leadership regrouped in Denver to lay out its strategy for the forthcoming contest.4 In

a repudiation of the 1948 setup, Summerfield's duties as RNC Chairman included

managing the campaign apparatus, meaning that no separate electoral organization

would be established to report directly to the candidate. In 1948, Brownell's work as

independent campaign director had angered a number of Republicans, especially

conservatives, who believed that Dewey had not fully utilized the party faithful.

Sherman Adams was appointed as Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and tapped to be the

liaison between the candidate and the RNC. Close cooperation between Adams and

Summerfield was meant to ensure Republican operatives had clear directions and

worked in concert with the wishes of the candidate and subsidiary organizations.5 The

question remained as to which state factions would be recognized and given

management duties in their bailiwicks, but that decision was left to Summerfield and

the RNC staff.

 The largest question the Eisenhower leadership faced was the role of Taft and

the conservatives in the Republican organization. A number of liberal Republicans

such as Adams and Lodge hoped that the Taftites would be left on the sidelines. This

put the tentative alliance made on the ninth floor of the Chicago Hilton to its first test.

One important part of that post-nomination meeting was Taft's request that his

backers be allowed to work in the presidential campaign and not be punished through

unfavorable assignments. Eisenhower had conceded this important point without

consulting any of his top aides. Taft loyally supported those who had fought for him

during the pre-convention campaign and did not want to see his lieutenants drummed

out of the party. Whether or not they wanted to stay was another matter altogether.


4 New York Times, 24 July 1952.

5 Washington Post, 29 July 1952; New York Times, 29 July 1952.