tactics, which Taft took personally, or compromise. In his opinion, they only came to

him out of necessity, so he did not rush to their assistance.20

 Despite the negative feelings still lingering from Chicago, Taft's closest

political allies encouraged him to meet with Eisenhower if only to check Dewey's

influence on the candidate. Reece, believing that the liberal Republicans seemed

poised to recreate all of the mistakes of the 1948 campaign, relayed a pessimistic view

of the Eisenhower organization. He noted that his Tennessee group had not been

given approval to lead the Republican activities in the Volunteer State and saw this as

a larger pattern of Old Guard exclusion. He claimed that the Dewey group had

organized the national effort "on a basis of elimination rather than assimilation."

Although he did not explicitly advise Taft to meet with Eisenhower, he implied that

failure was imminent in the general election unless Taft stepped in and provided some

guidance and balance to the Republican organization. The future, in Reece's opinion,

did not look bright if "Dewey, Hoffman and others of that ilk [were] brought into an

administration with the implications that would be involved."21 Jack Martin put it in

much starker terms when he claimed that "If he [Dewey] does come to Washington in

any capacity he will dominate the Executive Branch of the Government."22 He

advised Taft to make certain that Dewey was not appointed to any cabinet post and

strongly urged the Senator to meet with Eisenhower lest the Dewey organization have

free hand to handle the staffing of the new administration.




20 Robert A. Taft, Letter to Billie Noojin, 25 August 1952. Copy in Folder (1952 Campaign Alabama
- L-S), Box 320, Taft Papers.
21 B. Carroll Reece, Letter to Robert A. Taft, 22 August 1952. Copy in Folder (1952 Campaign -
Tennessee P-S), Box 407, Taft Papers.

22I. Jack Martin, Letter to Robert A. Taft, 14 August 1952. Copy in Folder (Eisenhower, Dwight D.,
1952 (4)), Box 1286, Taft Papers.