TALKING PEACE, LIVING CONFLICT:
THE MENTAL AND THE MATERIAL ON THE BORDERS OF APARTHEID

By

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1989
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by
Robert Shanafelt
To Michael Kananelo Shanafelt

Ha u phele ke khotso le ka bolokolohi

Mawuphile ngoxolo nengenkululeko

May you live in peace and freedom
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PREFACE

Despite its relatively small size and obscure place on the world scene Lesotho has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Since the 1970s there has been a flood of published and unpublished information about virtually every aspect of life there. Much of this work reflects an interest in general South African issues but a number of foreigners have also come to know Lesotho through their experience with the "aid and development industry" (I happen to be of that sort.) The hospitality with which foreigners have generally been received also typically makes Lesotho a congenial place in which to live and conduct one's research. Since the 1970s American and British students have done more than a dozen dissertations on Lesotho in the fields of economic history, anthropology (specifically in medical anthropology, development, the situation of women, anthropology of religion, and sociolinguistics), political science, geography, and religion. One may quite justly ask, then: what is the value of one more such study? Firstly, although previous studies, in general, represent important contributions to their respective fields they frequently have been unnecessarily confined to the domain of Lesotho itself. Although there are exceptions, generally, they have
not been concerned with synthesizing perspectives in order to account for relationships between worldviews, material conditions, and historical processes in southern Africa. In addition, most of the previous studies have focused chiefly on the village level without examining in much detail urban life or local perspectives on the nation as a whole. One of my purposes is to draw together information from the previous literature and my own field work to present a coherent account of contemporary life as it is experienced by a variety of people in Lesotho and other parts of South Africa's periphery. This will also include discussion of a hitherto neglected group, Lesotho's Xhosa-speakers.

This work is primarily an account of working life, culture, and identity, but it is organized to include ideographic as well as nomothetic information, humanist as well as scientific perspectives, and psychological as well as socioeconomic data. Central to the discussion is the relationship between "ethnicity," "nationalism," "occupation" and other aspects of identity and the historical-material conditions of Lesotho and its people. I view such categories as "ideal types," in the sense of Burger (1976), around which to organize my fieldwork and to engage in interpretation and explanation. Although I have not discussed the work of Godelier (1986) in the text, his stress on the interrelationship between thought and material
conditions is implicit throughout. His influence is obvious in that the subtitle of this work echoes his own title.

I went to Lesotho with the intention of learning about folk conceptions of skin color, we/they dichotomies, status and self-perception, and the possible relationships between such conceptions and one's place in a polity and a system of production, distribution, and exchange. Categories such as "status" and "class" are ideal types because they deliberately forsake some of the unique details of individual cases for the purpose of generalization. They may be also aptly termed "metafolk" categories in that they are explications of explications. Similarly, the models which may be developed from such concepts are folk models about folk models. Admission of this does not invalidate them as unscientific or necessarily commit one to a position of cultural relativism. Ideally the models of social scientists are built on detailed cross-cultural and historical studies and a conception of homo sapien as a species with a particular, biological evolution.¹

The folk models of any given society are limited to the extent that the view of its people is restricted--by poverty, language barriers, isolation from the flow of international information, and so forth. In South Africa the speech community consists of various degrees of interaction between the two Indo-European languages, the several distinct Bantu ones, and the languages of South
Asia. There is an ongoing interaction which cannot be understood outside the power and authority relationships in which they take place. Conditions of political and economic subordination have pushed English and Afrikaans to the fore at the expense of indigenous languages. Yet, the consequent desire to master English and the subjects of Western formal education have been inhibited by the Bantu education system and inequitable access to resources.²

The categories I am using then should not be reified, but instead used as pointers and view finders, directing one's attention to particular aspects of social reality. While I use ideal-typical categories, I also try to be skeptical of them. Too much attention to one category may lead one to define too much in its terms. This has already been the case all too often in studies of "race" and "class." Still, the problem of observer bias is an inevitable one because the interpreter must always perceive, not only in reference to the categories of research, but also against the background of his or her own experience and interests.

My goal in fieldwork has been to achieve a holistic understanding that not only was personally useful for explaining things in Lesotho, but one that was personally useful for getting along there as well. The latter is more than an intellectual exercise and for me has involved such things as learning to ride ponies, stand on crowded buses for hours at a time, walk long distances, and enjoy the
warmth of a cowdung fire in a smoke filled hut. Last but not least, it has involved emotion, ties of friendship especially, but also of love and sometimes of fear.\(^3\) I am in sympathy with the perspective that the critic Bleicher (1980) attributes to the hermeneutic methodology of Emilio Betti. In this conception, "Understanding is directed at a whole and presupposes a total engagement--intellectual, emotional, moral--on the part of the [perceiving] subject" (Bleicher 1980:32). Still, for me, this is not the limit of research. After understanding should come explication, critique, and criticism. In this dissertation I attempt to do all these things and I have found that it is no easy task. I must, therefore, apologize in advance for any mistakes of omission, interpretation, or misrepresentation which I have made.

NOTES

1. I emphasize the latter because evolution is a given in the world, the process through which our identity has been constituted. Folk models which are not capable of incorporating into their perspective the new knowledge which science has provided about the material world are in danger of becoming irrelevant or obsolete.

2. For an insightful discussion of some of these issues see Ndebele (1987).

3. I was both married and accosted by thieves in Lesotho. Although I cannot go into details here, suffice it to say that the latter incident was more frightening than the former.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


BNP - Basotho National Party. Party of the late prime minister Leabua Jonathan

EEC - European Economic Community

HWP - Highlands Water Project. Major dam project in Lesotho.

KL - Kingdom of Lesotho.

LCFTU - Lesotho Congress of Free Trade Unions. Largest association of unions in Lesotho.

LFTU - Lesotho Federation of Trade Unions. Second largest association of unions in Lesotho.

LLA - Lesotho Liberation Army. Military wing of BCP.

LNDC - Lesotho National Development Corporation.

NUM - National Union of Mineworkers.

SACU - Southern African Customs Union.

TEBA - The Employment Bureau of Africa. Agency that hires Africans to work at South African mines.

USAID - United States Agency for International Development.
GLOSSARY

(sa)hlolo - Sotho; Sharecropping arrangement.

Apostolic Churches - Africanist churches usually retaining more of the trappings of orthodox Protestant worship than do Zionist churches.

Bantustan - Pseudo-states established by South Africa as African homelands.

"Boers" - Afrikaners. Also, as sometimes used in Lesotho, cruel persons in general.

(se)boko, (isi)bongo, or (isi)duko - Sotho, Zulu, and Xhosa for family praise names.

Ciskei - One of two Bantustans established for Xhosa-speakers. Furthest from Lesotho.

(um)hlinzeko - Xhosa rite for returning migrant workers. Replaced by umsindleko.

induna - In traditional mining set-up, an African appointed by management to represent his "tribe."

joala/utywala - African-style beer.

Lekhotla la Bafo - Council of Commoners. Early political organization in Lesotho.

Lifagane - Nineteenth-century wars between African chiefdoms. Also called mfecane.

(ba)limo/(izi)nyanya - Sotho and Xhosa. Ancestral shades.

(ma)loti or rand - Units of currency. The loti is the official currency of Lesotho, but South African rands are freely traded. In Lesotho in 1987, 1 loti = 1 rand = approximately US $.50.

(ma)mpholi/(i)ngqwele - Sotho and Xhosa for most powerful person among group of herd boys.

(ama)ndlavini - Name for followers of a particular rural sub-culture, often associated with Xhosa-speaking males.
ngaka - Sotho. Herbalist and Diviner.

Russians - Criminal gang allegedly used by White authorities to cause dissension among workers and protesters.

(um)sindleko - Xhosa rite for returning migrant workers. Replaced umhlinzeko.

(le)tekatse - Autonomous woman, often associated with immoral conduct.

(aba)Thembu - Xhosa-speaking chieftaincy based in Transkei.

(bo)tho/(uba)ntu - Humanity, humaness.

Transkei - One of two Bantustans established for Xhosa-speakers. Borders on Lesotho.

(um)tshongolo - Type of dance done at the mines. Associated here with Mpondo miners.

tsotsi - Criminal, gangster.

(ama)Vundle - Xhosa-speaking chieftaincy with Sotho links resident in Lesotho.

Zionist Church - Africanist churches associated with distinctive uniforms, healing practices, and dancing.
NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND WORD USAGE

In this dissertation Sesotho and isiXhosa language equivalents are often given for phrases which lack direct English translations or may have connotations which differ from the English. I have adopted the practice of giving the Sesotho translation first, followed by the isiXhosa translation set off by a slash mark. Thus "humanity" is written botho/ubuntu with botho representing the Sesotho and ubuntu the isiXhosa. Where possible, in direct quotations the Sesotho or isiXhosa as actually spoken follows the English translation.

The structure of Sesotho and isiXhosa words makes them a bit difficult to adopt into non-Bantu languages. It has become common to drop the noun prefixes of words in Bantu languages when writing in English. In English Sesotho is often referred to as Sotho and isiXhosa as Xhosa. I have adopted this practice, with some modification. I use Sotho and Xhosa adjectively or when referring to the languages themselves as in: Sotho and Xhosa, Sotho history, Xhosa-speaking mineworkers, etc. but have retained the prefixes mo/umu and ba/aba when referring to people. I prefer the former because the noun roots "-sotho" and "-xhosa" lack adjectival forms. Yet, it simply does not sound proper to
my ears to refer to a person without the appropriate prefix used in reference to people. The reader should beware then that Mosotho refers to a single person, while Basotho refers to many Sotho people. Similarly, an umXhosa is one person while amaXhosa are more than one.

In writing Sotho I use the standard orthography of Lesotho. I follow the accepted procedure of replacing the diacritic "^" with an apostrophe for ease of typing. It should be noted that in this system "l" before the letters "u" and "i" is pronounced something like the English "d" rather than like the English "l." The semi-vowels represented by the letters "y" and "w" in English are expressed as "e" and "o" in Sotho. They occur only before vowels, as in ho ea and ho oa. "Q" and "qh" represent palatal clicks. (The "h" represents aspiration.)

Xhosa has several phonemes not found in Sotho. These include "ty" and "tyh" (palatal affricatives), "x" and "xh" (alveolar lateral affricative clicks), and "c" and "ch" (alveolar affricative clicks). Voicing and nasalization is also a distinguishing feature of Xhosa. Each of the above clicks can be voiced and nasalized. Similarly, the voiced alveolar lateral "dl" (as in amandla) occurs in Sotho in unvoiced form "tl" (as in matla). The Xhosa which I studied in Lesotho varies somewhat from written Xhosa and has significant Sotho admixture. Where Xhosa speakers use Sotho words I have tried to spell them as they might appear in
Xhosa orthography. My decision to give many words and phrases in Xhosa and in Sotho is meant as an implicit argument for the structural similarity of their metaphorical systems.

A final word should be said about the use of the terms "white," "black," and "colored." I have capitalized them throughout the dissertation to emphasize that they are socially defined terms with legal definitions in South Africa; they are not biologically distinct entities.
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TALKING PEACE, LIVING CONFLICT: THE MENTAL AND THE MATERIAL ON THE BORDERS OF APARTHEID

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December, 1989

Chairman: Ronald Cohen
Major Department: Anthropology

This study examines ethnic and class identity among Sotho and Xhosa-speakers from Lesotho. It has three principle objectives: 1) to depict the situation of Lesotho's people so their experiences can be "understood" in the sense used by sociologist W. G. Runciman, 2) to synthesize interpretive and inductive models of social study, and 3) to evaluate the experiences, events, and perspectives described in terms of so-called materialist and idealist epistemology.

Lesotho is described as a polity in which material conditions are frequently difficult, crime is at crisis levels, and governance is harsh. Dependence on migrant labor is high and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. In terms of economic dependency and political vulnerability there are only minor differences between Lesotho and South Africa's pseudo-states.
Workers in Lesotho convey a variety of perspectives which are sometimes contradictory. On one end are those who are actively involved in labor organization and who militantly resist the system of labor control of which they are a part. One the other end are people, such a mine policemen, who evidence some identification with the prevailing authority systems. In between these two extremes are the many who comply with the system because of overwhelming economic dependency.

The situation in southern Lesotho of relatively cooperative relations between Sotho and Xhosa-speakers is contrasted with the situation in South Africa's gold mines, where Sotho and Xhosa-speakers are said to fight. A study of events at an Anglo-American gold mine from 1984 to 1986 suggests that known markers of ethnicity are utilized to identify groups competing for material interests. Evidence is presented showing that some White administrators are involved in actively manipulating ethnic divisions among the workers.

The author argues that attitudes and ideas are patterned by experience in the material world and these patterns can be known through inductive methods. Yet, "idealists" have a point in seeking empathic understanding and in rejecting the simplistic causal models posited by some "materialists." The complexity of the social world is such that it cannot be completely represented by any linear model.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 'From what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world—Max Weber (1946:280).

"Idealists" and "Materialists" in South African Scholarship

This study depicts the lives and experiences of "ordinary" people from Lesotho in terms of the systems of power and authority in which they are enmeshed. It is a study of people reporting about, conceptualizing, making ritual sense of, and evaluating themselves and others from the context of experiences generated by the South African political-economy. This task is essentially journalistic. But it is set within a broad theoretical question, namely, "What is the relationship between ideas and material conditions?" More specifically: "How is race, class, and ethnic consciousness in southern Africa determined by material conditions and/or cultural-linguistic factors?"

Social scientists will recognize that these objectives can be formulated using the familiar metaphors of historical
or cultural materialism. In these terms, such a study would examine linkages between thought (superstructure), political-economic relationships (structure), and material conditions (base). Marx's proclamation that, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx 1977:182) tersely describes the core assumption about those linkages made by those that ultimately seek to call themselves "materialists." Although it is generally accepted by Neo-Marxists that relationships between base, structure, and superstructure should not be conceptualized mechanically or unilinearly, and that there is a certain autonomy in the realm of ideas, in the final analysis the determining ("shaping," "conditioning") effects of material and economic conditions on culture is maintained.

Another approach, a radical hermeneutic or interpretive one, would not formulate the study in such terms at all. For the interpretivist what is important is bringing to light and making meaningful to outsiders the world of meaning and experience of insiders. For them, the feuds over causality so common in the human "sciences" are only another sort of discourse. As one hermeneutician notes: "Verstehen [interpretive understanding], has to my knowledge, never been considered by any hermeneutician as a form of causal explanation or even a substitute therefore
... causal explanation has often been regarded as necessary only where verstehen proved impossible owing to the impenetrability of the object" (Bleicher 1980:48). Adopting this perspective, one would study discourse in terms of its setting and social action in terms of the discourses by which such action is interpreted and be content when meaningful patterns can be discerned.

By addressing questions of causality the present work is placed on the side of the materialists. Yet, it must be admitted that in treating something as vast, diverse, and mercurial as "thought", causal analysis of an empirical sort is fraught with difficulties. On this point Femia, a critic of Gramsci's political philosophy, argues that:

Historically, changes in both base and superstructure have occurred simultaneously and continuously, making it hard to isolate distinct orders of succession. To discover correlations, or 'elective affinities', is not sufficient, because a correlation, in itself, can tell us nothing about the direction of causation. What all these considerations point to is this: it is beyond the realm of possibility to conduct anything like a controlled experiment of the materialist hypothesis ... Still, the apparent methodological impossibility of proving that some factor B in social life is a derivation of some other factor A does not render the relationship logically impossible. Nor does it mean that rational argument about such relationships is pointless. (Femia 1981:218-219, italics in the original)

Such problems are exemplified in the modern debate in South African scholarship over the determining roles of "race" and "class" in the development and maintenance of
segregation and apartheid. Prior to the 1970s the most widely accepted argument was that, racism was not dependent upon economic concerns. Although some of the economic ramifications of racism were noted, it was seen primarily as imposing artificial and limiting constraints on the market. Neo-classical economics and sociology were combined to form this the "pluralist" argument. From this perspective apartheid was explained primarily in terms of attitudes, values, and beliefs (Johnstone 1976:206-207). As Goldin puts it: "Culture, tradition and shared socialization . . . are considered to be the locus of group identity and the conflict between various groups over state power and resources is considered to be a primary cause of racial antagonism" (1983:34). This type of explanation, Johnstone (1976:206) points out, is essentially "idealist"; it posits causality moving from the realm of ideas "down" to the realm of society.

The pluralists were challenged by Marxist analyses, notably those of Wolpe (1972), Arrighi (1970), and Bundy (1979). Each of these scholars pointed out the manner in which racial domination articulated with the exploitation of the labor of Black people. Wolpe (1972) in particular stressed the class nature of apartheid as a system of labor regulation and the functions it served in enhancing capitalist accumulation. These works were widely cited and quoted in the 1970s and continue to inform much analysis.
today. Yet, the materialist model has itself been criticized for ignoring the possible dysfunctions of segregation and apartheid and for treating apartheid as if it were the inevitable outcome of South African capitalist development. Posel (1983) points out such flaws, particularly in the argument of Wolpe. For example, she argues, English-speaking South Africans with manufacturing interests in the 1940s supported a policy which would have reduced dependence on migrant labor and allowed urban standards of living to rise for Blacks. Agricultural capital associated with the National Party, however, sought a policy of decentralization and an increase in influx control measures. Both measures would have benefited capitalism, therefore "apartheid was neither a necessary nor an inevitable outcome of capitalist processes and interests at the time" (Posel 1983:12).

In the 1980s a different type of study of race and class came to the fore. Much of this work dealt with local level situations and was concerned with the meaning these situations had for the people that lived them. Spearheading this movement were historians associated with the University of the Witwatersrand. Perhaps most prominent among them is Charles van Onselen (1982), a scholar whose work on the history of the early mining days on the Rand is an eloquent depiction of the lives of "ordinary" working class people, both Black and White. While Van Onselen does not eschew
causal analysis (he points out, for example, relationships between alcohol use, prostitution, banditry and the interests of agricultural capitalists) his discussion is less concerned with developing grand explanations about the development of capitalism and apartheid than it is in depicting the conditions of daily life experienced by the urban workers of the period.

"Experience" is one of the central concerns of the influential "History Workshop" programs launched at the University of Witswatersrand. The perspective of this school is clearly presented by Belinda Bozzoli (1983; 1987), editor of a set of volumes containing the writings of many of the workshop participants. Quoting Gramsci's "If you are not able to understand real individuals, you can't understand what is universal and general," Bozzoli argues that: "To escape becoming imprisoned in abstract and sterile theoretical debates, to confront and understand the history and nature of the spontaneous consciousness of ordinary people, to develop an analysis of culture which takes account of class and capitalism, rather than simply race and nationalism, these are all aspects of our project" (Bozzoli 1983:8).

A history concerned with common people and their "view from below" is seen as a corrective to abstract models, like that of Althusser, which are far removed from the world of everyday experience (Bozzoli 1983:8). For Bozzoli, such
history has come to be a way of understanding the "motifs" of popular consciousness. Ideally it "starts from the experiential category of the individual, works(s) through the local groups and communities in which such individuals forge their world view, and tease(s) out the layers of ideology-formation which shape the individual in the group or community of which he or she is a part" (Bozzoli 1987:2).

Clearly, the new social history in South Africa has attempted to come to terms with some of the conceptual difficulties of the materialist model while incorporating much of the interpretive perspective in the process. Yet, some historians have seen this as a regression to "idealistic" models of causality. Morris, for example, accuses this school of "an infinitely contingent empiricism" which completely fails to "grasp and reveal the totality of contradictions and forces structuring the lives of the 'ordinary people in the street'" (1987:9, italics in the original). In some of this work, particularly that of Keegan (1986) the "wheel has turned full circle" he says, and we are "back to a primary dependence on 'race', 'white supremacy' and 'racist farmers' as the major explanatory variables" (Morris 1987:16), that is to say, to a system of class domination and struggle. While he appreciates the detailed historical evidence that the new social history has brought to the field, Morris would ultimately turn the
conceptual wheel once more, but this time to a more traditional Marxian position.

The present study also harkens back to an older position, that of Weberian scholarship, but also looks forward to a newer conception of science and materialism. In so doing it seeks a way to analyze local level experience without abandoning concern for generalization. Like the Witwatersrand's History Workshop, this work is concerned with experience. While thought is seen as a product of experience, it is also argued that in order to be understood, experience must be conceptualized and general social patterns recognized.

Towards a Synthesis in Light of Weber and Contemporary Natural Science

The purpose of this dissertation will be to contribute, even if in a small way, to this continuing debate about materialism and consciousness. In doing this I shall advocate a middle ground between materialism and idealism, scientism and hermeneutics. In short, I want the best of both worlds. I seek the deep sense of understanding achieved through studies such as those of social historians such as Van Onselen (1982) and Keegan (1986), without giving up the scientific goal of explaining why any particular set of ideas should be seen as more salient than others. Weber's methodological perspective opens the door to this possibility.
Weber is a thinker whose ideas have been greatly neglected in the recent South African literature. Yet, he was perhaps the first and most notable of those who, after Marx, took up the task of describing relationships between material conditions and ideas. While his work, particularly his agrarian sociology, is sensitive to the importance of class interests, he also stressed the importance of differentiating factors such as status as a determining factor in history.

The latter concern is especially relevant to current South African debates. For example, Keegan's (1986) assertion that "cultural" factors were crucial in determining the course of capitalist agricultural development in the Orange Free State are logically quite similar to those "cultural" factors Weber discussed with respect to the development of capitalist agriculture in Germany east of the Elbe. Similarly, Adam and Moodley's (1986:34-35) work has unexplored parallels in that of Weber. For example, they argue that many Whites do not want Blacks in the same work category as themselves because of the challenge this represents to the special status they claim as Whites. Those Whites whose status position is least secure, like those who work underground at the mines, are generally the most hostile to Blacks. Weber argued much the same thing in reference to the American South, writing, for example, that: "the poor white trash were much more
hostile to the Negroes than the planters, who, because of their situation, were often swayed by patriarchal feelings" (1978:58). He even formed this into a general principle: "The interested parties in every status system therefore react with especial bitterness precisely against the claims of mere economic acquisition as such, and the more they feel threatened, the greater is their bitterness" (1978:53).

Weber, in general, chided mechanical notions of materialism and suggested as early as the first decade of this century that we are "liberated . . . from the antiquated notion that all cultural phenomena can be deduced as a product or function of 'material interests'" (1949:68). Weber also made methodological contributions which Hekman (1983) and Huff (1984), for example, see as important for resolving debates about "positivism" and "hermeneutics".5

In a series of essays written prior to 1910, Weber (1949; 1975; 1977) developed a position between the intuitive, empathic approach advocated by historians such as Dilthey, and a positivist economics which sought to establish laws of human conduct. In his critique of the idealist philosopher Stammeler, for example, Weber (1977) discusses in some detail both the importance and the inadequacy of a social theory that confines itself to the study of meaning. He finds that meaningful ideas, such as rules, must be taken into consideration in any social theory but they themselves are only one aspect of a given situation.
Weber consistently rejected the notion that the social sciences are distinct from the natural sciences because of the former's concern with the realm of meaning. He finds that meaning, values, and interpretation are integral components of all forms of analysis. The social sciences are to be distinguished from the natural sciences chiefly because they are interested in understanding the nature of particular, unique, situations as well as in developing principles of general applicability (Weber 1975).

My research aims to develop both the "ideographic" and the "nomological" perspectives. I follow Hekman (1983) and Huff (1984) in seeing Weber's work as being particularly germane to the contemporary debate between positivists and interpretivists over such conceptual issues. But we need not stop here. Physical science has gone well beyond the conceptual models of Weber's day. Recent work in such fields as particle physics, dynamics, and artificial intelligence suggest that the physical world is not as linearly ordered as many social scientists have assumed. Taking these fields as exemplars, the social world appears an interesting metaphorical equivalent of the patterned, but non-deterministic, flow of a moving stream or of clouds.

The patterns we find in the flow of social life are not new ones. Most of the social historians of the History Workshop would agree that the domains of experience open to individuals and groups are largely determined by the
political-economic system in which they operate. The mode of production dominates in that it determines how people spend their waking (and sometimes even sleeping) lives. As agriculture has become less and less important in the rural areas of the South African periphery, the dominant domains of experience have become those associated with labor migrancy and a wage labor economy. Yet, this does not mean that class consciousness can be taken as given. Other domains of experience are also important. Many of the determinants of social identity come from shared memories of the past. Identity and interests become congruent only in a statistical sense, and usually after some time has elapsed for shared senses of identity to catch up with changing experiences.

In what follows I shall suggest some ways in which thought is linked to material conditions and some ways in which it appears to have some autonomy. I suggest that thought is determined by material conditions, in the last instance, but the complexity of human social experience is such that even an extensive knowledge of material and social conditions does not allow one immediate access to the world of thought. A parallel may be drawn here with the weather. The weather is determined by the conditions of the physical world. It is patterned in such a way that some prediction is possible. Yet, the complexity of the world's weather system is such that one needs absolute knowledge, down to
the molecular level, in order to make completely accurate long-range predictions. Even then, some error is inevitable (Gleich 1987).

Following up on Weber, I have turned to the methodology suggested by W. G. Runciman (1983) in developing the present study. In his critique of Weberian methodology, Runciman (1972:83) argued that "idealists" may be correct about the distinctiveness of human social life at the descriptive level but incorrect at the level of explanation. What he means is that both hermeneutic and inductive, hypothesis-testing theorists are talking about two different, but equally valid, levels of meaning. His purpose is to elucidate what it really is to "understand" something. In doing so he argues that the process of understanding has only been partially captured by either one approach or the other. This is essentially the position of Weber, but Runciman (1983) refines the discussion by differentiating understanding into primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. At each level there are also problems of evaluation.

At the primary level of understanding one's chief concern should be with accuracy, that is, with making sure one's reports of actions, concepts, ideas, and so on, are adequate renderings of that which one has set out to study. Runciman sometimes calls this the level of "reportage" to emphasize a concern with reporting observations in a way that does not violate the journalistic sense of: Who? What? Where? and
When? The goal is to achieve validity, especially to avoid misperception and misrepresentation. Primary understanding also involves describing action in such a way as to be true to the meaning that actors attach to their own behavior.6

The second level of understanding is that of explanation. Understanding in the secondary sense answers questions about causality. For example, it refers to the questions "why?" or "for what reason?" It includes inductive goals but is, more simply, based on the order and predictability evident and assumed in the world. Runciman confirms Weber's view that explanation is the same in principle whether one is talking about wars, revolutions, art, or the condensation of water. Still, the most appropriate approach for the social sciences is usually not laboratory experimentation but "quasi-experiment," the systematic comparison of similar naturally occurring events, circumstances, and situations in such a way that causal hypotheses can be asserted and subject to disconfirmation.

The tertiary level is also called the "descriptive" aspect of understanding. It refers to the context of a situation and the knowledge of context which is evident to the participants. It reflects an awareness of the possibilities of the time and situation and the feelings and ideas which actors have about it. Without reference to such knowledge reportage and explanation are subject to a great deal of distortion. Still these descriptions must be based
on some theoretical concepts and these may differ from those of the people who are being described (1983:228). (This is similar to an argument made by Weber about the bubonic plague. Just because a people suffering from the disease do not say they have the plague does not mean that the outside observer must treat the plague as if it were not the plague.)

Finally, Runciman maintains that the social sciences have an inescapably evaluative aspect. "Since it is undeniable that everyone has and cannot help having moral, political or aesthetic views of some kind or other about what states of society are or aren't to be preferred to others, it must be doubtful if there has ever been a work of substantive social theory in which there is not somewhere a turn of phrase which was written, whether consciously or not, as an expression of a value-judgement to which the author subscribes" (1983:301). He argues that it is not necessary to attempt to expunge all hint of judgment from social science because the descriptive and/or explanatory content of any given, valid, account can be reformulated to conform with other ideological orientations (1983:303). In this dissertation I will attempt to depict "understanding" in each of its various senses so that a reader unfamiliar with Lesotho and South Africa will be able to come away with a feeling that he or she is better informed. While evaluation
and judgment is made throughout, I will also include a final statement of opinion in the conclusions.

As noted, Runciman's work supports my desire to write of meaning and of causality. In the opening sections of the next three chapters I will be primarily concerned with Runciman's tertiary or "descriptive" level. First I will present background information on Lesotho and the context in which its people live their lives. I then describe the migrant labor system to South Africa's mines and the nature of wage labor for those left behind in Lesotho. The next chapter contains case studies of individual lives which frequently exemplify points about the patterning of thought and experience. There is a more thorough examination of causal hypotheses about political identity in the southern African periphery in part II. The first two chapters of Part III provide interpretive and positivist analyses of local level identities in Lesotho. The chapter which follows them describes some of the "real world" aspects of identity and class interest in a South African gold mine. The complexity of these situations serves to exemplify the point that even for the positivist and materialist, in practice, the world of thought and action must remain open and contingent to a considerable degree.

Fieldwork Experience and Research Design

The fieldwork on which this study is based was conducted entirely in Lesotho and my perceptions have undoubtedly been
biased by that context. It is clear that people tend to modify their behavior, attitudes, and discourse to adjust to differing conditions. Mineworkers themselves say they are different sorts of persons at home and at work. Still, it may also be that, as one scholar of political symbolism has stated: "Although identity is subjective, multiple, and situationally fluid, it is not infinitely elastic" (Young 1976:43). I have included a limited check on this by varying the places I lived in within Lesotho.

My first area of residence was a rural, mountainous part of central Lesotho. It has a population of about 1,500. Partly for ecological reasons (soils of the mountains are quite fertile) mountain folk have been able to rely more on their agricultural and livestock produce than have their lowland brethren.7 Before the advent of the Highland Water Project in 1987 (more on this project later), contact with Whites was limited to that of missionaries, doctors, and American and Danish "development" workers. There are also a few Xhosa-speaking people living here interspersed among the Sotho-speakers.

The second area of my stay was an urban area, the town of Maputsoe (population about 10,000), that borders on the South African town of Ficksburg. Here there is a small but growing garment and light manufacturing sector. This is something new for Lesotho, but has been ardently encouraged by the government through the parastatal Lesotho National
Development Corporation (LNDC). This sort of business activity clearly parallels the growth and development of similar enterprises in such homelands as QwaQwa, Ciskei, and Bophuthatswana. Workers also cross the border daily for jobs in next door Ficksburg. Most of these are also in the retail trade or in light industry. Domestic servants tend to come from the South African side of the border, where there is a "location" reserved for Africans within walking distance of the town center. On the Lesotho side many of the retail stores are owned and operated by people of South Asian descent whom Sotho generally refer to as maIndia (Indians) or maKula (Coolies). Most of these people have been in Lesotho for at least one generation, coming first to Lesotho from Natal to settle in the more northerly town of Butha-Buthe. Maputsoe is a young town and most of the retail businesses have been there less than fifteen years. There are no South Africans of Asian descent operating such businesses in Ficksburg. There Whites take similar positions. On both sides of the border the African population is made up mostly of Sotho speakers, but there are also a few whose first tongue is Zulu or Xhosa. In town, these distinctions may be blurred in that many people can speak at least a little of two or three African languages.

The third and final area of my stay was a rural area, with a population of about the same as the first area, in
which Xhosa-speaking people make up the overwhelming majority. They identify both as people with a Xhosa language and customs and as citizens of Lesotho. They recognize that their language has undergone Sotho influence and that Xhosa-speakers from Transkei, for example, consider them as different from themselves. Many of them also identify with the line of Vundle chiefs who claim historical association with the Fokeng of the Sotho. Xhosa, Phuthi (another Nguni group), and Sotho-speakers have been living together in this region since at least the 1850s without having to conform to the regulations of identity which pertain across the border.8

The above sites were chosen initially to allow me to ask inductive questions about race, class, and ethnic consciousness in Lesotho. They vary in ways that have been theorized to exert important effects on such consciousness. Such variables may be depicted graphically as follows:

Table 1. Comparative Factors in Research Design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POP. DENSITY</th>
<th>MOUNTAINS</th>
<th>SO. BORDER</th>
<th>NO. BORDER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC COMPOSITION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho speaking majority</td>
<td>Xhosa speaking majority</td>
<td>Sotho speaking majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most</td>
<td>less</td>
<td>least</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION WITH OTHER &quot;RACES&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infrequent</td>
<td>infrequent</td>
<td>common</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Fieldwork experience was thus a sort of controlled comparison of variables. Degree of urbanization, ethnic and racial demography, and access to viable agricultural resources are dependent variables around which differences among independent variables such as ethnic, racial, and class identity in the central mountains, the southern border, and the northern border can be assessed. Yet, this is not a "village" or "town" study. My concerns are holistic. I have drawn from a variety of sources that transcend the boundaries usually maintained in an anthropologist's fieldwork. My justification for this is that any information is relevant if it contributes to understanding in Runciman's sense. My sources of data include participant observation, newspapers and books in the vernacular, and secondary sources from a variety of southern African contexts. A questionnaire was also designed to elicit ideological perspectives in each of the three areas. Questionnaire design, procedures, and results will be discussed in chapter seven and in the appendices.

As has been mentioned, the next three chapters contain descriptive accounts of Lesotho and migrant and other forms of wage labor in which Lesotho's citizens take part. Chapter five builds on the previous chapters in critiquing theoretical perspectives on the role of "mind" in the migrant labor system. A similar topic is addressed in
chapter six, the role of ritual and folk knowledge in three ethnically heterogeneous areas in Lesotho. The resiliency of historical identities is then discussed in reference to the "national" ideology of Lesotho. Chapter eight contains a discussion of historical identities based on "lineage" or "clan" and political relations between Sotho and Xhosa-speakers. Chapter nine describes recent conflict at a South African gold mine which led to violence between Xhosa and Sotho-speakers. Finally, in the last chapter the dissertation is summarized, discussed, and evaluated in terms of the "materialist" and "idealist" dichotomy. I will consider the utility of not being wedded to one or the other of the great divisions of idealism and materialism evident within anthropology today.

NOTES

1. Wolpe now essentially concedes this point when he writes: "the ideological, political and economic conditions of capitalist development are not only historically contingent but are also contradictory in their effects. It is, therefore, unnecessary and inadequate to accept the general argument (of the liberals) that capitalism and racism are always contradictory in their effects, or the opposing general argument that racism is always functional for capital (1988:60).

2. Moodie's (1975) study of Africaner political thought as "civil religion" is the major exception. Others, like Adam and Moodley (1986) and Greenberg (1987) make more limited use of Weber.

3. On this point Weis is particularly apposite: "Class-theoretical assumptions in particular play such an enormous role in Weber's entire historical and sociological work--from the essays on agricultural relations in antiquity to the enquiry into the situation of the agricultural workers east of the Elbe, from the analysis of the Wirtschaftsethik
der Weltreligion to Economy and Society— daß any special reference is quite unnecessary" (1981:90).

4. This argument, or ones similar to it, is not really a new one in the literature on South Africa. See, for example, Kuper (1965:399).

5. I do not wish to set Weber against Marx as has been done by some sociologists in the functionalist tradition. For Marx and for Weber the "mental" and the "material" are inexorably intertwined in the struggles that determine history. Indeed, they stand opposed to any radical separation between "subjective" and "objective" domains of reality, although in their historical writings they manage to make useful analytical distinctions between them. Recently, scholars have been writing of a Marx-Weber "dialogue" and reject the proposition that the ideas of Marx and Weber must be pitted against each other. (See Antonio and Glassman 1985.)

6. But Runciman does not mean to accept Harris' (1979) distinction between "emic" and "etic." This is because both descriptive and analytic levels depend upon accurate reportage: "It is true that the relation between observers' and agents categories is inherently problematic. But the problem will not be resolved by keeping them apart, since the necessary distinction between reportage of agents' behaviour on the one hand and its explanation on the other depends at the outset on the inclusion of reportage of enough (but not too much) of what goes on 'inside the natives' heads'" (Runciman 1983:119).

7. Although they are still dependent on migrant labor to maintain their agricultural systems. (See chapter two, footnote six.)

8. Southern Lesotho and the northern regions of Transkei and the eastern Cape are areas in which "ethnic boundaries" have always been particularly fuzzy. This mixing of different linguistic groups is actually common in South Africa historically, but colonial and apartheid policies have long operated on the assumption that this was not and should not be the case. Such situations can be unsettling to minds seeking quick and easy ways to define categories of people. Yet, despite these policies of separateness, if one goes to such places as the Hershel district of the Transkei today one commonly hears people mixing English, Afrikaans, Xhosa, and Sotho in a single breath.
PART I.

DESCRIPTIVE BACKGROUND
Figure 1. Sketch Map of South Africa

1 - Transkei
2 - Zululand
3 - QwaQwa
4 - Ciskei

Figure 2. Sketch Map of Lesotho
CHAPTER 2
THE NEXUS OF EVERYDAY LIVING IN CONTEMPORARY LESOTHO

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the ecological, economic, and political factors which are important for "understanding" Lesotho as it is today.¹

After a general introduction to Lesotho, some of the events, problems, and concerns which were voiced locally and in the media during the period of fieldwork will be discussed. These include the impact in Lesotho of the 1987 mine workers strike, the crime and law enforcement situation, and the imposition of a State of Emergency (related, allegedly, to crime). In concluding similarities and differences between Lesotho and the South African Bantustans will be described.

The overall picture drawn of Lesotho is one of rapid deterioration of natural and social resources. Whether one examines the condition of the land, unemployment, landlessness, rates of crime, or the political and human rights situation, the conclusion must be drawn that things have gone from bad to worse. State-based attempts to improve the general conditions of life are fraught with difficulty and in many cases exacerbate rather than ameliorate hardship. The increasing emiseration of the
population has led to high rates of violence and crime, on the one hand, and a new sense of militancy on the other. In this Lesotho has much in common with Bantustans such as the Transkei. Whether Lesotho's people will continue to turn their aggression inward or whether they will be successful in casting it aside in favor of more constructive forms of action remains an open question.

The Land.

Lesotho's founding father, Chief Moshoeshoe I, at one time claimed the land which extends west from the Caledon River well into the present-day Orange Free State. After the Treaty of Aliwal North in 1868, however, Moshoeshoe's domain was reduced to the area on the southern and eastern side of the river. The Sotho name for the Caledon, Mohokare, reflects the resentment felt at that time by the loss of this territory. It is said today that when Moshoeshoe first learned that the river was to be the new limit of his realm he exclaimed, "Moo kahare!?", meaning roughly, "There, inside [my territory]!?" From Moo Kahare is derived "Mohokare."

Lesotho now has a surface area of only 30,355 square kilometers and most of this is rugged and mountainous; a figure of between 9 and 13 percent is generally given as the amount of arable land (Kingdom of Lesotho, Bureau of Statistics, 1987:4; Bardill and Cobbe 1985:2). As part of South Africa's highveld grasslands, Lesotho was probably
never heavily forested. One of things about the area that
strikes first time visitors from abroad is this lack of
trees (although many thousands of trees have recently been
planted by the forestry section of the Ministry of
Agriculture).

There are three main ecological zones, the lowlands, the
foothills, and the mountains (a fourth zone, that including
the Senqu [Orange] River drainage is also sometimes
included). The lowlands are low, relatively speaking, since
the lowest elevation in Lesotho is about 1,300 meters. They
are fairly flat and cover, at most, the western one quarter
of the state. The soils are frequently shallow, sandy,
duplex soils with a hard clay pan.

Some of Lesotho's best agricultural land is situated in
the foothills. Here the elevation is not so high as to
retard the development of sorghum, at one time the staple
crop but now used primarily for the brewing of beer. There
is also some variation in vegetation as one moves up in
elevation. For example, the American agave and the prickly
pear cactus are less common at higher elevations. This is
significant as the agave is used for firewood and for making
stools while the fruit of the prickly pear is prized as a
delicacy. People in the more rural areas tend to be
knowledgeable of their local environment and collect a wide
variety of wild edible plants. In most such areas cabbage
is the only vegetable marketed in local stores and even then supplies are sporadic and unreliable.

The highlands reach their highest elevation at the peak of Mokhotlong district's Thabana Ntlenyana (3,482 meters), then drop off precipitously at the Drakensberg escarpment to South Africa's Natal Province. These high grounds were not settled by Basotho until the first decade of this century. Prior to 1850 they were occupied only occasionally by bands of San hunter-gatherers. By the middle of that century, however, the San were forced to take refuge there to escape both Afrikaner and African encroachment on their territories. Deprived of access to their normal means of subsistence, the San refugees turned to raiding horses and cattle from both sides. However, this led Basotho and combined Basotho-White forces to route most of the San from their mountain hideouts. After 1870 they ceased to exist as an independent people.

Physical conditions are peculiarly local. In the mountains there are problems with high winds, hail, and, in winter time, snow. In low rainfall years rain may fall heavily in one valley without spilling a drop in the next. Hail is also especially damaging and unpredictable. In the mountains, soils vary as well, but tend to be richer than those in the lowlands. They are frequently basaltic clays. The highest mountains tend to be rounded or topped with large plateaus, used locally as range lands. Terracing is
done on most mountain slopes, but strips between fields are generally narrow and erosion can be severe. Long time residents of the central Maluti range indicate that wheat was their principle crop until fifteen or twenty years ago. Growing seasons were too short for the varieties of maize and sorghum which were available at that time. Now maize and sorghum are more common than wheat.

Cattle keeping, although popular, is problematic. In 1975 about half of all households owned cattle, although of these, more than half owned less than eight (van de Geer 1984:55). Overgrazing has long been a serious problem. Available pasturage is deteriorating rapidly and in many lowland areas has been completely depleted. Government documents concede that Lesotho is at least 100 - 200 percent overgrazed (van de Geer 1984:60).

Overgrazing, fragile soils, and a climate typified by cycles of drought, heavy rainfall and intermittent hail, have combined to cause severe erosion of soils. Erosion gullies (known in South Africa as dongas) ten to twenty meters in depth are not uncommon in the lowlands. During my stay in southern Lesotho a young man fell to his death in one such donga. Unfortunately, such accidents are not infrequent.

Social and Natural Resources

In the previous century Lesotho was a net exporter of grains, but the productivity and market capacity of Sotho
and other African farmers was deliberately undermined by South African legislation and British colonial policy (Bundy 1979; Palmer and Parsons 1977). In the past 100 hundred years Lesotho has gone from "granary to labor reserve" and its people are typically characterized as a "rural proletariat" (Murray 1981). Lesotho, like the so-called homelands, functions as a "dormitory suburb" (Wallman 1969), supplying workers from the underdeveloped periphery to the center of South Africa's industrial heartland. Since 1975 the Lesotho government has been further linked to migrant labor by an agreement established with the mining houses over workers' wages. This requires miners to remit 60 percent of their wages to savings accounts in Lesotho's national bank.\(^4\) As a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Lesotho government also receives an approximately 20 percent surcharge on all goods imported from South Africa (Bardill and Cobbe 1985:65). In effect the two economies are so inextricably linked that it is a distortion to speak at all of a "national" economy for Lesotho.\(^5\)

Wherever one is in Lesotho reliance on the cash earnings of migrants is high and wage employment is greatly sought after—although this may be somewhat less the case today in the mountains (KL 1985:C-2-3-2).\(^6\) Older men from Thaba Tseka and Leribe districts proudly report how in their youth they sometimes rode horseback for two days over mountain
passes in order to apply for mine work in the lowland town of Hlotse. For at least the past 60 years Lesotho's main export has in fact been the labor of its men; in many years more than 50 percent of the able-bodied male population has been away on labor contracts in South Africa's mines. The number of Basotho miners peaked at nearly 129,000 in 1977, then fluctuated from 114,000 in 1984 to 121,000 in 1986 (Bardill and Cobbe 1985:62; KL Bureau of Statistics 1987:19). Some reports suggest that employment at the mines has declined again, falling as much as ten percent in 1988. The industry blames low gold prices and increasing costs (The Star July 5, 1989). But sources from Lesotho indicate that the number of mineworkers from Lesotho actually increased to 125,973 by the third quarter of 1988 (Central Bank of Lesotho 1988:4). Policy analyst Gordon's (1981:115) estimate that the husbands of 40 to 60 percent of women in Lesotho are away at work in South Africa is now somewhat old but still appears to be reasonably accurate. There is no doubt that migrant labor continues to define social as well as economic life.

Besides labor, Lesotho's major resources are water and diamonds. However, since 1982 when De Beers Corporation ceased operation in the country, exports of diamonds have been negligible. Currently, water is the primary target for exploitation. In a way that parallels the movement of Lesotho's work force, water is to be harnessed at a series
of dams and sent to South Africa. Lesotho expects to eventually receive about $50 million per year for the sale of water and electric power. Initially, most of the revenue will go towards servicing project debt.

Proposals to dam the rivers in Lesotho's highlands for South Africa's use were first put forward in the early 1960s (Young, B.:1961) and have not changed their basic form. The plans call for the construction of four to six major dams, two hydro-electric power plants, and 120 kilometers of pipeline, much of which must be tunneled through mountainsides. The water pipelines are destined for South Africa's Pretoria-Johannesburg-Vereeniging industrial area.

The government under the late Leabua Jonathan was slow to develop plans for the project, although initial feasibility studies were conducted from 1984 to 1986 under EEC and World Bank auspices. Work has now begun but the first dam is not scheduled to be operational until 1992. During Jonathan's rule there were major political difficulties concerning control of the facilities and security arrangements. However, after Jonathan was overthrown in the 1986 coup accords were quickly reached with South Africa. Although many of the details of the security arrangements are secret, Lesotho and South Africa are known to have agreed to a system of water control involving the use of dual electronic keys. Ideally, each country is to possess only one key
while the gates will require both to open (New African Yearbook 1987-1988:176).

The project is jointly funded by South Africa and the Lesotho government but Lesotho's portion is being financed by loans from the World Bank and the European Economic Community. Expected cost is approximately US$2 billion while construction may take as long as thirty years to complete. The Lesotho government now boasts that the Highlands Water Project is the largest such project on the continent. In the Thaba-Tseka district work on the access road to the first dam site began in 1987.

Preparations for the dam at the site erroneously called Ha Katse (after an original inhabitant named Katsi) have already brought about significant changes in local economics and politics. Most of these relate to the influx of temporary workers to the mountains and the nature of employment available to local residents (see p. 86).

Population

The population of Lesotho is at least 90 percent Sotho-speaking, but is rooted in linguistic diversity. In the last century the mountains and plateaus of Lesotho were important defensive structures and many people sought refuge there. These included Nguni-speakers (Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa) as well as Sotho-Tswana speakers. Most, but not all, of the Nguni-speaking people adopted the language and customs of the Sotho. These days there are two accepted uses of the
term "Sotho" in reference to people. In the first sense a "Mosotho" is anyone who practices Sotho customs and speaks a Sotho dialect. The term can therefore be used in reference to a citizen of South Africa. In the second sense, any person from Lesotho is referred to as a "Mosotho." In this sense, a person of Asian descent or a Xhosa-speaker can also be a "Mosotho." In what follows I shall sometimes refer to Lesotho's minority Xhosa-speaking population as "Basotho". In that case I simply mean that they are citizens of Lesotho. I will have more to say about relationships between Sotho and Xhosa-speakers in the third section of this work.

The density of Lesotho's population is extremely high. The most recent census, conducted in 1986, sets the population of Lesotho at 1.58 million people, with a growth rate of 2.6 percent. The population density is estimated at 52 persons per square kilometer, up from 46 in 1982. If these figures are accurate, there is a population density on arable land of 400 to 560 persons per square kilometer, depending on what percentage is considered arable (KL 1987a:4). This can be compared with other highly populated areas of Africa such as Rwanda or western Kenya. Among the Gusii of western Kenya population density was about 395 persons per square kilometer in 1979 while in Kenya as a whole population density on arable land was about 133 persons per square kilometer (Nelson et al. 1984).
Rwanda, with nearly 3,000 people per square kilometer of arable land in 1969, is clearly one of the most densely populated places in the world (Nyrop et al. 1982:49). Although Lesotho's population density is nowhere near Rwanda's, it is one of the high density areas of Africa.

