K. Lane
Punishing the sea wolf: corsairs and cannibals in the early modern Caribbean

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Much attention has been paid to the economic and political consequences of corsairing in the early modern Caribbean, but much less to what might be called its cultural and related legal features (Pennell 2001). This article explores some aspects of the development of the corsair image in Spanish culture and law as it developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of special interest is a convergence of terms suggesting a growing semantic linkage between certain native American peoples, specifically the famed "Carib cannibals" of the Lesser Antilles, and foreign – mostly Western European – poachers on Spanish wealth. By the first half of the seventeenth century, if not before, certain indigenous “Caribs” were described as corsairs, and certain European “corsairs” as ferocious cannibals. Although their acts of aggression rarely provoked full-scale, or regular and open war, both groups were deemed worthy of punishment, or castigo, a case-specific “war” measure under Spanish law. Through these terms – “Carib,” “corsair,” “castigo” – and their changing usage over time, this article explores a significant but little-studied nexus of crime, punishment, and cultural misperception that ultimately affected relations well beyond the Caribbean basin. The essay also examines how Spain’s violent exchanges with alleged pirates and cannibals affected the beginnings of what is today called international law.

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In a classic article on the career of Capt. Cornelis Jol, a.k.a. Houtebeen, historian Johanna van Overeem (1982:205) noted that the famous West India Company corsair was highly regarded by contemporary chroniclers for his “courage and prudence, his integrity, resoluteness and tenacity of purpose.” The opening stanza of a popular Spanish song, perhaps referring to Jol, runs as follows: “Patapalo es un pirata malo, que come pulpo crudo, y bebe agua del mar,” roughly: “Peg-leg is a bad pirate, who eats raw octopus and drinks sea water.” Clearly there is disagreement in these accounts.

Rather like the cannibal, the corsair, even today, rarely evokes a neutral response. That both stereotypes, if not archetypes, of the human as predator emerged from the early European experience in the Caribbean – both appear practically side-by-side in the famous engravings of Theodor de Bry, for example – may be reason enough to justify a few comparisons. But what frame or terms of analysis would be appropriate to this complex, pluricultural historical context that gave the West, and ultimately the world, both the forest-dwelling people-eater and the peg-legged buccaneer? For more practical than ideological reasons, this article uses the lens of law, specifically Western law, mostly as interpreted by select jurists of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain.

In the era of initial overseas expansion, implicit assumptions regarding the bounds of acceptable behavior among fellow Europeans and native peoples both at home and abroad yielded serious consequences. In many cases, misunderstandings and disagreements as to how to interact civilly without challenging the other’s accepted norms of sovereignty or propriety led to aggression and sometimes formal declarations of war. More often the result was what has been termed, until recently, “low-intensity conflict,” or “police action” taken against “bandits,” “guerrillas,” “smugglers,” and so on.

Like their more recent counterparts, early modern states and their enemies had other tools, or rather, weapons, to hand in lieu of formal deployment of troops and armament. Intractable indigenous peoples like the Island Caribs, and later the European corsairs (who could be regarded as a kind of unconventional weapon in their own right), used whatever means necessary to put up a fight; mostly they worked to exploit blind spots in the larger enemy’s defensive purview. Like modern bandits, rebels, and pirates, the marauders of the early modern Caribbean made use of various strategies, including hold-ups, hijackings, hostage-exchange, “terror” raids, arson, retreat to rugged terrain or uninhabited islands, and sudden disappearance into the vastness of the sea.

How to respond to these “guerrillas,” or informal “little wars”? The Spanish and Portuguese seaborne empires were arguably first to consider
“punishing” predatory and other so-called deviant behaviors in a truly world context. Their charges included familiar categories like theft, murder, contraband sales, and rebellion against state authority, but there were also crimes more reflective of the times. Most notably, the Spanish and Portuguese, as pious, single-minded Catholics, charged a wide range of enemies with heresy, superstition, diabolism, or other forms of religious infidelity.

Sometimes the issue of punishment, or castigo, was applied to religiously motivated rebels at home, as occurred during Spain’s 1568 to 1571 campaign against the Moriscos of Andalusia (Marmol Carvajal 1991). Meanwhile, in the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Caribbean, over which Spain claimed total sovereignty, the castigo, or punitive raid, was applied equally to alleged cannibals like the Island Caribs and corsairs like Cornelis Jol.

It could be that Spain’s encounters with “others” in the sixteenth-century Caribbean, particularly with “ferocious” indigenous peoples and foreign interlopers, gave rise to a partial perceptive convergence, one that interacted closely with a highly articulate legal culture. Examining how the Spanish — from Crown authorities to ordinary colonists — responded to both direct attack and purported violations of natural law overseas may also shed light on the larger and even less-studied process of colonial identity formation. This matter will only be lightly touched upon below. Moreover, although the principal focus is on Caribbean developments, useful comparative material relating to the early seventeenth-century Spanish Pacific has been incorporated, as well.

**CANNIBALS**

Although the image of the cannibal has become somewhat dissociated from the Caribbean in recent years thanks to the science of prion diseases and popular crime fiction, the two words share a common etymology. As literary critic Michael Palencia-Roth has recently noted (1993), the earliest European conflicts with native peoples in the Americas centered on alleged cannibal aggression, usually against so-called friendly Indians, the Island Arawaks or Guatiao of the Greater Antilles. Columbus ordered a 1498 attack on the island of Dominica using cannibalism as pretext, and Michele de Cuneo’s famous rape of an indigenous woman before 1495 called her “a woman of the cannibals,” at once justifying his own act and paradoxically rendering it more bestial than it already was. Although the long-accepted “peaceful Arawak/Carib cannibal” dichotomy has at last been discredited by anthropologists and linguists, it served the Spanish remarkably well in gaining a legal foothold in the New World.
Presumably horrified by so-called Carib cannibalism, by 1503 Isabella and Ferdinand enacted the first “cannibal law” (to use Palencia-Roth’s term), followed by others in 1511 and 1533. All of these proclamations stated that presumed Carib cannibals, wherever they might be found (including the mainland), were to be enslaved and placed in a kind of “corrective” custody. Although Palencia-Roth has apparently not studied developments beyond about 1550, by the last third of the sixteenth century, sentences of enslavement for alleged Caribs ranged from ten years to life and could not be applied to offspring born in captivity. The process was thus quite distinct from African slavery. Although “Carib” captives were cruelly treated, uprooted, branded, chained, and sold, they were not, by law at least, hereditary chattels.

Also, unlike the majority of presumed ignorant and defenseless native peoples placed in the “protective” custody of the encomienda, Spain’s quasi-feudal institution of colonial “entrusteeship,” the Caribs were being overtly punished for allegedly wayward behavior. Significantly, hearsay evidence of cannibalism was considered sufficient to condemn a given ethnic group to “Carib-ness” in the 1503 and 1511 edicts, helping to give rise to the much-lamented “destruction of the Indies.” And what of the so-called Spanish struggle for justice with regard to native Americans charged with the “crime” of anthropophagy?

Palencia-Roth may be right in claiming that those peoples labelled Caribs were excluded from documents like the reformist Laws of Burgos (1512) and later New Laws (1542-43) since they were not technically subjects of the Crown. But there is a considerable gray area here. Spain had claimed the entire world west of the Tordesillas line after 1494, and it appears no native American group contacted by the Spanish was ever offered the option of refusing the presumed universal authority of king and pope.

What was necessary, then, was a means of asserting or claiming a right to sovereignty in the Americas while criminalizing certain varieties of indigenous behavior. As several historians have noted, the two processes were inextricably linked; the legal reduction and incorporation of Hispaniola, Cuba, and Puerto Rico into the Kingdoms of Spain required an intractable external enemy. Since native lords, or caciques, had been formally recognized on the large islands, occupation of their lands was only justifiable when cast as an unavoidable response to these new allies’ requests for protection from violent neighbors. One could even argue, as jurists like Vicente Palatino de Curzola later did (Hanke & Millares 1943:13-37), that the great machine of Spanish conquest got rolling because alleged seaborne marauders had to be stopped; Columbus’s first friends were falling victims to Carib “pirates.”

By simply continuing established cultural practices (and probably modifying many of them along the way) the so-called Caribs – a term ultimately applied to myriad non-sedentary or semi-sedentary indigenous
peoples throughout the Americas were easy targets for persecution. Now any group whose behavior was deemed injurious could be pursued and punished for violating not only supposed natural law, but also the rules of civility within a justly claimed empire; consequently, their lands and persons were subject to confiscation. In other words, even being "subject cannibals" was not quite sufficient cause for war in Spanish eyes; proper Caribs had also to be kidnappers, and furthermore rebels against the faith. The relevant passage from the 1503 law is as follows:

And on some of the said islands they were well received and made welcome; [but] on the islands of San Bernardo and Isla Fuerte, and in the ports of Cartagena and the islands of Bura there was a people who are said to be cannibals and who never wished to hear [the men of the Church] nor receive them; rather they defended themselves against [the priests] with their weapons, and they resisted them so that [our priests] could neither land nor stay on the said islands where [the cannibals] live, and during the said resistance they even killed several Christians; and afterwards they have been engaged continuously in making war against those Indians who are in my service, and they have been capturing them in order to eat them, as they do in fact; and I have been informed that, the better to serve God and for the sake of the peace and security of the people who live on the islands and on Terra Firma and are in my service, the said cannibals should be punished for the crimes they have committed against my subjects. (Palencia-Roth 1993:23)

Again, it is significant that the passage points to a range of acts justifying punishment, cannibalism being only one. As reiterated by the great Spanish jurist, Francisco de Vitoria, in the late 1530s, rejecting the Christian faith was not sufficient legal cause for aggression. Persecution of Christian subjects, on the other hand, including missionaries and indigenous allies, certainly was (Scott 1934:155). Fitting well with the good/bad, or peaceful Arawak/Carib cannibal, dichotomy established in the earliest days of European contact in the Caribbean region, Vitoria emphasized the right of the state to free "innocent" captives from certain death by sacrifice – and further, ritual consumption of their corpses.

Still, cannibalism was not so much the crime here as kidnapping and homicide. As a Catholic state, and furthermore a powerful and well-informed one, Spain had a moral duty to redeem all innocents in distress (Scott 1934: 157). Vitoria's legal-philosophical stand on cannibalism has been thoroughly examined by the historian Anthony Pagden, and his conclusions need not be repeated here. Suffice to say that Vitoria regarded the practice of man-eating as fundamentally a mistake in gustatory judgement, a lapse in taste (Pagden 1982:85).

It should be remembered that Vitoria was among the most eminent humanist thinkers of his day, and for his support of indigenous rights vis-à-vis fellow Spaniards he often fell afoul of both king and pope. Upon reading
early reports from Peru in the 1530s, for example, he openly declared the
event of Atahualpa and subsequent conquest of the Incas fundamentally
unjust. Nevertheless, when it came to preserving "the peace and security of
the state," all offenders, including native peoples, even those living beyond
the pale, as it were, deserved punishment, or castigo. For their crimes they
were to be charged not as minors, but adults. These ideas were refined
and developed by Vitoria's successors, among them Francisco Suárez and
Baltázar Ayala (Draper 1990:188-90).

If cannibalism remained a sticky matter in legal terms, theft was less
ambiguous. That the Caribs engaged in frequent acts of larceny against
Spanish subjects was a priori just cause for war against them. Vitoria
termed such war "vengeance," an Old Testament-style reprisal entailing
(then as now) some form of "exemplary" state terror. In the colonies, of
course – especially when the state was unwilling to fund and mount formal
expeditions – it was not uncommon for these acts to devolve into the sort of
personalized vengeance cycles characteristic of gangland or so-called dirty
warfare. Vitoria justified state vengeance in this way: "[There] would be
no condition of happiness for the world, nay, its condition would be one of
utter misery, if oppressors and robbers and plunderers could with impunity
commit their crimes and oppress the good and innocent" (Scott 1934:201).
Most victims of violent crime, regardless of culture or nationality, would
probably agree with this statement. It is rather in determining the means and
extent of punishment that sharp dissent emerges.

In the early Spanish-claimed Caribbean the questions of sovereignty,
subject status, and the right to punish indigenous infractions may have been
somewhat cloudy, but certainly they were less so by the second half of the
sixteenth century. What had happened to the Caribs in the meantime? Who
were they, or who had they become? Anthropologist Neil Whitehead (1995)
has done much to revive interest in the overall ethnohistory of the eastern
Caribbean in recent years, and his findings and those of several colleagues
have a major bearing here. Also, in their recent collection of primary
documents entitled Wild Majesty, Peter Hulme and Whitehead (1992) have
collated and translated a number of quasi-ethnographic accounts of Carib/
outsider encounters.

Most relevant here is a young woman's remembrance of captivity
among the so-called Island Caribs of Dominica in about 1580. Luisa de
Navarrete, a Spanish subject of African heritage and a former slave on
Puerto Rico, had been captured in a 1576 raid. In the four years following,
she had ample opportunity to view her indigenous captors in action. Here
Island Caribs, almost a century after Columbus's landfall, were still being
routinely described as cannibals. The practice of anthropophagy was of
course too salacious and horrifying to omit, even if only rumored, but new
terms appeared as well. By 1580, these long-term rebels against Spanish
authority had come to resemble not so much exotic monsters of the medieval imagination as modern criminals, one might even say pirates. Here are some relevant excerpts:

this witness knows that in times past they had robbed the town of Guadianilla and Humacao and Maunabo and when the said caribes plundered Humacao and carried off this witness to where they held her, and being there she saw that they fitted out their armadas in order to come to this island and the said Indians used to bring their wives and sons ... and this witness has seen that ... without giving offence to the caribes nor causing them any harm, they arm themselves every year and cross to this island of San Juan [Puerto Rico] and rob and destroy whatever they can and this witness has seen that ... they have carried away a great quantity of negroes and left some in Dominica and distributed the rest amongst the Indians of these islands, which they take to their lands in order to serve them ... and the said Indians always used to go boasting and making great fiestas saying that they had burnt and destroyed many farms in this island and killed many people, and this witness saw that in the Dominica passage a ship appeared that was passing by, making its voyage, and they attacked and overcame and burnt and robbed it of whatever was within. (Hulme & Whitehead 1992:39-40)

The narrative goes on to describe the various abuses the Caribs allegedly heaped upon their captives, Spanish, African, indigenous, and otherwise. Some of those kidnapped were said to have been either tortured or fattened before being slain and eaten. There is also suggestion of religious ritual, which Navarrete (or the scribe taking her testimony) labeled devil worship, in relation to the otherwise incomprehensible practice of anthropophagy. Along with such hints of heresy – it was no longer possible to claim ignorance of the Christian faith nearly a century after Columbus – was the claim of apostasy among certain long-term captives who had “forgotten God.”

Setting these vivid allegations of cannibalism aside once again, it may be worth turning instead to the more conventionally piratical charges in Navarrete’s testimony. First, as a point of clarification, piracy has generally been defined (in terms of international law, at least) as larceny at or by descent from the sea. Thus, from the Western, rather than simply Spanish, perspective, the so-called Caribs described here were unequivocally engaging in acts of piracy. The charge was reinforced by Navarrete’s emphasis on organization, or at least seasonal planning, and the large-scale theft of African slaves, human capital of considerable value in this era. More interestingly, Navarrete mentions substantial Carib treasure hoards, what sound like great heaps of metallic booty. She claimed that “the said Indians [of Dominica] have much gold and worked and unworked silver, and Reales and silver collars and plates and much merchandise that they have taken from the ships” (Hulme & Whitehead 1992:42).
This was damning stuff, of course, but what interest did Luisa de Navarrete have in painting her captors as virtual corsairs, Carib pirates of the Caribbean? In fact, as Whitehead and Hulme note, the testimony of Navarrete is hardly pure, but rather a rendition made by a Crown official on Puerto Rico. If the Caribs were to be dealt with effectively, i.e., conquered and made either to render tribute to or serve the Spanish as slaves, then appropriate military aid would be required. The testimony, though probably not wholly false, was nevertheless carefully constructed to meet specific, political ends.

As further proof of this special rendering of evidence for the colonists' benefit, attached to the young woman's testimony was that of a young Carib man, Pedro. Pedro had been captured by French corsairs in 1567, but had subsequently been recaptured by the Spanish on Puerto Rico some time before 1580. Given his first captivity, Pedro may have been a genuine Carib corsair for a time, but for the benefit of Spanish officials, his brief testimony simply reiterated Navarrete's main points: the Caribs of Dominica and neighboring islands were cannibals, but even more menacing was their continued piracy, their constant assembling of armadas, or fleets of pirogues (Hulme & Whitehead 1992:43).

From these testimonies it would appear that in the decades following Spain's major juridical reforms with regard to native American affairs some troubling complications arose. Specifically, what was the empire to do with native peoples who refused to play by the rules? By 1580, at least, it seems that indomitable indigenous groups – often labelled Caribs no matter what they called themselves – had to be painted not simply as wayward spirits, barbarians misled by the devil into bestial practices like man-eating, but also common criminals, thieves motivated by greed. In order to justify punishment in terms unequivocally acceptable to the world and to God, the cannibal, in the end, had to become a corsair.

**CORSAIRS**

There were of course other thieves in the Caribbean by 1580; some were sponsored by European monarchs and high officials who felt that greed was good as long as it singed the King of Spain's beard. The French had gotten a head start, but by the last quarter of the sixteenth century there were also English and Dutch raiders expressing a keen interest in Spanish plate. Some individuals, like Walter Ralegh, sought to repeat Spanish successes in the indigenous interior, and others simply to trade or gather salt.

Whatever their initial motives, very quickly the sixteenth-century corsairs (in Spanish documents *cosarios*) gained a reputation for boldness,
a recognizable enough challenge to any Spanish *hidalgo* worthy of the title. These new seaborne interlopers were not taken for naked brutes or "natural slaves" but rather presumably civilized, if audacious and dangerous European rivals. With time, however, as literary critic Nina Gerassi-Navarro (1999) has recently argued, the corsair would be transformed in the Spanish colonial imagination into a sort of monster, still a thief, but also a heedlessly cruel infidel. Although Gerassi-Navarro does not link the corsair stereotype to that of the cannibal, the former was similarly imagined – in the worst case, at least – as a deluded savage ruled by base appetites.

The change in image is almost perfectly reflected in the career of Francis Drake, the epitome of Elizabethan bombast, on the one hand, and Spanish self-doubt in the age of Philip II, on the other. Lettered Spaniards of the day called him "the astute Lutheran," a kind of back-handed compliment, but was Sir Francis really the great man so many have claimed? As historian Harry Kelsey (1998) has recently suggested in a scathing biography, for all his notoriety, Drake, when examined closely, appears to have been neither a very good leader nor a very successful pirate. Worse, at least for romantic fans, he cheated his men on more than one occasion. Certainly this is not the image Drake has enjoyed in England and many former English colonies, including the United States.

In the Spain of his day, Drake was probably less terrifying than his admirers have claimed, but in the Spanish Caribbean things may have been different. If nothing else, "the astute Lutheran" served as fodder for early colonial moralist-historians. Among the most notable was Juan de Castellanos (1921), a priest from Tunja, near Bogotá, who in 1589 wrote Drake into his epic of Spanish America, the *Elegías de ilustres varones de Indias*, or *Elegies of the Illustrious Men of the Indies*. An Inquisition censor, who by chance also happened to have been a victim of the English corsair, removed Castellanos's "Discourse on the Captain Francis Drake" from the *Elegías* in 1591. It was subsequently lost until 1886, when a manuscript version was discovered in London. An excellent annotated edition of this manuscript, with many useful documentary appendixes, was published in Madrid in 1921.

Perhaps surprisingly, Castellanos's poem is itself a rich source for the history of piracy, informed as it was by both personal experience and eyewitness testimonies. The poet names names, traces events, and partially reconstructs dialogue. The epic is also useful in intimating contemporary cultural perception from the perspective of the colonies. The poet's Drake is both a bold and loathesome figure, to be sure, but his arrival in the Spanish Caribbean is interpreted primarily as divine retribution for the sins of the Spanish colonists, particularly those of the bustling and prosperous port of Cartagena de Indias. This pirate is not his own agent, he is God's scourge. According to Castellanos, as a direct result of their pride, sloth, avarice,
gluttony and other transgressions, most of them mortal, the colonists fell all too easily to the foreigner, the determined and astute heretic Drake.

But the moralizing diatribe, like satire, is a tricky form, and when writing in the shadow of the Inquisition one had to watch one’s step. Castellanos may have stumbled in composing his “corsair discourse,” but more likely by the accident of a particular censor’s personal sensitivities than for supposed glorification of the enemy. Indeed, for all his emphasis on Drake’s allegedly noble or refined characteristics, Castellanos knew also to describe the pirate in bestial terms, to properly demonize him as *hostis humani generis*.

The complicity of Queen Elizabeth in all this plundering of the Spanish Caribbean is not ignored, but as Gerassi-Navarro (1999:42; Castellanos 1921:25) points out, in the most extreme passages Drake’s hunger is described as canine. He and his compatriots are *lobos*, or wolves. Of course it helped that *lobo* rhymed with *robo* (robbery), but in the end, Castellanos’s Caribbean corsair emerges as a clear contradiction: on the one hand a sober, resolute foe bent on punishing the complacent and dissolute Spaniards, on the other a crazed, voracious animal, attacking without reason.

For Castellanos, like other contemporary poets, Drake provoked both shock and awe in roughly equal measure. This ambiguity was perhaps better suited to fiction than moral or cautionary tales, but what, in pragmatic terms, was to be done about the pirate menace? What did these images of the pirate have to do, if anything, with the pursuit of justice? In the supplementary texts accompanying the 1921 edition of Castellanos’s poem, along with numerous similar documents, one sees the meeting of language and law. In the various letters and reports of Spanish colonists and military officials, Drake and his contemporaries emerge as something less than legends, yet still something more than common criminals.

A sample testimony from officials in the city of Nombre de Diós to the Crown, May 14, 1572, sets the tone:

> These corsairs have committed important [i.e., serious] piracies and have killed on such a scale that within the last seven years they have killed more than 300 persons on land and sea, and have stolen and carried off more than two millions in gold and silver. Lately (in the month of June, 1572) English corsairs entered this city, wounded many of its defenders, and killed nine. (Wright 1932:72)

Cartagena’s cathedral dean remembered these details from Drake’s damaging, but ultimately not very profitable 1585 siege of that great port, the same raid that most inspired Castellanos:

> The enemy met with no resistance, nor was there powder with which to offer any. [Of the civilians] only Bachelor Hurtado was killed in his house by a stray cannonball. (Wright 1951:30)
A despondent official in Cartagena echoed Castellanos still more closely in a dispatch following the same attack:

I do not know where to begin to talk about my disgrace and loss at Cartagena; I can only say that it must be the lash of God for my sins and those of others. (Castellanos 1921:325)

As for charges of corsair heresy, a sample from Panama City written in 1577 may suffice:

What is felt most deeply, being cause for tears, is the little veneration they show the saints and the worship of God. They broke up images and crucifixes, they overturned the altar, knocking it to pieces. They used albs and vestments as kitchen-aprons. They beat and buffeted a Franciscan friar who happened to be there, ridiculing the pope, confession, and absolution. They committed many other insults and insolencies, for which God give us due vengeance, in defending His honor by your majesty's unconquerable arms. (Wright 1932:111)

But charges of heresy could flow back into things secular, as in the following deposition by a victim of John Oxenham's 1577 raid on the Pearl Islands in the Gulf of Panama:

Having found a child's lesson-book, one of the English named Chalona, who is the interpreter among them, stopped to read it, and reading the ten commandments, when he came to the commandment: Thou shalt not steal, he laughed loudly at it, and said that all goods were common property; and all of them laughed and jeered at the commandments. (Wright 1932:118)

Already by the 1570s corsairs like the Englishmen Drake and Oxenham were emerging in Spanish state papers as not only Lutherans but also bad people. Indeed, pirate atrocities raised a host of practical and philosophical questions with regard to preserving res publica, if not the fabled Pax Hispanica, in the colonies. How were colonists to protect women and children from rape and captivity, to control runaway slaves and other potential foreign allies, and of course to guarantee the safety of trade? The corsairs, astute, diabolical, or animal, were in the wrong all the way around, but what, specifically, was to be done?

For those not as lucky as Drake, among them his former companion in the Panama raids, John Oxenham, the crimes of theft, trespass, kidnapping, battery, homicide, and heresy would end with public strangulation and a burnt corpse. As noted throughout the hundreds of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spanish documents collected by Irene Wright and others, Caribbean corsairs and their alleged accomplices were summarily executed by the dozens upon capture, generally without due process.
Yet such hasty action was not the Crown's preference in every case. Pirates sometimes possessed useful information, and one of Spain's only defenses in lieu of expensive fleets was to squeeze those unfortunate enough to get caught for detailed reports of enemy designs. Whether they got the information they desired or not, Crown officials in the Caribbean wanted always to punish—to, as the Pearl Islands witness stated above, "defend [God's] honor by [his] majesty's unconquerable arms." As Vitoria had argued in his treatise on war, "oppressors and robbers and plunderers" (Scott 1934:201) of whatever stripe had to be stopped, then punished; in short, vengeance is mine, sayeth the king.

In August 1585, just as Drake set out for Cartagena, Philip II himself wrote: "All care should be taken to see what can be done to punish these corsairs" (Castellanos 1921:li). The term was echoed throughout the colonies, as in a 1589 deposition regarding an attempted landing by Drake's cousin, William Hawkins (Wright 1951:242). The call for punishment did not fall from fashion in the subsequent period of Dutch corsairing (Wright 1935, I:183; II:56). In fact, it seems to have become more shrill, as reflected in a typical edict from the age of Philip III (this one sent to the judges of the High Court of Quito):

As you already understand there come and go in that South Sea and in this North one many corsair pirates (corsarios piratas) who commit whatever robberies and injuries they can against my subjects, and although several of their vessels have been captured, the said corsairs have not been properly punished given the extent of their impudence, and thus they return with many more to commit the same robberies and injuries; and since they move about the ports and coasts of the Indies with such great liberty there result many and great inconveniences worthy of legal action; and in order to put such into effect whenever possible, and so that they not go unpunished (que no queden sin castigo), I command you to observe, enforce and execute the penalties established by law in these kingdoms and also [all appropriate] royal edicts — without any forgiveness, dispensation or dissimulation whatsoever — against all corsairs and pirates apprehended in the seas and coasts and ports of the Indies, from the Canary Islands forward; this is my will, Lerma, 6 July 1605. (Garcés 1946:85)

In short, the term castigo appears quite frequently in reference to sixteenth- and also seventeenth-century corsairs, whatever their nationality. "Punishment" seems an obvious enough word choice, given that it describes the usual response to crime in most cultures, but how was a monarch to justify punishing bona fide foreigners, sometimes acting as war proxies, for crimes committed against his subjects? Should they not be apprehended, then held accountable before their own sovereign? According to Vitoria, and echoed by his successors Suárez and Solórzano Pereira, these were matters of self-defense no matter where the deed or deeds in question occurred (Muldoon 1994:171). Swift and violent retribution was justified
without respect to nationality. Furthermore, as Vitoria had argued (echoing Augustine and Aquinas), it was justifiable not only to punish individual perpetrators, but also to wage war “in order to avenge a wrong done, as where punishment has to be meted out to a city or State because it has itself neglected to exact punishment for an offence committed by its citizens or subjects or to return what has been wrongfully taken away” (Scott 1934: 201). Even Hugo Grotius, as Hidemi Suganami (1990:234-37) has argued, felt compelled to concede the right of monarchs to “punish” pirates and brigands abroad.

Since, like any other, the Spanish monarch was ultimately a dispenser of justice, so-called rebels, heretics, and in truth all violators of Spanish law, foreign and domestic, were technically subject to his paternal wrath, his vengeance. This semantic emphasis on the word castigo should not be taken too far, of course, since one also finds in these early colonial dispatches casual usages, as, for example, in reference to victims of a 1595 English attack on Coro, Venezuela: “The carelessness and neglect of the inhabitants deserves due punishment, so that in the future they may be compelled to live with greater precautions” (Andrews 1959:396). It is worth remembering that like crime, punishment could also be a petty matter. But did the more serious castigos meted out to corsairs and cannibals really fit the crimes with which they were charged?

**Convergence**

Perhaps the central theme emerging here, although this is admittedly a tentative and shallow probe, is how the problem of punishing seaborne criminal activity in the early modern period helped fertilize the inchoate field of international law. One way of exploring the issue is to compare the images and experiences of those two great menaces to Spanish sovereignty in the early modern Caribbean: the indigenous cannibal and the European corsair. How did terms, as a reflection of perceptions, change over time?

First, in various contexts the Spanish called both the Island Caribs and European corsairs lobos, or “wolves.” The metaphor suggests bestiality, and more specifically canine hunger. The etymological connections between the words Carib, canine, and cannibal are well known, and need not be reviewed here. But the suggestion, extended now to the Caribbean corsairs, was that these were violators of natural law: fierce, irrational individuals, acting on base impulses, totally out of control. Consequently, like a conscientious shepherd (in keeping with Thomist thought), the monarch had not only a right but a duty to protect his flock – indigenous, African, Spanish, and otherwise – from such predators.
In religious terms, as has been seen, both the Caribs and corsairs of the sixteenth century were routinely charged with heresy. In both cases, these were not vague allegations, but rather detailed listings of what were deemed abominable acts of sacrilege and blasphemy as witnessed by various and presumably credible persons. The Caribs persecuted Christians and even martyred some for their steadfastness. Worse, they cajoled terrified remaining captives into converting to their diabolical faith. Most unthinkable—and thus all the more delicious for the moralist in need of illustrative themes—these natives went so far as to mock the sacrament by literally eating human flesh. For comparison, nearly identical charges were brought against the rebellious Mapuche of Chile in the 1590s (Hanke & Millares 1943:303-12). Here indigenous rebels not only “dressed their horses in [stolen] cassocks,” but also gnawed the still-beating hearts of vanquished Christians; man had become wolf to man.

European corsairs likewise flaunted their religious infidelity, mocking God, or at least Roman Catholicism, by persecuting friars and desecrating holy vestments. To deride the Ten Commandments in the name of communalism, as Oxenham’s compatriots had done in 1577, had to be among the starkest invitations to anathema yet seen in the colonies. Nearly identical charges were later levelled at Dutch-sponsored corsairs who attacked southeast Yucatán in the 1640s. Here multinational pirates under the renegade Capt. Diego “el Mulato” Lucifer de los Reyes, a contemporary of Cornelis Jol, “undressed [altar] images, chopped them to pieces with axes, and dressed up in mockery” (Jones 1989:227). As a result of chronic corsair and rebel Maya raids, this region, now Belize, was abandoned by the Spanish as ungovernable.

Ultimately, both Caribs and corsairs were viewed as “fanatical” canine types ruled by their appetites. Worse, they were incapable of distinguishing both proper food and its proper place of preparation; the Caribs made meals of Christians while the corsairs made kitchens of Catholic churches. This is perhaps a strained comparison, but in terms of straightforward criminal behavior, Carib and corsair appeared even more alike from the Spanish perspective; at least in legal terms. Both engaged in larceny at or by descent from the sea. Both launched armadas to attack Spanish ships and dwellings. Just like the Spanish themselves, moreover, both Caribs and corsairs raided and traded for slaves, African and otherwise. The practice of slave-raiding had distinct cultural meanings in the Carib case, of course, an issue that cannot be adequately addressed here, but what of the hoards of gold, silver, and merchandise mentioned by Luisa de Navarrete?

Since the issue of hidden treasure, particularly on Dominica, appears again in seventeenth-century Caribbean narratives (Hulme & Whitehead 1992:92), one wonders if the Caribs were learning “the sweet trade” from the French, English, and Dutch, or if they were simply continuing an established
practice with new materials. Could this alleged treasure-hoarding have had an occult cultural meaning among the Caribs? As with slaving, not much can be offered here on this question, but it is worth noting that precious metals, particularly gold alloys, were associated with both chiefly power and divinity in Arawakan culture (Whitehead 1995:99-100; Oliver 2000). Since it is also known that the so-called Island Caribs were essentially Arawakans like their neighbors on the bigger islands, it may be that certain aspects of Carib “piracy” were a variety of cultural survival or revival.

Carib belief systems remain largely inscrutable, but a look at another theater of violent interaction, the early seventeenth-century Spanish Pacific, may offer useful comparisons with regards to law and semantic convergence. The specific area in question, called by geographers the Greater Chocó (a dense rainforest now making up the entire west coast of Colombia), was effectively penetrated by Spanish subjects only after 1610, nearly a century after initial contact. Substantial portions of this region would be conquered by 1635, and most of the remainder by the 1680s. Like parts of the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean, gold was found throughout the Greater Chocó, but in much greater quantities.

In early accounts of Spanish-indigenous conflict in this little-studied region, particularly its southern half (called by the Caribbean term Barbacoas in colonial times), certain terms ring familiar. First, many of the native inhabitants of the Greater Chocó were regarded by Hispanic interlopers as cannibals (and in at least one case, headhunters, as if to complicate matters). To speak of cannibals in the context of Columbus, or even Philip II, might seem “normal,” but what of the 1620s or 1630s? Had anything changed?

As in the earlier Caribbean, the Spanish moved quickly to identify what they regarded as good (i.e., non-aggressive/willing to trade) and bad (i.e., bellicose) native peoples all along the Pacific coast, a dichotomy that once again enabled penetration and gave legal justification to violence, including enslavement. More interesting, however, is the appearance of the term cosario, or “corsair,” in reference to several specific indigenous groups in this region. Thus, in 1610, for example, a certain “bad” cacique, or chief, was labelled a “land corsair,” or cosario de la tierra, by his Spanish pursuer. By the 1630s, members of a particularly warlike indigenous group called the Sindaguas, were referred to in official testimony as “great corsairs of land and sea” (Lane n.d.).

These Sindaguas, also alleged cannibals, had in fact gone out to sea in their canoes to attack ships sailing from Panama to Lima. Inland, they attacked isolated farms and villages. In both regards, they had acted much like the Caribs of Dominica and neighboring islands. Perhaps for this

2. Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Seville, Spain, 1610, 1635. Manuscripts, section “Quito,” no. 16, parts 38 and 66.
reason, but also following what had become standard practice by this time, the Spanish governor of neighboring Popayán described the Sindaguas as gente muy caribe, that is, “a very Carib people” (Lane n.d.). At last, with this clear convergence of terms, the indigenous cannibal and corsair was one and the same. As if to reinforce the Caribbean connection, the Sindaguas were also said to have been chronic slave-raiders, and to have taken and hoarded Spanish merchandise and other valuables. Worse, like the Island Caribs, Mapuche, Elizabethans, and Pechelingues (Dutch corsairs), they had wantonly desecrated holy sites and defiled Christian bodies.

