wrapped up in the Pelican state contest. If the maneuver worked, Gabrielson would

recognize the point of order and remove the seven delegates from the group in the

Langlie motion, essentially saving seven votes for Taft. The Eisenhower forces would

have to challenge the Chairman to overturn his ruling, and Brown believed that they

would not risk losing the first vote of the convention over seven delegates. Once

Gabrielson had excluded the seven Louisiana delegates, Brown planned to accept the

Fair Play amendment, and take away the only issue that, in his opinion, the

Eisenhower group had.

 The Brown plan was a huge gamble. If it worked, the Taft group would take the

first step towards party unity and remove the major cudgel of the Eisenhower

convention campaign. If it was unsuccessful, the Taft faction would force an early

vote that it could potentially lose. Losing the first vote of the convention would show

neutral delegates that Taft's grip on the convention was not as tight as everyone

thought and give credence to the Eisenhower claims of widespread Republican

support. In their calculations, however, Brown and Coleman failed to consider the

practical realities of the convention structure. A packed convention hall filled with

cheering delegates and attendees was not a situation conducive to easy coordination.

Since the Fair Play amendment came in the opening moments of the proceedings, and

since Brown and Coleman had coordinated their strategy only minutes before the

convention began, they did not have time to advise the rest of the Taft leadership of

their plan. In short, they were the only two who knew the new strategy.

 As Langlie finished his proposal, Brown arose and was recognized. As he made

his way to the podium to make his point of order, he had a change of heart.

Gabrielson was never a full member of Taft's inner circle and was under severe

pressure from Eisenhower leaders, both publicly and privately, to condemn the Texas