While Taft attempted to play peacemaker, the two campaign managers issued

hostile statements castigating each other. Ingalls, thoroughly disgusted with Lodge's

personal attacks, sought to cast the Fair Play amendment as the actions of a desperate

individual. Lodge, for his part, continued his refrain and again pledged never to

compromise with thievery. Ingalls responded that the Eisenhower group had rejected

the Taft compromise without consulting their candidate and claimed that the Texas

Steal was the only issue Eisenhower had.74 Ingalls claimed that the Fair Play proposal

was similar to a football coach who said "My team is backed up on its 1 yard line,

with 30 seconds to play. Time out! We want to change the rules, and add 50 yards to

our end of the field."7 With confirmed delegate totals remaining at roughly five

hundred for Taft and four hundred and fifty for Eisenhower, Ingalls was clearly

confident that the RNC could hold back the Eisenhower forces regardless of the

morality of Mineral Wells. Taft disagreed and hoped to secure a peaceful end to the

partisan infighting.

 The Taft compromise was essentially a last-ditch effort from the Senator to

diffuse the ethical issue of the Texas Steal. The Taft leadership disagreed with the

maneuver, but the Senator overruled his subordinates. On July 6, the eve of the

convention, Gabrielson met with Lodge, Clarence Brown, and RNC Counsel and Taft

supporter Ralph Gates in order to broker a compromise and preserve the party he

oversaw. Gabrielson wanted Lodge to accept the Taft compromise, asking the

Eisenhower manager rhetorically why the GOP's dirty laundry should be aired in

public. Lodge, staying on message until the very end, informed the Taftites that he


74 Taft for President Committee, Press Release, 4 July 1952. Copy in Folder (1952 Campaign Press
Releases, Chicago, Ill.) Box 460, Taft Papers.

75 Taft for President Committee, Press Release, 5 July 1952. Copy in Folder (1952 Campaign Press
Releases, Chicago Ill.), Box 460, Taft Papers.