What was to be done? How was the empire to deal with the larcenous, heretical, and ferocious “corsair other” this time around? As has been seen, that lesson had already been learned in the Caribbean crucible: the waterborne enemy had to be punished. In this case, as an exemplary castigo — it was labeled as such — eighty-four Sindagua chieftains were hunted down by what amounted to a private contractor, or neo-conquistador, captured, and ceremoniously garroted. The heads of eight alleged ringleaders were lopped off and displayed on pikes. Surviving women and children were enslaved and exiled. In all, this baroque version of the head-hunt-in-reverse was deemed by Spanish officials a fitting end for such “great corsairs of land and sea.”

CONCLUSION

It may seem reasonable enough to argue that alleged cannibals like the Island Caribs and later-encountered native American peoples like the Sindaguas came to be conflated with corsairs in order to domesticate, as it were, their presumed criminality. That is, it may have seemed legally expedient to sidestep the issue of cultural difference raised by anthropophagy by emphasizing theft and other behaviors that even such a relativist as Grotius regarded as criminal. But what about the reverse? Although I have found no evidence of corsairs being labelled caribes, they did, as has been seen, come to be described as animals, even monsters.

In terms of semantics, this was probably both an issue of popular imagination and a partial legal interpretation. The evidence suggests that both Island Caribs and European corsairs really did attack, rob, rape, kill, and otherwise injure Spanish colonial subjects, and in the same geographical (specifically maritime) and temporal context. That the terms for each brand of predator should almost perfectly converge given the long duration of these cycles of aggression seems fairly reasonable, if not predictable.

From the victims' point of view, despite acknowledged cultural variations among perpetrators, the Spanish sensed that a similarly bestial ferocity showed itself in the heat of battle, and sometimes in its aftermath. Given the weight of experience, and testimonies like Luisa de Navarrete's and those of John Oxenham's victims in the Pearl Islands, were these criminal others to be regarded as rational humans or "wolves"? Certainly they did not behave like proper Spanish subjects (even taking into account the fact that Spaniards were widely known to have resorted to "survival" cannibalism, and otherwise "bestial" behavior, in the Conquest era).

The power of the sea-wolf image lay in its special ability to strike fear in the hearts of ignorant landlubbers. The image was thus ripe for manipulation. Whether to entice militia recruits or terrify "sinful" colonists, as need dictated, Spanish Crown officials and preachers felt it necessary to garnish the corsair's image with more than a hint of bestiality. To do so appealed directly to the colonial, and eventually creole, ego, a prod to reflexive indignity and outrage. Judging from official records relating to pirate attacks as disseminated or produced in highland cities like Quito and Mexico City, this rhetoric grew more imaginative, even ridiculous, in direct relation to the writer's distance from the coast. As with Luisa de Navarrete's captivity narrative, even the most equivocal tale of enemy outrage was fuel for colonial propagandists. Later colonial historians like José de Oviedo y Baños (1987), author of The Conquest and Settlement of Venezuela, first published in 1723, would recycle all of this material in their creole identity-building narratives; for them, early Caribbean history consisted of little more than valiant Spaniards fighting pirates and cannibals, first the one, then the other.

One might expect a more sober appraisal of such allegedly ferocious marauders in contemporary legal circles, but such was not necessarily the case, as demonstrated by numerous shrill and outraged court rulings justifying colonial castigos. Most Crown officials, as representatives of the self-consciously pious Spanish state, opted to throw the book at all enemies, apparently in hopes of legally justifying this rather too-emotional taking of vengeance (an act expressly forbidden by divine law according to St. Augustine).

It appears that Spanish colonists and officials of the early modern Caribbean, faced with so many violent challengers to their own frequently difficult-to-justify claims and greatly lacking reliable information, lashed out at alleged corsairs and cannibals in like fashion. True believers in what they regarded as a universal monarchy buttressed by law and religion, Spanish subjects in the age of the Habsburgs could only make sense of their enemies, indigenous and otherwise, if they were heretical, thieving, ferocious, even cannibalistic, in short, inverse images of themselves.
Despite the Spanish song, old Captain Houtebeen probably restricted himself to cooked, rather than raw, octopus and fresh, rather than sea, water. For all we know, he might even have been regarded as a good rather than bad pirate by some caught on the wrong side of his musket-barrel. In later years, however, affairs in the Caribbean slid still further in the direction of unmitigated violence and mutual hatred. The buccaneers of the late seventeenth century, exemplified by hard characters like Henry Morgan and Rock Brasiliano, would make the allegedly “ferocious” cruelty of men like Drake and Houtebeen seem mild by comparison. With the rise of foreign competition, the Spanish rightly complained of a progressively worsening pirate infestation of what had been “their” sea.

In 1678, the Dutch buccaneer-chronicler Alexander Exquemelin described one attack on the Spanish coast of Honduras led by the Frenchman François L’Ollonais:

L’Ollonais grew outrageously passionate, insomuch that he drew his cutlass, and with it cut open the breast of one of those poor Spaniards, and, pulling out his heart with his sacrilegious hands, began to bite and gnaw it with his teeth like a ravenous wolf, saying to the rest: I will serve you all alike if you show me not another way. (Esquemeling 1684:103)

After almost two centuries of punishing experiences like this one, perhaps the Spanish were right to conflate “corsair” and “cannibal” after all.

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Kris Lane
History Department
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg VA 23187-8795, U.S.A.
<krlane@wm.edu>
THE IRRELEVANCE OF INDEPENDENCE:
MARTINIQUE AND THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS OF 2002

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, one tacit issue dominated the French presidential elections in the overseas départment of Martinique: independence. Would not the victory by the Socialist candidate François Mitterrand result, as claimed by his conservative foes, in a leftist largage (dumping) of this French West Indian island? Although the French Socialists had claimed no such objective, the rightist strategy worked. No other French state, overseas or Metropolitan, backed Mitterrand's nemesis, incumbent president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, as strongly as the electorate in Martinique.

1. Fieldwork for this research was made possible by a sabbatical leave from Northeastern University. From September 2001 through June 2002 the author was visiting researcher with the Centre de Recherches sur les Pouvoirs Locaux dans la Caraïbe (CRPLC) at the Schoelcher, Martinique, campus of the Université des Antilles-Guyane. Special thanks go to CRPLC director Justin Daniel.

2. France calls the standard geopolitical unit into which most of the republic is divided département. In American terms, the closest equivalent is state: Hawaii and Alaska, for instance, are overseas states of the continental United States (whose federalism is in stark contrast to traditional French centralism). In addition to the four départements d'outre-mer or DOMs, there are five TOMs (overseas territories) and CTRs (territorial collectivities of the Republic), mostly in the Pacific. These are legacies of nineteenth-century colonization, as opposed to the Old Colonies from the seventeenth century. In contrast to the DOMs, whose cultures mainly emerged out of slave-populated colonialism, the TOMs are characterized by indigenous populations predating the French presence. See Aldrich & Connell 1992 and Doumenge 2000.

3. Metropole and Metropolitan refer to mainland (European) France.

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In France as a whole, however, Mitterrand squeaked by to become the fourth president of the Fifth Republic and the first from the political left. Mitterrand’s win, consolidated in the follow-up legislative elections by a Socialist landslide, did not, as it turned out, result in any cutting of juridical ties between Martinique and the Metropole. Rather, Martinique experienced the same institutional decentralization that the Socialists instituted throughout France.

Twenty-one years, and three presidential elections, later, another French national contest geared up, and Martinique faced a similar choice. A Socialist heir to François Mitterrand, Lionel Jospin, was to confront another conservative incumbent president, this time Jacques Chirac. Would Martinicans back the candidate who vigorously opposed any loosening of institutional ties with France (i.e., Chirac); or, rather, would they support the Socialist who had already gained their confidence in more recent elections (i.e., Jospin)? As it turned out, a complicating twist to the 2002 French elections deprived the overseas electorate of the expected option, forcing this Caribbean society into a Hobbesian choice. The twist simultaneously highlighted the underlying marginality of Martinique to the French body politic.

Instead of Jospin being a run-off candidate in the second round of the presidential elections, for polls indicated that he would take second place, the Socialist was edged out in the first round by the far-right, anti-immigration, and (presumed) racist candidate of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen. To a populace largely composed of slave descendants, Le Pen’s standing as runner-up was particularly galling. As a result, Martinican voters of even a leftist tendency were faced with the unpalatable option of voting for the “lesser evil” of Jacques Chirac or abstaining entirely. In the end, Martinique’s voters backed Chirac more than did those of any other département of France.

Besides the Le Pen surprise, three other factors complicate interpretations of the 2002 electoral results for Martinique. One is the relative success of Christiane Taubira, the black, female, left-wing candidate, in the first round of the elections. Second is the record-high abstention rate, particularly perplexing in a presidential election of such emotional import. Third is the outcome of the follow-up legislative elections, as a result of which Martinique sent one conservative, two moderate leftist, and one independentist representative to the National Assembly in Paris. The legislative elections also constituted a rebuff to the party of Aimé Césaire, the most prominent Martinican personality of the last half-century.

Paradoxically, although the administrative status of Martinique vis-à-vis France had finally surfaced in an overtly public and freely debated way in the months just preceding the elections, it hardly factored in either the presidential or subsequent legislative contests themselves. The primary
question for outside observers of French overseas and Caribbean politics—"Will the island become independent or not?"—is a nonissue for islanders themselves. The meaning for Martinique of the 2002 French national elections is thus fraught with ambiguity. But then again, ambiguity has long been the byword for Martinique's relationship not only with France, but with its very self.

BACKGROUND TO ELECTION 2002

Martinique’s relationship with France remains rooted in its colonial and slave plantation past. A French colony since 1635, it was interrupted by only two brief periods of British occupation. Until 1848 island society was defined principally by triangular trade and African-based slavery. Abolition in 1848 imparted both freedom and citizenship but it did not eradicate the distinctions among the white planter (béké), poor black, and bourgeois “mulatto” ethnoclasses. In 1946, Martinique’s representatives to the French parliament, including the poet and then-Communist Aimé Césaire, requested their island’s “assimilation” as a full département into the French Republic. That demand was motivated by a desire for the full equality that French colonial policy had long preached under the same banner (assimilation).4

Martinique, along with the other Caribbean “Old Colonies” of Guadeloupe and French Guiana and the Indian Ocean island of Réunion, thus typified French postcolonial exceptionalism: decolonization not through independence, as practiced by Great Britain and other colonial powers, but by integration. Départementalisation entailed the extension of the same rights and privileges applying in the Metropolitan French départements to the overseas ones. Although it took decades before they reached the same monetary levels, these droits acquis included social security, minimum wage, child allowance, health insurance, unemployment compensation, and all other components of the French welfare state. In large part they explain the seeming paradox of this former slave plantation colony’s rejection of a progressive, pro-Third World Socialist candidate in 1981 in favor of a conservative statesman whose very name bespoke aristocracy (Miles 1986; Satineau 1986). The proportion of the Martinican vote for Giscard d’Estaing over Mitterrand was 4:1. In follow-up elections, Aimé Césaire remained the only leftist parliamentarian (out of three) to represent Martinique in the Metropole.

Local trauma over the 1981 results did not last long. France’s new Socialist government bent over backwards to reassure the overseas

populations that there were no plans to divest the Republic of its DOMs. Not only did Mitterrand personally make symbolic gestures (such as postelectoral wreath-laying at the tomb of Victor Schoelcher, icon of emancipation) but the Socialists emphasized the legitimacy of regional and cultural difference within a hitherto Jacobin and centralist French political structure (Miles 1985; McDougall 1993). Autonomist Aimé Césaire did his part by declaring a "moratorium" on the question of Martinique's political status.

Martinique seemed convinced – even if in the Metropole itself, "right to difference" rhetoric was "largely discredited and abandoned by intellectuals and activists alike" by the late 1980s (Blatt 1997:49). In his reelection bid of 1988, the electorate swung from having humiliated Mitterrand in 1981 to giving him his highest scores in any département of France (59 percent in the first round, and 71 percent in the second). In 1988, it was the challenger Chirac who "took fire," that is, was "burned," as is said in Creole (Miles 1990). Martinique rejoined the rest of France in reelecting the Socialist incumbent. The Martinican electorate even sent leftist representatives to Paris from all four of her legislative districts (only to do the reverse in the subsequent legislative elections of 1993, with three out of four parliamentarians representing the right; in 1986, the left and right had split with two each.)

The year 1995 confirmed the seemingly leftward electoral tilt of Martinique, even though it put her at odds, as in 1981, with the French electorate at large. Although now the Socialist challenger was Lionel Jospin and not the more familiar François Mitterrand, Martinique massively backed the Socialist, giving him 59 percent of its vote in the second round. This was Jospin's best outcome overseas, and his second best throughout the Republic. It was Jacques Chirac, however, who became president of France (Miles 1995).

Gambling that early elections might strengthen his hand as president, Chirac called the French people to the polls in 1997. It was a tactical error. The Socialists took a majority of seats, forcing Chirac to appoint Lionel Jospin as his prime minister, a scenario known in French politics as cohabitation. The year 1997 was also significant because it saw the election of Martinique's first pro-independence representative to the National Assembly: Alfred Marie-Jeanne, mayor of Rivière-Pilote. (Two of the other parliamentary victors were from the right; the fourth was Césaire's successor, Camille Darsières.)

For the first time in the Fifth Republic, then, the presidential elections of 2002 pitted an incumbent president against an incumbent prime minister. All predictions were that overfamiliarity with both candidates, combined with a general malaise gripping the French nation at large, would make for a lackluster campaign. As the U.S. presidential contest of 2000 had
demonstrated not long before, however, lackluster campaigns can generate extremely surprising outcomes.

To better contrast the stakes and symbolism of the Martinican vote in the French presidential elections of 2002 with 1981, it is useful to survey the societal and political transformations that had occurred in the intervening twenty-one years. These may be examined under the rubric of French postcolonial policy, Martinican partisan politics along the ideological spectrum, cultural changes in French West Indian society, and the state of the island economy.

FRENCH POLICY, 1981-2002

By "policy" we betoken the influence in Martinique of a relatively pluralistic approach to French postcolonialism in the nonindependent former colonies. Decentralization, instituted after 1981 by the Socialists under Mitterrand, was not merely an administrative reform with efficiency objectives. It bespoke, rather, a philosophical shift in the way the center viewed the culture of its most far-flung, overseas components. These were still to be regarded as French, but French with a difference. Cultural specificity was no longer to be feared as a potential threat to Jacobin or Bonapartist control. Rather, a multicultural France — one that would valorize regional languages — was to be acknowledged and celebrated. Over the years, this would come to include Creole.

Socialist policy vis-à-vis the overseas represented a major ideological break with the spirit of postcolonial assimilation. Not that right and center-right governments from 1946 to 1981 had actively worked to eradicate, denigrate, or repress local cultures and identities: this anachronistic notion of assimilation had already undergone much softening by the First World War (Brunschwig 1964; Betts 1970). Right-of-center governments' conception of départementalisation, however, emphasized economic transformation over identity politics. Cultural differences were valuable in providing an exotic gloss (and, properly performed, a source of tourist revenue) in distant but still French lands. (Corsica proved to be an explosive exception.) To the pre-Socialist governments of the departmental era, however, they were not fundamental attributes to be promoted. This changed in 1981.

"I have been struck," declared President Mitterrand approvingly, during a visit to Martinique in 1985, "by a vigorous effort at ... the affirmation ... of identity." Mitterrand evocatively summed up the object of this effort in two words: "Martinican dignity." 5 Exactly ten years later Socialist leader Pierre

5. François Mitterrand, speech before the Corps constitués de Martinique, Martinique, December 4, 1985.
Mauroy called for "de-diabolicization" of identity politics: "Everyone must be able to show his difference ... the time of monarchies and colonizations is over." Yet more important than rhetorical flourishes from the left has been the appropriation of similar discourse by the right. We may view this as the mainstreaming of overseas French multicultural politics.

On the fiftieth anniversary marking the departmentalization of the "Old Colonies," for example, Jacques Chirac – one year after retaking the presidency for the French right – struck an overseas tone that varied little with that of his otherwise ideological nemeses: "The overseas departments occupy a special place within our Nation." They are justly "proud of their particular cultures, of their languages and traditions." Now as ever, there is "no question of the overseas departments conforming to a uniform and restrictive mold."

For Chirac, local specificity and identity in no way diminished, much less threatened, national unity. His jubilee speech also strongly emphasized the Frenchness of the overseas departments. Indeed, given the recent expansion of the European Union, it also stressed their newly expanded status within the Mother Continent. Indeed, Chirac envisioned a happy constellation of the three identities: "The overseas departments will not only be completely French but fully European, while maintaining the guarantee of respect for their own personality."

**MARTINICAN POLITICS, 1981-2002**

"Left" and "right" do not have the same meaning in Martinique as in the Metropole. Ideological notions of state and economy, law and order, private and collective play second fiddle to the overarching importance of the island's integration within the French Republic. Thus, the extreme left in Martinique – regardless of its views on socialism or collectivism – is synonymous with independentism. Such is the case with the Martinican Independence Movement (MIM), headed by Marie-Jeanne. A slightly more moderate "left," as represented by Aimé Césaire’s Progressive Martinican Party (PPM), argued for autonomy from its founding in 1956 until 1981. So

7. This is to be contrasted with a "nationalist turn" regarding cultural policy in the Metropole. See Ingram 1998. In the overall scheme of French postcolonial politics (or at least in academic literature on postcolonialism, hybridity, *métissage*, etc.), the role of the DOMiens is overshadowed by that of peoples of North African and Southeast Asian origin. See Vichniac 1991; Mckesson 1994; Hargreaves & McKinney 1997; Sherzer 1998.
does, incidentally, the much older, but now almost extinct, local Communist party. There is also an affiliate of the French Socialist Party. Leftist parties are also identified with the promotion of Creole culture and language.

“Right” in Martinique denotes adherence to départementalisation. The more rightist the movement or party, the more opposed it is to change that differentiates Martinique from the mainland. Such départementalisation parties generally identify with their French Metropolitan conservative counterparts. (Until they merged during the 2002 campaign, this meant the Union of French Democracy [UDF] and Rally for the Republic [RPR].) Traditionally, rightist/départementalisation parties have been suspicious or reticent about local cultural and linguistic movements that tend to promote Creole at the expense of francophonie. On account of the association between extreme right politics and racism, Martinique has eschewed political parties that smack of the far right. (This is in contrast to Guadeloupe, where a virulent anti-Haitian movement, headed by the disc jockey-turned-politician Ibo Simon, has tapped into an indigenous French West Indian xenophobia.)

A classic example of right-left political conflict emerged from the newly elected Mitterrand government’s proposal to merge the island’s general and regional councils into one. However logical the proposal — to reduce redundancy, save costs, eliminate inefficiency — the Martinican right opposed the Single Assembly proposal on the grounds that it would ominously alter Martinique’s institutional profile as a regular département of France. In the end, the Constitutional Council — France’s equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court — agreed with the Martinican right, and ruled that a Single Assembly would be unconstitutional in its administrative differentiation of the overseas départements.

Socialist decentralization policies, instituted in 1982, have smoothed the edges of the left-right conflict. Embraced even under subsequent conservative administrations, decentralization has entailed a transfer of power from Paris to all locally elected institutions of government, notably the regional council. Rightist/départementalisation politicians have benefited from increased resource allocation at the local level as much as their leftist counterparts. Greater power to the local councils has not, in fact, entailed any movement toward independence imposed from the Metropole. Neither a process toward gradual sovereignty for New Caledonia, an overseas territory, nor institutional reform in Corsica, whose independence movement embraces violence, has unduly upset advocates of the département status quo in Martinique.

9. In Metropolitan France, several départements constitute a region; due to their insularity, each of the overseas départements is a region unto itself. The general council is a département-wide body. Regional councilors are elected by the proportional system whereas general councilors vie in single-member districts.
CULTURE

It is perhaps in the realm of culture that the impact of decentralization has been greatest over the last two decades. Socialist promotion of a "right to a difference" and the legitimacy of regional specificity has not been rolled back by conservative French governments. The most audible of the changes has occurred in the regularization of previously underground "pirate radios," and the veritable explosion of nongovernmental radio and television channels that compete with the state-run ones of Radio France-Overseas (RFO). Some of these alternative news and information sources – notably Radio Lévé Débout Matinik ("Arise Martinique") and Radio Asé Pléré an Nou Lité ("Enough Crying, Let’s Fight") – openly advocate independence. Cable television programs on the former KMT\textsuperscript{10} also regularly critiqued and denounced ongoing French "colonialism."

Such competition has unmistakably influenced state organs of communication: it is no longer taboo to hear the word "independence" uttered over the official airwaves, nor for representatives of far left movements to be seen and heard. For sure, satellite television and the Internet have also introduced pressures upon state organs to liberalize their offerings; but decentralization has minimized whatever state resistance to these outside competitors there might otherwise have been.\textsuperscript{11}

Liberalization of the media has favored a progressive legitimization of the Creole language. At first heard only on pirate/independent radio stations, even RFO-Television now offers some news and entertainment (mostly comedy\textsuperscript{12}) in Creole. Commercialization, too, has favored Creole: spot ads sell products in the vernacular. As a venue for videoclips, the media have also helped promote Creole by airing new French Caribbean music – particularly zouk. The zouk phenomenon occurred precisely during the period under consideration, and speaks to the literal emergence of a French Caribbean "voice" in the cultural realm (Guilbault 1993; Berrian 2000).

It is not only in the informal culture that Creole has made great strides during the last two decades. An erstwhile imperial French national educational system has, during the last twenty years, recognized Creole as a regional language and, as such, eligible for curricular development. At the lycée (high school) level, there is a Creole language and civilization course option; and, as of 2002, competitive national certification examinations for

\textsuperscript{10} Kanal Matinik Tele, found and anchored by Roland Laouchez, was issued a temporary licence to broadcast and ceased to do so in the summer of 2002. It regularly featured as commentator Tony Delsham, journalist and novelist, as well as the outspoken nationalist Camille Chauvet.

\textsuperscript{11} For an analysis of the effect of globalization upon Martinique, see Miles 1995.

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, the five-minute sitcom Sizan et Jistan.
Creole teaching positions have been administered. At the local university, Creole language and culture have been promoted primarily through GERECF (Study and Research Group in Creole and Francophone Areas).

Local governments on the island have taken the initiative in reclaiming (or reinterpreting) previously suppressed and denigrated aspects of culture. In 1998 the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in France served as a literally dramatic example (Miles 1999:24-27). Most impressive has been the steady expansion of the municipal cultural office of Fort-de-France (SERMAC); however, even in rural communes, such as Anses d’Arlet, annual performances constitute a regular, if ambiguous, expression of politicized culture within an unavoidably commodified economy (Price 1998:184-96). For some, the lengths to which cultural entrepreneurs go to extol or revivify “traditional” lifeways speak to the reification, folklorization, and “pastification” of postdepartmental culture (Price 1998).

In the early 1980s France-Antilles, the island’s sole daily newspaper, was an unabashed supporter of conservative campaigns and the département status quo. It distinguished naught between editorials and articles: on the eve of the 1981 presidential elections, for instance, its headlines unambiguously called its readers to vote for Giscard d’Estaing. Two decades later, while still right-of-center editorially, France-Antilles had become more journalistically objective and professional in its coverage of politics. In 2002, its pre-election headlines were nonpartisan civic calls to vote.¹³

**ECONOMY**

Achieving parity between Martinicans and Metropolitans in terms of minimum wage and social welfare benefits was a major achievement from 1981 to 2002. No longer could disparity between what Frenchmen (and particularly Frenchwomen with children) of the Metropole and those overseas receive in wages or transfer payments be a major source of grievance. Even the thirty-five-hour working week was simultaneously applied to workers of Martinique and Metropolitan France. On the other hand, the perennial problems of high unemployment, unprofitable and undiversified agriculture, and financial dependence on the Metropole remained (Daniel 2001; Reno 2001).

That “dependence” still made for a relatively high standard of living, at least by regional standards. By the time of the 2002 campaign, Martinique enjoyed the second highest per capita income in the Caribbean, second only

to the Bahamas, and the highest of all four French overseas states. For a decade, already, her status as an “ultraperipheral” member of the European Union had been entrenched as per article 227 of the Treaty of Maastricht (Burton 1992; Jos 1995; Constant 2001). But GNP per capita was still only 58 percent of that prevailing in the French Metropole.

Indirectly, unemployment became an electoral issue. Concentrated among young males, in the absence of alternative programs lack of employment aggravated juvenile delinquency, increased crime rates, and heightened the sense of personal insecurity. These would become major campaign concerns, in Martinique as well as the Metropole. Socialist underestimation of their importance, combined with right (and especially extreme right) exploitation, would contribute greatly to the outcome of the 2002 elections.

**LE CONGRÈS**

What have been the main obstacles to development in the French overseas départements? In an effort to elaborate a comprehensive answer and to elicit proposals for further administrative reform, in late 1998 Prime Minister Jospin appointed two parliamentarians – Martinican senator Claude Lise and Réunion representative Michel Tamaya – to take stock of the overseas départements via a comprehensive travel mission. The prime minister also requested recommendations for an intensified decentralization. Specifically, Lise and Tamaya were asked to envision an ever-greater transfer powers from the national to local government, a rationalization of the relations between the general and regional councils, and better integration of the overseas states into their surrounding regions. The Lise-Tamaya Report, as it came to be known, recommended the creation of an ad hoc congress that would “initiate a process leading to an eventual evolution in the status” of the DOM.

A parallel guiding body of legislation for the overseas départements, the LOOM (Loi d’orientation pour l’outre-mer) was instituted by the French parliament on December 13, 2000. A notable section of the LOOM was article 62, which recognized the right to self-determination and envisioned

a statutory evolution specifically adapted for the overseas départements. Premised within all recommendations was consistency of institutional change with the French constitution – even if this would eventually entail modifying its article 73 governing the integration of the DOMs into the Fifth Republic.

Competing with such Paris-sanctioned sentiments for reform was the Declaration of Basse-Terre (Guadeloupe). In an unusual alliance, both the independentist Martinican leader Alfred Marie-Jeanne and the famously rightist stateswoman from Guadeloupe, Lucette Michaux-Chévy (presidents of their respective regional councils) affixed their signatures to a 1999 document that condemned, among other problems, the "systematic destruction of local initiative" and "generalized welfare dependence." The Declaration of Basse-Terre concluded by calling for a new status of "Overseas Region" encompassing Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana.19

"Even the political families traditionally the most attached to the concept of the unity of the Republic," observed Senator Lise (2001:8), "more and more adopt ... a position of openness." Such sentiments were confirmed in a historic address – remembered as the "à la carte speech" – made in Martinique by President Chirac on March 11, 2000. Chirac recognized among the overseas French a "great demand for recognition of their personality, dignity, identity, and capacity to assume for themselves a greater share of their destiny." He then left open the possibility of an institutional change, for "a status is never anything but an instrument in the service of a collective undertaking at a given point in time":

This policy cannot be applied in a uniform manner. Overseas France is rich in cultural and statutory diversity ... The departmental institution ... has perhaps reached its limits ... Uniform statuses have seen their day ... Henceforth each overseas collectivity, if it wishes, must be able to evolve towards a differentiated status ... All proposals, as long as they do not put into question our Republic and her values, will be considered.20

With both the Socialist prime minister and Gaullist president open to locally-initiated change in the institutional structure linking the overseas to the Metropole, the stage was set for the Congrès. In Martinique, it was held in two phases: June 2001 and February-March of 2002.

Between the two sessions, one poll conducted by the local branch of the Louis Harris Institute indicated that 92 percent of Martinicans wished their

island to remain a French départment. At the same time, fewer than half expressed faith that the départment was the best structure for preserving their social equality, health benefits, and educational rights. In another poll, conducted by Open Soft System, 38 percent of respondents were favorable toward the creation of a Single Assembly within the existing state system, whereas 31 percent preferred no change at all in the institutional setup. Fifteen percent expressed a desire for autonomy. In both polls, desire for independence was expressed by only 4 percent of respondents.

The 80 delegates to the Congrès represented 11 distinct clusters of political parties or movements. Moderate leftist groupings dominated with 39 representatives, encompassing Césaire’s Martinican Progressive Party (PPM, 14 representatives); Build the Country Martinique (BPM, 7); the Martinican Socialist Federation (FSM, 5); the Franciscan Popular Movement (MPF, 2); and the unaffiliated (11). Rightist/pro-départementalisation delegates, numbering 21 were more united: Martinican Forces for Progress (FMP [ex-UDF], 20) and Rally for the Republic (RPR, 1). Let’s Dare to Dare (Osons Oser, 6) was made up of traditionally rightist/pro-départementalisation delegates who, over the course of the deliberations, came to break with the FMP over some key votes. Pro-independence parties brought 16 delegates to the table: Alfred Marie-Jeanne’s Martinican Independentist Movement (MIM, 14); the ecologically-oriented Movement of Democrats and Ecologists for a Sovereign Martinique (MODEMAS, 1); and the splinter Party for the Liberation of Martinique (PALIMA, 1).

The deliberations were contentious. FMP in particular waged a rear-guard action to forestall any change in Martinique’s status as a French départment. Ideological opponents found FMP’s use of procedural objections to impede voting that it deemed objectionable particularly exasperating. Even more noteworthy, however, was the relative moderation of the independence parties. In previous years these had eschewed partisan collaboration with even pro-autonomy parties as tantamount to nationalist betrayal. Now, they

21. Le statut départemental plébiscité par les Martiniquais, *France-Antilles*, January 17, 2002. To the question “Which is, according to you, the status that best guarantees the rights already gained by Martinicans?” the long-standing option of départementalisation netted a strong plurality with 47 percent, while the novel notion of a “specific new territorial collectivity” was favored by 18 percent of respondents. Thirteen percent preferred autonomy. The poll had been commissioned by a local association of heads of private companies.

22. Sondage Open Soft System: Le département, l’assemblée unique et Marie-Jeanne président, *Antilla*, October 26, 2001, p. 18. This poll was also commissioned by a private sector association.

23. Since five of these held double mandates (i.e., they served in more than one legislative capacity), and one deputy had not been elected to either the general or regional council, the total number of possible votes was 84.
joined in common cause with all parties to advance incremental change within an implicitly French constitutional framework.

Such significant if subtle change justifies a digression. One should perhaps speak of “so-called pro-independence” parties, given that even the MIM has explicitly recognized that outright independence is not attainable within the near future. Independence will only come by stages, in steps, acknowledges the MIM leader, Alfred Marie-Jeanne. No timetable for island sovereignty is iterated. As president of the regional council since 1998, moreover, Marie-Jeanne has deftly used the resources available to him to consolidate his personal and partisan political positions. As acknowledgment of his political pragmatism deepens, Marie-Jeanne becomes even a safer salve for the Martinican nationalist conscience. One can support the so-called independentist out of principle and worry even less about the actual economic consequences.

Success of the Congrès hinged on the motion to convert Martinique from département to a “new territorial collectivity.” A single assembly, voted in by the proportional method, would replace the dual council structure specific to the overseas departments and enjoy enhanced powers. Eventually, this motion handily passed, 62-20 with a single abstention (from RPR); but FMP won a partial victory by forcing the delegates to pronounce themselves on a seemingly redundant – but politically tricky – vote to retain Martinique’s status as a département. That motion handily lost. FMP, this time with RPR, fiercely resisted the motion to accrue actual legislative powers to the new deliberative body, on the grounds that this is classically a prerogative of the National Assembly in Paris. Even the Martinican Socialists (and Osons Oser) demurred here, viewing the motion as a possibly illegitimate usurpation of constitutional power. It too, however, passed 52-21-11. With recommendations for a new island structure and assembly now irreversible, pro-départementalisation dissidents did agree to vote with the majority on some of the modalities of their structure, organization, and sphere of action. A public opinion poll conducted in the wake of the Congrès’ decision reflected growing acceptance for the institutional change: 43 percent expressed themselves in favor, with 29 percent opposed.24

A proposed amendment by PALIMA representative Francis Carole reignited passions in the Congrès. For the first time in history, a representative body duly constituted under the rubric of the French Republic was asked to acknowledge “the Martinican people and nation.” The proposed amendment brought to the fore all the hopes of some and fears of most about how the deliberations of the Congrès would be perceived by the

Martinican public and Metropolitan politicians. Despite repeated statements to the contrary, were the deliberations not in fact prelude to a severance from France?

A remarkable debate ensued - among Martinique’s own elected representatives - about the very existence (or not) of a Martinican nation and a Martinican people. Could such notions be compatible with the longstanding concept of “the French nation, one and indivisible”? Was there conceptual room for a (Martinican) nation within a (French) nation? Considerations played out on two levels: a theoretical one, concerning nationhood; and a political one, over how such a vote would, to use a U.S. colloquialism, “play in Peoria.”

Thus, viewers of the Congrès (broadcast live) were witness to the spectacle of the outspoken author of the pathbreaking Origins of the Martinican Nation (Darsières 1974) explaining why he and his party would not vote in favor of the amendment recognizing the existence of Martinique as a nation. Even if there were a Martinican nation, it was too risky to so proclaim: the people were not psychologically ready. Too many Martinicans might be alienated by such a vote. Ratifying sociological reality was not worth jeopardizing the entire work of the Congrès.

In the end, the maker of the motion was prevailed upon to have his amendment split in two. Separate votes were taken on recognizing a Martinican people and a Martinican nation. Thus, the Congrès could vote to affirm the existence of a people of Martinique (which it did, without any dissenting votes) separately from that of a nation of Martinique. The latter did pass, but only with 23 votes: 11 negatives were cast, 2 abstentions were registered, and a remarkable 38 (including all but one of the PPM delegates) actively affirmed their nonparticipation in the vote. For a rare instance in which the question of Martinican nationalism could be squarely faced by the island’s leaders, the outcome pointed rather to intellectual marronage, i.e., elitist flight before critical position-taking. As with the literary créolistes who both “rail ... against French domination and benefit ... [from] lucrative literary prizes from Paris” (Price & Price 1997:16), nationalist politicians expatiate vociferously but cast their votes prudently.

It is true that all resolutions of the Congrès were advisory and subject to further ratification by the regional and general councils. (The latter ultimately rejected the Martinican nation amendment after the former endorsed it.) It was also understood that any alteration of the island’s political system would require popular endorsement via referendum. Furthermore, no delegate contested the oft-iterated respect by the Congrès for the pouvoirs régaliens (sovereign prerogatives) of the French state, i.e., police powers, the judicial system, military defense, currency and coinage, etc. In short, the Congrès accepted that discussion of the hallmarks of classical independence was off-limits. Nevertheless, even within the context of a France that had already undergone Mitterrandist decentralization, the very existence of a Congrès –
not to mention its resolutions – was nothing short of historic. All participants and observers understood, however, that the long-term value of the Congrès hinged on the outcome of the upcoming French national elections.

**LES PRESIDENTIELLES – ROUND ONE**

A record-breaking number of candidates – sixteen – vied in 2002 for the presidency of the French Republic. While the electoral supply was thus very great, few anticipated the fragmenting effect this would have on the outcome.

