world, the possibility of seeing things beyond what they are in certain contexts of meaning.

Even if Gadamer keeps his original view of hermeneutic experience, his later explanations broaden the notion of horizon from a commonality of an order of things in space and time given in familiar language to the way we order things in space and time, hence the way we order space and time. Hermeneutic experience finds a larger ground of reality for the possibilities of sharing and participation than the reality given in a common language: a reality that can be shared in a new language even if our familiarity with it is only occasioned by the artwork. If we keep the original view in *Truth and Method*, that our access to the work is enabled by our apprehending the reality that the work speaks of, the sense of such reality is broadened from a linguistic reality, a reality given in ideals of language, to a reality which may exist only as a possibility in a larger ground of phenomenal experience. 44

The image, the beetle, in the work is a new constellation in the concreteness of here and now, beyond established systems of descriptive language, a new significance emerges. The imaginative constellation of the work is an experience. The work does not describe the beetle, it
is the shining of the beetle, but the beetle is not an Essence, it is an act of spontaneity of imagination, it is human intentionality that is at work, in the making of our world. Thus work of art upon the beetle is the way the work is a ‘being in touch with things’. The very things that the work brings forward are not there for us prior to seeing them in the work. The work brings forward a new significance in a new experience; it occasions itself. When Vesely speaks about life as binding condition, he knows life beforehand, the totality of possible occasions depending on the actual, his latent world, the things to be in touch with, and how of it, bypassing the work. We may learn reality in effective life traditions, as the substance of life comes us from there, but this substance of life should also always be a project for us that we participate through our acts of understanding, interpretation and making, and not a top-down given beyond our experience. Recalling Henry David Thoreau when he says “men have become the tools of their tools” (1854, 24), we can say that, if one sense of tools is the tools of representation as Vesely has it with his idea of divided representation, the other sense that lies in Thoreau’s insight is taking life traditions as iron curtains between us and life and world, without the possibility of individual reflection and thought on the possibilities of reality beyond the collective givens of tradition.  

### 3.4 Memory and Imagination

One notion of memory that has been prevalent in architectural thinking after the 60’s is based on the model of linguistic representation as discussed above, where architectural form is seen as carrier of collective significance, rooted in the collective memory. This view was most prominent in the work of Aldo Rossi, which was praised by Tafuri with a nostalgia for the traditional unity of organic form.

There is also a more productive notion of memory which does not see past as a source of inspiration for thinking the present but confronts the present as it is in its immediacy and particularity. This does not mean that memory is bypassed and thinking the present is starting
from scratch. On the contrary, thinking today in its concrete particularity depends, for its validity and vitality, on a deeper sense of memory than the known memory of past successes. To see the particularity of concrete situations, memory must be a live force that enables original confrontations with the new. One does not look at the history from a distance to see what is valid in it, if it is to be alive such look must already be shaped by a prior understanding of what is valid today which comes in the first place from a more immediate sense of present which is already shaped by memory. We can find such an understanding of memory in Dewey’s thinking. Memory for Dewey is alive, and an indispensable condition of consciousness and thinking. As he sees it, memory is the living temporality of individual self and the background of self-consciousness, where the mind has its substance in the accumulation of past experiences as they are retained in a developing network of meaning which is not always consciously available to the self. This background is always actively there in our interactions with world and one another. Thus, we can say that it is memory that unifies the consciousness as self-consciousness beyond the empirical identity of the self.

This sense of a live memory shaping the unity of original act here and now is also given by Vico in his conception of memory: “the faculty that connects disparate and diverse things and that identifies the appropriate” (Bitz). Thus, this idea of memory as a condition of temporality not only connects past and present, but also registers the spontaneity of human intentionality in the new acts of imagination which cannot be explained through discursive continuity of meaning through received history; it registers the immediacy of our relation to world and the possibility of original acts of new seeings. The meaningful act is here and now. It requires an original synthesis, an immediate significance in the concrete situation at hand and it is as such a product of spontaneity of mind, imagination. Being in touch with things is the result of such
spontaneity in the concreteness of here and now and our prior meanings can only be a regulative background of possibilities rather than determinant of actuality. 51

Reality is larger than our expressions of it in our constructions, in the cultural work, and we see this in the experience of the work of art, in the difference between the new work and the rest of the tradition, in the difference between the work and the world it is situated. The work belongs to a world, but it also changes it. There is a distance between the new and the old which cannot be subsumed under the reified forms of consciousness of life or tradition. Even if new, the experience of the genuine work seems more real than many other experiences, hence ‘enduringly familiar’ in a strange sense. We see in the experience of the work that our reality is broader than our daily commerce with world and life. The work as an act of spontaneity is not from scratch but also it is new: a newness not from scratch.

Newness of an experience expressed in the familiarity of a language is not the newness of expression in a new language. Artwork occasions an experience in a new expression in the newness of its language. The work is both its occasion and its language. The new language of the artwork is the only possible relation to the occasioned experience, as the experience is not possible in a prior, familiar language. It is the sheer presence of this new occasion that is to be explained (even if this is not a look for origins, or ontological grounds of the image for a top-down justification). Hence the newness which is not from scratch indicates such newness of an occasion that comes with the new language in the work, rather than the new in a familiar language which is still a newness like defined in linguistic account of hermeneutic experience, as a modification and transformation of an older significance. ‘Not from scratch’ is not a philosophical premise but an actuality in our experience. We see and hear it in the reverberations of the work, even if we cannot pin any of them down to a known source. 52 It is the temporality
of our representations that Kant discovers in the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, which is also what Dewey sees in the unity of past and present, in the unity of self as substance as the condition of possibility for experience. Unity of consciousness as the seat of possible experience precedes our linguistic abilities and our experiences contain more than what our language commands. Unity of consciousness does not need to be an a priori statement about some transcendental human cogito; it is being on the world on the face a constancy of the world in our experiences. It is the constancy of an empirical self (think about yourself) and as such it is a given.

Dewey’s account of temporality, hence his notion of the meeting of the old and new in new experiences, is different from the temporality Gadamer advances in his linguistic account of hermeneutic experience as Dewey sees recognition in a general, seeing-as, as a short cutting of perception of a spatio-temporal unity in its distinct experience. In Dewey’s account there is the strong emphasis on the empirical level of phenomena before our concepts of things, before our order of things, which is different from an understanding that draws an ontological line at the moment of empirical familiarity of things-at-hand in a life practice. For him, this level of experience is something we also share with the animals, the living interaction with the world in its immediacy. Dewey also underlines that experience is always aesthetic in its unity, and this is also how Kant understood aesthetic as the spatio-temporal unity of experience: in order for me to be conscious of some phenomenon, there must be a unity that demarcates that phenomenon from the rest of my phenomenal consciousness of the world, a spatio-temporal structure in my experience that I can take hold of in its distinctness.
‘This is a vase.’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But see the ‘vaseness’.’ Vaseness cannot be a given before what you see. When vaseness is taken as it always has been, then indeed there is a criteria of possible interpretations here to remain on the side of meaning.

‘Vase’ as such is an ideality, a vase is a thing known, ready-at-hand, that does certain things, is a certain thing. When we judge the ‘vaseness of the vase’, we are not by any means judging its function or another isolated property as science would have it. Aletheia is about the wholeness of the thing as a vase as it always has been for us in our daily commerce with things with care and affection, etc. Hence there is no judgment of beauty as such, but always as the beauty of something, the beauty of its somethingness as it is, as it always has been. That somethingness shows itself.

For Dewey that something can be anything, and not necessarily something that is known. There is still the possibility of significant experience without known significances, if the phenomenon has an internal unity of a quality for us. 56 When Heidegger makes this significance the thingness of the thing bypassing the individual act of mediation of the artist, he overlooks this possibility. He makes art a representation of what is existing in our horizon of meaning in language, in our moral-practical life. Art’s worldliness as representation is its aboutness of things that are ready-at-hand which for Heidegger are themselves part of a poetic participation in the order of things. When this is also made the condition of access to the art, making all judgments of beauty phronesis, abstract art becomes worldless and meaningless: removed from the truth of our lives, removed from any possible experience that has a significance for us.

For Dewey, like Kant, it is not the thingness of the thing that we care about in the experience but how it is what it is, how its perception has a determinant quality about it, as a spatio-temporal event that I am phenomenally aware of. Indeed such attention in the experience
brackets that quality of givenness, the how of the thing even before the what of it. It is about seeing a certain purposiveness, a certain relatedness between parts and the whole, a certain intentionality to the event itself before even knowing that it is ‘a vase’. The experience itself is not idea bound, it is free from any established contexts of meaning. The interest is in the experience, hence it is disinterestedness \(^{57}\) that maintains the perception to the degree that the recognition of what it is is not the concern. It is not the interest in a worldly significance, the vaseness, that is already known, as this will cut any possible judgment on things we do not know, like abstract art where there is no representational subject-matter, no worldly significance.

And this is not a claim on the side of art for certain distanced posture towards commonality. It is rather an epistemic point about our relation, or rather the possibility of our relation, to artworks. It is to say that artwork does not need a known commonality, or a common posture towards world, to communicate, to participate in the world. This is not the prime moment of its worldliness, its worldliness belongs to the moment of its very utterance, it is a one word language, a one word metaphor that occasions itself. And indeed it is this very same capacity to relate to world that also brings the vaseness in its full vitality and wholeness for us, beyond habitual ways of seeing things. \(^{58}\) But if we make the vaseness, the idealized common, the moment of participation, we might be waiving the very act of the maker which could have also brought something else. The measure must be the possibility of dialogue, not an idea of vaseness. The unity of subject and object in the work of art is not the same unity of thought and language in its descriptive sense of idealizations stabilized into common symbols. Thus it is beyond the commonalities of common world, but deeply worldly in its own way. \(^{59}\)

Idealization, generalization . . . the human connotation in the overall metaphoricity of language, or the abstract reductions of scientific thinking. Meaning as idealization, a group of
instances, which are all unique in themselves, idealized . . . always there is a kind of
generalization. If we have this skill to see similarities, relations, and if this is our natural mode of
knowledge, we also have a broader relation to things, where we can stay with the thing at hand,
without making it an instance of a series of other things . . . and we still can talk about the thing
at hand, even if every word we utter has the moment of generality to it, and even if we may think
that, because we can talk about many things about the thing at hand, it already becomes a
collection of all the attributes we make . . . still we know that our linguistic expressions will not
be able to exhaust the uniqueness of the thing at hand, we still see it in its uniqueness. When I
point to some quality that you do not see at first, how is it that you can see it? What if I take a
photograph that brackets that quality about the object you couldn’t see before and what if this
thing is a vase and the photograph has nothing to do with the vaseness of it? What if I make
something which has nothing to do with all the vases you know and put flowers in it?

I do not think this thing about us, that we can see and make all kinds of things, need to be
dramatized with moralistic overtones as seeing the colors on the body of a dead person. 60 Rather
than seeing it as a dangerous byproduct of our natural symbolic capacities, we could think it as a
productive tool for our dialogues in making sense to each other . . . perhaps this is why these
people are great artists, that because they show us things we normally wouldn’t see.

Notes

1 The question of double hermeneutic (as it is introduced by Frampton (1995) in the section on tradition in the
introduction of Tectonic Culture): When Frampton quotes Gianni Vattimo saying that “all that is left is to
understand legitimation as a form of the creation of horizons of validity through dialogue, a dialogue both with the
traditions to which we belong and with others.”(25) , this is not a possibility in the thinking of Heidegger and
Gadamer as tradition is an all embracing frame of intentionality and there is no possibility of dialogue beyond this
horizon. Then Frampton refers to Jurgen Habermas’s ideal speech situation in terms of client and architect dialogue,
for meaningful environment, “for intelligent cultivation of environment”(25), and he continues with his point of
double hermeneutic: “Apart from this, [the dialogue with the client for the intelligent cultivation of environment]
architectural practice has little choice but to embrace what one may call a double hermeneutic, one that, first, seeks to ground its practice in its own tectonic procedures, and second, turns to address itself to the social and to the inflection of what Hannah Arendt termed ‘the space of public appearance’” (25-26). Habermas is referring to the freedom of the individual in the common space of public with his idea of ideal speech, the freedom to have a viewpoint, hence the free dialogue, to construct horizons, rather than to go along with the established ones, the criticism of tradition is never addressed in Gadamer in *Truth and Method*, as he does not acknowledge a standpoint outside the horizon of tradition, and rational dialogue is not part of Heidegger’s project. (Note how Heidegger sees the question of questioning: “Questioning is the piety of thinking. ‘Piety’ is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to think about”. Quoted in Hintikka 2000, 497). And in fact it is precisely this relation between the individual and the collective consciousness, the role and epistemic status of individual in the society is the determining moment of the difference between the hermeneutics of Dasein and that of Vattimo and Habermas and it is this relation of individual to collectivity that makes a difference in the double hermeneutic that Frampton coins. One can see society as a collection of individuals with common interests and orientations bound with common understandings and meanings together in the warmth of an unquestioned horizon, or one can see the society as a multiplicity of individuals with different viewpoints on a shared world properties of which cannot be given top-down beyond its individual interpretations.

Also in one sense Frampton’s understanding of public space (1979, 1995), I think deviating from Arendt’s, implies a continuity at the level of common interests, common orientations. However Arendt keeps the individuality without yielding to a common interest, common orientations in the form of common understanding. Individual agency is not made a function of communal binding meanings in Arendt. Worldliness in Arendt’s case can be interpreted as a limit case, an idea that only emerges out of individual interpretations. What is worldly and what is not cannot be decided upon what is deemed worldly as this will not leave room for individual agency, to say otherwise. Privatization, as Arendt looks at it in the idea of genius has something to do with an instinct to preserve the individuality in a society where human actions and meanings are determined by the processes of production and consumption (see 175-195), where utility is the sole ground of meaning. Hence I think this is why Arendt celebrates art’s worldlessness, its emancipation from myth and religion, from the continuity of life when understood as a life deeply determined by existential conditions of being in the world (167), as they are apprehended in a society where communal meanings become authoritative in ones understanding of world and life. And I think Arendt differs from Heidegger radically when she underlines that “the conditions of human existence –life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and earth –can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely” (11). Hence it might be that Frampton oscillates between two extremes of private and worldly, without perhaps entertaining the possibility of an idea of world, hence worldliness, as a common object of dialogue without becoming authoritative in its reified forms in the consciousness of community.

2 This is an inherent conception in the very idea of tectonic as a self sufficient condition. For Semper tectonic form is the residue of a way of construction and it is this that becomes the element of meaning in subsequent
architectures. See the linguistic model in his thinking: “For as the roots of speech maintain their validity and continue to present their basic forms across all later transformations and through all extensions of the concepts they acquire, and as it is impossible to find a totally new word for a new concept without losing the primary purpose of speech, namely, being understood, that is, the new is always described by extending the meaning of the old –so one does not dare spurn this oldest type and root of the symbolism of art in favor others and leave it unaccounted for.” (Semper, 1878, der stil in den technischen und tectonischen Kunsten) (quoted in Bandmann 1951, 33)

3 On tradition in reference to Siza’s ‘architects do not invent anything, they transform reality’: “Unlike fine art, all such transformations have to be rooted in the opacity of life-world and to come to their maturity over an unspecified period of time” (1995, 25)

“Nevertheless we may assert that the built is first and foremost a construction and only later an abstract discourse based on surface, volume, and plan, to cite the ‘Three Reminders to Architects’ in Le Corbusier’s Vers une architecture of 1923. One may also add that building, unlike fine art, is as much an everyday experience as it is a representation and that the building is a thing rather than a sign… From this point of view, we may claim that type form – the received “what” deposited by the lifeworld – is as much a precondition for building as craft technique, however much it may remain open to inflection at different levels.” (1995, 2)

4 Siza writes: “I am not sure what materials to choose. Ideas come to me as immaterial, as lines on white paper; and when I want to fix them I have doubts, they escape, they wait at a distance’(1997, 200). See also how Adorno sees idea of materiality not in terms of a worldly given but as a “mediated distinction” through formation (1970, 147; 1979, 9-13).

5 And Eicher is just a case that exemplifies an attitude which is not unfamiliar in the context of education in our daily commerce at school when we see Scarpa sacralized beyond imagination with his details in analytic or precedent studies, or when we see the almost romanticized sentiment on materiality and tectonic details in projects before the questions of space addressed. Even the first year cube exercise may become a joint and materiality project sometimes, leaving away the systemic articulation of space. We see this attitude when the techniques of assemblage are taken as self-efficacious in themselves as if spatial idea of form comes from the idea of its material construction, reducing systemicness of spatial intentions to a language of joints and detailing.

