the extension of the bureaucracy and restoring a semblance of federalism would

attract more voters. Fred Virkus, Executive Chairman of the NRRC, argued that a

strong conservative position would boost fund-raising efforts and bring the party in

line with the will of the majority of Republican voters. Although he had no evidence

to prove that Republicans were by nature conservative, his NRRC was a very

prominent group in party circles and his leadership of the group allowed him to speak

with a degree of authority. As the meeting neared a close, Coleman offered a

resolution authorizing the strategy committee to craft a new statement of policy for

the GOP. Gabrielson objected violently, claiming that the strategy committee did not

have jurisdiction in policy matters and the measure was defeated.72

 The Dewey and Taft factions, working together for once, had thwarted

Summerfield's effort to issue a strong, forceful declaration of conservative principles.

This reflected the growing disconnect between the Taft factions and others on the

Right who wanted an unabated conservative program regardless of political realities.

Prominent members of the Taft camp and committeemen and women from around the

nation, many of whom believed the RSC to be a wasted effort, praised Gabrielson's

actions. Rentfro Creager said that "To declare against 'me-tooism' means anything or

nothing. Unquestionably some of the legislation, was needed, and we Republicans do

not dare advocate its repeal."73 Taft and his closest allies, while having a legitimate

dislike for a number of Democratic programs, understood that it was impossible to

legislate programs such as Social Security out of existence. They preferred to mount a

holding action to stop what they perceived as the advance towards socialism by

preventing any more sweeping federal programs and upholding a strict interpretation

72 Ibid.

3 Rentfro B. Creager, Letter to Marrs McLean, 3 January 1950. Copy in Folder (Republican Mc), Box
9, Summerfield Papers.