Four of these candidates came from the extreme left and had even less of a following in Martinique than in the Metropole: Olivier Besancenot (Revolutionary Communist League, LCR), Daniel Gluckstein (Trotskyite Party, PT), Robert Hué (French Communist Party, PCF), and Arlette Laguiller (Worker’s League, LO). On the extreme right, also with miniscule local support, were Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front, FN) and his erstwhile aid, Bruno Mégret (Republican National Movement, MNR). Center-left and center-right candidates who, like the previous six, did not travel to the overseas départements to campaign were Alain Madelin (Liberal Democracy, DL), Corinne Lepage (Citizenship, Action, Participation for the 21st Century, CAP 21), Christine Boutin (Forum of Social Republicans, FRS), and Jean Saint-Josse (Hunting, Nature, Fishing and Traditions, CNPT). Televised interviews conducted by Stéphane Bijoux for the overseas départements channel confirmed that these candidates had little familiarity with the reality of the French Caribbean. It was they who most glibly entertained the notion of independence for the overseas départements, under the mistaken notion that this is desired by the population.

Jean-Pierre Chevènement of the Movement of Citizens (MDC) was the first of the candidates to come to Martinique to seek votes. Previously known for his left-of-center leanings, as the elections approached Chevènement came to adopt more conservative views on certain issues, including those that touched on the overseas. He was thus a staunch supporter of maintaining Martinique as a French state, while favoring greater powers to locally elected representatives.

Environmental candidate Noël Mamère of the Green Party also traveled to Martinique, and was hosted by the ecology-cum-independence party of the mayor of Saint Anne, MODEMAS. Mamère reiterated his hosts’ ideological

25. The cover title of the leftist (and usually acerbic) weekly magazine *Antilla* (January 24, 2002) reflected this sentiment: “Trois votes ‘historiques’ des élus martiniquais: oui! oui! oui!”

26. That is the number who received the requisite five hundred signatures of other elected officials; an indeterminate number of others tried but did not make it that far.
line by linking the island’s fragile environment to the large landholdings of the erstwhile colonial masters of the island, the békés.

François Bayrou of the Union of French Democracy (UDF), a large conservative party in France, also campaigned in Martinique. Although he received a warm welcome from the local center-right alliance (FMP) the latter made clear that it would not revise its appeal to vote in favor of the incumbent president Jacques Chirac.

Of all the quixotic presidential contenders, it was Christiane Taubira of the Radical Left Party (PRG) who elicited the most interest overseas and in Martinique. In the Taubira candidacy, ethnicity trumped ideology. One of four presidential candidates to be female (in addition to Boutin, Laguiller, and Lepage), Taubira was also black. Representative to the French National Assembly from French Guiana, Taubira, who had once favored independence, now campaigned for a plural France, under the motto “My Homeland, My Republic (Ma patrie, ma république). In contrast to the so-called “Iron Lady” of Guadeloupe (the conservative Lucette Michaux-Chévry, who campaigned in Martinique for Chirac), the local press – perhaps taking a leaf from a Taubira campaign sticker “Follow Your Heart, Vote Taubira” – dubbed the French Guianese stateswoman the “Lady of Heart.”

For the Martinican left, Taubira’s candidacy presented a dilemma. On the one hand, the appeal in Martinique for a black female presidential candidate from overseas was perhaps understandable in the context of the history of local ethnic relations. On the other hand, however powerful its symbolism, her candidacy was certain to siphon votes away from the Socialist candidate who did stand a chance of winning the election, Lionel Jospin. Not even the (female) Martinican leader of the far left, syndicalist, and implicitly independentist Workers’ Fight party supported Taubira. The Martinican Progressive Party nuanced its position, both by “supporting” Taubira but calling on its members to vote for Jospin.

Prime Minister Jospin campaigned in Martinique on March 31. Reaffirming his openness towards an evolution of Martinique’s status within the French Republic, he insisted that four a priori principles be guaranteed: the unity of the Republic, equality of social rights, the link to Europe, and consultation of the population before any constitutional change. The Socialist candidate’s formula was “a single, but not uniform, Republic.”

27. In a bid to emphasize cultural commonality, this slogan was also placarded around the island in Creole. The vernacular version (Pa tiré boyo pou mété pay) was even more evocative than the original: literally, it said “To advance the country, don’t hold back your guts.”
28. Had she been a negropolitan, that is, a black from the Metropole, her attraction in Martinique would have been mitigated.
an interview with France-Antilles, Jospin was categorical in his rejection of a separation between France and her overseas territories:

By a great majority, French West Indians are attached to the Republic, just as the West Indies are dear to the heart of our country. Personally, the France that I love includes Martinique and Guadeloupe, and I have difficulty imagining her amputated from one or the other. 30

Although he was of waning influence, Aimé Césaire officially endorsed the Jospin candidacy. 31

In Jacques Chirac’s campaign tour to Martinique on April 5-6, the incumbent president expressed what seemed to be a reversal of his earlier à la carte openness to change in Martinique’s status. Taking particular aim at the recently concluded Congrès, some of whose resolutions his advisors presumably characterized as unpopular among the Martinique electorate, Chirac declared “I know but a single people, I recognize but one nation within the Republic – the French people and the French nation.” Amalgamating the Congrès with the entire overseas départements policy of the government headed by Jospin, Chirac spoke witheringly of the “institutional disorder” in motion. Indeed, the incumbent president detected a veritable “project of rupture” by the Socialists. While reaffirming openness to administrative reform via constitutional amendment, Chirac distanced himself from undoing département status for overseas France. 32

Up to the first round Martinicans accepted, along with other French citizens, the polls that predicted the customary electoral scenario: a left-of-center candidate, in this case, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, versus a right-of-center one, here, President Jacques Chirac. Appeals by pro-independence parties to boycott the presidential elections (on the grounds that Martinicans are “not concerned” by the elections of France) constituted little more than a usual anti-electoral refrain. Two prescient articles in France-Antilles did however assert that, given the anticipated closeness of the race between Jospin and Chirac, the nearly two million overseas voters, including about one million living in the Metropole, could make the difference between a new Jospin presidency and a renewed Chirac one. Even the specter of a Florida-like debacle as for the U.S. elections of 2000 was fleetingly envisioned. As in past presidentials, time zone inequity was evoked: final results

30. La France que j’aime inclut la Guadeloupe et la Martinique, France-Antilles, March 30-April 1, 2002.
32. Chirac was simultaneously responding to a recent campaign proposal by Jospin in Corsica. See Chirac s’engage à défendre “un projet de rupture,” France-Antilles, April 8, 2002; Désordre institutionnel, France-Antilles, April 8, 2002.
would, most probably, be announced in the Metropole even as Martinicans,
Guadeloupeans, and Guyanese would still have several hours to vote.33

Indeed, this is what happened. French media regulations forbade the announcement in the overseas départements of electoral results before the polls in those locations closed. Nevertheless, at 4:20 pm local time, Martinicans glued to their television sets witnessed the unimagined spectacle of Lionel Jospin conceding that he had already lost the opportunity to run in the second round of the elections. Yet they, as well as their counterparts in Guadeloupe, who had not yet voted, still had an hour and forty minutes to do so. There was little attempt to mobilize overseas voters in case the Metropolitan results were so close that the DOMs could change the outcome.34

Supporters of Jospin were stunned and glum. Backers of Chirac were jubilant. But theirs was a jubilation tinged with unease. For even though Chirac came out ahead both in Martinique and the Metropole, and his ultimate reelection was virtually assured, they too had to come to grips with the second place showing in greater France of the candidate that Martinicans of most persuasions were at one in despising: Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Discrepancy in the degree of support for Le Pen in Martinique vis-à-vis the Metropole was anticipated. So was the much higher backing for Christiane Taubira in the Départements français d’Amérique (DFA) than elsewhere. The nearly 25,000 votes that she garnered in Martinique – and a competitive third place – nevertheless needs to be relativized. In French Guiana she captured first position with an absolute majority. That is not surprising, given that French Guiana is Taubira’s home state. In Guadeloupe, however, she also came out on top. These results tend to confirm Martinique’s long-standing reputation as the “most French” of the three DFAs.

When compared with the other overseas départements and territories, the results for Taubira also temper the much vaunted explanation of “ethnic proximity.” In the one French overseas département, outside the Western Hemisphere (the Indian Ocean island of Réunion), also with a predominantly African-derived population, Taubira’s score was meager. She also did quite poorly in the non-Caribbean French overseas territories35 of French Polynesia

33. Le choix des électeurs d’outre-mer peut être cette fois déterminant, France-Antilles, April 11, 2002; Plus d’un million d’inscrits sur tous les continents, France-Antilles, April 16, 2002.
34. Attempts were made to annul the official results on the grounds that premature reporting had affected the voting behavior of overseas citizens. A certain number of late-hour West Indian voters did change their minds and voted for Jospin (instead of Taubira or other leftist candidates) when early projections showed that Le Pen might indeed surpass the Socialist candidate.
35. Unlike the overseas départements, overseas territories are expected to evolve toward ever-greater autonomy. However, their natives are full French citizens.
and Wallis-and-Futuna, and scored higher, relative to other territories, among the white overseas electorate of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Yet even in St. Pierre and Miquelon Taubira was outscored by Le Pen, as was the case in New Caledonia and Wallis-and-Futuna. Taubira’s appeal was thus as least as regional as it was racial or ethnic. In the eyes of the overseas electorate, Taubira did not incarnate overseas France per se. Individual histories and personalities of the various overseas states and territories continue to make for distinctive voting patterns.

Table 2. Overseas Votes for Front Runners of French West Indies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Round, 2002</th>
<th>Taubira</th>
<th>Chirac</th>
<th>Jospin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Guiana*</td>
<td>12,479</td>
<td>4,496</td>
<td>2,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52.3%)</td>
<td>(19%)</td>
<td>(10.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe*</td>
<td>34,210</td>
<td>26,557</td>
<td>21,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37.2%)</td>
<td>(28.9%)</td>
<td>(23.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique*</td>
<td>24,864</td>
<td>29,424</td>
<td>26,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27.8%)</td>
<td>(32.9%)</td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Pierre &amp; Miquelon**</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6.1%)</td>
<td>(30.8%)</td>
<td>(13.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayotte**</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>9,105</td>
<td>3,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(18.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réunion*</td>
<td>4,914</td>
<td>86,830</td>
<td>91,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
<td>(37.2%)</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia**</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>29,490</td>
<td>13,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.3%)</td>
<td>(48.4%)</td>
<td>(22.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna**</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,031</td>
<td>2,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td>(50.6%)</td>
<td>(35.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynésia</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>47,133</td>
<td>18,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td>(62.4%)</td>
<td>(24.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* represents département

** represents territory/collectivity
Taubira’s strong showing in Martinique muddies ideological analysis. Although candidate of a party calling itself radical left, she undeniably received votes from Martinicans, especially women, who otherwise would have cast their ballots for Jacques Chirac. Christiane Taubira was a personality with whom many conservative Martinican women identified, despite her affiliation with a leftist fringe political movement. But would these women have voted at all, had she not been a candidate?

Chirac’s apparent strong first-round performance in Martinique is subject to various qualifications. On the one hand, he indisputably came out in first position; indeed, Martinique is the sole overseas département where he did so. He bested his Socialist nemesis from the previous election. Chirac’s second-place Martinican showing in 1995 was obtained with 29.14 percent of the vote – by coincidence, exactly what Jospin gained in 2002. Compared with 1995, when there were seven fewer candidates to compete with and more voters participating, Chirac managed in 2002 to secure better scores, both absolutely (by 2,729 ballots) and proportionally (by nearly 4 percent).

On the other hand, Chirac undoubtedly profited from the Taubira candidacy. Although Chirac must indeed have lost some votes among the,
particular female electorate, Jospin probably suffered even more from this competition from a leftist rival. Going into the 2002 elections the Martinican left was uncontestably stronger, as measured by representation in local assemblies and municipalities, than the right. Without the Taubira candidacy, and those of several other leftist candidates, it is unlikely that that Jospin would have lost all 7,286 of the votes he did between the 1995 and 2002 first rounds. Had he retained only half that number, he would have overtaken Chirac on the island. Consider, too, that in the second round in 1995, Jospin beat Chirac by well over 20,000 votes.

The discrepancy between Taubira's tally in Martinique vis-à-vis the Metropole, where she garnered only 581,533 votes, or just under 2.1 percent, indirectly raises the thorny question of ethnicity in a political system which generally eschews it. That she did so well in Martinique and Guadeloupe reflected a desire among many electors to vote their color; that she did so poorly in the Metropole - even compared with other fringe candidates - reinforced the marginality of overseas France in a nationwide contest. Thus, while her very candidacy had symbolic import for the DFA in the short run, her low standing at the Metropolitan polls raises questions previously skirted about the acceptability, at the highest level of government, of candidates of color.

Did the Taubira candidacy affect the national outcome of the first round, and at Jospin's expense? Fewer than 200,000 votes separated Jospin from Le Pen. Overseas, Taubira netted nearly 80,000 votes. In the Metropole reside approximately 300,000 French West Indians, both migrants and offspring of migrants, of voting age. Assume that half of the eligible French West Indians residing in the Metropole voted for Taubira. Thus, if only one in two French West Indians had given his or her vote to Jospin rather than to Taubira, then the Socialist candidate, and not the far right one, would have faced Chirac in the run-off.

When queried about her possible spoiler role for the center left (the Nader effect, in U.S. parlance), Taubira bristled defensively. She counterqueried why she alone, the overseas candidate, was posed such a question, and not the other, Metropolitan, leftist presidential pretenders.

As is usually the case, third-tier candidates from the Metropole received insignificant electoral support in Martinique. Whereas four such candidates

36. Extrapolated from the numbers of persons born in the French West Indians living in the Metropole, the percentage of those born in the Metropole of French West Indian parentage, consistent migration from 1982 to 1990, and a 25 percent rate of persons under eighteen years of age. INSEE, Tableaux économiques régionaux de la Martinique, 2002.

37. Inasmuch as ethnic-specific exit polling is not conducted in France, this is a hypothetical assumption.
obtained the critical 5 percent threshold vote nationally, and two more came within one percentage point of it, none did so in Martinique.38

In particular, 2002 seemed to bang the final nails in the coffins of both the French and Martinican Communist parties. In France as a whole, Robert Hué’s 3.4 percent was poor enough, compared to his 1995 Metropolitan score of 8.7 percent. In Martinique, however, the candidate endorsed by the Martinican Communist Party (PCM) plummeted from 3.5 percent in 1995 to under 0.5 percent in 2002. (In the 1981 and 1988 elections, the Communist party candidate received 2 percent of the Martinican vote.)

Les Présidentielles – Round Two

Round two of the presidential elections, in Martinique no less than the Metropole, revolved around the sheer and stunning fact of a continuing Le Pen candidacy. A headline from a usually fringe publication for once summed up mainstream sentiment: “What is Happening in France?”39 In the past, massive protests had prevented the National Front leader from even landing on Martinican soil: now, he would be a presidential ballot choice at polling stations across the island. It made little difference that, officially, Le Pen did not exclude the overseas départements citizens from his vision of “a France for the French”; indeed, he even dispatched a Martinican from the Metropole, Huguette Fatna, to campaign on his behalf. Yet for virtually the entire local body politic Le Pen still incarnated racism. Reinvoking the Two France Paradigm (Miles 1986:47-48, 219, 234-35) we can say that, in the eyes of the Martinican population, Le Pen was the apotheosis of the colonial, slavist, oppressive Metropole against which French liberationist forces – West Indian as well as Metropolitan – still needed to struggle. But how?

One response was massive demonstration. High school students set the tone with large rallies in Martinique’s two largest cities, Fort-de-France and Lamentin, on April 25.40 May Day marches one week later also took on an electoral, anti-National Front dimension. Two expressions captured the spirit of the island vis-à-vis the Le Pen candidacy: faire barrage and barrer la route. Martinicans had to fend off, block the way, or otherwise stymie the far right from coming to power. But did that necessarily mean voting for Jacques Chirac?

38. Below 5 percent, parties lose a considerable portion of their deposit with the electoral commission.
Not for the pro-independence movements. Even faced with the prospect of a National Front presidency, PALIMA, the MIM, and the National Council of Popular Committees (CNCP) called for a repeated boycott of the voting booths; MODEMAS urged its followers to “vote blank,” that is, to turn in an envelope with no ballot inside.\footnote{Les indépendentistes appellent à l’abstention, \textit{France-Antilles}, April 19, 2002.}

For the more pragmatic parties of the left, especially PPM and FSM, second-round reality imposed an unpalatable choice. Throughout the campaign, their voting for Chirac had been an unthinkable option. Yet not voting for him theoretically enabled Le Pen to become president of France. Even if surveys indicated that such an outcome was virtually impossible, surveys had also lulled the electorate into certainty of a Jospin-Chirac run-off. So distasteful was the prospect of a National Front victory, or even near-victory,\footnote{Le Pen had fixed for himself a threshold of success of only 20 percent for the second round.} that virtually all French West Indians with a significant following on the left, from Aimé Césaire to Christiane Taubira, appealed to their followers to vote for Jacques Chirac. They did so, however, by couching their appeal in explicit caveats: theirs was an endorsement not of Chirac per se, but of democracy in general. Indeed, they put the incumbent president on notice that he should not misinterpret the significance of a pro-Chiraquian landslide.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Second Round of French Presidential Elections, May 5, 2002}
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
Candidate & Martinique & Metropole \\
\hline
Jacques Chirac (RPR) & 96.14 & 81.96 \\
Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN) & 3.86 & 18.04 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Table 3. Second Round of French Presidential Elections, May 5, 2002

Martinique’s race-sensitive electorate mobilized against Le Pen more than any other state in the entire French Republic. Chirac’s 96 percent victory there broke several electoral records. Still, local commentary revolved not around the overwhelming score for the winner but rather around the more than doubling of actual votes, between the first and second rounds, for Le Pen (4,353, up from 1,563).

Fixation on this small minority reflected enduring apprehension among the “colored” majority about the political and racial proclivities of the white minority.\footnote{The latter are of two basic origins: indigenous descendants of original French colonists; and “Metropolitans,” the French from Europe. Population of the former is between 3,000 and 4,000; the latter roughly 20,000.} Votes in Martinique for Le Pen would have had to emanate
from these groups, was the (usually) tacit assumption. Representatives of far left and pro-independence movements expressed these beliefs openly. Yet analysis of the Le Pen vote in Martinique – a marginal phenomenon, it bears repeating – does not unreservedly confirm this race-based voting correlation.

Between the first and second rounds Le Pen picked up 2,790 votes. Only one-fifth of these came from the capital, Fort-de-France, where Metropolitans are indeed concentrated. Tourist towns (St. Anne, Trois Ilets) also had above-average (for the island) pro-Le Pen scores. Yet certain communes (voting districts) with hardly any béké or Metropolitan residents also registered relatively high support for the National Front leader. Indeed, the second highest proportional score in Martinique for Le Pen (5.43 percent) came from the northern voting district of Lorrain. Other rural, relatively ethnically homogenous communes where Le Pen picked up noticeable numbers of votes were Gros-Morne and Sainte-Marie. Call-in shows and local news reports revealed nonracial reasons among Martinicans for voting Le Pen: on the one hand, an individualist rejection of the unprecedented massive and orchestrated campaign against this one candidate; and a sincere belief that crime would be better countered under a Le Pen presidency than a continued Chirac one.

Still in all, the amount of attention paid to the Le Pen vote in the state where he received the least backing is remarkable. It reflects a lingering political insecurity about the place of Martinique in the French Republic, as well as a social insecurity about the role of its resident whites.

Class is less tied to political party affiliation and membership than it was in previous eras. Since départemantalisation, the indigenization and expansion of the public administration have created a large and privileged cadre of civil servants who generally tend, with the partial exception of teachers, to support conservative parties that best represent the guarantee of continued paychecks – inclusive of the 40 percent bonus for “overseas” posting. These, along with other middle-class electorates, also gravitate, under conditions of personal insecurity, to “reasonable” law-and-order politicians (i.e., Gaullists as opposed to Le Penists). Welfare recipients and those unemployed and on the dole also, when they do vote, reflect their dependency on the French center. When in power, however, the French left has been able to reassure overseas middle and lower classes of its fiscal fidelity and thereby reverse the latters’ inclination to support more rightist parties. Overall, however, these classes are more apt to vote left locally but right nationally than to vote consistently to the left.

44. One-fifth of all Martinican voters are registered in the capital.
The Communist Party, which in Martinique had drawn its strength among agricultural workers, has virtually collapsed. Mechanization of farm work, the employment of foreigners to cut cane, and the gradual shrinking of the agricultural sector overall cut into the backbone of workers' parties. Aimé Césaire's defection from the PCM in 1956, and his creation of the rival PPM (with its vast empire of city employees) are also explanations. Trade union members constitute the core of other Trotskyte parties (Combat Ouvrier, Groupe Révolution Socialiste) but these are small and, by temperament, provide lukewarm support to their Metropolitan affiliates and candidates. Békés, it can be surmised, consistently support rightist parties. Their numbers are relatively small, however, and their electoral turnout unknown.

**The Invisible Victor**

In a campaign as emotional as that created by the Le Pen run-off candidacy, the most significant feature of the Martinican vote was arguably its nullity: abstentionism, several pundits and pressmen declared, was the true winner. Despite the demonstrations, party appeals, and antiracist programming, fewer than half the eligible voters came out to vote in the second round.  

Certainly, Martinican participation in French national elections has historically been low. In presidential elections, Martinique generally votes between 20 percent and 30 percent less than does the Metropole (see Graph 2).

Yet 2002 marked Martinique's lowest national voting turnout (second round) in its democratic history. That this should happen in the one presidential election in which race was a prominent issue in the nationwide campaign is all the more striking. Radical, pro-independence parties who customarily call for a "boycott" of "France's" elections only half-heartedly take credit afterward for low participation rates; their own candidates, after all, hardly galvanize the abstentionists when they do run. Blank and null balloting could be used more directly to express dissatisfaction with the choice of candidates or to register rejection of the political system. Yet the number of such blank and null votes (7,457) was not particularly high in 2002: it was only 78 more than in 1995. Disaffection with electoral politics, disconnection with Metropolitan society, and general erosion of civic duty better explain Martinique's receding participation in France's presidential elections.

45. In the first round, the turnout was one in three.
46. Direct voting for France's head of state was initiated with the Fifth Republic in 1965.
It is worth recalling the time zone dilemma. French West Indians have become used to nationwide voting results being announced before voting has ended on their islands. Knowledge that their ballots just do not matter to the Metropole reinforces a sense of national marginality and electoral alienation. That this should occur in an otherwise close electoral contest (in the first round, only 194,600 votes separated Jospin from Le Pen) is all the more galling. Moreover, long-standing regulations banning premature broadcast of the results by local stations were blithely disregarded in the first round of the 2002 elections on the grounds that Metropolitan stations were broadcasting live by satellite anyway. Chastened by local protest, France’s national media board called the local stations to task, and they did withhold the results in the second round until local polling time had concluded. But in the Internet age, where *Le Monde* posts electoral results every few minutes, such controls become increasingly irrelevant. Thus emerges a new paradox to Martinican politics: the more technologically connected the island becomes to the Metropole, the less acute can be its sense of relevance to it.

47. Yet on account of the same time difference, candidates in nationwide examinations must arise in the middle of the night in order to take their tests at the same time as their counterparts in the Metropole.

48. Of course, residents of the DFA have long been able to telephone friends and relatives in the Metropole to obtain electoral results early.
Technology does not transcend the geography that—in time as well as space—distances Martinique from the Metropole.

**LES LÉGISLATIVES**

Jacques Chirac had been reelected president of France. But unless the National Assembly could be realigned from Socialist Party control, his would be a Pyrrhic victory, undermined by continued *cohabitation* between a president of the right and a prime minister of the left. It was in the name of legislative effectiveness, and invoking law and order as a major theme, that the UMP campaigned against the Socialists in the legislative elections of June.

In Martinique, the appointment of interim Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin brought one obvious change: much greater visibility of regularly uniformed policemen and teams of black tee-shirted special intervention gendarmes. It was a moment to demonstrate the new—and potentially future—government’s commitment to counter the island’s crime wave.

A record-breaking thirty-four candidates vied for the four seats as deputy to the parliament in Paris. In the north Atlantic district, a staunch conservative, pro-departmentalist incumbent, Anicet Turinay, hoped to capitalize on the Chirac victory against five challengers. In the north Caribbean, a more moderate conservative, Dr. Pierre Petit, announced his retirement and tapped the pro-Chirac mayor of Schoelcher, Alfred Almont, to succeed him. In the center district, it was Aimé Césaire’s handpicked successor, Camille Darsières, who hoped to retain his seat as deputy (held since 1993) for the PPM. In the south, the pro-independence Alfred Marie-Jeanne sought reelection. To summarize, on the eve of the 2002 legislative elections Martinique’s deputies to the French National Assembly represented, in local political terms, the extreme left (an independentist); the far right (an unwavering *départementalisation* supporter); the “modernizing” right (a conservative open to institutional change); and the nationalist left (advocate of autonomy within the French republic).

Results of the second round of the legislative elections left Martinique’s political map just as varied. The staunch *départementalisation* supporter lost to a Socialist (Louis-Joseph Manscour); the pro-Chirac mayor won by the greatest margin of any district; the PPM incumbent was defeated by an ex-Communist; and the pro-independence deputy narrowly kept his seat from the staunch *départementalisation* challenger from whom he had previously captured it. In short, the Martinican electorate—that increasingly diminishing portion of eligible voters—once again expressed little ideological uniformity.

One can draw few conclusions about Martinicans’ overall views about their identification with the French Republic, and the prospect of change
within it, based on the legislative results. The greatest consistency lay in the "municipalization" of the elections: the winning candidates to the French National Assembly were all mayors who succeeded in (re)mobilizing their local island backers; the two incumbents who lost (the leftist/autonomist Darsières and the rightist/departemental Anicet) controlled no town hall. Local concerns and personalities trump national ones; and electoral indifference trumps all.\textsuperscript{49}

**CONCLUSION**

With the 2002 results, Martinique had voted in three out of the previous four presidential contests for one candidate more strongly than did any département of France. In two of these contests - 1988 for Mitterrand and 2002 for Chirac - Martinique's preference was also that of the French people as a whole. Yet it is no longer accurate to speak of the Martinican electorate being merely "legitimist"; i.e., supporting only the current incarnation of the French Republic. Le Pen's candidacy impelled the electorate, which had strongly backed Jospin in 1995, to vote for Chirac. Unlike the rest of France, Martinique did not in its 2002 legislative elections give the president a majority of like-minded conservative parliamentarians with which to govern.

In 1981, when independence for Martinique was not advocated in any Metropolitan party's campaign plank, the right nevertheless succeeded in brandishing the prospect before a fearful electorate; hence, Mitterrand's rout in Martinique. In 2002, even so soon after formal debate on institutional change had been activated by the French government, the question of Martinique remaining within the French Republic was strangely muted as a campaign issue, especially among local candidates to the National Assembly. Whereas Martinique's future as a département of France may have been open to serious formal debate in the pre-election Congrès, there was hardly any question about the island's remaining a part of France. Chirac's reelection, reinforced by a rightist National Assembly, renders even tepid institutional change more problematic. Institutional change for the overseas departments, according to Chirac, will occur only within the rubric of similar reform for all of France's constituent units.\textsuperscript{50} Martinique's foreseeable future thus

\textsuperscript{49} For a detailed treatment of the legislative elections in Martinique, see Miles forthcoming 2003.

\textsuperscript{50} Speaking on Antilles-TV, Chirac's minister for overseas states and territories, Brigitte Girardin, put it bluntly: "The Congrès produced documents. They are still interesting to read. But really, I feel that the exercise has come to an end ... You don't put the cart before the horse. You don't begin by telling the elected delegates 'Think about just anything - even if it is unconstitutional,' in order to say afterwards, 'Okay, we're going to do some patchwork to the constitution.'"
remains ensconced within the French Republic. Not even pro-independence forces actually believe otherwise.

Such a state of politics does not necessarily reflect an enthusiastic state of mind about being black, French, and overseas. Space does not allow for a full treatment of contemporary Martinican public opinion (as opposed to the views expressed by the internationally celebrated intellectual and literary elite\(^51\)). Suffice it to say that longitudinal surveying points to a dramatic individualization of Martinicans’ preoccupations and a corresponding depoliticization of consciousness.\(^52\) Increasing abstentionism is probably a symptom of this trend. One can now even conceive of a scenario in which a local referendum on independence (were France’s constitutional guardians to allow it) might result in – confoundingly low voter turnout.

It is impossible to speak of “a Martinican viewpoint” regarding the island’s institutional place within the French Republic. Multiple positions nullify any collective voice. These range from staunch opposition to any change in Martinique’s status as a département of France to (for a tiny minority) outright independence. Is this a case of democracy in action; or is it the result of a neocolonial strategy of divide-and-departmentalize? In either event, Martinicans are free, as individuals, to choose among a host of political options. They are also free not to choose, an option of which they are increasingly availing themselves by electoral abstention. Freedom also extends to the question of individual identity, the degree to which Martinicans choose to identify with their co-citizens of Metropolitan France.

France’s democratic structure does not provide for the election of a single, islandwide leader: voters have never had the opportunity to choose directly the president of their regional or general council. The executive administrator of Martinique remains a Paris-appointed prefect. Such a system mitigates any clear-cut, not to mention uniform, personalization of a Martinican worldview. The only candidate that all Martinicans have the opportunity to vote for is the president of the entire republic. Not since Charles de Gaulle has a French leader inspired the Martinican population at large, resulting in passionate and personal identification. Chirac’s record-breaking score of 96 percent in 2002 does not have the same emotional import as De Gaulle’s 90 percent in 1965.\(^53\) At a time when proximité has become much vaunted in Martinican and French political discourse as a democratic imperative, the citizen-president relationship requires serious reworking to stem the

\(^{51}\) A good treatment of this class is found in Burton 1993.

\(^{52}\) IPSOS, 2001-02, Tendances styles de vie: Martinique-Guadeloupe. Undistributed CD-rom.

\(^{53}\) The highest Martinican score for a presidential candidate was 91 percent in 1969 for Georges Pompidou.
hemorrhage of the citizen voter. Metropolitan presidential candidates have not only geographical but also ethnic and cultural distances to breach. For if Martinican voters fail to identify with their president, how will they identify with France? Juridically, Martinicans will remain French, but culturally – and psychologically – they will remain ambivalent.

REFERENCES


The slave, plantation, and racialized societies of the colonial Atlantic world were a laboratory of experiences, part of a movement that gave rise to ideas and their "agency"; a process of geopolitical and geocultural reinvention. Arguing on the basis of black music and political thought, Paul Gilroy (1993) stresses that cultural historians could view the Atlantic world as a unit of complex analysis from transnational and intercultural perspectives. To do so it would be necessary to rearticulate translocal solidarity, as well as the trans- and intercultural processes and heterocultural contacts that formed and reproduced black cultures in the diaspora. These processes and contacts could be found in several places at the same time, sharing and constructing differences and similarities. Historic narratives – which have always been fragmented – could be connected.

Although Gilroy's approach is largely centered on the English-speaking world, we can transplant his categories and use them to analyze colonial border areas, particularly those that were apparently on the economic periphery, in light of Portuguese and French colonial policies regarding the Americas. In these areas and specific contexts we can analyze cultural exchanges and the formation of identities on the basis of experiences of flight and perceptions surrounding freedom.

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In this paper, I will identify forms of micropolitical agency and perceptions that changed as a result of these experiences. The objective of this study is to attempt to steer a course through an agitated sea of interpretations. I will analyze the experiences of the mocambos, Maroon societies established on the borders of colonial Brazil and French Guiana, and the fears, ideas, and connections surrounding them, which I will present as indications of these transatlantic experiences and some local significations.

**Mocambos on the Borders**

The colonial occupation of the Amazon region went slowly. Only toward the end of the seventeenth century would the Portuguese metropole begin introducing African slaves into the region more systematically through the Companhia de Comércio do Maranhão. However, there were signs of an African presence throughout the region since the middle of the seventeenth century (Salles 1971:13). The first blacks to arrive in the Amazon were taken there by the British, who attempted to seize control of the extreme north of Brazil at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Reis 1971:17). Through trading posts established between the coast of Macapá and the Amazon delta zone, the British attempted to set up a large colonial farming enterprise, planting sugarcane to produce sugar and rum. The decision to use African labor on the farms arose because adventurers planned to win the Amerindians’ support to help establish their conquest (Reis 1971:13-17; Farage 1991:4-39).

Antônio Ladislau Monteiro Baena (1846), who was writing in the early nineteenth century, stressed that disputes between the Portuguese and French in the eastern Guianas gradually worsened in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. In 1678, the French began exploring the land in the region of the Oyapock River, which had belonged to Portugal since 1636. French settlers pushed as far as the source of the Amazon River and began penetrating nearby areas. In 1685, the governor of Cayenne complained that the French were going to Cabo Norte to buy Amerindians. That region would soon become the setting of complex colonial (and later postcolonial) experiences and spaces for the redefinition of ethnic identities (Baena 1846). With the help of traders and indigenous groups, black slaves also migrated in search of freedom from both the Portuguese and French sides of the border. In 1732 the two Crowns signed an international treaty by which each would send back the other’s fugitives. In practice, however, territorial disputes made it impossible to control the border area effectively. France and Portugal mistrusted each other as far as their colonial territories there were concerned. Seeking, however, to carry
out the terms of the agreement as far as possible, French and Portuguese authorities engaged in reciprocal exchanges of captured fugitives on several occasions. There were constant complaints from settlers and authorities, Portuguese and French alike, regarding the growing number of escapes, and even when international agreements such as the Treaty of Utrecht were in place, returning captured fugitives was a complicated process. Once, the governor of Pará complained that he had received “harshly” worded letters from French slaveholders, and even from the governor of Cayenne, regarding delays in the return of fugitives. However, the governor of Pará pointed out that the French did not always fulfill the Treaty of Utrecht. Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries also complained that their slaves (or Amerindians living in missionary villages under their protection) were fleeing to Cayenne. The Portuguese authorities stressed that the return of runaway slaves had to work both ways. When they handed over recaptured slaves in 1733, the Pará authorities demanded that the French do the same. In 1739, the French Crown ordered the punishment of anyone who helped slaves escape across the border.

The Macapá region played a doubly important role in Portugal’s colonial policy because it helped defend the mother country’s dominions due to its strategic position on the Amazon delta. At the same time, owning the region made it possible to produce products that were in great demand in the commercial capital. Generally speaking, the African presence in the Macapá region is associated with the construction of Fort São José de Macapá, which began in around 1764 and was completed in 1773. The association came about because settlers were required to send their slaves to work on the construction of the fort, much to the chagrin of the masters, who frequently complained.

Considerably more black slaves arrived in the Amazon region after the creation of the Companhia Geral de Comércio do Grão-Pará e Maranhão in 1755. During its twenty-two-year existence, the company introduced about 12,587 African slaves into Grão-Pará alone, although some were sent on to Mato Grosso (Salles 1971:32). When the company was liquidated in 1778, private enterprise, smugglers, and the domestic market kept up the supply of slaves. The internal trade in African slaves, called ladinos, for example, went on in a number of regions,
particularly Pernambuco, and became a reality for Grão-Pará in the early nineteenth century. In addition to doing farm work and building military installations, African slaves in the Amazon worked on urban construction projects and at shipyards, and were musicians and household servants. As in the case of Macapá, local residents ceded large numbers of slaves to build public works for the government (Vergolino-Henry & Figueiredo 1990:56).