**Politics and Administration**

Lesotho is divided into ten administrative districts (Butha-Buthe, Berea, Leribe, Maseru, Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek, Thaba Tseka, and Mokhotlong). Of these, three (Thaba Tseka, Qacha's Nek, and Mokhotlong) are entirely mountainous. Each of the districts has an associated praise name with which its people may be referred. For example, people from Mokhotlong may be called Liphamola (Big, strong, young men), from Quthing Liphakoe (Hawks), or from Leribe Linare (Buffaloes) and so on.¹⁰

The administrative system reflects the area's history. The districts are administered by hereditary chiefs, state ministry functionaries, and, since the coup in 1986, military officers. There are 22 principal and ward chiefs who operate, roughly, at the level of the district or above. Nineteen of these chiefs are direct descendants of the first house of Moshoeshoe. (The other three represent the Khoakhoa, Taung, and Tlokoa chieftaincies.) Each of the high ranking chiefs are in charge of a number of lesser ones, all of whom must be officially registered in order to receive a government salary. Beneath the registered chiefs
are local chiefs and village headmen who perform their duties without salary. Chiefs often rise to positions of authority in the ministries and in the military. This can cause resentment, especially since it is widely believed that better qualified people may be passed over for a promotion if their rival is a chief. Even if men from the family of chiefs are highly competent and well qualified, there still can be tension resulting from the dual status situation. For example, there are persistent reports of conflict between Lesotho's military ruler, Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, and subordinate members of the Military Council. This probably has much to due with the members' different approaches to policy. However, such approaches are conditioned by the interests and networks of political alliances that the different officers possess. As members of the senior chieftaincy, the Letsies, for example, are natural allies of the king (Machobane 1988:190). As a "commoner" from a mountain village, Lekhanya has found allies elsewhere.11

Theoretically, all land in Lesotho is held by the paramount chief (Morena e Moholo). He grants usufruct rights to lesser chiefs and they in turn grant allotments to the local villagers. That is the ideal, but in reality things are different. Since the 1979 Land Act some provision has been made for the long-term leasing of land. There have also been changes made to accommodate business
interests in the urban areas. There is a good deal of growth and sprawl, particularly around the capital, Maseru. Murray (1981:3) reports a rapid population rise in Maseru from about 9,000 to about 30,000 in the ten year period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. The population has continued to grow at a phenomenal rate. It was estimated at 106,000 in the last census (KL 1987a:3). Overall, Lesotho's rural population has declined from about 93 percent of the total when Murray conducted his research in the early 1970s to 84 percent in the last census. Much land previously used for agriculture has been taken for housing and rental accommodation. Renters pay from 10 to 30 Maloti/Rand (1 Loti [sing.] = approximately US [1987] $.50) for a single room, perhaps as small as 1.5 x 3 meters, without water or electricity in a cement-block, zinc-roofed structure of several such rooms.

Land has become increasingly scarce. Usufruct rights to land, traditionally set at three fields (of unfixed size) per household plus open grazing privileges, were once considered a right of all adults. In practice such rights have not been guaranteed because of land shortage. This problem is becoming increasingly acute with the rapid rise in population. Even for land holders, the total average holding as of 1970 amounted to only about 4.5 acres (van der Weil 1977:85). Rural landlessness has tripled in the past 30 years from approximately 8.5 percent in 1960 to 25.4
percent in 1986 (Setai 1984:14; KL 1987b:18). Such a
dramatic rise in landlessness puts an already abused system
under increasing strain.\textsuperscript{12} For example, in the recent
(1989) grazing season, dispute over grazing rights led to
murder in Qacha's Nek district. A local chief became
enraged when district development committee members seized
his livestock, alleging that they were grazing in reserved
pastures. A fight ensued, during which the chief or a
member of his party is alleged to have killed one of the
committee members. In retaliation, relatives of the victim
returned and stabbed the suspected murderer, killing him
(\textit{Moeletsi} June 18, 1989:6).

The first political parties of a Western type developed
in Lesotho partly in opposition to colonial institutions and
partly in response to complaints about the institution of
chieftaincy. In some ways these two factors are linked.
The British policy of "parallel rule" and later, indirect
rule, greatly encouraged the proliferation of chiefs
(Bardill and Cobbe 1985:22). This began when the first
paramount chief, Moshoeshoe, placed his sons over the chiefs
of immigrant groups. They in turn sought additional places
for their sons. The ruling lineage of Moshoeshoe, that of
the \textit{Kwena} (crocodile), thus quickly extended its authority
over most other groups. The British supported this process
by operating through the Kwena chiefs and by allying with
them to put down the rebellion of recalcitrant leaders such as Moorosi of the Phuthi chieftaincy.

From 1903 to 1948 Lesotho was administered officially through a 101 member national council. But this council met for only three weeks of the year. For most of the year the council was represented by a committee of only five. In the council as a whole, the paramount chief, the 22 principal and ward chiefs, and five members selected by the British resident commissioner (plus the resident commissioner himself) were formally recognized as members. The remaining 72 members were appointed by the paramount, subject to the commissioner's approval. Members served terms of undetermined length. They were initially meant to serve simply as advisors, but they became more active as the years passed. By the 1950s they were delaying, even vetoing, legislation initiated by the British administration (Sheddick 1953:49).

This system was not acceptable to many commoners because of their obvious lack of representation. Others accepted but were unhappy with the power it gave to foreigners. Two political parties, the Lekhotla la Bafo (Council of Commoners) and the Basutoland Progressive Association began to lobby for reform after 1907. In a move to appease popular opinion, a few members of the Progressive Association were finally included in a National Assembly in 1949. Members of the Lekhotla, however, were not. The
progressives were more acceptable to the chiefly establishment in that they advocated moderate policies and represented a constituency of salaried individuals (clerks, teachers) and small businessmen. The Lekhotla, on the other hand, advocated more radical change and represented a constituency that included those of the lesser chieftaincy, "peasant" farmers, and anti-colonialists (Breytenbach 1975:60-61).

The Lekhotla party merged with a new party, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC), in 1957. The latter was formed in 1954 under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle, a high school teacher with a Masters Degree in Biological Science. BAC (after independence, Basotho Congress Party [BCP]) leadership was drawn largely from an educated elite, but its rhetoric was quite similar to that of the Council of Commoners. Under the direction of Mokhehle, the BCP was outspoken in its criticisms of the Catholic clergy, chieftaincy, white traders, South Africa's racist policies, and colonial rule (Bardill and Cobbe 1985:32-33).

The Basotho National Party (BNP) is the party of the late prime minister, Leabua Jonathan, who ruled from 1966 to 1986. It was formed explicitly as a reaction to the BCP. Jonathan, a descendent of Moshoeshoe from the junior house of Molapo, and Gabriel Manyeli, a university lecturer, founded the party with the support of the Roman Catholic clergy. It was avowedly Christian and anticommunist and
initially advocated accommodation with South Africa (Breytenbach 1975:66-67.)

Modification of the old National Council in 1958-59 allowed for the incorporation of some 40 members from the general public, but candidates for these seats were elected indirectly by members of nine district councils. The district councils were in turn elected only by local, taxpaying, citizens. Even this restricted election, however, showed great support for the BCP. The BCP captured thirty seats, a BCP splinter group with differences over the role of the king (Marema Tlou Freedom Party), captured five, independents received five, and the BNP took but one (Breytenbach 1975:81).

In 1965 there was universal adult suffrage for the first time. Sixty representatives were elected to the lower house of a bicameral legislature. After a very close election won by only two percentage points, the BNP formed the government (Weisfelder 1972:95). But this election was marred by violence when there was a confrontation between supporters of the king and the police near the villages of Thaba Bosiu. BNP head Jonathan failed to gain election in his home constituency and was able to take charge only after winning a by-election in another area. In this manner, Jonathan became the nation's first prime minister at independence in 1966.
The next elections, those of 1970, were declared invalid by Jonathan when it became clear that he was probably going to lose. Jonathan claimed there was fraud, violence, and intimidation of voters on the part of the BCP. He used this as justification for declaring a state of emergency and a "five-year holiday from politics." In the wake of this, political opponents were arrested and the king was placed under restriction and later sent out of the country for several months (Weisfelder 1972:2-3).

The period between 1970 and 1974 was one of great uneasiness. Apparently there was a coup attempt in 1972. After this there was some attempt at negotiation with Mokhehle, but the talks came to nothing. Political oppression reached its peak in Lesotho in 1974 after a second outbreak against the government, when a number of police stations were attacked in towns north of Maseru. One account notes that: "The attempted coup, if such it was, was easily defeated and a witch-hunt of BCP supporters by the BNP's ruthless militia followed for several months. The Ministry of Justice gave an official toll of 52 killed, but South African press reports put the initial toll at 55 and another 150-200 killed in the reprisals, including 30-50 in the initial massacre at Mapoteng, and unofficial reports estimated the dead at around 1,000" (New African Yearbook 1987-1988:175). This period of history is remembered with horror by many Basotho and is sometimes referred to
disparagingly as the time when "politics" (lipolitiki) first began to ruin the nation.

Weisfelder's (1976) critique of the human rights situation in Lesotho as of 1975 aptly describes the nature of Jonathan's reign as a whole:

Since 1970 Lesotho has been treading the all too familiar path of arbitrary government, suppression of dissent, and sporadic violence. Unexpectedly, the adoption of this authoritarian format was accompanied by a distinct worsening of relations between Chief Jonathan's government and the South African regime. Basotho spokesmen stepped up their attack upon racial injustice under apartheid, denounced the forthcoming independence of Transkei as fraudulent, and warned that Pretoria's failure to promote equality and majority rule could only lead to bloodshed. Meanwhile, carbon copies of notorious South African laws have been added to the Lesotho statute book, including provisions for detention without access to counsel or courts and for indemnification of public figures from prosecution for abuses of power. (Weisfelder 1976:22)

After 1974 the BCP split into two main factions, one remained in Lesotho and sought reconciliation with Jonathan and the BNP, the other went into exile and began a campaign of violent opposition. The second group, calling itself the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), began operating in 1979 under the leadership of Mokhehle. Some of its members apparently received training at Pan-African Congress operated facilities, but the group also received support from the South African government. Small scale mortar attacks were launched on the Butha-Buthe district from South African territory and there were confirmed reports of LLA supporters
operating in Transkei (Cason and Fleshman 1985:3). Agents provocateurs were also employed by South Africa to spread anti-Jonathan, pro-BCP viewpoints at the mines (Pallister et al. 1988:143).

In 1980, after a general amnesty was declared, some BCP members returned to Lesotho. One of these was Konyama Chakela, the secretary-general of the BCP who had been in exile since 1974. Chakela promptly accused Mokhehle of cooperating with South Africa in the operation of the LLA (Wallis and Henderson 1983:187). In July of 1982, Chakela and Minister of Works J. K. Rampeta were assassinated during an attack in which an attempt was also made on the life of the Minister of Agriculture.

Still, violence was sporadic and Jonathan remained firmly in control until 1985. This despite the fact that his stance against South Africa had become increasingly pronounced. From 1972 onwards Lesotho began to vote for anti-apartheid resolutions in the United Nations with increasing frequency. It also accepted a large number of political exiles and refugees from South Africa.

Jonathan's public stance against apartheid now seemed clear. Yet things in the world of politics in the small states and territories dominated by South Africa rarely occur without intrigue. When South African commandos prepared to launch an assassination raid on the residences of alleged ANC leaders in Maseru in December of 1982
Lesotho's military forces reportedly cleared the streets of the late-night travellers who were moving in the vicinity of the area where the raid took place.\textsuperscript{15} The raid resulted in the death of forty-two people (\textit{UN Chronicle} 1983:16). Some of the dead were ANC members, many were not. Among the dead was a pregnant woman and a two-year-old child. Foreign journalists found no evidence for the "military base" which was the alleged aim of the attack (Hanlon 1986a:5-7).

Besides direct military operations of this sort, the South African government has also taken the simpler course of putting pressure on the Lesotho government by either closing or slowing down traffic at its borders. This happened a number of times from 1982 to 1985. In each case shortages of food and fuel rapidly followed. As increasing factionalism split Jonathan's government in late 1985, South Africa stepped up the pressure. On December 20th there was another raid on Maseru, resulting in nine deaths. This time the operation took the form of a "hit squad" rather than a full-scale commando operation. The raid was followed, on January 1, 1986 by a slow down of traffic at the borders. Such pressure not only exacerbated underlying factional tension in Lesotho, it undoubtedly helped to create it. The following account from \textit{Africa Contemporary Record} (Legum 1988) describes the nature of the political alliances, positions, and interests which have been proposed as forming
the background of the coup which took place on January 22, 1986:

By early 1984 the BNP's divisions had hardened into a sharp and bitter split between the 'right' and 'republican' factions. The former was a loose grouping led by Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana, who had long held key portfolios in the Cabinet. Many members of this group had business links with SA and were hurt by the sporadic border interruptions caused by deterioration in Lesotho's relations with SA. Accordingly, they wanted to normalize relations with Pretoria. .. . Meanwhile, the republican faction (identified here as the BNP radicals)—led by the BNP secretary-general, Vincent Makhehle; the Information Minister, Desmond Sixishe; and Rantumeng Matete, the Prime Minister's personal secretary—was more tightly knit. It was committed to the abolition of the monarchy and the chieftainship system, support for the African National Congress (ANC), and development of stronger links with communist governments. .. .It was this heightening struggle between the Right and the Republicans which reached its climax in the coup, not least because BNP factionalism found echo in the army. (Legum 1988:B658)

Others (e.g Edgar 1987) see the coup as a conflict between the army and the paramilitary branch of the BNP, the BNP Youth League. In the two years before the coup automatic weapons were widely distributed by the BNP to their supporters and the BNP Youth League used them to terrorize civilians. They were especially active at the National University of Lesotho, where they disrupted normal campus activities and took it upon themselves to expel a number of South African students (Edgar 1987:375). Although some of these youths received training from North Korean military advisers, as a whole they were highly
undisciplined. One little known incident, about which I have heard an eyewitness account, testifies to this. On New Year's Day 1986, it is alleged that police and Youth League supporters opened fire on a crowd that had peacefully gathered to attend a pop-concert at the national stadium. A number of people were killed or wounded, although the exact number is not known. A policeman is reported to have blamed the incident on alcohol abuse. Whatever the exact cause, it is widely believed that such incidents do occur and that armed youth are involved.

In the event, Major-General Lekhanya (a friend and business associate of Sekhonyana) and his supporters were successful in removing Jonathan from power. Jonathan was placed under house arrest and apparently was not abused. However, he was physically ill and permission to go abroad for much needed medical care was denied. He died of stomach cancer in April 1987, ironically—but predictably enough—in a South African hospital. In November 1986, former cabinet members Desmond Sixishe and Vincent Makhele, together with their wives, were abducted and murdered. A few months later, in March 1987, a Brigadier Ramots'ekhoane, Colonel Sehlaba, and another unidentified military officer died while in detention (Legum 1988:B661). These men have all been described as leaders or active supporters of the Youth League.
At this time the regime sought to disarm the BNP youth. This was partly successful, with over 1,000 AK-47 rifles confiscated by February, 1986. Still, incidents in which these rifles were used were still being reported in 1988. In April of that year, for example, two former BNP Youth Leaguers carrying AK-47 rifles were arrested in the Maseru district following the armed robbery of a wholesale grocery store (Moeletsi oa Basotho:February 28, 1988:1). AK-47s were used as well in a recent brutal attack on a bus in southern Lesotho, although their origin has not been determined. ¹⁶

In the three years since the coup, relations with South Africa have become much more cordial. The Highlands Water Project has begun, a South African Trade Mission has been established for the first time, and a number of South Africa refugees and political activists have been forced to leave the country. The South African Defense Force has also built a two million rand, 35 bed hospital near Maseru for the exclusive use of Lesotho military personnel and their families. ¹⁷ One expatriot clergyman—who was eventually deported—also maintained that in the year following the coup South African police and security forces were given a free hand to enter the country in pursuit of alleged foes of the Republic (Legum 1988:B660). ¹⁸

As a ruler, Lekhanya has faced a number of serious challenges. One report suggested that there were at least
three attempts to remove him from power as of March 1988 (Africa Confidential, March 1988:6). He has recently faced a crisis--allegations of murder were levelled against him. Because of this the King has reportedly asked him to step down, but he has refused (The Star International Airmail Weekly June 28, 1989; July 5, 1989).

Officially King Moshoeshoe is head of state and receives only advice from the military council of six officers whose head is Lekhanya. Machobane (1988) indicates that the king may harbor dreams of revitalizing the chieftaincy under his command, but in practice the chiefs must work through the military. It is thought by some that king Moshoeshoe has the support of the ANC and that the ANC, despite set-backs and exiles of leaders, still has significant influence in the country (African Confidential 1988:6). Still, of two ministers known to be associated or sympathetic with the ANC, (Michael Sefali and Khalaki Sello), one of them was summarily dismissed in August of 1988 (Moeletsi oa Basotho August 14, 1988:1). Whatever his feelings about the ANC, in October of 1988 the king officially met with P. W. Botha in South Africa for the first time ever (Lesotho Today October 27, 1988).

The right-wing faction, if such it is, has been attacked primarily through the media. Specific allegations of corruption were made in the independent newspaper The Mirror against Retselitsitoe Sekhonyana, the business associate of
Lekhanya and only holdover from the old BNP government. The editor of The Mirror, Johnny waka Maseko, was detained under Lesotho's 1984 Security Act, then expelled from the country (New African January, 1989:17; February 1989:32), allegedly for his unfair reporting of government affairs.

A third group known as "The Big Five", composed of the political leaders from five parties out of power, has been quite vocal in their opposition to military rule. They have repeatedly called for a return to the constitution. In August of 1988 it was reported that they had written a letter to P. W. Botha asking him to act as a mediator between Lesotho's military and political leaders. This move reminded many that these parties have strong ties with South Africa. (One of them, the Basotho Democratic Party, was formed after consultation with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha.) Lesotho government spokesmen made political capital out of the implication that the Big Five did not think Basotho were capable of handling their own affairs (Moeletsi oa Basotho August 7, 1988:1; September 4, 1988:1).

Church officials have strongly urged the government to talk with BCP leader Ntsu Mokhehle. It was at least partly because of their work that the government agreed to talk with him in Lesotho in May of 1988. Initially not much progress seemed to have been made. After the meeting Mokhehle commented: "The horse is still the same, only the
jockey has changed" (Pere e nt'se e le eona, ho fapane joki) (Moeletsi 22 May, 1988:1). Yet, in early 1989 Mokhehele returned to Lesotho. Since that time he has not engaged in public politics; and, at this writing (November), it appears he has retired from public life.

Nonetheless, problems with the Lesotho Liberation Army still exist. For example, in September of 1988 a bus was hijacked by an LLA splinter group during a much anticipated visit from the Pope. To the considerable embarrassment of local officials, South African military assistance had to be called in to put an end to the crisis. South African special forces stormed the bus and killed the four hijackers. Two passengers were also killed (Weekly Mail September 16-22; September 23-29 1988. Mokhehele claimed the hijacking was carried out without his authorization by a tiny splinter group of the LLA.

Lesotho 1987-1988: Time of Struggle and Strife

From August 1987 to the end of 1988 the people of Lesotho witnessed a number of traumatic events. The bus hijacking already referred to was just one. In August 1987, a massive strike, involving 230-350,000 workers, was organized by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). In the third week of the strike tens of thousands of workers were told to vacate the mine compounds at gunpoint. They were given a choice between returning to their homes or returning to work. When most chose to return home, the sudden influx of men strained
Lesotho's already overburdened public transport system to its limit. Strikers were initially in a buoyant mood as they returned—singing, dancing, drinking and giving voice to their experiences—but, this spirit of defiance and relief at being away from the conflict turned to frustration and despair as the strike came to an end and they were not recalled to their jobs. Week after week passed, but only a few were called back to work. Meanwhile, at the mine labor recruitment centers, hundreds of unemployed men lined up, hoping to seize the opportunity to find employment in a saturated labor market. After a wait of eight to twelve months, most of the miners were eventually recalled, but only after NUM took the Chamber of Mines to court.

The miners returned home at about the same time that heavy rain, snows and a severe cold spell gripped Lesotho's highlands. At least 15 people died of exposure and there was heavy loss of livestock in many areas (Work for Justice December, 1987:4). This compounded the loss of salary income for entire families.

The year 1987 also brought a number of dramatic incidence of banditry. Maluti Mountain Brewery (a joint Lesotho government and South African Brewery venture) was robbed of R90,000 ($US 45,000). Another R40,000 was taken from a Maseru merchant. Also robbed was the Bank of Lesotho (Moeletsi December 27, 1988/January 3, 1988:1). In February 1988 a further R47,000 was stolen from a retail merchant in
In most of these cases the bandits consisted of a number of armed men who acted swiftly and efficiently. While these crimes received most of the publicity, housebreaking and armed robbery also have become everyday occurrences in the lowland towns. Even underdeveloped rural areas were (and are) not immune. One group of bandits operates near a rural bus stop. People have been attacked as they walk the dirt trails and footpaths from the main road back to their villages. The group of bandits, known as "Batho ba nako e 'ngoe" (literally, "One time people," that is, a group of age-mates) have been particularly active on the weekends, a time when migrant workers, often laden with goods, come to see their families. Victims have been stripped of their possessions and clothing and sometimes killed (Moeletsi June 12, 1988:2).

Some Basotho commentators have related the crime problem in Lesotho to high rates of unemployment, the strike, and politics. One such commentator suggested three reasons for the recent crime wave in a letter to Moeletsi (October 9, 1988:2). He suggested, first, that people were stealing because of their dislike for the government. Secondly, he argued, the ANC, whom many Basotho support, has a section which steals in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana. The larger crimes may have been connected to it.
Thirdly, he pointed out that Basotho mine workers who lost their jobs because of the strike were now forced to steal.

Murder rates in Lesotho, like those of South Africa, have long been high, but in 1987-1988 they climbed still higher. In February of 1988 Lesotho's chief justice reported serious crime including homicide and culpable homicide had increased three to four times in the previous five years (Lesotho Today February 11, 1988:1). Radio Lesotho (September 23, 1988) reported that 315 people were murdered from January to June of 1988. In the same period in 1987, 298 homicides were reported.21 Virtually everyone is affected. In the three years I have lived in Lesotho there have been four victims of murders and two suspected murders among people I have known. The immediate cause of many seems to be impulsive reactions to domestic disputes or quarrels over love affairs, but politically motivated killings are also not uncommon.22 At the local level, the latter type of homicide is often related to disputes over the allocation of land or other scarce resources (see p. 38).

Government reaction has been to declare a state of emergency (on February 25, 1988). Since Lesotho was already under an order (Order No. 4) which prohibited political parties or the gathering of three or more people for any reason which might lead the police or one's chief to complain, the emergency was not much different than in South Africa.
The South African police took the opportunity of the "state of emergency against crime" in Lesotho to crack down on car theft. In this the Lesotho police were clearly their surrogates. The Sotho Catholic weekly Moeletsi oa Basotho has documented a number of cases in which suspected car thieves were kidnapped in Lesotho by Basotho and South African police, taken across the border and tortured there (Moeletsi October 16, 1988:1). Basotho police went from district to district confiscating taxi-vans which had not been properly registered. In some districts this meant that nearly all such taxis were confiscated. Many of the taxi drivers were beaten. The emergency helped therefore to support increased coercion and government pressure for tight control.

The state of emergency has seen numerous cases of alleged police brutality and indiscipline. The following is a list of some of the more notable cases publicized:

1) During a football match between two high schools in Mafeteng a fist fight broke out. Rocks were also thrown by the opposing sides. A van carrying armed police arrived and immediately started shooting to disperse the crowd. Three students were wounded (Moeletsi April 10, 1988:1).

2) Three homes in Maseru, belonging to two businessmen and a lawyer, were shot into. One of them claimed he saw a soldier shoot up his shop then shoot into his home. Lekhanya reportedly claimed that attacks on homes in Maseru were only against criminals (Moeletsi May 15, 1988:1).
3) Two off-duty policemen beat up a customer and shot up a shop at Mikaeleng on the 28th of August. This reportedly occurred after the customer had insulted them. Bystanders reacted by chasing down one of the policemen and nearly beating him to death (Moeletsi September 28, 1988:6).

4) In Quthing district, a policeman became angry and distraught during an argument with his lover's husband. In the course of events he shot his lover's mother. He then returned to the charge office and attacked the prisoners, shooting and killing five (Moeletsi July 31, 1988; statement of village resident to author).

Conclusions. Lesotho and the Bantustans.

In economic terms Lesotho has much in common with South Africa's Bantustans and in some respects is worse off. Like them, it is characterized by high rates of crime, increasing landlessness, agricultural decline, severe erosion, and dependence on migrant labor. Although more industry has begun to locate in Lesotho, it cannot give financial incentives to industry comparable to those offered by South Africa under its policy of "economic decentralization" (Wellings 1984/84:157).

Also as in the Bantustans, the people of Lesotho have yet to be free from the rule of an authoritarian regime. Even the 1986 coup in Lesotho can be compared to those which have recently occurred in "independent" Transkei and Bophuthatswana. In the case of Bophuthatswana, Pretoria apparently could not prevent the coup that toppled the Lucas
Mangope regime and had to militarily reinstate him after the fact. Similarly, in Lesotho: "Pretoria could not pull strings to ensure that the new government would be to its liking, but it can be argued that South Africa prefers a government with a measure of legitimacy to a puppet regime" (Edgar 1987:382). The latter point is typified by the role played by Mangosuthu Buthelezi as head of the KwaZulu homeland government. His disagreements with Pretoria at the rhetorical level and claimed allegiance to the ANC have served not only to legitimize to the outside world his personal status, but also the Bantustan structure in general.24

The conclusions of an article about the situation in Transkei as of 1983 now seems particularly apt for Lesotho as well, particularly since the state of emergency:

> The accumulation of structural poverty in the rural areas of Transkei is giving rise to new crises and new forms of rural conflict. The relevance of these struggles to broader political events will turn importantly on whether or not they lead to increased conflict ('faction fights') or link up to other attempts to restructure the fundamental imbalances of apartheid South Africa. (Bolus and Muller 1984:299)

Since the coup, voices inside Lesotho have also been raised comparing the country to a Bantustan. The Lesotho government reacted strongly against such comparisons in the state run newspaper, Lesotho Today, saying:

> Lesotho is not and will never be a Bantustan irrespective of the wishes of the Mirror [non-government newspaper] and their masters. Lesotho is a free country with a free press. People must
not be tempted to abuse this freedom. They must also remember that for every wrong there is a right. And so shall lies reported be matched with punishment. (Lesotho Today 27 October, 1988:4)

The rather chilling warning in the last sentence of this quotation was carried out when the editor of the Mirror was expelled from Lesotho in connection with the Sekhonyana scandal.

There are, however, some differences between Lesotho and the Bantustans. First, its heritage of independence has given it a kind of domestic and international legitimacy that places it in a special position. Independence, at the very least, has saved Lesotho from South Africa's passbook raids and forced removal schemes. This has also allowed it to tap into the international aid market. Rather than sole dependence upon financial support from South Africa it has received aid from overseas. Indeed, overseas development assistance has recently accounted for over 65 percent of GDP (Wellings 1986:219). Whatever the material results of such support, this means that many Basotho have significant and long-term contact and experience with the international community. Secondly, unlike the Bantustans, Lesotho has a tradition of trade union organization. In practice this difference might not be great, but it is potentially quite important. Although unions have not been particularly strong or politically active and the government has attempted to undermine them, they are at least legal and
have maintained a degree of autonomy. In most of the
Bantustans unions have been declared illegal or much more
forcibly repressed.

NOTES

1. Similar, often more comprehensive, accounts can be found in most academic writings on Lesotho. Probably the most thorough and widely respected of these are that of Lye and Murray (1980) and Murray (1981). Bardill and Cobbe (1985) is also a good reference, presenting in book length what I am here trying to do in a few pages. The only advantage of the present account is its summary of more recent political events and the 1986 population census. Modern interpretations of Lesotho's historical experience will be discussed in chapter seven.

2. This trade was probably facilitated by the Phuthi chief Moorosi. See the articles written by A. Sekese (1907; 1912; 1924) in the missionary newspaper Leselinyana la Lesotho. How's (1962) book is also a good source of first hand information.

3. Fifteen are considered necessary for the subsistence needs of an average family of six (Robin Cohen 1987:101).

4. This was done over the objections of workers (many of whom went on strike in protest) and is still resented by many. Individuals cannot withdraw this money from their accounts unless they are physically present in Lesotho.

5. Ferguson (1985) cogently argues this point and shows how, in the discourse of the "aid and development industry," the illusion of a national economy must be created in order to justify commitment to "developing" it.

6. An economic survey was conducted in 1984 in two localities of the Thaba Tseka district as part of the social impact study for the Highlands Water project. It was found that 19 percent of the male population was away working in one area, 27 percent in the other (KL 1985:C-2-3-2). This is much reduced from the 60 percent reported by van der Wiel (1977:85). Ferguson (1985), however, in a survey restricted to one village section, found that mountain residents are not significantly freer from migrant labor than are residents of the lowlands. His findings are in agreement with the earlier ones of Murray (1981) and van der Wiel (1977). Still, wages may allow livestock accumulation in the mountains that is no longer possible in the lowlands. My own data and those of van der Geer (1984:55) suggest that
accumulation of sheep, goats, and cattle is significantly greater in the mountains than it is in the lowlands. This is particularly the case for a small number of elite who are locally employed or otherwise have access to wage income.

7. The government puts the matter quite rosily: "This is the largest economic project Lesotho has ever embarked upon and it is one of the largest on-going projects in Africa. The M4 billion water harnessing project will take 30 years to complete resulting in 6 huge dams ushering in a better way of living for Basotho people through income from sale of water to the Republic of South Africa, generation of electricity for Lesotho, irrigation facilities, fisheries and increased tourist attraction for the country" (KL 1988:11).

8. Recall that Mosotho is the singular, Basotho the plural form.

9. It should be mentioned, however, that some land in the mountains not considered arable in statistical terms is nonetheless put to the plow.

10. The remaining names are Qacha's Nek (Melele), Butha-Buthe (Likila), Thaba Tseka (Lilala), Mafeteng, (Makaota), Mohale's Hoek, (Majantja), and Berea (Lioli). These names originally referred to the praises of area chiefs or to the names of their initiation regiments. Nowadays, some are used by regional football teams and have thus acquired new associations. Regional identities also may acquire new significance among migrants in South Africa. The so-called "Russian" gangs, for example, have had divisions which are partly based on differences in regional ties. See Bonner and Lambert (1987).

11. Particularly in South Africa.

12. Complaints about it are of long standing. In reports given to the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1903 - 1905 (SANAC 1905:379-431), for example, a variety of observers testified that the chiefs abused their authority in the allocation of land. Many of these were from individuals biased by Western capitalist perspectives, but even missionaries sympathetic to communal tenures suggested that under the current system "certain individuals obtain more than their share, and others, equally deserving, obtain very little, and that of a poor quality" (SANAC 1905:387). Basotho voiced similar complaints to a geographer who toured Lesotho in the 1920s (Sayce 1924:288). A law enacted in 1979 has brought about some reforms, such as provision for the inheritance of land use rights, but it is difficult to legislate against land shortage.
13. In 1960 Jonathan also received financial and other support from South Africa. For the church's role in Lesotho see Bosko (1983). In Bosko's opinion the Catholic Church, under the conservative administration of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, has long exerted a neocolonial influence that is distinct from that of South Africa's. He also argues that: "The Catholic Mission constitutes a veritable shadow government" (1983:7). For example, it provides many important services in education, postal distribution, and health care.

14. See B. Makalo Khaketla (1972) for a first-hand description of events.

15. A different perspective was offered by one government minister interviewed by Hanlon (1986b:322). He claimed that the United States had advance knowledge of the raid and withdrew its embassy staff from the city. If this is true, as an American living in Lesotho at the time, I was not aware of it.

16. In June, 1989 a bus near the village of Sinxondo was waylaid by five men, each of whom had an AK-47. Several people, including the driver, were seriously wounded when the bandits opened fire from the road. The bandits then entered the bus, shot the driver several more times, and took the ticket money. Before fleeing, the men set the bus alight. Fortunately, the passengers were able to escape before it was completely engulfed in flames. The driver and two passengers died in the incident and a number of others were seriously injured (Moeletsi July 2, 1989:1).

17. It was officially opened on July 29, 1988 by J. J. Geldenhuys, head of the South African Defense Force (Moeletsi oa Basotho August 14, 1988:1).

18. This situation continues, although probably to a lesser extent. A typical example is that of members of an organization called the Lesotho Patriotic Youth Organization. On December 12, 1987 one of their leaders alleges that he was abducted at gunpoint by three men who appeared to be of mixed-race and spoke Afrikaans and English rather than Sotho. After assaulting and handcuffing him they drove him to a wooded area and pretended to shoot him (Moeletsi 21 February, 1988:1).

19. In June of 1989 it was revealed that Lekhanya was present during an incident in December 1988 in which a young college student, George Mone Ramone, was shot and killed (The Star International Airmail Weekly June 28, 1989: July 5, 1989). During a formal inquest convened to investigate the incident, Lekhanya himself admitted to having shot
Ramone. He claimed he shot Ramone because the young man was fleeing the scene after attempting to rape a young visitor to the college campus. Lekhanya was found to have been justified in his actions (Moeletsi November 12, 1989:1).

20. Unemployment was roughly estimated at 23 percent by the Bureau of Statistics in 1986 (KL: Bureau of Statistics 1987b:19-20). Only about 29 percent of the adult working age population has found full-time wage employment in the formal sector, either in Lesotho or in South Africa (Work for Justice December, 1987:8).

21. If these figures are correct, this gives Lesotho a murder rate of nearly 38 per 100,000 per annum. In comparison, the 1987 figures for the United States' state of Texas, a state known for a high murder rate, were reported as 11.7 per 100,000 (World Almanac 1989:81). Huss-Ashmore (1984:90), in a study of health care in the mountain district of Mokhotlong, found that about 10 percent of hospital-based mortality was assault related. This is a rate also quite high on the world scale.

22. Fanon's observations on Algeria seem relevant here: "The Algerian's criminality, his impulsivity, and the violence of his murders are ... not the consequence of the organization of his nervous system or of characterial originality, but the direct product of the colonial situation" (1963:309).

23. Swaziland is less dependent on migrant labor than Lesotho and has more natural resources, but it too has recently seen an upswing in violent crime (BBC "Focus on Africa": August 16, 1988).

24. Despite Buthelezi's apparent freedom to criticize Pretoria and to resist KwaZulu "independence" his rise to power and current position is based on a life time of cooperation with White authorities on key issues of Bantustan administration (Mzala 1988).
CHAPTER 3

THE LABOR SYSTEM: SHAPING PEOPLES' LIVES

Despite the complexity of the South African political and social environment, all South Africans have to deal, in one manner or another, with the wage labor system. Wage labor structures peoples' experiences and much of their thought. This is as much the case for those in Lesotho as for Lesotho's migrant work force. Women in Lesotho depend on the remittances they receive from their husbands in the gold mines. Crop failure is common while even a good yield will not feed the family for very long; consequently, many farm reluctantly. There is a much more vigorous interest in developing small-scale enterprises (hawking food and drink, providing entertainment, opening shops, etc.) that will attract the money of those who have it to spend. Similarly, young people flood the towns in search of work. Any given day will find men camped outside the doors of the mines' labor recruitment offices. Sometimes they are forced to live on the streets while they wait.

The following two chapters are meant both as an orientation and glimpse into the world of wage labor in Lesotho and in South Africa. First, young peoples' traditional work in rural Lesotho is described. In some
sense, the work hierarchies of home articulate with the authority structures of the mines. After a discussion of this, the general nature of the migrant labor system to South Africa's mines is described. Particular attention is given to the gold mineworker's induction into the mine system. Also described are general living and working conditions at the mines and recent attempts by the National Union of Mineworkers to obtain improvements in health, safety, and wages. Following this the chapter returns to Lesotho to discuss the nature of labor for those adults who are not migrants. The next chapter continues this theme by providing several biographical accounts of workers and a discussion of the nature of ideological orientations.

**Herding and Domestic Labor**

A substantial proportion of Basotho males begin their laboring lives as herdsmen and shepherds. According to the Sotho agricultural scientist Phororo (1979:219), a majority of men who are now miners were at one time employed as herders. Many continue to be interested in livestock and invest their earnings in them. Much of the plowing is still done with oxen and miners may request leave during the plowing season in order to return home to help.

Herding life begins at a tender age for many boys. Anthropologist Judy Gay (1980:61) reported that in the lowland village where she conducted her dissertation research some 14 percent of boys between the ages of five
and nine worked full-time tending livestock. In most areas oxen are also used for draft power and such tender youths may lead them as the elder men plow. Herding is often a form of unpaid household labor but where herdsmen are paid they are generally paid in kind. In 1979, wages were normally six culled sheep per year plus 180 kilograms of corn meal flour (Phororo 1979:219). As Gay notes, "even before a boy is old enough to take a migrant contract he learns that his labour is highly valued by his family and has a market value" (1980:62). Because their labor power as boys has traditionally been used to offset the cost of their maintenance in the household, historically most miners have had very little formal education. This is slowly changing. However, even today few have attended schools beyond the first primary years.

In contrast to boys, the labor of girls generally focuses on the growth and maintenance of the household and family. Their chores also begin at a tender age and include cooking, cleaning, baby sitting, hoeing, and weeding. Since 1963 female migrant labor, including labor as domestic servants, has been prohibited in South Africa. (Although many women continue to circumvent these regulations, particularly for jobs as seasonal farm laborers.) In Lesotho itself a woman's best hope for wage employment is to acquire some formal schooling in order to compete for the few posts in teaching, nursing, and government service. Girls do, in
fact, attend school in greater numbers than do boys. Some women with limited schooling (junior certificate or less) manage to find employment as store clerks, but pay is extremely low—sometimes as low as 50 rands per month plus a 50 kilogram sack of corn flour. Many women depend on the modicum of income they derive from brewing and selling African-style beer (joala/utywala), sewing and doing handicrafts, or trading in goods acquired in South Africa.

Herding is sometimes done by girls or women, but only in situations of male labor shortage in the household. For males, the first experience of the politics of the labor process comes from the interactions between herdboys (balisana/abalusi), their leader, (mampholi/ingqwele), and the owner of the flock.\(^1\) According to Sotho written accounts of life in the nineteenth century, herding was in many ways seen as training for war. Herdboys were often intentionally treated roughly and made to endure the elements in order to instill military values (Sekese 1893/1979; Segoete 1913/1987). It was not uncommon for a boy to be referred to as a "cur" (ntja ea mokoto) and it was the prerogative of an adult male to cane boys at his discretion (Sekese 1893/1979:104-105). It became customary for a man to be hit with sticks when his wife gave birth to a son. This symbolized the life of war to which the boy was thought to be destined. Similarly, the proverb (maele), "Lebitla la monna ke letlaka" (A man's final resting place
is with the vultures) indicates that a man can expect to die a violent death. This attitude was very much in keeping with Lesotho's military situation in the nineteenth century, but is not altogether irrelevant for contemporary times as well. Boys and men still carry cudgels used both as walking sticks and weapons. Boys are expected to become adept at fighting with them. In the past it was also widely assumed that the chief herdboy (mampholi) achieved his position by demonstrating superior prowess in stick fighting or in some other display of valor. He could then extract tribute from the boys under his control. This tribute was usually in the form of food stolen or pirated away from the village (Sekese 1893/1979:105-106). Herding was thus associated with physical prowess, endurance, and obedience to the restricted authority of the male group.

The nineteenth-century situation has been tempered somewhat by a national ideology of peace and unity (see chapter seven) and by Christianity, but values of stoicism and militaristic ideals also articulate well with the migrant labor system which Basotho came more and more to depend upon in the twentieth century. Militarism was further reinforced as competition increased for the diminishing grazing lands and it became common for shepherds to quarrel over access to them. Indeed, the national ideology of peace and reconciliation which was utilized to amalgamate the various groups under Lesotho's first
paramount chief Moshoeshoe was often contradicted by local level experience. Even the common Sotho greetings Lumela (Agree) and Khotso (Peace) which are often associated with the national ideology of peace, reveal, on closer examination, the same contradiction. Both are shortened forms of the phrase: Lumela hore khotso e teng pele ke atamela (Agree that there is peace before I approach you) (Letter to the editor, Leselinyana, Sept. 11, 1988:2). This suggests that behind the expression of peace there also may exist suspicion of aggressive intent.

As long as there are sufficient jobs and land, a certain amount of habituation to the migrant labor system is possible. A miner may maintain a rurally-based worldview and concentrate his efforts at the mines on building up the rural resources of his home. However, with increasing landlessness and urbanization, the distinction between rural homestead and urban work place becomes less meaningful.

These days fewer young people are involved in agriculture and livestock production. Instead, they contribute to the household by participation in some form of money-making activity. Schooling is not an option everyone can afford, particularly those with large families. At bus stops and taxi-stands throughout Lesotho children can be found together with their elders hawking fruit, cooked food, watches and jewelry, and other such items. Many boys and young men are also employed by bus and taxi owners to
recruit (ho touta) passengers, to load luggage, and to collect money and tickets. Children and young women frequently work as clerks in the many tiny stores (known locally as cafes) which exist in virtually every village in Lesotho. These kinds of work experiences are becoming more and more important for the younger generation. They are likely to be different sorts of workers from their parents.

**Becoming a Mineworker**

Young boys frequently don the mining helmets, jackets, and overalls brought home by their elders. It is a form of imitation and pride suggesting that they too hope to become miners. This anticipation acts as a disincentive for schooling because educated men have little or no advantage on the labor market (Bardhill and Cobbe 1985:81). Many young people are both aware and express resentment about this situation. For example, in 1987 an interview with high school students was broadcast on Radio Lesotho as part of a series promoting education as a resource for "national development." To the dismay of the interviewer, students stridently maintained that their education was of little benefit. One student complained that while he was spending money on school fees his peers were already making money at the mines. He expected that his chances for finding a higher paying job outside the mines were slim and that he was consequently losing out to his less educated peers.

Nonetheless, in general, formal education is valued,
especially as it is widely recognized that chances of obtaining a high status job without it are exceedingly slim. Many miners regret that they have missed out on school. Basotho sometimes refer disparagingly to uneducated miners as "likwata" (rustics) or "malaisha" (lashers, in reference to shoveling and loading). One miner's yearning for education is reflected in the following poem:

The Standard Three
I wish I was educated, but Aah! my parents were too poor. They only took me up to standard three. Aah! the poor standard three useless to provide you with some meal, useless even to answer a simple English question. But I am ready to go underground where it is so hot, where rocks fall every minute, where I am pushed from behind to work harder and harder, every now and then (sic.). I don't blame my parents. They have played their part, but they were too old. They sit at home now. I am ready, I have to go, to face problems: death is ready for me, a poor man. I feel so sleepy. I go! I was made to work hard until I die. But look, the educated ones sitting there, talking, going up and down, shouting calling numbers, all day long. (Agency for Industrial Mission 1986:4-5)

The market for Black mine labor is controlled by South Africa's Chamber of Mines, an association of the major mineral producers (which is dominated by the giant Anglo-American Corporation). Through its affiliates the Chamber operates recruitment offices in the homelands, South Africa proper, and neighboring countries. This in itself is a major undertaking giving some indication of the vastness of mining operations in South Africa: There are about 150
recruitment offices scattered throughout southern Africa, most of which are those of The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). These arrange for the employment of about 500,000 Black migrants annually, in addition to employing a staff of their own of some 6,500 (Pallister et al. 1988:139).

The labor market has become tight. Up until the mid-1970s most men who wished to work in the mines had little trouble in being accepted for employment. There was even a labor shortage after 1974 when the government of Malawi withdrew its work force. Real wages increased dramatically in 1973 for the first time in nearly a century. The starting pay in 1988 was about R300 per month for underground workers at Anglo-American gold mines. Surface workers and miners at other companies generally receive less (South African Institute of Race Relations 1988:679). Since 1977, however, labor has been in oversupply and unemployment has become a serious problem. Hundreds of job-seeking men wait for weeks and months, sometimes even years, outside the offices of the recruitment agencies. TEBA has claimed that it could easily employ another 300,000 workers in South Africa alone (Crush 1986:167). Because of this abundance of labor, the mining firms have concentrated on rehiring skilled workers. It has offered few jobs to young, inexperienced men. Figures indicate that most of the new jobs are being given to workers from Transkei, KwaZulu, and Bophuthatswana (Crush 1986). Abundant labor enables the
mining houses to rapidly mobilize strike breakers whenever they wish to do so.

Most miners work on the some 40 gold mines which stretch from Klerksdorp (west of Johannesburg) and Springs (on its east). This also includes the complex of mines near Welkom in the Orange Free State. Many of these mines are mammoth operations employing great numbers of workers. Vaal Reefs, for example, has nine separate shafts and in 1986 employed over 45,000 (Pallister et al. 1988:226). After being hired, an employee goes through an induction process much like that of an army. New recruits and returning veterans make a bus or train journey together from the recruitment offices to their places of employment. Moodie (1983) has described in detail the transformation in character and identity many undergo as they make the journey; for many men the world of the mines and the all male compounds where they live is a separate reality which they try to keep distinct from that of home. As one miner recounts:

To be a miner is to change one's character now and again, because at home one has to behave one way and at work another way. For instance, all those people whom I know from home are different people here at the mines. (Agency for Industrial Mission 1977/1986:23)

This change in identity is expressed metaphorically when the workers, in crossing the Mohokare River, say they are "putting on another blanket" different from the "Sotho" one which they consciously identify with their home. When
workers cross the Mohokare River they often sing a song which speaks of this transformation and of the dangers they face at their work:

Mohokare, now I assume another blanket,
Now that I have crossed you. Wash me from the profanations I have had
With women at home.
Here I cross to the other side
And I do not know what dangers may face me.
Perhaps this is the last time I cross you here.
Wash me clean, Mohokare, and make me a pure man.
Make me a man who is fit to go to heaven.
Cleanse me from my sins because I am going to
The dangerous place where I may lose my life.

Now if ever I do not come back it will be just unfortunate.
But now that I have crossed you,
All the evil things I have done
May they move with you and go down.

In crossing the river I become a new man,
Different from the one I was at home.
At home I was secure
But now I am on this side
I am in a place of danger,
Where I may lose my life at any time.
So prepare me for death.

Now that I am this side
I assume a different attitude from the one
Where they are soft with other men.
This side they have to be tough and assume manhood
Not to be soft like the women at home.

Miners, like military inductees, are subject to a variety of institutional processes that depersonalize and humiliate. These include: 1) mass fingerprinting and body searches, 2) cursory medical examinations in which elders must stand naked before youths (and which have been described by one participant as "like the examination of
slaves—a landowner looking at the muscles of the men to see whether they are big enough" [Agency for Industrial Mission 1977/1986:14), 3) the mandatory wearing of identifying armbands and numbered bracelets, and 4) tests of physical endurance ostensibly designed to acclimatize workers to the conditions underground, but which are also used as a form of discipline. Workers are also made to learn the rules and regulations (mtheto) of the mine quickly and to master "Fanakalo," the pidgin language used there.

Although mine companies have recently improved living standards at the compounds (particularly after a number of riots and strikes forced the issue), conditions are often still very poor. Journalist Mzimkulu Malunga (1988) reported that the relatively new compound he lived in while working at the East Driefontein mine in 1986 still crowded twenty men into a single room. Older compounds are generally high walled structures which, for security purposes, have only one gate. They resemble prisons or army barracks and, indeed, maintain their own security police not simply for the protection of property, but also for control of the work force. In sociological terms, the compounds are, for all practical purposes, "total institution."²

Mines usually have a single compound associated with each shaft. Newer mines generally consist of two storey buildings arranged in dormitory blocks. They house fewer men per room and have better facilities. As McNamara
writes: "The newer, hostel-type structures accommodate between 8 and 12 ordinary workers per room. The older compound rooms feature a coal stove in the centre, as well as concrete bed bunks, whereas the new hostels make use of electric heating, steel beds and internal room dividers for additional privacy" (McNamara 1985:194). In the early 1980s there were about 100 hostels in the industry as a whole. On average, they housed 4,000 men each, but ranged in size from 2,000 to 10,000 residents (McNamara 1985:193). At many older mines housing consists of rows and rows of rooms (often called "lines") which lack all facilities except perhaps an electrical outlet. Outside the compound walls some housing is also generally provided for select black employees and their families. For the vast majority, however, housing is concentrated and controlled.

The administrative structure of the mines is quite complex. On the compound, workers must learn to deal with five or six different systems of authority, including clerks, managers, police, team leaders, management-appointed "tribal leaders," and committees--all of which are based on racial hierarchies and quasi-ethnic distinctions.³

The mines have also long reserved certain categories of employment for Whites. Underground the most contentious of these is that which pertains to blasting. Traditionally only Whites have been allowed blasting certificates, despite the fact that most of the actual blasting has often been
done by their Black "retainers" (piccannins in Fanakalo). As the labor journalist Friedman put it, "Racial job bars, zealously enforced by the most right wing [White] union in the land, ensured that few Africans gained the skills which would prevent employees replacing them--by mid-1985, the mines were the only industry in which Africans were stilled barred from skilled work" (1987:356). Since 1983 the traditional administrative set up has been challenged by a trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which now has stewards in most mines.