6 He criticizes Diller and Scofordio as well but beyond the names, including Gehry, it is the oppositions he works with that are problematic for me.

7 Bachelard: “To compose a finished, well-constructed poem, the mind is obliged to make projects that prefigure it. But simple poetic image, there is no project; a flicker of soul is all that is needed.”(1958, xxii) Read this through Ricoeur’s idea of plot and emplotment (1983).

8 “The phenomenon of music is nothing more than a phenomenon of speculation. There is nothing in this expression that should frighten you. It simply presupposes that the basis of musical creation is a preliminary feeling-out, a will
moving first in an abstract realm with the object of giving shape to something concrete. The elements at which this speculation necessarily aims are those of sound and time.” (1947, 28)

9 “Tonal elements become music only by virtue of their being organized, and… such organization presupposes a conscious human act. Thus I take cognizance of the existence of elemental natural sounds, the raw materials of music, which, pleasing in themselves, may caress the ear and give us a pleasure that may be quite complete. But over and beyond this passive enjoyment we shall discover music, music that will make us participate actively in the working of a mind that orders, gives life, and creates” (1947, 24)

10 “Nothing, therefore, will serve the architect but the fullest power to imagine the space-value resulting from the complex conditions of each particular case; there are no liberties which he may not sometimes take, and no ‘fixed ratios’ which may not fail him. Architecture is not a machinery but an art; and those theories of architecture which provide ready-made tests for the creation or criticism of design are self-condemned. None the less, in the beauty of every building, space-value, addressing itself to our sense of movement, will play a principal part.” (Scott 1914, 170-171)

11 “In 1953… [Kahn] made the sobering assessment that ‘the nature of space is something we really don’t know much about’, going on to note that architects tended to copy forms rather than develop their designs from first principles.” (McCarter 2005, 386)

12 Actually Eicher praises Le Corbusier for his boxes. But Le Corbusier’s boxes are not a priori, self-efficacious devices taken as meaningful by themselves in their ‘structure’ or ‘detailing’. There is always the higher consideration in Le Corbusier of a series of plastic events of body and vision beyond the internal logic of box which is there to control and systematize these experiential moments. See Anderson 1984 for an extensive discussion on how Le Corbusier prioritizes experience over any so-called ‘fundamental’ architectural parameters.

13 I am using this phrase in recalling Thomas Nagel’s seminal essay of 1974 on consciousness where he strongly argued for an irreducible subjective qualitative experience in our interactions with world even before explicit conceptual belief contents.

14 “Some have theorized that the problem of art, and therefore of architecture, is presently restricted to restoring communication and image. By this reasoning, novelty, reality, and experience, strictly defined, no longer exist; we have only an infinite and autonomous interpretability created by the information media” (Gregotti 1996, 96). And he underlines that beyond this promoted market image, there is an idea of image related to, rooted in perception as an attempt at establishing foundation. I think his notion of simplicity as logic of communication also relates to his idea of authentic image making, that is, a constructive logic that enables the textual / artifactual unity of the image to emerge beyond what is already done in a world that is full of ‘simulacra’; a “pause in the tumult of language” as he writes.
Intervention in the world of experience is only possible through such performance, rather than using representations of things instead of things themselves, performance is both the new sentence and its occasion. Genuine experience is only possible when forming meaning goes beyond representational mode.

15 “Today, the word ‘image’ commonly refers to that part of a thing, person, or action that appears to the others, rather than to the subject that the image constructs or the method of its construction.” (1996, 95)

16 “I always come to the same conclusion: the essential newness of the poetic image poses the problem of the speaking being’s creativeness. Through this creativeness the imagining consciousness proves to be, very simply, an origin.” (Bachelard 1958, xxxii)

“For us, Aristotle’s famous phrase ‘Art is the ability to create truth by reflection’ (if it refers, albeit improperly, to imagination as an activity, rather than as the mere recollection of images) can be interpreted in the sense that imagination and reflection, in their continuous interchange, can still construct new pieces of reality, thus modifying and enriching the world of our experiences.” (Gregotti 1996, 100)

17 Gregotti on image: “its character as a basic element of the architectural object; the character, that is, of that research which (rich in fragility, in a dialoguing state of hesitation) should accompany the constitution of the architectural object during the entire process of forming meaning” (1996, 97)

“The necessary activity of compositional imagination, the thought that produces, corrects, transforms, interprets, remembers” (1996, 99)

18 “The act of expression that constitutes a work of art is a construction in time, not an instantaneous emission”. “Even the Almighty took seven days to create the heaven and the earth, and, if the record were complete, we should also learn that it was only at the end of that period that he was aware of just what He set out to do” (Dewey 1934, 65).

19 “Suddenness of emergence belongs to the appearance of material above the threshold of consciousness, not to the process of its generation. Could we trace any such transformation to its roots and follow it through its history, we should find at the beginning an emotion comparatively gross and undefined. We should find that it assumed definite shape only as it worked itself through a series of changes in imagined material” (Dewey 1934, 75).

20 Bachelard’s specific context is also language, and he talks about the original symbolic act, the re-writing of language, hence indeed there is this sense of plot, as the language is still where the image finds its expression, even if it is independent from it as to its birth in the consciousness. Adorno underlines mediation through the constructive instance in the making of art form even when there is a representational content as follows: "It is not that artworks differ from significative language by the absence of meanings; rather, these meanings through their absorption become a matter of accident. The movements by which this absorption of meaning occurs are concretely prescribed by every aesthetically formed object" (1970, 124). Susan Langer also notes that imaginative articulation in form reflects "the principles of representation by which human sensibility records itself" (1967, 95). Note also: "For if there is a distinctive form of human experience, wherein ideas are sensibly or imaginatively embodied in such a way
that their embodiment is an inseparable part of their meaning, then we need a special term for it. The term 'art' has evolved and established itself for just this purpose." (Crowther 1997, 186)

21 “Artistic symbol *qua* artistic, negotiates insight, not reference; it does not rest upon convention, but motivates and dictates conventions. It is deeper than any semantic of accepted signs and their referents, more essential than any schema that may be heuristically read” (Susan Langer quoted in Etlin 1999, 8).

22 See also section 3.4. on two senses of memory. This nuance also hinges on how one sees history.

23 Which is what Stravinsky calls “the rules of the masters… even if they were not themselves aware of them” (1947, 38)

24 See section 3.4. for this sense of ‘unreflective’.

25 I think the same qualification can also be made for Rem Koolhas’s work.

26 This is also evident in Tschumi’s own distinction between architecture tradition as form vs. other determinants like movement, use, space, programme (see Tschumi 2003, 15 and 2006, 19).

27 Norberg-Schulz: “we don’t eat pastries in a Gothic cathedral.” (1965, 167)

28 “If anything is described by an architectural plan, it is the nature of human relationships, since the elements whose trace it records –walls, doors, windows and stairs –are employed first to divide and then selectively to re-unite inhabited space.” (Evans 1978, 56)

For Evans architecture is different from literature and painting and equating them will be making architecture “into a vehicle for observation and reflection. Overloaded with meaning and symbolism, its direct intervention in human affairs is spuriously reduced to a question of practicality”. “Yet architecture is quite distinct from painting and writing, not simply because it requires the addition of some extra ingredient such as utility or function, but because it encompasses everyday reality, and in so doing inevitably provides a format for social life.” (1978, 88-89)

29 I think the relation between a painting and the figures it depicts in Evan’s example is more like architecture’s mediation of life not as something abstract happening diagrammatically in a plan, but in the built space through the phenomenal experience. Thus plan may organize, systemize, spatial, hence social, relations but cannot make architecture as a lived phenomenon.

“Take the portrayal of human figures and take house plans from a given time and place: look at them together as evidence of a way of life, and coupling between everyday conduct and architectural organization may become more lucid.” (Evans 1978, 57)

On a Raphael painting he writes: “these figures are more than the subject of the picture; they *are* the picture, they fill it”. “if the tally between figures and plans is to be sought anywhere, it might as well be sought here, in a painting where personal relationships were translated into a compositional principle transcending subject-matter” (59)
And he concludes: “plans have been scrutinized for characteristics that could provide the preconditions for the way people occupy space, on the assumption that buildings accommodate what pictures illustrate and what words describe in the field of human relationships.” (89)

30 Van der Laan writes: “form is expressive because it images space” (1983, 177). I think this sense of form as giving shape to space is an important insight even if I do not agree with Van der Laan in his essentialism on the validity of certain configurations of space.

31 I think one’s body is still this ‘out there’ as to our consciousness of it. We only have a privileged access to what happens in our body compared to other bodies.

32 Phenomenal consciousness of space in this sense of performance of space cannot be explained in terms of a representation of an ideality. Thus it is not the “pragmatics” of Derrida, the ostensiveness of the representation at the moment of occurrence, hence the value of presence for representation. See Derrida 1986b, 580.

33 Dewey on form: “In every integral experience there is form because there is dynamic organization” (1934, 55). For him form is the necessary condition of all experience, form as “the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, situation to its own integral fulfillment” (137).

34 I think Tschumi’s writings are much more promising than his design work. In his designs, the form is sometimes underdeveloped, and there is too much easy mimesis of tradition, in the sense that his forms are too generic.

35 The ‘materiality of space’ that does something to me long before what may happen in that space: this cannot be the policy making of some ‘marking’, ‘spacing’ without really making space. Tschumi’s early posters, and even the Transcripts (1981), and filmic studies all allude to such literal and literary events of life.

36 Derrida’s writing on La Villette (1986b) is illuminating, not in terms of what he says about La Villette (as I think he sees more than what La Villette offers as architecture, he reads into La Villette what he sees as the possibility of architecture), but in the way he speaks about the possibilities of architecture as possibility of thought rather than representation of thought, in the way he sees the intentionality of making architecture as an intervention in the event space of life, our experience of the world.

He speaks about the possibility of intervention beyond representation, as architectural form can order space and time directly in its “imminence” (maîs tont of Derrida) without the mediation of thought, hence other thoughts, hence representation of thought. He speaks about ‘the other’ almost in terms of a dialogue, but of course not a hermeneutic exchange on some given ideality. The other, “the one through whom the promised event will happen or will not… the other in the magnetic field of attraction, of the common denominator… the other, who is only called to countersign the pledge (580).

Even if Derrida would reject any explanation of how such an engagement is possible in terms of a dialogue upon an objective condition, as he rejects any kind of systemic making, any idea of order, any possibility of synthesis, any unity of meaning, there is still some making that is at issue, which ‘holds together’, which is a texture. He writes
about performative writing, “an architectural writing interprets (in the Nietzschean sense of active productive, violent, transforming interpretation) events which are marked by photography or cinematography. Marked: provoked, determined or transcribed, captured, in any case always mobilized in a scenography of passage (transference, translation, transgression, from one place to another, from a place of writing to another, graft, hybridization)” (575). Note the reference to the event space of life in the mention of photography and cinema. ‘In a scenography of passage’, what can be this if not some Erlebnis? Not a synthesis, but some unity, the unity of a “magnetic field”, that will also capture the other in its “attraction” (580). Nothing formal of course for Derrida, but something ordered, without itself becoming an order, an order for possible orders, without being an order as such in itself, “a relation without relation” (580). But there is then some unity that performs, some unity of marking that marks something, a performance beyond the hegemony of speech (something that comes to ostensiveness of a speech act, the moment of utterance, the imminence of what it utters), there is a “past and a tradition” to such marking, but it “does not ensure synthesis”. Hence the unity of the performance is not secured by some idealized moment, here and now, within the possibilities of a language, but still it has a past and a tradition: “without nostalgia, the most living act of memory” (574).

Mostly Derrida’s rejection of possibilities of some kind of unity is still bound within the idea of form as language, form as idea, form on the model of language, that is representation. As he seems to applaud folies as to their open syntax, endless possibility of transformation, etc. Thus his concern is architectural form as meaning, form as representing a meaning. I think he sees Joyce in the restlessness (as he sees it) of the folies, what Joyce did to language.

He writes “we can no longer speak of a properly architectural moment, the hieratic impassibility of the monument, this hyle-morphic complex that is given once and for all, permitting no trace to appear on its body because it afforded no chance of transformation, permutation or substitutions. In the folies of which we speak, on the contrary, the event undoubtedly goes this trial of the monumental moment; however, it inscribes it, as well, in a series of experiences. As its name indicates, an experience traverses: voyage, trajectory, translation, transference. Not with the object of a final presentation, a face-to-face with the thing itself, nor in order to complete an odyssey of consciousness, the phenomenology of mind as an architectural step. The route through the folies is undoubtedly prescribed, from point to point, to the extend that the point-grid counts on a program of possible experiences and new experiments.” (574)

He is describing the Pyramid in the ‘hyle-morphic’, architecture as symbol of something, meaning as representation, presentation, making itself present, some ideal making itself present. This is all Hegelian Platonic aesthetics, shining of the idea, the presence of the idea to mind in its visible form. The invisible of Frascari, Vesely, Perez-Gomez, Bandman. On the one hand there is this strong rejection of metaphysics, and then there is the rejection of a whole system of culture, where there are men, subjects, etc., as if these all tied up together in the conspiracy of Western world. He celebrates the chance, inventive juxtapositionings, etc., all that is left to life non-designed, a diagram of possibilities, for a life to come. But then he speaks about the body and invention of its gestures: “the body will
receive the invention of its gestures”. A field that will also activate the body through experience, not control it but still affect the body.

I think he is stuck between language and architecture. He sees what architecture can do, order reality directly, without recourse to a system of things, idealities as in language, without an order of things as to its elements, without representing something, by ordering space and time with ordering form, but then there is the architecture of language, that built the Pyramid, hence the linguistic account comes again and again right at the moment when he speaks about experience, right at the moment when he speaks about performance (performative writing) through ordering. “Architecture where desire can live”: architecture as thought rather than representation of thought. All this seems to be beyond language, but he cannot use a terminology that is embedded in the very philosophy he criticizes as it will be in some ‘experience’, ‘performance’, ‘marking’ talk in the way we understand them, hence the convoluted routes through “dissociation”, “transgression”, “beyond meaning at the edge of meaning”, “but not synthesis”, “texture but not system”, “architectonic not as the sole possibility of assemblage”, etc. This is the experience of the Pyramid, Heidegger’s “alethiea”, an order of things shine in the moment of the monument, that again and again cuts through possible accounts of the experience of labyrinth, in its immediacy. Derrida cannot speak about being-present-in-the-Labyrinth.

Drop the presence of the thing as an ideality. Is still not there something like being in the moment, is at least not something like this required by the experience he himself had to refer to? Is it a Dionysian moment where subject loses himself in some flux, without any discrimination of subjects and objects in the continuity of a flux of moments? But this will not even need the spacing, marking of architecture as spatio-temporal discrimination. Is this Dionysian moment not an experience of some presence? Not the presence of some ideality in a particular presentation, representation, but some being-present-in-the-moment. Can even a Dionysian moment as such drop the subject and experience as to the phenomenal consciousness of being here and now in a situation on the world?

How far apart is Derrida’s account of La Villette from Le Corbusier’s promenade of spatial events, which are indeed not formal when form is understood as representational, as an end in itself, which carries a ‘message’, but about the event space of life, that ‘happens’ to anyone that is attentive, that ‘listens’, that ‘countersigns the pledge’? Is not the spacing and marking in Le Corbusier that which “lends the body the invention of its gestures”? Control vs. leaving open, linearity vs. open field of multiplicities, ‘permutations’. Plastic events vs. ‘contamination’ by life. These cannot be the arbiter here in terms of the phenomenal mechanisms of architectural object as tools to use. If La Vilette has ‘a past and a tradition’, a ‘most living act of memory’ for Derrida, it is the same possibility of ‘spacing’, marking’, ordering space and time with architectural form, without relying on the ‘hyle-morphic monument’. It is form’s performance to give texture to possible lives.

Roger Scruton uses this term to indicate the difference of musical space from physical space. Scruton explains this as a kind of understanding that rests on ‘appearance’ (hearing) in the context of his idea of musical movement, the spatiality of music where he defines musical intentional object as a construct of imagination, as a
“phenomenological fact” in the intersubjective space of experience (1983). I think this is also the level of ‘brute meaning’ that Merleu-Ponty identifies.

