conservative coalition. For the Republicans to work with the Southern Democrats in

the 80th Congress, the GOP would have to compromise their standing as the "party of

Lincoln" in order to prevent the passage of administration measures and override

Truman's veto on a number of occasions. The Bilbo matter, though, was a case where

principles outweighed pragmatic politics.

 Second, Taft, as head of the Republican steering committee, played a key role in

blocking Bilbo and had laid out the procedural strategy followed on the floor. This

was a sign of things to come in the 80th Congress, as Taft used the steering committee

and its newly-created successor, the Republican Senate Policy Committee (RSPC), to

create party strategy and reach consensus on controversial bills before they reached

the Senate floor. Taft hoped to use the new RSPC to formulate new bills on education,

health and social welfare, and to create unified support for a tax reduction. While

Republican Senators often disagreed on key measures, Taft hoped that and his

colleagues would hash out their disagreements behind closed doors and speak as a

unified party on most critical legislation. In many cases, they did. But in the five

critical policy areas listed above, the RSPC could not overcome the ideological

division among Republican Senators and between Republicans in the Senate and the

House.37

 The Bilbo incident was the first of several decisions the Taft-led Republicans

made on civil rights. In the 80th Congress there were three major categories of civil

rights legislation: anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and the Fair Employment Practices

Committee. For a number of years, the Senate had considered these measures but the

conservative coalition had prevented their passage. While not as strong as some


37 For more on the creation of the RSPC and Taft's leadership, see Donald A. Ritchie, A History of the
United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 1947-1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1997).