Unions for Black workers in South Africa were only legalized in 1979 following a number of years of labor unrest and police suppression.¹ In that year the recommendations of a government appointed committee, the Wiehahn Commission, were implemented. But even this accord limited the right to strike. Using a British model, a new system of government arbitration and regulation, through an industrial court, was implemented. All channels in this system must be completely exhausted before any strike action is deemed legal. Since the inception of NUM there have been only two legal mineworkers strikes; neither achieved major pay hikes or concessions. Still, significant gains have been made. This is especially true when one considers the youthfulness of the union. The presence of NUM shaft stewards at the mines directly challenging the long entrenched policies of management has won widespread support
for the union. Because of the initiatives of shaft stewards, some of the more blatant "master-servant" features of mines have been eliminated. Miners, with union urging, have also been fighting back when attacked by their White bosses. Although this has led to some bloodshed, it apparently has reduced the frequency of such attacks (Adam and Moodley 1986:184-185). The 1987 strike, in which between 230,000 and 350,000 workers participated, dramatically demonstrates the rise in union strength since 1982 when it was founded with only a few thousand members.

Migrancy and Lesotho. The migrant labor system is clearly the major factor determining life in Lesotho. Simply put, mine wages and remittances keep Basotho alive and sustain Lesotho's economy. Locally, people also are divided according to those who have access to wages and those who do not. Individuals of the former group may have the capital to improve their rural base; the latter may have to depend on food-for-work projects or the meager income they derive from the "informal sector" as migrants' capital is diffused through the local economy (Spiegel 1980:122-125). Some Basotho have come to stoically accept the migrant labor system because it is all they know. Certain factors, such as the linkage between the local livestock/agriculture economy and migrant labor and a tendency to interpret the mining world as "liminal," have helped to establish this fragile sense of habituation. Yet
this situation can only last as long as there are sufficient jobs and/or a rural base adequate to support an "ideology of successful migration" (see p. 96). Inflation and the steady decline in agricultural resources make for a new sense of urgency on the part of many miners. The idealized distinction between farm, home and the mines is one increasingly difficult to maintain. And miners are very aware of their plight. The speed in which the National Union of Mineworkers has been organized is testimony to this fact.

**Lesotho's Internal Work Force**

The fact that Lesotho serves as a labor reserve for South Africa's mining industry and has become increasing subordinate to South African political control does not mean that the political, economic, and administrative structures of Lesotho can safely be ignored. Experience with the state and local economy has its own peculiarities and dynamic. It is here that coercive power is exercised, on the one hand, and resources distributed, on the other. Since the state plays an important role in the local employment situation its patronage must be taken into consideration in any analysis of worker identity in Lesotho. However, since the resources directly under government control are so limited and the need so great, its patronage is more of a divisive force than a unifying one. This is to South Africa's advantage. For example, workers are likely to blame local
authorities for high rates of unemployment and difficulty in gaining access to South African jobs (Thabane and Guy 1984:19).

The influx of the capital of migrants into the periphery gives rise to new formal and informal systems of exchange at the local level (See Appendix I). As agriculture declines, attention is increasingly being turned to what is referred to as "business" (even by people who speak little English), ways to capture this capital through trade. Business activity is generally thought of in terms of exchange; a successful business is typically one in which goods obtained cheaply in South Africa are resold at a profit in Lesotho. The new ideal then--for the unemployed, for retired miners, and even for factory workers--is to establish a successful business of one's own.

The State, Aid, and Political Patronage

The Lesotho government is the main employer of individuals within Lesotho. Southall (1984:94) estimated that it provided about 22,000 (49 to 55 percent) of Lesotho's wage and salary jobs in the early 1980s. These jobs are often linked to political affiliation. During the political turmoil of the early 1970s, for example, official pressure was put on private employers to fire workers who supported the Basotho Federation of Labor (BFL), a union associated with the opposition BCP. Furthermore, many individuals seeking government or private sector employment
were refused unless they carried BNP membership cards ("liphephechana") (Mueller 1977:160; Southall 1984:97).

In addition to the jobs it can provide with its own resources, the government has been highly successful in attracting foreign assistance. Millions of dollars of these funds are pumped into the local (and, therefore, South African) economy. Throughout the 1970s foreign aid accounted for about 25 percent of GDP (Bardhill and Cobbe 1985:65) and was reported to be as high as 65 percent by the mid-1980s (Wellings 1986:65). Bureaucrats and politicians thus have great interest in insuring that international development assistance is maintained. It is also a resource that politicians attempt to manipulate to their own advantage. For example, village development committees, the principle local-level bodies controlling disbursement of aid during the Jonathan administration, were often organized along party lines (Mueller 1977). Areas that did not tow the line politically did not receive their share of aid.

The anthropologist Ferguson (1985) has recently shown that the Lesotho government bureaucracy and international aid agencies share a type of discourse about development which distinguishes the "Lesotho national economy" from the economy of South Africa. This discourse is ideological in that it disregards the realities of Lesotho's geographic position and the importance of migrant labor in order to
justify aid projects. This ideological perspective is fully reflected in Lesotho's First Five Year Plan:

For Lesotho economic independence and economic development are mutually inter-dependent. Lesotho is dependent on foreign countries for employment and incomes, and even, for balancing its budget. Freeing the country from this dependence involves providing more jobs in Lesotho, increasing local incomes and raising more government revenue. For Lesotho, economic development is not an end itself—in overcoming poverty, malnutrition, ignorance and unemployment—but it is also necessary if she is to survive as a nation. (KL, First Five Year Plan, 1970:23).

Since 1970 millions of dollars have been invested in numerous rural development projects. There were over 200 rural development projects listed in a 1977 Food and Agriculture Organization report (cited in Ferguson 1985:6). Between 1975 and 1984 some 27 different government agencies and over 70 private or quasi-government ones provided aid to Lesotho (Ferguson 1985:3-5). A quick look at three of Lesotho's largest projects will illustrate that failure has not diminished the extent of this aid; at best it has merely refocused it.

For Lesotho development has been big business. For example, the Thaba Bosiu project, begun in the early 1970s, required $9.8 million before it was terminated in 1977. It was financed through a World Bank loan of $5.6 million, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) grant of $2.8 million, $520,000 from the government of Lesotho, $530,000 from commercial banks, $280,000 from
farmers' down payments on loans, and $40,000 from United Nations development assistance (Moody 1976:53, 55).

Similarly, the Canadian government initiated the Thaba Tseka Mountain Development project. It cost well over 20 million dollars during its eight years of existence (Ferguson 1985:119, 128). Such projects achieved very limited, even questionable, success in increasing agricultural production, but at considerable cost per household. They require substantial investments for inputs and maintenance and most Basotho with land have not been able or willing to sustain them. Most projects die of their own weight once the influx of foreign capital comes to an end. With these failures in mind, some of the more recent approaches have been geared towards small holders. One such is a USAID project for small scale production and marketing of horticultural crops. After several years of operation, it does not appear to be self-sustainable (personal communication with USAID workers). One can only reiterate Murray's conclusion that "the history of development projects in Lesotho is one of almost unremitting failure to achieve their objectives" (Murray 1981:19). Nevertheless, the government continues to be highly successful in attracting international assistance. Politicians and bureaucrats have become particularly adept at exploiting Lesotho's vulnerable situation vis-a-vis South Africa in
making appeals for financial aid. And many have enriched themselves in the process (Wellings 1982).

Until recently, the government has been less successful in attracting private investors in industry and manufacturing. Since 1967 investment has been managed, almost exclusively, through a parastatal, the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC). Initially established with the technical assistance of South African magnate Anton Rupert and his Rembrant Corporation, the LNDC offers investors a six year tax holiday, grants for training workers, loans, assurance of the repatriation of profits, and custom-built factories. In addition, as a signatory of the Lome convention, Lesotho has duty free access to the markets of the European Economic Community. Another major selling point is, of course, the cheapness of labor.

Some of the initial efforts of the LNDC were frustrated by South African policy. According to one view, the South African government feared development of internationally financed industries on its periphery which could flood its markets. It therefore frustrated plans to establish a Honda motor assembly plant, a television assembly plant, and a shoe factory (Wellings 1984/1985:147; Strom 1977:115). Successful industrialization in Lesotho at the time would have conflicted as well with labor demands in the mining centers, and the attempts South Africa was making to lure industry to the Bantustans and areas on their "borders."
Because of such difficulties, the LNDC managed to create only about 6,000 to 8,000 jobs in the first fifteen years of its existence (Hanlon 1986b:123; Wellings 1984/84:152). The 1984/1985 financial year was typical. In that year the LNDC negotiated only modest investments of M13 million ($US 6.5 million) (LNDC:1985:1).

In the last three years, with a more cooperative government in Lesotho and an oversupply of mine labor, fewer barriers to industrialization have been imposed. Several South African clothing exporters also have set up shop in Lesotho to take advantage of a loop-hole in the United States' sanctions legislation. This excludes goods produced in third countries with South African capital from sanctions (Weekly Mail, November 6-12, 1988:18). There has been, in fact, something of a boom in clothing projects in the past two years. The LNDC has claimed credit for the creation of 5,640 new jobs during this period. In 1988 alone it approved 30 new manufacturers, mostly in garments and footwear, worth an estimated M130 million ($US 65 million) (Lesotho Today August 11, 1988).

Most of the new garment factories depend heavily upon female labor. Women typically work as seamstresses for assembly line manufacture of clothing (or other basic items such as umbrellas) from imported materials. They are organized generally in small groups. One typical firm expects a crew of five or six to produce 120 pairs of
children's shorts per hour. In Maputsoe in 1988 there were four such clothing firms, employing from 140 to 250 workers each. Another firm, Mustang Shoes, a manufacturer of moccasins, school shoes, sandals, and Puma brand soccer cleats, employs over 500 workers. Like their male counterparts at the TEBA offices, hundreds of women now camp out at the doors of these firms in anticipation of employment. Minimum wages were sometimes less than R20 ($US10) per week until a week long strike in August of 1987 led to a slight increase to R25.

Many unemployed Basotho depend upon work on government sponsored road crews or conservation and agricultural development projects. This work is generally back breaking labor such as shoveling, hoeing, or breaking and hauling stones. Many of the workers are women, teenage boys, and the elderly, but unemployed mineworkers also take part. A few skilled jobs, particularly those in supervision or stone masonry, are sought after by men. Workers generally sign up to work for a period of 15 days after which they receive food allotments and a nominal sum of money. Workers at one erosion control project at which I also occasionally labored received 25 kgs. of wheat flour, 25 kgs. of corn flour, four half-gallon containers of cooking oil and R7.50 in cash for each 15 days of work. This less than subsistence wage is often distributed inefficiently. At one point, workers on this project went for five months without being paid. It is
no surprise, therefore, that productivity on such projects is low and people have little commitment to them.

Although the government is optimistic about the Highlands Water Project (HWP), it is regarded with suspicion by many Basotho and is unlikely to be a panacea for Lesotho's unemployment problems. Certainly, it will provide a few thousand short-term jobs to Basotho. But, most of the firms involved in the construction of the dam and the related infrastructure will be engaged for only short-term contracts to do specific jobs. Therefore they will hire local workers for even shorter contracts and will not train many Basotho to do skilled tasks. This makes Basotho particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

Reactions are predictable. Workers employed on contracts associated with the Highlands project have already made official complaints about pay and working conditions. Several persons suggested to me that South African contractors were bribing a local chief in order to get his support in stopping the formation of a union for dam workers. True or not such suspicions are common. Similarly, people have complained to the relevant ministry that they are not receiving equitable wages for work that is the same as that of mining. Indeed, a Lesotho government official conceded that some men were working a 12 hour day for only eight rands ($US 4), less than what was originally approved and considered legal (Moeletsi July 3, 1988:3).
Other workers have been paid as little as five rands per day.

There is also resentment caused by South African firms bringing in Black, but non-Sotho, skilled labor to work when so many local people are jobless. In one area near the construction site Black South African workers are sometimes mocked as "Makoere-koere" (those who speak a funny language that sounds like "koere! koere!") or even as "Boers" ("This project is a thing of the Boers," I was told by a resident, "So their helpers might as well be Boers too!"). Despite these problems, however, in the long run cheap electric power and general improvements in infrastructure brought about by the dams may eventually help lead to significant industrial growth.

At the local level, people are hoping that the HWP will bring them jobs. According to official pronouncements the number of people displaced and the area of agricultural land flooded will be small considering the size of the project (KL 1985). By the time the project is completed it is estimated that about 8,000 people will lose access to previously utilized arable and grazing lands. Five hundred and seventy hectares of arable land and ten households will be inundated by the first dam (KL 1985:C-2-4-12; C1.5.1). Although provisions have been made for financial compensation, many remain skeptical and see the whole scheme
as a sell-out to the "Boers." Not atypical is the view of 'Malikhetho, a woman quoted in a recent newspaper article:

I think I am very jealous to see or learn that our white neighbours are now our countrymen. They travel freely in our country but whenever we are in their country they make us feel the pinch. The Boers are freer in our country than we are in theirs. Even our husbands who spend most of their lifetimes in South Africa's mines still have limits when there. Why do we still have to use passports to cross the border? Lesotho and South Africa now are one and the same country, with apartheid on both sides. The Highlands Water has been sold to our neighbor. Next, Lesotho will be sold at half price, if the Military Government is not careful. (Work for Justice March 1989:8)

Local Unions

About one-third of Lesotho's work force belong to registered trade unions. Two major trade union associations represent the majority of these workers. The largest of the two, the Lesotho Congress of Free Trade Unions (LCFTU) had 23 affiliates with about 12,368 members in 1986. In the same year the other association, the Lesotho Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) claimed four affiliates with 3,420 members (Work for Justice December 1987:7). Four independent unions represent an additional 6,700 members. In 1987 an affiliate of the LCFTU, the Maputsoe Trade Union, claimed over 3,000 members in Maputsoe alone. Members include retail sales clerks, grocers, garment workers, and light-industrial workers—virtually the entire working population of the town.
The history of these trade union federations is intertwined with the BNP/BCP political rivalry and government intervention. The government of Leabua Jonathan dealt harshly with the LFTU and its predecessor the Basutoland Federation of Labor, particularly during the early 1970s when BFL maintained open links with the opposition Basotho Congress Party. As Southall (1984) points out, the government has also attempted to keep union militancy in check so as to maintain an image favorable for investment. One of the ways it can do this is to incorporate unions into government and appoint their leaders. In 1984 the government nearly succeeded in eliminating the LFTU when it pushed for the unification of trade unions into a single body. Until this time the LFTU was the larger of the two union federations, but the merger attempt split its ranks. Since the merger into the LCFTU, this federation has witnessed a number of financial scandals. Most recently, a former LFTU leader claims she was forced out of the LCFTU after making allegations of high level corruption. Her most serious charge is that R40,000 donated by a Norwegian labor organization has been misappropriated by the current General-Secretary (Moeletsi July 2, 1989:2).

Southall (1984) discusses the general situation of the union movement in the following terms:

Lesotho's trade unions remain subject to all the disadvantages which accrue from operating within a
labour reserve. First, they labour under the aegis of a state which—whilst serving the immediate interests of the core petty bourgeoisie—is dominated, directly and indirectly, by South African and foreign capital. Consequently, the industrial relations framework within which they seek to further workers' interests promotes the objectives of capital. In effect, the laws and practices which regulate trade unions in Lesotho (eg. state determination of how unions may constitute their own federations, 'de facto' control by government over whether unions may register, a collective bargaining convention whereby firms do not deal with unions until they represent more than half the number of workers they employ, and so on) disorganise the workforce in a manner which does not apply to capital. Second, and fundamentally, trade unions have to operate within a context where an enormous reserve army of labour is virtually camped outside each set of factory gates. Clearly, there are very severe limits to what unions can do. (Southall 1984:107-108)

Nonetheless, there have been a number of local strikes in recent years: at Maluti sheepskin products in 1981, at Maseru banks in 1982, at Maseru OK supermarkets in 1983, at Maputsoe industrial estates in 1987, and at Lesotho Flour Mills in 1988 (Wellings 1984/1985:161; Moeletsi October 30, 1988:8). Still, these strikes are restricted to wages and working conditions and have not been linked to larger political issues or movements. During the nationwide campaign to boycott OK supermarket chain in South Africa in 1987, for example, the stores did business as usual in Lesotho. Furthermore, Lesotho workers have not made it a custom to strike during May day, June 16th, or Biko day as have many of their fellows in South Africa. Similarly, during the massive stayaways from work in South Africa on
June 6-8, 1988 (in protest of proposed labor legislation) Lesotho's workers were at their jobs as usual. Since apartheid policies are not directly visible in Lesotho, the country's workers have retained a certain distance from the storm brewing around them.

A number of workers in Maputsoe complained to me that their unions lacked clout and were reluctant to stand-up to management. One young man was attempting to establish an independent union for retail workers for this very reason. There is a general feeling that union officials are people like themselves, with families to feed and with material aspirations. Some workers see them, therefore, as being particularly vulnerable to bribes and payoffs. NUM officials, too, are not above such suspicions.

A letter to the editors of Moeletsi by a worker in Lesotho under the heading "Unions Serve Employers Not Workers" (Mekhatlo e sebeletsa bahiri e seng basebetsi) gives some indication of workers' feelings about their unions and is worth quoting at length:

It is not true that trade unions are really sympathetic with workers. Here I am speaking about Lesotho's trade union federations. The truth is that these organizations serve employers, not those who are employed.

And the employers are aware of this. It takes a truly ignorant worker not to notice this. These unions do not follow through on the promises that they make to the workers. Furthermore, they are timid and fearful of the employers. Perhaps if it is not true that the unions as a whole are timid, then their union officials are...

Here in Lesotho workers are inundated with "courses." These courses are set up so that
workers learn their rights. But how does it help to know your rights when you can do nothing to get them respected? If you attempt to do so you will be fired from your job and these unions will be left on the side along with you.

Also there is a government branch known as the Labor Department. But this branch shows absolutely no interest in the workers that work inside the country; it is only interested in the workers who work in the mines. Perhaps this is because these are the ones who bring money into the country; perhaps they do not want workers here to stand up for themselves for fear that opportunist investors [bo-ramatsetse] who are being invited into Lesotho with prospects of cheap labour would be frightened away.

(Hase 'nete hore Mekhatlo ea Basebetsi e tiile e utloela basebetsi boholoko. Mona ke bua ka mekhatlo e meholo kapa bo-'mamekhatlo ea Lesotho. 'Nete ke hore mekhatlo ena e sebeletsa bahiri, e seng bahirua.

Le bahiri ba tseba taba ena. Ke mosebetsi ea sa tsebang feela ea ke keng e eelloa ntho ena. Mekhatlo ena ke ka mohla ha e phethahatse lits'episo tseo e li etsetsang basebetsi. Ho feta mona, mekhatlo ena e boi e ts'aba bahiri. Haeba mekhatlo ena ha e boi, baokameli ba eona ba boi. . .

Lesotho mona basebetsi ba bolaisoa lithupelo. Lithupelo tsena li "reretsce" hore basebetsi ba tseba litokelo tsa bona. Ho thusang ho tseba litokelo tsa hao tseo u ke keng oa li phethahatse! Ha u ka re oa li phethahatsa, o tla lelekoa mosebetsing, 'me mekhatlo ena e tla be e emeletse ka thoko le oena . . .

Hape ho no le le leng lefapha, lona ke la 'Muso le bitsoa "Labour Department." Lena lona ha le bonts'e thahasella ho hang ho basebetsi ba sebetsang ka har'a naha, le thahasella basebetsi ba sebetsang merafong, mohlomong ke hoba e le bona ba tlisang chelele ka har'a naha, mohlomong ha le batle basebetsi ba ka phahama, ba ka tsabisa bo-ramatsetse ho tla Lesotho, kapa bo-ramatsetse ba mengoa ka tsebo ea hore basebetsi ba Basotho ba lefshoa hannya Lesotho. [Ke cheap labour].)

(Moeletsi May 29, 1988:2)
NOTES

1. Xhosa practice has varied somewhat but it is significant that when I asked a Xhosa-speaker also fluent in Sotho what the translation for *mampholi* is, he asked "You mean the boy who strikes *(ho shapa)* the others?"

2. Dunbar Moodie writes: "In total institutions like army camps, prisons, hospitals, boarding schools, work camps and mine compounds, a small administrative staff is expected to control many inmates. As a result they necessarily strive to reduce personal autonomy to a minimum, molding their subjects to a common institutional pattern. Degrading experiences such as recruitment, induction, and acclimatisation on the mines, whatever their official justification, attack the sense of self of their objects. Personal dignity is difficult to maintain in the face of nakedness and abuse, where men are 'herded like cattle in droves, clouted and cursed.' Black miners attempt to cope with such attacks by a shared consciousness that they are merely sharing a role, they maintain their personal dignity by distancing themselves from the subordination performances they have to give. From the mines' point of view, on the other hand, those who have internalized the culture of the total institution make the best inmates; it is these who tend to become compound police and indunas [men appointed by management to act as "tribal" leaders]" (1977/1986:VI).

3. For details of administrative structure see Moodie (1980). I will have more to say about the uses of ethnicity at the mines in part three.

4. Work related unrest and its associated repression has been common in South Africa since 1973. For the mines alone the toll between 1973 and 1976 was approximately 192 killed and 1,300 injured (Friedman 1987:357.)

5. For the way in which the Christian missions use coercion and reward to achieve compliance to their policies see Bosko (1983).

6. As of 1977, the annual return on migrant labor was six to seven times higher than that which could be gotten from an average farm holding using improved practices (van der Weil 1977:61). With the increase in mine wages since that time, this difference has gone even higher in favor of mine work.

7. Under its policy of "industrial decentralization," South Africa has been offering incentives to investment in the Bantustans since the late 1960s. This policy was "conceived as a means for stabilizing the state's system of influx control by providing alternatives to metropolitan employment..."
within the bantustan subeconomies" (Wellings and Black 1986:1). Still, without real economic advantages, decentralization has not been very successful. Wellings and Black (1986:11) suggest that South African manufacturing only began to make significant investments in the Bantustans when, through the efforts of trade unions, labor in urban areas became more expensive.

8. It is something of an exaggeration to call this a wage. In 1986 a rural household of five required approximately R370 ($US 185) per month to meet basic needs in food, clothing, and shelter (LNDC Newsletter 1987:6). By October, 1987 this had risen to R414. Work for Justice (March, 1987:4) estimated that R174 was the absolute minimum required by a "family of 4.2" during the same period.

9. For an excellent account of Lesotho's trade union history and political affiliation see Southall (1984). Southall also discusses Lesotho government's attempts to prop-up the weak union federation associated with the BNP at the expense of its much larger rival.

10. NUM is not recognized in Lesotho but has a fraternal association with LCFTU. In 1988 NUM helped establish the "Basotho Mineworkers Labour Cooperative" with the objective of aiding workers fired during the strike. NUM provided R40,000 and three trucks to the cooperative for the establishment of a brickmaking plant (Moeletsi August 21, 1988)
CHAPTER 4

WORKING LIVES: LIFE STORIES AND CONVERSATIONS

Workers, let me tell you, I am ready to die like a dog [for freedom in South Africa] -- Union activist travelling by bus with mineworkers on weekend leave in Lesotho.

Yes, it is nice at the mines. I have learned many useful things. I know first aid and how to properly search a man without provoking a fight. -- Mine policeman

Our mine did not participate in the strike. But if it had, I would have done my job. I have my family to feed. Still, I am very tired of this job. I want to retire and open up a little shop that sells beer to the weekenders. -- Mine policeman

Africans engage in witchcraft (ba loea), they are not to be trusted. -- Mineworker from Maputsoe dismissed from his job for participating in the 1987 strike.

In order to more fully describe labor as it is experienced from the perspective of people from Lesotho, several stories, conversations, and accounts of individual situations will be related in this chapter. While the total sequence of events which make up individual biographies are necessarily varied there is nonetheless much that is shared between workers. These common experiences influence thought such that patterns are readily discernable. However, this does not mean that there is consensus; far from it, worker attitudes are frequently contradictory. Opinions vary from open defiance to apartheid and labor exploitation on the one hand, to identification with the system on the other.
between are: 1) the many workers who overtly comply (most of the time) with the system because of economic dependency and need but who do not agree or express consent, and, 2) those individuals who reflect what followers of Gramsci (1971:333) call "dual" or "contradictory" consciousness, that is, those who express a certain degree of consent to the dominant ideologies on the rhetorical level while often resisting them in practice.

Many neo-Marxist sociologists and anthropologists of southern Africa, to the extent that they have been interested in thought, have tended to focus their investigations on the ideological implications of migrant labor. In Robin Cohen's terms (1987), participants in labor reserve economies often develop systems of thought which allow them to "habituate", at least temporarily, to the difficulties they face. Citing Murray (1981:41), he argues that this is accomplished in Lesotho through an ideology of successful migration. This means that an ideal is depicted of the man who, through his work at the mines, is able to build up substantial resources (especially a home and livestock) that will allow him to retire to a peaceful and prosperous life in his rural village. Alverson (1978) has written of similar ideals for Tswana migrants.

As long as mine employment can be depended upon, the prosperity of rural households is greatly tied to their stage in a "development cycle" (Murray 1981; Spiegel 1980).
To put this in general terms, the youngest and oldest households are often the poorest since they have high ratios of dependents to able-bodied workers. As the younger household matures and sends its sons off to work in the mines, it becomes increasingly able to invest capital in agriculture and livestock. This period also corresponds to a time in life when older members in the household take control of agricultural lands through inheritance. The prosperity of the household then gradually declines as the younger members marry and establish households of their own. Widows and widowers are particularly vulnerable to impoverishment since they lack the labor to work their fields and do not have sufficient income to hire help. In actual fact, there is also a great deal of variation. Illness, personal problems, politics, and so forth, may cause any one to lose a job, bringing about hardship and poverty for oneself and dependents.

The harshness of this structural situation has been attenuated somewhat by a system of "sharecropping" (seahlolo). Those with access to labor, oxen, a tractor, and/or seed enter a contractual arrangement with a landed person in order to plant for him or her. Ideally, the harvest is divided equally. But the landed try by all means to avoid such arrangements since they mean the loss of much of a harvest.
This situation still exists, but has begun to collapse under the pressure of rapid population growth and unemployment (Thabane and Guy 1984). Spiegel (1982:33) and Murray (1987) argue that analysis based on the development cycle is incomplete; class differentiation, and related linkages in the rural, urban, and regional political economy should also be considered. In this regard, it may now be more appropriate to speak of two general economic groups in South Africa's periphery, those with access to wages and those without. The former group are able to accumulate capital while those without must turn increasingly to kinship or patron-client ties, gift exchange, or become part of the growing urban working class. Women in particular, depend upon the brewing and selling of African beer to gain access to the incomes of men.

Below are two examples which represent fairly typical rural circumstances and perspectives. Spiegel (1980; 1982) describes in greater detail similar cases in Lesotho and Matatiele, Transkei.²

**TWO RURAL FAMILIES**

**Farmer and Beer Brewer.** Mrs. Malome and her husband Mr. Beni have a teenaged son and daughter. Another daughter, their eldest child, died while giving birth to her first child. Beni and Malome are raising the granddaughter born at this time. Together the family lives in two thatched huts in a small village ward of about thirty households.
They have little money for clothing, books or toys for the children. Their granddaughter, like most of the neighborhood children, is frequently cold and may have only a thin cloth to protect her from the cold winds of the mountains.

The hardship of Mrs. Malome, Beni and the children is very real. It is felt in the hunger of their bellies after having not quite enough to eat, the aching of their limbs after doing the daily chores, and the dryness of their skin from the ash, dust, and wind. Yet, they are a relatively prosperous family in local terms. They generally have enough to eat to keep them healthy, although not enough to buy the many South African produced commodities available in local shops.

They have managed to survive by farming and taking the few jobs which are locally available. Beni worked for a few years at a Natal coal mine, but that was back in the 1960s. He said he went to the mines to get money to invest in cattle. Since that time he has worked intermittently, being paid either in cash (at about R2 per day) or food-stuffs (cooking oil, maize meal). He has helped build the local clinic, been responsible for weeding the local airstrip, and worked on government road crews. He and his neighbors have also recently worked for a few weeks at a dam related construction site. Mrs. Malome works for wages or food as well, when given the opportunity. She has worked at several
jobs in the past few years: on a pick and shovel crew paid in kind to repair the eroded road that comes to the village, as a cook and cleaning woman at the local court, and as a clerk for a neighbor who sells beer, soft drinks, and bread.

Malome and Beni have only one field of about a hectare in size, but have managed to rear seven head of cattle, 50 sheep, and 56 goats. This makes them relatively prosperous livestock owners. But they must live extremely frugally and there is never enough for all the basic items the household requires. It is a rare treat for the children to receive an apple or an orange. Mrs. Malome's sixteen year old son must spend his days in the fields with the livestock wearing a threadbare blanket and plastic boots with no socks. Malome, like all the other women in the area, relies on dried manure (moiteli, bokuluba), and brush for cooking and heating fuel. It is often an all day job to trek to the hill tops or river valleys and return with a few days supply of wood. But she is an extroverted and outspoken woman and makes the best of her situation. She enjoys drinking and brewing joala, but her principle motivation for doing so is economic. She and her neighbors rely on the few rands profit that a successful beer drink will bring to their households.

While Malome, Beni and family enjoy spending time together in their two thatched huts, they would like more space and a better way to keep warm. During the winter, like most rural people in Lesotho, they keep warm by
huddling around an open fire in the center of the room. Smoke fills the hut, so that windows and doors must be kept open, thus causing much of the heat to be lost. If the smoke gets too bad, one simply goes outside again.

Malome and Beni still identify themselves primarily as farmers and want to increase the size and quality of their herds. While nominally Catholic, they both appreciate Sotho traditions. Their son was recently initiated (ho bolla) and this was greatly celebrated. While Beni cannot read and Malome only reads with difficulty, they are doing all they can to support their daughter in her studies. She has shown promise in school and they believe she will have better economic opportunities if she succeeds in graduating from high school. Their son would also like to attend school, but his help with the grazing of the livestock is more valued at present.

Farmer and Ex-Clerk. Mrs. MAF Sehoai has spent all of her life (except for a short time at high school in a lowland town) in Lesotho's mountainous areas. Her present home is just over the ridge from where she grew up, about a three hour horseback ride away. She did not finish high school because her parents decided that she should be married instead. Her husband likes the mountains very much and says that lowland towns are places of wickedness and devils (bolotsana, lisatane). Like his neighbor Beni, he has spent very little time away from home. He and MAF are
in their forties now and at a stage in the household
development cycle where their children are beginning to help
support them.

For many years Mrs. Sehoai worked as a clerk in a local
African-owned cafe (grocery store), but was forced to quit a
couple of years ago when the owner wanted to transfer her to
another village. The work was hard, sometimes as much as
ten to twelve hours per day without overtime pay.
Fortunately, she says, the storeowner is a Seventh Adventist
so she did not have to work on Saturdays. Other store
clerks in locally owned stores must work everyday, even
holidays. She says that she never made more than R70 ($US
35) per month. In those days, she also had to find time to
work her fields and cook, gather fuel, and wash her family's
clothing in the nearby stream.

Mrs. Sehoai had her eighth child in 1985 when she was 41.
Since then she has had problems with her uterus (o ts'oare
ke popelo) but has been unable to go to the lowlands for
proper medical attention. Besides being unable to afford
it, she must stay at home to take care of her husband's
mother. Nkhono (grandmother), who is now in her eighties,
was struck by polio in her youth and has long been unable to
walk. She is still technically in control of the two small
fields of less than three hectares that the family uses and
continues to be involved in the family's business affairs.

Mrs. Sehoai likes to farm. Even when she was working at
the store, she still put in long hours in the fields. She says that in a good year they can harvest enough grain to meet their needs for one-third to one-half a year, but to do this they also must farm by shares (seahlolo). The rest of their food must be bought. Mrs. Sehoai is interested in improving their harvests and was quick to try new varieties of things, such as the Mexican Highland Maize introduced through the Thaba Tseka project.

Mrs. Sehoai's oldest son has recently begun to work as a miner. He is a bright, responsible young man with a high school education. Perhaps because of his education he was able to get a job on his abilities. On his last visit he hired a truck to bring his mother a present of furniture. Mrs. Sehoai has heard stories of the troubles others have gone through to be hired at TEBA and is happy her son was successful. This is especially so since he got a job at one of the newer mines near Lesotho. Still, he is not able to come home much because of the shortage of transport in the area.

**Successful Migrant Careers**

A migrant career that fits the ideal of prosperity may be a rare thing, but there are examples of it that people can point to as exemplary. These careers may or may not be in mining. That does not matter. What is important is the results achieved with one's capital. While most migrant work is in mining, a few Basotho find employment at other
jobs, this despite the fact that Basotho are not technically allowed to leave the country in search of work.

Older Basotho say that opportunities were much greater in the past; and older women in the border town of Maputsoe are particularly bitter that their right to work in Ficksburg was curtailed after the installation of the formal border in 1963. Indeed, since then women have not been allowed to work legally at all in official South African territory.³ It is also true that labor legislation is circumvented when labor from Lesotho is needed. A case in point occurred during the Transvaal's cotton harvest in 1988. Over 300 Basotho men, women and children were hired to pick cotton at Mooipan/Pietersburg. Once at the job site they were reportedly prevented from leaving, housed in squalid, snake infested dwellings, and fed only cabbage, porridge, and bread. Wages were as low as R18.00 per month. (Moeletsi July 24, 1988:1). Most workers fled, arriving home physically exhausted, ill, and penniless. Similarly, but less dramatically, each year Basotho men and women continue to wade the Mohokare River to do seasonal labor on White South African farms. The following stories, however, are compiled from the recollections of two older men who were able to maintain a degree of control over their working lives and retire in relative contentment. Like Alverson's (1978) Tswana informants, they often recollect their
experience in terms of personal heroism and defiance. Their lives exemplify "successful" migrant careers.

Waiter and Cook. Mr. Motseki started working as a hotel waiter in South Africa in 1936, when he was seventeen. His memory is not clear on the order, but his work places included Zastron, Aliwal North, Koffiefontein, Trompsburg, Engcobo, Queenstown, Umtata, Ficksburg, Bloemfontein, the William Pretorius Game Reserve, Maseru, and Letsing-la-Terai. At his first job in Zastron he recalls that he was paid twelve shillings and six pence per month. When he was about 25 he received a raise to two pounds. He thought at the time that this was a lot of money. He remembers that a blanket then cost about one and a half pounds and a cow from two to three. According to his recollection, the hut tax was one pound and fourteen pence at that time. Mr. Motseki recounts that if a boss struck him or otherwise mistreated him he would keep quiet about it until the end of the month, then leave after collecting his wages. People were freer in those days, he says, and one could go and get a job "wherever the train would take you" (mo terene e tsamaeang feela).

Mr. Motseki's last job in a South African hotel was in 1980. He worked off and on for many years at this and another hotel in the town but does not receive a pension from either. He completed his working years by serving as a cook for Lesotho mills from 1980 to 1985. It is from them
he receives a pension—a 40 kilogram sack of flour and R60 per month.

Mr. Motseki attended primary school in the Cape colony where he was taught Xhosa as well as English. He is a firm believer in schooling. He agrees when his wife says it would be better if everyone went to school and abandoned the ancient ways that are no longer of any use. Despite suffering a heart attack in 1985 and being plagued by failing kidneys he continues to be curious about the world and witty in conversation. The room in which he rests has several shelves of books which he reads when his eyes permit it. Many of the books belong to his children, both of whom are college graduates.

Mr. Motseki has a number of stories about his working relationship with Whites. He says his facility with Afrikaans has gotten him out of trouble on more than one occasion. Even on the Lesotho/South African border this is rare and Afrikaners frequently ask him why Basotho are too proud to learn their language. He says that Afrikaners have long treated Black people with contempt, but he does see some difference between the older and younger generation. Younger people will greet you, shake your hand, and inquire about your health. Older people may not even acknowledge your presence. One old man he has known for years will now shake his hand, but only when there are no other Whites in the vicinity. Mr. Motseki tells of this man with obvious
amusement, but he is not amused when he says Black people still have separate waiting rooms at the doctor's office he visits in South Africa.

Mr. Motseki tells a story of how he once got into a fight with the owner of a hotel he was working at in Engcobo. One day the owner, a man by the name of Frances, went to Port Elizabeth on business. Mr. Motseki got the job of serving Mr. Frances' wife her lunch. Unfortunately, he was not careful about how he placed her dessert dish and the pudding fell into her lap. He and the other waiters helped her clean up as best they could. But, when Mr. Frances returned his wife reported that one of his waiters had been drinking and had spilled food on her lap.

That night Mr. Frances and three other White men came to the room on the hotel grounds where Motseki was staying. Frances asked Motseki what he was doing drinking on the job, then smacked him hard on the face. Mr. Motseki in returned kicked Frances and Frances fell down against the barbed-wire fence that surrounded the courtyard. Mr. Frances got up and tried to attack Mr. Motseki, but Motseki kicked him again. They then started to wrestle while the other men just stood by watching. Motseki said he managed to get Frances down and punched him in the face. After the fight, Mr. Frances' companions took Motseki to the police station. He said the police were very straight forward in their questioning. They did not threaten or assault him. They simply took his
testimony and noted Mr. Frances’ complaint. He was not even put him in jail. When the court case came up, Mr. Frances was in Durban and did not appear; therefore, Mr. Motseki was free. Still, he was afraid that Mr. Frances or his friends might try to shoot him. So, he fled back to Lesotho.

Mr. Motseki says that while Basotho are not particularly color prejudiced (khethollo ea 'mala), they do discriminate according to wealth and status (maemo). He says one Mosotho hotel owner he knows only wants to be with other rich men and he looks down on men like himself. In contrast, he recalls one White store owner in Quthing who befriended him and treated him decently.

Life in Maputsoe has changed dramatically since he and his wife first built a house here in 1960. At that time it was only a village known after the local headman (ramotse) or simply called the place "at the river" (nokeng). Now there are many thieves and prostitutes living nearby. They frequently cannot get to sleep at night because of the noise from people drinking in the local shebeens (places where home-brewed beer is sold). One day Mr. Motseki sadly told me that a young man he had watched grow up had just murdered someone over the loss of 50 cents in a dice game.

**Rural Shopkeeper.** Mr. Kelello spent nearly thirty years as a migrant worker at a South African asbestos firm. He has since retired and with his savings established a rural shop. He is the kind of man many others would like to
emulate—a Mosotho who became wealthy by investing his earnings wisely. He has several trucks that are nearly always busy resupplying his store or hauling freshly made cement blocks from the river. His tractors are also usually engaged plowing fields or doing other work in the fields, either for hire or in sharecropping (seahlolo) relationships.

As he prospers, so Mr. Kelello believes, the community will benefit. He will be able to help the community (sechaba) by providing people with jobs. To protect and manage his assets he lives in a tiny cement block room, next to his store. His sister works for him; she and her three young children live nearby. Mr. Kelello's wife lives at their home, a few hours drive away. She manages things there; her husband spends most of his time at the store.

Mr. Kelello's door is nearly always open and a day rarely goes by when he does not have a steady stream of visitors. He speaks a number of languages: Sotho, Xhosa, Zulu, English, Afrikaans, even a little Chewa. One of his neighbors is a nurse who spent a number of years in Johannesburg; they sometimes amuse each other by speaking together in Afrikaans.

Mr. Kelello denies that there is much to his apparent prosperity. He says most of the profits go to pay taxes. There are also many worries associated with business. He says his heart is not in it and he prefers agriculture. He
loves to plant and watch things grow. He says there is nothing more important than agriculture, that it is the foundation of life and power (ke lejoe la sekhutlo la matla). With 35 head of cattle and about 150 sheep he is also one of the most prosperous livestock owners in the area. Still, he has only one field of his own and that is farmed by his wife. Here, he says, he maintains an interest in farming through his seahlolo arrangements and is kept very busy at it.

Mr. Kelello believes he is fair and honest with his workers. When asked if he is not a bit demanding, he says his employees have a tendency to be lazy so must be pushed hard. His store is open seven days a week. His three female clerks have no set days off and must beg to go into a nearby town to visit the doctor or take care of personal business. Mr. Kelello supplies them with flour, but pay is less than R70 (US $35) per month.

Still, he says he is a man of peace. Mr. Kelello is in fact friendly and generous with visitors and seems to get along with most members of the community. Yet, he has been known to crack a whip at the heels of his clerks. Two clerks left his employ within the space of a year, complaining that he was abusing them.

Resistance

A significant number of mineworkers, particularly among the younger generation, are coming to see their situation as
intimately linked with the struggle for South African liberation. Yet, it is by no means clear that this is a majority position. While the union enjoys widespread popularity, many miners support it for the economic benefits it promises, not necessarily for larger political objectives (see chapter nine). Two accounts are given below which reflect some of the complexity of the miner's life and some of the events which have influenced mining opinion.

Union Organizer. James Motlatsi was born in Mohale's Hoek, Lesotho, in the early 1950s. He left school in 1970 to take a job at a gold mine near Welkom. For his first contract he worked with an underground water drainage crew (liforo tsa metsi), then became a White miner's aid (picannin) and, eventually, a hydraulic drill operator (mochiniboy). On his second contract he was a winch driver and a team leader. In 1973 he left Welkom because, he says, he was unwilling to pay a bribe to management. He alleges that some of the management people threatened to demote team leaders and certain other workers unless they consented to make such payoffs. By this time Motlatsi was an experienced worker, so he was able to resist this corruption without permanently jeopardizing his livelihood. After the contract expired he took a job at another mine, Western Deep Levels. There he continued his rise in the mining hierarchy and by 1975 was made a masiza, a chief clerk.
At the time lawyer Cyril Ramaphosa was beginning to organize NUM in 1982, Motlatsi was on leave from the mines. (But he was not unoccupied. Like many others he utilized his time off to peddle clothing in the informal markets.) When he heard about NUM Motlatsi was immediately interested and arranged through a friend to meet Ramaphosa. NUM strategy in the beginnings phases of union organization was to work especially with relatively well-placed and educated miners.5 So, there was need for people like Motlatsi. He soon left his job to work full-time for NUM. He is now president of the union.

Motlatsi says the purpose of NUM is to improve the lives of mineworkers. NUM is specifically striving to achieve better working conditions, a decent wage for all workers, an end to the job reservation system, and an improvement in mine safety. He says workers are frequently treated no better than dogs. As an example, he recounts how he was beaten by his White shift leader when he first began working at Welkom. When he took the matter to the mine manager, he remembers the manager saying to him:

"Do you have cattle at home?"

Motlatsi said he did.

"What do you do when one of your cattle does something you don't want it to?"

Motlatsi said that he would hit it.

"That's right," the manager replied. "That's why your
shift boss has beaten you."

When Motlatsi tried to dispute this the manager called him a miserable Kaffir (nigger) and told him to get out of the office before he was beaten again.

Libanon and Mr. "Morekisi". According to a Los Angeles Times report (August 22, 1987), things at the Gold Fields of South Africa's Libanon mine were relatively calm until Thursday the 20th of August, 1987. Until that day, only about ten percent of the mine's 8,000 workers had joined the strike. But then, according to one union organizer, most of the rest of the work force suddenly decided to join. Miners reported that mine management tried to force the night shift to work at gunpoint. Management claimed, however, that "'an armed mob of 250,' brandishing war clubs, spears and metal bars fitted with bolts, had returned from a union meeting and stormed the gate of a mine hostel, attempting to prevent the night shift from going to work" (LA Times Aug. 22, 1987 All). Management also claimed that the "mob" had been doctored by "tribal witch doctors" with medicines that were meant to protect them against bullets. A NUM spokesperson reportedly dismissed the Gold Fields version as "racist nonsense" concocted by public relations men to hide management's attempt to break a legal strike. Both sides seemed to agree, however, that there was some fighting and that security forces used rubber bullets and fired tear gas.
According to the press, at least one person was killed, perhaps as many as thirty more were injured.

In October 1987 I talked in some depth with a worker, whom I call Mr. Morekisi, who was at Libanone during the strike. His version supports some of both management's and union's version of events. He said the strike divided the workers in two—supporters, and those who wanted to work. The pro-strike people tried physically to prevent others from going to work. Management called in the South African army to put a stop to this. However, extra security forces were already present before the night of the fighting. On the 22nd of August (1987) helicopters flew over the mine compound between 7:00 and 8:00 PM broadcasting a message in Fanakalo that the night-shift must go down to work.

Morekisi did not mention anything about miners trying to stop others from working on that particular evening, but it may have been that he simply did not know about it because he was in his room. Following the broadcast, some workers did go down; many others fled to the African "locations". Shortly thereafter the soldiers and police rode into the compound in force in their "Hippos" (armored troop carriers). Morekisi said at first their guns would not fire. He stated matter of factly that a shaman (ngaka) of a certain group of men had used his power to keep the guns from going off; but then, other men came onto the scene who did not know the "prescriptions" (molao) of this ngaka.
Because these miners did not honor the code of the ngaka, the soldiers were able to shoot at them.

Morekisi said Basotho men in particular were picked out by the soldiers for harsh treatment. Tear gas was thrown into their rooms, their exits barred, while the troops shouted that the Basotho were all stubborn troublemakers. The soldiers shot indiscriminately at men outside and at those trying to break out of their rooms. My informant believes six were killed and many more injured. He said he was recently in the company hospital and five of the wounded were still there. It is Morekisi's understanding that the mine manager refused to release them to outside hospitals and that he would rather they die where they were. He had also heard that miners at Western Deep Levels had been forced to work at gun point.

Mr. "Morekisi" (the salesman), told me that he is still depressed about the strike and the situation in South Africa. He is very worried about the future. He recalls the words of one of his elders at home, a veteran of World War II, who used Biblical quotations in warning that a third world war would come some day. Morekisi wonders if that day has not already come in South Africa.

Morekisi was born near Pitseng in 1958. He was raised by his father's older brother (ntate moholo) who was a shopkeeper. As a child he was frequently sent out to sell oranges and apples. He took his first mining contract when
he was eighteen and was sent to a coal mine in Natal. After that he got jobs at the gold mines of Carletonville, Kloof, and Libanon. His last contract at Libanon is now finished. He says he has to go beg TEBA for renewal, a significant departure from pre-strike policy of giving renewals fairly easily to able-bodied men. He has had trouble like this before, in the early 1980s, when he was not rehired after a strike at another mine. At that time he made his living by going back to the Reef area and selling clothing to workers in the mine compounds. He lived illegally in the locations. One more than one occasion he was arrested in pass book raids. Eventually he was sent back to Lesotho. After that, however, he said he simply returned again. The money was good, more than adequate to pay the fines.

Morekisi complained that criminals often got off with light sentences while someone like himself trying to make a respectable living as a salesman was continually troubled by the police. He argued that a murderer or a thief could get out of jail in two or three weeks but a person selling goods illegally often got five or six years. He is now thinking about trying to raise vegetables in Lesotho. He told me that he has a piece of land near a river by his home that would be good for this.

Compliance through Dependency and Habituation

"Dependency" is here used to refer to a situation of poverty, need, or economic constraint that leads to
political compliance (Adam and Moodley 1986:154). Adam and Moodley posit that such dependency has accounted for the degree of compliance with the system which can be found among South Africa's Black population. Dependency is related also to habit--jobseekers often have so little choice that they must seek those avenues of employment which are available and familiar to them. For the men of Lesotho those avenues have been mostly limited to mining. Higher education offers an alternative to a few, but from the perspective of many, an alternative is not necessary as long as mining jobs are available. Thus, "habituation" refers not only to the sense of legitimacy the ideal of successful migration gives to the system, but also refers more directly to the simple notion that people become accustomed to the system in which they are operating. Nonetheless, there are extremes beyond which dependency may not go. Many of those most in need have given up on finding wage employment. Some turn to crime as a last resort. Yet, when this happens, the system of labor regulation which determines their lives remains relatively untouched by the crimes they commit.

Mine Policeman. Mr. Q. is a mine policeman who dotes on his wife and their two small children and makes considerable sacrifices to visit them on weekends. He is a diligent member of a small "Zionist" church. Because his church forbids it, he does not drink alcohol or smoke tobacco. At home he seems a quiet man. He enjoys farming, making
repairs around the house, and seeing to it that the herdboys properly tend to his few livestock.

