captured Eisenhower and was holding the Republican ticket hostage in the name of an

outdated political ideology.36

 The Taft-Eisenhower alliance highlighted one of Eisenhower's personal

strengths: the ability to compromise. Eisenhower's prestige greatly enhanced his

electability and allowed him the freedom to run a non-doctrinaire campaign. He was

able to overcome the factional dispute between conservatives and liberals primarily

because he could bridge the gap between the ideologies without sacrificing any votes.

Dewey in 1948 and Taft in 1952 had planned electoral drives that targeted a specific

group of voters. Dewey, believing conservatives out of touch with the American

voter, ran a centrist campaign that avoided forthright statements on many issues. Four

years later, Taft, thinking that the GOP did not do enough to please the Right, did the

exact opposite and positioned himself on the other side of the Republican spectrum.

The Morningside Heights meeting showed that an issueless, personality driven

campaign allowed a popular candidate to take a political stand and still keep the

centrist vote intact. Neither Taft nor Dewey could have accomplished this.

Eisenhower, then, essentially combined the electoral strategies of both camps into

one. Both factions continued as they desired, but Eisenhower's personality smoothed

out the differences and allowed both groups to operate together as a coherent whole.

 The publicity value of Morningside Heights had positive ramifications in the

short term. Energizing the conservative base was critical for voter mobilization, and

Eisenhower's assurances that he would not govern as a New Deal Republican helped

on this score tremendously. The Dewey faction, however, still set the tone for the

campaign and tried to persuade Eisenhower to run as a moderate. Taft had signed on

as a stump speaker, but had gained no real influence within the Eisenhower inner


36 New York Times, 13 September 1952.