38 See Appendix C for a further discussion of Wittgenstein’s private language argument.

39 The state of mind and the object of thought: the object is given to perception as it stands in the unity of consciousness as an “aesthetic nuance”, as Ulmer calls it, in Kant’s conception of experience. This “aesthetic nuance” can also be read as ‘being minded in a certain way’. A non-conceptual intentional content, hence not reflective in categorical sense. In Kant’s terminology, it is the consciousness of intuitions without categorical judgment, thus it is immediate, not mediated by concepts. See Appendix B for a discussion of intuitions without concepts in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

“Lyotard pursues the question, through Kant, asking: how can feelings orient a critique. Why should the latter have any need for them?. The answer that he evolves over an extensive reading is that the state of mind a fundamentally aesthetic nuance, constitutes the reflective dimension of judgment upon the object of thought.” Gregory L. Ulmer, Chorography


40 Any categorical / conceptual judgment in a context of meaning bypasses the complexities of experience as an “aesthetic nuance” to subsume it under a general known significance, through a habit of ‘interest’, whether moral-practical, or scientific. The natural act of thinking enables this economy. Recall that Husserl’s idea of ‘bracketing’ in the phenomenological method is to go back from this natural attitude and suspend the habits of seeing, to reach a higher level of awareness of the way the thing is in the consciousness, the way it is given to consciousness: the awareness of the aesthetic nuance. Grassi underlines two senses of language:

1. “Language itself is the truest cause of the dissolution of the unity of the organic insofar as it abstracts and isolates the objects of life from that rhythm of life in which they arise and receive their particular meaning.” (1980, 108)

2. “Language is not the cause of the separating out of the duality of subject and object but rather the result of it, with the task of reconstructing the broken unity in a new way.” (1980, 110)

This second sense allows the room for poetic metaphor, the language of the image, the language of art. The first sense is the descriptive language that subsumes particulars under known significances beyond their immediate, not mediated, significance in which they actually are given to consciousness (the aesthetic nuance in Ulmer’s words, the spatio-temporal modality). This is the economy of thinking. But this language does not work for the immediate experience, even if it is constructed upon it, as the immediate experience is informationally richer (for the lack of a better word, ‘more in content’) than the categories of descriptive language. In Kant’s way of saying this would be the difference between intuitions and concepts. Poetic metaphor is the language in which this immediate experience can be known and communicated in its fullness: the imaginative language that captures the state of mind. It does not describe the object of thought, it just points at the state of mind in which the object of thought emerges (metaphor shows the way for one to see on his own) (“the subject the image constructs” Gregotti 1996, 95)
Both Heidegger and Derrida seem to have.

Compare this quote above from 1986 to his view of taste in *Truth and Method*: “The unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes a society and bonds its members together differs from which constitutes the figure of aesthetic culture. Taste still obeys a criterion of content. What is considered valid in a society, its ruling taste, receives its stamp from the commonalities of social life. Such a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even its artistic interests are not arbitrary or in principal universal, but what artists create and what the society values belong together in the unity of a style of life and an ideal of taste.” (1960:84)

See also that he broadens hermeneutic experience beyond natural language as it “refers to a natural human capacity” (1987, 323).

As Derrida would have it (1986b).

Thus I think Gadamer acknowledges the spontaneity of mind and imagination, hence the agency of individual subject. And I think he is already beyond Heidegger’s ‘receptive and existential’ understanding frame for Dasein. See also Gordon 2004 and Verene’s introduction to Cassirer 1979 on the dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger on agency.

Speaking about individual reflection is not something favored in the current intellectual life where almost every philosophical reflection starts with a critique of Enlightenment, and keeps with the premise that there indeed is no individuality, it is a function of an ideology. I think we should at least keep it as a project. Note how Thoreau and Kant meet on the individual’s possibility to think and act:

“We belong to the community. It is not the tailor alone who is the ninth part of a man; it is as much the preacher, and the merchant, and the farmer. Where is this division of labor to end? And what object does it finally serve? No doubt another *may* also think for me; but it is not therefore desirable that he should do so to the exclusion of my thinking for myself.” (1854, 29-30)

“It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all. I need not think, so long as I can pay; others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me.” (Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?", Konigsberg in Prussia, 30th September, 1784)

Jungian archetypes are like the rock-bottom wisdom that Heidegger finds in the Greek and German etymology.

“I have explained that ‘logical’ thought is what is expressed in words directed to the outside world in the form of a discourse. ‘Analogical’ thought is sensed yet unreal, imagined yet silent; it is not a discourse but rather a meditation on themes of the past, an interior monologue. Analogical thought is archaic, unexpressed, and practically inexpressible in words.” (Jung quoted in Rossi 1976, 349)

Rossi: “I believe I have found in this definition a different sense of history conceived of not simply as fact, but rather a series of things, of affective objects to be used by the memory or in a design.” (1976, 349)
Live creature “instead of trying to live upon whatever may be achieved in the past, it uses the past successes to inform the present. Every living being owes its richness to what Santayana calls ‘hushed reverberations’ ”. “In life, that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges” (Dewey 1934, 18).

“The habits of the eye as a medium of perception are being slowly altered in being accustomed to the shapes that are typical of industrial products and to the objects that belong to urban as distinct from rural life. The colors and planes to which the organism habitually responds develop new material for interest” (Dewey 1934, 342). And I think this is not simply only ‘visual’ as changes of the habits of the eye but ‘mind’ itself changes, with all the substance it absorbs. There may be structures long duree, but this cannot mean there are ever valid Gestalts, or wisdoms in the past whose meaningfulness is self-evident as eternal truths.

Dewey on mind and consciousness: “Mind is more than consciousness, because it is the abiding even though changing background of which consciousness is the foreground” (1934, 265-266). Mind as “the body of organized meanings by means of which events of the present have significance for us” (1934, 273).

For Dewey, mind is background of lived experiences, a network of experiences, contents, where memory absorbs, registers, reconfigures. Thus he registers the temporality of meanings, the nodes of the network of experiences are not fixed, they can acquire new value in new constellations. Mind is a temporal intentional structure, ‘the capital with which’ self acts and thinks. Note how he explains this: “Whenever anything is undergone in consequence of a doing, the self is modified. The modification extends beyond acquisition of greater facility and skill. Attitudes and interests are built up which embody in themselves some deposit of meaning of things done and undergone. These funded and retained meanings become part of the self. They constitute the capital with which the self notes, cares for, attends, and purposes. In this substantial sense, mind forms the background upon which every new contact with surroundings is projected; yet, ‘background’ is too passive a word, unless we remember that, in the projection of the new upon it, there is assimilation and reconstruction of both background and of what is taken and digested” (1934, 264).

Vico on memory: “Memory is the same as imagination… Imagination also connotes ingenuity and invention… Thus memory has three distinct aspects: memory when it recalls things, imagination when it alters or recreates them, and ingenuity or invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrangement and relationship.” (1744, S819)

Bachelard writes in critique of Bergson’s Matter and Memory: “I propose on the contrary, to consider the imagination as a major power of human nature. To be sure, there is nothing to be gained by saying that the imagination is the faculty of producing images. But this tautology has at least the virtue of putting an end to comparisons of images with memories.

By the swiftness of its actions, the imagination separates us from the past as well as from reality; it faces the future.” (1958, xxxiv)

“If we cannot imagine, we cannot foresee.” (Bachelard 1958, xxxiv)
Dewey registers creative agency in relation to a regulative background of lived experiences: “Aspects of his prior experience of varied subject-matters have been wrought into his being; they are the organs with which he perceives. Creative vision modifies these materials. They take their place in an unprecedented object of a new experience. Memories, not necessarily conscious but retentions that have been organically incorporated in the very structure of the self, feed present observation.” (1934, 89)

“Each of us assimilates into himself something of the values and meanings contained in past experiences. But we do so in differing degrees and at different levels of self-hood. Some things sink deep, others stay on the surface and are easily displaced. The old poets traditionally invoked the muse of Memory as something wholly outside themselves – outside their present conscious selves. The invocation is a tribute to the power of what is most deep-lying and therefore the furthest below consciousness, in determination of the present self and of what it has to say. It is not true that we ‘forget’ or drop into unconscious only alien and disagreeable things. It is even more true that the things which we have most completely made part of ourselves, that we have assimilated to compose our personality and not merely retained as incidents, cease to have a separate conscious existence. Some occasion, be it what it may, stirs the personality that has been thus formed. Then comes the need for expression. What is expressed will be neither the past events that have exercised their shaping influence nor yet the literal existing occasion. It will be, in the degree of spontaneity, an intimate union of the features of present existence with the values that past experience have incorporated in personality. Immediacy and individuality, the traits that mark the concrete existence, come from the present occasion; meaning, substance, content, from what is embedded in the self from the past.” (1934, 71)

If we can, I think the work will not have the same power for us.

It is to this temporality that Derrida (1973) returns to ‘deconstruct’ Husserl’s phenomenology. What Kant discovered in his idea of conscious experiences, that they are unified in a field of consciousness, is transferred by Derrida (and Heidegger as well) to language as a unified field of ‘meaning’ and ‘distinctions’. The key in Derrida’s position is the collapsing of language and thought and thought and experience (see especially 83-143). Thus he can declare ‘there has never been a perception’ (103), that is, there has never been a given in thought other than what is already determined in the language through generals of articulate intentionality. This view issues from a highly intellectualized notion of experience, where experience is always determined under concepts, meanings. It is always ‘seeing-as’ (Gadamer shares this same view), and there is no seeing something where that very something is not within the possibilities of other somethings, the order of things in the language. But this view which maps Kant’s project in The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) onto language misses the possibility of intuitions as a non-discursive level of experience, without yet the ‘necessity of the object’ in categorical reflection, thus beyond determination of concepts, which Kant himself leaves room in his discussion in the first Critique (see Appendix B). This view also misses that Kant had broadened his view of experience in the third Critique (CI) when he explained a kind of regulative judgment of awareness which is not determined within a discursive field, where the object is not subsumed under a determination of necessity.

54 See how Dewey (1934) sees imagination and intuition in temporality of self, as bridging new and old in new constructs of seeing: “Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual.” (345)

“Intuition’ is that meeting of the old and new in which the readjustment involved in every form of consciousness is effected suddenly by means of a quick and unexpected harmony which in its bright abruptness is like a flash of revelation, although in fact it is prepared for by long and slow incubation”. “When old and new jump together, like sparks when the poles are adjusted, there is intuition.” (266)

In art, for Dewey, imagination “designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation. It is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole”. “When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created the far and strange become the most natural and inevitable things in the world”. “The welding together of all elements, no matter how diverse in ordinary experience, into a new and completely unified experience.” (267)

On imagination and spontaneity: “Possibilities are embodied in works of art that are not elsewhere actualized; this embodiment is the best evidence that can be found of the true nature of imagination.” (268)

55 “No experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has aesthetic quality.” (1934, 40)

56 Dewey underlines the experience of any significance as a “subtle shadings of a pervading and developing hue.” (37)

57 This notion of ‘disinterestedness’ in Kant’s view of judgment of taste is a much misunderstood point. See, for example, among many others: Danto 1994, 343; 1997, 84-86, Burger 1984, 42, Harries 1997, 23, Wilson 1992, 1-74. See also Thierry Duve 1996, 322 on how Kant is misread by many writers through Clement Greenberg’s misinterpretation of him.

58 Dewey’s principle of experience running its full course, consummation: having an experience for Dewey is perception of a phenomenal unity. “We have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experiences from other experiences” (35). Note that he is referring to the unity of consciousness as the field of demarcation of the particular experience in question. A “closing” is a “consummation” not a “cessation” as a satisfactory finish. “Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience” (35). And any experience for him is as such a unity in our daily commerce with things and events. But we have “an experience” when we attend to the experience in its fullness: “when the old and new clashes, the experience raises to consciousness”. This is an attentiveness to the unity of the experience itself before the recognition of object or event,
the ‘how’ of the experienced matter: the “quality that pervades the entire experience” (37). Also note that Heidegger uses artwork to critique the concept of a thing as it is advanced in scientific thinking, to show that we relate to a world of things before science makes its claims on objectivity. However, he himself, while dropping the line of objectivity from science to language and daily commerce, still keeps some layer of ‘things’ as known significances as the ground of our interaction with world, thus he misses the possibility of significant experience at the phenomenal level Dewey sees it.

59 “The proper intercourse with a work of art is certainly not ‘using’ it; on the contrary, it must be removed carefully from the whole context of ordinary use objects to attain its proper place in the world. By the same token, it must be removed from the exigencies and wants of daily life, with which it has less contact than any other thing. Whether this usefulness of art objects has always pertained or whether art formerly served the so-called religious needs of men as ordinary use objects serve more ordinary needs does not enter the argument. Even if the historical origin of art were of an exclusively religious or mythological character, the fact is that art has survived gloriously its severance from religion, magic, and myth.” (Arendt 1958, 167)

60 See Vesely 2004, 237 for Claude Monet’s confession after his wife’s death, and how Vesely uses it to underline his idea of aesthetic experience as erosion of humanity.

"The question is never once broached whether a psychologically sound Baudelaire would have been able to write The Flowers of Evil, not to mention whether the poems turned out worse because of the neurosis." (Adorno 1970, 8)
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: WHOLEHEARTED ACTION

But suddenly you touch my heart, you do me good, I am happy and I say: ‘This is beautiful.’ That is architecture. Art enters in. (Le Corbusier 1923, 153)

Observe the play of shadows, learn the game... Precise shadows, clear cut or dissolving. Projected shadows, sharp. Projected shadows, precisely delineated, but what enchanting arabesques and frets. Counterpoint and fugue. Try to look at the picture upside-down or sideways. You will discover the game. (Le Corbusier 1957, 38-39)

Michael Benedikt’s ‘experience of the real’ (1987) is a familiar phenomenon to us in daily life: “direct esthetic experience of the real”, “simple correspondence of appearance and reality”, “the evident rightness of things as they are.” ¹ This is comparable to Arendt’s insight into the ‘meaningfulness of rare deeds’, cited above, that the meaningfulness of everyday life lies not in everyday events, but in rare deeds. There is such ‘sheer presence’ of such experiences. But real is real, everyday is everyday. Whence comes the difference of certain experiences that are more real and more meaningful than the rest? How do we know, in Benedikt’s sense, that appearance and reality correspond in certain experiences? Recall Plato: “the shining of the idea”, his conception of knowledge as recollection and beauty as that ‘glimpse’ of the Idea that shows itself in phenomenal experience. The ‘soul’ remembers in certain experiences that come close to the Idea. Plato sees reality not in the flux of lived phenomena as it is, not in the contingent nature, but somewhere else beyond this. Even if we do not agree with Plato on the existence of a world of Essences set once and for all beyond this world we live in its concreteness and contingency, see how his account fits into this picture where we see the meaningfulness of everyday life in rare deeds or where some experiences are more real than the others. There is nothing behind the appearances, but how is it then some experiences are ‘more real’ than the others? It is our own intentionality that is at work in such experiences. ² Suppose that the Platonic Essences are what we make in our effort of making sense of world and life, and that they are always under
construction through new experiences. Suppose that imagination not only remembers but makes new images, new constellations, in spontaneous acts projected as conjectures, as future possibilities on some regulative background of lived experiences. Meaning as such is something we bring upon things. When Aristotle underlined poetry as truer than history, it is the same take on life as something we confer on to a contingent flux of things and events: the way things and events are meaningful for us, the way we relate to world.

The unity of our experiences has this meaning hinge which also is the source of meaningful act in the immediacy of concrete situations. This unity of ‘natural act’ for Grassi is something we share with animal life. The immediate meaningfulness of nature has a survival value for animal species. But he also underlines that human life is built beyond the codes embedded in animal nature that bestow nature with immediate value. It is not only via this animal inheritance but also via being born into traditions, life practices that phenomena have immediate significance for us. This is the ‘symbolic distance’ between us and reality that Cassirer constructs his philosophy on. We make sense of reality through constructions of culture, through idealizations. Through conscious meanings as Dewey sees it, through the work. Dewey also underlines the same unity of meaning and experience in the unity of the aesthetic experience. The particular experience is here and now in all its vitality and significance: ‘you do me good’. But its significance is beyond any source we know of, it is a glimpse from our overall background of lived phenomena. This significance is transcendence of self-consciousness in the immediacy of lived experience; it is a new synthesis of imagination to be registered into the memory, the unity of consciousness, becoming part of the substance of self, in Dewey’s sense of self, in its temporality.
‘Suddenly you touch my heart’. Without being able to find a description, the experience is registered in a metaphor by the self, in the familiarity of language. This is why the first language is of metaphor, and there is no further proof: ‘you will discover the game’ if you look careful enough, experience for yourself, or you simply won’t.

