campaign echoed the "Texas Steal" rhetoric and claimed that justice would be served

at the national convention in Chicago.97

 The Texas contest turned on Brownell's efforts to expand the Republican Party

beyond the control of the local Old Guard organizations, a theme that was repeated in

Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana. While Eisenhower had the popularity to draw

large number of Democratic votes, his organization only backed local factions that

were on the outs with the Old Guard when it benefited their candidate. There was no

sense of urgency to upset Democratic one-party systems when it could harm, or have

no impact, on the Eisenhower nomination. Florida was the most prominent example

of this, as the Eisenhower group snubbed the leader of a prominent movement

dedicated to increasing the state party in favor of a local organization that portrayed

itself as non-partisan in order to gain independent and Democratic votes. Party

expansion in the South, however, was the key to the Eisenhower strategy going into

the national convention in Chicago.

 The 1952 pre-convention campaign took place under much different

circumstances than in 1948. Taft, not willing to make the same mistakes, brought a

fully-developed management structure to the table and staffed it with experienced

politicians and Republican insiders. The four additional years of Truman's

administration had brought on new political issues, including the Korean War,

communism, continued high rates of taxation, and further expansion of the federal

bureaucracy. Taft hoped to draw support from the thousands of single-issue

conservative voters that were becoming tired of continued Democratic rule. Dewey,

on the other hand, had to work from behind the scenes and promoted a candidate who

could not make partisan statements. The Governor was also concerned with events of


97 Houston Post, 30 May 1952.