the support of Utah's J. Bracken Lee, Taft's most vocal gubernatorial supporter, at the

airport as he was preparing to board a plane for Chicago. Adams later reflected that

the conservatives, had they had time to discuss and give the matter full consideration,

likely would not have signed the petition because of its political ramifications.59 In the

press, the signatures of Lee and others made Taft appear isolated from his closest

allies.

 Taft quickly moved to downplay the Governors' statement. He told reporters

that the matter of disputed delegates voting on contests was not a question of

morality, but simply a parliamentary concern and the Governors were incorrect.60

Gabrielson also rejected the proposed rule change and told reporters that the party

must indeed have clean hands after the convention, and should therefore not make

decisions to benefit one candidate over the other during the national convention.61

While these arguments both had merit, the some members of the press did not agree.

The New York Times equated the seating of disputed delegates with the corruption

supposedly rampant in the Democratic Party and asked how a party could claim to

oppose moral laxity when it was itself governed improperly.62

 On 3 July, the convention proceedings revealed the political slant of the RNC,

as the Credentials Committee voted to add the pro-Taft delegates of Louisiana to the

temporary roll. It also ruled in favor of Taft on two minor contests in Mississippi and

Missouri. This resulted in a net gain of nineteen delegates for the Senator and showed

the Eisenhower group that it had no chance at changing the situation through regular



59 Sherman Adams, Interview, OH 162, Transcript in Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

60 Christian Science-Monitor, 3 July 1952.

61 New York Times, 4 July 1952.

62 New York Times, 4 July 1952.