Even if we are born into languages and traditions, and even if our world of meaning is given through them, they are always under construction through individual acts of meaning in new experiences. The human individuality is not the empirical identity of a self. It is more than this, a self-consciousness that relates to world through his/her own understanding and reflection beyond hardwired animal representations. Even if we are born into a common world of a collectivity, we are individuals in this world which is shared in common representations, and as such we also have a distance to it. The principle of individual is not the Cartesian self that precedes the world, contemplating the world and others from an interior distance. Such an understanding of self is in categorical opposition to the idea of the unity of the thought and made, where thought only becomes what it is, even for the maker, in the exteriority of the work, in the common space of dialogue of culture. However, embeddedness of self in the world, in culture in the languages and traditions, cannot mean that there is no such self that is unique, individual, has ability to think and relate to world from a specific viewpoint.

If we take embedded agency to be a fully immersed consciousness in the exteriority of culture, then it is inevitable that it would become a kind of ‘species’ consciousness like our animal counterparts. What is hardwired for the animals, regulating their world in their instincts, would be for us the language in which we come to know ourselves and the world. Thus communication in such a case would be a mere fulfillment of our given conditions. It is this way of seeing culture and collectivity that Arendt is against of with her idea of plurality. We are
born into languages and traditions but we are also agents in the shaping of them.¹¹ And our embeddedness in the world and culture can only be a condition for our capacities of thinking but not a total determination of ourselves to the degree of terminating self-consciousness and agency.¹² The unity of the natural act is also the source of the work, the unity of subject and object in the freedom of individual reflection. Reifying language and tools of tradition distances the subject, hence cancels the question of agency. The anchor of individual experience, the experiencing subject, is cut off, language and tradition raise into self-referential systems in the opaqueness of some common history becoming iron curtains¹³ for reality.

The work as meaningful action is not a representation, it is an individual take on reality, thus it is always an offer. Meaningfulness of the act lies in its promise which is a possibility among many other possibilities in the texture of the multitude of reality. When plurality is accepted as ‘the human condition’ as Arendt shows, such an offer of a new interpretation of reality in the newness of the work is already an intervention, it is a genuine making in the making of culture. The medium of the work is the intersubjective field of experience, and its conditions can only depend on the possibility of meeting with the other, that is, on the possibility of communication. For this condition of dialogue in the making of the world, I do not think we can set any justificatory ground beyond our conscious experience of a significance that emerges in the work, in the work between 'I and Thou':

It is possible to be efficient in action and yet not have a conscious experience. The activity is too automatic to permit of a sense of what it is about and where it is going. It comes to an end but not to a close or a consummation in consciousness. Obstacles are overcome by shrewd skill, but they do not feed experience. There are also those who are wavering in action, uncertain, and inconclusive like the shades in classic literature. Between the poles of aimless and mechanical efficiency, there lie those courses of action in which through successive deeds there runs a sense of growing meaning conserved and accumulating toward an end that is felt as accomplishment of a process. (Dewey 1934, 38-39)
I think this sense of “growing meaning” must be the core of the idea of unity of thinking and making as we architects should conceive it in the making of each new work: a wholehearted action. We should approach each new work in the spirit of Kahn’s insight that we do not know much about space (McCarter 2005, 386). The growing meaning in the work may come from a source unknown to us, buried in the depths of history, our psyche, or the cosmological grounds of being. We do not have access to anything like an ideal ground of this sort. And it does not matter where it comes from. What we see in the work is at most a resonance, a reverberation that ‘promises’ something, in the making of the thing at hand in the concreteness of here and now. Hence, to name it before it happens in the work, to think to know where it comes from, to think to know what to do beforehand in the reified examples of tradition, to take past achievements as authoritative to the degree of bypassing one’s own sense of judgment, all such top-down mentality issues from a philosophical habit, which indeed stamps the authority of abstraction into domain of acting by making in the concreteness of life and gives an easy way to a mechanical mimesis without conscious experience.

Notes

1 Benedikt refers to Heidegger in a later writing as a source of his thinking in For an Architecture of Reality, (1991, 125, endnote 91). But I think there are other possible explanations for the kind of experiences he refers to.

2 Vico establishes a common ground of human intentionality through which we relate to world. But he also recognizes the historicality of culture, of the work (locality). Thus the principles of common intentionality must be beyond common contents of historical meanings. Vico, perhaps, is the first to address the problem of intentionality in its modern form: how the mind orders a reality. His answers in memory and imagination together with his idea of common sense bring him in alliance with Kant and Dewey in terms of the way they understand the unity of experience in the temporality of a unified self. I read in Vico’s dictum “verum ipsum” the human self as a unified field of experience, where human made things are in principle accessible to every other human being. Thus, non-reflective judgments are forms of thinking that belong to “common understanding”. They are historical contents of the mind, the way things are for us, our things. Common sense must be more than this in terms of the form of mind as a field of possible experiences, the way we order things rather than ‘our things’, otherwise there would not be any
task for the philologist to clarify what lies in the work which is always an act in the immediacy and concreteness of a historical moment.

When we think some experiences as more real than the others, how is this possible as a non-reflective judgment? For Dewey, experience as such passes the threshold of consciousness, hence it is reflective in the sense that one is attentive to what is happening, but to the experience itself, rather than what s/he knows it to be, hence non-reflective in the sense that it is not about recognition but a seeing of multiplicity of reverberations in the experience itself on the basis of retentions in the memory and their possibilities. Some experience echoes, resonates more than any possible thoughts or references, hence the judgment is not on the event or object but the way it is in one’s experience, the judgment is on the resonance without being able to catch the references.

Common sense is a common basis of intentionality, the way the world is for us, the ground of “brute meaning” that Merleau-Ponty explains. It must be the ground of possibility for ‘perception’ beyond historical recognition, on which also possible recognitions can be based mediated through historical intentions. And if this is an accurate interpretation, then the verum factum principle cannot designate an unproblematic understanding of every possible work through empathy on the basis of shared ideals, but it can show a ground for possible mediation of the work, a ground of commonality in how we order things rather than a commonality of the things ordered into idealities known in a historical horizon of meaning. I think this is also what Kunze points at when he writes about the imaginative universals in Vico’s thought: (Kunze, 106) “Imaginative universality exists within the modifications of the human mind in the same way that a base, columns, and pediment constitute the basic unit of classical architecture. It is not the content but the form of the mind that affords the modern student of culture the experience of travel through time back to his anthropological origins.” (kunz106) “through his mediative acts, (the scholar) is able to gain access to everything human, at least in principle”

And I think such ‘form of mind’ is also what enables Vico himself to abstract from many particular mythical characters to achieve his universal dictionary, thus to get in touch with the past. Poetic characters and the universal mental dictionary (Bitz): “to gain metaphysical stature, there must be a model or paradigm for each character which is purified of all the particulars”, “to transcend these particular characters, Vico constructs a common mental language of ideas or characters common to all languages… the characters / ideas that are considered from different viewpoints in different languages”

In one sense, these mediative principles are also what Kant sought in his categories of understanding and the moral imperative: “His friends chose the dictum from the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) for his tombstone: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (5:161.33-6; tr. Guyer 1992, 1) (Guyer, Paul, 1992: “Introduction: the starry heavens and the moral law” in P. Guyer, ed.: The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.)

Note how Vico, when he establishes common ground of humanity as a divine principle in our creation (that we have a nature beyond nature), reasons:
S141: “Since human judgment is by nature uncertain, it gains certainty from our common sense about what is necessary and useful to humankind; necessity and utility are the two sources of the natural law of nations.”

S132: is about how brute emotions capacities, etc., all animal side… turns into civilization…

S133: “This (s132) axiom proves that divine providence exists and that it acts as a divine legislative mind. For out of the passions of people intent on their personal advantage, which might cause them to live as wild and solitary beasts, it makes civil institutions which keep them within human society.”

S134: Outside their natural state, things can neither settle nor endure.

S135: Since from the time immemorial the human race has lived harmoniously in society, this single axiom resolves the great question of whether law exists in nature, or whether human nature is sociable – which is the same thing.

S136: “…man has volition to turn his passions into virtues. But since his will is weak, he must be aided by God…”

S144: when uniform ideas arise in entire nations which are unknown to each other, they must have a common ground of truth.

S145: This axiom is an important principle. For it establishes that mankind’s common sense is a criterion which divine providence teaches peoples to aid them in defining what is certain in the natural law of nations. They arrive at this certainty by looking beyond local variations in this law to recognize its essential unities, on which they all agree. From these unities, we may derive a conceptual dictionary which traces the origins of all the various articulate languages.

3 Vico writes on the poet’s way of narrating: “He may depart from the daily semblances of truth, in order to be able to frame a loftier semblance of reality. He departs from the inconstant, unpredictable nature in order to pursue a more constant, more abiding reality, He creates imaginary figments which, in a way, are more real than physical reality itself.” (quoted in Kunze 1987, 211)

4 Grassi in reference to Cicero: “Man transforms reality through his own capacities… Through (this) ingenious activity we surpass what lies before us in our sensory awareness.” (1980, 9)

5 Dewey (1934) underlines the sources of aesthetic experience in the animal life, in the unity of experience that is necessary for being fully present at a moment on the world: “Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality”. “Instead of signifying being shut up within one’s own private feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events.” (19)

“The sense are the organs through which the live creature participates directly in the ongoings of the world about him. In this participation the varied wonder and splendor of this world are made actual for him in the **qualities he experiences. This material cannot be opposed to action, for motor apparatus and ‘will’ itself are the means by which participation is carried on and directed. It cannot be opposed to ‘intellect’, for mind is the means by which
participation is rendered fruitful through sense; by which meanings and values are extracted, retained, and put to further service in the intercourse of the live creature with his surroundings.” (22)

The unity of the empirical subject and world in the unity of experience is a common ground for animals and humans, but “man’s marvelous and distinguishing experience” (22) is different in that he saturates this experience “with the conscious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression.” (23)

Grassi underlines this as “the rhetorical ground of basic assertions” that metaphorical speech points at with figurative and imagistic constructions (1980, 19-20).

I think Dewey would say the same thing in terms of direct experience: “Apart from the organs inherited from animal ancestry, idea and purpose would be without a mechanism of realization.” (1934, 25)

Human world does not have an ‘immediate environment’ like animals, man’s world “must be constructed again and again” and it is the: “individual human being and not the immediate directive signs of the holistic and unproblematic world has the task of constructing the world that is lived in.” (Grassi 1980, 106-107)

“Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse, and action characteristic of the live creature. The intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power of selection and re-disposition” (Dewey 1934, 25)

Van der Laan writes: Even “the intellect, which directs on making towards its goal, is not entirely independent but must be informed from outside, through sensory perception, in particular through the perception of the things that are made. Thus the realization of human products demands a continuous interplay between action, perception, and thinking.” (1983, 185)

This is the idea of embedded agency in Vico’s idea of human work as human truth, in Cassirer’s symbolic forms as exteriorization of human spontaneity, in Dewey’s idea of artwork as the realization of “inner” material through forming “outer” material, in Adorno’s notion of constructive moment as forming the mimetic into perceptible form, in Arendt’s idea of artwork as the reification of thought. And as such it is the Kantian embedded self that can only know itself in the exteriority of space and time, on the world in the continuity of matter. This is how Kant rejects Descartes’s “I think therefore I am” and makes it, to phrase him, ‘I am on the world therefore I am’. See ‘Refutation of Idealism’ in Critique of Pure Reason.

See in section 1.3. above for Vesely’s idea of communication that it has no identifiable origin. I think its origin lies in the fact that we are agents and we speak to make ourselves understood, communication has its origin in the self-consciousness of human agents.

Self-consciousness and agency: Arendt underlines that human subject as a self-conscious being on the world is a unique standpoint that understands and interprets reality. Thus, for her, communication is a communication between different individuals that are not reducible to each other as would be the case in a species communication where there would not be the distinction of viewpoint that comes with the consciousness of self as having beliefs about the
world through a self-consciousness. We are equal to the degree that we can communicate, but we are distinct so that there is need for human speech and action. When Dewey speaks about conscious meanings in the unity of experience, I think he has the same point of self as a self-conscious individual that is a viewpoint on the world. See Appendix B also for a discussion of the relation between self-consciousness and experience in Kant’s thinking.

“Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough.”

“In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (Arendt, 1958, 175-176)

Agency, in all action and speech: “The revelatory character without which action and speech would lose all human relevance”. “Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively ‘objective’, concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests”. (182) Note ‘the revelatory character’ of action and speech in terms of being done by an individual agent.

Arendt also quotes Dante for the ‘revelatory character’ of action and speech: “For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image. Hence it comes about that every doer, insofar as he does, takes delight in doing; since everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows… Thus, nothing acts unless (by acting) it makes patent its latent self.” (1958, 175)

12 Arendt sees our embeddedness in terms of our capacities rather than an ontological determination: “the conditions of human existence –life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and earth –can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely.” (1958, 11)

13 The work is always a work of an individual interpretation, for Dewey, like Arendt, the work is not a species expression, self is in the work as the work’s uniqueness. This uniqueness of the work is also the uniqueness of the subject that realizes itself in the work. Thus the work is how the subject participates in the making of a common world from a unique viewpoint. What is said belongs to the world, but how it is said is an individual take on. That self is there in the work becomes all the more important when the action or making is beyond the economy of thinking that is stabilized in reified languages and traditions, that is stabilized and purged off from subjectivity when the language becomes a self maintaining machine that can operate without subjects, a self referential mechanism that drops the author.

“A poem or picture present material passed through the alembic of personal experience. They have no precedents in existence or in universal being. But, nonetheless, their material came from the public world and so has qualities in
common with the material of other experiences, while the product expressed awakens other perceptions of new possibilities in the shared world.” (Dewey 1934, 82)

“If there be no self-expression, no free play of individuality, the product will be of necessity be but an instance of a species; it will lack the freshness and originality found only in things that are individual on their own account.” (Dewey 1934, 107)
APPENDIX A
NARRATIVES AND OBJECTS: THE LOGIC OF DEVICE

It is not that artworks differ from significative language by the absence of meanings; rather, these meanings through their absorption become a matter of accident. The movements by which this absorption of meaning occurs are concretely prescribed by every aesthetically formed object. (Adorno 1970, 124)

When does one need a device to look at something? Probably when it does not unfold itself to the naked eye...

'Unfold'?

Would not it be naive to think that the thing itself asks for the device for its precious moment of ‘aletheia’?

An optical device, a device for measurement, a code for encryption, etc. Their common service seems to bring something under a level of determination, with some interpretation in view. The thing, the device, and the interpretation sought comprise an intricate unity. The interpretation as that which alone holds this fragile web together is often easily forgotten.

The library for Kant has been produced in result of a series of discussions with Professor William Tilson on the nature of the relation between ‘narrative’ and ‘object’. The idea explored is the possibility of a translation between literary ideas and architectural objects where they inform each other in a mutual reciprocity at an intuitive level without a reduction of one to the other. A main guiding principle for the project is the belief that architecture, as a specific way of thinking and making, has an internal formative logic and communicative dimension of its own, and any set of meanings cultivated within other domains of cultural reflection needs to go through a unique translation process to become a proper informant of an architectural object. This process of translation dissolves the discursive bonds of the articulate meanings and expands them in an unbounded intuitive field in the architectural object; it transforms these meanings
through an *architectural mediation*. Hence, the process is always of the nature of a transmutation rather than transfiguration or transliteration.

The architectural object brings the literary narrative informing its making under a unique determination. It is, thus, always an interpretation. Because the movement of the productive act is from a web of concepts to an object of experience, an intuitive unity which is always informationally richer than any given set of concepts. Consequently, the relation of the narrative to the architectural object is always an underdetermination rather than a smooth transliteration, or a one-to-one correspondence as in an unproblematic translation based on convention. The narrative irreversibly dissolves in the unity of the architectural object, being transmuted into a new interpretation.