*Mocambos* and the constant movement of fugitives evolved and grew in several parts of the colonial Amazon. Escapes by slaves from colonial dominions in particular were an important cause for concern in the border regions. These borders were not fixed because they were the subject of constant disputes, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Amapá region – which bordered on French Guiana – was the greatest source of apprehension. With the help of settlers, merchants, and indigenous groups, black slaves from the Portuguese and French sides of the border were continually migrating and establishing *mocambos*.

French and Portuguese authorities mutually exchanged escaped slaves on several occasions. We know that twelve blacks owned by a Frenchman named Dit Limozin escaped from Cayenne’s prison fortress in 1732, and Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries complained that their slaves had fled to Cayenne. In 1733, when handing twenty-five slaves over to Messrs. Fossard and Simosen, the Grão-Pará authorities asked the French to do likewise. The following year, King John I of Portugal wrote to the captain general of the state of Maranhão to clarify his instructions regarding the return of slaves who had escaped from Cayenne and sought refuge in Portuguese territory. And in 1739, the Portuguese Crown ordered the punishment of anyone who helped slaves to flee across the border (Gomes 1999:239).

In the second half of the eighteenth century, escapes were not only a regular occurrence, but slaves also began fleeing en masse. In 1752, the governor of Cayenne requested the return of nineteen blacks. Years later, accusations were made regarding the presence of French emissaries who had infiltrated the border regions to spy on and capture fugitives. In 1760, there were complaints about the arrival of Monseigneur Galvete in Grão-Pará to collect some slaves. Later, two canoes sailed down the Oyapock carrying French officers hunting fugitives. The return of escaped slaves – and the escapes themselves – would become a problem for the French

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3. IHGB, Conselho Ultramarino, Évora, tomo V, arq. 1.2.24, fl. 149 v. and tomo VII, arq. 1.2.26, fl. 180 v. and Códice Arq. 1, 2, 26, Conselho Ultramarino, Évora, volume VII, fls. 193v and 194. For further commentary in this regard, see note 2.
and Portuguese authorities alike. There were complaints about French raids that were supposedly intended to capture fugitives.  

The problem was more complex than escapes in that border region, where an improvised stage was being set for colonial disputes. The colonizers’ main focus was the constant push to occupy more and more territory. More than just looking for fugitives, the Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and, most of all, French crossed the borders to trade with the Amerindians and expand their dominions. In 1724, Portuguese authorities based in Pará captured a ship from French Guiana at the orders of the Overseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino). They discovered that its crew had intended to engage in trade in that border region. Every move on both sides caused suspicion and redoubled vigilance.

Amid these disputes and fears, slaves continually escaped from Cayenne. In 1763, three black people were captured at the mouth of the Camarupi River, near the town of Monforte. Although the forest was vast and therefore a guaranteed refuge, escape routes were dangerous. When fleeing from Cayenne to Pará or vice versa, fugitives generally preferred to travel by sea or on the rivers that flowed through the region. Entering the steeply sloping forests was out of the question. There, they would easily starve or fall prey to wild animals, fevers, and the tracking dogs of the French. They built canoes and rafts to venture onto the waterways.

In 1765, word came from Amapá that some fugitives had crossed the Matapi River on that could be found in the grasslands beside the Uanará-Pecú River and by the lakes formed by the Arapecú River, where sure signs that the fugitives had been there were also discovered. The escapees’ boats


Map of Brazil showing region of slave escapes.
often sank, however. When sailing off of Cabo Norte, Manoel Antônio de Oliveira Pantoja learned that some "fugitive blacks" from Cayenne had been there, and he found the remnants of foundered boats. It was even said that, plagued by hunger and despair, some gave themselves up voluntarily. In fact, an Amerindian hunting at the source of a stream found four escaped slaves who were weakened by spending several days eating nothing but hearts of palm.

As the years went by, colonial disputes were far from resolved, and slave escapes continued. They were still accompanied by complaints from the French and the establishment of *mocambos* on the borders. It was not unusual for canoes from Cayenne to arrive in Grão-Pará, intent on capturing fugitives. The authorities also learned that blacks from Cayenne were to be found in the Maguari-Caviana point region. (It should be observed that the escape routes ran both ways. Although the French complained more loudly and continuously, the flow of escaped slaves from Grão-Pará to Cayenne was just as steady.) In 1752, a French escort ship that docked in Belém put the local authorities on high alert. They did not want any contraband whatsoever, although many soldiers were bartering goods to obtain "some thick kerchiefs and pieces of striped cloth they could hide in their fort." In 1759, they charged that French emissaries had entered the region. In 1773, they identified escaped slaves from Grão-Pará who were now in Cayenne. According to the Jesuit priest Laillot (1893), "a little over two years ago, seven blacks arrived here in Cayenne, after several battles and deaths, but they were poorly received," which meant here punished and imprisoned. The following year, slaves who had fled into French territory were returned to Macapá.

The entire region was involved in conflicts caused by colonial disputes. Slave escapes and the establishment of *mocambos* made the occupation drive more complex. In the search for support, alliances, and solidarity in that region there were no boundaries. This was also true for *quilombolas* (Maroons) and fugitives in the eastern regions of the Guianas, particularly colonial Grão-Pará. They looked to the other side of the border and saw

6. APEP, Anais II, documento 9, official communication dated 14/11/1752; Códice 7, official communication dated 26/04/1763; Códice 63, official communication dated 06/02/1793; Códice 61, official communication dated 11/10/1765; Códice 65, official communication dated 28/08/1765 and Códice 255, official communication dated 04/02/1789.

7. See also APEP, Códice 671, Letter from the viceroy to the governor, 20/01/1768; Códice 65, official communication dated 26/08/1765 and Códice 593, official communication dated 14/11/1773 and Códice 148, official communication dated 03/03/1774.
French settlers and peasants and Amerindian settlements and other groups of fugitives and deserters who, although not good friends, became occasional trading partners. In 1789, it was even feared that blacks might enter “the Maroni village that the French of Cayenne have established by force.”

Contacts between the quilombolas and the French and other social groups were a fact that severely frightened the colonial authorities of Grão-Pará.

Investigations unearthed the details of these colonial experiences. An interrogation conducted in Macapá in 1791 revealed how blacks on both sides of the border communicated with each other. Miguel, a slave owned by Antônio de Miranda, provided this information. According to his statement, when he was on his way back from “his master’s field” he came across José, the slave of the late João Pereira de Limos, who asked Miguel if he “wanted to see and talk to blacks who had run away.” José took Miguel to a corral, where they found Joaquim, the slave of Manoel do Nascimento. Miguel was then told that “their [the quilombolas’] signal is to suck in their lips,” as if whistling. They met several quilombolas who were suspicious because they did not know Miguel and threatened to “attack him with bows and arrows.”

The first contacts began, and the quilombolas wanted to know “how they [black slaves] were doing around here,” meaning the town of Macapá. Miguel also asked “how they were doing over there” in the mocambos in the Araguari region, as well as the borderlands and French territory. According to the quilombolas, “they were doing very well,” and had “large fields and they sold their produce to the French because they traded with them.” In the mocambo where they lived there was also a Jesuit priest sent by the French, and it was he who “governed them and they were very fortunate.” Some of the mocamo’s inhabitants were away at the time, because they “had gone to salt meat for the priest and others had shortly before finished making bricks for the French to build a fortress.” Also according to Miguel, the quilombolas “always went about armed with short swords” and their clothes were “dyed with Caapiranga.”

Because they were already fearful and suspicious, this detailed information struck terror in the authorities of Grão-Pará. The problem seemed to be not only how to contain the continual escapes, but also to keep a close watch on French spies and put up with their insults and slaveholders’ complaints. Mocambos near the border traded with French settlers on a regular basis. They also had their own economic base – salting meat, dying clothes, planting crops, herding cattle, and making the bricks used to build French forts.

These quilombolas also visited the town of Macapá during the “Christmas feast.” They came and established contacts with several slaves, but “they did not come to force the blacks” to escape; these “would only go of their own

8. APEP, Códice 609, official communication dated 20/06/1780.
free will." They revealed "that the path they take to the town was no longer along the canebrake" but "down where Manoel Antônio de Miranda has the corral for love of the whites who went after them." Furthermore, they had a "small canoe on the Araguari River," because when they "came and went" they crossed the river "in it from one side to the other." As for contacts with French settlers: "their assistance to get there was the Araguari, but all the escaped slaves were from here." In other words, they were well aware that their settlements on the banks of the Araguari were in Portuguese territory but "to work in French lands they crossed the saltwater river to go there and they went in the morning and came back at night" and "when they came back they left half of their supplies on the way for when they went back." This mocambo was inhabited by "all the blacks who have fled from this town."9

The details in this information are revealing. They point to escape strategies and routes, and even to the possibility that these quilombolas might seek autonomy and protection. The quilombolas lived near the Portuguese border, but traded, worked, and had a variety of relationships with the French on the other side. The success of this strategy was assured by their crossing the border on a daily basis, which appears to have been a difficult task. The quilombolas traveled across rivers and through forests, carrying enough provisions for long journeys, among other things. These quilombolas were actually on the border of freedom, and they knew it. The authorities were alarmed.

Two years later, the judge of the Macapá Council went so far as to propose that if these quilombolas were captured, they should not be released and returned to their masters immediately. He suggested that they be sent directly from jail to "their owners [so that they can] sell them, which they must do in different countries whence they will never again appear in these parts because on the contrary they will pose the threat of another great disaster, for each of these slaves is a guide to these continents."10

It is worth mentioning the experiences of other Maroon societies on colonial borders in the Caribbean. Those of Le Maniel in Saint Domingue, which struggled for nearly a century against French and Spanish settlers in the 1800s, benefited from their location for several reasons. On numerous occasions, the Spanish authorities paid little heed to the comings and goings of fugitives, most of whom were slaves from the French side of the island. The hunt for these Maroon groups involved countless interests, including those of the settlers and the Spanish and French authorities in that border region. Farm workers and plantation owners on the Spanish side traded with

9. APEP, Códice 259, record of the interrogation of "preto Miguel," a slave of Antônio de Miranda, 05/09/1791.
10. APEP, Códice 259, official communication from the city council of Macapá, 21/02/1793.
escaped slaves and informed them of the movements of French troops sent to find them (see Debbash 1979:144-45).

Of the many mocambos established near the border with French Guiana, those in the Araguari area were without a doubt the most populous and stable. These mocambos were quite old, because by 1762 it was already said that there was a “large sum” of fugitives there, both from the nearby settlements and outlying areas, and it was also warned that they were “well supplied with arms.” In 1785, the governor of Grão-Pará declared that military expeditions were needed to capture or disperse escaped slaves and mocambos in several areas along the Araguari River. In 1788, there was another warning about the mocambos in that region. Later, information would arrive that, at the headwaters of that river, mocambos enjoyed a “safe asylum,” and that with great “effrontery,” groups of fugitives actually approached the town of Macapá with a view to “inciting the slaves of residents to follow them.”

More detailed descriptions of the mocambos on the Araguari appear in investigations undertaken in 1792. It all began with the usual complaints about escaped slaves. The residents of Macapá were so nervous about the frequency of these escapes that they did not punish slaves “for their customary rebellions” for fear that they would flee en masse. At the beginning of that year, three blacks were captured in the Baixa Grande area, not far from the town of Macapá, and one of them had escaped before. They were brought in by residents and their slaves. The captured fugitives confessed that they had intended to join several other slaves who had escaped from Macapá and go “to the mocambo of their relatives.” They were getting ready to set out, hiding in nearby farms where they intended to “make all the [manioc] flour they judged would be sufficient for their journey.”

Arrests and interrogations such as these helped expand investigations of the mocambos on the Araguari. The strategies adopted included trying to simulate a slave’s escape in order to gather more detailed information about the mocambos’ whereabouts. The military commander, Manoel Joaquim de Abreu, contrived this idea. To carry it out, Manoel, the black slave of a resident named Pedro Corrêa, was contacted so that he “could question the slave of Antônio Trez Orta, by the name of João, about all the circumstances of the mocambo and its distances [from the town].” The authorities were well aware of the communications network among the slaves and quilombolas in that region, although they were unable to destroy it. Whereas Manoel was considered in Macapá to be one of the few slaves “worthy of trust and friendly to whites and good Portuguese,” João was an important link, “being the only one who escaped from said mocambo over two years ago, but

11. APEP, Códice 25, official communication dated 13/03/1762 and Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (hereafter AHI), Documentação Rio Branco, Códice 340-1-3, official communication dated 08/07/1782.
always [being] in contact with the fugitives" when they returned to the town to trade, attack, and kidnap.  

So as not to cause any misgivings, the commander reminded Manoel that he should tell João that he was planning his own escape and therefore wanted to "get information for the best success" of his flight. This strategy was partially successful. In addition to providing an escape route for Manoel, João gave a thorough socioeconomic description of an Araguari mocambo. To start with, he revealed that the distance between the town of Macapá and the Araguari River could be traveled in four days "of good walking." After crossing the river, it would be another two-day journey to the mocambo. The mocambeiros were unaware of "any path by sea," as "they never exposed themselves to this because it was very far and the land routes facilitated the brevity of the journey" from the Araguari to Macapá.

The mocambo was well protected. First, there was a topographic barrier, an area surrounded by rivers and waterfalls that obstructed the approach of punitive expeditions and facilitated sudden retreats. It was located at the ford on the Araguari River "above the fourth waterfall" at the confluence of two brooks. That is where the artificial and natural defense systems came together. Although they did not build stockades or trenches – commonly found in many colonial Brazilian quilombos – they did dig pits and place "thorns about their dwellings" to prevent military expeditions of re-enslavers from approaching. They also had weapons: bows, arrows, knives and "some long jardineiras [sic] shaped like short swords." With regard to the demographic structure of that mocambo, João told Manoel that it was probably made up of about one hundred people at the time, including men, women and children, because when "he came away or escaped here from those companions, there would have been nearly forty persons." As for the houses, they were made from straw. In economic terms, the farms "only" produced manioc flour, maize, and rice, "being that some of these in distance were over a league and others next to their dwelling." They used "this method so that they could move far away as soon as they were attacked by whites, using this precaution to have what they [can] turn to."

Protective and defensive strategies were combined with socioeconomic strategies. The community was constantly on the alert for anti-mocambo troops. By working several farms located near and far from the mocambo, the quilombolas sought to have enough food so that they could hide out in the forest for long periods if there was an attack. They knew that they authorities were cruel and intolerant about their economies. But the quilombolas did not isolate themselves. Instead, some traveled to settlements and even the

12. APEP, Códice 457, official communication dated 27/02/1792.
13. APEP, Códice 457, official communication dated 27/02/1792.
town of Macabá, making contacts and engaging in trade. There was an entire social structure surrounding the contacts outside the mocambo. Also according to João, the older mocambiros did not allow fugitives who had recently joined the Araguari mocambo to return to the town of Macapá. They could only do so after spending a year at the mocambo and only then with the permission of the “overseer” and in “the company of his trustees.” Mocambiros wanted to ensure that these escapees, more recent residents, were not being used as “courriers” to discover the location of the mocambos or camps. All indications are that despite all Manoel’s talk about his supposed escape plans, João warned him “I advise you not to flee, because they will soon kill you for they know you are friendly with the whites and you are of their nation.” And Manoel, must have answered in a “fictitious statement” that “I always run away. If I do well, I stay, when I do not, I return and tell my [master] I was lost since the day I went hunting.”

Considering this information, we can analyze the political strategies adopted to prevent temporary residents of mocambos from giving away their location to the authorities when captured. The mocambo’s overseer only allowed people who had lived there for over a year to frequent the town of Macapá. Temporary residents – those who lived in the mocambos for a time and then chose to leave those communities and even return to their masters – were viewed with mistrust. They could become allies with and establish contacts for the more permanent quilombolas, but not infrequently they turned into traitors and enemies, as they could serve as guides for anti-mocambo troops. In this settlement on the Araguari, we can see the leadership powers of the overseer, who banned and persecuted anyone who fell under suspicion. João, who was supplying all this information to the authorities, was well aware of the power of that leader and his persecutions. During the time he lived in the mocambo, he saw that “the work of hunting and [farming] fields is ordered by the overseer, and as soon as they return from the hunt or the effects of the fields they take it to the same, who shares the [results] with everyone.” In his “revelations,” João also stated that he felt “a very great anger” toward the mocambiros of Araguari, because “they also wanted to kill him.” Furthermore, when they went to the town of Macapá, the mocambiros invited him to return to the mocambo, but he realized that the invitation was a trap and the “overseer’s recommendation to catch him here.” For that reason, he agreed that if he led an expedition against the mocambo, all its inhabitants would be captured, because he knew the locations of their dwellings well, even if the mocambiros had moved them.

14. APEP, Códice 457, official communication dated 27/02/1792.
15. APEP, Códice 457, official communication dated 27/02/1792.
There was probably more than one *quilombo* on the Aragüari. A number of Maroon groups must have spread out and established countless small *mocambos*. One of them – possibly the community where João lived for a time – was considerably large, with dozens of residents. But size was not the only difference between these *mocambos*. There could also be ethnic differences, some being older and others more recent, some where only Africans lived, and even these in specific ethnic groups, which was the case with the aforementioned *mocamo*, which was referred to as being of the “Benguela nation,” while there was another “small *mocambo de mendigar*” of those who had “absented themselves from the said Benguelas for many years.”

The Aragüari *mocambos* continued to worry the authorities in Amapá. In the last decades of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese officials received numerous complaints: between the headwaters of the Aragüari River and on many other rivers in that border region, “there were settlements of our blacks who escaped over twenty years ago.” They were eventually attacked by soldiers but managed to escape because the French warned them of the attack. There was also a large number of escaped Amerindians and military deserters, many of whom were in constant touch with the *quilombolas*. It was said that there were “settlements” of escaped Amerindians, such as the one on the Anani and Casipure rivers that had been there for twenty or thirty years or even longer. And on the Uranary River there were “scattered Indians and blacks [who were] former slaves in several thatched huts and ranches.”

Near the turn of the nineteenth century, the matter of *mocambos* and the movements of escaped slaves had become so serious that it was suggested that groups of Amerindians might be used against the *quilombolas*. The idea was to “attract a body of six hundred to seven hundred Indians of the Mundurukus nation,” considered the “most warlike” in the Grão-Pará captaincy, with whom – after many wars – the Portuguese colonial authorities had recently managed to “conquer peace.” In terms of strategies and resources, it was understood that “they would be the most appropriate people to make war with the blacks in the forests and marshes.”

A fundamental question brought forward when analyzing such narratives about the *quilombos* – usually colonial reports about punitive expeditions or preparations for them – is how the *quilombolas* themselves forged their own views of life, their experiences and established their communities. These documents can help reconstruct “events” on the basis of specific “memories”

16. APEP, Códice 457, official communication dated 27/02/1792.
17. Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro (hereafter BNRS), Códice 5, 1, 2 n. 2 (1791).
18. Primeira Comissão Demarcadora de Limites (hereafter PCDL), Códice A-44, correspondence between the governors and Portugal (Regency of John VI, 1797-99), official communication dated 29/03/1798.
with their own itineraries and intentions. But how did the quilombolas view their own communities? How did they define time, change, and alliances – including the small quilombos that were in constant touch with other social sectors? The above narratives do little to disclose “multivocal” sources and methods for gathering information about the quilombos for the purposes of ethnographic history. Furthermore, the border region, the logistics of occupation, and, essentially, local significations, redefined the quilombos in those areas.

In an updated interpretation of postemancipation slavery and its legacy in Brazilian historiography, the subject of quilombos (particularly former Maroon communities) has emerged as an important instrument for struggle, as well as a political tool. There has also been an attempt to build up the symbols of an ethnic identity around analyses of these quilombos (Gomes 1994). More recent studies of slavery carried out in various parts of the Americas have sought to reexamine slave resistance from different perspectives on the basis of extensive empirical studies, as well as engaging in dialogue with other theoretical and methodological inputs. The subject of Maroon societies has always attracted interest. It now seems to have been revived by countless new studies. Particularly in Brazil, the most recent original studies of the subject include ethnohistorical analyses of former quilombos – begun long ago for other countries – which are now taking an interesting shape.

Among the main perspectives analyzed in these new studies, there are those that view quilombola groups through their interactions with the worlds of slavery. Through the quilombolas' complex experiences, we can see beyond their resistance struggle and the various aspects of their social, economic, and cultural lives to the transformations taking place in master-slave relations. Rather than being isolated, the worlds the quilombolas created affected and altered the world of those who were still enslaved and of the entire surrounding society. Recent analyses have brought to light multifarious aspects of black resistance during slavery. On several occasions, slaves managed to escape, established quilombos, organized mocambos, staged uprisings, protests, and mutinies, and in this sense lived through the multiple experiences of day-to-day resistance. More than that,

21. There are numerous studies of former quilombos in Brazil, particularly in the Amazon. See Acevedo Marin & Castro 1991; Funes 1995; O'Dwyer 1995; Almeida 1996. For recent critical commentary and studies of former quilombos in Brazil, see Price 2000. I also discuss the “political” uses of the concept of quilombos by historiography and social movements in Gomes 1996.
whenever possible they re-elaborated, reorganized, and transformed the world in which they lived.

In the course of these historic processes, they experienced extreme situations involving struggles, conflicts, accommodations, clashes, and confrontations. This was the quotidian of slavery, which enable us to perceive how the significations of freedom were continuously recreated. More than just “reacting” to slavery, slaves were the agents of quilombos and many other forms of slave protest – explicit and otherwise (Gomes & Reis 1996; 2002:16-19).

**TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS**

Borderlands – plantations – can be viewed as transnational spaces. If this is true for structure (and only economic structures are usually emphasized), it should also be valid for human agency (Mintz 1988:117-33). On colonial borders in the latter decades of the eighteenth century – more precisely in the Guianas (the borderlands of Grão-Pará Captaincy, Portuguese America, and French Guiana), the focus of vying Portuguese and French colonial interests – rumors, the circulation of ideas and fears, took on a different magnitude. These regions were increasingly teeming with mocambos and fugitives.22

There was also great concern among the colonial authorities because as these were border regions, the authorities feared that the slaves could escape from Portuguese territory. In 1795, Governor Souza Coutinho admitted that fugitives were easily traveling to the grasslands of Macapá and that it was “essential to prevent” such “communications.” He deliberated the need to have boats available and keep a close watch on border posts, as the number of escapes was on the rise, all the more so “now that in Cayenne [the escaped slaves] will obtain freedom.”23

In the late eighteenth century, the colonial authorities were extremely nervous. They feared that slaves – particularly those in Portuguese territory – would come into contact with “dangerous ideas” about revolution arriving from Europe and the Caribbean through Cayenne. The main examples of such “contagion” were the French and Haitian revolutions and the Maroon wars in Jamaica and the Guianas. The Portuguese colonial authorities were mainly concerned about the borderlands because this is where slaves would first hear about and be nearest news of abolition in the French colonies, and

22. Salles (1971) continues to be the classic study on black slavery in the Amazon region. See also Vergolino-Henry 1990.
23. APEP, Códice 272, official communication dated 20/11/1795 and Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro, Coleção Manoel Barata, official communication dated 10/01/1795.
later Venezuela, which came about as a result of the independence struggles in Spanish America. Portuguese officials said that they were apprehensive about what "the French have done on their islands with regard to slaves." Two years later, the governor of Grão-Pará gave the viceroy a detailed account of the panic that reigned in the borderlands. Even so, he gave little credence to fears of a French invasion of Portuguese territory. In his assessment, the slave insurrections in the neighboring colony were a factor in their favor. As a precaution, however, he kept a close watch on ships from Cayenne and navigation on the Casipure River.

How did the settlers, soldiers, Amerindians, blacks, slaves, and freedmen and -women view this state of affairs? They reconstructed episodes, contexts, and fears with their own line of reasoning and expectations. Day-to-day affairs and their interpretations were essentially politicized. Amid colonial disputes between Britain and the Netherlands in the Guianas, it was said, for example, that some Amerindians were "influenced by mulattos from Demerara," seemingly "happy to obey the present British government in the colony." Trans- and inter-Atlantic contacts and ideas that circulated in that context were shared by blacks and Amerindians. For example, entire indigenous communities traveled across Spanish territory in search of refuge: On several occasions, foreign ships – particularly French vessels – sailed into Portuguese territory to hunt and recapture fugitives. Portuguese authorities and plantation owners also charged that their slaves found refuge in Cayenne, where French merchants and authorities gave them protection. In 1798, the arrival of two ships from Cayenne in the city of Belém in Grão-Pará that had the aim of "recruiting" blacks who had fled there was accompanied by tremendous tension. The tension was caused by the possibility of revolutionary propaganda and rumors of insurrection. It was also said that there were suspicions of a French presence near the Oyapock. It was feared that, like others passing through the region, the French could incite unrest among slaves in Portuguese territory. Investigations were immediately ordered by the authorities to determine whether "they brought books, manuscripts or pamphlets" (Gomes 1996:258). The governor of Grão-Pará received secret orders expressly recommending "great vigilance of all those individuals who through word or conciliaabula and especially through demonstrations [spread] the false and disastrous principles that have infested all of Europe" (Baena 1969:232).

25. IHGB, Códice Arq. 1, 1, 4, Conselho Ultramarino, volume 4, fl. 184, 184v e 185, official communication dated 03/04/1796.
At that time, it was believed that escapes, although constant and becoming collective, and *mocambos* on international borders could be controlled. It would be worse to have uprisings led by foreign emissaries involving Amerindians and even poor whites. The state of alert had reached its height. In 1791, when the Portuguese authorities observed the establishment of a small fort with some artillery and signs that another was being built, they recalled that the French objective was to establish "communications" on several rivers that reached as far as the Amazon and connecting trade routes with French Guiana. The worry for the Portuguese authorities was not only disputes about "royal dominions," control over trade, and the elimination of contraband, but also the borderlands which "were a comfortable haven for deserters and the safest *mocambo* in which the slaves could hide" and the danger that "could also be introduced in that region by the malignant, vertiginous spirit that has unfortunately consumed the [French]."²⁶ In that context, fugitives, *mocambos*, and the possibility of the circulation of ideas at international borders were viewed as an explosive mixture. One basic concern was determining "whether in effect there had been introduced or anyone had introduced in any way pernicious maxims and abominable doctrines that might have [dire] consequences, that had to be stopped in time." There was less concern about a possible attack by the Maroons and more that "more opportune and effective measures [be taken] to safeguard [against] and prevent any and all communications between these inhabitants and those of that unquiet nation."²⁷

This was a surprise that the colonial authorities, slaveholders, military, and sparse population of settlers were keen to avoid. Events that might have gone unnoticed could become a source of widespread hysteria. In March 1795, attentions focused on a "gathering" of slaves and freedmen in the heart of Grão-Pará Captaincy. The meeting place was the home of a black freedman in Belém. Although the investigations produced little information, it was a reminder that this was serious business, as "slaves did not hear with indifference [news] of what was occurring in the French colonies," and therefore "several of their own voices went out to incite unrest." One of the most important facts about that "gathering" was that its members included freedmen and slaves who were "many of the best known in the city for their cleverness" (Gomes 1995-96:40-55).

Fugitives fled through brushlands, waterfalls, and rainforests, over mountains, rivers, and streams. They tried to escape their pursuers by

²⁶. AHI, Documentação Rio Branco, Códice 340-1-3, official communication dated 01/03/1791.
²⁷. AHI, Documentação, Rio Branco, Códice 340-1-3, official communication dated 01/03/1791.
fleeing into other colonies or establishing *mocambos* near the border. They relied on the help of plantation slaves, innkeepers, Amerindians, herdsmen, merchants, peasants, black slaves, and others. In this context, in these parts of the colonial Guianas, whether they were escaped slaves, freedmen or free, blacks (in addition to Amerindians and other social sectors) created a space of contact and cooperation. With varying expectations, they established a setting of transnational experiences. Their inhabitants were a mixture of fugitives, plantation slaves, and deserting soldiers from both sides of the border – French Guiana and Grão-Pará Captaincy. They bore ideas that included perceptions that redefined or reinvented several different significations about the ideas of freedom. They were not indifferent to or dumbfounded by political decisions that could be beneficial to them or the movements of occupation/colonization; nor were they isolated in the vast Amazon forest. Through this constant flux and reflux, they achieved their own protection and independence.

The waters on this Atlantic border were definitely turbulent. Underestimating the perceptions slaves might have of this situation (and others) was yet another option for the version of history written by settlers and colonizers. At the same time that they said slaves might be “infected” by “ideas of liberty” from Europe through contacts with foreign colonies, the authorities feared that they might organize a widespread revolt. The military commander of Araguari, near Macapá, argued this in 1794: “In regard to the manumission of slaves in Cayenne, I have already spread the word that the French are not doing the same for the blacks.” Thus, “to prevent [slaves] from fleeing and having them in this manner more secure for work in the fields, or any other tasks for which they might be used, and in this manner, or with this irony, I keep [them in] doubt about said liberty” (quoted in Vergolino-Henry 1990:109-10). Herein lie possibilities for focusing not only on how the authorities perceived contacts and the circulation of ideas between slaves from different colonies, but also the political use of those ideas, although in an inverted manner. We can reflect on how slaves, fugitives, and deserters simultaneously perceived the new ideas, spread them, and acted as political agents of the slaveholders’ and authorities’ fears of these events in several different contexts. It is a fact that slaves did not necessarily need a set of so-called revolutionary ideas from Europe or the proclamations of foreign abolitionists to undertake their own protest strategies. On the contrary, they were capable of perceiving, assessing, and reconfiguring these times with their own significations.

In the last few years of the eighteenth century, the colonial Portuguese authorities judged that the movement of escapes to the borders – precisely as a result of the provisional abolition of slavery in the colonies and the possibility of connections with libertarian propaganda from Haiti – had taken on different meanings. Several assessments were made in a lengthy
official communication written in 1798. First, "the danger, if not the greatest at least the easier and more readily realized, is this Captaincy finding itself in a short time without slaves, and also without Indians, as they successively pass into the lands of Cayenne." A detailed evaluation would be made of the reasons for slave escapes from Portuguese to French territory and the possibilities of effecting changes.28

Escape movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are described as follows:

in the time when blacks suffered in Cayenne and in the other French colonies slavery was incomparably harsher, and more inhumane than generally [practiced by] the Portuguese; in the time when those who fled from this colony to that were sent to the galleys there or given to private parties who exploited their labor until they were asked for or delivered; in the time when the French, in view of the fact that they have always wanted to extend their dominions at the cost of Your Majesty's [slaves] did not have what they presently have and constantly proceed to subvert all governments and following their ruin establish their own, not only by force of arms but also through infernal machinations. In this same time without their cooperation, at least not officially, so many slaves fled from us that we lost those of whom only a small number could be taken, when attacking the mocambos where they dwell. During this time many Indians fled from us and formed settlements that were destroyed but only a few were taken also, not only because many fled on that occasion, but because to gain more security they had entered the lands of Cayenne.29

In the latter decades of the eighteenth century, escape movements sparked fears of slave rebellions:

Now that the blacks are free in that colony and live there more or less as freely as in the lands where they were born. Now that the cooperation of the French cannot fail to be as or more active than it has been in all parts where they have entered willy-nilly, and they could count on blacks and Indians entering into such easy, constant communication, it is inevitable ... and one cannot find a slave who runs away from his master and seeks out a mocambo to live there in peace. All those who seek that life of freedom do not subsist on ought but theft, and take their effrontery to the point of entering not only the farms and settlements but even this city [Macapá] and lure companions [to join them] and take them by force when they do not find them willing, especially women.30

28. PCDL, Códice A-45, correspondence between governors and Portugal/Regência de D. João VI – 1797-99, official communication dated 03/02/1798.
29. PCDL, Códice A-45, correspondence between governors and Portugal/Regência de D. João VI – 1797-99, official communication dated 03/02/1798.
30. PCDL, Códice A-45, correspondence between governors and Portugal/Regência de D. João VI – 1797-99, official communication dated 03/02/1798.
Even when considering the "intense internal war such people can wage against us," quilombos and mocambos in the borderlands were now viewed as a lesser evil – or at least one that could be more effectively controlled – compared with the possibility of sedition and the spread of "revolutionary" propaganda among slaves in Belém.

Whether coincidentally or not, escapes, the movement of fugitives and the establishment of mocambos in the late eighteenth century grew in the eastern borderlands of the Amazon, more than in any other region during the colonial period. The region had other serious problems as well, including militarization and fears of armed foreign intervention (Acevedo Marin 1992). In 1798, a time of great tension in the Amazon on the border with French Guiana, the Grão-Pará authorities advised residents to arm “their slaves and defend themselves from enemy invasions of their fazendas, and even on the rivers, incorporating the armed force that exists in them for the same purpose.” The idea was to “persuade” slaves to “collaborate in the defense of their property and the State with efficacy, zeal and courage, just as they have collaborated in other parts of Brazil to drive out the Dutch and French.” As for French settlers, every precaution should be taken “because you know that the maxims they have used have only served to disperse their strengths, make easy conquests and steal all they wish, for even the slaves that they deceive with the idea of liberty, the same [settlers] now have them in their fazendas under bayonets and a tyrannical regime” (quoted in Vergolino-Henry 1990:228).

Furthermore, an international analysis permits us to discuss the transnational movements of experiences in colonial and postcolonial slave societies. Certainly, the authorities were terrified and, fearing a foreign invasion, sought allies among their own slaves. It was necessary to transform “internal enemies” into friends in order to fight “external enemies.” However, they were unaware or gave little consideration to the political meanings that slaves could give to their actions at that time. For the Portuguese authorities, black slaves’ participation and collaboration with foreign invaders were the result of “seduction” and contact with “dangerous ideas.” For the slaves, however, it might have been different. They could choose to fight alongside their masters, bargaining for some compensation for their loyalty while continuing to be slaves. Another option was escaping and joining the ranks of the enemy forces. They could fight with or against their former masters. However, they would continue to be slaves, despite some false promises. For some slaves, escaping en masse and establishing quilombos would guarantee their independence – at least temporarily. Weakened by constant warfare, colonial armies could do little against Maroon societies hidden deep in the forest.

Slaves in several colonial areas probably had other options. They could closely and expectantly watch the outcomes of conflicts, arguments, debates,
etc., in the mother countries to see whether they would benefit them or not. In international borderlands, these expectations intensified. The decision to escape to this or that place or to join – or not to join – a colonial army, might offer a shortcut to freedom.

What the authorities viewed as “seduction” could be a management of identities (not necessarily racial) involving blacks, both freedmen and slaves. In the late eighteenth century, the black population in several slave regions was substantial. And it should also be observed that in some regions, slaveholders were freedmen and pardos (brown-skinned). On both sides of the borders, in the heart of the forest in Portuguese and French territory, quilombolas, persistent fugitives, slaves housed in senzalas (slave-quarters) and working on plantations, as well as Amerindians and military deserters could be making their own different political evaluations and possibly – but not necessarily – including news of the international scene in their considerations. In French Guiana, where slavery was briefly abolished, the slaves became restive. There was also the issue of marronage and rebellions. Baena (1846:228) stresses that “some Frenchmen owning good rural establishments” in French Guiana sought refuge in Grão-Pará and asked permission to emigrate there, because they were “fearful of the slaves, who declared themselves equal to whites.”

