largest segments of the Republican base, the business community, preferred their

opponent.34

 Dewey, despite the ever-growing support from the Sloan and other powerful

contributors, believed Taft could pose a genuine threat to Ike. In a memo written to

Clay sometime in December 1951, Dewey conceded that Taft's early strength had

made some members of the Eisenhower organization nervous, but that he himself was

not concerned. He claimed that half of his 1948 supporters had remained loyal to

Albany, with a quarter shifting to Taft and a quarter waiting on Eisenhower to

publicly declare his candidacy. He thought Taftites had a "fanaticism" that was absent

in the Eisenhower group, but believed that Taft had peaked too early and

"'commitments' in December can and usually do weaken or evaporate in the June

heat." Brownell believed that Taft and Eisenhower would each end up with 500

pledged delegates entering the convention, but Dewey thought the momentum would

swing toward Ike after January and make a first ballot nomination certain.35

 Despite Dewey's optimistic outlook, the Albany group was clearly at a

disadvantage. The coalition that Dewey had formed in June did not work well

together and the Pennsylvania delegation did not trust Stassen. The Pennsylvania

group and Henry Cabot Lodge, now a full partner in the group, had also, for unknown

reasons, removed Harold Talbott from his fund-raising role and installed millionaire

playboy John Hay "Jock" Whitney, a fact which Dewey greatly lamented but did not

stop.36 The Eisenhower leadership also could not agree on a viable primary strategy.



34 Robert Smith, Letter to Everett Dirksen, 23 November 1951. Copy in Folder (1952 Campaign -
Alphabetical File Clarence Brown), Box 424, Taft Papers.

35 Thomas E. Dewey, Memo to Lucius Clay, undated. Copy in Folder (Lucius D. Clay [July 1951 -
Dec. 1951], Box 24, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.

36 Ibid.