The differentiation in German between ‘Inhalt’ and ‘Gehalt’ for what is only ‘content’ in English may recognize this kind of a transformation. In the conceptual space of the traditional form-content distinction, Inhalt can be understood as a work’s literal *representational* content whereas Gehalt denotes what is *presented* by the work as to the content of its experience. Gehalt is the result of the specific intentionality of the work and cannot be reduced to Inhalt; it is only available within the experience of the work, not prior to it. A narrative informing an object in its making would be Inhalt only. But the essential architectural product is that which happens between Inhalt and Gehalt. Inhalt may not belong to architecture as a discipline at all. (As, perhaps, nothing narrated in a film is *filmic* at all; filmic may only be a relation between Inhalt and Gehalt. The same may hold for poetry as well.)

Hence the decisive moment of deploying a literary narrative in the making of an architectural object is the determination under which the object in turn brings the narrative, as narratives formed within different fields of cultural reflection are not able to generate
architecture without a distinct interpretative effort that translates their content into lived spatial/material phenomena that is the specific intentionality of architecture. Such a translation is also the dissolution of any literary content in the topical unity of thinking and making that holds the architectural object in its particularity. Likewise, no justification for architectural objects can come from the narratives informing their making if the original unity of an architectural interpretation is lacking in their experience.

Critical endeavour is creative to the extent that it gives rise to connections, analogies, circuits, or lines that not only might otherwise have gone unnoticed, but would have been impossible to recognize in the absence of the differential mechanism. (Sola-Morales 1995, 8)

The decisive moment is the "connections, analogies, circuits, or lines" that are disclosed in the architectural experience.

A Bibliothèque for Immanuel Kant:

We cannot learn philosophy; for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognize it?

We can only learn to philosophize, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at philosophy, always reserving the right of reason to investigate, to confirm, or reject these principles in their very sources. (Kant 1781/1787, A838/B866)

Placing the book. ¹

Finding the space for the text. the space of the epistemic vertigo, the cryptic foci . . . then the fragile balance, the unexpected suspension . . . and all over again. A unity almost incomprehensible. A fluctuating whole sensible only by intuition alone at a tangent to articulate reason.

¹ bib•li•o•the•ca: [L < Gr bibliothÉkÈ, library, bookcase < biblion, a book + thÉkÈ < tithenai, to place, DO]
Locating the text. Locating how to read the text. What it is . . .

Going beyond the formal architectonic of the text . . . to the intuitive grounds of its meaning, to the elusive bond of its structure.

To the aphoristic seed beyond the linguistic expression.

Seeing beyond the icon.

A floating folie, hovering above the garden, at a cryptical tangent to it . . . almost a contingent relation.

Still keeping a critical distance to the context in its contingency.

Alien marks on the ground, to make sense only when seen from the folie. The critical distance becomes the space of revelation. The folie gives a synthetic unity to the pieces inscribed on the ground: the movement is from above.

A baroque garden: The fabricated calmness, flat and smooth. Almost a metaphysical comfort . . . the reason's own games.


But don't question or judge it. Even in philosophy you cannot prove anything, win by argument. So, it is to be an aphoristic touch only . . .

A temporary gesture of a slight difference.

Every argument boils down to intuition. One has to see it on his own, and a temporary but careful disturbance within a similar language is sufficient here. The seed should be embedded in the intuitive conditions of the gesture. It is to be weak thought, weak architecture.

Reading Kant.

The epistemic vertigo, the cryptic foci . . .
Then the fragile balance, the unexpected suspension . . . and all over again: constant relapses.

A fluctuating whole sensible only by intuition alone at a tangent to articulate reason.

The space for reading him is to be so: a contingent balance in/of a delicate suspension.

A volume in constant expansion and contraction . . . a fluctuating void. The blind.

The space should lay down the problematic of reason under the gaze of intuition . . . as the condition of its own existence.
Figure 1. A Library for Immanuel Kant.

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Figure 2. A Library for Immanuel Kant 2.
Figure 3. A Library for Immanuel Kant.
This paper aims to explore a possible way of reading Kant’s claim that “intuitions without concepts are blind”, yet it is necessary to bring [the mind’s] intuitions under concepts. The claim is expressed in Kant’s famous dictum as follows: “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts)” (1787/1781, B76/A52). My intention is to focus on the possibility of finding some notion of consciousness in Kant’s account of experience before categorical determinations.

What makes the above statement intriguing is the possibility that intuitions can be brought under concepts despite Kant’s arguments that no representation can achieve the status of conscious representation before conceptual determination. This possibility seems to suggest that there can be some kind of consciousness of intuitions without concepts, so that they can be brought under concepts.

Allison, in reference to W. H. Walsh’s description of “a Kantian sensible intuition” as “only ‘proleptically’ the awareness of a particular”, suggests that “the point here is simply that, although intuitions do not in fact represent or refer to objects apart from being ‘brought under concepts’ in a judgment, they can be brought under concepts, and when they are they do represent particular objects” (1983, 67-68). How they can be brought under concepts, and what their status can be in relation to the consciousness of the subject before being brought under concepts seem important questions to explore. In order to pursue these questions, I will explore Kant’s idea of conscious representations.
The reading below is partly prompted by Strawson’s interpretation of Kant’s account of experience where he places the distinction between how things are and how they are experienced at the center of the argument: “the necessity of saving the recognitional component in an experience from absorption into its sensible accusative (and thereby saving the status of experience as experience) is simply identical with the necessity of providing room, in experience, for the thought of experience itself; and it is just this necessity which calls directly for the distinction between how things are and how they are experienced as being” (1989, 110).

Strawson bases his interpretation on the distinction between objective representations vs. subjective representations, and takes this as a correlate of general concepts vs. particular intuitions.

He explains “the thesis that experience necessarily includes awareness of objects conceived as distinct from particular subjective states of awareness of them, from particular ‘representations’ or ‘experiences’” as the thesis of Deductions (p. 89). However, this distinction seems not so obvious in the Deductions. Because, in the first place, the awareness of objects is only possible by the category-governed unity of intuitions as any representation, to become a conscious representation for the subject, i.e., to be taken into the unity of consciousness, has to come in an objective unity. Hence, in the argument of the Deductions, it seems, there is no room for a distinction between objective and subjective conscious representations, because the object is the representation of the unity of the subject’s representations (the manifold of intuition), and the very same unity is already the sole condition of the possibility of subject’s consciousness of his representations. That is, the consciousness of the object is already only possible as the consciousness of the subjective representations. It seems that here there are no two distinct
representations that the subject can be conscious of; i.e., there seems to be indeed no subjective unity apart from an objective one to become a conscious representation for the subject.

In the quote below, Kant affirms the necessity of the categories for all conscious representation:

All sense data [data der Sinne] for a possible cognition would never, without those conditions, represent objects. They would not even reach that unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of myself (as object of inner sense). I would not even be able to know that I have sense data; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. They could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence on my feeling and desire, without my being aware of them (assuming that I am even conscious of each individual representation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their apperception). This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Allison 1983, 153)

This passage expresses one of the main points in the Deductions and it seems clear that, for Kant, any subjective representation apart from an objective determination cannot be a conscious representation for the subject.

The distinction between objective representations vs. subjective representations is emphasized in full force in the Second Analogy by Kant where he elaborates on the schema of the category of cause. Here he distinguishes between subjective representations and objective representations as to their temporal order and argues that the representation of what is objectively in time is only possible by subjecting the temporal order of the subjective representations to the category of cause/effect. But there is an apparent difficulty in understanding this claim in the light of the argument given in the Deductions. Apprehension of the manifold of an intuition is always determined under the concept of an object to be taken, in the first place, into the consciousness of the subject. Hence the empirical intuition of an object in one state cannot be a conscious representation before a determinate time and space are generated (through at least the synthesis of homogenous, category of magnitude). The apparent difficulty is how to understand
the claim that “I am only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other
after, not that one state precedes the other in the object” (1787, B233). Because, it seems to be
the case that, at least given the argument in the Deductions, the subject’s consciousness of the
states of the object ¹ already contains their spatio-temporal determinations, hence which follows
which. It seems that what Kant ascribes here as subjective representations, ‘one state of the
object after another as they appear to the subject’, cannot be merely subjective at all if we
consider that the subject is conscious of these representations, which, according to the
Deductions, is only possible as the outcome of an objective unity. It is one of the main arguments
of the Deductions to ground the empirical consciousness on the original unity of consciousness
(see 1787, B140). However, the difficulty of relating this distinction between conscious
subjective and objective representations in the Second Analogy to the argument of the
Deductions is only apparent. It seems to result only from Kant’s different emphases in two
sections. Before articulating a way of reading for how to understand the subjective conscious
representations in distinction from the objective representations, another point is in order.

We can state the same apparent asymmetry between the Second Analogy and the
Deductions on a different but related topic as well. Strawson underlines that the case for a
particular ‘unruly perception’ is not made in the Deductions but only in the Analogies (p. 89).
This suggestion seems only partly true. Because, in the Deductions Kant talks about
uncategorized representations, e.g., “objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having
to be related to functions of the understanding” (1781, A90), or, “it would be possible for a
swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it”

¹ Kant writes here only ‘states’ but not ‘objective states’, however, that these are objective states is clear in the
preceeding statements: “I perceive that appearances succeed one another, i.e., that a state of things exists at one time
the opposite of which existed in the previous state” (1787, B233).
(1781, A111). However, in this context, these representations are such that the subject cannot
even be conscious of them: “But these would then belong to no experience, and would
consequently be without an object, and would be nothing but a blind play of representations, i.e.,
less than a dream”(1781, A112), or, “as good as nothing for us” (1781, A111). Hence, it seems
that an ‘unruly perception’, in Strawson’s terms, cannot be a conscious perception at all here. As
for the argument in the Second Analogy, Kant seems to allow room for ‘conscious unruly
perceptions’: “if I were to posit that which precedes and the occurrence did not follow it
necessarily, then I would have to hold it to be only a subjective play of my imaginings, and if I
still represented something objective by it I would have to call it a mere dream” (1781, A202).

This asymmetry is such that in the argument of the Deductions whatever representation
that can reach to the level of consciousness is already determined under the unity of self-
consciousness, hence of the categories; that is, any representation should be of some objective
unity in order to be a conscious representation in the first place. However, in the Second
Analogy, Kant seems to express the possibility of conscious representations which are either not
objective or pre-objective. In the second case, in the example from A202 above, the suggested
possibility is that the subject may have conscious representations, even if ‘illusion’ or ‘dream’,
where the category of causality is waived, hence the conscious representation is not objective. In
the first case (1787, B233 above), the possibility is that the subject has conscious representations,
but they are not yet objective. The subject is conscious of his own apprehension before he is
conscious of the objective state of affairs represented by them: “The apprehension of the
manifold of appearances is always successive…Whether they also succeed in the object is a
second point for reflection, which is not contained in the first” (1781, A189). Both of these
cases can be related to Kant’s statement that “through mere perception, the objective relation of
appearances is not determined yet” (1787, B233). And, in both cases the subject is conscious of some intuitive representations before recognizing their objective determination. The difference between the two seems to be that in the case of ‘unruly perception’, the recognition of objective determination cannot be achieved, hence the perception is to be registered as a merely subjective representation.

Both cases suggest that the subject is conscious of the representation of apprehension before recognizing its unity under categories. And, from the argument of Deductions we know that the representation of apprehension is already unified under categories through the synthesis of imagination and that this determination is the condition of subject’s consciousness of his representations. Hence, in both cases, we can suggest that the conscious perceptions of the subject are produced by the imagination as determined under categories before the subject is reflectively conscious of this determination. Only, in one case this determination is complete, in the other it is partial. ² That one is an objective perception whereas the other is only a merely subjective representation can only come to consciousness by the subject’s attending to this determination. And, the latter recognition would lack the complete unity of categorical determination required for the recognition of an objective perception, and would hence be registered as ‘unruly’. Kant underlines that “apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of empirical intuition, in it there is no representation of the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances juxtaposed in space and time” (1787, B219). Here, to restate my claims above, we can suggest that even though ‘the representation of the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances juxtaposed in space and time’ is not part of the representation of apprehension, it is already determined under such a necessity in the case of objective perception,

² It could be suggested that in order for some perceptions to become conscious representations for the subject, they should at least be determined under the categories of quantity and quality.
and the subject’s recognition of this determination would be the consciousness of this necessity. For the ‘unruly’ case, because there is consciousness of the representation of apprehension, there would at least be some spatio-temporal determination of the perceptions (under the categories of quantity and quality), but the recognition of this determination would not achieve any consciousness of their necessity in this or that order.

Reading the statements below from the Second Analogy in the light of Deductions can be illuminating: “The apprehension of the manifold of appearances is always successive…Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point for reflection, which is not contained in the first” (1781, A189); “I am only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that one state precedes the other in the object” (1787, B233). According to the argument of Deductions, the manifold of intuition is already synthesized by the imagination under the determination of categories. Hence, indeed, there is no room or need for ‘a second point for reflection’ to be conscious of the representations’ objective unity insofar as they are conscious representations. Because, it is this unity in the first place that elevates the manifold of intuition to the level of consciousness. To be sure, this need for ‘a second point for reflection’ in order to determine the objective rule of perceptions cannot mean, for Kant, a requirement of looking into nature to extract rules of objects. The only candidate, we can suggest, for such a point of reflection in Kant’s account of experience is the subject’s recognition of the unity of his representations as they are determined under the categories. Hence, we can suggest that the subject is conscious of his representations as they are synthesized by the imagination, but not necessarily reflectively aware of their unity as they are determined under categories which indeed is the source of the synthesis of imagination in the first place. The moment of recognition, we can suggest, is the subject’s attending to his intuitive representations and bringing their unity
under concepts into his reflective awareness. To put it boldly, we can suggest that the categories do their job in the background and bring forth our conscious representations even when we are not aware of their workings as such.

“I am only conscious of my own representations”, “whether they designate an object is a second point of reflection”. But, in the boat example, Kant underlines that the order of the subjective representations is itself derived from the order of the objective state of affairs. Read together, one may even suggest that these statements do not seem to express parallel ideas. The subject is conscious of his representations as they are already driven by the objective state of affairs, but still there is a further step to determine whether they represent the objective state of affairs. However, they can be interpreted together to indicate that the subject, already conscious of the synthesis of imagination, only recognizes the unity of his representations under categories by this further step of reflection.

To continue with Kant’s example, we can suggest that when I see a boat first at some point then at another downstream, it seems to be a possibility that I can merely apprehend these perceptions without thinking that the current of the stream caused the movement of the boat. I can be conscious of my perceptions without attending to the causal relations. However, if they were not already determined by the category of causality, I could not even have been able to apprehend such perceptions in the first place. They would not have been able to be taken into consciousness at all without the determination of the category.

To all empirical cognition there belongs the synthesis of the manifold through the imagination, which is always successive; i.e., the representations always follow each other in it. But the order of the sequence (what must precede and what must follow) is not determined in the imagination at all, and the series of successive representations can be backwards just as well
as forwards. But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance), then the order in the object is determined, or, to speak more precisely, there is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object. (1787, B247)

The emphasis of these statements, we can suggest, is that the representation of the necessity of the temporal determination of the subject’s subjective representations only comes about by his recognizing them under the category. What precedes and what follows in his perceptions as he apprehends them (“I am [only] conscious of my own representations”) is already determined under the category, but he may not be conscious of this as such -the necessity of his perceptions as to what must precede and what must follow, and this reflective awareness only comes about by his recognition of the unity of his perceptions under the category.

Kant does not mention his distinction between ‘objects as they appear to us’ and ‘objects as they are’ (1781/1787, A258/B314) in the Deductions. An example from the Deduction A where Kant uses the category of cause as determining the possibility of intuition is in order:

The concept of a cause is nothing other than a synthesis in accordance with concepts; and without that sort of unity, which has its rule a priori, and which subjects the appearances to itself, thoroughgoing and universal, hence necessary unity of consciousness would not be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. But these would then belong to no experience, and would consequently be without an object, and would be nothing but a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream. (1781, A112)

Here Kant’s emphasis is only on the possibility of intuition under the category. Without their determination under the category, I could not even have been able to be conscious of my perceptions as I apprehend them (hence ‘less than a dream’). There is simply no possibility of conscious representations here that can be ‘backwards just as well as forwards’ as Kant suggests.
in the above quote from B247, as there is no synthesis of the imagination. But when there is, there is a unity that the subject can apprehend (how things appear) even without thinking the necessity of this unity (how things necessarily are).