Mr. Q. is in his mid-thirties and has been working at the mines for over ten years. He says that he is tired and wishes he could be with his family. His wife is not as diligent in her tasks as he would like and she shows little interest in farming. He recently hired a tractor to plow two small fields near his house but she was not able to sow or plant them. When heavy rains came, gullies quickly formed on the barren fields and washed away much of the topsoil. He feels things would be better if he were home to supervise.

The platinum mine where Q. works did not go out on strike in 1987. He said, however, that if a strike had come he would have done what he was hired to do, that is, protect mine property and keep order. There seemed little alternative to him. He had to keep on doing what he was doing in order to support his family. Mrs. Q. and the children have grown quite accustomed to the money and presents of food he brings to them. Besides them he helps support his aged mother and a number of other relatives.

Mrs. Q. once visited Q. at work but she did not have a permit to stay. She was arrested after staying a few weeks "illegally" in a nearby settlement. Now Q. does not like her to visit at all. As an African Zionist he finds the life in towns around mines to be both dangerous and
corrupting. With this in mind he has endeavored to keep his work and home life quite separate. His wife seems to know little about his work. For example, when he pointed out to me that each time he returned from leave he had to undergo the acclimatization process, she expressed interest apparently because she had not previously heard anything about it.

Strike Breaker. The following account is that of a man from urban Lesotho who became a "scab" employee. He has no land or livestock, only his labor power to sell.

I was told by the TEBA official that vacancies were available at their office for experienced ex-mine workers. I jumped at the chance. I was employed right away and given a three-month contract. Other men's contracts ranged from three months to one year; I do not know why.

There were many people at TEBA offices lining up for jobs. I thought I was lucky that I managed to get the job. We did not go through the normal procedures of being examined by the doctor before we left for the mines.

When we arrived at the mines, at Vaal Reefs Number 8 (an Anglo American Corporation mine), the atmosphere was still tense. We were issued with forms to sign. These forms, we were told later, said that we denounced NUM and we would have nothing to do with it. I was then given a card, which I was told would allow me in and out of the hostel. At the hostel, the gate was manned by six security policemen dressed in camouflage. Inside the hostel I saw many security men patrolling the hostel.

We were not allowed to enter or visit other hostels on the same mine. After work we were only allowed to eat one meal, and the food we were given was very little. The NUM office was bulldozed. The liquor bar was re-opened on September 9. On that day, after the bar was closed, I saw workers who had been loyal to management by not going on strike pointing fingers at some people, saying they were the members of NUM. Those people were immediately dismissed.
The kitchen workers were very hostile to us when we asked for more food. Underground the Whites treated us harshly; when we complained, our complaints were not treated fairly. I realised now that things have gone back to where they were before the Union was introduced (Work for Justice December, 1987:3).

Mphokho Rockshelter: The Street People of Maseru.

Dependency on and habituation to mine work is so great that most male jobseekers have no alternative but to vigorously compete for all available positions. Each year many thousands of Basotho men come to the major recruitment centers in Maseru and other lowland towns seeking work at the mines. Often their money runs out while they are waiting or they are simply too poor to pay for lodging. In one recent survey of the recruitment office at the town of Leribe, between 400 and 500 job-seekers were counted. Of these, only about 150 were hired during the next month (Agency for Industrial Mission 1986:12). The situation is similar in Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, and Quthing. Those left behind live from day to day, waiting for any chance at mine employment. In the meantime, they take piece-jobs, such as digging a resident's garden, which are sometimes offered to them. Some of these jobs pay as little as R.10 (US 5 cents). The unemployed may also be recruited to work temporarily on South African farms. Wages there may be as low as R1.50 per week (Agency for Industrial Mission 1986:13).
A favorite gathering place for jobseekers in Maseru is the central traffic circle near the Catholic cathedral. It is generally known that day laborers can be found there. (Some have given up looking for work and have joined the ranks of Maseru's criminals and full-time gamblers.) When the day is done some of these men are forced to take shelter for the night at a nearby hill named Mphokho where there is a large rockshelter.

A Sotho-language magazine, Litsoakotleng (1988), recently interviewed a number of men living there. Below is a brief account of some of their stories. It gives one some idea of what these men are up against and how they have reacted to it.

Mohale is a twenty-six year old man with a standard four education. He has spent about a year in Maseru. Before that he worked as a shepherd, but left when the owner of the animals was no longer able to pay him. He thought he would easily find a job in Maseru and consequently was not prepared for the difficulties which he has encountered. Mohale sometimes finds piece jobs which help him to buy bread, but many days he goes without eating. To the journalists, he asks: "I believe that we are human beings just like other human beings; what wrongs have we done to deserve this?" (Ke lumela hore rona re batho joalo ka batho ba bang, ebe joale rona sebe sa rona ke se feng?)
Sepaile does not know his age because he was never been able to attend school. He has a wife and two children but his wife has deserted him. Because of family problems he overstayed his leave from the mines in 1984. Consequently, he was not rehired. At the time of the interview, he said, he had gone for three days without eating. He is reluctant to return to his home village because he is ashamed to face his family in his present condition. He says he is just a poor person (mofutsana feela) with no fields and no cattle. His twenty-six year old friend Motseki is in a similar situation. Although he has the apparent advantage of being unmarried, he is trying to support his mother. His father died long ago. He has finished standard seven, but has no experience as a miner. They have fields at home but, he says, they "lack the strength" (re hloka matla) to work them adequately.

Mokhali is twenty-nine, married with three children. He lost his job at the mines after fighting broke out between miners from different ethnic groups (mefere-fere ea merabe). He also has no fields or livestock and is finding very little money in Maseru. Daniel, at forty-seven with four children, is in a similar situation. He worked at the Hartebeestfontein mine until he lost his job following the strike there in 1974. He was unable to keep his room in Maseru because he could not pay the rent. He says living at
Mphokho is very dangerous—they are all hungry and desperate men.

**The Unemployed Women Left Behind.** Each day scores of women sit patiently outside the newly constructed factories in Maputsoe's industrial area. The younger ones often play catch with a tennis ball as they while away the time. They are all, in fact, mostly young. Some say they would like to be in school but have had to leave because they are unable to pay school fees. The average age of a group of 31 I talked to one day was 24. One woman said she had been coming to wait here everyday for about six months. There is a rumor that a new clothing factory will soon open so the group is now particularly anxious.

It is difficult sitting here day after day, but they have formed friendships with the other women who share their plight. Most assume that as a White man I will be able to help them get jobs, so they ask me to approach the White managers on their behalf. They say they are afraid of these men and those who work in the offices with them and add that even the Black clerks may insult jobseekers and call them "likafore" (kaffirs). (On another occasion a Black assistant manager tells me of the difficulties he has getting "semi-literate women" to work efficiently.)

Close to the area where the jobseekers wait, another group of women sit sewing shoes. They are the outside workers at the shoe factory. They receive a piece-rate wage
of about 75 cents per pair. Some of these women say they make more money than those inside, if they work hard. Also, they believe there is an advantage in not having to stand all day and in being able to work at one's own pace. The women who wait outside the clothing factory say they want to work as seamstresses, not sewing these shoes. They have heard that the manager of the shoe factory, whom they all know by name, is a particularly harsh employer. They say that if they begin working for him they will not be able to get another job. It is said of him that he tells other White managers not to hire his ex-workers.

Mrs. Lerato is one of the jobseekers. She has been waiting for over two weeks. Her husband is a miner and is away at work. They have two small children but there are twelve, altogether, who live in the house. She would especially like to support herself by sewing at home where she could also look after her children. She believes firmly that women have to work hard in life. These days they have to depend on machine or hand sewing or on raising chickens to find money. She does not have any fields to labor in but has managed to raise three sheep and six chickens. These days, she says young girls need to be self-controlled (boitsoaro) and respectful (hlompho) and must study hard in order to be able to support themselves (ho iphelisa).

Bonyatsi (Lovers) and Trade. 'MaLiapole is 35, with five children. She came to Maputsoe from her mountain home in
order to escape an abusive, mentally disturbed, husband. The children have been left in the care of her husband's parents. She hoped to find a job, but has been unsuccessful. She is currently living in a tiny room with a leaky roof. Many of the nearby rooms are rented by a group of women who come from near her home in the mountains. They often visit one another, exchanging food and information about events in town and at home. For the past year 'Maliapole has been travelling to South Africa about once every four or five weeks with one or two of her friends. She has a lover (nyatsi) who works at the mines near Carletonville. She entertains him and he rewards her with "gifts." While in Carletonville 'Maliapole may buy a few small items in the hope of selling them at a profit back in Maputsoe. She can only legally stay in South Africa for two weeks. After this she returns to Maputsoe.

'Maliapole may be considered a "letekatse" (woman of low moral standards) by some of her neighbors, but she would claim she is not a prostitute. She does not make it a "business" to sell her body and is disgusted by those around her who do so. If, however, she finds someone she likes at a dance or a beer drink, she may go home with him—and expect some sort of gift in return. But she does other things to make a living, like selling clothing or fruit at the market or taking day labor jobs that may come along.
Father and Son. Mr. M. is a retired man who lives in a mountain village. He has access to land, owns livestock, and receives a small Lesotho government pension—perhaps enough to supply him with his monthly flour needs. This, however, is not enough to feed himself, his wife, a daughter-in-law, and several grandchildren. Like most men of his generation, he has also worked as a miner. Presently, his son is working at the mines as well. His remittances makes a considerable difference in their lives.

In September, 1987 I discussed mine work with M. and one of his sons who happened to be on leave from his own mining job. The miners had only just ended their strike, but because of his leave M.'s son had seen nothing of it. M. said he himself had worked for six years in the mines prior to 1961 when he began working for "Muso" (the Lesotho government).

I said I was afraid of the dangers of work underground. M. said there could good reasons to be afraid; the mines have places that are visited by the ghosts of White men (liphoko tsa makhooa). He noted that these ghosts overtake men when they are alone. His son added that such a ghost can make men go mad and get lost in the mines. A ghost could also write on a person's arm an amount of money (such as R24,000) and require that person to acquire that much money to send home. ⁶
When I asked M.'s son about working with White men, he said the "Boers" (Maburu) were particularly cruel. The first thing he mentioned was that you could be working with them and they would sit down and eat their food right in front of you, without even offering to share. Black workers have to sit off to the side while the Whites eat, just as if they are dogs. As we were talking and sipping tea the daily news was broadcast over their shortwave radio. The son stopped the conversation and brought in the radio from outside so that we could hear better. The main item of news was that there had been an accident at Welkom in which the cords to one of the mining shaft elevators had snapped, probably killing all forty-two workers. M.'s son's immediate comment was bitter—this was no accident, he said, clearly the cord had been cut intentionally by the Boers as an act of revenge against the striking miners on their first day of work after the settlement. True or not, the instant interpretation by a Black worker of an event that looked like an accident as racial violence shows clearly what Black workers feel about their privileged White co-workers.

Widow, Housekeeper and Cannery Worker. Mrs. Emily R. was born in Morija around 1924. Her father was a teacher and a Protestant minister. He took jobs in various locations in Lesotho, from Qacha's Nek to Leribe. Emily married a young man from Mokhotlong in 1947. She said that he came from a family wealthy in livestock. They paid the entire
bridewealth (bohali) of twenty cows, ten sheep, and a horse at one time. This was something very rare then and almost unheard of these days. She recalls her years in Mokhotlong as difficult ones. A major problem was that her husband's father had two wives. He was the son of the junior wife but had been raised by the senior one.

Emily recalls that her troubles in life started right from the beginning of her marriage. She had six children, but was sick with each pregnancy. Each of her children lived only a few years. She said the cause of their weakness was the enmity between her two mother-in-laws brought about by her marriage.

During much of this period her husband worked as a policeman in Springs. One year she did not receive any communication from him so she went with one of his relatives to find out what the problem was. They found him living with another woman. Mrs. R. demanded that he return home with her. He agreed, but said he needed a few days to make the necessary arrangements. She found a place to stay while she waited, but she was, in fact, never to see him alive again. Before two days had passed she was visited by two policemen who informed her that her husband had been stabbed to death. She returned home with the corpse.

Back in Lesotho Mrs. R. realized that she must now do something to support herself. Her parents wanted her to work in Lesotho but she did not see any opportunity there.
She had a brother in Johannesburg so she went to stay with him. Not long after her move she realized that her brother was running around too much in the dangerous setting of township bar life. One day he got into a fight after a football match and was struck on the head with a steal pipe. The blow killed him.

She said she had to learn a different kind of life in town, but she was soon able to find work as a housekeeper. She worked for many years for an English-speaking family in the Mayfair suburb. She said they were fair to her and even took her along when they went on holidays to Durban. They succeeded in getting her a work and residence permit when that became necessary. She was able to maintain it until the early 1980s when she was forced back to Lesotho.

Mrs. R. has her own house in Lesotho, but no land. She has recently supported herself by working across the border in an asparagus cannery near Gumtree. She says things were very bad there in 1986. She describes an incident in which workers, most of whom were women, were attacked by a group of male thugs (litsotsi) near the end of their last pay period. Some women were "necklaced" and some raped. She herself, old woman that she is, was threatened with rape. She thinks that five people were killed. She suspects that these thugs were hired by the owner of the cannery to disperse the workers so he would not have to pay their R80-
90 per month wages. Despite the attack most people would not leave until they were paid.

Mrs. R. is currently working to help a relative, who is an acting chieftainness, manage her household. She now finds herself plagued by toothache, constipation, and moea, a spiritual ailment brought on by visitations from the shades (balimo).

"Contradictory" Consciousness

By "contradictory" consciousness, we mean simply that what people say and what they do are not always congruent. The abstract ideas one expresses may in fact contradict the actions one takes in concrete situations. That this seems a common place in everyday life is perhaps all the more reason to consider the ramifications such common places have for political interaction. In times of crisis, during mass movements, or when dealing face to face with felt cruelty, hardship, or injustice, people may react in ways different from the way they themselves might believe they would.

An Urban Miner. Mr. B. is typical of the new group of urban and proletarianized migrants from Lesotho. He has no fields or livestock and is interested only in those livestock, such as milk cows, that may potentially earn him money. He was born and raised in Maputsoe and looks to trade and wage labor rather than agriculture as the best way to make a living. When he is not working he stays with his wife and two children. They live in a tiny (about 6 paces
by 5 paces), single room, cement block flat which is jammed with two metal frame beds, several trunks, a gas powered refrigerator, table and chairs, and a kitchen cabinet. The house is situated on an equally tiny plot of land for which there is inadequate room to maintain a viable garden. Maputsoe is expanding rapidly and it is difficult to get even such a small plot on which to build. Many of the fields on the edge of town have now been taken over by houses or rental "units."

At 34, Mr. B. has thirteen years of experience as a miner. Previous to that time he worked for a short while at a local, "Indian" owned, shop. He is quick to point out that he was only paid R7.10 a week. He suggests that when it comes to wages "Indians" (MaIndia) are worse than "Boers" (Maburu).

Before the strike Mr. B. worked underground as a battery attendant. His job is to make sure that the circuits are working that run the mining cars. He participated in the strike and has been active in the union. He was unemployed for over a year because of the strike and feels this is because of his union activities. Since that time, however, he has been reengaged. Mrs. B. works at one of the new textile factories in Maputsoe where she is paid a relatively high wage of R39.00 per week.

B. is worried about the future and knows that work in South Africa for Basotho is diminishing. He was suspended
from his job because of his participation in the strike, but himself remains deeply suspicious of African leadership. He mistrusts African leaders because he believes they are concerned only with their own interests. He believes they engage in witchcraft ("ba loea") and in general are not very useful ("Mafrica ha se batho ba bahlokoa"). In support of his case, he suggests that the leaders of Lesotho have stolen tremendous sums from government coffers with no regard for the welfare of the nation as a whole. The situation in other African countries is the same, he says.

Widow, Farmer, and Servant. Mrs. Mohlolehali has been a widow since her husband died in 1985 in a horseback riding accident. Without the small income she receives from brewing joala and the occasional odd job she would be completely without income. She works in the fields, does domestic chores for local government employees, and works on the road crews. She is a small, but strong and energetic woman, a very young widow at age thirty-five. She recently found work as a maid for two White South Africans who were in the area doing preliminary studies for the Highlands Water project. She worked three or four days a week at R3 per day for the six weeks they were in the area. She does not speak English, Afrikaans, or Fanakalo. The men do not speak Sotho. They tried to communicate in Fanakalo but she said they mostly communicated by hand signals. Sometimes a translator was found.
Mrs. Mohlolohali expresses a certain awe for White people (makhooa) and "their" technology. She puts this by saying "Makhooa a melimo e meng" (Whites are different sorts of gods/spirits) and that they must be very intelligent to invent things like automobiles and airplanes. Still, she does not feign subservience in front of White people. And she resents it when she is treated as an inferior. About the Whites coming to work for the Highlands project she says "Maburu ana a inahana hore Mosotho e mong le e mong ke mohlanka oa hae" (These Boers think that each and every Mosotho is their servant). She also noted that these Whites smelled peculiarly. (I, who was living with the Basotho, lacked this smell, she said.) Maburu are especially peculiar and jokes about them are popular. After doing her "Boers'" laundry one day she discovered that one of them had underwear that was full of holes. In fact, she pointed out to her friends, they were so full of holes that surely his testicles must hang out.

Factory Worker. Mrs. MM is a 33 year old widow who works at a factory in Lesotho. The firm makes electric lamps which are sold in South Africa. She likes her job and says that she and the others are not forced to work too hard (Ha rea huloa ka thata, re sebetsa hantle feela.) She respects her White boss and says he respects them. He understands their problems (O na a utloisisa mathata a rona) and therefore treats them like human beings. She is somewhat
anxious, though, because he has found another job and a new
manager will soon be coming.

Like nearly everyone these days, she says that life is
about money and "business". She sometimes acts as an
entrepreneur herself by taking the bus to Durban in order to
buy "stock" (clothing, blankets, dry goods, etc.). She then
sells the goods at a price slightly higher than in Durban,
but less than is charged in the shops in Maputsoe. Still,
she thinks that for there to be real development in Lesotho
Basotho must learn to work together cooperatively. White
people are better at cooperating and keeping their promises
to one another, she believes.

Mrs. MM has to rent a room in Maputsoe because it is too
far from her home to make the journey by public transport
everyday. This enables her to walk to work, but the room
she rents is small and cramped. The roof is raised only
slightly above her head and there is barely enough space for
her bed, cooking utensils, and kerosene wick-stove. There
is no place for her two children. In any case, she would be
unable to take care of them here. So, they must stay with
their grandmother. Mrs. MM only sees them during her
weekend visits home and during holidays.

Identification

A person may be said to identify with a job when he or
she enjoys it, is proud of the status it brings, and thinks
about it favorably in non-work situations. Many workers in
Lesotho seem to identify with their jobs, especially those who work in government service. This identification undoubtedly helps the Lesotho government maintain stability. A much more difficult question is whether migrant workers identify with the administrative apparatus of the South African state. Adam (1971) made the controversial claim that African identification with White rulers was common. He went so far as to argue that: "In terms of psychoanalytic theory the response known as 'identification' with the aggressor,' tends to be revealed collectively in South Africa. The subjugated group takes over the explanations of its rulers and identifies with their strength" (1971:105). While the general concept of identification with the aggressor has been called into question (Des Pres 1976) and events since 1976 indicate that Adam was mistaken in his beliefs about the extent of its existence in South Africa, nonetheless, a more limited notion of identification may still have some utility. For example, some people may identify with occupational roles that help maintain the state and its repressive apparatuses. There are apparently willing members of the police and security forces among the Black population in South Africa. The case of the policeman described below gives some indication of how a degree of identification with the status quo may be possible.
Mine Policeman. J. is 26 years old and has married fairly recently. His wife gave birth to their first child in 1988. He says that he has been working at the mines since he was 15 years old. He worked underground for two years before becoming a mine policeman. He still has a rather boyish face and is slight of build, not quite what one might expect for someone in his occupation. Perhaps his facility with languages helped him get the position. He speaks Xhosa, Sotho, and Afrikaans, as well as some Shangaan. He seems quite proud of his status and describes with evident pleasure some of the things he has learned as a policeman. For example, he tells me the details of carrying out a proper search without provoking a fight. He says the training they receive is quite useful. He likes the excitement of life at the mines and rarely visits his home village. He finds home life quite dull and monotonous. His identification with mine life is not surprising, considering that he has spent over one-third of his life there.

J. works for one of Anglo-American's large mines. He was present during the recent strike and participated in combined police and military action against strikers. He is quite willing to talk of his role then and in fact brought it up without my prompting. He says that they entered the compounds early one Friday towards the end of August. It was about 4:00 A. M. when they entered in the personnel carriers, shooting tear gas and rubber bullets as they came.
He explains frankly that their purpose was to round up all the workers and make them choose between going back to work or being sent home. The men's presence on mine property was no longer permissible, he claimed, because they were not working. Those who said they wanted to go home were put aboard buses and immediately sent on their way. There was some resistance, however, and J. helped to quell it. He recalls with what appears a certain fascination seeing one White policeman get his leg burned from a molotov cocktail and then shooting at the people whom he thought were in the vicinity of the bomb thrower. J. says the White policeman shot the wrong person and the bullet pierced the unfortunate man's eye.

Summary and Conclusions. This chapter has offered a brief foray into the world of Lesotho's laborers. Particular attention has been given to miners, since the mines so clearly dominate Lesotho's economy, but people in other occupations have also been discussed. Biographies have been organized according to categories of resistance, compliance through dependency and habituation, and, in one case, "identification" with the status quo. No attempt has been made to systematically assess the frequencies of these categories; in many cases they are clearly overlapping and are used here primarily as an heuristic device. Nevertheless, some generalizations can be made. On the one hand, the recent strike by NUM suggests that migrant workers
can be mobilized on a massive scale in defiance of the mining systems' traditional methods of domination. On the other hand, the surplus in the labor market, compliance brought about by dependent need, and habituation to the system as a whole suggests that unity and long-term commitment to union goals remains problematic.

Political consciousness is determined by the complex interrelationship between material interest and individual and group experience (including social history and cultural heritage). In Lesotho the latter, increasingly referred to in South African historiography as "inherent ideology" (after Rude 1980), is undergoing rapid change. Orientations are shifting from agriculturally-based systems of interpretation to those more in keeping with land scarcity and the wage labor system.

In the past two chapters I have suggested some ways thought and experience is patterned by the social relations of production which exist in the context of the apartheid state. Yet, some have suggested that even in the harsh context of South Africa, thought maintains a certain autonomy from the material world. They argue that no matter how harsh or how "material" African experience is in South Africa, it is still interpreted, discussed, and explained in symbolic terms. In the next chapter I take a more systematic look at this hypothesis by examining the role of
ritual and worldview in the contemporary southern African context.

NOTES

1. These statements are paraphrases. The first was made in general conversation with bus passengers, the rest in conversation with the author at the speakers' places of residence.

2. While Lesotho and Matatiele are economically and ecologically quite similar they differ because of the population influx brought about by South Africa's relocation policies.

3. Some Basotho men and women are, however, working in the homelands. This is a good example of habituation and dependency: pay, particularly for teachers, is simply better there.

4. My account of James Motlatsi's life is based on an interview in the NUM (1986) publication, A Thousand Ways to Die.

5. This strategy was adopted not because the union favored high status workers but because of the way the state determined union legality. See Pycroft and Munslow (1988:168) for details.

6. The ghosts of White men, miraculous gifts of or demands for money, the figure of Satan, and supernatural "snakes" all play a role in mining folklore. A few of these are discussed in AIM (1977). I will have more to say about them later on.
PART II.

EXPLAINING MIND AND RITUAL
IN SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER 5

MIND, COLONIALISM, AND MIGRANCY

The previous chapters have reported on some of the situations, issues, and opinions which Basotho commonly encounter in the context of their everyday lives. This chapter turns to a more detailed examination of Runciman's "explanatory" aspect of understanding. The literature on southern Africa, as elsewhere, is sharply divided over the question of causal links between material conditions, thought, and political identity. Those whose work derives from a "materialist" perspective emphasize the class or colonial nature of thought and identity. They see men and women in the South African periphery as workers with workers' perspectives who are dominated by state structures conducive to the exploitation of labor. Racism and apartheid, as ideological mechanisms of control, mystify the class basis of exploitation and fetter the minds of exploiter and exploited alike. "Idealists," on the other hand, suggest that thought is not so directly derived from the material interests of a people. They argue that language and worldview are quite resilient and flexible and should be treated on par with the so-called material infrastructure. Culture, which is conceived as the symbolic
system of a people, has a certain autonomy, such that individuals who appear to be subordinate to state, class, or race control may see themselves as existing in a world defined in reference to separate values.

In this chapter I first discuss the relationship between the migrant labor system and political identity in the labor reserves in terms of existing arguments presented in "idealistic" and neo-Marxist writings. As we shall see, on the one hand, Alverson (1978) argues that the Tswana have been relatively unaffected psychologically by colonialism and apartheid. On the other hand, the South African context can be argued to support Fanon's (1967) ideas about the negative impact of colonialism and racism on the self-image of the colonized. In between, Wallman's (1972) depiction of a "non-development syndrome" in the labor reserves lends support to Fanon, although she herself interprets this situation in quite different terms.

In developing explanatory hypotheses additional information will be provided in the form of ideal-typical representations of--and generalization about--"African" notions of society. Specifically, concepts of "humaness" (botho/ubuntu), racial identity, and social status will be discussed. These issues are essential components of "idealistic" perspectives, but are discussed here in the context of political and economic authority structures as well. This chapter, therefore, continues the argument for
the epistemological and methodological synthesis suggested by Weber. Methodological issues are discussed further in the next chapter where the material/economic conditions, rituals, and folk perspectives of three differing areas in Lesotho are compared and contrasted.

Modes of Explanation: Alverson, Fanon, and the Scars of Bondage

In a provocative book on "the Tswana", Alverson (1978) argues that the material conditions in Botswana of widespread poverty, dependence on labor migration and subjugation to the general South African political-economy are analytically separable from the subjective manner in which such conditions are experienced. The Tswana phenomenological world, he argues, is such that individual Tswana are able to interpret experiences of, for example, racial discrimination, in terms favorable to themselves and to the Tswana perspectives on proper human conduct with which they have been raised. His account is very different from the widely accepted view that colonized people suffer psychic scars (such as feelings of inferiority or lack of self-esteem) as a result of their experience of colonialism and domination. He suggests that the "scars of bondage" thesis as presented by Fanon (1967) and others needs to be rethought in light of the Tswana evidence (Alverson 1978:2).

Alverson's work was partly inspired by his reading of Alfred Schutz (1970) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). He
finds in their work a "satisfying theoretical and intellectual synthesis of materialism and idealism" (Alverson 1978:xii). In his interpretation, Merleau-Ponty's work is representative of a "rationalist" epistemology which suggests that "No human being is simply the sum of the 'objective' characterizations that others have created" (1978:5). The self, according to Alverson, has a certain autonomy to create meaning in the world. Yet, Alverson presents *The Phenomenology of Perception* (1962) primarily as a rejection of empiricism without noting Merleau-Ponty's critique of the idealist tradition of Descartes. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological method is one concerned with "being in the world," with the body's incorporation and participation in a world of sense perception, space, time, language, and social interaction. For him, "both idealism and realism, the former by making the external world immanent in me, the latter by subjecting me to a causal action, falsify the motivational relations existing between the external and internal worlds, and make this relationship unintelligible" (1962:364). In other words, Merleau-Ponty suggests that realism errs by reducing the world of subjective experience to a mechanical response to externally derived variables while idealism errs by acting as if the external world does not exist.

Alverson stresses the subjective aspects of consciousness in a way that Merleau-Ponty does not. This is evident in
statements such as "a rationalist would argue that colonial experience itself is principally to be found in the subjective world of consciousness" (1978:5). He views this sort of subjectivism with favor and incorrectly associates it with the position of Merleau-Ponty. Alverson's analytic distinction between "objective" and "subjective" domination is a separation that also runs counter to the general thrust of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty there is not 1) the self and 2) the world, but a corporal body alive in the world: "my body," he writes, "is a movement towards the world, and world my body's point of support" (1962:350). Merleau-Ponty clearly indicates here the importance of the interplay between felt experience of the self and the material context in which the self is experienced. As Weber pointed out, a holistic understanding requires methods and theories that include both realms of experience. And this does not rule out discussion of causality. Causality may be treated as sufficiently complex to avoid a reduction of consciousness to mere epiphenomena.

The position of Alverson has been criticized on other grounds by Moodie (1983). Moodie suggests that Alverson's focus on the discourse of returned migrants in Botswana may distort the realities of the conditions they actually experienced during the time of their labor contracts. His detailed studies of life in the mine compounds show how the "total" nature of the social institutions and roles of the
mines forces men to act and think in new ways. He also points out that Alverson's concern with Botswana meant that those men who never returned to their home territory, a social category known in the literature as "absconders", are not taken into consideration. This slants his work in a direction more favorable to a conservative, "traditionalist" perspective. These problems can be related to Alverson's definition, which emphasizes the continuity of the self over time. While some continuity is obviously necessary for there to be a recognizable "self," Schutz's (1970) definition of the individual's private world as "a set of self-typifications arranged in domains of relevance that is continuously in flux" (1970:84) places greater stress on the situational aspects of the self.

Even if Alverson's evidence about conscious self-perception is accepted, there is still much in Fanon (1967) that warrants discussion. There are two main points which Alverson's work makes against Fanon, but these are not necessarily fatal to his "scars of bondage" position. First, and most convincingly, Alverson argues that colonialism and domination do not exactly "wipe out" indigenous customs and systems of thought as Fanon (1967:110) at one point contends they do. Secondly, Alverson shows that some Tswana men are able to maintain self-esteem by feigning compliance while at the same time presenting an interpretation of their behavior in terms of
great cunning and "tricksterism." This suggests that feelings of cultural inferiority and problems of dependency are not necessarily a consequence of colonialism and imperialism. But, Fanon (1967), does not say they are. He is concerned with demonstrating that such feelings are common, particularly among intellectuals, but does not suggest they are necessary.

Fanon writes most forcefully about the social and linguistic aspects of discrimination and the powerful influence such discrimination can have on self-perception. His existential psychology, by focusing on examples of individual experience in social context, avoids the subjectivism of Alverson's work. Consider, for example, the following passage:

A Malagasy is a Malagasy; or rather, no, not he is a Malagasy but, rather, in an absolute sense, he 'lives' his Malagasyhood. If he is a Malagasy, it is because the white man has come, and if at a certain stage he has been led to ask himself whether he is indeed a man, it is because his reality as a man has been challenged. In other words, I begin to suffer from not being a man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination on men, makes me a colonized native, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white world . . . (1967:98)

There is little doubt that this conception has wider application and that a Tswana "lives" her or his Tswananhood in a similar fashion.
The emphasis on the processual aspects of domination and subordination takes Fanon in directions unexplored by Alverson. He examines relationships between the languages of the colonizer and the colonized, for example. Fanon shows how French creole has been used in France to define the Black "other" as an inferior, lesser being. What are the effects of the everyday use of English and Fanakalo on Tswana consciousness? Are they not similarly used? Alverson's work provides a rich account of Tswana culture, thought, and self-perception, but by focusing on individual "Tswana" accounts, Alverson does not tell us enough about the multi-linguistic and multi-cultural aspects of contemporary experience for individuals living in the general South African context.

In a recent thesis on political perspectives in a rural area of South Africa's Transkei, Seger (1986) supports the position of Fanon. She argues, on the basis of participant observation and the statements of a number of informants, that villagers in Matatiele have low self-esteem and a sense of inferiority in relationship to the dominant Whites. She suggests this is a consequence of colonial domination and the images of prosperity which are broadcast to local people through advertising media.

Similarly, some Zulu-speaking intellectuals of the last generation expressed views that are remarkably in accord with Fanon's perspective on colonialism. Marks (1989)
suggests that fear of being seen as primitive was behind a number of African intellectuals' opposition to the introduction of ndlamu dancing in the schools. For example, in 1949 K. G. Msimang wrote, "... the African people must be very careful not to keep on with customs and beliefs of ancestors which will make them a laughing stock. It is no secret that many people of the other nationalities like to see some of the dances because, as they say, they like to see a bunch of baboons performing, or because they want to see something 'wild' and 'primitive'" (quoted in Marks 1989:231). A clearer demonstration of Fanon's view could hardly be found. Here that aspect of culture which is defined as "wild" and "primitive" by the Whites is accepted as such by a leader who wishes himself and other Blacks to be seen as "civilized" in their eyes. Yet, even intellectuals who rejected Msimang's position still accepted White notions of civility and primitiveness. Percy Ndhlovu, reacted to Msimang in a revealing statement:

That there are those among educated and civilized Africans who have such an inferiority complex that they imagine their own fellow-men are looked upon as monkeys or baboons when they indulge in primitive dancing is lamentable. The civilized and educated African should see no shame or disgrace in trying to uplift his wild fellow-man, by selecting what is good and rejecting what is bad. (quoted in Marks 1989:231-232)

So, while Ndhlovu laments the "inferiority complex" of others, he continues to accept the ideology of the dominating group. For both Ndhlovu and Msimang Africans
who lack schooling are in need of reform and African customs which fail to measure up to Western derived values are to be rejected.

In contrast to Alverson, the work of Wallman (1969; 1972) suggests that a kind of "scars of bondage" condition is widespread in the South African labor reserves and this condition results directly from the migrant labor system. Writing of the situation in the 1960s, she argued there was widespread drunkenness, hypochondria, and apathy in the rural areas of Lesotho. She also argued that Sotho workers on rural development projects show greater respect for and trust of White supervisors and expect those under local supervision to fail. Her explanation of this is a "cultural" one. She suggests that a "non-development syndrome" is likely to exist in any underdeveloped labor reserve economy. This is because high expectations engendered by experience with the advanced technological society in which workers are employed are frustrated by the reality of the poverty of their homes. Her description of the labor reserve of Lesotho and Seger's of Transkei appear to directly contradict what Alverson says about Botswana. I will attempt to explain this discrepancy later on in the chapter.

From a Marxian perspective analyses like those of Wallman are inadequate because they stop at cultural explanations without sufficiently examining the material or economic
implications of ideas and attitudes. Seger (1986) argues that the feelings of self-deprecation and low self-esteem she observed are a good example of Marxian "false consciousness." "Villagers' false consciousness or self-deception," she writes, "has led them to place the blame for all that is bad in Transkei on the Transkeian government and on Blacks themselves. The falseness of the illusion is that it is the White South African government, in collaboration with an elite group of Black Transkeians, who are responsible for the situation in Transkei today" (1986:149).

As indicated in the preceding chapter, in Lesotho an ideal is depicted of the man who, through his work at the mines, is able to build up a substantial amount of capital (especially a home and livestock) that will allow him to retire to a peaceful and prosperous life in his rural village. This is similar to the ideals described to Alverson by Tswana men, but for Lesotho Robin Cohen (1987:80-81) emphasizes their derivative nature and the low rate at which they are actually realized. Neo-Marxists such as Spiegel (1982:33) agree that a migrant worker's material interests in his home frequently makes him an essentially conservative person. If this is true a simple corollary is that as the capacity to develop rural resources declines, the class consciousness of migrant laborers is likely to increase. Without rural capital to fall back on, the importance of wages is all the greater. This makes migrants
as vulnerable to inflation and layoffs as their urban counterparts and helps explain, in part, the growing trade union activism of Lesotho's work force.\(^3\)

The previous two chapters suggest that the articulation between local experience and the experience of migrancy can lead to a political perspective that is ambiguous. This suggests that there is a degree of complexity in the relationship between the ideal and the act that can easily be overlooked. To understand this, material interests need to be seen in historical and cultural context. The South African case indicates that experience in the "material" world is interpreted within a "cultural" framework (Calhoun 1982), but the given material situation, in the long term, modifies that cultural frame.\(^4\) Below I describe popular concepts of "identity," "race," and "status" and point out how such linkages occur in practice.

**Conceptualizing the Other**

**Personhood, Productivity, and Demographics.** The concept of personhood (botho) described by Alverson (1978) fits Lesotho and other areas of southern Africa as well (compare Sotho-Tswana botho with Nguni ubuntu). In ideal typical terms, personhood is achieved through social relations, Motho ke motho ka batho ba bang.\(^5\) One's ethical conduct is given prime importance; physical characteristics are of secondary concern. One becomes a reputable person by developing one's home and community in both material and
spiritual terms. This is an on-going process. In everyday life one shows botho/ubuntu through ritual exchange of greetings and in reciprocal exchange of food, alcohol or similar gifts with one's neighbors.

Botho/ubuntu, therefore, is not an abstract philosophy with no social basis. Rather, it is a legitimating concept linked to the political structure of household and community. Specifically, it reinforces the authority of the male elders and the chiefs because it is tied to concepts of respect (ho hlompha/ukuhlonipha) and compliance (tumello/uthobeko). A person (motho/umntu), because he or she is by definition socially constituted, must respect the social order. Deference, humility, and etiquette are thus all attributes associated with personhood. When botho/ubuntu is denied a person becomes like an animal (motho o fetoe ho phoofolo). Indeed, animality is the opposite of botho/ubuntu. When a Zulu speaker utters the greeting "Ngiyakubona" (I see you), the unspoken implication is "kuthi awuyiso isilwane" (that you are not an animal). Similar connotations can be inferred in Sotho greetings (Mabogoane 1988:8). An animal is wild, unrestrained and outside the limits of social control. An animal knows no law, authority (molao/umthetho) or social propriety. Those who take advantage of others, such as thieves and hoodlums (litsotsi) are by definition outside the moral order. There is a saying in Sotho which aptly expresses the common
sentiment: "A thief is a dog who pays with his head"  
(Lesholu ke ntja le patalla ka hloho ea eona.) The link between ideal and act is reinforced as criminals are beaten by vigilante groups and criminals, in turn, become increasingly violent.6

An economic system based on unskilled wage labor denies botho/ubunto. A person is valued by his or her capacity to do tasks for which he or she may be quickly replaced. For management, personhood, especially at the level of production, is irrelevant. From an "African" perspective, the places of wage-labor, as manifestations of this view, are asocial and therefore capable of transforming the human into the animal. Similarly, in the tradition of segregation and apartheid, these places are where color takes precedence over conduct. As Vilakazi remarked some years ago: "every African male is a boy or John to the Whites, and every woman a girl or an Annie" (1957:94).

While Whites and Blacks are geographically separated, they must meet in the context of their work. As they do so the White boss, aside from possible ethnocentricism or racism, is still removed from ordinary interaction with Blacks because of linguistic and status barriers. The White farmer may benefit from knowledge of the personal habits of individual workers, but the White director of "manpower resources" at an Anglo-American division may safely confine himself to productivity rates. In contrast, it is to the
Black worker's benefit to know as much about the quirks and habits of the manager as he does of those of the farmer. At the work place White bosses are known and discussed, their habits and quirks categorized. They are given nicknames which reflect their demeanor and attitude towards the workers. Racial hierarchy thus reinforces the tendency to evaluate others in terms of botho/ubuntu. Surely related is the tendency to interpret history in personalistic terms which has been noted in recent work of the Oral History Workshop (Bozzoli 1987:12).

Miriam Tlali's (1979) ethnographic novel of daily life at a retail furniture, radio, and appliance store shows some of the ways a botho/ubuntu and a Christian perspective are effected by the structure of the work place. The protagonist, a Black female clerk, is attune to the moods, personalities and ethical conduct of her White co-workers and adjusts her behavior accordingly. They, on the other hand, react to her in stereotypical fashion and are insensitive to her individuality. They tolerate her presence because her work is invaluable, but treat her as a nuisance.

Tlali describes many seemingly minor incidents which reflect opposing perspectives on proper human conduct. Below is her account of an imaginary encounter between two strangers, one White, one Black, while both are shopping.
It is meant to answer the question "What do you get when you respect a White person?"

You are standing next to a smartly-dressed white lady perhaps near a counter, both waiting to be served. She inadvertently drops something which you quickly rush to pick up and hand to her. She in turn grabs it from your hands without even thanking you. She may perhaps even give you a scornful look. You see, according to her, you picked up the article because it was your duty to do so and she does not have to be grateful to you. If you were daring enough, you might perhaps ask why she does not thank you, and very likely she would throw in your face, 'My girl, you must remember that I am white and you are black!' You suddenly realise that you should never have picked up the article. That if you had not, you would have spared yourself all the degradation, aggravation and humiliation, and that would serve as a lesson you would never forget, you tell yourself. But sooner or later, you find yourself 'respecting' again and extending your hand to help because you realise that it does not help to be bitter. You laugh at yourself and you shrug your shoulders. It is because you have been taught by your Christian mother to respect all humans. You slowly learn that not all Christian mothers teach respect; some teach that respect must be shown only after looking at the colour of the skin. (Tlali 1979:62-63).

It is common knowledge that some Whites, as directors of Black labor, attempt to control Black comportment and demeanor as well. Yet, these judgments are often capricious and arbitrary. In these cases, a common response is to ridicule the peculiarities of the bosses. Maria Mokoatleng (1989:4) tells the story of Mary and Dorries, two young housekeepers who work in Johannesburg's White suburbs. Both are single and quite fashion conscious. They spend much of their money on clothing, shoes, and fashion accessories.
Dorries' employer becomes jealous and fires her, saying she needs only one master in her house. Dorries tells Mary of her plight. To her surprise, Mary's employer offers to take Dorries in as well. The employer tells Mary that she enjoys seeing Mary dress nicely because it makes her feel proud. To Basotho this is a humorous incident with a moral: one woman's jealousy is another one's pride. Yet, it also shows the keen, shared awareness of how the lives of Black people hang on the status consciousness of Whites.

**Perceptions of Race.** As a "White male" travelling by bus and taxi through Lesotho and South Africa I have been consistently impressed by the open and friendly manner in which I have been received. Even during the heart of the 1987 mineworkers' strike, miners accorded me considerable hospitality, especially when it was learned that I spoke some Sotho and was living among Basotho. Informants suggest that this indeed has to do with the concept of botho/ubuntu. Yet, it would be incomplete to leave it at that. While Basotho do not generally seem to be racists, stereotypes about Whites do abound nonetheless. Bosko (1983:67-68) described the stereotypes he heard during his fieldwork. Informants told him Whites are freer from disease than Basotho, that they have small sex organs, and that they are less voracious in their sexual appetites. Further, some people suggested that Whites are intelligent, have strong "medicines" (litlare), and are fantastically wealthy. Some
rural Basotho went so far as to say Whites must be something like angels, particularly in their beautiful white color.

Seger (1986:138-143) notes a similar sense of awe communicated by Xhosa and Sotho-speaking informants. She also relates the sense of longing for the days of paternalistic (or more exactly, maternalistic) White rule which some of her informants expressed. She argues that an "image of the benevolent White" is common in the rural Transkei and gives a number of examples, two of which I include below:

I grew up with these Whites in Matat[iele] and know them very much, I also know these Blacks and I would prefer it if these Whites stayed here and it remained South Africa.

A calf feeds from its own mother and how would it be if you took the mother away? That's how it is if you take the Whites away from us—we have fed from their breasts. (Seger 1986:143)

I have heard similar opinions expressed in Lesotho. One young man, a high school student, told his family and me this joke:

On the day of creation a White man and a Mosotho are brought before God. God asks the White man what he would like. The White man replies that he desires intelligence (bohlale). God then asks the Mosotho what he wants. The Mosotho stammered, then replied, "Ah, my Lord, I'm just accompanying the baas" (Che, morena, ke felelitse base feela) (fieldnotes, December 11, 1987)."

The teller of the joke insisted that Black people, particularly Basotho, are not as clever or inventive as Whites. When I pointed out that the differences he observes
may be due to differences in education and other opportunities, he still objected that Basotho are lagging behind. Even though he accepted that Basotho could learn such things as how to build airplanes from White people, he still maintained that Blacks are following only, not doing the inventing themselves. Such views of Black worth are remarkably in accord with dominant White ideology. In one newspaper poll of White opinion undertaken in 1974, for example, ninety percent of the respondents agreed with the statement "It will be many years before the Bantu will reach the same level of civilization as the Whites" (quoted in Lever 1979:187).

Still, the image of the benevolent, intelligent White does not quite tell the complete story. The image synthesizes local, long-term, experience many rural Blacks have had with paternalistic White missionaries or administrators, helpful teachers, expatriate development workers with a professional/bureaucratic ethic, and so forth. Yet, there is a flipside, namely, "the image of the wicked White." This negative image is less likely to be described directly to individual Whites, but is more readily encountered as Blacks recollect acts of brutality perpetuated by other Whites. For example, after the 1982 raid on Maseru I heard considerable invective expressed about the cruelty and callousness of White South Africans. Mayer's (1971:48-51) urban informants openly complained to
him about Whites. In such discourse Blacks have no difficulty seeing Whites as cruel, vindictive, selfish, and exploitative. The "wicked White" may steal from Blacks, beat or torture them and take great pleasure in doing so.

In Lesotho and many parts of South Africa, the wicked White image is typically associated with Afrikaners. Indeed, it is difficult for many Africans to think of Afrikaners in different terms. I was once informed by a man from the mountains that the "Boers" (Maburu) and some people (Batho) were having a meeting to discuss the Highlands Water Project. I asked him if "Boers" were not people too. He took very little time in responding, "There are very few Boers who deserve to be called "people" (Ke Maburu a fokolang haholo ba ka bitsoa 'batho'). Still, other Whites are not immune from such characterizations. The journalist Mabogoane (1988:8) indicates that it is common for Africans to refer generally to Whites as animals because animals, like Whites, do not know how to greet their fellows.

That there is an image of the wicked White suggests that Black consciousness of Whites is only "false" to the degree that it is portrayed incompletely. When this image is seen together with the image of the benevolent White what is suggested is a Manichean view of race relations. But this is still one in which events in South Africa are understood in terms of character, rather than structure--personal characteristics rather than structures of domination. Such
a perspective accords with the colonial experience of missionary protectors, on the one hand, and settler/conquerors on the other. However distorted this perspective may be, it is not mystification. If rural Blacks show a lack of sophistication in understanding the contemporary social and economic conditions which shape South Africa, this is because of poverty and inequitable access to cultural resources. In any case, their views are rooted in their experience as rural, autochthonous peoples. As such, however, views are changing as experience of wage labor, landlessness, and dispossession increases. Newer images which have long been part of the urban experience are also taking shape in the countryside and in the urban periphery. Class-based perspectives are evident in the views of union activists like James Motlatsi. Their importance will be shown in the analysis of recent events at the Vaal Reefs gold mine given in chapter nine.

In an urban, quasi-industrializing environment such as that of Maputsoe it is not surprising to find negative images of Whites. What is more surprising, however, is to find paternalistic images of Whites in this same setting. This is certainly due to the recentness of the industrialization but it is also related to the demography of White control. In the small shops of Maputsoe usually one or two Whites are in charge of daily operations. In Burawoy's (1985) terms they are typically managed in the
style of "paternalistic factory regimes." As Mrs. MM from Maputsoe told me, she likes her (White) boss "because he understands their problems." A White boss who treats his workers as human beings, is understanding of personal problems (perhaps to the extent of giving cash advances) is seen in benevolent terms.

At the mines, it has already been mentioned that workers are standing up to White miners, indeed, fighting back when attacked. And workers mobilized on a massive scale over wages and working conditions. In anthropologist Gluckman's phrase "an African miner is a miner" (cited in AIM 1977:29). Yet, it is not adequate to dismiss as "racist nonsense" the suggestion that African miners are also Africans, with some perspectives that derive from African languages, religion, and epistemology.

