Events, but Taft was not as involved in proselytizing a dogmatic conservatism like

Summerfield. He focused most of his time on codifying these principles into law in

the pragmatic world of American politics, rather than campaigning for a philosophical

doctrine. Summerfield took a different approach and used conservative ideas to

influence political officials.

 Summerfield had a number of political allies, but worked closest with Thomas

Coleman, a prominent manufacturer and chair of the Wisconsin state finance

committee. Coleman and Summerfield operated as a team in fund-raising and political

strategy, advising each other on their movements regularly and sharing political

gossip from around the nation. Summerfield and Coleman were also ideological

compatriots. Both men held conservative, pro-business viewpoints, opposed union

activity, and believed that the federal bureaucracy threatened to encroach on popular

democracy. Coleman actually held views even further to the right than Summerfield.

Coleman sat on the RSC, and he joined Summerfield in his drive to craft a

conservative policy statement and sidestep Gabrielson's leadership of the RNC.

 In August 1949, Summerfield demanded that the strategy committee be allowed

to issue a declaration of policy, but Gabrielson and members of the Congressional

leadership denied his request.69 They were willing for the RSC to coordinate the

national campaigns, but once again refused to hand over the duty of crafting a

national platform to Summerfield and his group.70 Despite Gabrielson's appeals to

redraw the RSC as a campaign organization, Summerfield went ahead with plans to

hold a policy summit. On December 13, the RSC met in Chicago. The reality,


69 Arthur Sumerfield, Letter to Owen Brewster, 27 August 1949. Copy in Folder (B (3)), Box 1,
Summerfield Papers.

70 Arthur Summerfield, Letter to Mrs. Howard Coffin, 27 August 1949. Copy in Folder (C (1)), Box 1,
Summerfield Papers.