claimed that Taft's latest "tantrum" was misguided not because of the impeccable

reputation of Gallup, but because Ives and Dewey were "not that close." Of course,

Dewey and Ives had a professional working relationship and often came down on the

same sides on civil rights and labor policy. It was Dewey, after all, who instructed

Ives to end his criticism of Taft-Hartley and allow its passage. For the Alsops to claim

that Ives and Dewey were not working together, or that Ives did not want an

Eisenhower presidency was simply a misstatement of fact.49

 On June 30, Taft and his backers found solace in their continued control of the

RNC. Most of the delegations had declared, with only Michigan, Pennsylvania,

California, and Maryland still publicly undecided. With the delegations beginning to

fall into place, the contested delegations remained the outstanding issue of the

convention. The Taft and Eisenhower forces were at odds over three states, Georgia,

Louisiana, and Texas. They had agreed not to get involved in the Florida contest

because the pro-Taft state party and the independent Florida for Eisenhower group

allied against the upstart Miami faction of Wesley Garrison. Eisenhower also stayed

out of the Florida challenge because the double-dealing Florida leadership had sent an

exploratory message to Hugh Scott asking for favorable consideration from the

Eisenhower group in exchange for their votes. Florida RNC member C. C. Spades

assured Scott that the Pennsylvanian would be "perfectly satisfied with the number of

votes for Eisenhower."50 Since the regular delegation guaranteed had the strongest

legal case for seating, the Eisenhower group did not make Florida an issue and the

Spades group was seated by a unanimous vote of the Credentials Committee.



49 Washington Post, 30 June 1952.

50 C. C. Spades, Letter to Hugh Scott, 24 March 1952. Copy in Folder (1952 Convention Delegate
Contests Florida), Box 129, Brownell Papers.