For example, the dangerous nature of mine work reinforces belief in concepts of supernatural causality. As Malinowski (1954:79) pointed out long ago, the practice of magic provides psychological comfort in a dangerous, capricious environment. Nash (1979) has shown that this is the case for Bolivian tin miners, while Taussig (1980) argues that for these miners the dangerous world underground retains an "enchanted" quality that is foreign to capitalist, commodity production. In South African mining the underground world is also enchanted. The mines are inhabited by ghosts, spirits, and dragon-like snakes (linoha tsa metsi/iinyoka
zamanzi). Indeed, a mine is itself perceived as a sentient being that devours workers (Coplan 1987). Satan also figures in South African mining discourse, although miners sometimes refer ironically to him as a fellow Black worker or as a human adversary who can be defeated. This contrasts with the Bolivian image where Satan must be humbly propitiated.\textsuperscript{10}

In mining folklore, underground snakes (linoha/iinyoka) are responsible for cave-ins and tremors. They are dangerous, fire-breathing, creatures who live in the water which constantly threatens to flood the mines. The snakes may come suddenly upon workers and kill them. They are associated, therefore, with Satan or angry ancestral shades (balimo/izinyanya), but do not usually figure in the mining songs, lifela, that Coplan (1986; 1987) has written so eloquently about. The snakes can be controlled by powerful "medicine" (moriana/umuthi) which is known only to Whites. Miners who accept the folklore interpret underground geological testing as a crucial part of this "medicine."\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, an important distinction is made between the White person's world of ordinary knowledge and that of ordinary Blacks. The world of modern technology may be "White," therefore outside the realm of knowledge typically available to those who are not White. Whites control this technology not only materially, but metaphysically as well. Even outside the mines Whites may have distinct power over
technology. Tlali (1979:99) relates that it is not unusual for illiterate Blacks to believe that Whites have supernatural power over some types of machines. Muriel, the protagonist of her novel about a radio, appliance, and furniture store, mentioned this in reference to some Black customers who bought radios on installment from the White-owned store where she worked. Some came to believe that the White merchants used their special power to prevent the radios from playing of those who were late in making their monthly payments.

In mining folklore, the fundamental imbalance between White and Black resources is sometimes righted with the assistance of supernatural forces, however. This is especially the case in the many stories miners tell about the ghosts (lithotsela/isithunzela) who inhabit their subterranean world. In one version (that recorded in AIM 1977:29), the ghost comes upon the miner in an isolated part of the shaft and writes a substantial amount of money on his belly, perhaps R5,000 to 10,000. The miner is told to show this mark to the White payclerk. The payclerk will pay the miner the amount written. If he refuses, a part of the mine may cave-in on unsuspecting White miners.¹²

**Status and Wealth.** Race and status are inexorably mixed in South African popular perception. While Whites are often considered naturally to be wealthy, wealthy Blacks are sometimes referred to as "Whites" (makhooa/abelungu, more
literally, "Europeans"). Thus, it is not uncommon for a Black employee to refer to his Black employer as "my European" (lekhoa la ka). A mineworker who has completed his contract and is returning home laden with cash also is called a lekhoa or White. So too are the African bureaucrats who administer rural areas in the Transkei (Segar 1986). 13

Bosko (1983:101) notes that high status people like shopkeepers (of whatever race), chiefs, and lingaka (shaman) are often regarded with suspicion in Lesotho's villages. They may be suspected of liresetlo, ritualized murder committed to gain supernatural power. "Basotho," Bosko writes, "impute the use of powerful medicine, eg. bits of human flesh, to persons such as successful shopkeepers. They reason that medicine like that composed from human flesh must account for the wealth of such a man" (1983:100). In folk wisdom, extraordinarily rich and powerful Black men, like Whites, occupy a liminal status because they are not bound by the ordinary rules of social life (Bosko:101). Lesotho's scholar-priest Pula (1988), gives some indication of the extent of these beliefs. His informal surveys suggest some 90 percent of Basotho believe that witchcraft (boloi) is practiced by their fellows. Leat's (1988:77) formal survey of approximately 500 mineworkers indicates that 59 percent believe that witchcraft exists at the mines.
Still, a belief that inequality is in the natural order of things is widely held as well. It is only when differentiation becomes extremely distorted, or when wealthy individuals refuse to comply with the ideals of botho/ubuntu, that suspicions are raised. One of my informants, 'MaSanthe, told me that division into rich and poor was unavoidable. She explained this in terms of an analogy with the situation of school children. In school no one wants to fail, she argued, but some students are smarter or harder workers. The class sorts itself out; if one is first another must be last. When asked if riches were brought about by intelligence/good sense (kelello), cunning (bohlale), or theft (bosholu) she said it could be any of these things. More important for her was that we are all created by God (Molimo) and he created us with unequal gifts.

Deference to authority is marked in political ritual. This is especially noticeable in the pitso, a kind of "town" meeting said to have originally been established by Moshoeshoe as a kind of national forum. These days, while pitso(s) at the local level continue to provide some opportunity for ordinary citizens to speak, they are often used by the state to announce policies; compliance is expected. Speakers—be they the government representatives or visiting dignitaries addressing the crowd, or local people responding—typically begin in formulaic phrases of
respect and humility (ho isa hlopho). The king, the chiefs, government workers, and other relevant social categories are listed in order of status as each speaker begins. Questions from the audience are asked ka hlopho, respectfully, and the general term for deference and respect, morena (my chief, my lord), is ubiquitous.

A sense of "natural inequality" is most pronounced in age and gender relationships. In folk belief, youths live to serve their elders. This is expressed in the popular proverb, Lefura la ngoana ke ho rungoa (literally, a child's "oil" is in being sent). Despite the migrant labor system, elders have been able to maintain a degree of control over their sons because of the formers' authority over rural resources and the social institutions legitimizing marriage (particularly in bridewealth transactions).¹⁴

Migrant labor and the subsequent shortage of men this causes has led to high levels of female participation in local level politics. For example, women frequently made up the majority in the village development committees through which Jonathon's BNP exercised his patronage and control. Still, Mueller (1977) suggests that women's high participation in the public realm has not led to an elevation of women's status in general. A majority of rural women continue to see their primary role as wives, rather than as citizens of Lesotho or of a particular village (Mueller 1977:154). And, while in actuality leaders are
generally chosen on the basis of their abilities
(particularly their good sense, *kelelelo*), regardless of
gender, "the belief that women are spiteful, bad spirited,
and jealous is often expressed by both women and men"
(Mueller 1977:158). Mueller argues these perspectives
should be interpreted in terms of the migrant labor
situation. Women cannot achieve independent authority as
long as they are heavily dependent on the wages of their
husbands. Meanwhile, it is they who must fight the everyday
battles for scarce, locally available resources. Also,
because their status is so tied to the unpredictable, risky
nature of a male's career, (for whom women are in
competition), it is women, rather than men, who are
stereotyped as jealous and spiteful.15

For many women rural life is perceived as oppressive.
Some simply resent male control and are attracted to urban
life. Oftentimes, however, women have no rural assets,
children to feed, and no one to support them. For them the
housewife/farmer ideal is simply a dream. As we have seen,
some manage to find employment in Lesotho, but others work
illegally in South Africa, or support themselves through
beer brewing and/or prostitution. The figure of the female
beer-seller and the prostitute are dominant images in
popular consciousness. Indeed, as Coplan (1987:425) has
pointed out, the Sotho word commonly translated as
"prostitute" (*letekatsa*) in practice often means any
independent woman not under the guardianship of a man. Outside such control a woman is morally suspect.

The urban culture of Matekatse (plural form of letekatse) has diffused into the countryside so there is now a well-developed ideology which runs counter to that depicted above. In this perspective, men are seen primarily as a resource to be exploited (Gay 1980:294; Coplan 1987:426). Women returning from South Africa may entertain their fellow bus passengers in Lesotho with tales of their exploits. On one trip between Maputsoe and Maseru a beer-guzzling young woman spent an hour regaling men, calling them pigs (banna ke lifariki), who were only interested in their own sexual satisfaction. Some men responded to her charges, most just shrugged and said, "Ah well, she's a letekatse".

Because of the migrant labor system, women are caught in a gender compliance bind similar to that which pertains in the system as a whole. Just as men and women must comply with, rebel against, or accept the political economy, so women must respond to the gender situation the political economy has brought about.

Conclusions. I have included detailed evidence about popular perceptions of concepts of the person, race, and status in order to suggest that recent popular thought has not yet been adequately described and has often been misunderstood. Wallman (1972) in particular was too quick to label behavior "hypochondria" or "apathy" without
investigating what it is a person means when they say, for example, they are tired (ke khatetse) or they are sick (kea kula). I too have heard these phrases, quite frequently from apparently healthy, vigorous people. Yet, it also seems to me that they generally infer "I would like a cup of tea" or "I have been working hard." In such case, they are expressions of social solidarity with those whom one shares botho.

Alverson's (1978) position has evidence to support it, even in Lesotho. In miners' songs (lifela), for example, miners do not see themselves as dominated victims, but as heroic men (Coplan 1987). Similar themes are also present in written Sotho literature (Shanafelt 1988). Yet, Alverson's view is too static and mentalistic and therefore distorts the phenomenological perspective which he professes.

My own depiction of the phenomenological world of work, race, and status suggests that "culture" is not an inoculation that cures one from experiences of discrimination, physical deprivation and hardship. Culture can ameliorate such experiences but it is in turn modified by them. Some individuals attempt to live completely within the framework of their home world, others opt out, taking on a view of themselves that derives from new experiences with the wage labor economy and the ideologies of conquest and/or resistance. This dichotomy is expressed in popular thought by an ambiguous attitude towards modern technology. On the
one hand, the commodities and tastes of industrial, consumer society are highly regarded. On the other hand, the modern technological world may be identified as "White" and somehow out of the material and spiritual control of ordinary, rurally-based, Black people.

**NOTES**

1. Furthermore, this perspective is not necessarily out of keeping with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. See the section on the work of Alverson below.

2. On his phenomenological method, Merleau-Ponty writes: "The true Cogito does not define the subject's existence in terms of the thought he has of existing, and furthermore does not convert the indubitability of the world into the indubitability of thought about the world, nor finally does it replace the world itself by the world of meaning. On the contrary it recognizes my thought itself as an inalienable fact, and does away with any kind of idealism in revealing me as 'being in the world'" (1962:xiii). Hence colonialism rests on relations of domination that are also "real," it cannot be defined simply as the mental states of those involved. These are indeed important but no more so than than the materially supported conditions of domination.

3. But, we should add, trade union militancy continues to be attenuated by an ideological shift from agricultural to small business ("petty bourgeois") aspirations.

4. But not in a predetermined fashion. The social and cultural world is sensitive to chance factors, any of which may have a "butterfly effect;" that is, a single incident may have systemic effects (a butterfly flapping its wings may change the weather). See Gleich (1987).

5. Literally, a person is a person through others. The proverb takes the same form in Xhosa: Umntu ngumntu ngabantu.

6. When I was robbed in Maputsoe, neighbors told me that I should have killed the "dogs."

7. Miriam Tlali makes the point more eloquently in a novel to be discussed below: "The whites, with a few exceptions, are ignorant of the Africans' living conditions. This is partly due to their indifference and partly to their misconceptions. The Africans, on the other hand, know more
about the whites because they have to know them in order to survive. With even fewer exceptions (in fact a very negligible proportion) their daily bread depends entirely on their going into the white homes, factories, garages, offices, or standing at their doorsteps looking for work, pleading or even begging. With the Africans it is a matter of life and death" (1979:11).

8. McNamara (1980:309) noted that mining compound managers are nicknamed in this way. For example, one manager was nicknamed Thandabantu (one who likes people), another, Mabulal 'ehleka (one who kills you while laughing). An Anglo-American inquiry on the violent clashes that occurred at Vaal reefs in 1985/1986 also provides some insight into this practice. A popular manager there was known as Mashukumisa (the shaker-upper), while an unpopular one was called Tsotsi (gangster, hoodlum) (Bregman Commission 1987: PT71/2629-2631).

9. Peires writes that there is similar old joke told among so-called Coloured people of the Kat River settlement:

    God asked the Chinaman: What will you do?  
    And he said: I will keep a shop.  
    God asked the Jew: What will you do?  
    And he said: I will go into the clothing business.  
    God asked the Bantu: What will you do?  
    And he said: I will work with a pick and a spade.  
    Then God asked the Coloured: What will you do?  
    And he said: I will follow the baas. (Peires 1987:87)

10. In his discussion of miners' songs, Coplan argues that this "is a form of defiance directed at the powerful and often contemptuous mine clerks, who refer to the miners as satane tsa makhisa ('long-haired devils')" (1987:422).

11. Many local people interpreted the geological testing done at the Ha Katsi dam site in these terms. The White geologists were said to be there to secha paola (search the fire-box) in order to control the giant khanyapa snake that is thought to stretch beneath the mountains.

12. Not all of the miners' ghosts stories have to do with interracial relations. In another version, informants told me that after an amount of money is written on the miners' arm, he is instructed to save that amount for the benefit of his people at home. If he refuses, he will go mad.
13. Experience of European domination has led to the same categorizations in other parts of Africa as well. On Zaire, Jewsiewicki writes: "At the level of popular discourse, race relations are used to express class relations by the likening of the black bourgeoisie/bureaucracy to the white race" (1989:326).

14. See, for example, Murray (1981). Only those who are legitimately married may be allocated land.

15. Gender relations, whatever their "traditional" form, have obviously been radically transformed by the migrant labor system. Boonzaier and Ramphele (1988) provide a particularly dramatic example of the gender exploitation that is fostered at the migrant workers' hostels in Cape Town.
CHAPTER 6

RITUAL, IDENTITY, AND FOLK KNOWLEDGE: A CONTROLLED COMPARISON

This chapter continues the discussion of the mental and the material in Lesotho in terms of Runciman's explanatory aspect of understanding. This is done through the comparison of data from three areas in Lesotho—an urban area, a rural, Sotho-speaking area, and a rural, Xhosa-speaking area. Some tentative judgments linking the context and content of thought are made in this way, although the conclusions remain somewhat speculative. As noted in the introduction, experimental tests of the materialist hypothesis are problematic because of the complexity and interrelationship of the factors involved. Nonetheless, controlled comparison does yield insight that might otherwise be lost. In keeping with this observation, the chapter suggests some ways ritual practice and ideological discourse appear linked to changes in material circumstances and some ways in which ritual and thought appear to have some autonomy from material circumstances. Perhaps more questions have been raised then answered, but this underscores the point that causal explanation is a crucial aspect of interpretation and understanding.
Even social analysts who do not appear to posit causal hypotheses often end up making interpretations based on assumptions about causal links between variables. For example, historians of Africa have shown that many phenomena once thought to be "traditional" and unchanged are recent innovations (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Knowledge of such historical processes often allows the analyst to posit explanatory hypotheses that are not otherwise apparent. A succinct example of this is McAllister's (1987) fine analysis of the umsindleko ritual, a rite of incorporation practiced in many rural, Xhosa-speaking communities.

McAllister shows that the umsindleko practiced today has undergone significant modification. Today it is a large beer drinking feast for one's friends, kin folk, and neighbors. The elders recall, however, that it used to be a much smaller scale event, an animal sacrifice (umhlinzeko) performed for the household by a father for his returned son. Elders explained the change to a new form of ceremony in mystical terms. The umhlinzeko ritual, they told McAllister, is only acceptable when there is a proper relationship between the ancestral shades and their living kin. But, some young men had returned home after their stay at the mines in a condition not acceptable to the ancestors. The elders argued they had been bewitched. They felt, therefore, that animal sacrifices to the ancestral shades were inappropriate, even dangerous. Consequently, the
umhlinzeko ritual of thanks to the shades was abandoned in favor of a general community celebration not directly linked to them. McAllister explains the change in another way: migrant labor undermined the power of elders and caused generational conflict. The conflict was ameliorated when the ritual moved out of the household domain and into the community. The umsindleko gave more freedom to the returned migrants while continuing to channel their energies toward community interests. Furthermore, it continued to provide a returnee with a satisfying welcome home.

This example is a clear case of historical research establishing variability around which causal explanations can be formulated. An antecedent condition, A (authority of elders, umhlinzeko ritual) is followed by a consequence, B (decline in authority of elders, umsindleko ritual). The change in A is then explained in terms of intervening variables (migrant labor, enhanced power of youth). Weber (1975) argued that such arguments about cause and effect are an integral part of historical research. Similarly, all physical sciences are historical in that they are based on such patterned relationships over time.

The present chapter is also concerned with patterns of thought and behavior. But, the focus here is with variability in space rather than in time. The content involves patterns in ideological practices and beliefs of three present-day communities, each of which vary in a
particular way. My aim is to examine the effects of a group of "independent variables," (degree of urbanization, language used, and the extent of interaction with other peoples) on a set of dependent variables including attitudes, ritual, and belief. In other words, I am looking at some indicators of identity, and at factors that make these features vary across communities. Some of the similarities and differences found between the communities are based on shared historical experience, others are not.

As I previously indicated, the three communities of my stay in Lesotho differ in several respects. One, Mguyeni (a pseudonym) is a predominately Xhosa-speaking area in southern Lesotho. The second, Maputsoe, is an urban, border town. The third, Ha Dinku (another pseudonym), is a mountain village. Three months of participant observation were spent in Maputsoe, ten months in Mguyeni, and two months in Ha Dinku.1 A survey was conducted in each area with the aid of two assistants. Forty-two individuals were questioned in Mguyeni, seventy-four in Maputsoe, and sixty-four in Ha Dinku. Numbers of men and women varied from place to place but the total number is equal. As noted below, these groups were not randomly selected, but nonetheless appear representative. Survey respondents are compared below in terms of personal characteristics such as age, household size, education, rural capital, etc. Following this, local ritual life is compared and contrasted
as it relates to political perspective and identity. Lastly, the survey and the results found are discussed.

**Comparison Group Characteristics**

When taken as a whole, survey responses conform to a considerable degree to distributions in the census data. (See Appendix II.) For example, average household size is seven, with the mean number of children three. Rural resources are meager: an average of 1.23 fields, 15.4 sheep and/or goats, and three head of cattle. The range of ages sampled is large, from a stated age of 16 to a stated age of 89. The mean age is 41, old enough to be in the course of development cycle "prosperity". Thirty percent consider themselves to be unemployed; twenty-six percent are employed locally. However, migrants are under-represented, comprising only thirteen individuals. Average education is just to the fifth grade level (standard five).

Ferguson (1985) argues that distinct, non-transferable, domains of wealth are operative in the countryside. For example, he maintains money may ordinarily be traded for cattle but cattle may not ordinarily be traded for money. Similarly, cash may be converted to individual housing but individual housing cannot be converted to cash. Land is not a commodity for sale, he argues, therefore neither are houses. In general, land holdings are so small that they are frequently inconsequential. These factors mean some of the poorest people are land owners without access to wages.
People may be poor in several domains—in standard of living (particularly in clothing) or in kin-based resources (particularly those from which bridewealth payments may derive)—but wealthy only in one (livestock).

Ferguson's perspective is insightful, but has certain limitations. First, things are different in urban areas where profit from land is more easily obtained (however surreptitiously) and housing exchanged for rent. Also, there is little opportunity to amass stock in town. In town, only the very richest can afford to rear animals at distant cattle posts (The late prime minister had a substantial herd of cattle and sheep in the mountains of Leribe district). For most urban people, therefore, all domains of wealth are conceived in monetary terms.

Similarly, Ferguson's (1985:198-199) perspective on land is debatable. For one thing, unlike his analysis of cattle, it emphasizes the legal nature of property in land while eschewing local interpretation. Few people in the mountains maintain that land is unimportant for their well being. And the present survey indicates there are a small number of individuals living in the mountains who have significant (in local terms) land holdings. In Ha Dinku 25 percent of the sample are landless while five percent control more than five fields. One individual has eight. (He also has the resources to maintain them.) A situation like this makes for a general sense of relative deprivation. This is
further reinforced by the wide ranges in livestock ownership. For example, eleven of the twelve wealthiest sheep and goat holders come from Ha Dinku. Seven own 124 or more, with the richest man in the sample owning 300. These men are also wealthier than their fellows in land and cattle. The wealthiest man not from Ha Dinku is a store owner from Mguyeni. Significantly, he is able to keep much of his livestock at mountain cattle posts. As one might expect, there is also a higher degree of landlessness in the urban group. But in the mountains, landed people (especially women) are less likely to consider themselves unemployed. The data support the conclusion of a major difference between the mountains and the lowlands in the capacity to accumulate agricultural assets. Ferguson's survey was restricted to one small village subsection (ward) in the mountains and therefore failed to take into consideration possible differences between mountain and lowland villages. The rurally-based worldview Ferguson so admirably describes is dying out as agricultural assets diminish.²

Xhosa and Sotho speakers in the groups vary little in the above items. The major difference between them is in church affiliation. This is more important than it first might seem. Recent historical studies show the important role missionaries have played in the formation of ethnic group identity in southern Africa (Vail 1989). In Lesotho, the
missions founded by French protestants and conservative Catholics (Order of Mary Immaculate) are still dominant, but have had little impact on Xhosa-speakers. Most Xhosa-speakers in southern Lesotho resisted Christianity until the early 1960s when their principle chief began forming links with Anglicans in the Transkei. Nowadays, Xhosa-speakers mainly attend Anglican or African independent (so-called "Zionist" churches), but there are still some who continue to reject Christianity.

Religious change is occurring rapidly in Maputsoe as well. Here a number of Christian sects are engaged in vigorous evangelical campaigns to win adherents to particular brands of doctrine and worship. Like the Africanist churches West (1975) studied in Johannesburg, these place a heavy emphasis on healing and spiritual power. High rates of violence and crime are explained both in terms of the anger of the ancestral shades and of the wickedness of human nature. Christian sects and denominations also provide worshippers distinct ideological perspectives. These range from Pan-Africanist and egalitarian to individualistic and competitive.

All in all, the hypothesis that there are important material differences between rural and town life, and mountain and lowland villages, is supported. These differences do not pertain to level of formal education, however. Differences in this regard, if they should exist
presently, are not likely to become evident until the second generation of urban life.

Rituals of Community

Initiation. In a classic ethnography on the Basotho of Lesotho, Ashton (1967:49) noted that circumcision ceremonies (lebollo) were becoming rare. Murray (1979:355) considered them nearly obsolete. Given the validity of diminution, by the 1980s initiation had regained popularity, especially the ceremonies for males. Bashemane, makoloane, litsoeiane, and bale (males and females in different phases of the initiation process) are common sights in rural areas, particularly in the mountains. Their feasts are popular, widely attended events.

In the process of resurgence, initiation has undergone certain changes. Its form—fitting the classic pattern of separation, liminality, and incorporation—has remained the same, but the category of initiate has changed. These days middle-aged men and women commonly join the ranks of youths in training. While it is still primarily a rite marking the transition of youths to adult status, it also has other functions. For adults, initiation is an affirmation of community and social solidarity, an attempt to return to the balance disrupted by conflict and violation of the moral order (melao). Images of ancestral spirits appear to uninitiated adults and request them to undergo the training. This sign or "calling" from the ancestors cannot be ignored.
For some, it is an event that explains affliction. For others, it is a duty, neglect of which may cause it.

Sotho male initiation requires the active participation of hundreds of people from several villages. It is opened and closed in dramatic ceremonies which take considerable effort to coordinate. Up to fifty or sixty males can be initiated at a time. Initiates have to be fed and continuously monitored during their two or three month mandatory absence from the village. This involves the participation of both men and women. Women participate by carting foodstuffs from their homes to an area in the mountains near the initiation lodge where men collect it.

In contrast, Xhosa initiations (ukwaluka) in Lesotho are smaller-scale affairs, generally involving three to a dozen participants. They center around a village section rather than the community as a whole. This is true even where Xhosa are in the majority and the number of potential participants is high. In practice, however, Xhosa-speaking villagers become involved in a cycle of successive initiation feasts, celebration of which moves from place to place over a period of several months. Opening, intermediate, and final feasts are held and on each occasion a sheep or goat is slaughtered for the community in the name of each initiate.

Sotho and Xhosa initiation vary significantly, but there is no rule that bars a person from one group undergoing
initiation in another. Sotho-speaking informants in the mountains where there are nearby Xhosa-speaking families say that it is not uncommon for a young man to be initiated twice, once in the Xhosa style, once in Sotho. Some young Sotho-speakers are attracted to the different style of Xhosa initiation. For the minority Xhosa, however, participation in both initiations allows them to claim "Sothoness" without giving up their Xhosa heritage.

Because it is less centrally organized, Xhosa initiation may have been historically less susceptible to disruption. Sotho initiations nearly died out because of strong mission opposition. The initiation depends on the authority and leadership of the chief. When Christian chiefs criticize initiation or refuse to cooperate the whole system is disrupted. Still, causal relationships are difficult to determine. On the one hand, it may be that Xhosa initiation is strong because of widespread attitudinal resistance to mission-style Christianity. On the other hand, it may be that the structure of Xhosa ritual has allowed Xhosa-speaking people to be relatively more resistant to Christianity. The resiliency of Xhosa ritual is evident in other areas as well, as in the umsindleko rituals mentioned above.

Rituals, Redistribution, and Authority. While Xhosa rituals of incorporation have been transformed recently, Sotho ones have been abandoned. The umsindleko continues to
be practiced among Xhosa-speakers in southern Lesotho and are essentially the same as those described by McAllister (1981). In contrast, a similar ritual, the matlatlo, is no longer maintained by the Sotho. This has implications to be discussed below.

An intense cycle of Xhosa ritual including umsindleko, umguyo (initiation feast), umtshotsho (youth dance), and udini (feast for the ancestral shades), suggests that much of the wealth of Xhosa-speaking migrants is distributed throughout the community. But this has costs and benefits. On the one hand, Xhosa practice promotes social solidarity, on the other it promotes competitiveness and conspicuous consumption. For example, a migrant may raise his status in the community by outdoing his fellows in the lavishness of his umsindleko. This means that greater quantities and more potent kinds of alcohol are continually being introduced. Also, the sacred nature of the ceremony may sometimes give way to belligerent drunkenness and fighting. Nonetheless, in Lesotho the Xhosa ritual cycle seems to have successfully muted— if only, perhaps, temporarily—generational and sexual cleavages. At present, the benefits of frequent community rituals of redistribution outweigh the costs of the occasional conflict. Not only do they function to feed those in the community without access to wages, they also help maintain strong bounds between migrant workers and their homes. Miners regularly return on weekends from as
far as Rustenberg to participate in ritual events. They may even help organize them from their places of employment.

For the many Basotho, bridewealth (bohali/lobola) transactions have taken on distinct characteristics which make them especially important in the contemporary world. Sotho elders have been able to maintain a degree of control over their juniors through the maintenance of high bridewealth compensation (Murray 1977). This high bridewealth insures that wealth will be accumulated by migrant males and redistributed to the older generation.

Marriage among Sotho-speakers of Lesotho requires some of the highest bridewealth payments to be found in the South African periphery. Whereas Xhosa-speakers are generally expected to contribute ten beasts or fewer to the bride's family, Sotho customary law requires twenty cattle, ten sheep or goats, and a horse (or a negotiated cash equivalent). This difference is not to be explained away simply as a "traditional" cultural difference. Murray (1977:90-91) points out that despite the cultural similarities between Tswana and Sotho, bridewealth payments in Botswana are much less than in Lesotho. He suggests causal relationships be sought in the varying economic conditions of the household.

The variations among rituals discussed so far are depicted in the following table:
Table 2. ECONOMY, RITUAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND.

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<th>Bridewealth Norms</th>
<th>Rites of Incorporation</th>
<th>Environment/Economy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho's Rural Xhosa</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Transformed</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Sotho</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Abandoned</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Tswana</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Different</td>
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Source: Murray (1977); author's field work.

Since they share a common economic situation, the apparent difference between Xhosa and Sotho-speakers in Lesotho suggests that economy alone is not sufficient to explain differences in ritual, other, "cultural", factors play an important part in such determinations. Murray himself is not unaware of this. Although he stresses a materialist perspective, he also notes that "For historical reasons which have much to do with their tenuous grip on a separate political identity, Basotho lay stress on and show affection for those aspects of custom which particularly enhance this identity. Bohali at twenty cattle, ten sheep and a horse is one of these aspects of custom" (1981b:117). Unfortunately, not enough data about bridewealth transactions among Xhosa-speakers were collected to make further statements in this regard.

In contrast to the umsindleko feast, bohali transactions contribute primarily to the subsistence fund of the household (Murray 1977:91). Maintenance of these rituals therefore functions to assert household over community
interests. The dominance of **bohali** helps explain why community-based rituals like the **matlatlo** were abandoned by Basotho. Xhosa-speakers followed a different path when they abandoned the household-based **umhlinzeko**: they thereby asserted the priority of community over household. This latter tendency is reflected as well in volunteer organizations and societies like those of African Zionist churches or of diviners (**amaggira/mathuele**). While both types of groups can be found in all parts of the countryside, they have longer traditions and enjoy a higher status among Lesotho's Xhosa-speakers.

Both bridewealth and **umsindleko** contribute to the maintenance of a rural ideological system which asserts control of juniors by elders. However, this control remains tenuous at best in Lesotho as a whole. In many places, be they villages or towns, the system of reciprocal obligations maintained by community and household ritual are threatened by capitalist exchange and ideology. The dominant social events of everyday life involve neither bridewealth nor reincorporation. Rather, they revolve around the sale of commercial and home-brewed beer. In some cases this takes the form of a well organized beer party and dance (**focholo, stokfel**), organized by a group of women to supply a revolving fund of credit. More frequently, the beer brewing and sale is organized and funded by an adult woman for the benefit of herself and her household. In recent years
commercial alcohol has become quite popular as well. Many women now buy commercial beer in bulk and sell it individually at a substantial mark up. Since establishing its partnership with South African breweries the Lesotho government has profited from this trend and has actively promoted it. There are now state-managed wholesale liquor distribution warehouses in most of the districts.

Obviously, the widespread selling of home-brewed and commercial alcohol reinforces the status of those with money. These are usually migrants or government employees. On some occasions impoverished elders attempt to parlay their traditionally high status for free drinks. Or, elders may show great deference to their juniors in begging for a gift of beer. Similarly, migrants enhance their esteem by offering generous gifts of beer to their companions.

Profuse beer brewing and selling, based on the economic needs of households for cash, contributes, therefore, to the enormous potential for conflict which is present already through migrant labor alone. As noted above, the beer trade helps undermine the authority of elders and contributes to generational conflict. Similarly, a woman's role as an entrepreneurial brewer may conflict with her widely accepted role as housewife, mother, and farmer. For many women beer and bar culture have become an established way of life. Many have come also to depend on the gifts of money or goods they receive in exchange for sexual favors. Competition for
affection and fiduciary rewards in the context of alcohol consumption accounts for a great deal of the violence that is part of everyday life.

Ritual Life in Town: The Growth of Independent Churches. In urban Maputsoe and other parts of lowland Lesotho the established rituals of community which sustain rural life are being superseded by those of the independent churches. Rituals of community can be found in mission and African independent churches, but the independent churches are particularly vital. For first generation town folk independent churches provide new forms of community, social organization, and moral authority as well as psychological support in conditions of uncertainty and leadership roles for the relatively unschooled (West 1975:197-199).

In Maputsoe, a plethora of religious interpretations and ritual forms are being scrutinized and tested. Mission Christianity and Afro-Christian derivations are discussed and debated commonly on the streets and at the work place. While many townspeople find Zionist or Apostolic churches too unsophisticated or emotionally unrestrained for their tastes, others are attracted to their powerful use of song, dance, and oratory.

Some of the more influential independent churches in Maputsoe are the Twelve Apostles in Christ Church, the St. John's Apostolic Faith Mission, the Zionist Christian Church (Z.C.C.), and the Church of Moshoeshoe. There are also a
number of small Zionist groups, such as St. Patrick's Church in Zion, whose membership usually does not exceed fifteen or twenty. Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists are commonly found passing out literature on the streets; their doctrines are particularly debated since they directly challenge beliefs relating to the ancestral shades.

The Catholic Church, however, is still very popular. Besides the benefit of tradition, it has the advantage of controlling the local primary and secondary schools. Although some catholics cast aspersions on the independent churches, many are drawn to the message of healing which they proclaim. Those who wish to remain in conformity with catholicism or the policies of other mission churches sometimes attend secret church services (kereke ea sephiri) in which the healing rituals ordinarily practiced in independent churches can be found.

For present purposes, two independent churches have been selected because their message is particularly germane to questions of ethnic and status identity. The first to be considered is the St. John's church. Founded in the Transvaal (at Katlehong/Evaton) in the 1940s it continues to have a wide following in South Africa. The second is the Twelve Apostles in Christ Church. It was founded more recently in Durban by Pakhathi Moapostola (Phakhathi the Apostle). In terms of West's (1975) terminology, both may be described as "Apostolic;" that is to say they retain
elements of African belief within a structure and style of worship quite similar to mission churches of the past. Members believe in the power of the Holy Spirit and are sometimes possessed by it. However, they are quick to point out that they do not dance and whirl to the beat of a drum as Zionists commonly do.

The St. John's church has been popular in South Africa since at least the 1940s when it developed its distinctive style under the leadership of the late Mrs. Christina Nku (known to her followers as Ma Nku). Sundkler (1961:320) describes her as a "Sotho-speaking Ndebele." Her duel ethnic background undoubtedly contributed to the church's pan-ethnic emphasis. One of her principle followers, Bishop Masango, established his branch of the St. John's in Lesotho in the 1970s. Today both Ma Nku and Masango are revered as prophets. In church, God may be referred to as the God of Masango (Molimo oa Masango/Nkosinkulu kaMasango); some members wear buttons with photographs of Ma Nku or of Masango.

The St. John's people have their major center at Lekokoaneng, about a twenty minute bus ride southwest from Maputsoe. In Maputsoe they have a smaller church and flat of rooms. Both church and rooms are painted white with blue trim, the church's colors. The blue is said to be associated with the sky and heaven, white with peace. There is a full-time minister whose needs are looked after by a
group of five young women and two men. This group lives and works on the church's grounds while they seek cures for spiritual affliction.

Major church services are held on Wednesday and Sunday. Members, especially women, wear a standard uniform. Women wear blue skirts, long white jackets, blue sashes draped diagonally over the shoulders, and blue nylon cords wrapped several times around their waists. Their heads are covered with white berets or head scarves. Men wear sports jackets and dress slacks, with blue sashes draped over their shoulders. Men and women sit on opposite sides of the room, facing one another. The preacher dresses in long white robes and carries two meter-long metal rods. Some of the women also carry staves but theirs are considerably shorter.

Like most other Africanist churches, St. John's preaches a non-racial, humanist philosophy. Believers proudly relate that church members come from all ethnic and racial groups. A distinguishing feature of the St. John's worship service is that it is carried out simultaneously in Sotho and Zulu. This practice was developed in the multi-linguistic context of urban South Africa but is maintained in Lesotho even though virtually everyone speaks Sotho.  

Nearly every aspect of the service is conducted at a feverish pitch: testifying, translating, and singing, are all done in rapid-fire succession. Participants literally take communion on the run. The steady blending of languages
also contributes to high emotion and, as Sundkler (1961:320) says, makes for a sense of sacredness and mystique. A significant feature of the service is that each member is given the opportunity to stand before the group and give an evangelical testimonial. As she or he does so another member stands with them, translating. This is no ordinary feat. The effect is contrapuntal and rhythmic. It is as if an emotional sermon of one American tent-meeting evangelist is simultaneously translated into Spanish by another tent-meeting evangelist. Members of the congregation often go into trance as they testify and feel the power of the Holy Spirit upon them.

In contrast to the emotional message of St. John's church, the message of the Twelve Apostles Church (Lekhotla la Baapostola ba Twelve) is decidedly staid. Worshippers wear fine suits and fashionable dresses, rather than a standard uniform. Services are initially conducted by a small group of dignified men who sit together in a row before the congregation. They each make formal speeches before the principle moruti (preacher) makes a dramatic entrance from the back. Holy Spirit possession occurs, but only during an allotted time of the service. During this period worshippers from the congregation may stand and relate a message in a trembling, falsetto voice. This is thought to come directly from the Holy Spirit.

The Twelve Apostles church appeals chiefly to Maputsoe's
small business community and aspiring middle class. Many of the leaders are successful businessmen. They believe in the role of the ancestral shades, faith-healing, and manifestations of the spirit, but they are not willing to reject the solemnity of mission-style Christianity. Also, in the style of Jehovah's Witnesses, members attempt to win converts during the week through visiting and evangelizing friends, neighbors, and acquaintances.

The view of the Twelve Apostles Church with respect to the ancestors is distinctive and peculiarly individualistic. An ancestor is conceived as a sort of personal god (molimo, plur. balimo). Parents, as potential balimo, are to be revered. Every individual has the potential to be godlike because he has been given the spirit of God (Motho e mong le e mong ke Molimo hobane o file moea oa Molimo). It is this potential that makes faith-healing possible for the ordinary person. Despite this apparent pantheistic thrust, members fervently deny their views are pantheistic. They argue that emphasis on the spiritual power of the individual does not deny the essential unity of God. Be this as it may, the Twelve Apostles have established a workable synthesis between traditional belief about the ancestors and the individualism of capitalist enterprise.

Folk Knowledge: Reflections on Self and Everyday Life

One of Alverson's (1978) techniques for learning about Tswana epistemology and worldview was simply to ask people
broad, philosophical questions about life in a systematic fashion. Such a survey was completed for the present study as well. Also included were a set of questions derived from the work of psychologists Loevinger and Wessler (1970) and Holt (1980). Some common themes gleaned by the author from this survey are discussed below. These themes concern "common sense" views of everyday living, morality, and authority. After the themes are described, various similarities and differences within and between the groups will be presented.

The Practical Considerations of Everyday Life. A set of diverse philosophical questions about: 1) "development" (ntlafatso ea sechaba/ingqubelo yesizwe), 2) the requirements of a "good life" (ho iketla/ukunwaba ngempilo), and 3) the relative merits of life in the past and present elicited responses representing similar social concerns. Not surprisingly, given the reality of everyday political and economic events, there is overwhelming concern with material interests and the state of social life.

First of all, there is an ubiquitous hunger for jobs and money. Some people express a preference for type of job (teaching, banking, sewing), but many are looking for anything that will provide a secure income. For men this usually means mining, for women, local jobs or small-scale trading. However, few men seem to identify with mining; instead mining is a means to an end. The new ideal is to
acquire the material goods that will make their lives healthier and more comfortable. Agriculture is still important for a few, but only a small minority give it a high priority.

After material concerns, survey respondents regarded social harmony and cooperation as central to their well being. Some people expressed this simply as a desire for "peace" (khotso). They feel that modern life has become a battle (ntoa). For many the increasing violence and strife of recent years is obvious; but it is difficult to understand nonetheless. The source of conflict is often identified locally, as a loss of respect for one's fellows. Hunger and want are recognized as serious problems generating such conflict, but individuals are just as likely to say that personal greed and the loss of moral standards are the cause of it. There is a general feeling that there are many jobs in South Africa which Basotho are being denied for political reasons. Nevertheless, only one or two people of the 180 questioned linked local social problems directly to the politics of apartheid South Africa. Problems which manifest themselves locally continue to be explained in local terms.

People tended also to evaluate the past and the present in terms of material and social concerns. When asked which is better the major criterion of judgment was either standard of living or degree of social and political
harmony. The sample as a whole was split on this question—about the same number favored the past as favored the present. However, urbanites tended to idealize the past, generally seeing it as a time of great prosperity and plenty. Lowlanders also put greater emphasis on social and political harmony in general, perhaps indicating that they enjoy less of it in practice.

Morality and Authority. The ideological system that has supported a sense of habituation to chiefdom politics and labor migration continues to find substantial support at the verbal level. As will be discussed in chapter seven, the image of Moshoeshoe continues to be important. However, there is less consensus when it comes to lower levels of the chieftaincy. While it is clear that most people surveyed believe that local chiefs can fulfill an important symbolic function necessary for maintenance of community identity and social solidarity, this is less the case in town. But even in the survey as a whole there is some suggestion that more and more people are seeing this function as obsolete.

At the level of the household and local community a great deal of emphasis is placed on duties and obligations. The ideal man or woman complies with norms (molao/umthetho) of morality and respects (ho hlonepha, ho hlonepha/ukuhlonipha) self and others. This is conceived as something of a personal challenge. Individuals most "hold themselves in check" (Sotho, ho its'oara hantle) or "govern themselves
properly" (Xhosa, ukuziphatha kakhle). However, occasional examples of counter ideology were manifested in the survey as well. While most people took the questionnaire quite seriously, several women established joking relationships with the survey taker. One jocularly suggested, in response to the question, "What is the thing you like about yourself?" that the thing she liked about herself was her vulva (sepantu). Such frankness and teasing is not uncommon among those women in Lesotho who, for one reason or another, have come to accept the perspective of the so-called "matekatse."

Nonetheless, most people questioned believe it is everyone's duty and responsibility to marry and establish a family. Men accept that it is their responsibility to labor for their families and support them materially with their wages. But this is the norm; actual practice may vary. Women are aware of this and express anxiety about the role of men as providers. Many suggest that a man's worth is shown by the extent he provides material support to his family.

**Group Similarities and Differences.** Statistically, most significant differences in responses to the questionnaire were between urban and rural areas or between the lowlands and the mountains. Only a few differences were found between Sotho and Xhosa-speakers. This evidence can be used to support one, two, or all of the following positions: 1)
Sotho and Xhosa speakers share quite similar cultures; 2) contemporary perspectives are shaped by migrant labor; and 3) urbanization is a more important factor in determining attitudinal positions than are ethnic differences. I believe all three are correct.

Two differences between Xhosa and Sotho-speakers are worth noting, however. First, although Xhosa-speakers have a favorable attitude toward Moshoeshoe I, their interpretation of his life varies slightly from that of Sotho-speakers. They are less likely to stress his personal leadership qualities and his humanity (botho/ubuntu). More see him as important for preserving his land and traditions. Secondly, although the data are limited and must be treated with caution, Xhosa-speaking men surveyed tend to stress social and emotional obligations to their households and community slightly more than do Sotho-speaking men. (See Appendix V, Part II, item 8, where p=.002.) If this is indeed true, it lends support to the previous suggestion that slight variations in ritual style have important ideological consequences.

Men in each of the groups were interested in making investments with monetary returns. But, as might be expected, men in the more rural areas expressed a greater commitment to the rural economy. They were more likely to say that agriculture or crafts are good ways of making a living, urban men more often mentioned formal sector
employment.

As mentioned above, most men questioned would welcome the opportunity to work at jobs not in mining. Not one of the thirteen miners questioned mentioned mine work as a good way to make a living. In contrast, nearly half of them argued that farming was a good way of life. This despite the fact that the agricultural assets of this small group are quite slim, averaging only about five sheep or goats, two head of cattle, and less than one field. Most of the migrants who mentioned farming were from rural areas, although the number of urban migrants questioned was too small too make any statistically reliable generalizations.

The relatively wealthy agriculturalists tend to come from the mountains so it is not possible to compare them across groups. However, when compared to the entire sample, they share some important perspectives. All but one of them referred to material concerns when talking about the "good life." This is a much higher percentage than the group as a whole. The group as a whole placed more emphasis on social harmony. The relatively wealthy farmers also are favorably disposed towards the present (67 percent); and eleven of twelve say that material conditions have improved.

Conclusions. The "controlled comparison" of three areas in Lesotho has yielded some highly suggestive information. First, ritual life varies and has been obviously transformed in each of the areas. But ritual, whatever its form, has
aided people in coping with the stresses of migrant labor and urbanization and allowed them to maintain a tenuous sense of community. This has not proceeded in a mechanical fashion. Seemingly minor variations in ritual practices have had important, unintended consequences for communities as a whole.

The migrant labor ideology which puts a premium on rural life is still upheld but is being superseded by capitalist market mentality. It has severely eroded in town where money counts for everything and theft is an everyday occurrence. People from the mountains have been most successful in accumulating rural resources and remain most committed to farming. But even in the best places, the numbers of relatively successful farmers are extremely few. As the rural base rapidly declines jobs, money, and the things that one can buy increasingly define the nature of "the good life."

NOTES

1. Over two years were spent in the area of Ha Dinku as a Peace Corps worker from 1982-1984. Therefore my initial experience there precedes the implementation of the Highlands Water Project. All of my survey data were collected before the dam project began to have a noticeable impact in the area.

2. Not touched upon here is Lesotho's wealthiest and most powerful group, the bureaucrats and entrepreneurs of Maseru.

3. A bit of minutia stands out in my memory in this respect. Once, while attending a lelingoana ceremony (a ritual marking the beginning of isolation for male initiates) I heard a middle-aged woman intersperse her traditional
ululations of praise with shouts of "Compral! Compral!"
Compral is the brand name of a popular and widely advertized
pain reliever which comes from South Africa.

4. Informants themselves were vague as to the reasons.

5. Many of the independent churches realize the harmful
consequences of alcohol abuse and have banned members from
drinking.

6. One comparatively highly schooled person suggested that
their very newness makes the independent churches suspect.
The long established tradition of the Catholic church, he
argued, gives it much more validity. Another skeptical
person suggested that many young people are drawn to
independent churches simply because they like to sing and
dance. As Blacking (1981) has demonstrated, music is a
central element in the expression of Zionist worldview.

7. So too are the Anglican and the Lesotho Evangelical
Church.

8. Similarly, in Swaziland where nearly everyone speaks
Swazi and understands Zulu, St. John's services are
translated into Sotho (Sundkler 1961:320).

9. It is not unusual for people of differing ethnic groups
to agree on the importance of particular belief or rituals
but to vary on the specifics of interpretation.
PART III.
CROSS-CUTTING BOUNDARIES:
IMAGES OF THE PAST, ACTS IN THE PRESENT
CHAPTER 7

NATIONAL IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY, AND THE EXAMPLE OF MOSHOESHOE

"Lesotho" is not merely a construct of apartheid planners; it has mental and material "reality" for the people who live there. It is a land and a people with a shared experience of history. In once sense Lesotho is real because it has meaning and is important to its citizens. In another sense, Lesotho is a physical reality whose landscape shapes and is shaped by the experiences of its residents. This physical association of African people with land takes on additional importance as a symbol of autonomy in a South Africa typified by the dispossession of the land of millions of people. Land legitimately fought for and legitimately maintained, as Lesotho has been, is of tremendous symbolic importance for its people. Yet, the very precariousness of its geographic position and the distinctiveness of its history suggests questions about the meaning of Sotho "nationhood" in the larger South African context.

A shared sense of origins, participation in state-formation, and a legacy of resistance to outside domination gives Lesotho a legitimacy that is missing in most of the Bantustans. Lesotho has a local ideology which is capable simultaneously of legitimating political authority while
being held above the mundane world of political struggle.¹
Thus, much of what is happening there continues to be
interpreted in local terms. The present levels of violence
and conflict are seen as aberrations or deviations from
ideals established in a mythical past. This sense of the
past provides one of the major supports to the entitity
"Lesotho." Yet, this notion of distinctiveness can be
maintained only as long as ideals are broad and flexible
enough to be adapted to the changing demands of material
experience. As fortunes change in South Africa, so might
the conception of Lesotho.

Lesotho owes its semi-autonomous existence more than most
states to what may be called a "sensitive dependence on
initial conditions."² A myriad of factors including good
fortune in leadership, warfare, interpersonal relationships,
diplomacy, and geographic location all played a role in
Sotho state-formation. There was no recognizable Sotho
state before the lifagane/mfecane wars of the early
nineteenth-century. Prior to this time people living on the
South African highveld were organized in local chieftaincies
which were loosely linked through ties of kinship. The wars
changed all this. Warriors under the Northern Nguni chief
Shaka raided villages through much of Natal and sent their
victims fleeing for refuge in the highveld. A number of
Sotho-speaking chiefs survived, even prospered, by offering
shelter to these refugees in exchange for their loyalty.
One of the most successful in increasing his following in this way was a young chief known popularly as Moshoeshoe.

Both folk conceptions and historical scholarship support a common view of Moshoeshoe as a man of extraordinary talent and foresight.\(^1\) It is generally held that his military and diplomatic skill in warding off enemies and attracting allies was instrumental in assuring that the people he ruled would have a place, albeit one reduced in territory, which they could genuinely call their own. Likewise, Moshoeshoe was fortunate in finding help from relatively sympathetic Europeans such as the French missionary Casalis.

Casalis and his associates arrived in Moshoeshoe's domain in 1833, the lifagane battles not yet finished. They often acted as arbiters between the Sotho and the British as the Sotho chiefs sought allies against Afrikaner conquest. Casalis got on well with Moshoeshoe, and through his correspondence, helped Moshoeshoe become known as an African leader of superior intelligence and diplomatic skill. Because Christian missionaries had a role in the very founding of Lesotho, Christianity itself constitutes an integral part of Sotho historical memory.

Today, the model represented by Moshoeshoe and his times is still an important metaphor for local political discourse. My purpose in the present chapter is to present evidence showing the role that the memory of Moshoeshoe plays in current political ideology and values. The image
of Moshoeshoe is one of the central elements constituting the identity of the nation. The Moshoeshoe example represents a kind of charter of conduct to which people of various statuses, religious beliefs, and ethnic backgrounds can identify. It is, to a certain extent, a confirmation of Leach's (1953) view of the power of ideology, that is, the way in which political beliefs can overcome just such differences.