We may suggest some supporting evidence for this interpretation of conscious intuitions before categorical recognition in both the Transcendental Logic and the Deduction B. In the Transcendental Logic, where Kant introduces his account of synthesis, he explains that “the synthesis of a manifold first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition”, and underlying that it is the “mere effect of imagination” he continues “yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.” (1781, A78) We can see here that the ‘certain content’ unified by the imagination in the synthesis is nothing other than the concept recognized by understanding, or vice versa, the concept recognized by the understanding is the already unified –even if ‘raw and confused’- content of this synthesis. It is clear in Kant’s account that the synthesis of the imagination does not yield cognition, for this, the concepts of the understanding are required (1781, A79). However, the consciousness of this synthesis of intuitions as it is without a reflective determination under the concepts as to its unity seems possible. Because, as it can be brought to a reflective determination under concepts, it already must have the unity that a conscious representation requires. Such a consciousness, we can suggest, is a consciousness of the unity of intuitions prior to its reflective awareness under concepts.
In the Deduction B, we can suggest that Kant lays down condition of the possibility of such a consciousness. “That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered” (1787, B132). But this necessary relation is only that “the I think must be able to accompany all my representations” (1787, B132), not that it must *always* accompany them. And, it is a sufficient condition of the unity they require for being conscious representations. A manifold of intuitions must belong to a self-consciousness in order to become a conscious representation. This, as underlined by Kant, is an analytic requirement for any conscious representation of the unity of a manifold of representations. (Different parts, to become a unity, should belong to a self-consciousness. Different consciousnesses can be conscious of each part respectively but not of their unity. The same consciousness can take hold of each part but still not become conscious of their unity if it is not conscious of itself in its representations of each part. Only the same self-consciousness can become conscious of each part and itself in the representation of each part, hence of their unity.) Hence the manifold of intuitions, in order to become a conscious representation, must stand in such a unity that it *can* belong to a self-conscious subject. Even though I may not represent each of my representations as mine, they must still be in a unity that will allow me to ascribe them as mine, otherwise, without such a unity, they will not be a conscious representation in the first place, hence can never be mine. This, it seems, is what Kant emphasizes: “the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (*even if I am not conscious of them as such*) they must yet necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in universal self-consciousness, because otherwise
they would not throughout belong to me” (1787, B133). Therefore, we can suggest that even though I may not reflectively ascribe my intuitions in a given representation as mine -hence ‘grasp them together as synthetically combined in an apperception” (1787, B139), because I am able to do so, they already must have the unity a conscious representation requires. And, it seems possible in Kant’s account of experience that we can apprehend this unity before recognizing objects through empirical judgments.
APPENDIX C
A CRITIQUE OF WITTGENSTEIN’S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

This essay aims to discuss Ludwig Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. As the vast literature on the argument already indicates, the issue is hard to be seized in all its dimensions because of both the ambiguity of Wittgenstein's style of writing and the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter itself. Therefore, I will confine myself to a brief examination of a particular aspect of the argument. Besides pointing out the obvious idea that language is a social phenomenon, the argument has a crucial dimension which extends into the role of language in our apprehension of the outer world and our own experiences. ¹ In its strong sense, the negative argument about the possibility of a private language seems to claim that the world as it is apprehended by us is given by the language that we learn in our upbringing and it is only through the concepts we acquired through language that we are able to organize not only our experiences of the outer world but our sensations as well. Hence, it seems to claim, the familiar immediacy of the world to us is only the immediacy of some order of things that we come to learn in language: an immediacy of the mediation of language, which is not an immediacy at all. I will argue that this strong sense cannot be drawn from Wittgenstein's argument.

I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition… I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation -and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. But what is that ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely

¹ This aspect of the argument seems to be "a major source for eliminativist sentiment" as suggested by Joseph Levine (1998). The following passage clearly explains the sentiment: "The solipsist has neither a standard, a sample nor a customary practice of using the word ‘pain’ against which the inclination to apply the concept can be judged. There is nothing independent of this inclination that enables the solipsist to determine whether the application is correct or incorrect. But in so far as there is nothing to determine whether the application is correct or incorrect, the idea of using the word correctly or incorrectly makes no sense. And in so far as the solipsist lacks a criterion of correct application, the solipsist lacks a concept of pain." (McGinn 1998)
See also Churchland 1988, pp. 51-66 and Dennett 1991.
serves to establish the meaning of sign. Well this is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. (Wittgenstein 1958, 92)

Wittgenstein's point is that the utterance of the sign 'S' when the private language speaker has a certain sensation cannot establish a meaning for the sign for its correct future applications. Why this cannot be done -hence the claim "Whatever is going to seem right to me is right"- may be examined from two viewpoints. One position considers the ostensive definition of the sign 'S' upon the occurrence of a certain sensation. And the most plausible readings of Wittgenstein's argument underline this viewpoint. 2 This explanation considers that the sign cannot take on a proper use by the mere act of associating it with a sample sensation. Because the link between 'S' and the sensation cannot have an independence from the memory of the sensation which is the only means upon which another occurrence is to be identified. Hence, in this way of association with ostensive definition, the private language speaker has no other criteria to judge his identification of the sensation as S than the sample memory by which s/he already identified the sensation as S. Here there is the use of the same memory twice, and for the private language speaker, 'whatever seems right to her/him is right'. The second position, I hold, from which Wittgenstein's argument can be approached considers that the sign 'S' can have an independence from the sample memory of sensation as to denote a certain kind of sensation while retaining in the memory of the speaker. This possibility is not entailed entirely in the former explanation of Wittgenstein's argument. Because, what is underlined is a general problem of ostensive definition even in public use of language and a shortcut is made to the case of private language. It is argued, in this way of reading Wittgenstein's argument, that the private language speaker's

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2 See Kenny 1973 (pp. 178-202), Candlish 1980 (pp. 85-94), and Candlish 1998.
problem is not only a problem of memory, as it might be supposed to be at a first glance. Because, as already suggested, association of the sign with a sample sensation does not itself elevate 'S' to a status of a word which has meaning in the form of 'the kind of sensation' to signify a certain *class* of sensations. Hence there is nothing to remember for another case of 'S' other than the first memory of the sensation. That is, for the scheme of 'identifying something as something' -identifying a present sensation as the kind of sensation S'- the second 'something' is missing as it is collapsed into the first one. The explanation why it is so focuses on the impossibility of a private ostensive definition. It is claimed that for an ostensive definition to be successful in the public use, the necessary background -'stage-setting' in Wittgenstein's terms- is prepared by language in advance. So, the thing referred to by the word ostensively defined is only located within a network provided by the public language without which the ostensive definition cannot succeed. And the shortcut to the private language is taken by arguing that such a background is not available for the private speaker. I argue, as a supporter of the second position, that this shortcut is not convincing. The background to satisfy the conditions of an ostensive definition is available for the private speaker as the unity of her/his consciousness. And if a public ostensive definition is successful within the network of concepts language provides, then there is no reason for a private ostensive definition not to be successful within the unity of the network of experiences that the speaker's consciousness sets up. I will call this network of experiences 'unity of consciousness' throughout the paper and, appealing to intuition, suggest that our conscious phenomenal states display a coherent network both synchronically and diachronically only in which we can take hold of them.

My argument for the private speaker is that the sign can take on a meaning independent from the sample memory of sensation. Because, the sensation, to be a conscious mental state in
the first instance, should be in such a way that the experience already occurs as 'such and such a sensation' to the speaker; that is, the sensation is to be identified -in its distinct character- within the unity of consciousness to become an experience at all. If consciousness is, in one sense, awareness of our experiences, to be aware of a sensation's identity should be in such a manner that the sensation is not exhaustive of all one's consciousness at any given time but resides in its identity among the other contents of consciousness where a characterization of the sensation is possible. Hence, the criteria for later applications of the sign to denote a certain kind of sensation can be established by this characterization via which the sensation is taken into our vocabulary of experiences which is always in the form of a characterization of the sensation as to its relations to other experiences. The route for such an argument is that this unity of consciousness is an indispensable element of meaningful public discourse and our continuous interaction with the world. Without the unity of our consciousness, no organization of our experiences would be possible in the first place and there would only be fleeting sensations. Hence, no successful identification of any state of affairs would take place in the absence of a coherent sensation/experience taxonomy, which is the only means by which we can correlate words and experiences in our public use of language. In order to clarify the argument, a more detailed examination is in order.

To understand the target of Wittgenstein's argument, we should scrutinize the case of the utterance 'This is S'. Obviously, this is an introspective judgement: 'This, what I feel now is S'. This judgement, like all perception and introspection judgements, is in the form of 'identifying something as something' and comprised of two components. One is the current sensation, the first 'something'. The other is our characterization of it as an experience of some kind by the help of our memory, the second 'something'. Our perception or introspection judgements are functions
of these two instances. And, that these two are inseparable seems to be the kernel of Wittgenstein's argument. Because it is always the case that 'What I feel is what I feel' or 'What I see is what I see'. The possibility of a mistake here is senseless for the reason that what you believe your experience to be is already determined by your memory of what this sort of experience is. When the speaker expresses her/his judgement as 'This is S', s/he identifies a sensation s/he remembers to be S. And there is no point in asking whether s/he identified the sensation wrong or s/he misremembered the sensation to be S: 'whatever seems right to her/him is right'. However, understood that way, the private speaker's position is not altogether different from situations we encounter as public language users. All our sensation judgements are in the form that whatever seems right to us is right. We identify our experiences as to what we believe - or remember- them to be. Nevertheless, even the two instances of current sensation and our characterization of it are inseparable; they are not to be thought as indiscernible for that matter. Indeed, because they are discernible that we can make successful identifications and have coherent experiences without having the illusion to do so. That is, our discriminative capacity does not elude us, otherwise all our interaction with the world would lose its cohesion. This performance is successful not only when we identify our experiences employing concepts acquired through linguistic practice independently of our private experiences, but also in the case of occurrences of new and unfamiliar sensations which we have no concepts at all. In a sense, we can make private ostensive definitions in the form of 'such and such a sensation' for new and unfamiliar experiences which we cannot describe with our concepts, yet recognize them in the future without the slightest hesitation.

One of the major difficulties of the way Wittgenstein formulates the argument is that he pictures the sensation which the private diarist is to record in such a manner that two instances of
the judgement seem to become indiscernible for the subject. For he imposes at the outset the
criteria for the sensation that no definition or description can be given and there is also no natural
expression but only the sensation. The diarist seems to be in a position that he cannot introduce
a sign by ostensive definition, and in the absence of any criteria other than a presumably faint
sample memory he is thought to be indecisive in a future occurrence, for there is nothing to
remember in the form of 'such and such a sensation'. Leaving aside the question of figuring out a
sensation of the implied kind, I shall suggest another source of difficulty. Wittgenstein does not
clarify whether, for 'S' to become a word denoting a certain kind of sensation, subjective criteria
established in independence from the sample experience is sufficient or the criteria should also
be independent from the subject as well. He, on the other extreme of a faint sample memory,
introduces a publicly accessible criterion exterior to the speaker her/himself to resolve the crux
of his argument. He suggests that if the speaker notices, for example, that a manometer indicates
a rise in her/his blood pressure along with the sensation, 'S' can satisfy the necessary condition to
become a word to indicate a certain class of sensation (1958, 94). But this time, 'S' already
becomes a public word independent of its use by the private diarist. Because now it has a use
publicly confirmable by the help of a manometer.

What Wittgenstein does not discuss is the alternative that 'S' can become independent of
the mere sample memory by the speaker's characterization of the sensation in the manner that 'S'
is now associated with 'such and such a sensation' in general. In this alternative, 'S' seems to
become a private word for the speaker in the sense that s/he can judge another sensation with the
criteria he establishes -'such and such a sensation'- in the act of prior characterization. And this
case seems not different from our characterization of a new experience or an unusual sensation
and that we recognize it successfully in another instance. However two things should be

3 See Wittgenstein 1958, §256 and §258.
mentioned here. First, the criteria still reside in the speaker; that is, the problem, in Wittgenstein's terms, that 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right' is not purged off. But this time it is only a problem of memory as much it always is in our public use of language, for we also have to remember, hence identify, certain sensations. Second, whether 'S' is still a private word or already becomes a public word by its association with some criteria is an issue open to discussion. On the one hand, it can be suggested that it is still a private word; for, the criteria that define it are established by the speaker and known only to him in the sense that they are related to his other mental states. However, on the other hand, it can be suggested that these mental states are not private as far as they are expressible in public language; hence, the criteria that the word is associated with are public and it becomes a public word in principle. Leaving the second issue aside, 4 I will discuss the first one only.

Both our introspection and perception judgments bear the bi-polarity outlined above as instances of the present experience at any given time and our characterization of it as an experience of some kind. And none is immune to the weakness that 'whatever seems right to us is right'. The judgement 'This is S' is in fact in the form of 'This what I feel now is that kind of sensation and it is S'. And when 'S' is correlated with some criteria, the problem the private diarist has is the same as we have in identifying a certain sensation and the correct word for that

4 I think our language about perceptual experiences bears the same conditions as our language about sensations. With perceptual experience, still we do not have any access to its private correlate in the other person, to his/her experience, how s/he picks up the object in question. However, using shared concepts, we describe what we see and make ourselves understood. Here, it seems, a conceptualization of the experience takes place and our communication is secured on this base. A new experience is taken into language or a new language activity about a new experience is established by our capacity to conceptualize. And there seems no reason why things should be different for our sensations. Again like sharing a perceptual experience through concepts, we communicate our sensation, we make ourselves understood by using our capacity to conceptualize. This account of communication on the basis of shared concepts seems more plausible than determination of our experiences by concepts already possessed. It seems not that we identify our experiences by shaping them into known concepts. Rather we are able to identify our experiences in their distinctness and, only then, we can conceptualize them to communicate what we identify. For example there are cases where we encounter with new and unusual experiences of which we cannot even make sense in their first instance. It is pending that despite our inability to handle these sort of experiences in our conceptual network, we take hold of them in their distinctiveness.
sensation. And I think we can ignore the problem of remembering the name for some sensation which is a problem we always face with. What differs between the diarist and us is that he has no further possibility to check his memory for the word 'S' as we can ask to others a name that we cannot remember for something even when we know what that something is. But this difference only shows an obvious triviality of the idea of a private language and nothing more than this at all.

On the issue of identifying a certain sensation, I suggest that in all our judgements we use a discriminative capacity based on the unity of our experiences. And, our identification of an experience and application of a specific concept to this experience are disjoint events. It is a possible situation that a certain pain can begin to disturb you. Even though it is a pain you have never felt before, it is possible that you learn this pain in its distinctiveness and you can judge your sensations as 'Yes, this is that pain' or 'No, this is not that pain' without any need of verification. This seems to be a primitive ability without which we cannot even survive. Without making use of any general concepts we possess we successfully identify our experiences. Or conversely, even if we possess the concepts, there are cases in which we cannot identify successfully our sensations. It is a commonplace that kidney pain and spinal column pain are usually mistaken for each other even by the people who experienced both of them separately. That we can recognize our experiences in their distinctness, I suggest, is a function of the unity our consciousness displays and this capacity precedes our conceptual and linguistic abilities. 5 And the possibility that we can make ostensive definitions of private signs for even unfamiliar sensations can be grounded by this unity. Like the 'stage-setting' of language for public ostensive definitions, where the referent for a word is located in a network of other concepts to which it

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5 I think we can suggest that non-linguistic animals and human infants have a coherent experience/sensation taxonomy even in the absence of conceptual abilities.
establishes certain inferential relations, unity of our consciousness supplies this setting for our experiences. The sensations we have are already located into the fabric of our experiences. For, we cannot think of a sensation which is non-relational, overarching and singly exhaustive of all consciousness. This would be like a sensation without your consciousness of it: not a sensation at all. However unique a sensation may be, it seems that it is still a sensation of such and such sort for our consciousness to be a sensation for us in the first place. And the fact that we come to identify new experiences and take hold of them seems to show that even an unfamiliar experience is relational as to its differences and similarities within our taxonomy of experiences, and this process seems to mean that the differences are apprehended in a certain way via which the unfamiliar sensation is registered.