Emissaries and spies who sent reports to the Portuguese authorities stressed that, “after being freed the blacks threaten Indians with slavery.” Furthermore, “In the streets of Cayenne one hears nothing but ‘Convetion [sic], Nation, Citayan [sic] et Egalité,’ and this is from the mouths of these same blacks, who are very boastful, although there is no sign that any black has been made an Officer.”

By the latter years of the eighteenth century, Cayenne had lost control of its slave population. News arrived that farmers and authorities hoped for “help from the troops to conquer the blacks once and for all and put them to the work that they more or less continued to reject.” It was recalled that “they raised in São Domingos [Saint Domingue] the bloody voice of Liberty for the slaves, a voice that decided amidst the most horrific torments, the fate of almost all the white inhabitants who resided on that island.”

A Portuguese priest in Belém soon caused fears and generated a great deal of correspondence among the police authorities in 1814. Why? He had recently arrived from Barbados and had been to Haiti and England. And it

31. Regarding the local importance of the French and Haitian revolutions in French Guiana, see Bénat 1997. Regarding the economic structure of slave societies, marronage and slave resistance in French Guiana, see Cardoso 1999:398-412.
32. AHI, ministry documents before 1822, Pasta 9, Lata 172 and maço 2.
33. PCDL, Códice A-44, 31/01/1798 and Códice A-45, 03/02/1799.
34. BNRJ, Códice I-32,18, 3 (1809).
was discovered that "in conversation with some blacks who served him, he greatly deplored their fate, saying that all are children of God and there was no reason for them to be the slaves of whites, showing them the example of São Domingos." The winds of fear that blew in all directions had brought the boomerangs of Haiti to Grão-Pará.

There was tremendous anxiety about contacts in the borderlands. Ears were attuned to Europe and eyes focused on the Americas. Regarding such fear, as the governors of Grão-Pará reported to the Crown,

It should not be measured by that which has been seen in several European countries, because in these [parts] many and varied circumstances are added that make it much greater. First, in Europe, it was necessary for the government of France to send out its emissaries, these had to learn the language of the peoples whose spirits they should prepare and even alienate from subjection - [from] the laws of their supreme rulers and always exposed to the great risk of being recognized and taken by surprise.36

In their view, the problem resided in how such ideas were perceived in that geopolitical context. Amerindians and Africans with different expectations were continually crossing the borders:

Here, on the other hand, blacks from different nations that we have as slaves are the parents, children and siblings of those who live free in the neighboring colony. The Indians in our settlements, although of different nations, almost all have relatives in Cayenne, almost all of them speak the general language that is also spoken not only by those who fled from them but those who have always lived there. Some are without a doubt better emissaries than the best-instructed Frenchmen, and as many of our fugitives know all communications, being that many facilitate escapes on the many rivers, brooks and islands in this country, and the settlements are very remote, and scattered, and the same fazendas, when we least expect it we can have in our house a large body of our [slaves] armed against us, and when we await a great remedy the great evil of seeing ourselves free of slaves and Indians, we can [instead] find ourselves in combat with them.37

Amid all the panic and hysteria that predominated in the authorities' discourse, we can make out transnational ethnic scenarios in the borderlands involving indigenous groups, mocambos, and other social groups.

35. Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro (hereafter ANRJ), Coleção Caiena, Códice 1192 (1792-1816).
36. PCDL, Códice A-45, correspondence between governors and Portugal/Regência de D. João VI – 1797-99, official communication dated 03/02/1798.
37. PCDL, Códice A-45, correspondence between governors and Portugal/Regência de D. João VI – 1797-99, official communication dated 03/02/1798.
Communities and “nations” and their connections were reinvented. The borders had been obliterated.\(^{38}\)

Regarding the contexts of the circulation of ideas, connections, and experiences in the borderlands, particularly on the French Guianese border, it is interesting to note that the chronology of the Haitian Revolution, the declaration of the independent state of Haiti, and the spate of uprisings, political debates, and other slave rebellions in the Americas could have specific repercussions in different colonial regions. We can imagine the “African-American boomerangs” proposed by Peter Linebaugh (Linebaugh & Marcus 1990), and Julius Scott’s “common winds” converging in the borderlands of part of the colonial Amazon, and crossing other borders in the Atlantic world.\(^{39}\) In this case, we could follow the paths of ideas, fears, and these agents’ historical connections and experiences. Other questions could be posed, particularly in a border region where transnational spaces were formed, as was the case with the colonial Amazon. Escaped slaves – some of whom established mocambos – could have taken ideas and expectations about the Haitian Revolution and its impacts to the Amazon via French Guiana, giving them new dimensions.

As a result of the European wars fought by France, Britain, Portugal, and Spain at the turn of the century, Portugal eventually invaded and occupied Cayenne in 1809. Although their routes and itineraries changed, the fears in that region would still persist. When Cayenne fell in June 1809, one of the orders its new rulers received was: “to ensure that all rebels leave the colony whose future conduct might give rise to concerns about future vicissitudes to which the establishment might be subjected.” With regard to the maintenance of Cayenne’s economic system, the Portuguese authorities stated, “the freedom of blacks was highly prejudicial to Cayenne.” As for controlling the black population, they alerted, “above all you shall zealously [establish] the Police system, which you must establish in the Colony, not only to ensure its internal tranquility and the subordination of the blacks but most essentially to prevent all correspondence between the inhabitants and the French government.”\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\) In regard to Benedict Anderson and other authors, please note the reflections suggested in Matory 1999. See also Mintz 1988.

\(^{39}\) See also Linebaugh and a critical response from Sweeny (1988:205-19; 221-31) and Scott (1986:118-19).

\(^{40}\) BNRJ, Códice 7, 4, 82, official communications from the governors of the Pará and Rio Negro captaincies ... conquest of Cayenne ... 1805-19, official communications dated 24/03/1806 and 10/06/1809 and Códice I - 28, 28, 15, “Cópia da resposta do Bispo do Pará sobre a divisão dos bens da Conquista de Caïena de que deve servir de prova incontestável de asserção referida na Pastoral” 19/08/1811.
It is interesting to note that both the French and the Portuguese used blacks as soldiers. In fact, the French even used blacks to put down slave rebellions, which also took place in other parts of Brazil. The idea of “arming black against black slaves” also heightened the fears of the Portuguese and French for different reasons. While the Portuguese were afraid of setting a “bad example” for their slaves, the French feared the outcome of such a measure: that these “armed blacks” would return to their status as slaves. Being constantly informed – by their spies – of events in Cayenne, the Portuguese authorities in 1795 learned that “battalions of blacks” were being formed in French Guiana to “put blacks into subjection,” which they found “difficult to believe, given that it goes against reason to arm blacks to subjugate blacks.” In the struggles to occupy Cayenne in 1809, the French sent black slaves to the front lines, while the Portuguese armed Amerindians from their aldeamentos.

It is also known that some French slaves deserted and fought alongside the Portuguese. Once the city had been occupied, the authorities disarmed the blacks and Amerindians. They redoubled their vigilance over the slave population, as well as freedmen and -women and mulattos. The document officializing Cayenne’s surrender, signed in January 1809, contains orders that “all black slaves from one side and the other” should be “disarmed and sent back to their homes.” As for the “French blacks” admitted “into service during the war” or freed by the Portuguese government, they should be “ordered out of the colony so that they cannot in the future be an object of disturbance and discord.”

Several memoirists and historians who discuss the conflicts involving border disputes with France have stressed that fears of invasions and slave rebellions permeated the entire historic process from the early eighteenth century to the first decades of the nineteenth century. Despite the silence of diplomatic history, beyond the fears and rumors of insurrection, blacks and Amerindians, whether escaping, migrating, or forming mocambos, laid the groundwork for establishing those borders. Ideas and experiences circulated there. Fears were the vectors for the development, occupation,

41. ANRJ, Caixa 747, 1795.
42. Villages established to control and acculturate nomadic indigenous groups. Some were run by Jesuit missionaries.
43. BNRJ, Códice 7, 4, 83 (1811).
and colonization of those Amazonian borderlands. Costa e Sá (1895) put it this way: “It would be greater if the insurrection of black slaves spurred by the example of the Island of S. Domingos did not occasionally prevent the Governor of Cayenne from using his troops to invade Pará, obliging some of their masters to seek refuge there, and if reinforcements to be sent there from France had not been delayed.” In regard to the spread of ideas and connections, he recalled the “excitement” in Suriname, “the same blacks being disposed by previous insurrections, there being no time limit or foreign tongue that could impede a similar act for such instigations were totally unnecessary.” As for the situation in Cayenne, “in the United States, reports were printed in 1798, on the advice of farmers from those States, which have appeared translated into Portuguese,” and that “the French in the year 1802 on the occasion of their communications to execute the Peace Treaty the previous year” had “sought to instigate the spirit of revolt thus among the blacks and Indians of Pará” (see Lisboa 1895; Sá 1895:6, 34).

According to a study by Acevedo Marin, “revolutionary contagion” from France was viewed with equal dread in the Amazon. Such fears even led to the rapid militarization of border areas, in light of territorial disputes with French Guiana (Acevedo Marin 1992). Different readers could have interpreted these “ideas of liberty” in different ways. Slaves, whether Creole or African, free men, soldiers, officers from the mother country, Europeans, sailors, mulattos, Amerindians, or others could each have reinterpreted them differently. They were not unaware of all of these interests, nor of their ability to survive in the regions in which they had chosen to settle. Furthermore, the routes these ideas took could also vary. On the eastern borders of Grão-Pará, the quilombolas and fugitives may have been responsible for spreading them.

In Belém, there appeared Franciscan friar Luiz Zagallo in 1815, “an apostate and freemason, fanatic of the French Revolution, instructed in the city of Cayenne.” Before being driven out two years later, he was accused of “revolutionary and absolutely troublesome preaching,” which stirred up the slaves of Belém and Cametá, saying that “in the age of freedom” there was no reason for “men to be subjugated by others.” Slave uprisings and fears of rebellion would forcefully return in the 1820s with the ferment of debates about political emancipation. It was a subject frequently discussed in the local press. More than being mobilized, it was believed – at least the accusations were veering in this direction – that some political leaders, such as Felipe Patroni and later Father Batista Campos, were manipulating the slave and freed black population.44

44. Regarding Friar Zagallo, Patroni, and Batista Campos, see Salles (1971:240). Regarding the role of political propaganda, the press, confrontation, and radicalization vis-à-vis the military government of Grão-Pará in the early 1920s, see an excellent study by Coelho 1993, particularly page 177 and thereafter.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, during the popular uprising called the Cabanagem revolt, the borderlands presented an even greater danger because slaves had crossed over to the "Peruvian Republic." Previously, in 1815, the Marquis de Aguiar of Grão-Pará wrote a letter expressing his concerns about "the rebellious state in which the Spanish provinces bordering on this Captaincy still found themselves." The movements of Spaniards across the borders should be viewed tolerantly but with "caution." On the borders with what were initially Dutch possessions, particularly in the Rio Branco area, there was concern about the "articulation" of settlers and the British authorities and the "beginnings of philanthropy in the defense of the independent tribes" of Brazilian Indians. In 1846, it was feared that Venezuela might stir up Brazilian slaves with abolitionist ideas. In some contexts, slave uprisings in the Americas from the late eighteenth century were linked to revolutionary propaganda from Europe, slave rebellions in the Caribbean – particularly the Haitian Revolution – and the independence movements underway in Spanish America. In Grão-Pará, references to Haiti reappeared in police records in 1848, precisely during the period when slavery was permanently abolished in the French colonies. Slaves who escaped from Grão-Pará increasingly fled to Cayenne following that abolition. In the beginning of 1849, an official letter from the Imperial Legation in Paris warned the Grão-Pará authorities about the activities of "a mulatto born in São Domingos [Saint Domingue]." This mulatto identified himself as an Englishman who was an "emissary of the societies that are working to free the slaves" and "joining with other agents from the same associations set off with them to England and from there went on to Guyana with the intention of penetrating into Brazil." The Imperial Legation spoke of the need of preventing and the means that should be taken to "prevent contagion with the innovations [with which] the French Revolution has affrighted that nation which does so much to remove it from the Empire." For Grão-Pará, because the "consequences of such wiles" were well known, they stated in the strongest terms that every precaution should be taken when "some foreign agent should appear" wanting to "seduce slaves and move them to proceed [with] ... any means to attain their liberty," as well as the entry of freedmen and -women into the province. In those fearful times, the focus continued to be on the borders and the possible connections they afforded. Slaves left the province and foreign emissaries could enter. It was necessary to take "effective measures of prevention" on the border of Rio

45. ANRJ, Caixa 747, official communication dated 06/03/1815.
46. APEPA, Caixa 79, official communication dated 01/10/1841.
Branco and Demerara (British Guiana) in 1849 as well, due to an “uprising of blacks and mulattos.”

Throughout the nineteenth century, the movement of fugitives continued to increase and the mocambos multiplied, both in the outskirts of Belém and on the borders with French Guiana and Suriname. And in 1854, fear of insurrections launched a wave of repression against the quilombos in several parts of Grão-Pará. From Óbidos in the Lower Amazon, the local deputy demanded that measures be taken on that occasion, pointing to the weakness and inefficacy of the provincial police and predicting that so many escapes and fugitives could result in “the same thing that happened in Haiti.”

We know very little about what the slaves and even quilombolas really thought. Our views of them generally emerge from reports from planters and colonial officials who were trying to control and eliminate them. Rather than just seeking a view of the quilombolas’ world – particularly of those who moved about in the permeable borderlands – we should look to the multivocal sources for perceptions of flight and the constructed social space in the area disputed by colonial powers. Although we cannot know how slaves, fugitives, and quilombolas interpreted the world they created and the ideas that surrounded them, the authorities’ fears (and details and arguments) can show us how the fugitives assessed the most favorable junctures for escape, including foreign invasions and revolutions. They feared the “contagion of ideas” in social groups that were never isolated, meaning quilombos in the heart of the forest. Although we cannot be certain, and we lack systematic proof, the authorities’ correspondence reveals that the fugitives were well aware of what was going on in the borderlands, and in the case of the late eighteenth century, perceptions of events in Saint Domingue and the French Revolution were also significant. We could raise questions about possibilities. Different perceptions and varied expectations arose. The images and impact of Haiti were subjected to various interpretations in slave societies, and represented more than just a major slave revolt. In many cases, they were the agents of symbols of secret societies of freedpersons and literate black men. In several regions these images took on other significations in an immediately postcolonial context (see Gomes 2002). The impacts of and rumors about several Caribbean

47. APEPA, Caixa 79, official communications regarding the border question (1841-49), dated 21/02/1849.
island revolts could have reached the continent’s borderlands. What was at
stake were changing the perceptions, expectations, and policies of slaves and quilombolas, as well as those of the colonial sectors.49 In any event, the emphasis of images on Haiti and the associated fears expressed in the authorities’ correspondence – whether in borderlands or not – also points to the need to assess their significance for the formulation of policies on the control of slaves from a transatlantic perspective.

As for the fears and Atlantic connections in slaveholding Brazil, we must take care not to transform transient winds and breezes into gales of freedom.50 But we must also avoid running the risk of shutting the theoretical windows too quickly and seeing nothing at all. For cultural (and other) contexts, it is essential to retrieve the idea of “internationalism” when dealing with Atlantic dimensions and forms of exchange and the reciprocal nature of possible interactions. Fragmented narratives on the material means of this or that form of transmission and interconnection should not become obstacles. It is a good thing that historians are beginning to identify subjective forms of cooperation in which experiences and knowledge cross borders – not just oceans and forests – that are thereby altered and enriched. Antislavery and libertarian ideologies, including racism and antiracism, were born in the agitated waters of the Atlantic. In the preface to the Brazilian edition of The Black Atlantic (1993), Gilroy himself suggests: “International trade apart, the resistance to slavery also had significant translocal dimensions that historians cannot easily describe. As the song says, ‘Haiti is here,’ and we should recall that this marked the construction of Euro-modernity much more deeply than was previously recognized.”51

More recently, several historians have investigated the size and impact of the Haitian Revolution, the formation of Haiti and the Revolution’s impact on slave societies and the modern world as a whole.52 One great challenge has been to arrive at an articulated explanation of the directions and significations of “internal” and “external” influences. One of the most noteworthy studies produced in recent years is by Michel-Rolph Trouillot

49. For the context of Demerara in the Guyanas, see Viotti da Costa 1994.
50. For a discussion of the theoretical and methodological possibilities for dealing with “fears,” “rumors,” and “anxiety” in analyses of slave protests in Brazil, see Azevedo 1987; Cardoso 1988; Challhoub 1988; Gorender 1990; Gomes 1994; and Machado 1994.
52. Regarding more recent studies of Haiti, including reflections on historiography, see Fick 1990; critiques of historiography of the slave revolution in Haiti can be found in Geggus 1993. For a recent overview of Haiti’s impact on slave and colonial societies, see Geggus 2001.
He criticizes the idea that the Haitian Revolution was merely an offshoot of its French counterpart and suggests and points to new directions for analysis that take into account the intellectual output and the logic of its agents. He brilliantly argues how the idea that the Haitian episode was a "nonevent" was formed through power relationships, the silencing of the past, and the production of history in the West (Trouillot 1995:70-107).

Haitian propaganda spread throughout the Americas in the latter part of the eighteenth century and firmly advanced in the nineteenth century. The Haitian Revolution and the one in France had an impact on French colonies and neighboring regions. Ships arriving from Haiti with all-black Haitian crews caused apprehensions. As the experience of sedition made the rounds, authorities and farmers made a fearful evaluation of the possibility of an articulation of that experience and subversion in the context of the end of the eighteenth century (see Jancsó 1997:387-438). Local meanings would be redefined. News of the abolition of slavery in the British Caribbean (1832) and principally in the French colonies (1848) was published in the press, alarming Brazilian authorities. There were multiracial popular uprisings that encompassed several regions and contexts. Complex experiences (with a black and a white face that changed in a historic movement) were not only perceived and articulated but were transformed in terms of political significations. New studies should consider undertaking an in-depth analysis of the communities and cultures involved and the internal and external contexts that gave rise to slave protests.

Quilombolas in the Amazon and other parts of Brazil and the Guianas were not unaware of all these interests or of their chances of survival in the areas in which they chose to live. By reconstituting the historic process involving some people and the political directions inherent to the quilombolas’ actions and analyzing the forms of repression, agency, and conflicts involving some groups of escaped slaves, it is possible to take stock of their day-to-day ideas and actions. In contacts between groups of fugitives and the worlds of slavery, the former must not be seen as mere tools that could be used at the whim of authorities and farmers with commercial interests. On the contrary, Richard Price (1988-89) suggests that in several parts of the Americas where slavery still existed, numerous examples illustrate how some groups of fugitives expanded their strategies for struggle by forming “alliances of convenience” with plantation slaves, pirates, Amerindians, merchants, and white farm workers, and even established truces and peace treaties with farmers and colonial officials.

53. See Linebaugh 1983-84.
Thus, tensions and conflicts between the mother countries and their colonies, the weakening of colonial authority as a result of internal and external struggles, parliamentary debates about emancipation and other circumstances, even within the plantations, were perceived by slaves as favorable opportunities for open revolt or for forcing their masters to concede greater freedom within the bonds of slavery. And even escaped slaves who formed Maroon societies tried to force colonial armies to call a truce. Of course, in a correlation of forces, which were mostly unequal, the authorities and slaveholders not infrequently responded to the slaves’ attempts with violent repression (see Price 1979, 1988-89).

On the borders of the colonial Amazon, Maroon societies – supported by other figures from the worlds of slavery – were already “many-headed hydras” when they came into contact with ideas and what were essentially different historic experiences (Gomes 2001, 2002a; Gomes & Queiroz 2002b). Reflections on these quilombolas and their interactions with the rest of slave society – Amerindians and blacks – might take us in different directions. It is possible to discover more profoundly, among other things, that the worlds of the quilombos may not have been as distant from the slave quarters as they seem, even from those in other countries. More than that, by following these paths we can also piece together the traditions of freedom. It is a good thing that these pieces are not found exclusively among the dust, silverfish, and yellowing pages of official manuscripts stored in the archives. Part of this tradition may be stored to this day in the memories of indigenous and black ethnic groups in the Guianas. Furthermore, the histories of these communities – like many others – could be reconstructed on the basis of tales and images of the “early days” of flight, struggle, and resistance (see Price 1983, 1990).

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FLÁVIO GOMES
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Largo de São Francisco, número 1, Centro
Rio de Janeiro, RJ-Brazil
Cep. 20.000-0
<escravo@prolink.com.br>
In 1990 I published a photo and captioned it "Gaamá Djankusó (tribal chief, 1898-1932) wearing his ceremonial gorget and his "lôndô"" (Price 1990: 410), with the image credited to Morton Kahn's *Djuka* (1931: facing p. 106). The adjoining text, discussing the Saramaka chief's ceremonial uniform, explains that

> Before its general shape was altered during the twentieth century, the gaamá's cocked hat was called by Saramakas "lôndô," the more usual meaning of which is "cunt," because the shape of its orifice resembles the female genitalia. Tebini described to me how Gaamá Djankusó (who died in 1932) proudly told him that Queen Wilhelmina herself had sent him his, and he noted that, "like a woman's private parts, it's good forever." (Price 1990:411)
At the time, this was the only photo-portrait known to me of this important Saramaka leader.¹

Several years later, Ben Scholtens and colleagues (1992:32) published a book containing two photos purporting to be Djankusó. One was the photo from Kahn’s book, the other – captioned “Saramaka dignitaries on visit in Paramaribo” – can be dated to sometime between 1928 and 1931.² Examined closely, however, the two chiefs’ faces do not match.³

Last year, while conducting research for a new book, I read for the first time Melville Herskovits’s 1931 review of his friend Morton Kahn’s Djuka (1931), which had just appeared. (Kahn was a public health physician who had conducted malaria research among Saramakas and Ndyukas in 1927 and who accompanied Herskovits on his first, brief trip into Saramaka territory in 1928; he also made the excellent museum collection of Maroon artifacts

1. An undated, poorly-reproduced group photo of Djankusó with his frequent nemesis, Bos-opzichter L. Junker, and other colonial and Saramaka officials appears in Oudschans Dentz (1972:135). Gouvermentssecretaris P.H.W.G. van der Helm is identified in the caption, allowing us to date the photo between 1922 and 1925, when he held that post.
2. Governor Dr. A.A.L. Rutgers, shown in the center of the photo, acceded to this position in 1928. Djankusó died in Asindoopo, January 14, 1932.
3. Djankusó’s likeness in the “Saramaka dignitaries” photo reproduced in Scholtens does match that in the Oudschans Dentz volume mentioned in note 1.
now in the American Museum of Natural History. His book, *Djuka*, is largely about Saramakas.) Herskovits (1931:68) notes in his review that “His book is finely printed and beautifully illustrated ... [but] I regret that he did not confine himself to the photographs he himself took ... One such photograph is unfortunately mislabeled, for the picture given of Jankoeso, chief of the Saramacca tribe, is not of this chief.” Shortly thereafter, Kahn – who had never ventured as far as the gaama’s village and had never met Djankusó – wrote to thank Herskovits for having reviewed his book and explained: “The mistake about the photograph was unfortunate. I got this picture from Van Heermstra [sic], who certainly told me that it was Jankoeso’s photograph.”

So, the gaama in the Kahn photo was not Djankusó, but who was he? I knew he was not Amakiti, who was Ndyuka gaama throughout the relevant period (and whose face had been published frequently, e.g., in Van Blankensteijn 1923: facing p. 96, and on the cover of De Groot 1969), nor was he Aluku gaama Awensai (1917-36), who did not wear the Dutch colonial uniform. So, I reasoned, he must be either Matawai gaama Asaf Kiné (1926-47) or Paramaka gaama Petrus Apensa (1901-23), neither of whose faces were known to me from photos. Fortunately, in response to my emailed inquiries to colleagues, Chris de Beet solved the mystery, sending me a photo of Asaf Kiné, which Miriam Sterman had brought back from her most recent visit to the Matawai. Chris writes that “a young Matawai named Melion Emanuel got the picture from his father ... who was from the Asaf family in Posoegroenoe.” The photo Chris sent is identical to the one published by Kahn.

Meanwhile, work in the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture (New York Public Library) and the Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution (Washington DC), has turned up a photo that, however poorly exposed, does without any doubt depict the Saramaka chief. So, with apologies to Djankusó for the misidentification in *Alabi’s World*, here is the story of how the true image of the gaama came to be taken.

Herskovits, with his wife Frances and six other members of his fieldwork entourage, were visitors in Gaama Djankusó’s village of Asindoopo for eight

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4. Northwestern University, Evanston IL, Melville J. Herskovits Papers (hereafter MJH Papers), Kahn to Herskovits, letter dated October 14, 1931. A.J.A.A. baron van Heemstra was governor of Suriname from 1921 to 1928. As early as 1968 I had an indication – which I ignored – that Kahn’s “photo of Djankusó” might not in fact depict that chief. A Saramaka friend, then in his late fifties, who had known Djankusó in the early 1930s, examined the photo and said it did not look like Djankusó, but I assumed that the photo might have been taken when the chief was younger and that my friend was having trouble “reading” the image correctly. Uncharacteristically (I hope), I trusted the printed evidence in Dr. Kahn’s book more than my Saramaka friend’s memory.

5. Personal communication 2003.
days in 1929, their intended stay of two weeks having been cut short by their fear that Saramakas might kill them. Their book Rebel Destiny presents a memorable word-picture of the chief, as a larger than life Noble Savage and a staunch friend of the anthropologists (Herskovits & Herskovits 1934: 248-67). And right after returning from Suriname, the couple thanked Djankusó in print — indeed in this very journal! — with MJH writing of his “urbanity, strength, and vivid personality [that] stand out so strongly in our remembrance ... He made us welcome in his own house, made us comfortable, and with an amazing degree of comprehension, helped us to learn of his people where it was in his power” (Herskovits 1929/30:401-2). About the same time, MJH wrote a series of thank you letters to officials in Suriname, including a personal one to Djankusó, telling him that “When we return to Africa we shall tell the people there of their children in the Saramacca country and I am sure they will be as glad to hear of you as you were to hear of them.”

Upon reading Rebel Destiny soon after its publication, Kahn wrote the Herskovitses to congratulate them, singling out their depiction of the gaamd as a highlight of the work: “The chapter on Jankoeso, was a real literary gem to say the least, and — Frances — as the actual writing sounds like it had more of you in it than of Melville, I wish to inform you that I think you have an excellent style ... never did my interest lag for one moment.”

The Herskovitses’ 1929 field diaries, including those written during their anxiety-ridden stay in Djankusó’s village, present a rather different perspective on their relations with the gaamd and other Saramakas — the details are now available elsewhere (Price & Price 2003). But I quote MJH’s diary for the couple’s final morning before their premature departure downstream, in order to document the picture-taking itself.

August 4 – Sunday – We were up after 6, and the tent to our boat, which was too low, was fixed early. By 8 the conversations began, with me asking the big chap to photograph him. He posed with surprising alacrity, putting on his white hat for the purpose. Then I asked him to sell me the beautiful Apinti drum in the house but he said it wasn’t his, and he couldn’t ... We asked the old boy for a bangi from the house where we stayed for a remembrance. The one we picked had the lo-emblem, an axe-head, as the motif for the design, and tho he hated to he couldn’t refuse, so I gave him two guilders for it. We also gave him a parting present; bacon, a bottle of salt, flour, our hard red beans, a bottle of perfume, a can of jam, etc. He seemed to like it. Finally we were ready. He took his umbrella and we went in state to the river-side. After not too enthusiastic good-byes we left, getting away at 9:30, and wondering if they’ll try anything on the river.

6. MJH Papers, Herskovits to Djankusó, letter of July 10, 1929.
7. MJH Papers, Kahn to the Herskovitses, letter of June 27, 1934.
Gaamá Moana Djankusó, photographed by Melville J. Herskovits in Asindoopo, August 4, 1929. (Courtesy of the Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution.)
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RICHARD PRICE
Department of Anthropology
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg VA 23187-8795, U.S.A.
<rixsal@earthlink.net>

EDWARD L. COX
Department of History
Rice University
Houston TX 77251, U.S.A.
<ecox@rice.edu>

Studies on African contributions to the making of the Atlantic world have gathered momentum since at least the 1970s. Peter Wood (1974) and Daniel Littlefield (1981) showed the central role played by enslaved Africans in the development of colonial South Carolina’s rice industry and the economic viability of the struggling colony. In this thought-provoking and wide-ranging study, historical geographer Judith Carney builds on their conceptual frameworks to demonstrate how crucially important Africa and enslaved Africans were in the transportation to and dissemination of rice cultivation in the Americas. While Wood and Littlefield largely limited their works to the involvement of Africans in the emerging rice culture of the South Carolina Low Country, Carney charts new ground by concentrating on the African origins of rice cultivation in the South. Central to her thesis is the notion that enslaved Africans brought with them a body of knowledge informed by prior exposure to rice cultivation in western Africa that enabled them to build a successful rice industry in the Carolinas during the colonial period. She persuasively argues that in the process Africans rather than Portuguese sailors transported not simply the knowledge of rice cultivation but also an entire culture. In her words, “rice cultivation in the Americas depended upon the diffusion of an entire cultural system, from production to consumption” (p. 165).

Carney’s study benefits from her ability to draw on several disciplines, including agricultural history, geography, botany, and anthropology, to inform us of the multifaceted nature of rice cultivation across two continents. It is informed by a rich array of secondary and primary sources that include
plantation records, travel accounts, planter memoirs, and slave-ship logs. She takes her readers deep into the distinct environments of the West African hinterland where rivers and wetlands provided the ideal circumstance for growing rice. The Africans capitalized upon these situations, at times using sophisticated labor-intensive irrigation methods along the floodplains that ensured that rice could be cultivated in distinctly different environments over a broad region in West Africa.

Carney suggests that as part of the “Columbian Exchange,” African rice probably entered the Americas in slave ships when traders transported foodstuffs to feed their slaves on the transatlantic voyage. This is contrary to the common notion that Europeans had introduced the crop into the Americas by way of Asia. In her estimation, the Cape Verde Islands had emerged as major grain producers during the height of the Atlantic slave trade when demand for local foods increased. Thereafter, the seeds were steadily diffused into South Carolina, Suriname, Brazil, and to a lesser extent, various other parts of Central and South America. However, Carney admits the limitations of her evidence on the precise nature of this diffusion of different strains of African rice into the Atlantic over varying periods. Recognizing the dangers of some of her speculations, she concedes that “more archival, botanical, and archaeological research is needed in the Americas” similar to the wonderful studies conducted in the Niger Delta by Roderick J. McIntosh (1998). Archaeological work on early plantations would thus “confirm whether rice was grown in the early colonial period and perhaps even uncover samples of African rice” (p. 152). Viewing rice culture as a “knowledge system that informed both the cultivation and milling of rice,” Carney contends that “slaves from West Africa’s rice region tutored planters in growing the crop” (p. 81).

Women were the important agents in the cultivation and harvesting of rice in both West Africa and the South Carolina Low Country. In West Africa, they remained virtually in charge of sowing, cultivating, reaping, and even cooking. Drawing on work done by Richard Price (1983), she posits that this gendered division of labor in rice cultivation remained virtually intact among the Saramaka Maroons of Suriname. To be sure, she indicates that in South Carolina women were generally in charge of sowing, hoeing, and weeding. Given her assertion that rice cultivation was “Woman’s Wuck,” Carney’s evidence regarding women’s control of rice cultivation is less compelling than one would have expected. Most of her analysis of the work rhythms on the estates applies to slaves in general rather than to women specifically. Her closest effort at convincing us is her assertion that “as the principal growers of rice in West Africa – specialized in sowing, weeding, and cultivating freshwater floodplains – the expertise of female slaves in rice culture must have proved of value for adapting the crop to new conditions in the Americas” (p. 121). Yet as Carney rightly notes, the demands of South
Carolina's labor system ensured that men were increasingly used in milling and other specialized nonagricultural capacities.

Reconsidering the "Columbian Exchange," Carney takes us back to West Africa. Largely through the efforts of various abolitionist societies, freed blacks of the African diaspora were repatriated to Sierra Leone and Liberia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Carney suggests that these return migrants were responsible for the introduction into Africa of the Americanized rice strains. In her words, "whether the result of the Amistad voyage or of others sponsored by abolitionist and colonization groups, the Carolina gold variety of rice still being planted by slaves in South Carolina figured among the seeds introduced to West Africa during this period of black repatriation" (p. 175). Carolina rice thus reached into the heart of Africa where thousands of years earlier farmers had domesticated rice. Black missionaries, freed slaves, and recaptives thus reintroduced into Africa a cereal and knowledge system that had left West Africa on slave ships.

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Historical studies of individual Caribbean territories can be of great value. General regional approaches are able to draw on more localized studies and illuminate wider realities. *A History of Antigua* belongs to the second category of investigation, but the book also has much of interest to say about the island of Barbuda, which began its life as a special kind of European outpost when it was leased to the Codrington family in the late seventeenth century, and retained relations with Antigua, where the Codringtons also owned considerable property in plantations and slaves throughout the years of slavery in the British Caribbean. Dyde’s account of Barbuda helps to illustrate that the histories of Caribbean territories are far from uniform. The book appears to have been written for general readers, and Dyde’s vantage point of inquiry seems to be from outside Antigua and Barbuda.

Much greater emphasis is placed on the development of Antigua over more than 350 years, from the end of the fifteenth century to the later twentieth century when support of decolonization and independence for former colonies finally led to the creation of the unitary independent state of Antigua and Barbuda in 1981. This historical sweep creates thematic and interpretational frameworks for making a wide range of connections of which, however, Dyde does not take full advantage. He pursues the limited attractions of chronological narrative history that draws attention to selected highlights. At the end of the book the careful reader is still left to wonder what the history of Antigua and Barbuda has amounted to.

The first of four parts covers the early English settlement of Antigua in 1632, the subsequent growth of the colony on the foundations of sugar and slavery, and the general character of colonial slave society with strong internal tensions that precipitated a major crisis, not between the slaves and their masters, but among the masters themselves, culminating most dramatically in the assassination of the governor, Daniel Parke, in 1710. It is not made clear, however, how this conspicuous demonstration of division within the ranks of the ruling class affected the consciousness, if not the actual behavior, of the colony’s enslaved population. The book’s Part II discusses how extensively sugar and slavery shaped the colonial society
and economy of both Antigua and Barbuda up to general emancipation in 1834, making some mention of the internal crisis that Antigua experienced in 1736 with the discovery of a major conspiracy among the slaves to revolt. More attention might have been given, however, to another crisis in 1831 when unrest erupted among the slaves following the abolition of their treasured Sunday markets without the allocation of a substitute market day by law. In 1834 the legislature of Antigua, with memories of 1831 still fresh in their minds, emancipated the slaves without inclusion of a period of apprenticeship. Dyde offers a fascinating discussion of the plight of Barbuda at the time, and describes how problematic the coming of emancipation was for the tiny territory, which was still part of the private property of the Codringtons. However, he missed an opportunity to explore the many meanings of full emancipation for Antigua.