As a first, and fairly typical example, I quote from a speech given by King Moshoeshoe II on March 12, 1986 in honor of the national celebration of "Moshoeshoe Day":

In the year 1786, a baby was born in the house of Mokhachane at Menkhoaneng. This baby grew up like all Basotho children. But quite early in life, he showed that he was out of the ordinary, a man very different from other men. He welded together his clan, and added to it other tribes, not by seizing their property and annexing their land by force of arms; the amalgamation was effected by diplomacy, sympathy and dedicated service. This man ably shepherded his new nation against such terrible odds as Lifaqane Wars, dire poverty, marauding vagrants, and fierce battles. In the end he managed to save his people by a miracle we do not understand to this day. This took place on the world-famous mountain of wonders, Thaba-Bosiu, which has become the Mount Zion of the Basotho.

When this wonderful man died, on the 11th of March, 1870, he left us a valuable legacy: a land, a United Nation, and peace. His greatest teaching was that man is God's respectable creature, who should not be defiled in any way whatsoever. He meant thereby that leadership should be characterised by honesty, sympathy and devotion to duty. To this end, he taught his sons and people that a chief is such because of the people, that is, the nation rules. (Moshoeshoe II:1988)

This is a view of the past shared by many people in Lesotho, from king to commoner, migrant mineworker to street
vendor. Typical of responses to a question I asked about Moshoeshoe I's contemporary importance comes from a 25 year old store clerk in Maputsoe:

The example of Moshoeshoe I is still important for us these days even though we may have difficulty in living up to it. Despite the difficulty though we try by all means to follow it. His example is that of being a truthful friend and neighbor, both to individuals and to different nations. A person should try to forgive another, even if that person has really done him or her wrong.

Some foreign scholars who have studied Lesotho's history and who have visited there as well as other parts of Africa suggest that Lesotho's national identity somehow sets its people apart from people living in South Africa. Leonard Thompson, a well-known South African historian, noted in the epilogue to his biography of Moshoeshoe that:

Although Moshoeshoe's political system has been superseded and his country impoverished, his legacy endures . . . the Basotho possess significantly more cultural integrity and social cohesion than Blacks who became subjected to white South Africans. When they work in the Republic, Basotho have to submit to the discriminations and humiliations experienced there by other Blacks, but at home in their villages they have preserved an atmosphere of freedom. (Thompson 1975:329)

The Grahamstown based anthropologists John and Cassandra Perry express a nearly identical view:

One of the most striking features of the Basotho is their sense of identity, their belief in themselves as a people and a nation. This feeling has been forged by
their long struggle to preserve from many competitors their mountain fastness with its rich arable lands along the Caledon River. Central to their idea of nationhood is their reverence for Moshoeshoe who united a number of disparate and heterogenous clans and tribes and welded them into the Basotho nation. (In Jingoes 1975:242)

Historian Jean Herskovits (1988) concurs with Thompson and the Perrys in her March 1988 Moshoeshoe I Memorial Lecture. She also quotes from a notebook kept by her father, the anthropologist Melville Herskovits, to support this view. During a visit to Basutoland (as it was called then) in July of 1957 he recorded that: "It has been a pleasant time . . . staying in an atmosphere that is psychologically relaxed after the tensions of the Union" (Herskovits 1988:26).

Yet, we must attempt to separate the historical figure of Moshoeshoe from the ideology that surrounds the remembrance of him. King Moshoeshoe II, in the speech just quoted, went on to compare the "miracle" of his great-great grandfather's life, to the "miracle" of the military coup of January, 1986. According to the king, the coup was a Moshoeshoe-like action in that it was motivated by a desire to end internecine feuding and return the nation to peace. "What the Army is after," he said, "is reconciliation, peaceful co-existence, justice and fair play in all areas of life. They wish to remind everybody of the golden rule:
'You shall love your neighbour as you love yourself'” (Moshoeshoe II:1988:9).

The king here is obviously attempting to use Lesotho's past to justify current actions. He is not alone. The late prime minister, Leabua Jonathan, frequently utilized it to justify his long period of rule, just as it was used by opposition figures to denounce him.4 The idea of Moshoeshoe provides a model for proper human conduct: one should be just and fair, opt for peace over war, reconciliation over vengeance, and incorporation rather than exclusiveness. What then becomes at issue is how best to achieve these goals and who should best achieve them. Critics deplore the misuse of Moshoeshoe's memory and suggest that it is often something which political elites hide behind while they go about plundering the wealth of the nation.

In addition to explicitly referring to the Moshoeshoe paradigm of conduct, people often utilize metaphors which make reference to the days of his reign. In a letter to the editor of the Sesotho newspaper Moeletsi oa Basotho (Oct. 18, 1987) a man complained of favoritism in the government bureaucracy and in the schools. He suggests that a wealthy or high status person is likely to receive better service than will an ordinary citizen. He gives extra force to his complaint by introducing the subject with metaphors associated with praise-poetry (lithoko) and folklore (lits'omo); his prose suggests that favoritism is like a
great mythic beast or like the thunder clouds and reminds Basotho of the days when cattle and was one of the principle things which defined their strengths.  

In 1988 a series of meetings were held between government officials and church leaders to discuss the continuing political discord in the country. In the meeting which the government called to break off the talks, church leaders challenged the new government to live up to the promises which had been made during the period immediately following the coup, that is, to live up to the example of Moshoeshoe:

In our statements we repeatedly pointed out that Moshoeshoe I's example was one of dedication to true peace.

When the present government took power, we applauded the announced program of Reconciliation, Peace, and National Unity and the intention of putting an end to the difficulties which have beset our land for these many years. On our side, we have left off offering any advice to the government until the present moment.


This interchange between church and state reveals another aspect of discourse relating to Moshoeshoe; contemporary interpretations of his example often parallel church derived examples of Christian ones. If we refer to the king's speech of March 12 once more, we notice that as it recounts the story of Moshoeshoe I's life it is peppered with
Christian metaphors of redemption—shepherded, miracle, wonders, Mount Zion, and so on. Aspects of Moshoeshoe's life which do not fit this standard are conveniently ignored.

Although Moshoeshoe was never officially baptized, he is known to have publicly expressed some sympathy for the Christian message of his missionaries. Sanders, citing missionary sources, wrote that during the first few years of missionary residence in his territory: "[Moshoeshoe] attended church regularly and encouraged his people to follow his example; sometimes he was moved to tears by a sermon, and often he was so caught up with it that he repeated it afterwards at great length to anyone who cared listen" (1975:127). Within five or six years he was allowing people to bury their dead in accord with Christian teaching rather than with Sotho custom. He also refused to have his younger sons initiated (ho bolla), permitted two of his converted wives to divorce him, and repudiated the killing of people suspected of witchcraft (Thompson 1975:91-95). There were periods, however, when he became disillusioned with Christianity, particularly because he saw a great gap between the rhetoric of his missionaries and the behavior of their fellow Europeans. In one well-known incident Moshoeshoe advised the senior chief of the Kwena clan not to accept Christianity for himself, even if he deemed it acceptable for his subjects. Reinforcing this
message, he sent the chief presents of guns and livestock (Sanders 1975:150). In a recent dissertation, Bosko (1983) argues that Moshoeshoe's relationship with the missionaries was based more on the practical considerations of rule than it was on spiritual concerns. Moshoeshoe, he maintains, used the missionaries as he did his other clients to strengthen the administration of a growing state.

Near the end of his life, Moshoeshoe's heart seems to have softened once more to the idea of Christianity, though it may have been that he was merely attempting to appease his "missionary chiefs." In 1863, after Roman Catholic missionaries had been with his people for a year, he was recorded as having said to one of them: "Though I am still a pagan, I am a Christian in my heart" (Thompson 1975:319). In the last days of his life the Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed vigorously to win the aged Moshoeshoe to their prospective sides. Moshoeshoe requested a dual baptism but this was completely unacceptable to them. Finally, as he was nearing death, he made preparations to publicly accept the Christianity of his old French Protestant missionaries. Unfortunately for them, he died just a day or two before this was meant to take place (Thompson 1975:318-23). It is possible that he was merely putting them off because he did not want to set a precedent of choice that would divide his people. His long reluctance to be baptized is certainly also related to his desire to
retain his polygynous household and the system of patron-client ties which were associated with it. Moshoeshoe's marriage alliances were a crucial part of his strategy for holding his political domain together.

After Moshoeshoe's death, the monarchy did not become officially identified as Christian until the conversion of Griffith to Catholicism in 1913. By becoming directly associated with Christian themes, though, the monarchy in Lesotho has been able to avoid some of the ideological challenges that other monarchies in Africa have had to face. Lemarchand (1977), for example, has suggested that in other African states with monarchies: "Major threats to monarchical legitimacy arose from the ideological resources made available through Christianity" (Lemarchand 1977:18). In Lesotho this has not exactly been the case although Christianity has fostered divisions in society. Most of the higher ranking chiefs are Catholic and the Catholic hierarchy was actively involved in the foundation of the conservative Basutoland National Party (BNP) in the 1950s. Protestants have tended to be less conservative and more likely to support the opposition Basotho Congress Party (Breytenbach 1975). Still, the principle of monarchy has rarely been attacked.

A further example of the association of Moshoeshoe with Christianity comes from Lesotho's independent church movement. One of the country's first independent African
churches began shortly after a local Protestant preacher had a mystical vision which included a vision of Moshoeshoe. In 1909 or 1910 this man, Walter Matitta, began preaching a message which challenged the authority of the White-controlled churches. Matitta claimed to have had a vision of heaven in which he saw both Christ and Chief Moshoeshoe. Moshoeshoe charged him with the task of founding an authentic church for his people. Matitta went on to found the Kereke ea Moshoeshoe (Church of Moshoeshoe) (Mohono 1981; Haliburton 1975). This church still exists in Lesotho today, although its membership is relatively small and it has lost much of its original emphasis.

Also during the period of the growth of Matitta's church, independent political organizations began to be formed for the first time. One of these was the Lekhotla la Bafo (Council of Commoners), founded in the 1920s by teachers, shopkeepers, and farmers. It too made use of the ideal of Moshoeshoe and was closely associated with Matitta (Haliburton 1975:123-125). As well as appealing to such people and the lower ranking chieftaincy, it also sought support from what one historian of the group has called "the fundamentally alienated social forces in the country--the marginalized, women, landless, and poorer migrants" (Kimble 1985:65). At the time it was the principle organization through which ordinary people expressed their opposition to colonial rule and economic exploitation, but it gradually
gave way to the political parties which were formed in the 1950s. Despite a certain leftist rhetoric, the organization expressed support for the principle of monarchy and chieftaincy. What they stressed was that these institutions had become corrupted and were no longer accountable to the people in the way they had been in the days of Moshoeshoe. One Lekhotla la Bafo leader, H. M. Tsoene, wrote to the British "Aboriginal Protection Society" in 1932 to express such views:

Chief Moshesh [Moshoeshoe] as the collector and founder of this nation had established a parliament known by the name of 'Pitso' and it was through its medium that he was able to consult his people . . . He had no power to enforce his desires which are in conflict with the popular desire of his nation . . . [The present king] destroys all measures which Chief Moshoeshoe had created for the maintenance of good relations between himself and the people and has become a tyrant of the worst description. (Quoted in Edgar 1988:165-66)

Josial Lefela, president of the League, provided an explanation for the loss of a responsible chieftaincy. It was the result of Europeans who were scheming to corrupt the chiefs so as to be able to easily remove them and take their land:

As the chiefs are entrusted with the right of preserving and looking after the social laws and customs which bind together the people as one harmonious whole upon their chiefs, it was contrived that through a policy of treachery and betrayal the powers enjoyed by the chiefs over the people must be ruthlessly taken away; and . . . the chiefs in the protectorates must be deluded to misuse their powers and rights over their people to maltreat and oppress them . . . so that it may be easy for the Europeans to
take Basutoland to exploit and enslave its indigents. (Quoted in Edgar 1988:107)

So, even in the view of the most radical organization of the time, the legitimacy of the principle of chieftaincy was not really questioned and Moshoeshoe was still held in very high esteem. In fact, Lefela used to pray to Moshoeshoe. He gradually came to feel that: "For the Basotho the appropriate mediator with God was not Jesus Christ or St. Peter, but Moshoeshoe" (Haliburton 1975:125).

The Basotho Congress Party (BCP), formed in the 1950s under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle, received the support of Josiel Lefela. In many ways it was the heir to Lekhotla la Bafo philosophy. While it strongly denounced alleged abuses of power on the part of the chiefs, it too refrained from directly attacking the institution of kingship. Also during the 1950s, leaders of the Pan-African Congress evoked images of Moshoeshoe and other personages of the heroic past in their efforts to win support for their cause (Gerhart 1978:148). Moshoeshoe I and his descendant Moshoeshoe II remain important figures in Lesotho. Although there have recently been indications of some disenchantment with the notion of kingship on the part of some leaders, this does not appear to be very widespread (Legum 1988:B658).7

Lesotho is almost exclusively a Sotho-speaking country, yet there is a small Zulu-speaking population in the northern district of Berea and a larger population of Phuthi
and Xhosa-speakers in the southern districts of Quthing and Qacha's Nek. It is important to note that Moshoeshoe has also been held in high regard by their leaders. The Vundle chief, Chief Mhamha, for example, was eager to express this to a visitor in 1934:

> From time to time the Chief would come and address us and explain how his ancestor Moshesh had been a great and wise Chief, who, instead of fighting his neighbors, had made friends with them even when he was attacked, and had founded the Basotho Nation. He told us how Moshesh's wife had drawn his attention to the Bavundle clan of the Bafokeng living among the Tembus, and how Moshesh in his great wisdom had given them this beautiful fertile stretch of land to settle in" (Meyerowitz 1935:39).

A survey conducted by the author in 1987-88 indicates a continued and strong appreciation for the Moshoeshoe-ideal. Sixty-nine percent of a sample of 42 Xhosa-speakers from Quthing agreed that the ideal is still important today. In urban Maputsoe, 58 percent of a sample of 76 agree, while in the mountains, 93 percent of a sample of 64 agree. Many also show appreciation of the gap that exists between the ideal of Moshoeshoe-like conduct and the behavior that exists in reality. This is particularly the case in the urban area. About 24 percent of those questioned there said that, while they appreciate the value of the Moshoeshoe-ideal, it is no longer important because people today no longer pay any attention to it.

What, then, are the effects of the Moshoeshoe-ideal as ideology? Does the memory of Moshoeshoe "weigh like a
nightmare on the brain of the living," that is, does it inhibit the development of working class or other more universal forms of political consciousness? And does this adherence to a nineteenth-century based model of Sotho-Christian heroism serve to reinforce a national identity that is potentially divisive and harmful in the greater South African context?

The on-going conflict in Natal between Buthelezi's Inkatha and supporters of the UDF is one example of how "traditional" values can be made to serve apartheid ends. While it is certain that many people living in Buthelezi's domain have had little choice but to show support for his Inkatha organization, it is equally certain that many have also found his revitalization of Zulu nationalism appealing. Here, the founder of the Zulu nation, Shaka, and Moshoeshoe are clearly parallel figures. It is significant that Buthelezi has made "Shaka Day" a national holiday in Zululand. As a skillful politician, Buthelezi links his Inkatha movement with a heroic vision of Shaka and the Zulu past while at the same time including distorted symbols of the African National Congress in Inkatha regalia.

Yet, the uses of the past are many, at least as many as are the practical considerations of the present. Historical figures—with all the ambiguities of their lives and the ease with which diverse biographies can be created—are subject to various uses. As a scholar and activist Marx was
acutely aware of the role of historical figures in the creation of new social movements. While the thrust of his argument in the 18th Brumaire is that revolutionary movements need to address themselves to new conditions in new ways, just as a beginner in a new language must eventually think in terms of new idioms, he also pointed out that: "the awakening of the dead in these revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not parodying the old; of magnifying the given task in imagination, not of fleeing from its solution in reality" (Marx in Marx and Engels 1977:98).

Within Lesotho, the Moshoeshoe-ideal remains important; outside it's usefulness is more restricted. In South Africa Moshoeshoe is simply one among a number of the African heroes of old. Yet, he is not completely irrelevant. In remaining true to the sort of Moshoeshoe-ideal described to me by the grocer in Maputsoe, a Mosotho in South Africa could express a Pan-African philosophy (although specifics may vary), believe in peace and diplomacy (but not at the expense of autonomy and freedom), and work for justice rather than give in to abuse. When expressed in this abstract way, the Moshoeshoe-ideal can clearly be seen as a moral code that, far from being irrelevant or harmful to liberation movements, is a positive factor which may contribute to their realization.
Still, the answer to my questions about the implications of the Moshoeshoe-ideal are not to be found on paper, but in the way in which events play themselves out in the region. For the politician in Lesotho who makes deals with South Africa, Moshoeshoe may mean peace at all cost over conflict of any sort, reconciliation, when necessary, over an already compromised autonomy, and short-term business interests over concerns about social justice. Circumstances in Lesotho have not forced most people to make a choice between one perspective or the other as they have in Zululand. If they do, however, the result could be just as devastating. Indeed, chapter nine shows how mineworkers are being forced by circumstances to make similar choices.

NOTES

1. Cohen (1988) argues, following Hannah Arendt, that it is characteristic of legitimating belief systems to appeal to an outside authority to which even the most powerful members of society must bow.

2. The phrase is from "chaos" theory. See Gleich (1987).

3. For the view of "liberal" historians see the biographies by Thompson (1975) and Sanders (1975).

4. Similar dialogues with the past are going on throughout South Africa. One of the masters of symbolic manipulation is M. Buthelezi, the Zulu chief and head of Inkatha. He falsely purports to be from a long line of advisors to the Zulu king. (See biography by Mzala 1988). Thompson (1985) discusses the changing uses of "Afrikaner" history in his The Political Mythology of Apartheid.

5. His words are: "Basotho chabana sa khomo se arohane likoto-koto ke khethollo lits' ebeletsong. Khethollo ke kholumo-lumo, leru le lets'o ho bana ba Thesele." (Moeletsi oa Basotho, October 18, 1987).
6. The name "Moshoeshoe," for example, is a praise name which refers to a particularly bold theft of cattle from a rival chief (Thompson 1975:6). In his youth Moshoeshoe frequently engaged in cattle raids and men were killed in the process. There is also one tradition that claims Moshoeshoe once had five of his subjects put to death for failing to promptly carry out his orders (Sanders 1975:139).

7. A. C. Manyeli, leader of a small political party known as the NIP, and the well-known historian Dr. Mosebi Damane recently debated the attitude of Moshoeshoe towards governance in three issues of the Sotho paper Leselinyana la Lesotho (July 1, 1988; July 29, 1988; and August 26, 1988). Manyeli's charges that Moshoeshoe wanted to leave the government of the nation strictly in the hands of his descendants and that he regarded commoners as no more than "fleas in his blanket" were regarded as inaccurate, even slanderous, misrepresentations by Damane.
CHAPTER 8

LOCAL IDENTITIES:
BASOTHO AND AMAKHOSA

I am not aware that there is any feeling of animosity or what between the Basutos on the one hand and the Xhosas on the other as such. We do not have any tension. People in the south-eastern part of the country do interact a lot with people from the other side of the border, but there have never been really any reported incidents of tension and things like that. The only incidents you could hear of could possibly be those of theft, that one side would allege that the other side has stolen cattle, things like that, but they have never resulted in any serious tensions -- Member of the Delegation from the Kingdom of Lesotho to an Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry on Violence and Unrest at Vaal Reefs Mine; Speaking on August 7, 1987 (Bregman 1987:PT134/5035).

By focusing on "experience," the new social historians of South Africa have opened a tremendous domain for investigation. Each locale--be it cattle post, village, workplace, residence, or administrative center--has a history that could some day be written. So too, could a history be written for the various familial, religious, cultural, economic and political associations which link any number of people and locales. The present chapter is concerned with examining the complexities of such microlevel situations. Yet, Morris (1988) is right to ask where studies of these sort will lead.
Part of Weber's (1975) answer to this question was that we study something because of its interest to us. Some interpretivists may wish to leave it at that,¹ as Winch (1958) has done. Weber does not, however. He argued instead that history, like physical science, should have a problem focus and a concern for generalization. We agree with this view. This chapter focuses, therefore, on a general problem—the nature of group identity—and on a particular case in light of that problem—the case of Sotho and Xhosa interaction in southern Lesotho.

Defining the Group

After its rise to power in 1948 the Nationalist government of South Africa sought to maintain rigid, unambiguous, boundaries between peoples of all colors, languages, and ethnic backgrounds through the implementation of apartheid legislation and policies of "separate development."² Most obviously, apartheid has separated "White" from "Bantu," "Colored," and "Asian." But such crude typologies are inadequate to depict the perceived variations between the African population that occupy various geographical regions of the country. For this Whites rely on folk understandings of what constitutes a "tribe" or tribal nation. For many Whites there are, for instance, widely accepted distinctions between the so-called Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Swazi, and Shangaan. "Experts" speak also of such subdivisions as Mpondo, Thembu, Dlamini, or
Mfengu. Some of these subdivisions are based on nineteenth-century chieftaincies; in that case "tribe" has come to refer to a group smaller than a given linguistic and cultural area.

The first South African anthropologists and missionaries based their studies on the assumption that local peoples were organized according to definite and bounded groups. For anthropologists the word "tribe" took on a technical meaning--a community of people living in the domain of a particular chiefly authority. Yet, missionaries and others who were confronted with the linguistic diversity of local peoples encouraged the standardization of new languages which were not "tribal" in the anthropologist's sense. Missionaries then became interested in comparison and first used the term "Nguni" to describe the mutually intelligible dialects of the eastern Cape and Natal they had codified as "Xhosa," "Zulu," and "Swazi" (Marks and Atmore 1970). They also worked to standardize Sotho and Tswana dialects.

Yet, scholars who became familiar with Nguni, Sotho and other southeastern Bantu languages have often stressed similarities that transcended recognized boundaries. Junod argued that, "When we consider the consistency of Bantu languages, we find that they are so closely related that a student with a good ear and a good philosophical training can switch from one to the other simply by transposing . . . root forms into their various tone-keys" (1938:28). A
similar point was made at about the same by the noted linguist C. M. Doke (1937). In terms of "traditional" culture Monica Wilson (1969) came likewise to believe that: "In their intellectual system, as expressed in language and material symbols, ritual and law, there is a great similarity between Nguni, Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga. Details varied in grammar and vocabulary, in the rules of marriage and rituals celebrated, but the framework was constant" (Wilson 1969:182).

In Sotho and Xhosa the word "tribe" can be translated as morabe and uhlobo, respectively. But both these words have connotations wider than does the English. Uhlobo refers to a general category whose members share characteristics in common. It is often used in the sense of the words "sort" or "variety." As it is used in reference to people and other living things the range of meanings of uhlobo extends from an individual relative, to a family, breed, or species (Kuper 1982:172). In this case the emphasis seems to be on putative genetic links. The words sechaba/isizwe are sometimes glossed as "tribe" as well but rather than descent they connote "community" or "nation." A sechaba/isizwe may therefore be greater or less than an ethnic group or a national boundary. Even people from a single village may be referred to as a sechaba/isizwe if they are perceived as sharing a common purpose. Likewise, the term sechaba may be used rather ambiguously in different contexts to refer to
all citizens of Lesotho, all ethnic Basotho, or all South Africans. Thus, the processual nature of identity is reflected in South African concepts of groupness which are lost in the pejorative senses of the Latin derived concept "tribe" (Cohen 1978:384).

In Sotho, fights between groups of Africans divided on so-called ethnic lines, such as those which are said to occur at the mines, are usually called "lintoa tsa merabe" (fights or battles of the merabe). Frequently, the names of these merabe stem from Sotho experience of the lifaqane period. For example, in folk perception Xhosa-speakers tend to be lumped together as "Bathedu" (abaThembu). This probably stems from the fact that Moshoeshoe I raided cattle from the Thembu chieftaincy. The abaThembu were consequently the first Xhosa-speakers with whom people under Moshoeshoe had sustained contact. Similarly Northern Nguni-speakers, particularly Zulu, are often referred to as Matebele (Ndebele). This is another association which can be linked to the lifaqane.

Many rural Xhosa-speakers are sometimes identified by terms derived from nineteenth-century political divisions, what Whites have referred to rather ambiguously as either "tribes" or "clans." Chief among these divisions are the abaThembu, the amaMpondo, the amaXhosa, the amaMpondomise, the amaBomvana, the amaMfengu, the amaRharhabe, and the amaGcaleka (see map p. 235). Some of these groups have been
associated with different stereotypes or habits. In Lesotho and probably elsewhere, the amaMpondo and the amaBomvana have a reputation for fierceness and a propensity for fighting. McNamara (1980:318) noted that Xhosa-speakers at the mines from Ciskei and Transkei were divided in their sports preferences; Ciskeians often preferred rugby, Transkeians mine dancing.

The terms "lineage" and "clan" have been used widely in the southern African literature, but also not without ambiguity. According to Kuper (1982:46-50), clans as traditionally defined (exogamous, totemic, unilineal descent groups with some political role in society) do not exist in southern Africa. First of all, he argues, there is little evidence that anything like clans ever fulfilled significant political functions in the various southern African polities. What mattered were the ruling houses of the chiefs. Similarly, no group was exclusively exogamous. While the Basotho and Batswana had totems, these might change according to prevailing political circumstances. Therefore people who shared a totemic name did not necessarily share a common origin. Comparable problems are found in applications of the term "lineage." Genealogies, except those of chiefly lines, tend to be very shallow, "extending to only one or two generations of deceased patrilineal forbears" (Kuper 1982:49). In Botswana Kuper found the closest thing to a lineage or clan was "a
mechanism by which local groups of agnates could define their identity and their relations to other groups in the village by projecting this back on to an origin myth of their people" (1982:50).

Kuper (1982:53) points out further that the identities of such local groups are not simply the product of an unchanging past; on the contrary they result from on-going political processes that define chiefly rule. Local identities were fluid because they were engendered anew each time a new chief came to power.7 Even today people in Lesotho may refer to themselves as "children" of the chief in power. Clearly, local identity is bound up with the legitimation claims of chiefs.

Names, Praises, and Group Affiliation. Kuper's "deconstruction" of the concepts lineage and clan in southern Africa is apposite, as is his stress on the centrality of chieftaincy. Yet, his focus on the political nature of identity under chiefs leaves out some important social and religious aspects of the terms seboko, isibongo, and isiduko--Sotho, Zulu, and Xhosa for what has been traditionally translated as "clan" or "lineage". These also may be causally related to the maintainence of the concept under changing circumstances.

The link between one's seboko/isiduko and one's well being is one developed from infancy. In Sotho custom, crying infants are said to be comforted by the songs of
their **liboko** (plural of **seboko**); without such comfort they may suffer from fussiness, colic, or other disorders. Children are taught their **seboko** praises as a game and as a mark of respect; herdboys amuse themselves by memorizing long family praise-poems. One sings such praises in order to acknowledge one's links with the ancestral shades and thereby maintain proper relations with them.

While focused on glorifying men, the **liboko/iziduko** also may help women establish and maintain solidarity with female patrilineal kin. This is particularly the case with Xhosa-speakers. Adult women Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho typically are referred to by tekronymys based on what are referred to locally as **isiduko**. **Mampinge**, for example, is a general name used by all women who are putatively linked to the male ancestor uMpinge and therefore to the amaMpondomise section of Xhosa-speakers in the Transkei. Men too may be referred to by their **isiduko** name, but their personal names are used more commonly than are those of women. One of the fundamental questions both men and women ask strangers is **Ungumni?**—literally, "You are a person of what sort?" meaning what **isiduko**. McLaren's (1963:33) definition of **isiduko** as an ancestral name or watchword is apt. To a certain extent an **isiduko** is a kind of family praise-name.

As Kuper indicates, **liboko/izibongo** incorporate non-kin; therefore the kinship they imply may be fictive. This provides individuals and groups the flexibility necessary to
adjust to changing political circumstances, also suggesting that such identities are subject to ideological manipulation. Yet, one's ancestral links are not always modified or abandoned with the passing of one chief and the succession of another. In fact, individuals who publicly identify with the ruling kin-group may continue to maintain the distinct ancestral ties associated with the homestead. At various times people from the Xhosa-speaking area in which I lived referred to themselves as amaVundle, the name of the chiefly "lineage," or as people of the Vundle chiefs of the heroic past. Yet, they also made reference to the familial "lineages" of commoners.

Some of the complexity of familial identity in the Vundle chieftaincy is depicted in the table below:

Table 3. Principle and Derived Iziduko of Some Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle Branch</th>
<th>Derived Branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AmaVundle</strong></td>
<td>AmaDudube; AmaFola; AmaHaba; AmaHegu; AmaLowe; Amalu; AmaMvulani; AmaNgcwele; AmaNggosini; AmaVuloshe; AmaNxobe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AmaJola</strong> (AmaMpondomise)</td>
<td>AmaBhukwana; AmaMpinge; AmaNgwanya; AmaNqabashe; AmaNxabane; AmaXeyi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AmaHala</strong> (AbaThembu)</td>
<td>AmaNdungwane; AmaGcina; AmaNdlane; AmaQithi; AmaNxongo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AmaRudulu</strong> (AmaMpondomise)</td>
<td>AmaNabe; AmaNgcingane.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Branches: Xhosa - AmaGcaleka; AmaQwathu, AmaQhinebe, AmaQwambi.

Source: Author's fieldnotes; Soga (1930).
Each of the derived branches claim links with the older, primary branches as is typically the case in lineage systems. When asked to report their iziduko, people generally mention one of the branch names. These are also the iziduko people use typically to refer to one another in casual conversation. However, people with the above iziduko may say they are amaVundle as well. This is because they are all residents of the Vundle chieftaincy and recognize its authority.

The Ambiguities of Identity: The Case of the AmaVundle

Examination of the history and current situation of the Vundle people points out some of the limitations of both primordialist and instrumentalist views of ethnicity and identity. Both perspectives rest on the assumption that well-defined, unambiguous distinctions between groups are easily maintained (Cohen 1978; Bentley 1987). Yet, in any system of classification there are anomalies. The "amaVundle" represent one such anomaly, for they are simultaneously Xhosa people and not Xhosa people, Sotho people and not Sotho people. They speak Xhosa and maintain many customs similar to those of the abaThembu of the Transkei, yet most also speak Sotho and have some customs in common with them. For example, the Vundle isiboko is totemic like the Sotho seboko. They also share some initiation customs in common with the Basotho (Xana 1982).
In social systems "anomalies" frequently occur at the frontiers and borders where two or more groups meet. Groups with mixed African heritages, such as the Griqua, are not at all rare in South African history. Unfortunately, contemporary examples have not often studied by anthropologists, perhaps because they do not represent "pure" types. It is not because examples are hard to find, however, even in rural areas. People who combine both Sotho and Xhosa linguistic and cultural elements are common on the Transkei/Lesotho borderlands. The amaVundle are one such group who have survived because they have always lived on the margins, boundaries, and peripheries of other groups. Yet, this very situation has often placed Vundle leaders in special circumstances, allowing them to play important historical roles.

**Vundle** (Hare, usually written Vundla) is a totemic name associated with the dominant chiefly house of Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho. Xhosa-speakers who identify with the amaVundle claim a descent relationship with a Sotho chiefly line, the Bafokeng. Both amaVundle and Bafokeng claim the Hare as a totem. Oral historical accounts from both Vundle and Fokeng sources agree that several centuries ago they lived together as a single group at a place in the present day Orange Free State known to the Basotho as Ntsoantsatsi (Ellenberger 1981:16; Xana 1982:15).
Figure 3. Sketch Map of Transkei showing rough approximation of Vundle migration and approximate location of nineteenth-century Xhosa chieftaincies after establishment of White rule. (Source for chieftaincies Hammond-Tooke 1975)
Xhosa-speakers within the Vundle chieftaincy who are not "proper amaVundle", are predominately from amaMpondomise, abaThembu, and amaXhosa iziduko. In Lesotho, "amaVundle" live mainly in the southern districts of Quthing and Qacha's Nek. In the valley of the Mjanyane river, where the amaVundle chieftaincy is centered, there is presently a de facto population of about 2,400 people (KL Bureau of Statistics 1987d:00135-00136). Not all Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho identify with the Vundle clan, however. This is particularly the case with recent immigrants from Transkei who do not live in close proximity to Mjanyane.

A separate, but related, branch of the Vundle chieftaincy also can be found in the Qumbu district of South Africa's Transkei (Jackson 1975:14-15). This is a "location" which was originally established by Cape administrators to incorporate the major Mpondomise chieftaincies. There may also be ancient kinship ties with certain Vundle families in Natal, but they are much more vague and are of less importance today.10

According to Ellenberger, the amaVUNDLE probably divided from the Bafokeng in the seventeenth century.11 Oral accounts indicate the split was brought about by a quarrel over succession. A certain Mofokeng chief, sources are not clear as to his name, took a San woman as his senior wife. When he died some of his followers argued that they could not accept the son from this union as a legitimate claimant
to the chieftaincy. Apparently this faction was in the majority, for the aspiring chief left Ntšoanatsatsi with his followers. His people lived in Natal and Transkei for several generations and came to speak an Nguni dialect rather than a Sotho one. The chieftaincy also incorporated other peoples into its ranks. Most of these people were Nguni-speakers but Khoi and San were probably also included.

**Vundle Wanderings.** Soon after the move from Ntšoanatsatsi the Vundle chieftaincy split into subsections identified as the amaNgqosini, the amamVulane, and the amaVundle proper (Xana 1982:16). These groups defy simple classification because they were simultaneously Sotho and Xhosa, and possibly also Khoi and San.¹² Before the time of Shaka these Vundle groups were probably living near one another in southern Natal and northern Transkei, close to Mpondomise chieftaincies. In the late eighteenth century, they moved further south, towards an area occupied by abaThembu and San. During this trek the group also included a more recent immigrant Sotho group, a junior branch of the Kwena. They sought safe passage through the Thembu domain in their quest for new lands (Xana 1982; Soga 1930:295).

According to contemporary Vundle accounts a messenger from their chief, a man named Mqhaqheni, was killed by abaThembu of chief Ngubengcuka at this time (Xana 1982:39-40). Thembu sources, however, say that Ngubengcuka was away at a feast at the time of the arrival of the strangers and
his subordinates merely refused the travellers passage. Fighting then broke out when they refused to acquiesce. In any case, both sides agree that a fight broke out and the Vundle/Sotho group was beaten back (Soga 1930:295). The various travelling Vundle-Sotho peoples seem then to have dispersed in terms of their prospective chiefs. The amaNgqosini under Mjobi moved off southeastward and settled in the area between the Fish River and the Kei (Soga 1930:296).

The amaNgqosini established a small, but powerful, chieftaincy which was a threat to Hintsa's Gcaleka chieftaincy. They lived near to, but independently of, the amaGcaleka. They were even able to raid cattle from Hintsa's people. The amaGcaleka, however, were eventually able to defeat them (Soga 1930:296-298; Pieres 1982:62).13

The main branch of the amaVundle continued to live on the fringes of Thembu territory. Like Mjobi's amaNgqosini they established an independent chieftaincy, but unlike them they were able to resist conquest. The oral accounts from contemporary amaVundle claim that superior organization and tactics allowed them to defend against the more numerous abaThembu (Xana 1982:39-40). In this they were undoubtedly aided by the rugged terrain of the eastern Drakensberg mountains where they were based.14 Another important factor contributing to their survival was an alliance formed with the amaQwati, a branch of the amaXesibe who had
recently moved to the area as well. The amaVundle and the amaQwati would later trek to Lesotho together, although many of the amaQwati and some of the amaVundle returned (Soga 1930:349, 486).

The Frontiers. In the early nineteenth-century the Thembu and other smaller nearby chieftaincies like the Vundle were living on the edge of several different and rapidly changing frontiers. The first of these was that between the Southern Nguni peoples and the San, and the San and the Whites. The San were driven in a wedge between the African expansion from the north and the European one from the south. For years they had fought both groups for their survival. The abaThembu under Bawana, were fighting the San for control of the area at the time the amaVundle came into the it. Vundle tradition also indicates that they fought against the San during this period (Soga 1930:478; Meyerowitz 1935:395).15

The second frontier was that which existed between the various African chieftaincies. As we have seen, conflict was endemic at the local level, but Thembuland was also not immune from effects of conflicts which arose from far afield. In 1827-1828, for example, Thembu and Cape Colonial forces combined to route the amaNgwane, a group of people originally from Natal displaced and militarized by the lifagane (Peires 1982:86-88).
It was also at about this time, in 1828, that cattle raiding parties from Moshoeshoe's Sotho began to make forays into Thembu territory. Moshoeshoe's ally and quasi-subordinate, Moorosi, convinced the Sotho chief of the ease with which cattle could be taken from the abaThembu. Moshoeshoe and Moorosi probably agreed to time their attack to correspond with the Thembu's umjaki celebrations. In the event, Moshoeshoe's raiders were successful in capturing many cattle. The raid was to be followed by two others in the next few years.

Vundle tradition reports Moshoeshoe and the Vundle chief Tyhali met for the first time on the third and final raid, in 1835. This raid had turned into a disaster for Moshoeshoe's warriors. After they had seized several thousand cattle the abaThembu launched a successful counterattack. Since the Vundle were not on friendly terms with the abaThembu themselves, they decided to help Moshoeshoe's forces. Vundle tradition suggests that their chief Tyhali and his people played an heroic role in the battle. Moshoeshoe escaped with Vundle help, although one of his brothers had already been killed (Xana 1982:42). Most of the Basotho managed to retreat, but their captured cattle were lost.

From the Vundle point of view this was the beginning of a very important relationship. In return for their help, Moshoeshoe is said to have offered the amaVundle a place in
his territory should they ever require it (Xana 1982:54). They took up this offer a few years later when Tyhali and his amaVundle moved into Moshoeshoe's territory, settling near Moorosi's Baphuthi.

A third frontier was that between white colonists and the southern Nguni in general. Although the bulk of the fighting against Whites was done by the amaRharhabe, many of the African societies to the north were affected by it—if only to the extent that access to new land in the southwest was limited. Migration to new land, a time honored method with which cleavages were resolved within African societies, was thus becoming less and less possible. For the amaVundle, migration only became a viable option because of the recently created alliances which Tyhali had forged with Moshoeshoe's people to the north.17

Settlement in Wittebergen and Outhing. Tyhali and the bulk of his people arrived in the area just north of the Wittebergen mountain chain (in present day Herschel district), in 1846 or 1847 (Ellenberger 1981:3). Tyhali acknowledged Moshoeshoe's authority by immediately informing him of the Vundle presence (Xana 1982:44, 53). Moshoeshoe welcomed his old allies, perhaps reasoning they would help him bring order to the territory. At that time it was not a particularly safe place for settlers as banditry and cattle raiding were common (Peires 1982:117-118). Although the territory was widely recognized as Moshoeshoe's, it was in
fact occupied by a diverse population including White settlers, Nguni, San, and Basotho.

As of 1865 the Vundle chief and his followers were living on both sides of the Telle River—the dividing line between present day Lesotho and Transkei's Herschel district (Theal 1964 Volume III:398-399). According to the Vundle, Tyhali's chieftaincy extended west to the town of Sterkspruit in Herschel and southeast to Maxongo in the eastern Cape (Xana 1982:45). In keeping with their position on the borderlands, the Vundle maintained relations with Xhosa-speaking chieftaincies in the Transkei while continuing to respect the authority of Moshoeshoe.

The Vundle chief's position was special in that it allowed him to play the role of emissary from Chief Moshoeshoe to various Xhosa-speaking chiefs. In one dramatic case, Moshoeshoe sent Tyhali to the Xhosa chief Sarhili in an attempt to form a pan-African alliance against the British (Theal 1964 Volume II:143). While the alliance did not come about, Tyhali's work undoubtedly helped keep Xhosa from allying with Whites against the Sotho.

Tyhali did not relinquish control of his former territory in the Cape when he moved into Moshoeshoe's domain; he kept it secure by placing his son Stokwe as chief there. Stokwe was particularly influential in Xhosa politics. He and his people participated in the active resistance of Xhosa
chieftaincies against the imposition of White rule in the Transkei (Soga 1930:485-486). According to Soga (1930:486), when the Thembu chief Gungubele was imprisoned for his part in a war against the British (War of Ngayecibi, 1877-78), Stokwe was one of a number of prominent chiefs who offered themselves up as bond to secure his release. When this offer was not accepted, he probably participated in the skirmishes that followed. He continued his role as a fighter a few years later when he supported the Mpondomise chief Umhlonhlo's uprising against British disarmament efforts (Soga 1930:486; 343-344). This uprising was defeated within a few months and Stokwe was imprisoned (Brownlee 1923:33). Because of this resistance and related battles in Lesotho (during the Gun War), Vundle territory in what is now the Cape province was lost (Xana 1982:81; Sheddick 1953:78).

Stokwe became chief of all the Vundle upon his return from prison in the 1880s (Xana 1982:81), but he chafed under Sotho authority. Relations with the Sotho particularly had become strained in the past few years since a Sotho chief from the house of Moshoeshoe was placed in Quthing. With the approval of their chiefs, the Sotho began to occupy land previously claimed by the Vundle and the Phuthi. Stokwe lodged a number of official complaints about this with the British Assistant Commissioner for the district, but to little avail (Xana 1982:54). Unchecked, the population in
Quthing jumped dramatically from about 7,000 in 1888 to 20,000 in 1893 (Xana 1982:83). Their fighting days over and their land holdings diminished, men of the Vundle chieftaincy turned increasingly to migrant labor.

Contemporary Sotho-Xhosa Relations: Striving for Community

Writing in the 1950s about the Xhosa of southwestern Lesotho, the missionary R. Germond cast them in a romantic light:

Their taller physique, lighter skin and more frequently aquiline—-one is almost tempted to say Arabic—features, mark them as a distinctive type. They live a contented, voluntarily segregated life, for they are extremely conservative. There is little intermarriage with the Basuto and far more local colour among them than is the case with the more adaptable dominant tribe (Germond 1959:9).

In the terminology of the Ciskei (Mayer 1971), most of Lesotho's Xhosa were "Reds" (Abomvu), people who rejected Christianity and Western education and tried to preserve traditional ways. To Germond, they may have seemed "colorful," but their very quaintness was a mark of success in resisting his creed. To the Christianized Sotho, the Xhosa's rejection of Christianity was far from quaint; it meant they were backward and heathen. A common stereotype which persists among some Sotho is that Xhosa steal without compunction, that they are dirty, and that they walk about naked. Ashton (1967:11) noted that the Sotho looked upon them with contempt.
Yet, as the opening quotation of the chapter suggests, the relationship between Xhosa and Sotho speakers has generally been good. At the very least, Xhosa-speakers have been allowed to go their own way. Long-term rifts brought about by the Sotho encroachment into Quthing in the 1880s seem to have been avoided. The Vundle have maintained their right to be represented in chiefly circles in Lesotho. The late chief Sandile was a member of the Lesotho parliament from 1973 until illness forced his retirement in 1985.

As has previously been mentioned, many Xhosa now profess Christianity, particularly of a Zionist sort. Local residents see this as a great change. One local man, a migrant worker in his 30s, recalled how his own father used to walk about the village wearing only a blanket. Such things are almost unheard of today.

The local primary schools are a medium of much of the change; until the late 1960s or early 1970s a few schools were taught in Xhosa. Now all are taught in Sotho. Children may even be caned for speaking Xhosa during school hours. Some parents see this as a linguistic imposition and believe their children will receive a better education in the Transkei. Others see it as an acceptable way to learn Sotho--both languages are needed, they argue.

Sotho attitudes about the Xhosa may also be changing. Although the numbers are probably less than ten percent in the area I studied, Xhosa-speakers and Sotho-speakers do
intermarry. Several Sotho women who have married local men have adopted Xhosa dress, language, and customs. To them Xhosa ways are fine and admirable and worthy of emulation. Perhaps some of the "colorfulness" of Xhosa custom is being appreciated now that many Xhosa-speakers profess Christianity. Sotho-speakers coming to work in villages where Xhosa is dominant are quick to learn it. And Sotho who have never seen Xhosa rituals are keen to learn about them. The Lesotho government itself has recently taken part in promoting the Xhosa. During a celebration to open a new bank in 1988, the government bussed in Xhosa singers and dancers to provide entertainment.

While Sotho and Xhosa relations in Lesotho are not perfect, they are surprisingly free of interethnic conflict. Given the long history of policies enforcing ethnic exclusiveness in South Africa, this is especially important. The example of Lesotho's Xhosa people challenges the simple assumption that there are necessarily unambiguous groups to whom people can or wish to be attached. In the next chapter, some of the recent consequences of enforced ethnic group identification at the mines will be examined.

NOTES

1. Although even they must make their work interesting enough to attract a publisher and an audience.

3. Murray continues to make this distinction. For him, "the term tribe refers to the members of a political community defined by their allegiance to a chief who has authority over a given territory" (1980:88). The technical definition of the anthropologist seems never to have caught on in popular imagination where "tribe" continues to be used as a prototypical concept for a variety of African communities.

4. See Harries (1989) for this process among the so-called Thonga.

5. Their own phonologies may have had unintended linguistic consequences however. Southern Sotho, as spoken in Lesotho is noted for a tendency to pronounce "r" as a velar rather than as a flap or trilled consonant. Plaatje (1916) attributes this to the influence of the missionaries who were mostly French.

6. Their dialect of Xhosa is also said to be distinct; informants suggested it is as much like Zulu as it is Xhosa. In order to learn "correct" Xhosa, Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho told me that I should live in the Transkei with the amaXhosa "proper," that is, with those from Xhosa iziduko. Many have accepted the standards codified by missionaries and taught in schools so that the Xhosa-dialect is regarded as superior to others.

7. Resulting conflicts were frequently avoided by the secession of contending parties from the previous chief's domain. Chiefs whose status was secure enhanced their authority by "placing" their sons as chiefs in nearby regions. This worked well as long as there was room for expansion, but with White encroachment such expansion was less and less possible. Over time the number of chiefs proliferated, but there were too few places for them to govern. Such a situation led to a severe political crisis in Lesotho in the 1930s (Kuper 1982:53-55).

8. This query is not unusual in Africa. Compare the equivalent Swahili phrase, Mtu gani wewe? (What sort of person are you?)

9. For an excellent concise summary of Vundle customs see Sheddick (1953:77-79).

10. At least two of Stuart's (1979:129; 1982:213-214) nineteenth century informants mentioned people of the Vundle "clan" living in their areas. For example, a Mr. Mkhehlengana, chief of the amaQwabe in Alexandra district, mentioned them along with thirteen other small groups. There seems to be some confusion between amaVundle and
amaMsane however and it is not clear if these are different peoples or simply different names for the same people.

11. This time period seems best to conform to what is known of their later history. Xana probably overestimates when he places the division in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. His recently collected genealogies provide some evidence that conflicts with this earlier date. For example, Mvulane appears in the second generation of his genealogy, but is known from historical evidence to be an eighteenth century figure (Soga 1930:295). His genealogies may have been recast in light of the Vundle Chief Mhamha's (d. 1980) efforts to revitalize his chieftaincy. Xana himself, aware of this movement, labels it the myth of "Vundleism." Ellenberger, working several generations before, did not have to deal with this problem to the same extent.

12. Xana's (1982) study of Vundle oral tradition is the first to identify the amaNgqosini with the amaVundle. Soga (1930) thought they were Sotho, Peires (1982) suggested they might have been Sotho or Khoi.

13. Before making his successful attack, Hintsa consulted a Bomvana shaman who provided him with medicines with which he was assured that he could defeat the recalcitrant Ngqosini. He also enlisted the support of San reinforcements, whose poison arrows were extremely effective weapons—especially in a surprise raid. In the event, Mjobi was attacked at a time when the bulk of his warriors were away on a hunting expedition. Unable to defend himself, he was killed by one of the San's poison arrows. The amaXhosa then went after his warriors and managed to encircle them. A fierce battle ensued and some of the amaNgqosini were able to break through and escape. Still, this was the effective end of the Ngqosini chieftaincy. The survivors became attached to the nearby Xhosa or to a Bomvana chieftaincy in Mpondo territory (Soga 1930:296-298; Peires 1982:62).

14. They were probably based somewhere between Maxongo (Xuka's Nek) and the upper Umtata River. This is near Ugie and Elliot in the present-day Cape Province.