If we deny ostensive definition to the private diarist, it seems that the argument threatens our public discourse as well. First of all, if our experiences had arbitrarily changed without our awareness of this change, and if our sensation/experience taxonomy were not coherent and our memory of sensations had always deceived us in a way that it is impossible to discern between the instances of current sensation and our characterization of it, we could not even have the ability to discriminate consistently between, for example, fresh and rotten food. On the other hand, it seems, we use the very same capacity to correlate words and experiences for the mapping between the linguistic and the non-linguistic. And that the conditions of public ostensive definition are not available for the private language speaker seems not convincing. Because even if the word ostensively defined is to be related to some phenomenon from a specific viewpoint set in language, the linguistic background cannot itself assure the mapping between the linguistic entity and its non-linguistic counterpart which can be understood as a specific experience. And, I suggest, to understand the meaning of a word in the sense of being
able to think of an object is also a function of this mapping. Wittgenstein, to emphasize the inadequacy of mere ostensive explanation, suggests: "If someone points to a piece and says 'This is the king' this does not tell me the use of the piece -how to move it, its importance, etc.- unless I already know the rules of the game and am merely unfamiliar with the shape of the piece." (Kenny 1973, 157) However, even if an acquaintance with the bearer is different than understanding the meaning of a word, the chess analogy seems to be a strong one. Because one can in no way understand how 'king' has a role in the game by examining the piece itself, as the relation between the actual material piece and its 'meaning' is totally arbitrary, here we cannot even talk about an ostensive definition. However, when we think of, for example, 'This is pain', many connections of the phenomenon, hence a lot about the use of the word 'pain', can be derived from the specific sensation. While it seems true that not all the use for the word 'pain' may be fixed in one single act of ostensive explanation, the sensation itself seems not totally arbitrary as in the 'king' analogy. Because our pain-language seems to have indispensable relations to the sensation of pain itself, even if it is not just a reflection of the individual pains we have. Kenny claims that an ostensive definition "will help me to understand the word; but [it] will not suffice by itself, because it can always be variously interpreted" (p. 157). While it seems plausible that the interpretations of ostensive definition may vary without the background language provides, I do not think there are no limits, for the phenomenon itself as apprehended by us is likely to define certain boundaries by its demonstration. And if we cannot contribute to the functioning of language by our conscious experience, I claim, the background set in language will be of no help to us. While it is true that how the word relates to the phenomenon is specified by this background, without the unity of consciousness we possess, the phenomenon will not even be apprehended from such a viewpoint in the first place. And if we cannot take hold of such
an experience in its distinctiveness -hence our experiences in general- before anything else, I claim, our whole interaction with the world and among ourselves, hence the coherency of our public discourse, will not be possible at all.

Wittgenstein many times underlines that for meaning to occur in language what goes on with the speaker is of no relevance. His idea of meaning of a word, very roughly, is that it is the word's use in language and that it has no relation to the inner states or inner pictures of the speakers of the language: 6

Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant -so that he constantly called different things by that name- but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" -in short he uses it as we all do. Here, I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. (Wittgenstein 1958, 95)

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. -Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might imagine such a thing constantly changing. -But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? -If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as something: for the box might even be empty. -No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (Wittgenstein 1958, 100)

Likewise, Wittgenstein's urge that "always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you" is explained by Kenny to be accompanied with the question "what possible difference could it make?" (p. 195) Cases of misremembering meanings or wrong identifications of things are indifferent to linguistic meaning and this view of language seems in no way concerned with the consciousness of the speaker. Still it is pending how it is possible for someone that he uses a word as we do, but himself always refers to different things. Or, how there is the word 'beetle' but no beetles at all. Unless, it is the case that all what we take as our

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conscious experiences are illusions mediated by conceptual structures acquired through linguistic practices. Certainly, this subject is much beyond the scope of this short essay. The only thing I shall claim is that Wittgenstein's private language argument seems not to be an advance for one view or another on this issue. Because it seems that the argument -at least in its most entertained version in the literature of the philosophy of mind- denies the possibility of the unity of consciousness to the private language speaker already as its premise and then concludes that he cannot have a coherent taxonomy of his own experiences in the absence of a necessarily public language.
This essay aims to discuss a crucial point in Heinrich Rickert's views on the difference between natural and cultural sciences (1921). My intention is to show that Rickert's emphasis on the purely formal principle of demarcation between the two domains cannot capture their real differences. What Rickert needs to take into consideration is the difference between their subject-matters: the contents of their concepts. Against Rickert's refusal to base the methodological difference between the natural and cultural sciences on psychological phenomena, I will argue that our knowledge of the psychological phenomena bears a difference from that of the non-psychological phenomena (that does not involve or related to any psychological event) in terms of the formation of generalizing concepts and this constitutes the methodological difference between natural and cultural sciences.

Rickert argues that "nature is the whole of psycho-physical reality conceived in a generalizing manner" (1921, 90), and psychology, since its concepts are generalizations of what is common to a plurality of objects, is on a par with the other sciences of the natural. He adds that "a method specific to a science whose subject-matter falls within psychological domain is untenable" (p. 91). Hence, for him, psychological phenomena cannot be a basis of a discrimination between the natural and cultural sciences. He marks the distinction between these two domains on the basis of their concept formation from a formal point of view, rather than a difference in their subject-matters, and argues that while natural sciences aim to grasp reality in its generality, the latter concern what is particular, unrepeateable. Without discussing the tenability of Rickert's generality vs. individuality principle, I will focus on whether our psychological concepts are really on a par with the concepts of natural sciences, hence they have no relevance to the methodological difference between natural and cultural sciences, even though
we grant that they generalize phenomena that are common to a multiplicity of objects. My point is, if we can say that human behaviour is the general subject-matter of cultural sciences, an explanation of human behaviour in terms of the psychological states of the agents betrays a methodological difference from the explanations of natural phenomena, even it is the case that only general psychological state concepts are used in such expositions.

One way of arguing for the differences between our psychological concepts and concepts of natural phenomena is to emphasize that our psychological concepts are primitive and basic in the sense that we begin with them and they are invulnerable to the revisions that our natural concepts constantly undergo. We may well be wrong in identifying a natural phenomenon and a scientific account can correct this. But, whatever findings a possible super-cognitive science comes up with, it cannot weaken our confidence in our folk psychological ascriptions. While to underline this dis-analogy between our psychological and natural concepts will serve to show that Rickert's account of psychology within the conceptual framework of natural sciences is inaccurate, I will consider another point of difference which seems more informative about the methodological difference between natural and cultural sciences.

In what follows, I hope to show that analogy from our own case is a necessary part of our explanations of the behaviour of others because such explanations involve attributing psychological states to others and psychological state terms have an ostensive dimension for their meaning. I will argue that psychological state terms cannot acquire complete meaning when they are defined within a conceptual network that anchors to world only through overt behaviour and external conditions without taking into account the conscious experience of human subject. Their meanings have an indispensable ostensive dimension which comes from our own first person knowledge of 'being in such and such a state'. Hence, when we attribute a
psychological state to another person, we use a term whose meaning covers a state of affairs we
directly know from our own case. Therefore, empathetic understanding is an indispensable
epistemic condition for us to explain others' behaviour in terms of their psychological states. And
this notion should be part of any account of the methodological differences between natural and
cultural sciences. 1

If we view explanation of human behaviour on the model of natural sciences, what we
have as the observed phenomena are the overt behaviour and external conditions, and we
hypothesize psychological states to explain the agent's behaviour. In order to make sense of
natural phenomena, natural sciences construct concepts on the basis of observed phenomena and
they hypothesize about some unobservable lower level phenomena that can explain the observed
higher levels. The conceptual networks that natural sciences construct are anchored to world by
the concepts that delineate some observed phenomena. The hypothetical lower level concepts
acquire their meanings completely within the conceptual structure of the theory and they are
related to world only by the higher level concepts that have the observed phenomena as their
empirical contents. I will call this acquisition of meaning within a conceptual network a 'network
theory of meaning'. Since there is no directly observed state of affairs for the empirical content of
lower level phenomenon, the terms designating lower level phenomena acquire their meanings
completely through the conceptual relations within a conceptual network. Hence, these lower
level phenomena are employed in natural-scientific explanations as 'explanatory hypotheses'.

If our psychological state terms acquire their meanings completely within a network of
other psychological and behavioural concepts without a recourse to our conscious experience of

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1 It is important to mention that my account is neutral to Rickert's naturalism about psychological phenomena. Even
if we grant that psychological phenomena are natural phenomena, our epistemic position to them marks the
difference between our psychological and natural concepts.
them, we can say that our explanation of others' behaviour conforms to the methods by which we explain natural phenomena. Hence we can say that there is no difference between the natural and cultural sciences as to the methods they employ for explanation of their subject-matter. Because, if we pursue the method of natural sciences in the cultural domain, while overt behaviour is analogous to observed natural phenomena, psychological states are analogous to hypothetical lower level phenomena. Since we cannot directly know others' psychological states, we infer them on the basis of others' behaviour.

However, even though we cannot directly observe the psychological states of others, they are not like the unobservable entities that we hypostatize in our scientific theories in order to explain observable natural phenomena. The unobservable entities of scientific theories are defined within a conceptual network which is anchored to empirical reality only through observable phenomena. Hence, they are pure postulations and their meaning is completely derived from and exhausted within the conceptual structure of the theory. That is, their concepts acquire content exclusively through their relations to the other concepts of the theory, because there are no directly observable state of affairs to be brought under these concepts. Accordingly, scientific explanations involve these unobservable entities only on the basis of evidence from observable phenomena as their meaning is already determined through a conceptualization of the observable phenomena. On the other hand, for psychological state concepts, ostensive definition -via our conscious experience of 'being in such and such a state'- is part of their acquisition of content. We are directly acquainted with the phenomena brought under them. Hence their explanatory role for human behaviour involves an indispensable dimension of analogical inference from one's own case.
A network theory of meaning for psychological state terms makes it possible that even someone who does not have the first person knowledge of 'being in a state X' from her/his conscious experience can know all its relational features to other psychological and behavioural concepts and s/he can know what kind of state X is as much as others, who have the knowledge of being in state X from their own experience, do. Hence, according to a network theory of meaning, the experience of being in state X itself is of no relevance to the meaning of the term 'X'.

Consider a community where no one experiences the state X because of their different neural setup. Could this community have the term 'X' in their language? I think it is plausible to suggest that there could be no concept of X for there is no state of affairs to be theorized in such a concept for that community. Let us now think of ourselves and what we theorize in our concept of X. If no reference to the actual experience of being in state X itself is pertinent to the meaning of the term 'X', then what remains to be conceptualized in the term is the state of affairs delineated by some overt behaviour and related external circumstances. Hence, when we strictly pursue a network theory of meaning (NTM) in conjunction with an explanatory-hypothesis approach (EHA), we should say that 'X' refers to a psychological state which is postulated to explain some observational regularities noticed as combination of what we might call X behaviour and some related external circumstances. Here there is no appeal to one's own case of being in the state X.

However, I claim, this approach betrays a problem. The word 'X' refers to a psychological state, but only via the observational circumstances; therefore, its meaning is derived only from

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2 In this essay, I will ignore the distinction generally made between intentional and phenomenal psychological states. Because it does not make any difference for my main points and considering this distinction would result in a level of complexity beyond the scope of this essay. I think that whether intentional or phenomenal –even if we take this distinction as valid, psychological state terms acquire their meaning mainly by ostensive definition through one’s first person knowledge of ‘being in such and such a state’.
some overt state of affairs. And when we apply the term 'X' to a certain psychological state of ours what we do seems to be the application of a word to some set of phenomena which its meaning does not cover. As we can only define 'X' in relation to a certain set of publicly observable phenomena, it should be the case that we cannot legitimately apply the term in the absence of such phenomena. That is, when we confine ourselves to NTM and EHA, it should be the case that we cannot attribute state X to someone, including ourselves when there is no X behaviour or external circumstances to be observed. And with such an understanding of the meaning of the term 'X', our utterance "I am X now" in the absence of publicly observable criteria is senseless because the term is devoid of any content other than the one specified in terms of the publicly observable ones.

With NTM and EHA only, the term 'X' is like the concepts of unobservable states defined in scientific theories. Hence, for example, Martians without neural systems to be in a state that we know from ourselves and attribute to others as X can learn and use the term as well as we do. Suppose we teach Martians 'being in state of X' by describing the observable behaviour in cases of someone's being in state of X and related external conditions. What remains outside of their understanding of 'X' is only the actual experience we have when we are in state of X. When someone, in the absence of any X behaviour and any external circumstances to be observed, utters "I am X now", it seems there is nothing to which 'X' refers here for the Martians. They would see no X. Likewise, for a scientific theory, even if there occurs a state, it is not observable, detectable for us; that is, we cannot know it until its detection. The subject's utterance is like declaring the passing of a subatomic particle without our seeing its trace in the cloud chamber. ³

³ A cloud chamber is an instrument that detects the presence or passage of particles. The presence of particles are inferred from the tracks of condensation.
When someone, with X behaviour this time, says "No, I am not X now", the Martian will still see X and our theoretical inference, on the model of scientific theories, will also record a state detected to be X. This time the subject's utterance is like declaring that there are no subatomic particles moving even when we observe the traces in the cloud chamber.

If the actual experience of being in state X itself remains outside of the meaning of the term 'X', what is at hand is only the publicly accessible set of phenomena for the application of the word. And for many cases there are overlappings between different psychological states as to their behavioural outcomes. For observations pertaining to such overlapping instances, a correct identification of the psychological state seems beyond access because the term lacks the criteria applicable to the state itself in isolation from behavioural and other external conditions. That is, the meaning of the term cannot provide the sufficient content for its application to such an empirical occurrence. And one's self-ascription of a psychological state seems not to be in a better position than her/his attributing psychological states to others.

My point is that even though our psychological state concepts are nodes in some conceptual network, it seems that we cannot apply the terms properly in many cases if this conceptual network anchors itself to empirical reality only through overt behaviour and publicly observable circumstances leaving the first person knowledge of being in those states outside of its structure. Only because our direct knowledge of a psychological state from our conscious experience has its part in the content of its concept can we legitimately identify our psychological states even in the absence of any determination other than our conscious experience itself. I think the problem is not an inherent one for NTM and EHA. As core models they seem sound and the problematic aspect is their inability to account for our first person knowledge of being in a psychological state when they are placed in strict opposition to the
dimension of ostensive definition for meaning and the explanatory dimension of analogy from one's own case.

What is supplied by our own conscious experience of being in a state X seems to be an important part of what we theorize in our concept of X. It seems that without the feedback from our actual experience, the term cannot acquire complete meaning. And the claim that someone who does not have the first person knowledge of 'being in a state X' from her/his conscious experience can still know all its relational features to other psychological and behavioural concepts seems not to be convincing, because to determine the relational features of a psychological state, one is in need of an empirical content for that state only by which these features can be defined. There should be an empirical correlate to fill in the content of a psychological term, only by virtue of which it can maintain conceptual relations to other psychological and behavioural concepts.

An empirical identity to be explained in its conceptual relations to other psychological and behavioural phenomena and to cohere with our capacity to apply the term seems not possible without the actual experience of being in 'such and such' state itself which is the only thing that can lead to a conceptual exposition subsequently. Within the bounds of NTM alone, the meaning of a term is fixed within the conceptual network and the question how it gains empirical significance is not answered. The question, in other words, is how far the term 'X' can be determined as a node in a conceptual network as to its inferential relations to other terms without the empirical content supplied by our conscious experience of being in state X. A person who does not have the first person knowledge of being in state X, I claim, cannot completely possess the meaning of 'X', because s/he is not in a position to determine its conceptual relations to other psychological and behavioural phenomena unless they are given to her/him which can only be
partial. And even when s/he takes hold of some of these relations to an extent, her/his conception still seems to be far away from supplying the empirical content only by virtue of which one can apply the term correctly in most cases by bringing the correct particular instances under the concept.