Parts III and IV discuss the development of free society when, in conjunction with the effects of the legacy of slavery, more identifiable ramifications of coloniality continued to operate. These later chapters are in some ways strikingly different in approach, perspective, and thematic emphasis from the earlier ones. Their emphasis tends to be more political and constitutional, dealing with the struggles of the free black working class to make a living and to lead decent lives when the means of employment and production were still dominated by the remnants of an earlier planter class. The significance that Dyde gives to these chapters appears to be related largely to the rise of black working-class consciousness, the emergence of a labor movement, and the heroic and charismatic role played by V.C. Bird, who rose from that movement to shape and lead it, and ultimately steer the island to independence. This narrowly focused approach has its limitations in explaining the history of Antigua and Barbuda from emancipation to the end of the twentieth century, but it is a useful beginning.

Readers of this book may be struck by the absence of any substantial treatment of how life evolved in Barbuda and, especially, Antigua, for all classes of society, although in regard to the working class after slavery, Dyde draws some attention here and there to various forms of hardship. Is it not possible, indeed desirable, to probe into the substance and the effects of colonial marginality and deprivation? How important did emigration to other territories become? What about cultural life and education? Beyond questions that may be focused on localized contexts is another that asks to what extent the history of Antigua and Barbuda can illuminate the larger history of the Caribbean region. One clear advantage of a general history like this one is that some explanatory apparatus is employed to connect the various pieces of the long, involved, and complicated story in ways that give meaning to some issues while exposing, even unintentionally, others that still evade scrutiny.
Blue Coat or Powdered Wig: Free People of Color in Pre-Revolutionary Saint Domingue. STEWART R. KING. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001. xxvi + 328 pp. (Cloth US$ 45.00)

CAROLYN E. FICK
Department of History
Concordia University
Montréal QC, Canada, H3G 1 M8
<cfick@alcor.concordia.ca>

This book offers a much-needed study of colonial St. Domingue’s free colored populations in the decades preceding the Haitian Revolution. All too often, historians in the past have treated the free coloreds as an undifferentiated unitary group whose members, simply, were neither white nor slave, who were denied social equality because of their African ancestry but who, collectively, constituted the educated or propertied mulattoes along with a tiny subgroup of less fortunate free blacks. More recently, the work of John Garrigus on the free colored elites, particularly in the colony’s South Province, has gone a long way to break this persistent view of the free coloreds as a homogeneous group, intended by metropolitan and colonial law to constitute a subordinate racial caste whose members, by virtue of their African descent, and their status as free persons notwithstanding, would serve as an impermeable buffer between the colony’s slaves and the white ruling minority. Stewart King’s book continues in this direction and offers us a window through which to see a highly variegated set, and subsets, of people who, collectively, owned one-third of the colony’s slaves and one-quarter of the property on the eve of the Revolution, thus placing them in a unique position when set in comparison with other Caribbean slave societies. We are presented with a multitude of individuals whose racial, social, and property relations within their own community, and with the white community, as well as in their relations with their own slaves, challenge simplistic class or racial categorization. King relies primarily on the notarial archives of St. Domingue, located in Aix-en-Provence, and singles out the elite and middle sector (that is, those whose social and economic activity would require them to make use of notarial services), and identifies two groups of the upper strata – the planter elite and the military leadership group – for his analysis.

In the four chapters of Part I, King sets out to build a framework of analysis that will allow readers to understand better the heterogeneity of the free colored groups. Chapter 1 discusses the principal source for the study, the notarial archives of St. Domingue, and considers how the notarial system functioned in the colony. The following chapter is intended to provide readers
with some basic information about the colony's geography, its economic history as an agricultural plantation colony, and its changing demography. The last chapter of Part I discusses the position of slaves and free coloreds in the colonial armed forces, as part of the general introductory background, and as a parallel to the discussion of agriculture in which the free colored planter elite actively participated.

Part II is by far the strongest section of the work; it is here that King utilizes the vast array of notarial documents from his sample to describe free colored slave-owning, landowning, and entrepreneurial characteristics by comparatively examining the types of slaves owned by the two free colored elite groups, and those owned by the free colored and white slave owners generally. He further differentiates the free colored planter and military groups in their degree of entrepreneurship, their attitudes toward capital acquisition and accumulation, and their connections to the rest of free colonial society. While the planter elites are fairly well connected to the wealthy white families and exhibit conservative entrepreneurial habits, the military group maintains closer relations with other members of free colored society by establishing networks of fictive kin and by witnessing marriages, births, and other family acts. The latter group is more aggressively entrepreneurial and also displays a greater propensity to purchase *bossales*, or African-born slaves, something King sees, curiously (and without explanation), as a persistence in the military free colored group of African cultural values stemming from African traditions of treating purchased slaves as "trade" slaves subject to sale. The last two chapters of Part II look at noneconomic markers of status among free coloreds, such as office-holding in the church or service in the military, the adoption of French-sounding names, and the apposition of one's signature on public documents as a sign of literacy and a claim to social status, as well as the use of family ties and networking for social advancement, with free colored women actually exercising a good deal of autonomy, often as managers of property or even as slave dealers.

Finally, Part III recapitulates the strategies of the planter elite and the military leadership group and restates the seminal arguments of the book concerning these two elite groups, something that could have been done more efficiently if it had been integrated substantively into Part II. In fact, the book is exceedingly overlapping and disjointed and still bears much of the style of the original doctoral dissertation. Overall, its strengths and originality lie in the extensive use of previously untapped notarial records through which we now have a clearer understanding of who the free coloreds were and, therefore, a better understanding of the inner dynamics of St. Domingue as the world's foremost slave society.

Some of King's freewheeling assertions (and more than a few factual errors) throughout the book bear noting: the comparative potential with other Caribbean plantation slave societies is alluded to but not critically pursued,
and the presumption that many of the conditions found in prerevolutionary St. Domingue resemble those in other colonies contradicts the argument for St. Domingue's uniqueness. More pertinent is King's suggestion that further research on relations between different groups within the military and on connections between the colonial free colored military, the revolutionary military, and the Haitian armed forces of the independence period might be elucidating. The colonial free colored military leaders probably did play a role in the Revolution, but here King misses one of the most profound lessons of the Revolution, which is that much of the decisive fighting and battles were of African-style guerrilla warfare. As for the revolutionary military, Toussaint Louverture (referred to by King as a "half-hearted" revolutionary), who was a colonial free black, one of the great military geniuses of that period, and preeminent leader of the former slaves, had no military training in the colonial era; neither did Dessalines, an ex-slave and military architect of independence. These men constituted the military elite of the revolutionary and most of the independence periods, while light-skinned members of the colonial free coloreds, like André Rigaud and Alexandre Pétion, both colonial military men, ultimately represented the landed and commercial interests of their group.

In his earnest attempt to present St. Domingue's free coloreds merely as individuals motivated by self-interest, and to reject what he thinks a Marxist analysis might be, King overlooks the fact that such individuals are historical beings who do belong to classes, that they are members of social and racial groups that came into being through the contradictory dialectics of class, race, and imperialism – all of which goes a long way toward explaining the peculiar legacy of class and color in postrevolutionary Haiti.


César J. Ayala

Department of Sociology
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles CA 90095, U.S.A.
<cejayala@ucla.edu>

*Puerto Rico's Commerce, 1765-1865* is a detailed reconstruction of the patterns of trade in the smallest island of the Greater Antilles. The book is
well documented and the source notes indicate arduous work collecting trade
statistics, tracking the sources of imports, locating the outlets for exports and
the intermediate trading centers through which Puerto Rico's producers and
consumers became connected to the world at large. This is a specialized book
based on extensive scholarly research in primary archives and secondary
literatures written in English, Spanish, French, German, and Danish. While
the book is full of findings concerning the specific patterns of trade, in
general terms the main conclusion is that the island evolved from having
its trade take place principally through the Danish island of St. Thomas, to
direct trade with the United States and Europe. In a sense, then, this is also a
book about the decline of St. Thomas as the principal intermediary for Puerto
Rican trade. The Danish island, however, remained an important regional
entrepôt for trade and credit until the 1860s.

In the eighteenth century, Spanish neglect of its insular possessions forced
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico to trade with the neighboring islands in a
pattern of clandestine inter-Caribbean commerce, which was by all accounts
much larger than the official trade in Spanish ships, and more important to the
islanders. Smuggling was rampant. The Spanish empire was too concerned
with its large continental colonies to devote primary attention to its island
colonies, which were valued principally for their strategic location in the
routes connecting Spain with its mainland colonies through the Caribbean.
But beginning in the 1760s, after the British occupied Havana for several
years, the Spanish attempted to reconstitute and rationalize their trade with
the islands. This was done through the establishment of privileged trading
companies and by authorizing new ports in Spain to trade with the colonies.
In the period 1810-45, San Juan was an intermediary for trade between the
South American republics and Spain, and even U.S. goods sometimes passed
through the port of San Juan on their way to Spain. However, the volume
and nature of the entrepôt trade was limited by Spanish legislation and
international agreements, so that San Juan never acquired the importance of
St. Thomas in the regional trade of the Caribbean, even though for a while
the San Juan depot was competitive with St. Thomas. San Juan merchants
owned vessels registered under Danish, American, British, or Dutch flags.
They sailed to Venezuelan ports after stopping in St. Thomas, where they
were received as arrivals from that island. Thus, by implication, at least some
of the St. Thomas trade was actually Puerto Rican.

In 1765, Basques and Catalans were allowed to emigrate to the Spanish
possessions. The Cédula de Gracias of 1815 further opened the channels for
other Europeans to settle in the island of Puerto Rico. Catalans constituted
a merchant community in the island, and Puerto Rico was a preferred
destination for Catalan emigrants from the peninsula. Basques who
emigrated from the Spanish peninsula or from Venezuela after the wars of
independence also constituted an important merchant community, forming
some of the most prominent import-export firms in the nineteenth century. These enterprises were run by family organizations from specific regions of Spain. Successful firms did not start from scratch, but were rather endowed with initial resources. Over time they were strengthened by new arrivals. Most of the capital generated was repatriated, members of the trading families tended to retire in Spain, and throughout, the families retained a strong peninsular identity. Although scholarship by Americans has generally emphasized the intransigence of the Spanish colonial regime, these trading families were able to lobby the Spanish state toward imposing measures advantageous to them. By the 1840s there was a vibrant plantation economy in Puerto Rico, producing sugar with slaves imported from Africa, and the typical conflicts between merchants and planters ensued. Sonesson argues that the position of the peninsular traders “was strong in relation to the planters, many of whom were foreigners and all of whom had their capital tied up in land and slaves” (p. 100).

As a port of trade, St. Thomas was a competitor to San Juan, but the Danish presence in the island was also functional to Spanish interests. Spanish officials feared that the decline of St. Thomas would cause Denmark to sell it to the United States, which represented a much bigger threat to Spanish interests in the Caribbean than the Danish. Heavy taxation siphoned off the economic surplus to Spain and inhibited the modernization of the sugar industry, and in the 1860s and 1870s it even caused the withdrawal of commercial and agricultural capital to Spain and France. Whereas sugar sold primarily in the U.S. market, it was Puerto Rican coffee that paid for the imports of flour from Santander and tobacco from Cuba. Puerto Rican tobacco went also to the three Hanseatic ports of Hamburg, Altona in Denmark, and Bremen, which were also important buyers of Puerto Rican coffee, until the island started sending increasing amounts of coffee to Spain and Cuba after 1859.

Chapter 5 is a rich and complex discussion of Puerto Rico’s trade statistics, with a detailed exposition of the statistical sources, their coverage and accuracy, and estimates of how far official statistics might deviate from actual trade flows. This is done by comparing statistics at different endpoints of trade – for example, by comparing Puerto Rican figures for exports of sugar to the United States with U.S. figures on imports from Puerto Rico – and by juxtaposing certain estimates of consumption to comparable figures from Cuba. Actual exports from the island were larger than is reflected in the official statistics, while the value of imports was actually less than what is reflected in the bookkeeping of the Spanish authorities. The island thus enjoyed a positive trade balance which is greater than official estimates. According to Sonesson, “the result was that the real trade surplus was drained off to Spain and to the big merchant houses, instead of being invested in the island’s internal economy. Despite the situation, the elite, both those
who identified themselves as Spaniards and those who had become Puerto Ricans, chose to support the island’s colonial status in return for protection from foreign predators and social unrest” (p. 147).

In the 1850s, the development of sugar-refining capacity in New York increased demand for the low-grade sugars produced by Puerto Rico. The island continued to produce sugar in increasing quantities until the 1870s, when abolition apparently caused the decline of the industry. This image of the sugar cycle is somewhat different from that provided by Francisco Scarano in his 1984 study of Ponce, which emphasizes decline and indebtedness of the planters in the 1840s and decline after 1850. Although there is mention in this book of the slave trade, in general little attention is paid to it in its pages. One is left wondering how much merchandise was carried by slave trading ships from Puerto Rico, and whether these had any impact on the aggregate volume of trade.

Chapter 9 on the import trade is an important discussion of what Puerto Rico consumed from abroad in the nineteenth century, offering a detailed breakdown of the geographical sources of the commodities (flour from Santander, Catalan textiles, codfish from British North America, cheese from Venezuela, and so forth). Here Sonesson links shifts in import patterns to possible shifts in class relations in the island. As export agriculture and population expanded, subsistence plots for farmers and agregados declined, and the island resorted to increasing importation of flour, cornmeal, and rice as basic sources of carbohydrates. The trade in codfish and beef jerky also increased, providing protein to the increasing population of Puerto Rico. In the past Puerto Rico had been a net exporter of cattle to the neighboring Caribbean. Sonesson offers detailed, and very interesting comparisons (with Cuba), of per capita consumption of imported food. This is perhaps the one chapter of the book where there is an effective integration of, on the one hand, the analysis of trade and, on the other, an analysis of the productive structure of the island, whether slave plantations, small coffee farms, or large coffee haciendas. This is a rewarding addition toward the end of the book. Aside from this chapter, however, one is left wondering just what effect the changes in trade patterns had on the local economy and society. Sonesson seems to have the primary archival materials and an incredible breadth of knowledge of the literature to at least draw some inferences on social change in the island as trading patterns evolved. Indeed, the reader is left with a desire for elucidation of the social and economic impact of trade changes. Given the high level of erudition displayed in the book, expectations are high. But the conclusions drawn are quite modest, given the staggering deployment of rich historical information. It will be left to others to formulate and debate what these changes in trade actually mean. Everyone will be indebted to Sonesson for the wealth of historical material deployed here.
Puerto Rico’s Commerce is a book of fine scholarship for a specialized readership. It can be used in graduate courses on the history of the Caribbean. It is rich in primary materials and displays impressively broad knowledge of the secondary literature. It will be a standard book of reference on Puerto Rico’s trade for years to come, for those who venture into the detailed world, fine scholarship, and erudition of its pages.

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NADINE LEFAUCHEUR
Centre de recherche sur les pouvoirs locaux dans la Caraïbe
CNRS/Université des Antilles et de la Guyane,
F 97275 Schoelcher, Martinique
<nadine.lefaucheur@wanadoo.fr>

Bernard Moitt’s book fills a gap in Caribbean historiography – a synthesis in English of the material about slave women in the French Antilles – and will be useful both to historians of the French Antilles and to those most interested in gender issues, who want to compare the fortunes of enslaved women in the Caribbean societies. It is based on secondary sources on the French Antilles, either by modern historians, mainly Arlette Gautier’s book on slave women (1985) and the many publications of Gabriel Debien on slavery (from 1944 to 1977), or by contemporaries, in particular, the two Dominican Fathers Du Tertre (1671) and Labat (1722), and the abolitionists Moreau de Jonnès (1842) and Schoelcher (1840 to 1847). But Moitt also uses primary sources such as archives, official publications, and newspapers, and examines various court cases. While Arlette Gautier’s pioneering work focused on maternity and resistance, labor and resistance form the core of Bernard Moitt’s study, which also deals with gender relations and their interplay with race.
The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the black woman's early presence in the slave societies of the French Caribbean, mostly on her presence during the period of European indentureship and tobacco era, when slaves were mainly acquired through raids or purchased from Spanish or Dutch traders, and when the colonies were largely male in composition – at least that is what Moitt states against others scholars like Abdoulaye Ly and Richard S. Dunn. This chapter looks particularly at St. Christopher (today St. Kitts), the first Caribbean island partly inhabited by the French from the mid-1620s until the early eighteenth century. The number of mixed-race children was already significant and the black women, accused of a tendency to promiscuity and prostitution, were seen by the authorities as posing a threat to the maintenance of white families and to society.

The quantitative impact of the Atlantic slave trade, the presence of women in this trade, and the sex ratios that, according to Moitt, stayed unbalanced (about 60 percent men, 40 percent women) until the slave population became largely creolized in the early nineteenth century, are discussed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 offers an analysis of the gender basis of the allocation of tasks, focusing on women in field labor, household production, petty trade, and marketing. It shows the double standard applied to white women, even indentured, who were all seen as unsuited for hard labor, and to black women. The latter were required to do the same work as men, but most of them were field slaves and worked in the “first gangs” that performed the most arduous tasks of cane cutting, mill feeding, and distilling rum, while men were much more frequently specialized workers, if not slave drivers.

Chapter 4 examines labor in the domestic sphere, which includes not just cooks and household staff but seamstresses and slaves in health care positions. The role of the last was considered so crucial to the growth of the slave population that they were highly open to (often false) charges of infanticide or poisoning, which planters in the eighteenth century believed they committed as a means of resisting slavery. Moitt discusses the supposedly better situation of the domestic slaves and points at its drawbacks, like indeterminate hours of work and instability.

The ways in which women functioned as mothers, wives, concubines, and prostitutes – how they lived and died – constitute the subject matter of Chapter 5. Moitt argues that slaves were generally hostile to Christian and legal marriage but that they valued kinship and conjugal life. He points to the contradiction between the official pressures on slaves to marry – also conceived as a way of preventing sex and concubinage between blacks and whites – and the reluctance of most of the slave owners to sanction legal unions that would have prevented them from selling separately the members of a family unit. Slave owners were also caught between a strong concern about the very low birthrate of their slaves, and their will to exploit as much as possible the women's labor force, which hampered good reproduction.
Moitt points to the two-pronged strategy that they adopted, offering incentives to mothers and midwives, but punishing them when they were suspected of abortions and when children died at birth, supposedly from malicious inoculation of tetanus.

In focusing on discipline, physical abuse, and assault, Chapter 6 details the brutality, mostly physical, to which slave women were subjected by slave owners and other plantation personnel in positions of power, mostly men. Moitt documents corporal punishment, execution, and deportation, but also the ways in which slave women drew upon the judicial system or used other means to combat abuse.

Slave resistance is taken up in Chapter 7, which examines women's multidimensional responses to slavery in detail. It probes patterns of resistance such as armed revolt, marronage, acts of poisoning, work slowdowns and stoppages, and women's associations, and documents penalties that women suffered for their resistance.

The last chapter focuses on manumission and discusses how some slave women - most often domestic slaves, mixed-race women, or mothers of mixed-race children - could acquire freedom, including the unofficial status of libre de savane or libre de fait. It evokes the protracted struggles they waged, in the early nineteenth century, at all levels of the judiciary, to free their relatives, most of the time their children.

Besides differences between field and domestic slave women, Moitt's study shows some differences of situation between women who were born in Africa and creoles, between black and mixed-race women.

This presentation of the content of Moitt's book shows how rich and important it is. But in addition to the unequal wealth of the available sources for different periods, the choice of a thematic framework, although pertinent, does not help the reader to appreciate the chronological developments, which are not sufficiently emphasized.

Unfortunately, some errors and misunderstandings stand in the way of an unqualified endorsement of this book. I cite just two of them. Arlette Gautier did not conclude that some estates were stud farms, as Moitt states on page 13; on the contrary, one of her main lines of argument was the refutation of the existence of such a policy in the French Antilles. And when Moitt picks up the story reported by Gautier of two colonists, Bernard le Jeune and Andrault de Salle, one of whom was living with a black slave named Louise who gave birth to a girl, the other of whom remarked that "he should be now in family if Louise had been good" (Gautier 1985:175), not only does Moitt invert the two men's roles, but, more seriously, he misinterprets the point completely, writing that the birth of a female child "spared him the expense he would have incurred for manumission had it been a male" and, consequently, that boys tended to be freed more than girls (p. 160), while the
issue was rather that the newborn was a *negritte*, a black girl, suggesting that she had in fact been fathered by a slave.

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EDWARD L. COX
Department of History
Rice University
Houston TX 77251, U.S.A.
<ecox@rice.edu>

The act abolishing slavery in the British Caribbean provided for the creation of an apprenticeship period between 1834 and 1840, during which former slaves and former masters would become adjusted to the changing labor and social systems. As mediators in the crucial transitional period, more than one hundred Special Magistrates were dispatched to the Caribbean to oversee the process and settle disputes between apprentices and their former owners. One of the nine magistrates who served in St. Vincent was John Anderson, a Scottish lawyer whose tenure lasted from early 1836 until his death at age forty in September 1838, one month after the Apprenticeship ended. *Between Slavery and Freedom* is Anderson’s journal and recollections of experiences and perspectives on the society of which he was a part for two-and-a-half years.

Roderick McDonald, the editor of this long-awaited publication, is well known for his work on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Caribbean history. Of particular relevance to this volume is the highly fruitful use he has made of Anderson’s journal in previous articles and conference papers. In making the journal available to the scholarly public, he has provided excellent footnotes and a useful introductory essay that draws on the journal and material gleaned mostly from Colonial Office sources. McDonald has thus
contributed to a better understanding of the intricate nature of the difficulties and tensions present during the Apprenticeship.

Special Magistrates were expected to be impartial administrators of justice in adjudicating cases that came before them. Anderson, a lawyer by training, claimed that he "formed [his] opinions from actual observation, - not fanciful theories." He reports that, before leaving Scotland, he had "read authors on either side of the West Indian question; - and came out unbiased (sic) by any, determined to judge for myself" (p. 91). Nevertheless, his racial prejudices, Eurocentricism, and Anglophilia severely compromised any claims of impartiality he might have made and obviously adversely affected the faithful discharge of his duties. His frequent description of the apprentices as lazy persons, cowards, liars, and thieves reflects both his own biases and the difficulties he encountered in appreciating anything positive or creative in their actions or behavior. Anderson wrongly assumed that if the apprentices were to learn anything worthwhile, they had to be taught by whites. Commenting on their religion, he asserts that "all the scriptural information which they possess, - it is no ways unfair to suppose, they are only uttering what they have been taught, and imitating their instructors" (pp. 91-92). For him, black apprentices were apparently incapable of independent thought or action.

Such biases found their way into his official duties. The severe and frequent whippings he inflicted on apprentices found guilty of infractions prompted enquiry from his superiors, who deemed his punishments to be out of line with those of his colleagues. Nor did Anderson's feeble explanations of these and other questionable decisions find favor either with officials in the Colonial Office or with Lieutenant-Governor George Tyler, who reassigned him after giving him a severe reprimand. Detested by apprentices, who viewed his rulings as invariably supportive of white planter interests, Anderson makes almost no critical remarks of whites. While it is unclear whether he deliberately courted the favor of whites, both whites and apprentices with different motives perceived him as a "Buckra Magistrate," especially when he took forceful action to suppress a free colored riot in the capital of Kingstown.

Despite these shortcomings, Anderson was undoubtedly a conscientious magistrate who maintained a grueling travel schedule to hear cases and administer justice. In addition to adjudicating complaints between apprentices and their employers, he faithfully submitted monthly reports to his superiors on the working of the apprenticeship system within his jurisdiction. Whereas some magistrates merely resubmitted previous reports with minor modifications, Anderson diligently noted changes and developments that offered a detailed picture of the difficulties that accompanied the "birth pangs of freedom" (p. 27). Mutual distrust and a consequential lack of goodwill between apprentices and employers during a period when such divergence
of interests existed ultimately fostered additional societal tensions. Echoing sentiments generally expressed by scholars of the period, McDonald asserts that “Anderson’s journal thus shows how, rather than facilitating a smooth transition from slavery to freedom, the Apprenticeship experiment may well have exacerbated the crisis that accompanied Emancipation” (p. 30).

Anderson did effect some change locally. In response to his complaints about the island’s undermanned police force’s inability to curtail the frequent breaches of the peace in Kingstown, the Assembly expanded the powers of the special magistrates to permit them to act as town constables. Eventually, he was appointed chief police magistrate of a consolidated police force. From this vantage point, as he has catalogued in his “Journal of Cases,” he was able to observe closely the involvement of apprentices in rural crime and the concerns of island whites at that time. As has been done so effectively for the slave experience, other scholars must follow McDonald’s lead and contrive to delineate the urban and rural dimensions of apprentices’ experiences.

Whatever his reasons may have been for keeping a journal, Anderson contributed more than he probably intended to our understanding of St. Vincent. A keen observer, he remarked on the island’s weather (including hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanoes), and natural phenomena (fruits, insects, reptiles, and plants). His biases notwithstanding, he commented on the pastimes, religious practices and beliefs, habits, and diseases that were frequent among the apprentices. Overall, this journal presents an interesting picture of a Caribbean island during a critical stage in the transition from slavery to full freedom. Beautifully complementing the journal of Special Magistrate John B. Colthurst of Barbados and St. Vincent (Marshall 1977), it adds considerably to our understanding of the workings and challenges of the Apprenticeship.

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Dutch merchants were late in joining the European expansion in the Atlantic. Despite some initial forays in the 1570s, it was not until two decades later that regular contact with American territories was established. By that time the New World had already become known to a wide Dutch audience. Reports by Columbus and Vespucci reached the Netherlands in the 1590s, and the first translations into Dutch followed quickly thereafter, setting off an avalanche of books, pamphlets, paintings, and engravings. Benjamin Schmidt (University of Washington) uses this material to describe the Dutch representation of the New World. His main analytical tool is the concept of “cultural geography” — “the manner in which other places and peoples were imagined, appropriated, and manipulated” (p. xviii). While focusing on the first century of the Dutch Republic (1570-1670), Schmidt also pays considerable attention to the decades before these years.

Dutch publications in the first part of the sixteenth century were mostly translations of Spanish reports. While these were occasionally critical of Spanish behavior in the Americas, most of them were positive. This changed when the Dutch revolt against Spanish overlordship began in the 1560s. Making full use of Bartolomé de Las Casas’s Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (1552), Dutch pamphleteers jumped at the opportunity to depict the Spaniards as tyrants who, when given the chance, would treat the Dutch as they had treated the Indians. Even the leader of the Dutch Revolt, Prince Willem of Orange, joined the fray in his Apología of 1581. Of course, the leyenda negra (Black Legend) was also used as a polemical instrument in other European countries such as England and France, but, as Schmidt points out, the direct experience of the Dutch with Spanish atrocities gave exceptional poignancy to their identification with the Indians. The use of the topos varied over time, following the ebb and flow of the hostilities with Spain, but it remained an important element of propaganda for over a century.

By the time the Dutch West India Company was founded in 1621, the representation of the Americas had given rise to unrealistic expectations of
alliances with the suppressed Indians against Spain. Attempts were made to strike up a friendship with the natives of Peru and Chile, but these were unsuccessful. Even worse, in some of their colonies the Dutch behaved almost as badly against the Indians as the Spaniards had. In the 1630s and 1640s pamphlets began to appear in which the Dutch West India Company was heavily criticized and the pernicious influence of the New World on Europe, via its gold, sugar, tobacco, and syphilis, was described in heavily moralistic terms. By 1670, the Dutch Republic had lost Brazil and New Netherland and its direct involvement with the New World continued on a much smaller scale. This did not deter writers and printers. On the contrary, the Americas continued to be featured in Dutch publications, but with a different emphasis. Adopting "a strategy of exoticism" (p. 316), a commercialized form of Americana emanated from the Dutch Republic to reach a wider European audience.

The juxtaposition of Spanish tyranny and American (and Dutch) innocence works very well as a narrative device, but is less convincing as an analytical tool, especially as Schmidt tends to overstate his case occasionally to the detriment of other elements in the Dutch representation of the New World. His choice of material seems to have been led by his aim to support the central thesis of Innocence turning into Tyranny. Consequently he omits or glosses over other works in which that juxtaposition does not feature as prominently. I would suggest that America had more meanings in the Dutch Republic than just as a tool in anti-Spanish or moralistic fulminations. The cannibalism of some of the Indians, highlighted for instance in the description of the Iroquois by Rev. Johannes Megapolensis, and the perceived lack of a form of religion pointed out by Adriaen van der Donck in his Beschryvinge van Nieu-Nederlant (Description of New Netherland) serve as antidotes to the image of the noble savage.

In making some of his sweeping statements, Schmidt attributes the representation of the New World to "the Dutch." In many cases, the context makes clear that while some ideas about the New World may have been shared by many Dutchmen, other ideas were the intellectual domain of specific groups of merchants, politicians, ministers, or scholars, and were not commonplace. This is directly connected with the origin of the material Schmidt uses to compile his narrative. Most of it is propaganda, some of it directed against Spain (before 1610), some of it against the Dutch West India Company (in the 1640s). And almost all of it is printed material. Since printed propaganda by its nature requires a specific style and content to appeal to its audience, it does not necessarily provide a balanced reflection of how America was thought of in the Dutch Republic.

Despite these critical remarks, Innocence Abroad provides an important contribution to both Dutch colonial history and the history of the Atlantic world. Earlier accounts of Europe’s encounter with the New World have
generally neglected the Netherlands, with the exception of the rather academic discussion between Hugo Grotius and Johannes de Laet on the geographical origins of the Indians. Schmidt's book goes a long way toward filling the void, and while it may spark off some debate, it will also be a work that others can build on, nuancing and elaborating it where needed. Above all, it is erudite, well-composed, and beautifully written. Schmidt displays a mastery of style which unfortunately is rare in historical scholarship. In short, this book is a joy to read.

The title of this volume of selected conference papers mistakenly suggests a more or less homogeneous collection of essays. Several contributions are completely silent on travel, discovery, or early relations with the Americas or other continents for that matter. The peculiar hodgepodge includes, for instance, articles on "Atheism in the Early Dutch Enlightenment," "Metaphysical Aspirations in van Ostaijen's Poetry and Poetics," and "From Westerbork to Auschwitz: The Function of Travel in the Diaries of Etty Hillesum." The term "new world(s)" is thus interpreted so broadly as to lose all coherence.

Are there any redeeming features? The two essays that might interest Caribbeanists most both bear on linguistics. The first, by J. van Donselaar, discusses the vocabulary of the Dutch in their seventeenth-century colonies in Brazil, Berbice, and Suriname. Van Donselaar concludes that the Dutch language dominated, although new compounds were introduced as the century advanced, and existing words acquired new meanings in the colonial context. Entirely new words, predominantly taken from Indian languages, were introduced as well, mainly to denote indigenous plants and animals. In Suriname the Dutch borrowed heavily from the ousted English when referring to the process of sugar production. (Sugar) cane thus became "kaan" or "keen," and storehouse "stoorhuis." Curiously, the article does not
refer to other scholars who have worked on Berbice Dutch, such as Sylvia Kouwenberg.

While Van Donselaar's essay is confined to the classification of lexical elements, Anthony F. Buccini's more in-depth analysis also addresses matters of syntax and the development of pidgin. Buccini does not deal with the Dutch Caribbean, but compares the Dutch colony of New Netherland in North America and the Cape Colony in South Africa. The linguistic development of New Netherland, he argues, differed markedly from that in the Cape Colony, due to the respective relations with non-European peoples. At the Cape, the Dutch settlers were in close touch with native Khoisan workers in their employ and imported slaves from other parts of Africa. By contrast, contact between white families was limited. New Netherland's European population was concentrated, while slavery did not have the same weight and natives were not rapidly and massively incorporated into Dutch colonial society, as happened at the Cape. Afrikaans, the lingua franca that emerged in South Africa, was a "semi-creolized" language, whereas in New Netherland pidginized varieties of Indian languages developed, as the Dutch learned native tongues in order to facilitate business deals and the Indians presented their languages in ways that enabled their acquisition by the newcomers. At the same time, this simplified language allowed the natives to keep the Europeans at a distance.


WOUTER GORTZAK
Geerdinkhof 512
1103 RH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
<gortzak@planet.nl>

The Dutch government regularly commissions research projects.¹ Sometimes the commissions are given to its own employees, who continuously feel their boss breathing down their necks, but sometimes a project is assigned to an outsider.¹ Such an outsider can work in great freedom, speaking candidly with relevant persons and perusing the as yet confidential documents and reports

¹ Translation of this review from the Dutch by Hanneke Teunissen.
about various internal discussions. It was as outsiders that two researchers began a commissioned description and analysis, in 1996, of Dutch colonial policy in the Caribbean from 1940 to 2000.

Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers worked on this task with diligence and precision for roughly four years; nothing that happened on the Dutch side in the period they studied escaped their attention. Although their study does not include all aspects of recent history – economic developments, for example, receive little attention – the three thick volumes of *Knellende koninkrijksbanden*, with their overwhelming abundance of notes and glosses, have become indispensable in university libraries and the personal collections of interested lay people, as a standard text on the history of an eventful period. The work is virtually an encyclopedic reference book for developments in the Dutch Caribbean in the mid to late twentieth century.

Although the Dutch government must be praised for the openness with which it assigned the project, it seems to have gotten cold feet while assessing the results. The authors were reproached for drawing too enthusiastically on, for instance, the proceedings of the council of ministers, and they were strongly advised to whittle and trim their work thoroughly. Whereas the publication of the three volumes was delayed by a year because the authors initially refused to carry out the requested editing, the compromise they eventually reached is commendable in that the original content of the study has remained unchanged: several quotations were removed, but their accompanying observations were retained.

