candidate who was willing to defer to his leadership, was not beholden to Taft, and

had national appeal. Neither Stassen nor Lodge met either criterion.3

 Brownell was also fully aware of the differing brands of Republicanism

throughout the United States. Southern and Midwestern Republicans tended to hold

more conservative political beliefs, and this was where Taft found most of his

strength. Republicans in the Northeast and the West were more liberal in their

thinking and tended to support Dewey both financially and through votes in the RNC.

In 1948, Brownell had attempted to fight a number of local battles to take power away

from established state leaders who favored Taft. Although this remained the preferred

strategy, the uproar surrounding the loss in 1948 made this a riskier proposition. In

order to guarantee victory, the Dewey faction would either have to run a balanced

ticket linking the Midwest with the Northeast, or find a candidate who could bridge

the traditional divisions between the regions.

 To realize his goal, Dewey turned to the man who pundits and politicians had

gazed at with starry eyes for the last four years. Dwight D. Eisenhower was one of a

handful of successful World War II commanders who were regarded as presidential

material. As early as 1949, columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop speculated that

Dewey was on the hunt for a candidate who had a national following and similar

political beliefs, and mentioned Eisenhower as his first choice. Since Eisenhower held

the presidency of New York's Columbia University and resided in the Governor's

home state, he seemed the logical heir to the Dewey organization. The Alsops claimed

that Eisenhower already had the backing of the New York financial community and, if




3 The same could be said for the 1948 Taft faction. In 1952, the Taft supporters were more concerned
with ideology than Dewey backers, but no other conservative Republican had Taft's public reputation
or political stature.