How new vocabulary is articulated for new experiences seems to be an illuminating case. A new and unusual psychological state, for example a particular G effect in a roller coaster, can be experienced by two people. And the two can delineate and talk about the same psychological state even though they do not have any concepts beforehand to identify it: "Did you experience that?" "Yes! Great!" Even though they do not share their respective inner experiences, it seems possible that they can develop a common-experience vocabulary specified more and more precisely by the psychological state's articulation within the language. This is a common issue, for example, among musicians or wine tasters; people sharing particular experiences can develop a specific language activity upon these, almost inaccessible to people who cannot have the similar experiences. One can learn and speak this language but only to the extent that s/he can have the experiences delineated by the concepts of this language. Here it seems a conceptualization of a psychological state takes place and the first person knowledge of this psychological state precedes and determines the process. Only after the first person knowledge of the particular psychological state in its distinctiveness comes the term's specification under its relations to other concepts where these conceptual relations also expose the way the psychological state is experienced by the subjects.

It might be argued that there are cases where one first learns the concept via its relations to other concepts and only then is able to experience the state delineated by the concept. Hence, the concept acquires its content through its relations to other concepts rather than by ostensive
definition. My claim is that even for such cases where learning the concept within a network of other concepts precedes the experience, the concept cannot acquire complete content before it is actually experienced by the subject. The concept's relations to other concepts help to direct the attention of subject to a certain viewpoint to apprehend a phenomenon. But the concept acquires its empirical content for the subject only when s/he is able to apprehend the phenomenon from such a viewpoint. If s/he cannot have the distinct experience the concept delineates, s/he cannot get hold of the concept completely. Therefore, these cases do not support NTM as the concept cannot acquire its content before the subject's actual experience.

Psychological state terms cannot acquire complete meaning when they are defined within a conceptual network that anchors to world only through overt behaviour and external conditions without a recourse to conscious experience of human subject as their meanings have an indispensable ostensive dimension which comes from the subject's first person knowledge of 'being in such and such a state'. This shows that when we attribute a psychological state to another person, we bring under the concept of this psychological state a phenomenon beyond the pattern of overt behaviour and external conditions. That is, we use a term whose meaning covers a state of affairs we directly know from our own case even though we cannot share the actual experience of the other person. Hence, explaining human behaviour in terms of psychological states always involves analogy from one's own case.

Empathetic understanding is a conceptual inference to others' psychological states since we cannot share our conscious experiences. However this seems to be different from EHA using a strict network model without any ostensive dimension for meaning, as in the case of Martians' theoretical access to our psychological states, which is devoid of any empirical content for psychological state concepts other than those specified by overt behaviour and external
conditions. Because our conceptualization of psychological states is of-and from- the actual psychological states themselves, as we have first person knowledge of them from our conscious experience. Here an appeal to one's own case for the content to fill in the concept is necessary. This is the ability to have the experience of being in a state X which the concept 'X' delineates; hence it is the ability to identify the particular instances to be brought under the concept.

Understanding others, which occurs in language, becomes possible on the basis this process of conceptualization -and expressing, formulating the experience in language- from one's own case. Even though there are differences as to our subjective experiences, the differences are compensated within the common language we use which is the product of the common psychological states we have. So, in a sense, a person unable to have a certain psychological state can, to an extent, possess the concept of this state but only because of other shared psychological state concepts content of which s/he can fill in from her/his own experiences.

Because, the psychological state to be taught to the person who does not have the first person knowledge of being in that state inevitably has references to some other psychological state concepts for its exposition as to the way it is experienced by us. Hence, our understanding of other human beings is unlike Martians conceptual inference to our psychological states. Because the divergences among us are very minor compared to the capacities we have in common and the differences are compensated on the ground of shared psychology.
This paper aims to discuss views of Donald Davidson and John Searle on the limits of social sciences as to their explanatory and predictive power compared to natural sciences. 1 While both authors' arguments are analogous to each other and can be read to emphasize similar points about the mental phenomena and human behaviour, I tend to highlight some nuance for appealing to a broader intuitive space about our understanding of the nature of human actions and its prospects for the social sciences. My main idea is to argue for the priority of social reality and our views as rational agents capable of symbolic action over ontological assumptions about the nature of the mental phenomena based on the current level of physical theory.

Davidson holds that insofar as psychology operates with intentional concepts it has certain epistemic limits for providing laws of human action. His focus is our epistemic position in regard to ourselves and the conceptual status of the explanatory framework of intentionality in which we tend to understand human behaviour. Searle, on the other hand, emphasizes collective intentionality and institutional facts as some higher level phenomena brought about purely by collective intentionality -human agreement. He holds that these higher level structures, as the object of social sciences, are only intelligible with an understanding of collective intentionality because of which they exist in the first instance. The nuance of interpretation I want to highlight is while Davidson's point explicitly confines itself to our epistemic position to ourselves and makes a larger -counterintuitive- claim about the relation of mental phenomena to physical phenomena based on a current assumption of the physical world, Searle, with his discussion of social reality, directs our attention to the actual structural changes we are capable of on the physical world. His argument widens the space of intuitive support for our views of our selves as

1 I will focus mainly on the views expressed in Davidson 1980, and Searle 1984, 1995.
agents capable of symbolic action, bringing about changes on the physical world that are not explicable and predictable from a point of view different from that of us. Whatever Searle says might be perfectly consistent with Davidson's argument and his actual ontology might be not different from that of Davidson, however, the main emphasis on the construction of social reality as some higher level phenomena intelligible only by human collective intentionality can also be read as providing a ground intuitively solid enough to direct us to a reconsideration of our current assumptions on the nature of physical reality. That is, while in Davidson an ontological assumption of physical determinism at all levels of phenomena -based on the current level of physical theory- comes to forward to dominate his argument and reduces the problem of the mental phenomena and rational human action, hence social structures, to an epistemic problem for us, in Searle, I tend to see a discussion of social reality given priority without yielding to the ontological assumptions about the nature of physical reality.

Davidson's focus is our epistemic position in regard to ourselves and the conceptual status of the explanatory framework of intentionality in which we tend to understand human behaviour. His point, very briefly, is that the intentional vocabulary we use to make sense of human actions does not cover a closed domain of phenomena to yield a rigorous theorizing as we have in physical sciences. And the intentional framework has a conceptual autonomy which means it is not reducible to another, more comprehensive, vocabulary that might lead a thorough conceptualizing. Anomalous Monism, Davidson's position in relation to mind-body problem, holds that mental events are identical to physical events token by token. However, as the mental and the physical are distinct vocabularies in themselves, there no nomological relations that can be obtained between mental events and physical events. Hence, psychophysical laws between the mental and the physical are not possible and mental events are not reducible to physical events as
a class. This view has the consequence of setting epistemic limits for the social sciences. Insofar as we operate within the framework intentionality to explain and predict human actions, strict laws are not possible, because (1) the mental vocabulary does not cover a closed domain of phenomena, being in causal relations with the physical events which cannot be brought under mental concepts, (2) and it is conceptually autonomous -a condition which eliminates the possibility of nomological reduction of mental events to physical events. Davidson maintains that, while a reduction of mental vocabulary to another is not possible, a change of vocabulary -eliminating the mental- also will not yield a better theorizing of human actions as a change of vocabulary will mean losing the subject-matter itself. However, it is not clear why this should be important at all given that the old vocabulary is already eliminated and we have a clearer picture of the phenomena within a new and more comprehensive vocabulary.

Searle, on the other hand, addresses the ontological status of the object of the social sciences by emphasizing the notion of 'institutional facts' -'facts by human agreement'. He argues that the intrinsically mental character of the social phenomena marks a radical difference between the social and natural sciences. He accepts that the mental phenomena are features of the brain; however, he distinguishes between higher level and lower level phenomena and argues that for psychological, hence social, phenomena there are no systematic connections between higher and lower levels. In natural sciences like biology, geology, or meteorology that have higher level phenomena as their subject-matter, the higher level phenomena, however complex it is, can systematically be grounded on the behaviour of more basic level entities. Searle claims that the intentional phenomena, as the higher level phenomena, has a self-referentiality that makes its systematic grounding on the physical impossible. He explains that the concepts we use to identify and explain intentional phenomena are partly constitutive of the phenomena itself.
Because, they exist in the first instance only because the agents believe themselves doing so; that is, that the very concept that identifies the phenomenon is involved in the contents of the beliefs of the agents is a condition of existence for the phenomenon itself. This self-referentiality marking the intentional and social phenomena has the consequence that there are no physical limits for realization of the social phenomena and there are no systematic connections between the social and the physical. Hence, the institutional facts as subject-matter radically demarcate the social sciences from the natural sciences. As facts purely by human agreement -and as facts which in turn constitutive of the human behaviour, they indicate an infinitely open domain of empirical reality on which social science operates.

The emphatic difference, it seems, between the two authors is this: For Davidson, the psychological and the social phenomena perfectly fits into -explicable and predictable in- a larger physical vocabulary, when they are described in it. Because they are already governed by causal deterministic physical laws. With Searle, it seems, we can suggest that the social phenomena will not accept an intelligible description purely within physical vocabulary insofar as they are facts purely by human agreement. Even though they are also physical facts, their physical properties has nothing to do with their being social facts. I think this point reveals a difference between the relation the social phenomena have to the physical and the relation between the mental states and brain states, to the extent that we cannot say that mental properties of a subject has nothing to do with the physical properties of his brain and the nervous system.

Davidson argues that events are mental only as described and that we cannot achieve a rigorous science of the intentional human behaviour as the mental vocabulary does not cover a closed domain of phenomena. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that we can achieve a science of human behaviour through a different description of it. If advancement in the
explanatory and predictive power of our framework is not possible with a particular description of the phenomena, it should be theoretically possible that we can work with a redescription of the phenomena within a new framework. Davidson's claim for such a possibility is that a new framework will bring about the change of subject-matter itself. But why should we consider and worry about a change of the subject-matter insofar as the observable phenomena is explained and predicted with more power within a new vocabulary?

Suppose that an alien nation from outer space decided -for some reason- to explain and predict human behaviour by observing earth. Also suppose that they command a significant knowledge of physics. In the course of their 'humanology' they observe the overt human behaviour while they scan the brain states. They are in full command of all the physical phenomena on earth and their physical theory can explain and predict all physical events. In a sense, their position to us is not different from our position to biological or meteorological phenomena, but with a much advanced physics. The crucial question, in such a situation, is whether they will be capable of explaining and predicting overt human behaviour to the extent that they are capable of explaining and predicting the behaviour of clouds and storms, or primitive biological organisms. In Davidson's argument there seems nothing that excludes the possibility that they can. Because, events are mental only because they are described as mental. As physical events they are determined and predictable as with the rest of the physical world. The aliens can explain and predict the overt human behaviour with recourse to brain states which in turn are explained by the behaviour of elements at the particle level. Hence, whatever that is happening on the earth -from falling leaves to clouds to our overt behaviour- is explainable and predictable to the same degree by the aliens even though they have no idea of our language, concepts, or meanings. There might be different degrees of complexity for different phenomena,
but not different 'kinds' of phenomena. Will their 'humanology' have any resemblance to our social science? Most probably not, because while explaining and predicting human behaviour, they will not use our intentional concepts. Even they will not entertain any reasons or mental states which are exclusive things only we can be aware of. But, on the other hand, they will command the knowledge of all the physical states identical to our mental states and the rest of the physical events occurring in our brains. Perhaps they will not know which physical states we are aware of as our mental states, but it seems that they will not need to as they will already know -certainly in a different way- more than we do about ourselves, intentions, and actions. From our inescapable subjective viewpoint we can only be aware of our mental states, but these in turn are in causally deterministic relations to other physical events in our brain and nervous system. To the extent that our behaviour is determined by the totality of this physical system, it seems, their theoretical judgments, based on the knowledge their physics can provide, will have more explanatory and predictive precision than our judgments operating within the intentional framework of our current social sciences. What about their subject-matter? Insofar as the aliens can predict my overt behaviour with the exactness that even I cannot know, I do not think it is still important to name them within a familiar vocabulary. They will already have a very coherent picture of human behaviour within the physical vocabulary, hence, it seems, no intentional term is needed at all. If my interpretation of Davidson's position is correct, it seems to me that this picture of some alien 'humanology' is consistent with it. And whether our physics can be advanced to such a degree to explain and predict all the human behaviour in physical vocabulary is another question.

In an example, Davidson suggests that even if we know the complete knowledge of brain to the degree to be able to produce a human clone, still our knowledge will not be advanced in
regard to intentional phenomena and its relation to brain (1980, 245-259). We will not be in a better position to predict mental events or identify them by observing brain states. For example, he suggests, we cannot know whether our clone is angry or not, or whether he holds a specific belief or not by simply observing the physical phenomena in brain. But we will know what his overt behaviour will be in any case and this knowledge will likely to be more than we can know of it in the case we know his mental states. For example, we will likely to predict that he will stand up, walk to us and smack us in the face with a certain force. This seems a more powerful prediction than we can have if we know that he is angry. Moreover, we will likely to be in a position to say why he will do so, not like "because he is angry" but something like "because of such and such firings, he will stand up, walk to us and smack us in the face with such force". If we can predict the movements of a physical system we should already know the explanation beforehand. I will not stretch the examples, my point is that, if Davidson is right, our full knowledge of the physical phenomena occurring in the brain and in the nervous system and their causal deterministic relations to behaviour will brings us a lot than our social sciences can provide and we will not need any intentional vocabulary at all.

In Searle's argument, there might be an insight that can change the suggested picture of alien 'humanology' in line with Davidson's view. The idea that human action is self-referential insofar as it is brought about by institutional facts -facts purely by human agreement- may be understood to suggest that, without knowing our conceptual structures -meanings- by which we think and act, the aliens will not be in a position to explain or predict our behaviour -even in physical vocabulary, as they can do in regard to clouds or biologic organisms no matter how.

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2 For example, it seems we will also be in a position to predict that he will make such and such sounds, because of such and such firings, hence we seem to be in a position to find the correlations between his words -insofar as we know the language, and this is different from aliens position to us- and brain states.
much knowledge they have of the physical states of our brains. This is too much reading in what actually Searle says, but as an insight it seems it appeals to our intuition insofar as we think ourselves as agents capable of symbolic action.

Searle argues that a systematic grounding of the psychological and social to the physical is impossible. He claims that institutional entities, like money, are physically realizable in indefinitely many ways. It is always open to the next people to accept and treat something different as money. Hence, there cannot be any physical determination in regard to institutional facts. They also have a physical existence, but their physical properties are irrelevant to their being treated as institutional facts. Our view of alien 'humanology', as it is above, suggests that the picture, as we see it, of the social phenomena while we treat some institutional entities on the basis of beliefs we have of them regardless of their physical constitution is perfectly explicable and predictable within a larger picture of the physical phenomena. That is, what we view as symbolic action which seems to us being realized purely because of the intentions we have is completely explicable and predictable within physical vocabulary. In such a view, in Searle's terms, the higher level social phenomenon becomes explicable and predictable by the lower level physical phenomenon; or, rather, the physical description of the higher level phenomenon fits into the scope of explanation and prediction by the behaviour of lower level elements. However, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that the physical relations obtaining between different social facts are also predictable and explicable within physical vocabulary. Even though we will not have social facts in such language, what works against the intuition is that some physical entities, while being treated and viewed by us purely according to our intentions regardless of their physical properties, will not be seen as anomalies within a larger framework of inert causal
mechanisms of physical phenomena but, on the contrary, will be explicable and predictable as with the rest.

I think the important point that should be underlined for Davidson's argument is that, in his view, our mental states and behaviour has no difference from the rest of the physical world, and completely determined and predictable within the physical. The sense of psychological freedom accompanying our experience of action is brought about by the condition that the mental does not cover the whole domain of brain events, hence the relation between reasons and actions are not deterministic. But our actions seem to be already determined by the relevant physical states and whenever we act on our reasons freely, it seems that we only suppose ourselves to do so. It turns out to be that the anomaly is an anomaly only for us which we cannot avoid unless we stop viewing ourselves as rational agents and overstepping our epistemic position to ourselves becomes a matter of historical question, because if we can have a physical science advanced enough to understand the physical phenomena occurring in the brain and the nervous system, we already will be in a position to have a coherent picture of our actions within the rest of the physical world and the anomaly will be eliminated. That we are conscious, self-reflective beings makes no difference for the rest of the world and that we are rational agents is just an illusion of our subjective viewpoint. Davidson suggests that even the entire physical history of the world is known, no single mental event is predictable or explicable with this knowledge. I think this only means you can only not hear the whistle accompanying the workings of the machine if Anomalous Monism is true.
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Levent Kara received his Bachelor of Architecture (1996) and Master of Architecture (1999) degrees from Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He has been teaching architectural theory and design studios at the University of Florida since 2002.