15. The San who managed to survive were forced into remote regions of the Drakensberg mountains. Game being largely depleted (Thompson 1827:2-6), those still free increasingly turned to raiding African and European cattle. In turn, some white trekkers hunted the San, massacring the adults and exchanging their children for such commodities as horses (See letters by Rolland and Arend in Theal, Vol. 1, 1964:37-39). In this way many San were forced to become servants, slaves, or vassals of the conquerors.
16. Moorosi lived in the southern extreme of Moshoeshoe's domain with a mixed following of Nguni (amaDlamini, amaBulane, and amaZizi), Basotho, and San. The Baphuthi, as his people are called, speak a northern Nguni dialect with significant Sotho admixtures. This language is still spoken in southern Lesotho.

Moorosi's Baphuthi lived within a few days horseback ride of the abaThembu and had made previous raids against them. The Phuthi chief reportedly had intelligence about Thembu activities and this may have made the idea of a raid more attractive to Moshoeshoe. He is said to have told Moshoeshoe that he knew when the abaThembu would be involved in an all-night celebration known as umjaki. The celebration of this feast could leave the abaThembu vulnerable to a raid (Damane 1960:13).

17. A previous attempt to move to Lesotho with the amaQwati may have failed (Soga 1930:486).

18. They must have been on friendly terms with Moorosi's Baphuthi for this adjoins his territory. Xana (1982) makes a good case that both the amaVundle and the Baphuthi were subordinate to Moshoeshoe, but neither controlled the other.

19. This is known from British intelligence sources. On June 2, 1855, Chief Commissioner for the frontier John Maclean relayed the following message to the Governor: "Information received from Danti, a Counsellor of Toise's Tribe:--About a fortnight ago a message was sent by Moshesh [Moshoeshoe] to Kreli [Sarhili], conveyed through a petty Tambookie [Thembu] Chief named Tyali, a son of Gobosi, residing on the Orange River, to the effect that he, Moshesh, had with only a small portion of his nation, under one of his sons, defeated the English troops at the Berea, and had he mustered all his forces on that occasion, he might have destroyed the whole of the troops then engaged against him; he therefore wished to come to an understanding with Kreli as regards a combination of Kaffirs [Xhosa] and Basutos against the white Government, as he, Moshesh, was of opinion that if such could be carried into effect, the White Government could with ease be conquered" (Theal 1964 Volume II:143).
CHAPTER 9

WORKERS' STRUGGLES AND THE MANIPULATION OF ETHNICITY:
CONFLICT AT VAAL REEFS, 1984 - 1986

If we go back and we count up all the number of clashes that we have records for from 1973 up until last year the most common form of clash is in fact between Sotho and Xhosa, I think we know this. -- Kent McNamara, anthropologist, labor consultant, testifying before an Anglo-American Corporation inquiry into unrest at Vaal Reefs mine, August 7, 1987 (Bregman 1987:Pt134/5035).

It is necessary to the raise the consciousness of people so that they realize the people of Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa are one; it is the Whites who have deceived us by dividing us into different tribes. -- Letter to the editor of Leselinyana la Lesotho (March 1986) by mineworker from Lesotho.

Management wishes to reassure its workers that they care a great deal for them and do not want any violence or lawlessness whatsoever which will interfere in their well being . . . Remember management is here to look after you and not abuse you and hurt you . . . Without happy workers on a mine the mine becomes an unpleasant place to be. All people work on a mine to earn money for their families. Mining underground is a tough and dangerous job--management want their workers to be as comfortable as possible when on surface. -- Brief to workers from mine manager of Vaal Reefs east division following violent clashes at compound one, December 6, 1986 (Bregman 1987:Memorandum/following exhibit "J").

The following case study of conflict at the Vaal Reefs gold mine brings together a number of themes from previous chapters. First, it shows the irreproducible complexity of individual events while at the same time revealing patterns
that make them understandable. Second, it helps point out the inexorable link between explanation, understanding, and action in social life. Third, the events at Vaal Reefs disclose divisions in the work force which can be understood in terms of the typology used in chapter four: resistance, dependency and habituation, "contradictory" consciousness, and identification. Similarly, the situation as a whole cannot be adequately understood without consideration of particular relationships between ideas and material interests. Questions about ethnicity take on added significance when advocates of a caricatured idealist position are mine management, on the one hand, while trade union activists interpret events in terms of a more materialist perspective.

In chapter three it was pointed out that miners have been administered traditionally according to their purported "tribal" affiliation. Thus ethnic background means something quite different at the mines than it does in Lesotho. Whereas ethnic difference seems to have little political saliency in Lesotho, at the mines the case is quite different. Xhosa and Sotho-speaking indunas are often well-established in the mine system and may compete for the position of chief induna of a compound and the higher wages and level of authority this position brings.

Despite the phenomenal growth in union membership from 1982 to 1984, it would be an oversimplification to suggest
that the union developed without resistance from those individuals with relatively secure positions in the established systems of mining authority. Indeed, even if all individuals in collective groups can be shown to have the same material interests, unity in action still remains problematic. Olson (1965), for example, points out that it is not economically rational for individuals to participate in endeavors in which there are collective interests—in such cases individuals can simply "free ride" on the efforts of others. In Olson's view the problem of free riders in collective action generally has to be overcome either by the offering of selective incentives to attract support or by the use of coercive force against those who refuse to cooperate.²

In South Africa White policy makers have taken advantage of the differentiation of its work force by attempting to coopt Black workers occupying relatively elite positions (Pycroft and Munslow 1988). Through introduction of a system of job grading, the so-called Patterson Plan, the mining establishment has attempted to stabilize the work force and reinforce status distinctions between workers. More contentiously, the Patterson system has provided proportionally higher pay increases and selective incentives to Blacks working in positions of authority (Pycroft and Munslow 1988:166). This differential pay has led to protest and conflict within the work force. As we shall see, union
members and supporters have resorted to coercive force against clerks and team leaders to counter managements' incentives.

Union solidarity is most evident when the struggle with management is over questions of pay and working conditions. The massive support given by the rank and file to the 1987 strike over wages is evidence of the kind of solidarity that can be achieved. However, from 1985, union leadership began to formally address larger political issues and to see itself playing a vanguard role in the political education of workers. As the NUM Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa said during the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions in December of 1985: "When workers are paid their wages, it is not only an economic issue, it is a political issue. . . As unions we have a solemn duty to develop consciousness among workers of their exploitation as workers" (Africa Report 1986:10). As the struggle moved out of the realm of the direct material concerns of all workers and into the realm of the struggle for national liberation solidarity became more problematic.

For the NUM leadership workers are workers, their distinct national or ethnic backgrounds are viewed largely as irrelevent. Ethnic or linguistic differences between workers are seen primarily as factors manipulated by management to hamper worker solidarity. Yet, it was perhaps a miscalculation on the part of the NUM not to realize that
the newly proclaimed national political agenda of the union made migrants from foreign countries particularly vulnerable to threats or repatriation and endangered the solidarity achieved in struggles for improvements in wages and working conditions. The fragility of this solidarity became evident in the outbreak of violence that occurred between mineworkers as the union became more overtly political.

In 1985 and 1986 many of the South African gold mines were hit with what are variously referred to as "faction fights" or "riots" on the one hand, and "inter-group" or "class" conflict on the other--depending on one's ideological perspective. According to anthropologist and one-time employee of the Chamber of Mines, Kent McNamara: "During 1986 alone, at least 118 mineworkers were killed in inter-group violence" (McNamara, *Sunday Times* July 6, 1987). In the South African media and in government reports such violence is often associated with ethnic antagonism. It is undoubtedly true that when battles are fought in the compounds, alliances may form on linguistic lines. Xhosa and Sotho-speakers, who make up the majority of mineworkers, have frequently been on opposite sides of fights. Between 1974 (when workers from Lesotho began protesting the mandatory deferred payment system) and 1979 conflict was particularly widespread. A South African government inquiry into mine "riots" leaked to the press in 1978 blamed the situation both on the migrant labor system itself and on
primordial ethnic attachments (Pallister et al. 1988:140-142). In an effort to forestall such conflict (and make riot control less problematic) the Anglo-American Corporation implemented a new system of housing in which blocks of rooms were no longer assigned to single "tribes." Instead, the blocks were "integrated," although individual rooms remained linguistically homogeneous (McNamara 1980:397). For its part, the National Union of Mineworkers has actively campaigned against tribalism, at the same time urging workers to see one another in terms of their common interests. Prior to 1986, interethnic conflict was indeed on the wane. Many workers gave the NUM credit for promoting a new sense of solidarity.

The class background to so-called tribal violence is frequently noted by workers and academic observers. Close examination of actual cases generally shows that such conflict at the mines correlates with disputes over pay, racial discrimination, and working conditions, and competition for scarce jobs allocated on an ethnic basis (McNamara 1988). The historian Ranger (1978) has pointed out that similar economic factors can be casually linked to ethnic conflict which took place at a mine in 1914. Nowadays, workers often say management deliberately provokes fights among them in order to insure management's continued control. In the recent incidences of violence, one miner stated bluntly, "The cause of these fights which are famed
for being 'tribal' are not "tribal" at all; the fighting is about the union, period" (Sesosa sa lintoa tsena ho tummeng hore ke tsa merabe; ha ho merabe ea letho, ho itoants'etsoa union feela qha) (Litsoakotlena 1987:23). This control is facilitated by the induna ("unit supervisor") system which automatically allocates authority and privilege on an ethnic basis. From this perspective "ethnic conflict" at the mines is simply another example of the old story of divide and rule. This has been suggested by labor leaders for a number of years. As one put it in 1975: "if labour forces on individual mines were homogeneous, mines would run the risk of strikes being total instead of partial" (SALDRU 1976:24). Yet, even if the ethnic differences of workers are manipulated by management, the question that remains to be addressed is in what way workers respond to it. It may be that many workers do not see themselves only as workers; places of origin and the shared life impressions generated from them--what Bentley (1987), after Bordieau, calls shared "habitus"--may also be important. Still, Sotho and Xhosa differences in this regard should be quite minor. How then are Sotho and Xhosa-speaking miners possibly subject to manipulation and division?

To answer this question unrest at the Anglo-American Corporation's Vaal Reefs mines will be examined. At Vaal Reefs in 1986 dispute over a variety of issues including pay, racial discrimination, the Transkei elections, and the
privileges of team leaders, indunas, and clerks led to periodic incidents of violence including a number of clashes between club and sword wielding "Sotho" and "Xhosa" which left some 35 workers dead. Testimony before the Bregman (1987) commission of inquiry into the unrest conducted under the auspices of the Anglo-American Corporation reveals a picture of considerable complexity. Nonetheless, it is clear that ethnic related violence that Bregman investigated, if such it is, only emerged after a whole series of other conflicts. These other conflicts are the fuel that fired a process of schismogenesis that eventually took on what seems to be an ethnic form.

Background

Vaal Reefs is one of the largest gold mines in the world. It is situated on the West Rand, near the "White towns" of Klerksdorp and Orkney and the African townships of Kanana and Joubertina. Managed by the Anglo-American Corporation, it consists of nine separate, deep-level, shafts. (A tenth, Afrikaner Leases, is treated as part of Vaal Reefs for management purposes, although it is actually on the other side of Klerksdorp.) Each of these shafts has its own compound where several thousand workers are housed and fed. These shafts are quite distinct and some distance apart. Workers from one shaft often use taxis or buses to visit another. The entire Vaal Reefs complex covers some 80 square kilometers (Bregman 1987:PT1:26). For management
purposes, it is divided into an east, a west, and a south division, with two to four shafts per division. According to a report published in the *South African Labour Bulletin*, in 1985 these divisions were organized as follows:

West Division had shafts numbers:
- 6 with 2,900 miners
- 7 with 2,500 miners
- 3 with 4,000 miners
- 4 with 4,100 miners

East Division had shafts numbers:
- 2 with 4,000 miners
- 1 with 4,500 miners
- 5 with 3,000 miners
- 10 with 1,500 miners

South Division had shafts numbers:
- 8 with 12,000 miners
- 9 with 6,000 miners

(Golding 1985:100)

Not all workers live in the compounds. White miners may also live at the mines in segregated housing while senior level African personnel and their families often live at a major complex referred to as the "Black Married Quarters" (BMQ) or Umuzimuhle Village. The Black Married Quarters contain approximately 1,010 houses with 5,370 official residents. Unofficially probably twice that number stay at the BMQ at any one time (Bregman 1987:PT8/449). In addition, about 60 Black employees and their families live in the married quarters near shaft four and shaft seven (Golding 1985:100). Much of the mineworkers' informal economy, like the African beer trade, is centered at Umuzimuhle Village. Mine security identifies this area with vice and crime. For example, one senior Vaal Reefs security
officer described it as a "Sodom and Gomorrah" (Bregman 1987:PT9/451).

Private security at the mines is organized to protect mine property, guard the gold and uranium extracted, and maintain order among the work force and their visitors. At each of the shafts a White security officer oversees day-to-day affairs. In 1987 all but one of these men were former members of the South African police force, the lone exception being a former South African Railways policeman (Bregman 1987:PT7/363). At east division, where most of the conflict took place, there are 162 men on the security force. Most of the senior officers are White, but the junior ranks are largely Black (Bregman 1987: Transkei Memorandum:3). The mines' private security is augmented by the South African Police and Defence forces which are easily and rapidly mobilized from the nearby towns and by a 100 man Emergency Protection Unit comprised of White company-employees. The security police have at their disposal an array of weapons including attack dogs, handguns, shotguns, semi-automatic rifles, tear gas, and hand grenades. They are mobilized for mass action in riot vans and a variety of armored personnel carriers. During recent years they have generally shot tear gas and rubber bullets when firing; no one was reported to have been shot by live ammunition in the 1986 disturbances. Security monitors the compound gates 24 hours a day, but workers on their own time are generally
allowed to come and go as they please. According to an agreement reached with the NUM, union representatives are supposed to be given access to the mine compounds and allowed office space there.

Events

Union Organization at Vaal Reefs. The National Union of Mineworkers began organizing at Vaal Reefs in 1982. One regional organizer reported that when he first began at Vaal Reefs No. 6 in October of that year he had only seven active supporters. Workers often insulted him and chased him away, believing that he was actually promoting some sort of insurance fraud (Golding 1985:100-101). Union organizers maintain that management used indunas and team leaders to spread disinformation about the union and discourage others from joining.

Despite the initially slow start, union membership soon mushroomed. An issue to which many workers responded readily was that of alleged abuses of power by management, especially with respect to what were perceived as unfair dismissals (Golding 1985:100-101). By February 1983 thousands of miners had joined the union. At the west and east divisions management conceded that membership exceeded 50 percent of the workers. Therefore, according to the recently enacted labor legislation, Vaal Reefs was forced to recognize the NUM as a legitimate representative of the workers at these divisions. By September 1984 the NUM was
confident enough at the industry-wide level to launch its first legal strike.

**Workers Allege Management Provoked 1984 Fights.** A management spokesperson at the Bregman inquiry argued that, aside from the September strike, 1984 was a relatively quiet year at Vaal Reefs (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:2). Some miners told a different story, however. An unnamed NUM source told the Lesotho magazine *Litsoakotleng* (1988:14) that before the strike shaft stewards at No. 4 foiled a management instigated plan to cause ethnic clashes among them. They claimed to have intercepted four men--two workers and two other men thought to be associated with the criminal gang known as the Russians--who confessed to receiving 500 rands each from mine security in order to start interethnic fighting. The same NUM source also implied that fights which broke out at shafts one and three at about that time, leaving more than eight men dead, were a consequence of similar tactics.5

**Political Protest, Dissent, and Conflict in Early 1985.** In 1985 protests and strikes at the mines were frequent and widespread. In early March Vaal Reef workers rallied against management's decision to give pay increases to a select few employees by working short-shifts. This coincided with a campaign by militants at the mines to attack the entrenched hierarchy of the work place. To this end dining halls segregated according to occupational status
were disrupted and liquor outlets on the mine complex boycotted. Taxi and concession stores were also boycotted in protest against poor food quality, poor service, and high prices.

Some of the mineworkers, including shaft stewards, were allegedly associated with militant youth known as the "comrades." Comrades who were not mineworkers probably were involved in a number of the mine protests of 1984 to 1986. During the inquiry it was suggested they were involved in such incidents as spilling groceries of miners who broke a shop boycott, disruption of the balloting for Transkei elections held at the mines, and assault of Black office workers. Management claimed work-related affairs were being clouded by the national political agenda of some activists. They also argued that the short shifts were illegal and that many workers were being threatened and intimidated.

In April, 1985 a series of work stoppages occurred. At shaft six ordinary workers protested against the special privileges offered to an induna and a group of team leaders; at shaft one, against the "piccanin" system; at seven, against working hours and overtime without pay (Golding 1985:107). The protests at shafts eight and nine (south division) had the most serious consequences as they led to the dismissal of 14,000 to 17,000 workers--at the time the largest dismissal of workers in South African history. Union sympathizers say Black workers were protesting the job
reservation system by refusing to set dynamite charges (Golding 1985). As mentioned previously, blasting has long been done by Blacks but the job category has until recently been officially reserved for Whites. This protest at south division resulted in dramatic losses in production. Management, however, did not acknowledge this as the central issue leading to the massive dismissals. They claimed instead that miners were dismissed for illegal short shifts, sabotage, boycotts, intimidation, and holding unauthorized meetings (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:3).6

Another dramatic event occurred at No. 5 in July after a period of protest against the quality of food served at the compound dining halls. This protest, coupled with the general NUM campaign of "equality for all," resulted in a serious rift and fight between team leaders and other workers. The mine manager claims that team leaders at No. 5 came to him with complaints of intimidation. He stated in an affidavit that "During July 1985, No. 5 Shaft team leaders and unit supervisors alleged intimidation by gangs of NUM members and office bearers singing songs outside their rooms containing such statements as: 'Vaal-Maseru buses will be filled with (your) dead bodies'" (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:4). For its part the NUM alleges that mine management regularly used team leaders and others recruited from outside the mines to attack the union and its representatives.7 According to one report
sympathetic to the union, tension was exacerbated by a search conducted by security police of all rooms except those belonging to team leaders (Work for Justice June 1988:8). Shaft stewards say they feared an attack was being planned against them. To forestall this, they maintain, a group of miners attacked the team leaders first. A mob descended upon rooms shared by team leaders, attacking them with clubs and handmade swords. Four team leaders were hacked to death and their bodies set alight.

Violent Confrontations in 1986. Much of the conflict that occurred at east division in 1986 can be traced to these murders. In February 1986 nine were arrested in connection with the killings. Shaft stewards and their supporters in the east division organized a sympathy strike (illegal in South Africa), saying that shaft stewards who took no part in the killings were selected for arrest simply because of their position in the union. On Friday, February 26 a Sotho-speaking mineworker known as Seven broke the strike at shaft No. 1 by leading a group of 23 new recruits down to work. Strike sympathizers complained that Seven and his group were armed and, although this violated company regulations, their weapons were not confiscated. They suggested that if the mine authorities wished to insure the safety of those who wanted to work an escort should have been provided for them by mine security.
Because Seven was staying at the quarters of the Sotho induna, many felt the Sotho induna—and perhaps other indunas—were associated with his actions. On the night of March 4 the automobiles of the three indunas for the Basotho, amaSwazi, and amaShangaan were bombed (Bregman 1987:PT40/1724-1725). Undoubtedly, in the minds of many workers this was connected with the breaking of the strike, but the perpetrators were not found.

The following day action in sympathy with the defendants from shaft five was continued in the form of short-shifts. Management obtained an interdict from the South African Supreme Court declaring this action illegal and ordering the miners back to work. During or about this time a rumor circulated among the miners that the hostel would be attacked by thugs hired to break the union. Workers were reportedly walking about armed (Bregman 1987:PT75/2729).

On the morning of March 7 miners were lined up in the presence of security and asked to sign a form reaffirming the conditions of their employment. Due to the vast number of workers the oath signing continued throughout the day and on into the next morning. The following night a bomb exploded near the Sotho induna's house. The Sotho induna, known as Mpalinyana, claimed he heard someone who was outside say "Let it burn" in Xhosa. This is the first hint of a meaningful ethnic dimension to the conflict.
Mining operations returned to normal on March 9, but this semblance of normality was not to last. Two days later clashes occurred of an apparently "interethnic" sort. These were the first "inter-ethnic" clashes to be investigated by Bregman's commission. One perspective on the origins of these fights is summed up by the mine manager K. V. Dicks:

A pervasive fear grew amongst the employees caught between the threat of possible bodily harm or even death for non co-operation with the NUM and the threat of dismissal for participating in illegal activities. In my view, this fear and tension caused polarisation along tribal lines and the first faction fights between Xhosa/Sotho occurred on 11 March 1986 leaving 3 dead at No. 1 Shaft. This faction fighting spread to No. 3 Shaft where 9 people lost their lives on 16 March 1986.

(Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:5-6)

Dicks supports his position by citing statements allegedly made at the time to security by mine workers in fear for their lives. One such statement, purportedly made by a miner housed at room 404 in No. 1 Hostel, relates an account of some of the fighting along with the alleged eyewitness' explanation:

We went outside and saw that Basutho (sic.), in blankets, were running in the direction of the shaft. They were chased by Xhosas, dressed in white sheets, they had in their hands spears in (sic.) steel. We all ran away towards the hostel gate. The Sotho were over [a] hundred the Xhosas were far in the majority. The Xhosas kept beating the Basuthos (sic.) chasing them. At the gate we were met by security. They told us to wait. We then went back, behind the security vehicle. We met with the Xhosas who ran way. As we proceeded we found two bodies, of Sothos. The security tried to bring us together to discuss the problem. At that time the Basotho were [on] one side the Xhosa were on the other side. Security urged the Xhosas to return to their rooms. The Xhosas
refused. The security asked the Basotho. We Basotho told them that we could not go to our rooms because the risk to be killed. We advised security to go with us and to stay with us until morning. Security remained and protected us. The whole situation developed since the previous week when the shaft stewards supported by the Xhosas urged and forced us to refuse to work. A few days later the shaft stewards blamed the Basotho to be the pimpi [collaborators] of the Whites. . . The Xhosas said that if the Basotho do no (sic.) cooperate they will be killed. This was said by all Xhosas who stated it is better to kill the Basotho as they were the collaborators of the Whites. (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/KVD40)

In the inquiry itself more details emerged indicating that this fight was not simply a fight between a unified block of Sotho sympathy-strike opponents against a unified block of Xhosa sympathy-strike advocates. A miner alleged that one of the Xhosa men killed was pointed out by security police before being attacked. Mine and hostel management itself emphasized that the dispute had much to do with a power struggle between the Sotho induna and the Xhosa induna and their supporters. Sotho-speakers also suspected that their induna's house had been singled out because of his association with Seven. The Xhosa induna, nicknamed Machain, allegedly was threatened and chased around the compound the night prior to the killings by a group of Sotho-speakers (Bregman 1987:PT36/1578; PT40/1701-1702). Xhosa and Sotho factions spent the day of the eleventh buying or handcrafting weapons.
Both the incidents in which Machain was chased and that in which the first three miners were killed were preceded by the blowing of a whistle. This is a rallying signal generally associated at the mines with the Basotho (Bregman 1987:PT40/1711).10 One miner who identifies himself both as a shaft steward and as an umpondo told the inquiry of participating in the fight. Under questioning, he described the scene immediately preceding it:

**MR CHAIRMAN:** So when the whistle blew did the Xhosa advance to the Sotho or the Sotho advance to the Xhosa?

**MR:** As soon as the whistle blew the Sotho--the Sotho group attacked first.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** Yes, where did they attack?

**MR:** They advanced straight to us. And as they advanced we also advanced towards them. Because we knew what was going to take place.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** The whistle did not blow until all the Xhosa had been deployed right round in that semi-circle of the horse-shoe?

**MR:** I am inclined to say so Sir.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** Yes. Was any sign given to the Sotho to say now we are ready, that is a sign by the Xhosa to say all right?

**MR:** No, no.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** But it was obvious that now the Xhosa were ready?

**MR:** We were always ready. We were always ready for a signal.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** All right. Now is there any reason you can give why the battle only started at 20h30 that evening why not earlier?

**MR:** The reason that I can give is that people then were busy preparing for themselves of what would take place later on.

**MR CHAIRMAN:** So they needed time to prepare:

**MR:** Yes, it is true that they need time to prepare for themselves because all the faction fights on the mines start at night.

(Bregman 1987:PT40/1714-1715)
Miners working underground were informed by White workers that a fight had broken out at No. 1 Hostel. Some prepared weapons while still beneath the surface, but all refrained from fighting there.\textsuperscript{12} Workers returning to the compound after finishing the second shift were stopped by security at the gates. Although many Basotho had been pushed out of the compound during the initial fighting, only Basotho were allowed to enter. In fact, the Lesotho delegation to the inquiry found, they were actively encouraged to join the fighting by two senior White officials (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Lesotho Delegation:2). However, about half of all workers chose to remain outside.

The workers who chose to go into the compound were told by security to go to the mess hall. At the mess allegedly they were fed an unusually nice meal and told not to allow the amaXhosa in to eat. One miner testified that he heard the hostel manager, a White man nicknamed Tsotsi (gangster), encourage the new group to join in the fight. Tsotsi is said to have promised to take the side of the Basotho because he blamed the amaXhosa for instigating the recent short shifts (Bregman 1987:PT76/2758; 2761). As the fighting proceeded the Sotho-combatants, now with the support of security, were able to reverse their earlier loss and drive the Xhosa faction out of the mine compound. They then set about looting rooms known to belong to Xhosa-speakers.
A different perspective on these events was given by a group of shaft stewards who testified at a special session of the inquiry on July 31, 1987. They said the March confrontation was not merely between Basotho and amaXhosa and their indunas, but between indunas and shaft stewards as well. Stewards admitted that indunas often hate them because of the union's campaign to take away the indunas' special privileges (Bregman 1987:PT122/4529). For this reason, on March 11 the Sotho induna's followers, allegedly with security's collusion, came after a Sotho-speaking steward named Thabang because he was seen as siding with Xhosa militants against the Sotho induna. A steward said the March fight was "a fight between the Basuto (sic.) who supported the Union and the Basuto who supported the Induna" (Bregman 1987:PT23/4572). Another admitted that the majority of Sotho workers supported the induna in this particular case (Bregman 1987:PT123/4573). He went on to add, in a revealing statement, that, in general, men from Lesotho "do not believe that we are one thing as workers. They still want to continue to isolate themselves as a Basuto ethnic group" (Bregman 1987:PT123/4580).

Despite these admissions, the shaft stewards maintained that the whole Xhosa/Sotho fight was created by management. They argue that security actually came into the compound on the night of March 11 before fighting broke out (Bregman 1987:PT122/4556). Security provoked a fight along ethnic
lines by arbitrarily dividing the workers into Sotho and Xhosa-speaking groups before firing rubber bullets at the "Xhosa." "Even those Basothos who were mixing up with Xhosas were also shot by the rubber bullets," a witness stated (Bregman 1987:PT115/4344).

State of Emergency, Protest, and the Slaying of Shaft Stewards. A state of emergency was declared in South Africa on June 12, 1986 to combat the wave of protest actions occurring throughout the country. A few weeks later, in the first week of July, two shaft stewards from Vaal Reefs were detained in terms of the emergency regulations. Many miners felt the arrest of one of these stewards was connected with an earlier incident in which Black and White workers had clashed underground. In August NUM and other activists renewed their political campaign by staging marches which involved singing, dancing, and waving union banners as they trotted through the hostels. It is alleged that some of the participants had tires draped around their necks--an ominous sign of the notorious "necklace" style killings employed against supposed collaborators with the White regime (Bregman 1987:Memoranda:Dicks Affidavit:7).

The next incident to receive extensive treatment by the Bregman inquiry occurred at shaft one in late September. This concerned the balloting for Transkei elections being held in the compounds. A group of singing people marched upon the hall at shaft one where balloting was scheduled.
They overturned tables and scattered ballots before making off with one of the Black mining clerks officiating the election. He was then paraded through the compound, and possibly assaulted. Tension reportedly rose sharply at No. 1 Hostel after three men, including a shaft steward, were dismissed from their jobs and subsequently arrested in connection with this incident (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:7).

On October 8 security forces were sent down shaft one on information that a sit-down strike was about to begin. The mine manager maintains that such a strike was attempted at level 65. It was for this reason that twenty-seven workers were arrested and five subsequently dismissed from their jobs (Bregman 1987:Memoranda/Dicks Affidavit:7). On their part, union representatives deny that any such strike took place. They say all that happened is some men working underground received unprovoked beatings from security men (Bregman 1987:PT20/1047-48; PT58:2205).

Many workers were angry about this incident. The situation again grew tense in hostel one. Some six to eight days after the below-ground arrests were made, rumors spread that an attack by "Russian" vigilantes on hostel one was imminent. A provoked "tribal" clash was feared. In order to prevent this, shaft stewards and others spent the night of the 16th and 17th patrolling the compound. On the night of the 17th two White man in a Mitsubishi sedan and a van
full of Black men were seen allegedly entering the compound. Further, "people were seen climbing over in to the bar, they were climbing the fence into the bar" (Bregman 1987:PT50/2041). There were no attacks, however, and in the next few days tension subsided somewhat.

In early November some 700 miners crowded into the compound meeting hall and voted to boycott the mines' liquor outlets. For many the boycott was seen as the only forceful way left to protest the dismissals connected with the October conflicts and the arrests which they felt stemmed from them (Bregman 1987:PT21/1070). All previous appeals made by the NUM through official channels had been rejected (Bregman 1987:PT48/1978-1979; 1990). Critics among the workers charged, however, that the boycott lacked a clear mandate and was being foisted upon them by shaft stewards (Bregman 1987:PT52/2044-2047). The boycott was to lead to complex political maneuvering and, eventually, to more violence and bloodshed.

The day after it was called the boycott was broken by half a dozen men identified by other miners as amaMpondo (Bregman 1987:PT21/1072). They were recognized also as members of the hostel's umtshongolo dancing group (PT21/1078). They entered the bar attired in white sheets. This identified them both as Xhosa-speakers and, possibly, as belonging to the ndlavini Xhosa subculture. One of the shaft stewards, himself an uMpondo, went to the liquor
outlet to talk with them. They told him they were not respecting the boycott because they had received no recompense from the looting which took place during the March fight (Bregman 1987:PT21/1080; PT58/2229). After the boycott was broken by the Mpondo group, it was agreed to call it off temporarily. Supporters of the boycott said they wanted to avoid a confrontation; less enthusiastic boycotters simply may have welcomed a return to routine drinking.

The boycott was resumed on Wednesday, November 19. It was respected on the 20th but violated the following day by a group other miners identified as amaMpondo. This time there were between 35 and 45 men involved (Bregman 1987:PT59/2242-2243). They were armed with staves, clubs, panga knives, and swords. Security was called but did not disarm them. The reaction of the security police indicated to many miners that the boycott-breakers had the approval of management (Bregman 1987:PT 77/2814; Transkei Memorandum:17-18).

As the Mpondo dance group and a few others continued to drink that afternoon, someone thought by the drinkers to be a shaft steward threw a fire bomb into the bar. This act so angered the drinkers that they set off enmasse on a hunt for the alleged culprit as well as the other nine shaft stewards. Some of these armed men ran immediately into the hall next door where a movie was being shown and threatened
those inside. Frightened movie goers "crashed through closed windows in a stampede as they desperately looked for escape routes" (Bregman 1987:Transkei Memorandum:13).

The group of Mpondo drinkers chased most of the shaft stewards out of the compound, but they succeeded in capturing one. Perhaps because he was also a team leader, he was not killed. However, he was beaten and sustained serious injuries. The battered corpse of another man, a suspected comrade, was found in room 386 that evening (Bregman 1987:Transkei Memorandum:14). White security officials and the Hostel Manager Tsotsi were reportedly seen in the liquor outlet praising and shaking the hands of men in the Mpondo group after these attacks occurred (Bregman 1987:Lesotho Delegation Memorandum:3).

The hunt for shaft stewards continued the following afternoon, Saturday, after the first shift. A group of about 400 men, amaMpondo prominent among them, were reported to have converged on the Black Married Quarters sometime between 2:00 and 5:00 in search of stewards hiding there. Allegations were made that the Mpondo leaders increased their numbers by threatening other workers and forcing them to join them (Bregman 1987:Transkei Memorandum:14). Workers from other hostels were probably also recruited (Bregman 1987:Lesotho Delegation Memorandum:5). On Saturday and Sunday gang members are said to have shouted that they had been given six days to finish their job; common wisdom in
the hostel was that they had been instructed by management to eliminate shaft stewards (Bregman 1987:PT28/1296-97). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a group of 400 armed men marching on the Black Married Quarters in the middle of the day could go undetected. Once at the BMQ the armed men conducted a house to house search. Apparently they succeeded in finding at least one steward. The body of shaft steward Mhlamvu Alton was found at the BMQ on the following morning.

While the armed men were rampaging through the BMQ the men remaining in the hostel prepared to defend themselves. Xhosa and Sotho-speakers initially joined in a common defense. When the marauders returned from the BMQ this Xhosa/Sotho alliance fought them and succeeded in driving them out of the compound. About an hour later, however, an apparently unprovoked murder broke the unity of the Xhosa/Sotho group. A Sotho-speaking man allegedly killed an umXhosa in cold blood, saying he was tired of his victim speaking Xhosa and not Sotho (Bregman 1987:PT27:1275). After this the Xhosa men abandoned the Basotho and joined the amaMpondo group that had been driven out of the hostel in the fighting. This is reportedly how the ethnic fighting began (Bregman 1987:PT27/1276).

With its renewed support the so-called Mpondo faction had the upper hand. They were aided further by a man (probably from the group of defectors) who opened the back gate
leading to the liquor outlet. The combatants from outside were able to enter the compound secretly and attack the main body of Basotho from behind. They forced the Sotho fighters out of the hostel then turned to looting rooms known to belong to Sotho-speakers. Some of these rooms were occupied by men who had chosen not to fight or who were unsure about what side to take. A number of these relatively defenseless men were found and killed. While this was happening, security prevented the Sotho combatants from reentering the compound, threatening to shoot anyone who tried to do so (Bregman 1987: Lesotho Delegation Memorandum:5). All in all thirteen people were killed on the 22nd and 23rd.

On Friday, December 5 a further round of fighting was sparked off when a Sotho man spotted an umXhosa man wearing clothing which he claimed were his own (Bregman 1987: Memoranda/minutes of December 7 Meeting between Management and NUM Representatives). While the specifics of that fight are unclear, on the following evening, according to the Basotho, a horn sounded and, "All of a sudden, they found that the Xhosas were heavily armed with lethal weapons" (Bregman 1987: Lesotho Delegation Memorandum:6). A Sotho spokesperson claimed later that: "From Wednesday [amaMpondo] started moving into the hostel with dangerous weapons and security did nothing. Two days ago [the day before the fighting], security were in the hostel and they saw Xhosa with dangerous weapons but did nothing" (Bregman
1987: Memoranda/Minutes of December 7 Meeting between Production Manager, Sotho, and Xhosa Delegation. Most of the Sotho men fled through the main gate, but a few were trapped inside. These men were systematically hunted down and murdered, allegedly in sight of mine security (Bregman 1987: Lesotho Delegation Memorandum: 6).

The next day 587 miners, mostly Sotho-speakers, decided to return to their homes (Bregman 1987: Dicks Affidavit: 9). The Lesotho miners' understanding of the situation at that time was summarized as follows:

a) Management had wanted to use them against Xhosas in March and they refused.
b) Management had now found a willing group to be used i.e. Pondos [amaMpondo] and this group was being used against them (Basotho)
c) There could not therefore be any protection that could be expected from Management in the circumstances.
   (Bregman 1987: Lesotho Delegation Memorandum: 8)

After a few weeks many of these miners returned to the mines, but they were reinstated at low level positions, regardless of their previous statuses. At the time of the inquiry, shaft stewards still feared for their lives. Apparently one person was charged with threatening a shaft steward in November but at the time of the inquiry he was free on bail and back working and living in the same hostel. Nonetheless, as evidenced by the ability to mobilize workers for the September strike of 1987; the power and influence of the NUM was not broken by these incidents.
A chronology of events at Vaal Reefs in 1984 - 1986 is outlined below:

September, 1984 - Legal strike in September. Miners allege Russian gang members hired to provoke ethnic conflict.

November, 1984 - Local shops boycotted.

March 11 - 14, 1985 - Short-shifts in protest of pay hikes for select employees.

April 21 - 22, 1985 - Workers at south division protest working conditions, refuse to do blasting "reserved" for Whites--14,000 to 17,000 dismissed.

July, 1985 - NUM "equality for all" campaign, includes protests at senior dining halls. Serious rift develops between team leaders and NUM militants at shaft five. Five team leaders murdered.

December, 1985 - Black administrator's car is bombed.

February 18, 1986 - Nine arrested in connection with July killings.

February 25, 1986 - Men from East division (1, 2, 5) go out on sympathy strike for those arrested.

February 26, 1986 - Seven and 23 others break strike. Seven associated with Sotho induna.

March 4, 1986 - Car bomb attacks on three indunas.

March 5, 1986 - Short-shifts in sympathy with those arrested. Some workers allege union or "comrade" intimidation.

March 7, 1986 - Three Black administrators allegedly assaulted, forced to run through compound with the NUM banner for not respecting short-shift.

March 8, 1986 - Bombing of Sotho induna's flat.

March 9, 1986 - "Normal" production.


March 16 - Fighting at No. 3, nine more men killed.

July 7, 1986 - Confrontation between Black and White workers

August, 1986 - NUM/COSATU militants and "comrades" campaign in hostels.

September, 1986 - Transkei "elections" disrupted.

October 8, 1986 - Alleged sit-down strike. Workers claim they were beaten for nothing.

November 6 - 7, 1986 - Liquor outlets first boycotted at No. 1. Broken by Mpondo dance group.


December 5 - 6, 1986 - Fight over possessions leads to renewed fighting at No. 1. Basotho claim compatriots brutally murdered while security watches; 13 killed.

INTERPRETATION.

This short discussion of events at Vaal Reef obviously cannot do complete justice to the complex series of events that took place there in 1984, 1985, and 1986. There is evidence in the transcripts from the Bregman inquiry to support a number of different interpretations. Some of the evidence is contradictory and there is a great deal of self-interested evasion. Yet, apart from problems of truthfulness and evasion, it is clear that much of the evidence is colored by the differing ideological perspectives of the participants. There is a "Rashoman"
effect at work here. For example, one could take a hardline anti-White/anti-management view and argue that all the so-called "tribal" fighting was created by their machinations. There is little doubt that they encouraged, tolerated, and promoted much of the violence. It was in their interest to promote ethnic hostility in order to weaken the union and the more revolutionary groups associated with it. Such hostility took the form of Basotho/amaXhosa fighting because these are the dominant groups represented at the mines. They are consequently the people usually involved in the struggles for power and authority in the induna system of compound management.

Some shaft stewards themselves admitted that worker unity was an ideal rather than a reality at hostel one. Workers from Lesotho were mentioned particularly as clinging to ethnic consciousness; Mpondo workers are another group at the mines with whom a well-defined set of ethnic characteristics are associated. Part of the reason for the conflict between shaft stewards and other workers is that political identities are changing. There is generational conflict at work here too. A number of militant young Sotho and Xhosa-speakers do see themselves primarily as workers. But this puts them in conflict with those men established at the mines who also have been able to "build up their homes." When it comes to issues of wages and working conditions, there is no conflict between them and worker unity is great.
But many workers are less willing to support radical "comrade-style" tactics. Team leaders and office personnel at shaft one, for example, could hardly be expected to vigorously endorse a sympathy strike for people suspected of harassing and killing others in their position at shaft five.16

Worker unity may or may not be growing in the wake of the 1987 strike. Incidents of ethnic and racial tension continue to be reported from the mines. For example, a miner recently wrote to Moeletsi oa Basotho (July 18, 1989:6) describing conflict between Xhosa and Shangaan workers at Western Deep Levels. According to his report, this fight began in early May after the headless body of a young Xhosa-speaking worker was found underground. The young man had been missing for several days. His team leader, reportedly a Shangaan, admitted killing the youth at the instigation of his White boss. For unknown reasons, the White miner allegedly was seeking the head of a Black man. What is significant here is that Xhosa-speakers retaliated against other workers whom they identified as "Shangaan" and six of them were killed.

NOTES

1. Ho lokela ho hlaka likelellong tsa batho hore batho ba Lesotho, Botswana, le Africa Boroa ke sechaba se le senq se mpang se arotsoe ke batho ba Juropa ho re thetsa hore re lichaba tse fapaneng.
2. Of course other less self-interested factors, like group symbols and norms, also need to be considered in analyses of social solidarity. For an elaboration of Olson's perspective see, for example, Hardin (1982) and Hechter (1987).

3. "Sotho" and "Xhosa" here actually refers to political alliances formed chiefly, but not exclusively, on linguistic/ethnic commonalities. In mining accounts of the incidents Tswana and Sotho-speakers are often lumped together as are various sub-divisions of Xhosa-speaking peoples (listed below as Pondo, Pondomise, Xhosa, Baca, and Hlubi). For management, tribal categorization is often a function of numbers. For example, nationality gets precedence over ethnic background for the relatively few Malawians; therefore, all Malawians are referred to as members of a single "tribe." On the other hand, the various subdivisions of Xhosa-speakers are considered salient apparently because there are many Xhosa-speakers to contend with. As defined by management, the ethnic composition of the residents at Vaal Reefs No. 1 Hostel was as follows:

Table 4. Ethnic Composition of Vaal Reef's No. 1 Hostel as Defined by Management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pondo</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PondoMise</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baca</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlubi</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangaans</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedi</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td>5,032</td>
<td>4,662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source Bergman 1987:Memoranda/Exhibit L)
4. The Bregman Commission was established as a private fact-finding commission rather than a state sanctioned criminal inquiry. While Bregman was engaged to conduct a "one-man commission" of inquiry into the disturbances, the actual proceedings involved a number of other professionals. Lesotho and Transkei sent official delegations as did the National Union of Mineworkers and the management of Vaal Reefs. Witnesses who testified included numerous workers, shaft stewards, and other union representatives. All of the testimony from miners was taken on the grounds at Vaal Reefs. During the formal proceedings at least, the hearings seem fair and even-handed.

5. A story told to the author by a veteran miner indicates that some ethnic clashes can be provoked by seemingly minor incidents. He recalls that a fight once broke out between Shaangan and other miners during the showing of a movie. A scene was shown of a Black man acting exceedingly meek to a White man. Someone shouted out in Fanakalo that this must be a Shangaan worker because only they are so meek. Shangaan viewers became upset and an argument and fist fight ensued. Workers do have ethnic stereotypes of each other, but these stereotypes cannot be adequately understood unless the nature of interaction at the work place is considered.

6. Mine officials often fail to acknowledge the issues which are the motivating force behind mass worker action. This is not necessarily cynical manipulation on their part; it could also be a manifestation of an ideological system which defines miners as illiterate and primitive. For a good example of this type of management ideology in operation see Prior (1977).

7. For examples see Work for Justice (December 1987:6-7; June 1988:7-8).

8. A senior Black administrative official also had his car bombed in December of 1985. This occurred after he intervened in an incident in which miners reportedly disrupted a senior staff dining hall (Bregman 1987:PT32/1426).

9. They may have been competing for the position of chief induna for all the hostel. The Sotho induna's position was vulnerable because of the declining number of Sotho men hired. See table given in footnote two.

10. In contrast, a horn (isibaba) is often used to rally Xhosa-speakers.
11. The testimony of the witness was translated from Xhosa during proceedings. The original Xhosa was not transcribed. The name of witness has been deleted by the author.

12. The decision not to fight underground is probably related to the expectation that security reaction is swifter and more ruthless when the means of production is threatened (see Bregman 1987:PT75/2751). In this case, a miner testified that Sotho and Xhosa workers actually helped each other make weapons while they were still underground, although they expected a fight on ethnic lines (Bregman 1987:PT75/2749-2750).

13. Black workers reportedly retaliated after a White shift boss assaulted a co-worker. The next day the White mine captain threatened Black workers with a loaded revolver. At the end of the shift, he refused to let—in his words—"Kaffirs" surface until all Whites had done so. When the elevator eventually returned for them, the Black workers refused to board. They only agreed to surface after a shaft steward went down and convinced them to do so. This shaft steward is one of the two detained under the state of emergency (Bregman:Lesotho Delegation Memorandum:3).

14. A worker explained it this way: "When the Russians get into the hostels they attack Xhosas and Xhosas would presume that they are being attacked by Basothos and then a faction fight would erupt" (Bregman 1987:PT50/2046).

15. The Pondo (amaMpondo) are a Xhosa-speaking people associated with the Pondo chieftaincy. The umtshongolo is a type of dance done by some Mpondo men at the mines. Ndlavini are Xhosa-speaking men, frequently brought up in rural areas, who embrace modern South African popular culture without completely rejecting Mpondo customs.

16. A team leader testified that team leaders were sympathetic to those killed at shaft five and were against the actions of shaft stewards in this regard. They participated in the March short-shifts because they were afraid for their safety (Bregman 1987:PT73/2678-2681). This is not easily dismissed as testimony of a man telling the commission what he thought they wanted to hear. For example, he also argued that he was in favor of the union and that all the "tribal" fighting had been created by management's clever use of Russian mercenaries (PT107/4000).
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

Consciousness, Experience, and Explanation

This dissertation has considered several facets of contemporary experience for people based in the South African periphery (primarily in Lesotho). The goal has been to provide an account of this experience sufficient to achieve understanding, in Runciman's sense. Like the anthropology of experience depicted in such works as Turner and Bruner (1986), the present study has discussed Sotho and Xhosa-speakers' expression of their own experience. Yet, unlike the case of many interpretivists, such expression has not been sought as much in the details of dramatic performance,¹ as it has in reflections of the everyday world found in newspaper accounts, formal testimony, casual conversation, and responses to the anthropologist's ordered questioning.

Like many interpretivists, Turner and Bruner (1986) emphasize the creative way in which experience is expressed in "art," "narrative," and "drama". Clearly, to understand such creative achievements is to comprehend much of the experience upon which they are based. In southern Africa, experience of "apartheid" does find expression in folk
music, dance, theater, poetry, and so on. In performance, individuals make explicit aspects of their lives which are not ordinarily open to public scrutiny. Yet, according to the conception of understanding put forth here, descriptive accounts of such events are incomplete as long as larger questions about causality are not addressed as well. From this perspective it is unfortunate that these are just the sorts of questions the interpretivists generally reject. Geertz, for example, thinks such questions have been asked so often that they are now hackneyed. In his epilogue to Turner and Bruner's work he reports happily that, "The Durkheimian manner that has been for so long the favored mode of dealing with symbolic materials in anthropology--the 'see it fits!' clanish-thoughts-for-clanish-societies approach to things--is silently but firmly discarded" (Geertz 1986:376). Symbolic expressions do not simply "reflect" social conflict, he continues, but "changes in symbolism are part of that conflict--and not the least important part" (1986:376). Similarly, in the same volume Boon argues there are a plurality of symbolic expressions in Bali which cannot be unraveled by reference to the traditional explanatory schema of anthropologists.

It would be easy to reject Turner, Bruner, et al. as "idealists" and posit "materialist" explanations in place of their own. But denigration of such work is not intended here. On the contrary, the work of the interpretivists is
of considerable value for demonstrating that "the mind" is not a simple machine that can be understood in terms of nineteenth-century conceptions of positivism and determinism. Although the brain is obviously not independent of the material world, the complexity of its structure is such that the idealist philosophers have a point in treating it as autonomous for purposes of understanding consciousness as it is experienced. What is suggested here is a methodological distinction between the material system in which thought must be generated and the specific content of thought itself. Such a distinction is necessary only because the amount of information required to specify the conditions upon which particular mental dispositions and inclinations are based probably cannot be reduced to anything less than the current experience of the person and relevant memory traces of his or her past. As the physicist Pagels has recently noted in reference to the epistemological implications of the new sciences of complexity, "no one can possibly simulate you or me with a system that is less complex than you or me" (1988:331). For methodological purposes physicists too may argue that: "In a sense consciousness is in part independent of, yet completely supported by, the material world" (Pagels 1988:176).

To understand any group of people, considerable attention must be paid to the details of their past and present
situation. The plethora of historical and contemporary factors involved in generating a collective sense of identity and consciousness is exemplified in the case of the so-called Vundle chieftaincy. Yet, this is just one small story. Such histories could be sought thousands of times over without approaching the "complete story" of South Africa's people. This makes understandable the previously mentioned complaint by Mike Morris (1987) that the historical perspective on the experience of ordinary people has led to an "infinitely contingent empiricism."