There are many descriptions of the Netherlands' transition, in the seventeenth century, from a recently independent marshland to a colonial empire. The speed with which it was transformed is hard to believe, but even harder to believe is that the empire largely remained intact for almost three centuries. And the Dutch were proud of it, at least, in the Netherlands East Indies, where “the Netherlands was accomplishing great things” and the merchant was collecting his profits. The mother country’s interest in its Caribbean territories, consisting of Suriname and a handful of Windward and Leeward islands, stood in stark contrast to its glorification of its eastern colonial mission. At one time, “The West” was also lucrative, the Suriname plantation economy flourished, and the islands functioned as links in the slave trade, as smugglers’ hideaways, and facilitators of contraband activities. But it was when funds had to go to, instead of coming from, these territories that interest waned. Partly due to the decrease in attention for its western colonies and a debate about compensation for slave-owners, the Netherlands abolished slavery only in 1863, and no one seemed then to know what should become of its West Indian possessions. “Everything that has been tried in Suriname ... has simply failed,” the colonial minister cried in 1935, and he hoped “that for once in the Netherlands, someone would arise who knew what should be done” (Vol. 1, p. 17).
That the colonial empire would not continue to exist in the same way after the Second World War eventually occurred to the Dutch government in exile in London. In late 1942, Queen Wilhelmina articulated this new insight by talking of a future relationship, “in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Suriname, and Curaçao will all have a part, while they will each independently, and relying on their own strength, yet with the will to support one another, meet their internal needs” (Vol. 1, p. 33). This symbolic step in the direction of decolonization, which was simultaneously aimed at perpetuating the kingdom that reached into all parts of the world, was meant, in particular, for the Netherlands East Indies. However, that part of the kingdom declared itself independent in 1945, and despite military intervention on two occasions and a series of political manoeuvres, the new republic did not want to maintain any constitutional or political relationship with the former colonizer. In 1949, the Netherlands finally granted sovereignty to Indonesia.

Because the attention had been focused so strongly on Indonesia before, it is surprising that the Dutch government, after Indonesia’s independence, continued to aim for a new-style kingdom, now with only the previously ignored possessions of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. Would not a more logical step have been to encourage the independence of those regions at that time? Maybe letting go of all imperial pretensions (“the last remnants of the tropical Netherlands”) was more than the grieved colonial souls could bear; perhaps the Netherlands also acknowledged how much Suriname’s bauxite and the oil refined on Curaçao and Aruba had meant to the allied war effort; possibly the Dutch government was inspired by a sense of responsibility for regions that, with respect to, for instance, the composition of the population, were to a great extent a Dutch creation (African slaves, Javanese and British Indian indentured laborers).2

Good intentions are no guarantee for good results, and mutual distrust has, for fifty years of shared history, marred the Dutch-Caribbean relationship. Their leeriness of each other is understandable. Colonial spite3 is partly

2. I cite just two of the numerous references to this sense of responsibility. In 1985, Dutch politician Aad Nuys still spoke of “history as an inheritance which one cannot refuse” (Vol. 3, p. 67). Every time its feeling of responsibility was threatened with oblivion, the Netherlands was reminded of it. In 1971, the Suriname politician, Jagernath Lachmon, fearing for Creole-Hindustani riots after Suriname’s independence, pointed out to the Netherlands that “those who brought our forefathers here also bear the moral responsibility to see that the descendants of these immigrants do not squabble and go on to spill blood” (Vol. 1, p. 107).

3. Around 1940, the authoritarian Suriname governor, J.C. Kielstra wrote to the Dutch minister Ch.I.M. Welter that “a desire for responsibility for one’s own fate is not a predominant trait of Surinamers” (Vol. 1, p. 67). Variations on this statement would return regularly even after the new relationship was established.
the cause for Dutch apprehension regarding the ability of Surinamers and Antilleans to become autonomous. Reciprocally, irritations in Suriname and the Antilles may be explained by the patronizing attitude of the Dutch, which does not sit well with their acquired domestic independence.

In 1954, the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial relationship was precipitated by *Het Statuut*, "the highest legal arrangement within the Kingdom, to which the Dutch constitution and the special regulations [state regulations] of Suriname and the Dutch Antilles are subordinated." The *Statuut* provided for a system of law by which the three countries would each promote its own interests independently, take care of its joint affairs on equal terms, and give support to one another. Foreign relations and defense would remain the responsibility of the Kingdom; the government of the Kingdom would consist of the Dutch government supplemented with ministers plenipotentiary from Suriname and the Antilles. And while responsibility for the realization of fundamental human rights and freedoms and legal security and for the reliability and honesty of the government was carried over to the individual countries (the Netherlands, Suriname, the Antilles), safeguarding these was an affair of the Kingdom (*Statuut*, art. 3). Because each of the participating countries had to agree to changes in the *Statuut*, it would turn out to be so difficult to change that Oostindie and Klinkers would speak of "galling Kingdom bonds." The relations between the various islands of the Netherlands Antilles, were, after all, fixed in a separate "island regulation for the Netherlands Antilles" (ERNA), whereby the individual islands would eventually take on more tasks to be carried out autonomously.

Although the Netherlands was proud of the *Statuut*, and Suriname and the Antilles were for the most part content, it was soon evident that this statute had not been written to last in perpetuity. Particularly (Creole) nationalists in Suriname would press increasingly insistently for independence. The acquiescence of the Dutch to this demand in 1975, at the time of the progressive Den Uyl administration, would always remain controversial. Suriname’s Hindustanis wanted to maintain relations with the Netherlands, and in Suriname’s parliament, the majority on the side of independence was slim and suspicious. What is more, there was no referendum on Suriname’s independence. Dutch consent to change the statute was said to result from a socialist trauma caused by Indonesian decolonization, from the Netherlands’ close relations with nationalistic Creoles, from possible pressure from the UN and, most of all, from the sharply increasing immigration of Surinamese, which caused the Netherlands to feel a threat to its stable domestic relations. When Suriname became independent, the Netherlands gave it a dowry of 3 billion guilders (of which a portion has not yet been transferred to Suriname), to be spent over fifteen years. Those who oppose independence (as well as some proponents of independence in the Netherlands) consider the sum,
which was intended to stimulate economic development, as an attempt at redemption.

Developments after 1975 were to influence the statutory relations and also lead to tensions. The Antilles were bound to the Netherlands by the funds the latter handed out. Dutch financial support (as much as 5 percent of its budget for development assistance), which the Antilles continued to require, was accompanied by the Netherlands’ wish to oversee the manner in which it was spent (“it’s our taxpayers’ money”), which many Antilleans considered an attack on their autonomy. This type of friction also arose as a result of Dutch comments about the quality of government. Conversely, politicians in The Hague lost sleep over the possibility that troops might need to be deployed during a period of unrest in the Antilles (like in Curaçao in 1969), because, although it was outlined in the statute, this could be seen elsewhere as neocolonial intervention. It is therefore not surprising that Dutch politicians advocated Antillean independence to rid the Netherlands of this image. Because the Antilles did not want Dutch interference but did want Dutch guarantees and financial aid, these pleas fell on deaf ears.

For a brief period, nonetheless, some steps in the direction of independence seemed to be taken. Contradictions within the country of the Netherlands Antilles (between Curaçao and Aruba) would lead to the revision, in 1986, of the statute; Aruba gained the status of a country alongside the “Antillean five” (namely, Curaçao, Bonaire, St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba). By granting this Status Aparte, Aruba was ready for complete independence, to be realized by 1996. But Aruba was not pleased and retained its autonomy within the Kingdom even after 1996.

Good intentions, but the outcome was not always pleasant: while the new country of Aruba prospered and could provide for itself even with the almost complete cessation of Dutch financial support, the Netherlands Antilles has, for years, been in almost a crisis situation, which has helped to stimulate significant emigration to the mother country, where much of the youth is not able to adapt, or only with the greatest difficulty. The Antillean problems led St. Maarten to desire the Status Aparte; this wish provoked irritation on the Dutch side, where the question of whether the Antilles might count on its budgetary support was made independent of the IMF’s endorsement of Antillean economic policy – and this endorsement has thus far not been accorded. The Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba remain bound to each other by the Statuut, but the bond is felt to be too constrictive to make both sides happy, and this is thoroughly elucidated in the work under review.
This courageous work addresses a contradiction. Anthropologists writing of Maroons and Indigenous peoples in colonial Suriname traditionally described them as "states within a state," peoples who by common agreement largely looked after their own affairs. Yet postcolonial Suriname claims that these peoples and their resources have from the very beginnings of settlement formed an integral part of the state. Ellen-Rose Kambel, originally trained as a jurist, has the chutzpah to demonstrate, by careful digging through the legal history of the country, how the state's current narrative is a largely (and relatively recently) made-up story, one that can be effectively challenged on historical as well as legal grounds.

Chapter 1, "Historical Background: Indigenous Peoples, Resource Laws and the State (1650-1992)," adduces rich documentation to show that "at least until the 1950s Indigenous peoples and Maroons were not considered to be part of Surinamese society" (p. 30) and were often treated as "separate nations" (p. 53), and that even twentieth-century Suriname laws and agreements frequently referred, for example, to "the self-government of the Aukaners [Maroons]" (my emphasis, p. 33). The collective writings of those anthropologists who worked with Maroons from the 1950s into the 1970s – Andre Köbben, Bonno Thoden van Velzen, Ineke van Wetering, and Diane Vernon for the Ndyuka, Ted Green, Chris de Beet, and Miriam Sterman for the Matawai, John Lenoir for the Paramaka, Thomas Price and Shelby Givens for the Aluku, and Sally Price and I for the Saramaka – certainly lend strong support to the assertion that successive governments in Suriname consistently (with the notable exception of the Afobaka dam land expropriation) treated Maroons as far-off "others," as fully "states within a state."

Chapter 2, "Who Owns Suriname: Questioning the Conventional Story," is a reasoned assault on what has become received wisdom within the country, that "Indigenous peoples and Maroons have no recognised rights in Surinamese law" (p. 88) and that "the state owns and has always owned all land in Suriname including Indigenous and Maroon territories" (p. 119). Kambel traces these notions, now embedded within the country’s
legal system, largely to the ideas of a single man, the late law professor A.J.A. Quintus Bosz, whose publications (from the 1950s to the 1990s) have become the official basis for the state’s dealings with Indigenous peoples and Maroons. And, after showing that no one has ever seriously questioned such statements of his that, for example, “all land to which others have not proven ownership rights, belongs to the domain of the State” (p. 120), she goes on to do exactly that, showing that there is no evidence in the historical record to support them. The chapter also includes a discussion of the eighteenth-century Maroon treaties, concluding that “no evidence exists that the treaties with the Maroons have ever been lawfully terminated, nor did the Independence Treaty between the Netherlands and Suriname in 1975 affect the validity of the treaties” (p. 75).

Chapter 3, devoted to the land rights debate since 1995, asks why the “conventional story” continues to exercise such force in Suriname and describes the efforts of Indigenous peoples and Maroons to counter it by means of international human rights discourse. As for “why,” Kambel argues that “development” – a word that George Lamming (1995:30) once called “perhaps the most dangerously toxic word in our vocabulary” – and the exploitation of natural resources (timber, gold, bauxite) is perceived by urban Surinamers as the main road to “progress” and “modernization.” And she shows how this quest for development can lead to strange legal reasoning: the legal counsel for Golden Star Resources, which is building a giant gold mine on the site of the Maroon village of Nieuw-Koffiekamp (“Nieuw” because Koffiekamp’s residents were forcibly moved to this site when their villages were flooded by the Afobaka dam in the 1960s) “stated on the national radio that he considered the people of Nieuw-Koffiekamp to be ‘squatters.’” Kambel adds dryly, “a position which is very difficult to maintain considering that the inhabitants ... are living in houses, going to a school, and attending a church that was especially constructed for them by the government” (p. 122).

Chapter 4 offers local perspectives on the lands rights issue, derived from Kambel’s several-month-long fieldwork in a Lokono village and in a Kalin’a village. Based on numerous interviews and participant observation, she focuses on the Indigenous peoples’ insistence on communal (collective) land rights, as opposed to the individual titles that are found in national legislation, but she also explores local peoples’ ideas about nature reserves, forest exploitation, and much else. The next chapter stresses gender differences in local discourse about land, ranging over cosmovision, division of labor, and the local distribution of residence, farming, and hunting and fishing rights. And Chapter 6, the final in this series of three, considers the usefulness of international human rights law in protecting indigenous women’s rights to lands, laying out the two, often contradictory, dominant discourses, one focused on “Indigenous rights,” the other on “women’s
rights.” It comes to the conclusion that for Indigenous women in Suriname (and perhaps elsewhere in lowland South America), exclusive focus on the “women’s rights” approach will do more harm than good. Leading readers through a morass of international law cases, Kambel concludes that “in order to protect Indigenous women’s access to and control over land adequately, it is important to apply Indigenous rights and the principle of non-sex discrimination simultaneously” (p. 226).

In a work that, perhaps, tries to do too many things at once – a history and critique of land rights legislation in Suriname and international law, with a special focus on Indigenous women’s needs – the final chapter tries both to summarize what has come before and provide an extension of some of the arguments. “Published” in present form as a doctoral dissertation at Leiden University, the text deserves to be tightened up and properly published so that it may reach a wider audience of people interested in human rights law and conflicts over resources. It is a fitting companion to The Rights of Indigenous People and Maroons in Suriname, which Kambel co-authored with Fergus MacKay in 1999 (see the review in NWIG 74:353-56), and which is now available in Dutch as De rechten van inheemse volken en marrons in Suriname (KITLV Press, 2003).

REFERENCE


PETER REDFIELD
Department of Anthropology
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill NC 27599-3115, U.S.A.
<redfield@unc.edu>

For almost four decades now, Richard and Sally Price have devoted themselves to the study of Maroon societies in the New World, concentrating on the Saramaka people of Suriname. Over this time they have produced a remarkable series of individually and jointly authored works, ever meticulous
in scholarly detail, but increasingly experimental in analytic frame or mode of presentation. Their latest offering marks yet another departure: together they have produced a short, clear, relatively conventional introduction to Maroon peoples in French Guiana, published in French and made available to the local reading public.

As the title would suggest, *Les Marrons* aims to provide a measure of comprehensive coverage within its concision, equipping the reader with an essential framework for grasping Maroon life past and present. While any distillation of specialist knowledge provokes scholarly anxieties — detail being the hard currency of academic authority, after all — the Prices succeed admirably in producing a digestible précis that does justice to the topic and their engagement with it alike. Moreover, the result is resplendent; chockablock with illustrations, informational sidebars, and lively colors, this slim book is as aesthetically bright as the artwork it describes.

A brief preface announces the central ambition of the text: to offer a more accurate portrayal of Maroon life than that of circulating stereotypes, one available to all interested readers in French Guiana, including Maroons, especially those of a younger generation who may have lost personal access to their ancestral history. The authors underscore four points at the outset: 1) that Maroons in the region belong to six distinct groups, divided by language, territory, and historical rivalries; 2) that Maroons now collectively compose some 20 percent of French Guiana’s population, placing them second to only to Creoles in demographic significance; 3) that none of these contemporary Maroon groups originated in French Guiana, but all initially formed in Suriname and migrated at distinct historical moments; and 4) that Maroons have established an international reputation for cultural richness and historical knowledge. They also explain their preference for the term “Marron” as a neutral collective marker in French, in opposition to local alternatives such as “Buschinengué” that preference some of French Guiana’s Maroons over others. Next comes a series of short sections providing general background on the subject. The first of these sketches the establishment of new societies by escaped slaves along the edges of the New World’s plantation complex, before they move their focus to the Guianas. This is followed by an outline of the conditions under which enduring Maroon groups emerged in Dutch Guiana during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, graphically summarized by the well-known, but ever-disturbing engravings of William Blake. Readers are then given a quick sense of differences between these Maroon peoples alongside their overall cultural and linguistic similarities.

After this introductory material, the Prices turn to a more extended study of the presence of four of these groups in French Guiana before 1970. Drawing extensively on the work of Kenneth Bilby, they first trace the historical trajectory of the Aluku (or Boni), a relatively small Maroon group whose territorial position eventually led them to be included within
the French administrative imagination. By virtue of occupying the right side of a riverbank at the right moment in history, the Aluku now enjoy French citizenship, the only Maroon group to do so. The authors then present the case of the Saramaka, the people they know best, whose homeland lies deeper within Suriname. Numbers of Saramaka men begin to migrate to French Guiana for work as early as the 1860s and 1870s, a fact that will no doubt surprise many in Cayenne. During the subsequent gold rush they cornered the market in river transport by canoe and appeared in settlements along the coast. Saramakas sometimes worked as bounty hunters for the penal colony, and in the 1960s they comprised a significant part of the labor force that built the space center at Kourou. Finally the Prices introduce the Ndyuka (Ndjuka) and Paramaka, whose territories lie further down the same border river as that of the Aluku, but who lived on the Dutch side until the 1970s. Unlike the officially recognized Aluku and the more itinerant Saramaka, the Ndyuka and Paramaka kept close to the Maroni River basin, and consequently remained on French Guiana’s periphery.

A second extended section covers the presence of Maroons in the French department over the last three decades. Two key political transformations deeply affected these populations during this period. Those resident in Suriname experienced that state’s independence in 1975, followed by a coup in 1980 and a small but brutal civil war between 1986 and 1992 in which Maroons found themselves a primary target. Those resident in French Guiana, on the other hand, experienced a new policy of *francisation* beginning in 1969, which sought to bring their everyday lives into accord with French norms. The Prices outline the consequences of these developments for Maroon peoples, including the exodus of many from Suriname into French Guiana as refugees and the erosion of traditional structures of authority in the face of the greater machinery of French bureaucracy. They also cast an eye on the chaos caused by the more recent gold rush in the department’s interior, producing a “Wild West” atmosphere in the traditional territory of the Aluku. The chapter ends with a survey of the most important coastal settlements where Maroons now have an established presence (St. Laurent, Mana, the space town Kourou, and the capital Cayenne) along with images testifying to their often marginal existence amid an ever expanding horizon of commodities.

The last section of the text provides the reader with a short orientation about future prospects for Maroons, emphasizing disparities between the Aluku and members of other groups who, while five times as numerous, lack the crucial legal advantage of French citizenship. Here the spirit of advocacy animating the work grows most clear. In addition to documenting signs of impending cultural transformation in increased intermarriage and new musical forms, the Prices make a series of pointed observations about the plight of the Saramaka and other undocumented Maroons before current
French law and call for remedies from Paris. The book then closes with a condensed, but still lavish folio of Maroon art in wood and cloth, as well as a list of recommended readings and notes to assist anyone seeking a deeper engagement with the subject.

Recent years have seen much discussion of “public anthropology” at anthropological meetings in the United States, indexing a desire among some academics to put their knowledge into wider circulation and influence practice. Here the Prices are clearly engaging a particular public in a specific way, without bothering to claim the mantle of a more grandiose agenda. *Les Marrons* challenges teachers, lawyers, and the greater apparatus of social welfare in French Guiana with a perfectly approachable opportunity to learn more about Maroons, while arming Maroons themselves, particularly the Saramaka, with a small but significant arsenal of facts. And while the general material may be familiar to long-time readers of the Prices elsewhere, they too will welcome the work, both for the cogent, up-to-date summation it offers, and for the impassioned and sustained sense of scholarly engagement it displays.


M A R Y C H A M B E R L A I N  
School of Arts and Humanities  
Oxford Brookes University  
Oxford OX3 0BP, U.K.  
<mcchamberlain@brookes.ac.uk>

While there has been considerable research into postemancipation adjustments, there has been relatively little that explores the continuities in political and cultural resistance from the nineteenth century into the twentieth or how and when the struggles for economic equality and political freedom metamorphosed into a quest for self-determination and nationhood. This collection is, therefore, to be welcomed. The essays, from a range of disciplinary perspectives, explore key moments, and people, in the development of a nationalist perspective in Barbados, from the slave revolt of 1816 to the economic challenges of the twenty-first century.

It is a timely and ambitious publication, for the debate on nationalism in Barbados is high on the contemporary cultural and political agenda. “In
tracing the lineaments of Barbadian nationalism," the editors argue, "one discerns a single theme of freedom, an empowering impulse, running through popular conceptions of nationhood, sometimes sitting uneasily alongside elite perceptions of the national interest" (p. x). Some of the book's essays address directly the theme of freedom: Hilary Beckles and Pedro Welch on the 1816 slave revolt and its aftermath, George Belle on Samuel Jackson Prescod, Sir Keith Hunte on Charles Duncan O'Neale and the Democratic League, and David Browne on the 1937 disturbances all focus on watersheds of resistance, when the "empowering impulse," in word or deed, became acute.

Other essays – by Hilary Beckles (again), Anthony Phillips, or Karl Watson – examine the political influences on, and consequences of, the twentieth-century leadership of Grantley Adams and Errol Barrow, and the ways in which they trod the tightrope between a populist impulse and elite constraints in carrying forward the project of independence and nationhood, while Don Marshall assesses the contemporary dilemmas, both internal and external, which face Barbados. Importantly, Glenford Howe and Rodney Worrell examine the ways in which pan-Caribbeanism and pan-Africanism contributed to a sense of national, if not regional, identity, pointing critically to the influence of migration on the nationalist project. Finally, Curwen Best, Korah Belgrave, and Richard Clarke provide essays on the impact and importance of popular culture, language, and the arts in contributing to, and reading from, a sense of national belonging.

This is, however, a very uneven collection, in terms of range, quality, and coherence. Many of the essays represent solid scholarly work on aspects of Barbadian political history and thought; some have been published elsewhere. For many of the essays, the link with "nationalism" is far from clear; in others, nationhood is elided uncritically with "freedom," "identity," or "empowerment." As a result, the book sometimes assumes the character of an anthology, representing canonical articles on Barbadian history, juxtaposed with new chapters (though not all based on new research) that introduce a hodgepodge of notions on Barbadian nationalism. Thus, Barbadian slaves may well have claimed a birthright in Barbados, and they may even have had a notion of an independent Barbados on the Haitian model, but it is stretching the argument to present the former slaves as proto-nationalists in the twentieth-century sense. Similarly, Richard Clarke's essay on the genealogy of the Barbadian personality, and Curwen Best's readings of dub suggest very different kinds of engagement with a notion of nation from those posited by, for instance, creolization in Pedro Welch's argument for the pre- and postemancipation period. Some writers – notably Howe in what is, incidentally, one of the best essays in the collection – point to the ways in which a regional identity pre-dated a national identity; yet the importance of a West Indian identity, for much of the history of the twentieth-century English-
speaking Caribbean, with its links both to migration, the Federation of the West Indies, and the future of the region are not fully developed elsewhere. Belle’s exposition of Prescod’s political prescience and sophistication – an essay which would have benefited from thorough editing – stands in contrast to Watson’s anecdotal appraisal of Grantley Adams, or Phillips’s discussion of Grantley Adams and English liberalism, neither of which addressed the critical issue of his role in the development of nationalism.

There are also gaps. The editors point to the essays which failed to materialize (on Clement Payne, on cricket, on the white Barbadian contribution to a nationalist tradition), but nothing appears to have been commissioned on, for instance, the Federation of the West Indies, or the Federation riots of 1875, or the political and intellectual linkages of Barbadian politicians, writers, and artists with independence struggles in Africa and elsewhere in the Caribbean from the 1930s (although Worrell’s essay on pan-Africanism attempts to address some of these wider influences). And while David Browne provides a useful demographic portrait of the rioters involved in the 1937 disturbances, there is no critical assessment of the importance of those riots to the political and cultural formation of Barbados, or of 1937 as a pivotal moment in the movement for independence.

A firmer editorial hand would have produced a provocative and important book, providing a coherent focus and a strategic grasp of what should and should not be included, eliminating repetitions, long windedness and jargon, and sustaining quality control throughout. The book would also have benefitted from a theoretically, conceptually, and historically informed introduction on nationalism, which could link the debates and continuities and explore the more recent literature on transnationalism and long-distance nationalism (e.g., Glick Schiller & Fouron 2001), central to understanding the social, economic, and political transformations in many Caribbean societies. Some organization by theme or chronology would have similarly improved its presentation and enabled a more coherent exploration of the evolution of a “nationalist tradition” through the various watersheds of postemancipation Barbadian history. What has emerged is, unfortunately, a ragged production which feels rushed and which lacks a critical, contextual and, sadly, historical edge.

Reference

A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba.

JEAN STUBBS
Caribbean Studies
London Metropolitan University
London N7 8DB, U.K.
<j.stubbs@londonmet.ac.uk>

This fascinating and major contribution to our growing knowledge of race in Cuba combines empirical and discourse analysis to unpack the myth and reality surrounding Martí’s dream of a racially egalitarian nation with all and for all. De la Fuente begins by posing three questions: How racially unequal has twentieth-century Cuban society been in education, the labor market, and power resources? What explains the relative position of blacks and whites? What roles have racial ideologies played in defining racial coexistence within the Cuban nation? His responses jostle contested ideologies of racial equality and racial hierarchy, linking nationalism, sovereignty, and independence to social justice across race and class lines, and highlighting battles for citizenship and competing notions of cubanidad.

The book is structured chronologically and thematically: Parts I and III cover the first and second republics (1902-33 and 1933-58); Parts II and IV examine inequality (1900-50s) and socialism (1959-90s). Early chapters on racial order versus racial democracy and electoral politics examine U.S.-backed racial exclusion supported by the propertied classes, juxtaposing the discourse of whitening, whereby affirmation of blackness was unpatriotic, with racial fraternity. Attempts to deracialize Cuba failed as notions of white generosity were contested by black assertiveness. The debate on citizenship, suffrage, and black enfranchisement accompanied Conservative and Liberal Party competition for the black vote; multiple forms of political action alongside black autonomous mobilization in the ill-fated Independent Colored Party; and accommodation of blacks in public administration after the ignominy of 1912.

Government-favored (white) Spanish family colonization ran counter to sugar company-favored (black) West Indian seasonal cheap labor, the demise of both ushered in by the 1930s depression, 50 percent Cuban labor laws, and forced repatriation. The years 1899-1931 saw the early proletarianization of the African Cuban peasantry, particularly in the east: black control over land fell 50 percent, in number of farms and total farmland, as blacks were early
victims of sugar latifundia and land dispossession; the resulting urban drift was then accentuated by the 1920s sugar collapse.

While there were increasing numbers of blacks in civil and military service and mobility through education, black professionals railed against hard-to-open gates into the middle classes and distanced themselves from the majority "low" blacks. Education and culture became a cornerstone of discourse; struggles were fought over segregated social spaces; Afro-Cuban societies became major routes for new generations of modernizing Afro-Cubans' social and political ascent.

The 1920s- and 1930s witnessed a reinvention of cubanidad and the Cuban race or color cubano. The association between communism and equality saw Communist Party membership one-third black in 1934 and three-quarters in 1944. Whites played on this, as well as on black support for Machado and Batista, both of whose regimes had elements of patronage for blacks. Conversely, black involvement in the anti-Machado and anti-Batista revolutions was minimized, oppositional elements to Batista also describing him as el mulatto malo and the "black beast." Fascism reinforced the centrality of race; the fight against fascism became the fight against racism and was central to 1939 debates for new constitutional order.

The revolutionary period falls neatly into two chapters. "Building a Nation for All" covers the 1959-89 years of breaking down hierarchies. Radical action led to early claims that discrimination had disappeared with class privilege, the antithesis of Miami where early Cuban refugees pushed out Afro-Americans and rejected later 1980s Cuban emigrés on grounds of class and race. Black/white indicators leveled for life expectancy and education, while major differences remained in housing, the criminal system, and prison population. Successes were linked to government performance, and this, De la Fuente demonstrates, was most hit in the 1990s, "The Special Period." Racial tensions increased with inequalities linked to remittances and tourism. Government policies to cope with crisis bolstered pervasive racist ideologies to create a surprising intensity of racial prejudice in popular consciousness and black resistance through informal and frequently illegal activities as blacks were displaced from more lucrative sectors. The poignant paradox is that, as new generations born and raised in socialist Cuba came of age, the socialist experiment began to unravel, and racialization of the crisis might lead to racially defined forms of organization and resistance further fueling racial tensions.

De la Fuente is arguably at his best on the early period, highlighting aspects crying out for further study, the black urban drift being one. Coverage of the period 1930s-50s comes over as weaker, for example glossing over the impact of the cold war on the ousting and assassination of (black) communists in late 1940s politics and the labor movement. In the context of recent debates on race in Cuba, he veers to a primacy of class
over race which may in part be a function of his positionality and his source material, drawing heavily as he does on the press and to a lesser extent on archival documents. There is a noticeable lack of attention to Afro-Cuban discourse and studies located outside the U.S.-Cuban/U.S.-Latin American axis or within an Afro-American or Pan-Caribbean context. This occasions some surprising bibliographical omissions; suffice it to mention Franklin Knight as one. Interestingly, the introduction begins with a black ex-maid asking the question, “Will my children be maids again?” It is fitting therefore to conclude by noting that, while De la Fuente’s study stands firm on its own ground, a recent testimonial novel of one such maid (Pérez Sarduy 2001) is demonstration of how important it is also to heed the subaltern voice.

REFERENCE


SHERYL L. LUTJENS
Political Science Department
Northern Arizona University
Flagstaff AZ 86011, U.S.A.
<sheryl.lutjens@nau.edu>

The future of Cuba has become a compelling question for Caribbeanists and other academicians who have attended, more and less carefully, to the forty-four years of the Cuban Revolution. The intrigue of a small socialist island continues in the post-cold war world, though the terms of academic engagement have shifted greatly. Scholars are not the only Cuba watchers, of course. If forecasting futures has become a dominant theme in recent writing on Cuba, the politics of “watching” provide a backdrop for interpreting the logic of real and anticipated change.

The dynamics and probable outcomes of the of the 1990s are the focus in this book edited by Susan Kaufman Purcell, vice president of the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas, and David J. Rothkopf, CEO
and chairman of Intellibridge Corporation. The short volume is the result of a Tinker Foundation-supported study group by the Americas Society that brought together members of the Americas Society, and others from corporations, the Tinker Foundation, the Wall Street Journal, the Council of Foreign Relations, and the American Enterprise Institute. The group met several times in 1999, and again in March 2000, with selected academics, policy analysts – including Otto Reich, the controversial Bush administration assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the minister-president of the Central Bank of Cuba, and Monsignor Carlos Manuel de Céspedes of Havana.

The invited papers and commentaries of the study group meetings are the foundations of seven chapters that address the process and prospects for economic and political change in Cuba. The introductory and concluding chapters by William M. LeoGrande (American University) contextualize the views of the contributors, which together do, as he suggests, offer “an invaluable picture of how things stand in Cuba” (p. 11). LeoGrande notes that competing perspectives of Cuban realities and reforms – in this case, “intelligent, moderate, and yet utterly at odds with one another” (p. 2) – make prediction difficult, but the difficulties are more than ideological positionings or social scientific shortcomings. Indeed, “so much still depends on the decision of the líder máximo, who has on occasion changed his mind and abruptly reversed course” (p. 1), while the dynamics of global capitalism must also be considered.

All the authors assume a future market liberalization of the Cuban economy, despite some differences with regard to how fast or slow reforms should and will proceed. In “After the Deluge? Cuba’s Potential as a Market Economy,” Manuel Pastor, Jr. (University of California, Santa Cruz) argues that systemic change is inevitable, yet “muddling through” will remain the pattern of policy-making (p. 36). Cuba has some advantages in its transition; it can learn from transitions elsewhere, geography facilitates access to U.S. markets, and Cuban Americans are poised to invest in the island economy. Political change is needed to realize these advantages, however, and Pastor is doubtful that such change will occur inside Cuba or in its relations with the United States. Despite other advantageous conditions for competing in the global marketplace, restructuring will require aid and social safety nets. Andrew Zimbalist (Smith College), another economist with a long-term interest in the study of Cuba, similarly concludes that the Cuban model is not viable, and his chapter, “Whither the Cuban Economy?,” proposes that practical policies can salvage “social gains” and help avoid the consequences of a “devastating collapse of the present system” (p. 27). The state might be important to Cuban success in the international economy, for example, yet it must permit competition from an expanded private sector; privatization
is critically important because allowing property-holding for island Cubans creates their stake in a future market society.

The matter of interests and stakes is raised in a different light in the chapter by Jaime Suchlicki (University of Miami), “Castro’s Cuba: Continuity Instead of Change.” Suchlicki is pessimistic about both short- and long-term change. He explains resistance to change in terms of the regime’s totalitarian foundations; resistance is institutional (the party, military, and security apparatus) and will outlast Castro. Economic conditions confound any meaningful emulation of the Chinese model, while better economic relations with other countries will not resolve Cuba’s ongoing crisis. Suchlicki concludes that for Castro, “political considerations are paramount” (p. 78).

The nature of political considerations is problematized by the two chapters devoted directly to the past and future of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Kaufman Purcell’s chapter, “Why the Cuban Embargo Makes Sense in a Post-Cold War World,” argues that the embargo should remain as the core of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Critics who see it as a complete failure are wrong, and the alternative of constructive engagement, apparent in other countries’ relations with Cuba, has not rendered results. Lifting the embargo will only “help Castro and hurt the United States,” according to Purcell (p. 91). In contrast is Rothkopf’s essay, “A Call for a Post-Cold War Cuba Policy ... Ten Years After the End of the Cold War.” Rothkopf wonders what the U.S. national interest actually is in the post-cold war context of bilateral relations with Cuba. Cuba is not a security risk at this point, and Rothkopf believes that the embargo has alienated allies, disadvantaged U.S. businesses, and “punished the Cuban people more harshly than their own government” (p. 124). For him, Cuba policy is a problem of U.S. domestic politics, rather than foreign policy, and the best tack now is to permit the Cuban people to “experience the benefits of capitalism and democracy” (p. 124).

Cuba: The Contours of Change successfully draws the reader into the difficult realities of contemporary Cuba, highlighting the dilemmas of change as they are viewed from the United States. LeoGrande’s final chapter is titled “Cuba’s Dilemma and Ours,” and he concludes that a “chief obstacle” to gradual and distributionally-sensitive transition is that Castro will not “accept that his socialist experiment has failed” (p. 128). One is left to wonder what the Cuban view of their dilemmas and their future might be, especially given the shock-like restructuring of the sugar industry in summer 2002 and the hard-line Bush administration perspective of Cuba in post-September 11 security policies.
Robert Fatton, Jr. has come home. Having written extensively on African politics, he offers, in this latest book, an in-depth study of his native country’s "unending transition to democracy" since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986. *Haiti's Predatory Republic*’s main thesis is that liberal democracy is a result of a balance of forces among competing classes – i.e. bourgeoisie and working class – stemming from the realization that one class cannot seize state power by force and hope to govern indefinitely and exclusively without incurring the wrath of the other(s). In the absence of this balance, which, once again, compels (and eventually habituates) classes to come to a political entente, democracy becomes predatory.

A predatory democracy combines liberal democracy with aspects of authoritarian rule, such as executive dominance of the other branches of government and extreme corruption. It is little more than a cover for *la politique du ventre* carried out by elected protomonarchical despots. Such is the case in Haiti, where the various disfunctionalities of the economic base (i.e. a peasant subsistence economy where the tools of production are clearly outdated, environmental degradation, population growth, illiteracy, etc.) and a disabling historical legacy produce neither a bourgeoisie nor a working class. Control of the state is the means by which the dominant classes, divided between a *classe possédante* in the economic sense and a ruling class or state “bourgeoisie,” conspire to keep *le peuple* in its place. In this dispensation, says Fatton, it does not matter what type of regime or constitutional arrangements are made, for ultimately class configuration determines politics. The election that brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his Lavalas movement to power in 1990 threatened to offset the status quo; the coup that overthrew Aristide in September 1991 was a reaction bound to happen.

