threat for Ike. The liberal coalition that Dewey had formed six months earlier was spending more time attacking each other than Taft, and Dewey clearly was not in control of the situation. Dewey also reaffirmed that Eisenhower's most critical weakness was his lack of public policy statements. The Governor again pleaded for Eisenhower to return in the spring "in order to answer the additional questions which honest men have a right to ask."59 The next few weeks saw Taft reaffirm his strength in the Midwest. In Wisconsin, the bailiwick of his Midwestern manager Tom Coleman, Taft won an aggressive campaign against an ineffectual Stassen and California Governor Earl Warren.60 For most of late March, Taft stumped in the Badger State and, on April 1, took twenty-four delegates to Warren's six. On the same day, Taft won the Nebraska primary by just over twelve thousand votes against Eisenhower. Neither candidate had entered their names on the ballot, but their followers organized write-in campaigns, Taft's obviously more successfully.61 The press believed that the Wisconsin and Nebraska results had rejuvenated the Taft campaign. Marquis Childs wrote that Taft had scored a "technical knockout" in his Midwestern campaigns.62 To the Taft camp, the results affirmed their strategy of criticizing Eisenhower for his lack of public pronouncements and promoting their own conservative ideology. Romney summed up the sentiments of the Taft group when he told one correspondent that "General Eisenhower is living, as it were, in a glass house. He has 59 Ibid. 60 Eisenhower was barred by Wisconsin election law from placing his name on the ballot unless he personally affirmed that he was actively seeking the nomination. Since he was precluded from doing this under military regulations, Eisenhower could not run head to head against Taft in Wisconsin. See New York Times, 16 January 1952. 61 Christian Science-Monitor, 18 March 1952; Christian Science-Monitor 2 April 1952; Greene, The Crusade, 82-93. 62 Washington Post, 3 April 1952.