Collective experience will always be greater than the capacity for historians to tell and absorb it.

Yet, such stories as we are able to put together deserve to be told. When we look at a situation such as that of the workers at Vaal Reefs, all sorts of theoretical questions about race, class, and ethnicity may be raised; and the recent events there can be "explained" from a variety of perspectives. But this is not all. The plight of the men living this reality also demands our empathy. The particular experiences of other human beings are of value because they are the experiences of our fellows. Without such empathy, abstract theorizing appears nothing less than a crude way of toying with the story of other peoples' lives.

Much of this dissertation has been about violent social conflict and how people interpret it. Theoretical
considerations aside, a justification for this emphasis has been the feeling that the current events in Lesotho and South Africa are traumatic to such an extent that to downplay them would be to make trivial the very pain "experience" so often entails.

This has meant perhaps that other perspectives have not been given the attention they deserve. One important perspective receiving inadequate treatment here is the role of the everyday metaphorical systems through which Xhosa and Sotho-speakers express their experience in the modern world. Translation of words and phrases used creatively or idiosyncratically to describe modern experience is particularly problematic. I have frequently provided the words of my sources in Sotho or Xhosa so that those more linguistically competent than myself may evaluate them. The nature of contemporary Sotho and Xhosa linguistic expression deserves a thorough study on its own right.

By emphasizing empathy and referring to the complexity of the world I do not mean to suggest that inductive models are pointless. If we are to make progress in our self-reflective quest for understanding human experience, then our quest must be subject to critical examination. The hypothetico-deductive methods of modern science are useful in this regard. While I do not believe that a positivist social science will develop models capable of predicting with absolute certainty the complexities of day-to-day
interaction, they already have evidenced considerable predictive capacity in the study of broad social trends. There are patterns in social life and it is these patterns that make a comparative, generalizing, and limitedly predictive social science possible.

In the present work inductive methods have not been eschewed. On the contrary, it has been hypothesized that differences in material conditions lead to differences in social identity and worldview. In other words, the fundamental tenet of the materialist perspective has been stated as an inductive proposition. In the introduction it was suggested that this hypothesis be examined through a comparison of political identities in three areas where material and social conditions were said to vary. It was posited that in these areas differences exist in population density, agricultural potential, ethnic composition, and interracial contact. In general, these statements of difference do accurately reflect the situations found in practice.²

The survey research and ethnographic observations described in chapter eight suggest that the posited differences between Maputsoe, Ha Linku, and Mguyeni are significant. Of the four variables, population density, agricultural potential, and ethnic composition are particularly important determinants of social identity. In Ha Linku, where population density appears least and
agricultural potential greatest, people most readily identify with farming and an agricultural way of life. They express a high degree of consensus on the value of the Moshoeshoe ideal and the importance of being Basotho. For some highlanders, the lowlands are disparaged as places of crime and loss of respect for Sotho customs and traditions of authority. (For this reason the highlanders are all the more adversely affected by the Highland Water Scheme which is being imposed upon them.)

In Maputsoe changes in peoples' relationship to their environment have also brought about changes in worldview. For example, there is great experimentation with the new forms of worship which provide competing explanations for the problems of the contemporary world. The relatively high density of residents in town and their easy access to the latest news from South Africa means also that they are presented with many more choices. In general, older ways are more readily called into question than they are in rural areas. One striking example is that more and more women in town see themselves as autonomous wage earners or entrepreneurs rather than as housewives and farmers.

Many people throughout Lesotho identify with middle-class values of consumption and capital accumulation, but among lowlanders this is particularly common. In the lowlands the brewing and conspicuous consumption of alcohol is a direct consequence of the migrant labor system. It is not the love
of alcohol which has led typically to economic dependency and hardship, but economic dependency and hardship which has led to the love of alcohol.

Little evidence of ethnic conflict between Sotho and Xhosa-speakers has been found, but ethnic differences remain noticeable. Xhosa-speakers in Lesotho's southern districts cling to their distinctive markers of identity. Most emphasize a different orientation to Christianity than the Basotho. Nonetheless they share many features in common with Sotho-speakers, such as a similar ideological orientation towards the place "Lesotho."

The tenacity of the Xhosa-speaking way of life in this area can partly be explained by its proximity to larger areas across Lesotho's southern border where many other Xhosa-speakers reside. Being a Xhosa-speakers does provide one with some potential material benefits. For example, the ability to act the part of an individual from either ethnic category has allowed some Xhosa-speaking Lesotho citizens greater autonomy when seeking employment in South Africa. Still, the tenacity of Lesotho's Xhosa enclaves does not seem to be entirely explained by consideration of their material circumstances. This problem of an apparent lack of fit between some material situations and some ideological systems will be discussed below.

This dissertation as a whole suggests some ways thought is "determined" and some ways in which thought appears
"independent" of the material base and social structure. As mentioned above, changes in material conditions are casually related to changes in identity and worldview. In Lesotho in general the deterioration of resources and increase in landlessness has led to changes in peoples' perception of themselves. The old ideal of labor migration for the purpose of building up the agricultural base of one's homestead is breaking down. This ideal is being supplanted by a variety of other perspectives including militant worker and race consciousness, "petit bourgeois" aspirations and consumerism, and the self-interested militancy of violent criminals (litsotsi). While land and rural resources should be seen as key independent variables shaping consciousness, the ideas and linguistic frames of reference which make up the political and cultural heritage of Africans cannot be molded in an absolute fashion to conform to the exigencies of the immediate moment. Worldviews may change quickly, but because learned systems are costly to abandon, they also have about them a considerable degree of tenacity.

Of the works discussed here, Alverson's work on Botswana represents the strongest argument for the tenacity of culture. While his position has been criticized as a misreading of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and Fanon's existential psychology, his understanding of Tswana worldview is useful in showing that the linguistic and cultural heritage of Black workers cannot be assumed to
automatically disappear in the process of wage labor. He emphasizes the continuity of ideas and the resiliency of cultural expression in the face of political and economic subordination. The present work also points out that some cultural-linguistic concepts (such as that of botho/ubuntu and the Moshoeshoe ideal) are remarkably resilient but adds that concepts are subject both to prosaic and creative modification and to processes of selection which favor those ideas which are in keeping with everyday experience.

In rural South African society, ritual forms such as umhlinzeko and letlatlo have been subject to such selective processes. In the former case the umhlinzeko ritual has been transformed to better express the experiences and interests of young migrant laborers and their elders. In the latter case a similar ritual appears to have lost its saliency when it was not modified to reflect new conditions. Yet, not all change can be accounted for in such simplistic terms. Bridewealth is a case in point. Variation in norms of bridewealth which do not correspond with cultural, economic, or ecological differences cannot be easily understood in terms of materialist explanation alone. While high bridewealth norms in Lesotho clearly serve utilitarian ends, the norm itself is best explained as a symbol that continues because it reflects ideals of Sotho autonomy and desires for rural prosperity. These ideals are cultural forces which can be sustained as long as rural life and
Sotho identity continue to have meaning for relatively large numbers of people.

The study of ideas such as these which appear to have some autonomy from material referents is no longer the exclusive domain of idealist philosophers or, for that matter, of materialists bent on showing that all ideas must have materialist functions. The work of ecologists Boyd and Richerson (1985:271-279) on learning and the evolution of culture is exemplary of new types of "positivist" models which are capable of explaining linkages between ideas and material processes without recourse to a procrustean functionalism. One of Boyd and Richerson's models concerns "frequency-dependent bias." By this phrase they mean an individual's general tendency to conform to that which is being done and said by significant others (Boyd and Richerson 1985:135, 206-207). They argue that a tendency to conform to one's group may have been selected for because it is a relatively efficient way of learning that facilitates the acquisition of locally adaptive behavior (Boyd and Richerson 1985:223). Furthermore, because culture is acquired and maintained through a process of interaction with and imitation of valued others (like mothers, or successful businessmen, or countercultural figures like wealthy criminals), the value placed on these others may itself become an indirect selective force favoring the continuation of an exemplar's preferences. Such imitation
may lead to the continuation of ideas and practices which appear afunctional or even dysfunctional from a utilitarian perspective (1985:259-279). In the conditions of scarcity, relative deprivation, and dislocation which is the reality for so many people in southern Africa, norms of reciprocity and deference to authority become less common and values which denigrate human life become more so. Such "anomic" values may then expand exponentially as they become part of a new conformist tradition.

The direction of culture change is not always predictable because of the difficulty of specifying relevant initial conditions. Although the customs and folkways of the various African language groups have always been quite similar, the different directions similar ritual expressions have taken in response to colonialism, capitalism, and Christian hegemony suggest that minor variations in initial conditions can lead to significantly different, unintended, consequences. The decentralized nature of Xhosa rites of passage in Lesotho, for example, may have contributed to their adaptability and resistance to change. Such decentralization may also help explain why Xhosa-speaking people have historically been able to maintain a stronger tradition of resistance to the message of Christian missionaries than have Sotho-speakers.
Lesotho and South Africa. Evaluating the Case.

Runciman's fourth criteria of understanding is that of evaluation. Evaluation has been implicit throughout the present work, but in concluding I wish to make it more explicit. This evaluation is based on the conviction that human life is of intrinsic value, that state bureaucrats and policy makers should be accountable for their actions, that governments should be subject to popular selection and dismissal and that the latter is highly unlikely where the distribution of wealth is inequitable. These values are not simply the impositions of a foreigner; they are values which I share with many others in Lesotho and southern Africa in general.

Clearly, the micro-state of Lesotho fairs poorly on these criteria. As I have previously indicated, there are high rates of crime and political violence, dissent has been suppressed, accountability is minimal, and inequity has increased. Why this is the case, whether the blame for this lies essentially with individuals or systems--individual White rulers versus the apartheid system or individual Lesotho rulers versus the structural situation in which they find themselves--is a separate question.

Comparative evidence (for example, Schatzberg 1988) suggests that structural factors such as the political security of the regime itself should be assigned greater causal weight in determining levels of oppression than the
characteristics of individual rulers or the cultural precepts of a society. Nonetheless, individuals have some latitude in deciding whether or not they consent to participate in activity which they know is unjust. Thus, individuals should not be considered above reproach.

Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects the idea of making evaluation explicit in description, it is a practical reality that nations interact with other nations, form policies, and implement plans in terms of their interests, ideologies, and assumptions about the world. Many nations have decided that Lesotho is deserving of substantial aid. I do not wish to challenge that judgment, but merely to point out that it cannot be founded on the assumption that Lesotho's people are "freer" than people in South Africa.

NOTES

1. For this type of analysis see the excellent work of Coplan (1987).

2. There is room for disagreement here, however. As noted in chapter two, most previous scholars have found little difference between the mountains and the lowlands in degree of dependence on migrant labor. Some may feel that by creating the category "agricultural potential" I am obscuring this lack of difference. I would only reiterate that differences in labor migration rates between lowlands and mountains have recently been reported (KL 1985) and that the greater fertility of mountain soils is not an irrelevant factor. Of the four factors, degree of interracial interaction seems least important because it was quite low in all settings.

3. At least until such ideas and preferences reach a very high level of frequency, after this, novelty may become more appealing.
4. The fact that circumcision ritual was abolished among the Mpondo in Pondoland does not necessarily weaken this argument. The practice was abolished and replaced by new forms of military organization on order of the nineteenth-century chief Faku. This was as an innovative response to the decimation of his chieftaincy by mfecane warriors. Still, the circumcision rituals continued through much of the century, being successfully abolished only through the imposition of fines (Beinart 1982:17).
APPENDIX I.

SOURCES OF INCOME FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN LESOTHO WITH NO FORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% South Maseru 1986</td>
<td>% Qeme Area 1987</td>
<td>% Five Villages 1986</td>
<td>% Southern Road 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer/Liquor</td>
<td>37% M101</td>
<td>36% M56</td>
<td>47% M21</td>
<td>47% M19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Sales</td>
<td>11% M26</td>
<td>16% M30</td>
<td>26% M14</td>
<td>1% M5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicrafts</td>
<td>3% M250</td>
<td>13% M55</td>
<td>16% M10</td>
<td>9% M62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Products</td>
<td>0% --</td>
<td>28% M51</td>
<td>26% M61</td>
<td>32% M9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Sales</td>
<td>0% --</td>
<td>0% --</td>
<td>26% M25</td>
<td>19% M24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Crop Sales</td>
<td>3% M46</td>
<td>16% M22</td>
<td>16% M33</td>
<td>12% M13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>6% M160</td>
<td>8% M390</td>
<td>0% --</td>
<td>9% M66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts/Relatives</td>
<td>23% M105</td>
<td>40% M31</td>
<td>11% M20</td>
<td>20% M24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop Value/</td>
<td>9% M17</td>
<td>80% M17</td>
<td>58% M17</td>
<td>58% M7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Mean Monthly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>M82</td>
<td>M82</td>
<td>M46</td>
<td>M33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Work for Justice March 1988:5. M=approximately US $0.50. The percentage figures refer to the percent of households claiming that category as a source of income.)

*The data are compiled from studies done by John Gay and a number of associates. South Maseru refers to a southern
section of the capital city; Qeme is a lowland area near Maseru; five villages refers to villages in western Lesotho's lowlands, foothills, and mountains; and southern road refers to villages near the road from Moyeni to Qacha's Nek.


APPENDIX II

GENERAL INFORMATION ON SURVEY RESPONDENTS

1. SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64 = 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(16-20)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21-25)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26-30)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31-35)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36-41)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42-46)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47-51)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52-57)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(59-66)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Over 67)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64 = 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. MARITAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow(er)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64 = 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. CHILDREN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-4)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-6)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7-8)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9-11)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64 = 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. HOUSEHOLD SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-4)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-6)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7-8)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9-10)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11-16)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-- = 112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Question inadvertently omitted from Ha Linku survey)*
6. **CHURCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeneni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEC* (Zionist)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adv.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 = 176</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Lesotho Evangelical Church, includes Kereke ea Basotho in Ha Linku)*

7. **AGRICULTURAL FIELDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeneni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-4)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-8)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>64 = 180</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. **INTEREST IN LIVESTOCK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeneni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | **42**    | **74**   | **64** |

9. SHEEP AND GOATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-9)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10-25)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26-45)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46-54)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(60-105)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(124+)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>57 = 164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. CATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-4)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-8)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9-11)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15-45)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57 = 165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. SCHOOLING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-5)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>(6-8)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9-11)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11-12)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46* = 159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Question inadvertently omitted on 18 questionnaires)*
12. **EMPLOYMENT**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Range1</th>
<th>Range2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed Locally</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Non-wage)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired (no pension)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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13. **LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME**

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APPENDIX III.

QUESTIONNAIRE WITH SOTHO AND XHOSA TRANSLATIONS

The questionnaire is divided into three parts: 1) a set of questions meant to elicit responses about ideological orientations; 2) a set of questions used to elicit concepts of social identity—modified from psychologists Loevinger and Wessler (1970) and Holt (1980); and, 3) questions about personal background and economic resources. The purpose of the first set of questions may not be immediately apparent to outside observers. They were constructed to match some of the philosophical questions suggested by Alverson (1978) and to elicit attitudes of ideological significance. The questions approach this latter task with a deliberate degree of indirectness. The author's previous experience in Lesotho indicated that it was not appropriate to ask directly political questions in survey form. Questions were therefore made general enough so that respondents would express opinions with political content only if they so chose. The questions did in fact elicit such responses. For example, in answer to the first three questions, many people complained about their economic plight and what the Lesotho government was/or was not doing about it.
Similarly, the fourth and fifth questions are oblique ways of eliciting attitudes toward the chieftaincy and toward Lesotho as an ideological construct. I have found that talking about poetry and talking about Moshoeshoe are good ways of approaching these questions in a non-threatening way.

The second set of questions was taken from the Washington University Sentence Completion test in its short form (Holt 1978). This is a non-copyrighted test designed as a measure of ego development. I have modified it here and have used a different method of evaluation. Therefore, I am not attempting to say anything about the "ego development" of individuals or, indeed, about the utility of the concept itself. However, cursory examination of individual responses suggests to me that the test, if sensitively used, may have some cross-cultural validity. Unfortunately, my resources were inadequate to take the kind of care in translation which would have been necessary for evaluation of responses according to Loevinger's (1970) format.

PART I.

1. What makes for a good life?

   {Boiketlo ba bophelo haholo ke taba ea'ng?}
   {Ukonwaba ngempilo kakhulu yindaba enjani?}

2. What is community/national development?

   {Ntlafatso ea sechaba ke eng?}
   {Inkqubelo (ntlafatso) yesizwe yintoni?}
3. Which is better life today or life in days gone by? Why?

{Ha u bapisa bophelo ba batho ba sejoale-joale le bophelo ba khale bo molemo ke bofe? Hobaneng?}

{Xa udibanisa impilo yakugala nempilo yangoku enencedo yeyiphi? Ngokuba kutheni?}

4. What is the aim of the praise-poetry for the chiefs? Is it still important?

{Sepheo sa lithoko tsa marena ke sefe'ng? Li sa na le boholokaoa matsatsing ana na?}

{Injongo yokuzibonga kwamakhosi yintoni? Zisenencedo kwelixesha likhoyo?}

5. Is the example of Moshoeshoe I still important for today's people? What does his example demonstrate?

{Mohlala oa Morena Moshoeshoe oa pele o sa na le boholokaoa ho batho ba mehleng ena na? Mohlala oa hae o bontsa'ng?}

{Umzekelo kankosi Moshoeshoe wakuqala usenencedo ebantwini bangoku? Umzekelo wakhe obonisani?}

PART II. Questions derived from Washington University Sentence Completion Test (Short Form for Men)

1. If you had more money what would you do with it?

{Hoja u na le chelete e fetang eo u nang le eona hona joale nka be u tla etsa joang ka eona?}

{Xa unemali eninzi onayo ungenza ntoni ngayo?}

2. For a man, what is a good career/well-supported life?

{Boipheliso bo botle ba monna ke bofe?}

{Ukuziphilisa kakuhle kwendoda kunjani?}
3. **What is the thing you like about yourself?**
   
   *(Ntho eo u ratang bakeng sa sebopeho sa hau ke eng?)*
   
   *(Into oyithandayo kwinkubo yakho yintoni?)*

4. **How are women fortunate/blessed?**
   
   *(Basali ba hlohonomolohloa joang?)*
   
   *(Abafazi basikelelewe njani?)*

5. **What should a father do to be a good father?**
   
   *(Ho ba le liketso tse ntate ntate oa bana o ts\'oanetse ho etsa joang?)*
   
   *(Kukuba nezenzo ezintle kutata wabantwana ufanele ubenjani?)*

6. **A man feels good when he is doing what?**
   
   *(Monna o ikutloa monate ha a etsa joang?)*
   
   *(Indoda iziva kamnandi xa kunjani?)*

7. **What should a wife do in her life?**
   
   *(Mohatsa oa monna o ts\'oanetse ho etsa joang?)*
   
   *(Umfazi wendoda ufanele ukwenza njani?)*

8. **What should a man do in his life?**
   
   *(Monna o ts\'oanetse ho etsa joang bophelong?)*
   
   *(Indoda ifanele ukwenza njani empilweni?)*

9. **When a woman asks for her husband's help what does he usually do?**
   
   *(Ha mosali a kopa monna oa hae thuso lapeng monna hangata a etsa joang?)*
   
   *(Xa umfazi ucela uncedo endodeni yakhe emzini indoda yenzani kaninji?)*
10. When you are criticized what should you do?
   (Ha u nyatsoa u ts'oantse ho etsa joang?)
   (Xa ungavumiyo ufanele wenjenjani?)

11. When does a man usually feel pride?
   (Monna o ikutloa boikhosomo hangata ha a entseng?)
   (Indoda iziva ineqhayiya xa injani?)

12. For a man, what are the laws/rules of life?
   (Melao ea bophelo ba banna e re'ng?)
   (Imithetho yempilo yamadoda yithini?)

PART II. CONTINUED (SHORT FORM FOR WOMEN)

1. To support herself a woman should do what?
   (Mosali o ts'oanetse ho etsa joang ho ba le boipheliso bo botle?)
   (Umfazi ufanele kwenze njani ukuziphilisa kakuhle?)

2. What does a girl have a right to do?
   (Moroetsana o na le tokelo ho etsa eng bophelong ba hae?)
   (Intombazana inamalungelo okwenza njani empilweni?)

3. What is the thing you like about yourself?
   (Ntho eo u ratang bakeng sa sebopeho sa hao ke eng?)
   (Into oyithandayo kwinkubo yakho yintoni?)

4. What is good education for a woman?
   (Thuto e ntle ke e joang ho motho ea mosali?)
   (Imfundu entle kumuntu ongufazi yenjani?)
5. What are the duties of a wife?
{Ts'oanelo ea mosali ke eng?}
{Imfanelo kumfazi wendoda yintoni?}

6. When you are angry what do you do?
{Mohla oo u halafileng u etsa joang?}
{Xa ukhaliphile wenza njani?}

7. How are men fortunate/blessed?
{Banna ba hlohonolofaloa joang?}
{Amadoda asikelewe njani?}

8. A woman feels good when she is doing what?
{Mosali a ikutloa monate ha a etsa eng?}
{Umfazi uziva kamnandi xa kunjani?}

9. What do you and your husband plan to do?
{Oena le monna oa hao le batla ho etsa eng--kore le rera ho etsa lintho tse joang?}
{Wena nendoda yakho nifuna ukwenza ntoni--kuthi niplana ukwenza zinto ezinjani?}

10. For a woman, what are the rules/laws of life?
{Melao ea bophelo ba basali e re'ng?}
{Imithetho yempilo yabafazi yithini?}

11. I myself . . .
{'Na ke . . .}
{Mna ndi . . .}
12. What must a woman always do in her life?
(Mosali ka mehla o ts'oantse ho etsa joang?)
(Umfazi kaninzi ufanele ukwenza njani?)

PART III. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. What year were you born?
(U hlaile ka selemo sefe?)
(Uvele ngawuphi unyaka?)

2. Where is your home?
(Haeno ke kae?)
(Ikhaya lakho liphi?)

3. How long have you spent at your present residence?
(U qetile nako e kae _____?)
(U gqibe ixesha elingakanani e______?)

4. Are you married? Where is your spouse?
(U na le monna/mosali na? Haeba o teng eena o kae?)
(Unendoda/unomfazi na? Xayiba ikhona yiphi?)

5. Do you have children? How many?
(U na le bana? Ba ba kae?)
(Unabantwana? Bangaphi?)

6. How many people are there at your home?
(Le batho ba ba kae lapeng la haeno?)
(Ningabantu bangaphi ekhayeni lakho?)
7. Do you go to church? What church do you go to?
   (U kena kereke? Kereke efe?)
   (Uhamba icawe? Uhambe eyiphi?)

8. Do you have fields? How many?
   (Le na le masimo? Masimo a makae?)
   (Ninamasimi? Amangaphi?)

9. Are you interested in raising livestock? How many animals do you have? What sort are they?
   (U na le thahasello ho rura ka liphoofolo na? Le na le liphoofolo tse kae?)
   (Uyathanda ukufuya inyamakazi? Unenyamakazi ezingaphi?)

10. What grade of school have you completed?
    (U balile sehlopha sefe sekolong?)
    (Ufunde bani esikolweni?)

11. If you are working, what are you working at?
    (Haeba ua sebetsa, u sebetsa eng?)
    (Xayiba usebenza, usebenza ntoni?)

12. What languages do you speak?
    (U tseba lipuo tse fe'ng?)
    (Wazi iilwimi ziphi?)

**NOTES**

1. The Xhosa used here is that which is used in Lesotho and may vary with standard written Xhosa. The Sotho translation is given in the first set of brackets, the Xhosa translation in the second.
   Those questioned in Maputsoe and Ha Linku where also asked to define and discuss a set of 16 proverbs. These items are omitted here as they not discussed in the text.
APPENDIX IV
CODING OF SURVEY RESPONSES

PART I.

1) WHAT MAKES FOR A GOOD LIFE? (boiketlo ba bophelo/ukuphila kakuhle)

1. money (96)
2. health (12)
3. physical needs (31)
4. jobs (12)
5. family (10)
6. respect for "customs" (3)
7. freedom (2)
8. justice (1)
9. farming; land/cattle ownership (9)
10. Christian faith (4)
11. Personal property, possessions (6)
12. Peaceful social relations (2)
13. Progress and development (4)

2) WHAT IS COMMUNITY/NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT? (ntlafatso ea sechaba/inkqubelo yesizwe)

1. schooling; being educated (10)
2. cooperation, social harmony (47)
3. improved agric. and home industry (41)
4. soil conservation (12)
5. self-sufficiency, plenty (10)
6. good government (2)
7. developing infrastructure (transport, roads, schools, hospitals) (5)
8. general employment (25)
9. social programs (social security, work compensation) (4)
10. end to racial discrimination (1)
11. Hard work (3)
12. Nutrition, health and hygiene (41)
13. equitable distribution of wealth (leruo le lekaneng) (2)

3) WHICH IS BETTER LIFE TODAY OR LIFE IN DAYS GONE BY?

1. past (88)
2. present (88)
3. Don't know, undecided (2)

4) WHY?

1. Past, we were more prosperous, self-sufficient, healthy, had more land (57)

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2. Past, there was peace, cooperation (14)
3. Past, traditional medical knowledge (3)
4. Past, inflation is bad (9)
5. Past, there was more work (3)
6. Past, we weren't taxed (1)
7. Today, better infrastructure, medical facilities (51)
8. Today, jobs and money have made life better (8)
9. Today, we're Christian (4)
10. Today, we have schools, education (9)
11. Today, there is more cooperation now (2)
12. Today, past ways are obsolete (3)
13. Today, wages are better (1)
14. Today, women can support themselves now (2)
15. Today, there was too much violence in the past (lifecane) (3)
16. Today, because of machines (1)
17. Today, we're living away from oppression (1)
18. No answer (20)

5) WHAT IS THE AIM OF THE PRAISE-POETRY FOR THE CHIEFS?

1. inform about history, origins, chiefs' lives (52)
2. show respect to chiefs, "uplift" them (58)
3. show cooperation, unity of people (3)
4. remember/give thanks to elders, chiefs of old, ancestral spirits (9)
5. provide examples of good government (3)
6. help us to keep our customs and protect our nation/community
7. please chiefs, make them happy (1)
8. inform chiefs about the poor (1)
9. to get people to like the chiefs (1)
10. help us keep pride in ourselves (3)
11. teach purpose of the chiefs (2)
12. give advice to the people (4)
13. teach military prowess, motivate warriors (28)
14. have fun (ho thabisa) (2)
15. instill patriotism, praise the country (1)
16. don't know, no response (16)

6) IS IT STILL IMPORTANT?

1. yes (105)
2. no (48)
3. don't know, N. A. (27)

7) IS THE EXAMPLE OF KING MOSHOESHOE I STILL IMPORTANT FOR TODAY'S PEOPLE?

1. yes (99)
2. no (10)
3. no, example is good but people no longer follow it (30)
4. no, old ways are gone (2)
5. yes, but people aren't following it (1)
6. don't know (5)
7. only for some people (1)

8) WHAT DOES HIS EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATE?

1. A leader who demonstrates unity (6)
2. A leader should show respect, peace, love, humanity (botho) (111)
3. respect for customs (esp. lebollo) (14)
4. value of missionaries, bringing peace, education, progress (1)
5. justice, compassion (8)
6. importance of cattle (5)
7. how to get along with and support his people (5)
8. people should stay in his territory (5)
9. proper conduct, what being a Mosotho is all about (5)
10. only how to be under the Boers (1)
11. how to be a good leader, king (6)
12. wisdom (1)
13. that Basotho should be masters of their own land (1)
14. fighting and plundering (2)
15. success (1)
16. love, patriotism for country (3)
17. good life (8)
18. nothing (2)
19. Don't know (8)

PART II. QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SENTENCE COMPLETION (SHORT FORM FOR MEN)

1) If you had more money what would you do with it?

a) don't know (1)
b) use it for education (6)
c) build a home (13)
d) buy livestock (7)
e) help others (community/nation) (1)
f) save it, bank it (10)
g) live well, support myself (6)
h) buy clothing (1)
i) invest in business (rental property, shops, hotel business, tractor for hire service, etc.) (39)
j) help others (family, friends) (2)
k) get married (1)
l) make plans to use it (2)
m) buy agriculture equipment (2)
n) buy a car (2)

2) For a man what is a good career/well-supported life?

a) good family life (7)
b) good nutrition, not being in physical need (16)
c) farming/agriculture (17)
d) skilled crafts (building, carpentry, general repair) (4)
e) work at a job; wage labor (28)
f) to be wealthy, have money all the time (7)
g) Respect (S.--ho hlonpha, hlonepha; X.--ukuhlunipha); good moral conduct; (ukuziphatha kakuhle) (3)
h) mine work (1)
i) a business, self-employment (8)

3) What is the thing you like about yourself?

a) working (9)
b) my family (6)
c) physical characteristics (strength, beauty, intelligence, skin tone etc.) (41)
d) farming (ho lema/ukulima) (3)
e) health (5)
f) livestock (2)
g) if I have money (3)
h) personality ("peaceful" interpersonal relations, "outgoing") (8)
i) clothing (3)
j) business goals (want to start a shop) (1)
k) nationality, origins (being a child of Moshoeshoe) (2)
l) personal hygiene (cleanliness, etc.) (2)
m) like development (2)
n) that I'm improving my life (1)
o) not right to say, for others to say (1)

4) How are women fortunate/blessed (hlohonolofaloa/ukubenothamsanga)?

a) because they're able to bear children; or to take care of them (49)
b) because they are supported by men (6)
c) because they're people of peace (2)
d) because of their work (5)
e) because they can bear heavy burdens (2)
f) they are not blessed at all (2)
g) because of their good singing and dancing (1)
h) because of their religious faith (ka bolumeli) (3)
i) if they respect their husbands (3)
j) in their conduct of family affairs (5)
k) because they respect their marriage vows (4)

5) What should a father do to be a good father?

a) conducts himself properly, respects the family (22)
b) loves wife and family (10)
c) travels (2)
d) supports his family financially/materially (food, clothing, shelter, education) (37)
e) teaches his children respect, brings them up properly (9)
f) administers house justly (1)
g) makes plans [for the future] together with his wife (5)

6) A man feels good when he is doing what?

a) he has children (8)
b) things are nice at home (11)
c) he is working/has worked (41)
d) he is able to support his family/is not in physical need (10)
e) he is not plagued with worries (4)
f) he is healthy (3)
g) he has livestock, is farming, has a successful harvest (11)
h) has money, is wealthy (6)
i) his wife respects him (7)

7) What should a wife do in her life?

a) obey and respect (28)
b) keep house clean, work for husband and family (50)
c) be healthy and happy (4)
d) love husband/family, be loyal to them (10)
e) be moral (X. - ukuziphatha_kakuhle) (4)
f) have children, raise them properly (5)
g) plan for the future (0, see women's responses)
h) advise her husband (2)
i) provision the household (0, see women's responses)
j) get a job, work for herself (0, see women's responses)

8) What should a man do in his life?

a) Be respectful and have proper conduct (ukuziphatha_kakuhle) (10)
b) farm (20)
c) work, work to support the family (42)
d) educate children (2)
e) raise children right; administer the household justly, discuss things with wife (2)
f) fix things in the community (3)
g) procreate (sleep with women, father children) (5)
h) make his family happy (1)
i) pray to God (1)
j) think/plan his life (2)
k) accumulate wealth (1)
l) love his wife (1)

9) When a woman asks for her husband's help what does he usually do?

a) helps by giving her money or whatever she needs (82)
b) doesn't help (3)
c) talks over problem first (3)
d) gets angry (2)

10) When you are criticized what should you do?

a) take person aside to discuss the problem (4)

b) accuse (ho gosa/ukumangalela), fight back (10)

c) leave off what I have done; change subject; ignore it (8)

d) feel hurt; sorry for myself (13)

e) criticize myself if the criticism is just (23)

f) try to stay calm (3)

g) apologize (15)

h) find it provoking, irritating (1)

i) listen (1)

j) think about it (6)

k) show humility (24)

11) When does a man usually feel pride?

a) he is content with his home life (14)

b) he has livestock; a good harvest (10)

c) he has money/capital; has become accomplished/is wealthy (5)

d) he is physically strong/healthy (5)

e) he is not in need, is sated (4)

f) he shouldn't; pride is not a good thing (3)

g) there is peace (1)

h) he is with a woman (2)

i) he is working (13)

j) he has children (12)

k) he has made a mistake [i.e. and won't admit it] (4)

l) he has done something right (1)

m) he has his own home (4)

n) he has educated his children (1)

12) For a man, what are the laws/rules of life?

a) don't know; N. A. (1)

b) those of Christianity (ten [commandments], to receive the grace of God) (4)

c) to be respected; (are to respect the chiefs etc.) (36)

d) to fulfill social obligations of work, custom etc. (to live with family; to marry; take care of family, to work hard, get a job, to be initiated) (34)

e) to maintain harmonious social relations (to get along with others, to have good and proper conduct) (3)

f) (not like they were in the past, they've changed, are many, go round and round) (7)

g) relate to "traditional authority", (are a thing of the chiefs, that men are heads of the household) (3)

h) say not to steal (2)

PART II. CONTINUED [SHORT FORM FOR WOMEN]
1) To support herself a woman should do what?

a) don't know (1)
b) work (in general), labor (48)
c) farm (10)
d) make things to sell, sell farm produce; handicrafts (30)
e) behave properly (6)
f) be intelligent (1)
g) have her own home-place (ha_hae) (5)

2) What does a girl have a right to do?

a) behave properly (25)
b) be taught to farm (1)
c) to be married (7)
d) to an education (12)
e) to work [for wages] (21)
f) to work for household (4)
g) to respect parents/respect in general (10)
h) she has no rights (17)

3) What is the thing you like about yourself?

a) no answer, don't know (0)
b) my ability to work (20)
c) I'm a good household manager (4)
d) I like to farm (2)
e) I like to tease (1)
f) I'm healthy (8)
g) I'm self-controlled (4)
h) I get along with others (10)
i) physical characteristics (strong, skin tone, etc.) (32)
j) personal hygiene (cleanliness, etc.) (6)
k) having money in my hands (3)
l) age (3)
m) love God, know God (2)
4. **What is good education for a woman?**

a) don't know (1)
b) work (4)
c) "housekeeping"; household skills; (childrearing, cooking etc.) (46)
d) proper moral conduct, respect, discipline (35)
e) fortitude (1)
f) schooling because it helps a woman get a job (4)
g) teaching or nursing (1)
h) handicrafts; home industry (7)

5. **What are the duties of a wife?**

a) no answer, don't know (2)
b) proper moral conduct, respect (48)
c) work for husband and/or his household (39)
d) have children; raise them properly (7)
e) are received through her husband (2)

6. **When you are angry what do you do?**

a) no answer, don't know (0)
b) show I'm irritated; upset (9)
c) fight (10)
d) take a walk (1)
e) scold, reprimand, tell person who has made me angry (38)
f) cry (17)
g) try to control myself (9)
h) treat children roughly (1)
i) may get sick (2)
j) sit deep inside the hut (5)

7. **How are men fortunate/blessed?**

a) don't know, no answer (7)
b) when they have children (5)
c) when they support their wives (8)
d) when their family is happy; they get along with their family (8)
e) because they can get jobs easily (13)
f) because they can do heavy work (16)
g) if they don't drink alcohol (1)
h) when they are working (0, see men's responses)
i) because women get blamed for their actions (6)
j) physical characteristics (beards etc.) (6)
k) they're heads of households (2)
l) they have a special relationship with God (5)

8. **A woman feels good when she is doing what?**

a) no answer (0)
b) she has children (29)
c) she has been drinking African beer; eating good food (5)
d) she is healthy (6)
e) she lives contentedly with her children and husband (39)
f) she is working for her household (14)
g) she has a nice house/home (3)

9. What do you and your husband plan to do?

a) no answer, doesn't apply (14)
b) educate our children (19)
c) save money (2)
d) love one another, cooperate, to found a happy family (10)
e) build a home (25)
f) start a business (11)
g) work in the fields (3)
h) rear children properly (esp. to know God) (3)
i) have no plans (2)
j) have a family, children (10)
k) work hard so that we can live well in our old age (2)
l) buy a car (1)
m) develop this country (1)
n) see that our child becomes a shephard (1)

10. For a woman, what are rules/laws of life?

a) don't know (2)
b) pertain to Christianity (ten, love God) (1)
c) relate to respect (love, respect family/household) (36)
d) refer to social obligations of work, custom, morality (41)
e) to maintaining harmonious social relations (live well with others, etc.) (7)
f) [responses with negative connotations] (not like they were in the past, they've changed, are difficult, many) (6)
g) relate to "traditional authority" (of chiefs, of men etc.) (2)

11. I myself ...

a) personal name (11)
b) marital status (2)
c) [things person enjoys doing] (like church, like to talk/sing, like to work, like to make friends,) (11)
d) [activities] (look after the chickens) (5)
e) health (am well) (1)
f) gender (39)
g) ethnicity/nationalism (am a Mosotho, am a Xhosa) (34)
h) age (am old) (3)

12. What must a woman/wife always do in her life?

a) don't know (0)
b) obey and respect (13)
c) keep house clean, work for husband and family (62)
d) be healthy and happy (1)
e) love husband and family, be loyal to them (1)
f) be moral (ukuziphatha kakuhle) (2)
g) have children, raise them right (5)
h) plan for the future (1)
i) advise her husband (0, see men's responses)
j) provision the household (1)
k) work, work for herself (10)

NOTES

1. Frequency of responses are given in parentheses.
APPENDIX V

SURVEY RESULTS

In order to compare and analyze survey results the individual categories outlined in appendix four were lumped further. Ideally such a process is cross-checked with survey respondents, but this has not been possible here. Some of the distinctions were noted in the field, however, and I have had conversations with local people (not necessarily survey respondents) about them. For example, the major distinction found between answers on the question, "What makes for a good life?" seems to be between those who stress material needs and interests and those who emphasize social and/or family harmony. These two perspectives are expressed in everyday conversation by the oft heard phrases Khotso, re batla khotso (Peace, we want peace) and Mosebetsi, re batla mosebetsi (Jobs, we want jobs). Critics may wish to challenge some of the categories. Yet, I believe they are reasonably accurate representations of the general opinions expressed in the survey.

In the following charts frequencies for Nguyeni, Maputsoe and Ha Linku are given in the horizontal cells. In the first section, basic background information collected from survey respondents is compared. Here the manner in which I
have lumped the data is obvious. This is less the case in
the next three sections, so in order to show more clearly
what has been done I have listed the numbers or letters from
appendix four which I have placed in that category. At the
bottom of each contingency table I have listed statistics
obtained from the Statview 512 program (Abacus Concepts
1986) designed for Macintosh personal computers.
These statistics include chi-square, G statistic, the
contingency coefficient, and Cramer's V. In cases where
chi-square is not significant this is noted and chi-square
is the only statistic included. Frequency of responses are
not always consistent because individuals were allowed to
respond with more than one answer. What is being compared
are frequency of responses, not the individuals who
responded.

PART I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(16-25)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26-35)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36-46)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47-57)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(59+)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=31.358  df=8  p<.05
G statistic=31.495  Contingency=.385
Cramer's V=.295

Young people (under 25) are overrepresented in Maputsoe, underrepresented in Ha Linku group.
2. CHILDREN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-4)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-6)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7+)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=14.06 df=8 p>.05

3. SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
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</table>

Chi-square=1.11 df=2 p>.05

4. MARITAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow(er)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=5.28 df=4 p>.05

5. FIELDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3+)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=23.15 df=4 p<.05
G=24.1 Contingency=.338 Cramer's V=.254

Data from urban Maputsoe vary most from rural areas. No significant difference between rural areas.
### 6. SHEEP AND GOATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-25)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26-124)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=26.25  df=4  p<.05  
G statistic=30.27  Contingency=.371  
Cramer's V=.283

Variance mostly between Maputsoe and other areas. No significant difference between rural areas themselves.

### 7. CATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-8)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9-45)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=38.99  df=4  p<.05  
G statistic=40.52  Contingency=.437  
Cramer's V=.344

Significant difference between rural and urban areas  
(Chi-square=36.9  df=4  p<.05)

### 8. EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage labor</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-wage/ Unemployed</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=.887  df=4  p>.05
9. CHURCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyení</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Evangelical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Zionist&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=40.887  df=8  p<.05
G statistic=44.895  Contingency=.435
Cramer's V=.342

10. SCHOOLING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyení</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-5)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6-8)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9+)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=21.4  df=8  p<.05
G statistic=22.62  Contingency=.344
Cramer's V=.259

11. LANGUAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyení</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sotho</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Chi-square=137.286  df=2  p>.05
G statistic=130.21  Contingency=.658
Cramer's V=.873
PART II. PHILOSOPHICAL/IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

1. GOOD LIFE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material needs, interests (1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social/family harmony (4, 5)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other (6, 7, 8, 10, 13)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=21.45 df=4 p>.05

2. DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved standard of living (jobs, health, infrastructure) (1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved socio-political situation (2, 6, 10, 11, 13)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=.375 df=2 p>.05

3. BETTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=11.57 df=2 p=.003
G statistic=11.72 Contingency=.248
Cramer's V=.256
4. WHY?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Better standard of living (1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 16)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Better political situation (2, 6, 11, 14, 15, 17)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=18.38 df=4 p=.001  
G statistic=18.617 Contingency=.317  
Cramer's V=.236

5. PRAISE-POETRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Educational (1, 15)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Solidarity through chiefs (2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 16)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=7.06 df=4 p>.05

6. PRAISES IMPORTANT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Yes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=18.19 df=4 p=.001  
G statistic=19.12 Contingency=.303  
Cramer's V=.225
7. MOSHOESHOE'S EXAMPLE IMPORTANT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Yes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. No (people don't respect it)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=6.38  df=4  p>.05

8. MOSHOESHOE'S EXAMPLE IS?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Botho/ubuntu leadership (1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Importance of land and way of life (3, 6 8, 13, 17)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Negative comments (10, 14, 18)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Other favorable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=14.63  df=6  p=.02
G statistic is not applicable
Contingency=.274  Cramer's V=.20

PART II. WOMEN

1. SUPPORT ONESELF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Work (in general) (b, c, g)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Selling/trade (a, d)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Good social conduct (e, f)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=7.05  df=4  p=.029
G statistic=.7.2  Contingency=.256  Cramer's V=.26
2. GIRL'S RIGHTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Duties/Obligations (a, b, c, f, g, h)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. education, jobs (d, e)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=1.43 df=2 p=.489
G statistic=1.438 Contingency=.108
Cramer's V=.109

3. SELF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Personal likes/capacities (b, c, d, e, k)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Personality (g, h)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Physical Characteristics (i, f, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Other (j, k, m)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics not applicable due to low number of expected frequencies in row d. If this row is omitted then Chi-square=28.518 df=4 p=<.05
G=28.154 Contingency=.522
Cramer's V=.433

4. EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Housekeeping (c)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Morality/virtues (d, e)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Schooling, other &quot;non-traditional&quot; (b, f, g, h)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=36.35 df=4 p<.05
G statistic is not applicable
Contingency=.522 Cramer's V=.433
5. DUTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Moral virtues (b)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Household obligations (c, d, e)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=.05 df=2 p>.05

6. ANGER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Aggression (c, e, h)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Withdrawal, self-control (d, g, j)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Become upset show irritation (b, f, i)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=27.04 df=4 p<.05
G=29.61 Contingency=.479 Cramer's V=.385

7. MEN FORTUNATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Privileged status (e, i, k, l,)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. If they're responsible, do duties to home and family (b, c, d, g, h,)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Physical characteristics (f, j)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=15.56 df=4 p=.003
G statistic=17.08 Contingency=.37 Cramer's V=.286
8. A WOMAN FEELS GOOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M guyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Doing &quot;traditional&quot; roles (b, e, f)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Physically healthy, satisfied (c, d, g)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=8.84 df=4 p=.012
G=10.45 Contingency=.29 Cramer's V=.303

9. PLANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M guyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Economic investment, savings (c, e (f, l, k, o, g)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Social/familial goals (d, h, j, b, m)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=1.67 df=2 p>.05

10. LAWS/RULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M guyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Compliance, Respect (b, c, e)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Obligations (d, g)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ambiguous (f)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics may not be appropriate due to low expected frequencies in row three. If the third row is omitted, the following numbers are given:
Chi-square=2.398 df=2 p=.301
11. I MYSELF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical status (e, h)</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender, ethnicity (b, f, g)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (a,)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes, aspirations (c, d,)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=57.08  df=6  p<.05
Contingency=.579  Cramer's V=.503

12. A WOMAN SHOULD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obediance, morality (b, f, d, h)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household duties (c, e, g, j)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other work obligations (k)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=11.64  df=4  p=.02
G statistic=10.86  Contingency=.332  Cramer's V=.249
PART II. MEN

1. MORE MONEY

A. Save it, invest in transferable property (f, h, i, m, n)

B. Invest in rural economy (c, d, m)

C. Use for personal, family, or social needs (b, e, j, k, g, l)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyen</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=6.75 df=4 p=.14

2. SUPPORT ONESELF

A. Good Moral Conduct/home life (a, g)

B. Not be in need (Self-sufficiency) (b, f)

C. Agic./Crafts (c, d)

D. Business, any wage employment (e, h)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyen</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=17.73 df=6 p=.007
G=not applicable Contingency=.404
Cramer's V=.312
3. SELF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Economic likes aspirations (a, d, f, g, j, m, n)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Family, social relations (b, h)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Physical status</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=24.5 df=4 p<.05  
G=27.9 Contingency=.491 Cramer's V= .399

4. WOMEN FORTUNATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Childbearing (a)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. In their work and/or respectful conduct (c, d, e, g, h, i, j, k)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other (b, f)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=10.728 df=4 p=.0298  
G=not applicable Contingency=.34 Cramer's V=.256

5. GOOD FATHER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Provides financial support (d)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Teaches and shows good moral behavior (a, b, e, f)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other (c, g)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=11.484 df=4 p=.02  
However, if row three is omitted chi-square=.563 and is not significant (p=.75)
6. MAN FEELS GOOD

A. Builds up a home and family (a, b, c, g, i)
   - 10  35  30

B. Has money, is not in need (d, h)
   - 6  2  10

C. Is mentally and physically healthy (f, g, h, k, l)
   - 7  0  0

Chi-square=33.56 df=4 p<
Contingency=.501 Cramer's V=.41
For a 2 X 3 table omitting row three:
Chi-square=8.8 df=2 p=.012
Contingency=.294 Cramer's V=.308

7. WOMAN SHOULD

A. Show compliance respect (a, e)
   - 8  7  15

B. Fulfill obligations (b, d, f, i, h)
   - 14  28  24

C. Other (c)
   - 2  2  0

Statistics probably not appropriate for 3 X 3 table due to small cells sizes of row three. If row three is omitted then Chi-square=3.27 df=2 p=.195.
8. A MAN SHOULD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Proper conduct (a, i, j)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Farm (b)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Fulfil work/financial obligations (c, k)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. Social, community obligations (e, d, f, g, h, l)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=31.96 df=4 p=
G=31.72 Contingency=.459 Cramer's V=.365

There is also a significant difference between Xhosa and Sotho-speakers on this question: Chi-square=.12.397 df=2 p=.002 Contingency=.334 Cramer's V=.354

9. WHEN A WIFE ASKS FOR HELP HUSBAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Helps</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Other</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics not applicable

10. WHEN YOU'RE CRITICIZED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Aggression (b, h)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Contrition (d, e, f, g, k)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Thoughtfulness, diplomacy (a, c, i, j)</th>
<th>Mguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=54.464 df=4 p<.05
G statistic is not applicable
Contingency=.579 Cramer's V=.502
11. MAN FEELS PROUD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Built up a home (a, b, j, m, n)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Has wealth, money a job (i, c)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other (f, g, h, (k, l)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=0.504 df=4 p>.05

12. RULES/LAWS ARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nguyeni</th>
<th>Maputsoe</th>
<th>Ha Linku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Compliance Respect (b, c, e)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Obligations (d, f, g, h)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ambiguous (f)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square=3.28 df=4 p>.05
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R. Hunt Davis
Professor of History

Art Hansen
Associate Professor
of Anthropology

Robert Lawless
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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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