There is much to be admired about *Haiti’s Predatory Republic*: its prose, the clarity of its arguments, its blend of case study and theory, and its courage for taking on the hegemonic worldview (i.e. mainstream democratization theory). Indeed, because it goes against the grain, and does so with passion
and erudition, the book is a tour de force, a welcome, and I daresay overdue, counterpoint to the dominant paradigm. Fatton convincingly demonstrates that democracy, a most innocuous-sounding concept which on the surface should elicit no overt opposition, can be used as a weapon in the maintenance of social inequity. However, Fatton does not reject liberal democracy as “false consciousness.” Instead, he calls for its intensification to include the masses and popular control over the economy. Thus, he aptly uses class to critique democracy, but accepts its utility as a sociopolitical project. This makes him a radical or integral democrat.

One may quarrel with Fatton on some analytical and Haiti-related issues. His class-based analysis, although not as dogmatic as Marxian analyses tend to be, seems at times overly mechanistic and deterministic. Institutions, ideas, and decisions made at key points in history matter for the latter’s dénouement; they are not simply “residual” phenomena, while the balance of classes remains preeminent. In the Haiti case, it is not at all clear that the coup that toppled President Aristide in 1991 would have succeeded (though it might have happened) had he appointed Hérard Abraham to head the army (FAD’H) rather than Raoul Cédras, or had the former priest been more inclined to work with the group (FNCD) that had allowed him to run under its banner, rather than antagonize the entire Haitian political class. In fact, Aristide’s on-again, off-again presidential tenure in the last twelve years may be seen as a series of political missteps and oversimplifications, from which he never seems to learn, and even when he does, it is only after considerable damage to himself, his cause and, more importantly, Haiti. The man’s decision-making has not displayed the type of “princely” qualities that might have made for a smooth (or at least less bumpy) transition to democracy. Simply put, leaders matter, and class, while not unimportant, must not be overrated.

Further, the discussion of Haiti as a country ruled by a mulatto-dominated economic elite of foreign origin and a black middle class in control of the state, with both hell-bent in excluding the majority from enjoying the few resources of the country, should be qualified. The fact that Haitian entrepreneurs have significant investment in the Dominican Republic, where presumably they pay taxes, perhaps even more than they would have in Haiti, suggests that they are not viscerally averse to redistribution. What they object to – and I have talked to a number of Haitian “bourgeois” in the last two years, perhaps the same ones who confided in Fatton – is a predatory state led by a demagogue who takes their taxes but does nothing in return, except fanning the flame of class resentment to hide his government’s incompetence.

Finally, a strong argument can be made that the Haitian crisis is so profound and multidimensional that it transcends class. Haiti faces state collapse (i.e. anarchy) and ecological disaster (as a result of deforestation
and population growth), in addition to acute class struggles over a shrinking national pie and a rocky transition to democracy. Hobbes and Malthus may provide as much insight into today’s Haiti as Marx. Be that as it may, Fatton’s *Haiti’s Predatory Republic* is an excellent reacquaintance with the latter.


ELIZABETH McALISTER
Department of Religion
Wesleyan University
Middletown CT 06459, U.S.A.
<emcalister@wesleyan.edu>

Beverly Bell’s *Walking on Fire* is extraordinary in that it brings to print first-person narratives of excruciating and harrowing violence that are at once narratives of survival, resistance, and overcoming. The book is really an edited volume of (mostly poor, mostly nonliterate) Haitian women’s testimonies about life during and after the coup d’état against Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991-94), framed by contextualizing analysis. Entering the anthropological conversations about everyday acts of resistance generated by James C. Scott (1990), Bell’s central argument is that Haitian women engage in resistance, or “the negotiation of power by the weaker against the strong,” in many ways that are usually overlooked. In her book, then, “the definition of resistance is expanded to include any act that keeps the margins of power from being further encroached upon, even where the protagonist cannot expand those margins.” Trapped at the bottom of a system of structured inequality, “if [a woman] does no more than maintain her resources and rights – in the face of attempts by other people, institutions, or systems to deny her them – then she practices resistance” (p. 5).

Poor Haitian women are indeed among the world’s most disenfranchised people, oppressed by class, race, and gender in the poorest country in the West. Most of the women featured in the volume are members of one of the loosely organized coalitions of grassroots groups known as the “popular movement.” Each woman, then, is engaged in some aspect of political organizing, collective action, or cooperative living. A central theme in the women’s narratives is that it is through collective efforts that meaning-making analysis is forged and dignity is recovered. In Bell’s book, poor Haitian women come
to an understanding of their situation, their victimization, and themselves, which allows them to recover the selves that have been traumatized. It is this transformative process that the women in the book undergo – by speaking their stories to their comrades in collectives and, one senses, in recounting their narratives to Bell. Because of this transformation operating in most of the stories, the tone of the volume is often celebratory, even optimistic, in the face of relentlessly harsh realities.

One extraordinary story is that of Tibebe ("little baby"), presented in a section titled "Resistance as Survival." A product of the rape of her mother, a servant, by her employer’s son, she is born on a street corner and never issued a birth certificate or a proper name. She is given away by her mother to be a restavek, a child slave. When her biological aunt sees her as an older child, she realizes Tibebe is a relative, and gives her the name – and the birth certificate – of her biological father’s legitimate daughter, who has just died. At the end of her father’s life the family abandons him in his loss of fortune and it is Tibebe who pays for his funeral. Tibebe is finally taken to a women’s group, where, she says, “They made feel like I exist in society. I became a person” (p. 44). Exemplifying the problems of structural poverty, the child slave system, illiteracy, and violence against women, this first-person narrative presents primary source evidence of the local and the specific within the contextualized analysis Bell brings to bear on the structural and systemic.

Bell’s methods are noteworthy: she develops a process of interviewing poor members of what she loosely terms the “women’s movement,” traveling to women’s dwelling places and recording their stories in Creole. She holds a small tape recorder and invites: “Tell me anything you want about your life, about what it’s like to be a Haitian woman” (p. xv). After transcribing and editing the interviews, she meets them again to read back their words, and they work together to reshape the text to their specifications. The results – oral histories, testimonies – are highly constructed and edited, but the important point here is that they are edited in collaboration with the subjects themselves. This methodology is time-intensive and could be considered problematic from the point of view of the tradition of single authorship, but it addresses problems that have long vexed subaltern studies in that it presents stories authored and edited by poor women themselves. If each narrator performs a pattern of redemption of sorts – she was a hopeless victim but now she is a dignified human being who is oppressed yet politically aware – perhaps that is ultimately the evidence for the book’s message. It is through collective association and narrative construction (meaning-making) that the oppressed, and victims of violence, can regain their humanity and negotiate power.

Another truly extraordinary story is that of Alerte Belance, whose narrative is presented in a section entitled “Resistance for Political and
Economic Change.” A grassroots community organizer who spoke out in her poor neighborhood against the 1991 coup d’état, Belance was kidnapped and brought to the infamous “killing field” of Titanyen, outside Port-au-Prince. Hacked in the head and arms with a machete, Belance was left for dead but managed to survive, one arm severed, face and tongue cut in half. “They killed me that night in Titanyen,” begins her story (p. 104). Her attackers were members of the paramilitary group FRAPH, who were financed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to destabilize Aristide’s government (p. 13). She has since filed a lawsuit against that organization and is supported by several international human rights groups. It is Belance who is given the last word in the volume, and she extends the book’s argument by speaking directly to enfranchised North Americans: “You who are not victims, you should lend a hand. Because many hands make the burden light” (p. 234).

REFERENCE


GÉRARD COLLOMB
LAIOS /CNRS
54 Boulevard Raspail
F - 94120 Paris, France
<collomb@msh-paris.fr>

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Caribs were only a handful of persons in British Dominica, who occupied a narrow area in the eastern part of the island, the “Carib Reserve.” These Amerindians — “remnants of the conquest” — were the descendants of the Caribs encountered by the European “discoverers,” and had inherited all the stereotypes formed throughout the colonial period. Ever since the first contacts, they have held a special place in the European imagination, exemplifying for visitors to the island the type of
fierce warriors who fought against European invaders for three centuries and forced the peaceful and gentle Arawaks westward to the greater Antilles.

Continuing work he had begun in *Colonial Encounters*, Peter Hulme offers here a detailed account of writers who have visited the Caribs in Dominica since the end of the nineteenth century. The book makes “travel writing” an object of scholarly attention, applying to it the techniques of literary analysis. It deals with five moments, five narrative genres and finally five approaches to the Caribs of Dominica. This people was rediscovered in the 1870s, when the American ornithologist Frederick Albion Ober came to the island, stumbling across the Caribs while looking for birds. Ober was the first traveler since the middle of the eighteenth century to take interest in this group, hidden in one of the most isolated islands in the Caribbean. There he found the material to paint a portrait of Carib culture to which other nineteenth-century visitors often referred in their descriptions of Carib life. With Ober, the Caribs were not simply viewed through a Western eye; they were reassessed and looked at as vanishing Indians, in contrast to the previous image of them as warlike cannibal fighters. This idea of a present degradation of a former greatness remained as a dominant image through subsequent writings.

Hesketh Bell, a British administrator of Dominica and an amateur anthropologist, represents another important figure in Hulme’s book. He was the one who, in 1903, formalized the Carib “reserve” in Dominica, and set the territorial boundaries with which the Caribs still live today – providing protection from outside incursions and sale of land by individual Caribs, but also (as Hulme points out) fixing “the essentially unfixable” in an inadequate survey, thus creating a lasting resentment. Douglas Taylor, the British linguist and ethnographer, represents another important character in the book; as a European, he had a “visitor’s” view of the Caribs. But at the same time he lived for many years with a Carib woman and was much involved in Dominican and Carib life and society in the 1930s, after the dreadful episode which is known as the “Carib war.” Taylor became an authority on Carib language and way of life, and his work has had a strong influence on Carib studies.

Other figures in Hulme’s book are the novelist Jean Rhys (who was born in a Dominican family and left the island in 1907, but came back for a visit to the Caribs thirty years later) and several more contemporary writers, such as the French novelist Jean Raspail and the British traveler Patrick Leigh Fermor. Hulme points out that Fermor, like Ober a century earlier, became a frequent reference for travel literature on the Caribs, opening the way for “followers,” whether novelists or those quintessentially modern travelers – tourists.

*Remnants of Conquest* constitutes a key contribution toward an anthropology of postcolonial societies in the Caribbean and the native
lowlands of South America. It gives readers a great deal of historical information about the Amerindians of Dominica, in a time when they were no longer "savages" but not yet of ethnographic interest, after a century during which they were forgotten, and it contextualizes literary and ethnographic texts within both the political history of colonization in the Caribbean and the history of anthropology. Hulme reminds us that the writings of visitors — whether anthropologists, administrators, or tourists — have strongly contributed to shaping an image of the group. As he explains, the Caribs were "passive recipients of those who deemed them visitable." They were not only looked at by these visitors, above all they were "to be looked at," in a period when new ways to view people — tourism, sightseeing, and photography — were being developed. The last chapters of the book explain how these colonial images, which can be made out between the lines of much contemporary writing, are still involved in the making of a present-day "Caribness" or "Carib identity" in that small eastern portion of an independent Dominica, which is no more a Carib reserve and has been renamed Carib territory by the Caribs of today.

Postcolonial Paradoxes in French Caribbean Writing: Césaire, Glissant, Condé. JEANNIE SUK. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 216 pp. (Cloth US$ 70.00)

CHRIS BONGIE
Department of English
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada
<bongiec@qsilver.queensu.ca>

What struck me after finishing this quaintly deconstructionist account of three extremely canonical French Caribbean writers was that over half the book is devoted to the novels of Maryse Condé. This curious asymmetry, in a work ostensibly devoted to three authors, is worth highlighting here not (simply) because it testifies to a structural flaw, but because it draws attention to the startling fact that even now, some thirty years after she came on the literary scene, no single-author monograph on Condé has appeared in either French or English (apart from a slim erstwhile-dissertation on her plays published last year by Peter Lang). Why, despite the ever-growing heap of articles on, and interviews with, this prolific novelist has no one devoted an entire book to someone who can legitimately be called the doyenne of Francophone
studies in the United States? The reason for this, I would suggest, is that the “Francophone critic” – ever intent on making arguments about aesthetic and political resistance, on situating texts in some mythical “denunciatory tradition” – would be hard-pressed to provide a book-length overview of Condé’s entire oeuvre without having his or her ideological biases severely tested: our hypothetical critic would have to face up to the fact that Condé’s novels are not always (and are not aimed to be) the resistant triumph, be it aesthetic or political, that mainstream Francophone criticism demands from its consecrated authors, as well as to the possibility that, as her popularity suggests, Condé might in certain respects be looked upon as the very model of a resolutely middlebrow novelist – the sort of writer that, in theory, Francophone and postcolonial literary icons are quite simply not supposed to be. In subterranean fashion, a haunting awareness of the middlebrow nature of so many of Condé’s novels has curtailed the amount and type of critical attention that the Francophone culture industry has been willing to invest in one of their star players. Rather than consider at length the diversity of her work – including its disturbing (for the Francophone critic) marketability and its by no means unquestionable (for the aesthetically-minded critic) literary value – people have found it far more gratifying for the most part to fixate upon the holy trinity of Heremakhonon; I, Tituba; and Crossing the Mangrove as “representative” works, and write article after article on these “indisputable” masterpieces, praising them for embodying or disrupting whatever critical orthodoxy (antillanité, créolité, hybridity, nomadism, diasporicity, etc.) happens to be in fashion at the time of writing.

Although she acknowledges that “of all the Antilleans currently writing, Condé is perhaps the best known, her books the most popular on the international literary scene” (p. 21), Suk predictably fails to pursue the implications of this potentially destabilizing insight into Condé’s middlebrow popularity. Instead, she chooses the well-worn path of her critical predecessors, interrogating with deadly seriousness the “big three” novels, while throwing in by way of novelty an ambitious reading of archetypes in Condé’s second novel, the Afro-potboiler, Season in Rihata (pp. 103-16). If Suk attempts to differentiate herself from the standard Francophone approach, it is not by emphasizing the “low” aspects of Condé’s work (aspects to which only a cultural-studies-type analysis could do justice), but by taking the “high” road of a belatedly deconstructionist approach that may well provoke in a handful of readers no small nostalgia for the days when it was fashionable to gird one’s articles with references to Paul de Man and Barbara Johnson. A few examples of the often inflated rhetoric through which Suk ups the critical ante in talking about Condé’s novels should suffice to give an idea of where she is coming from: “What comes into focus in the moment of being postcolonial,” we are told at the end of her discussion of Season, “is also the now possible condition of asking what becomes the impossible
question of allegory” (p. 116); the central figure of sorcery in Tituba “strives simultaneously to allegorize literature and to transcend allegory” (p. 148). Time and again we encounter in (Suk’s) Condé the “postcolonial paradoxes” referred to in the title, which prove to be nothing more (or less) than the same old paradoxes of which deconstructionists were so fond (crossings that cross by not crossing, and so on). Her allegiance to this now rather unfashionable, and very homogenizing, highbrow critical approach occasionally frees Suk up to contest cliché-ridden Francophone-studies interpretations of Condé (as when she argues against Elisabeth Mudimbe-Boyi’s “enthused emphasis on Condé’s unveiling of the ‘power and presence,’ and the preservation of the ‘integrity and authenticity,’ of Tituba’s voice” [p. 119], or politely dissents from Françoise Lionnet’s reading of Crossing the Mangrove [pp. 149-50]), but such refreshingly polemical moments are few and far between in the at times admirably clever, but just as often tiresomely self-indulgent and unmotivated, readings of Condé on offer in this book.

Notwithstanding its obvious limitations, Suk’s highbrow take on Condé has a certain vibrancy – if only because the latter’s novels just barely support the sort of arduous theory-drenched readings that Suk wants to extract from them, and the resultant tension between novelist and critic, while at times comical, is also occasionally productive. No such tension exists between Suk and the modernist “masters” she examines in the first two chapters of her book: for that reason, her accounts of the “rich re-encounter with [a] problematic exoticism” in Césaire’s Cahier (p. 36) and of the role of “traumatic modes of experience, thinking, and narration” in Glissant’s Discours antillais (p. 82) seem rather less forced than the later chapters on Condé, but they are also decidedly less energetic and suffer even more from the lack of direction that characterizes the entire book (and that is sadly anticipated in its meandering introduction). In revising her thesis for publication, Suk would have been well advised – if for no other reason than commercial caniness – to dump the chapters on Césaire and Glissant, abandon much of the emphasis on “the peculiar dynamics of allegory, trauma, and the space-time world of Antillean culture” (p. 184) that provides a supposedly “unifying” framework for her book, and transform her manuscript into the first book-length study of Condé. To be sure, an entire book of deconstructionist analysis devoted to “the discomforts and paradoxes of postcoloniality” in Condé would have been excessive, but limiting her focus to this single author – an author whose largely mainstream novels in so many ways resist the demands of Suk’s highbrow deconstructionism – might well have forced her to reconsider and redirect her argument, to diversify her homogenizing analysis, and provide a more comprehensive and layered account of Condé. That Suk might have been capable of moving in other critical directions becomes apparent in her brief and curiously self-deflating epilogue (pp. 181-85), perhaps the strongest and most direct piece of writing in the entire book, where she voices a certain
confusion as to what exactly she has accomplished and seems unsure of why she wanted to accomplish it in the first place. "There may," she tentatively offers, in a comment that reflects with no small irony on her own enterprise, "be a point at which paradoxes stop being useful triggers for reflection and start to become obfuscating, forbidding, evasive, and regressive" (p. 184). Most readers of this intelligent but deeply flawed tome will have reached that conclusion a good many pages before its author does.


MARIE-HÉLÈNE LAFOREST
Department of English
Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale"
80134 Naples, Italy
<mhlaforest@iuo.it>

That two mainstream publishers have put out books on women writers of the African diaspora in the same year testifies to the place these women have come to occupy in the contemporary literary world.

Rody's The Daughter's Return and Hoving's In Praise of New Travelers approach African American and Caribbean literature differently and examine different women writers (except for Michelle Cliff, to whom each dedicates a full chapter). Rody looks for trends, tropes, and archetypes in African American and Caribbean women's novels; Hoving offers a close reading of work by several Caribbean women, namely Beryl Gilroy, Merle Collins, Grace Nichols, Jamaica Kincaid, Michelle Cliff, and Marlene Nourbese Philip. Both books leave out Erna Brodber and, although this is no criticism of the texts themselves, it is unfortunate. Despite Brodber's three novels and the constant use of the metaphor of the kumbla throughout Caribbean women's criticism and in these two volumes, Brodber is not generally included in critical works which deal with literature of the 1980s and 1990s.

The Daughter's Return deals with the burden of history – specifically, with women's relationship to ancestral female figures. Rody shows how the
desire to suture the tears, fractures, and disjunction of families brought about
by slavery has led black women writers to transcend time and directly link
their lives to those of their enslaved foremothers. She traces this trend in
African American and Caribbean women writers and identifies June Jordan’s
*Jubilee* (1966) as the novel that inaugurated the topology of these mother-
daughter epics.

In the first part, Rody identifies a magic black daughter archetype in
African American women’s literature; the second part, dedicated to the
Caribbean, is more varied and less conducive to generalizations. The multi-
etnic, polyglot Caribbean has resisted efforts at classification, and women’s
historical writing is no exception. Indeed, despite her working hypothesis,
Rody is bound to present a series of contradictory images of Caribbean
mothers and motherhood.

The section on African American women seems richer, with the inclusion
of sci-fi writer Octavia Buthler’s novel *Kindred*, Jewelle Gomez’s “New
Age/lesbian/gothic romance” *The Gilda Stories*, and Julie Dash’s 1991 film,
*Daughters of the Dust*. However, *Beloved*, as the paradigmatic text of the
black daughter-mother plot, dominates.

When dealing with Caribbean women writers, Rody focuses on the work
of the classic trio made up of Rhys, Kincaid, and Cliff, exile subjects par
excellence. Then jumping linguistic barriers, she analyzes Maryse Condé’s
*I, Tituba* which allows her to extend her horizontal plot (inclusive of more
cultures) to Bharati Mukherjee through the figure of Esther Prynne. Her
analysis of women’s historical fiction broadens therefore into other “ethnic”
groups. In the “general unsealing of history” (p. 22) which characterized
the end of the twentieth century, black women’s fiction has certainly been
significant, but Rody makes an even more important claim for these writers.
In her view, they have “recast the conventions of historical fiction” (p. 3)
and created a “distinctive late century feminist subgenre” (p. 11) with a
distinctive feminist idiom for retelling history.

As Rody rightly points out, connections are numerous between black
women’s texts, but influences are not as obvious. Are “all matrifocal texts
[in the Caribbean] indebted to Schwarz-Bart” (p. 121) as she asserts? Can
the magic black daughter in these texts be seen as U.S. or Latin American
derived (p. 201)? One may easily concede that the success of African
American women writers has helped legitimize certain discourses – perhaps
magic among them – but it is doubtful whether one can speak of influences
in this case. Magic belongs as much to the Caribbean as to the rest of the
black Atlantic world and has its own tradition. What one can perhaps say
is that it has not been exploited to the full either by writers or critics of the
Caribbean.

Hoving’s book is a case in point. Dedicated solely to Caribbean migrant
women’s writing, often to works inspired by the magico-religious spirit alive
in the Caribbean, *In Praise of New Travelers* gives little space to this aspect and chooses “to understand magic as the miraculous, more or less frightening effects of the hidden manipulation of the (super) natural by others” (p. 94). However, the volume also deals with a variety of other issues. Hoving’s analyses follow Evelyn O’Callaghan’s crossroad model, according to which women’s texts are at the crossroads of several concerns which have to do with gender as well as with race and class. Her engagement with the texts brings her to discuss how women have reappropriated male tropes and to challenge the view that postcolonial texts tend to represent positive selves.

She herself recognizes that her discussions sometimes proceed line by line and cover minute details, as in the analysis of the pronouns in Cliff’s *If I Could Write This in Fire*. She also offers close readings of Beryl Gilroy’s *Frangipani House*, Merle Collins’s *Angel*, Grace Nichol’s *Whole of a Morning Sky*, Jamaica Kincaid’s *The Autobiography of My Mother*, and Marlene Nourbese Philip’s *Looking for Livingstone: An Odyssey of Silence*. This would have been quite sufficient for a book, but Hoving’s range is even wider. She includes black British women as well, a commendable effort, since they are often ignored, but that section is dated and less researched than the rest of the book. Still, Hoving offers new insights into many writers’ work, which she arrives at through the lens of postcolonial theories. Staple themes of Caribbean studies are enriched through new intuitions drawn from Stuart Hall, Gayatri Spivak, Deleuze and Guattari, and Homi Bhabha.

Hoving deals with the tropes of the journey and the island, with landscape as memory, with the silenced histories of the Caribbean, the use of Creole, the function of orality, the construction of home and nation, the concept of motherhood. New points of entry into the texts are also provided by Bakhtin, Yuri M. Lotman, Adrienne Rich, Chinua Achebe, and Carole Boyce Davies.

To deconstruct the dichotomy between orality and literacy and explain how Collins and Gilroy produce the illusion of oral narration, Hoving draws on Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s theory of the “speakerly text” (p. 128). In the chapter on Kincaid, instead of defining her as merely “extravagant,” as Rody has done, Hoving discusses the techniques used by this “diabolic” (p. 198) and “satanical” (p. 202) writer who constantly “lure[s] the reader into a rhetorical structure that will suddenly be subverted; only in this way is the desired shock effect attained” (p. 208). Readers will find interesting her discussion of Cliff in terms of an “aesthetics of reluctance” (p. 253) whereby silence becomes a representational strategy. The issue of silence reappears in her analysis of the work of Marlene Nourbese Philip (to whom she dedicates a full chapter), which shows how she has deconstructed Freudian and Lacanian categories. In Philip, Hoving writes, there is an “entanglement of silence, sexuality, knowledge, and (colonial and native) power” (p. 271) which amplifies the sexual connotation of the tropes regarding domination of the Other.
But Hoving often overstates her case. Most likely inspired by her readings of Kincaid and Cliff, she sees “feminine sexuality and sensuality as the forces that enable women to travel, to explore the world, or to create a sense of belonging” (p. 75). Sensuality, however, does not seem to be a feature of Caribbean women’s texts; Jamaica Kincaid (1997:69) has affirmed that “I grew up alienated from my own sexuality and, as far as I can tell, am still, to this day, not at all comfortable with the idea of myself and sex.” And sexuality, as critics Denise de Caires and Evelyn O’Callaghan (1994: 628) have pointed out, is commonly associated with “shame, defilement and the forced renunciation of childhood freedom … among women from the region”.

Hoving oscillates between commonplace assertions (“Kincaid’s writing must be placed not only in a general postcolonial, postmodern, or feminist context but also in a more explicit Caribbean context” [p. 203]), portentous omens (“Cliff’s position fits in so well with postcolonial theoretical discourse that one might value her work as the last word on women within postcoloniality” [p. 269]), and claims to her own originality (“Perhaps I am driving the matter rather far if I argue that an innocent act like gardening has its violent moments, through which it connects to the history of colonialism” [p. 267]). Since Kincaid, whom Hoving quotes afterwards on the subject, has expressly stated this very position, why claim this as her insight?

Rody is not immune to these narcissistic turns either: “Desiring, then, both to build something encompassing and new and to keep all lanes open in an era of dynamic literary change, I attempt to see what it is possible to learn by juxtaposing these two bodies of literature” (p. 12). As readers of Afro-diasporic literatures well know, several critics before her have fruitfully linked African-American and Caribbean women’s fiction.

Both *The Daughter’s Return* and *In Praise of New Travelers* are informative and at times engaging. Hoving’s book is more theoretical, while Rody’s is more mindful of the beauty to be discovered in Afro-diasporic women’s writing.

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CATHERINE BENÔT
Department of Anthropology
Connecticut College
New London CT 06320, U.S.A.
<cben@conncoll.edu>

If for the purpose of this review a link must be established between these two books, I would point to the fact that Healing Cultures is dedicated to the study of the healing dimensions of Caribbean cultures while Le commerce diabolique suggests that Caribbean cultures produce ways to hurt people. Specifically Le commerce diabolique examines those who are said to have trade with the devil and as such are ostracized by the Martiniquan society. This review will analyze separately these two books without claiming any further benefit of contrasting or comparing.

As indicated by its subtitle, Le commerce diabolique is an exploration into the Martiniquan imaginary of pacts with the devil. Franck Degoul, a French graduate student who turned his master’s thesis into a book, analyzes people’s discourses about these pacts. He defines his ethnographic approach as an “anthropology of ‘what is said’” (anthropologie du on-dit). One can appreciate the scale of the project only when knowing the amount of stories on evil, witchcraft, and sorcery in Martiniquan newspapers and TV and the phenomenal literature ever since the beginning of colonization (either short stories, novels, travel accounts, or anthropological essays) on Guadeloupean or Martiniquan witchcraft. This book is a rare attempt to consider seriously these narratives of people who speak about this peculiar trade rather than merely considering them folkloric tales.

In French Creole the pacts with the devil are called angajman (engagement) and those who contract them are the angajé. The etymology of angajé refers to the very poor indentured laborers, called in French engagés, which at the beginning of the French colonization of the Caribbean, each ship had to recruit, proportionately to the size of the boat, in order to populate the colonies. These men and women paid their passage by working for free during three years to receive, eventually, a small plot of land. They were
more likely to die, however, because of dire conditions than to fulfill their three-year agreement. Therefore this labor system disappeared in the 1730s and 1740s and was replaced by the enslavement of Africans. Today, the pact with the devil is understood as a contract likely leading to the death of the contracting party.

The book is organized as a rite of passage which according to the narratives would lead someone into a pact with the devil. It develops in three movements entitled preliminal (Parts I, II, III), liminal, and postliminal (Part IV). The last two parts (V and VI) analyze the identity of those considered angajé.

Degoul's discussion of the liminal stage explores the motivations of the individual who decides to trade with the devil (such as a search for wealth and power) and the way contact with the devil is established through old French sorcery books. His treatment of the liminal and postliminal stages details the popular semiotics of the “engagements.” Through this structure Degoul brings to light the stereotypical discourses on engagement. The narratives unfold following a deductive approach that aims to interpret signs such as quick acquisition of wealth (especially of a young person), behavioral deviance, and the disappearance of a person or one of his/her relatives. Eventually Degoul describes the different types of figures who can potentially trade with the devil – the white creole, who can be assimilated to the devil, the Indian, still denigrated in the French Caribbean, the successful shopkeeper, the former plantation supervisor, the politician, and finally the Freemason or Rosicrucian (perceived as wealthy). The participant in these pacts is always a successful, wealthy, and entrepreneurial person.

In the beginning of the book, Degoul argues that the narratives he is analyzing must be regarded as more than fictional folklore because of their ability to structure society and infiltrate its collective imagination. By the end of the book readers can perceive how imagination feeds reality, since success and wealth always produce condemnation and suspicion. Nonetheless, we would have liked to know the consequences of such accusations for the designated victims and their families. This very rich semiotic analysis would then benefit from incorporating a sociological perspective.

*Healing Cultures*, a collection of essays edited by Margarite Fernandez Olmos and Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert, follows their 1997 book, *Sacred Possessions: Voodoo, Santeria, Obeah and the Caribbean*. It first explores the healing dimensions of religious systems and analyzes how religions contribute to what is glossed as the “well-being” of a culture. It then presents the healing dimensions of music, literature, film, and theater. The diversity of Caribbean religious systems and arts is analyzed both within the Caribbean and, because of the migrations to the United States, in Boston, Miami, and New York.
Healing Cultures is in its own right a work of art, constructed of personal accounts, experimental writings, drawings, and poems inserted among more traditional academic writings. The richness of its analysis lies in the diversity of the contributors’ backgrounds as anthropologists, psychologists, writers, artists, and healers. Primary sources such as one of Lydia Cabrera’s texts (in translation) or interviews with Steve Quintina (a well-known Santeria priest in the Boston area) and Leroy Clarke provide fascinating insights into healing practices. The same analytic approach accompanies the contributors’ discussion of their personal engagements with the art of healing, either as a patient, healer, or artist, an issue that is too often skirted.

Vodou, Santeria, Espiritismo, and Obeah are analyzed as unique healing systems. However, thanks to an invisible thread that runs though the chapters, the reader is led to realize that Caribbean religious systems can be placed along two continua. The first one defines the self as an entity composed of different souls whose well-being is dependent on an equilibrium in the relationships of the individual with family members, ancestors, and spirits of the dead. The healer is the one who is able through spirit possession to diagnose the origin of the disorder and treat it by restoring the lost equilibrium. The second continuum demonstrates that some of these religions can be practiced from different perspectives. For example Espiritismo can be experienced as providing immediate care, as a religion or as a philosophy. Healing Cultures defines healing as the restoration of links not only with one’s kin or ancestors but also with one’s individual and collective pasts. Healing is about establishing connections with Africa – or, as one of the contributors argues, stressing connections with Africa that are already present and, for immigrants in the United States, with the island of origin as well. Recovery is gained through the personal reappropriation of ancestral voices, cultural symbols, and memories. Some of the contributors argue that in the context of migration it is only by turning to traditional healers that people are able to confront their past. Some of them even make a plea that traditional medicines need to be taken into account by Western medicine. Regrettfully these points are not used to open up a broader discussion, since the field of medical anthropology deals with the questions of culture-bound syndromes, the situation of medical pluralism, and the collusion of collaboration between Western medicine and traditional healing systems. Nonetheless the personal narratives about the resort to Santeria or Espiritismo in addition to or instead of Western medicine in the researcher’s life are insightful contributions for this ongoing debate.

One of the most original contributions of the book is to stress that reappropriating the past and the cultures of origin, either African or Caribbean, can be accomplished through different arts – those of the healer, the filmmaker, the painter, or the writer. The first part of the book, “Healing Arts,” shows how, through the elucidation of the origin of illness, religion
and medicine mediate personal, family, and historical histories. In the second part of the book, “Artistic Healing,” two chapters provide an analysis of films that contribute to healing. Healing can happen for the public through film when it relates to one of the five following topics: challenging official history by showing events that have been forgotten or erased, recording the passage from rural to urban societies by stressing the values of community life, examining situations in the contemporary Caribbean, questioning the nature of Caribbean migrations, and showing death as the ultimate resurrection in Africa. The act of writing can also induce personal healing to readers by providing meaning to their personal and collective pasts.

Although each article has its own strength and individuality, the book as a whole is based on an assumption, at least for the editors and the artist LeRoy Clarke, that the Caribbean is made up of “ailing cultures,” cultures “in jeopardy,” cultures “unformed” and “uninformed,” whose people are “mere parrots” of others. In the work of postcolonial writers the healing metaphor is becoming, according to Olmos and Paravisini-Gilbert, a counterargument to the colonial discourse asserting that colonized bodies are diseased bodies. This characterization of Caribbean cultures as sick cultures by contemporary scientists and artists – those whose ancestors have been defined as such to justify colonization and assimilation – raises real questions, mainly because this view has never been theoretically framed. Roger Bastide (1972) showed at length that the processes by which individuals’ personalities are defined as either normal, neurotic, or psychotic do not apply to the study of societies and therefore cannot be used to characterize them as “crazy.” Later, George Devereux, viewing culture as the process that differentiates Homo sapiens from animality, argued that a healthy society encourages the development of creative and individualized personalities, while sick cultures force their members into patterns of pathological (or at least passive and unspontaneous) behavior in which they “cannot tolerate individualization and individualized sublimations and therefore favors dedifferenciation, loss of individuality, suppression, repression, reaction formation, and other regressive manifestations of this type” (Devereux 1980:290-91). From this perspective Devereux provides more of an understanding of how some societies at certain moment in their history can promote “insane” behavior, and this understanding allows him to diagnose cultures as healthy or sick. In the case of the Caribbean the identification of mechanisms that produce individual or collective ailing, if there are any, remains to be done. Ultimately, depicting Caribbean cultures as “unformed” and “uninformed” would mean denying people’s creativity since the beginning of slavery which has been theorized by the concept of creolization. If the healing dimensions of Caribbean cultures can be seen as a response to alienation as posited in the preface of the book, it is precisely because Caribbean cultures have
encouraged creativity more than acceptance, and mimicry, of the European cultures.

Nevertheless, Healing Cultures provides in a unique aesthetic format an original perspective on healing and a persuasive understanding of the healing processes at work in Caribbean religious systems and arts.

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JORGE PÉREZ ROLÓN
Liberal Arts Department
Popular Music Program
Interamerican University, Metropolitan Campus
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00919
<jorge_perezrolon@yahoo.com>

Any observer of the recent developments between the governments of the United States and Cuba to normalize their economic relations would agree that in a few years this task, once considered almost impossible, may be achieved. It is a complicated scenario that involves many pressure groups including, among others, the Miami-based Cuban exiles in the United States who oppose any kind of negotiation with Fidel Castro's self-proclaimed Communist government. The recent visit of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter under President Bush's Republican government to this Caribbean island-nation symbolizes the first steps toward the normalization of relations. It seems that the pleas of U.S. companies who for years have been wanting to participate once again in the Cuban market were heard. Their position is that they have been left behind, without access to compete in this growing market dominated by other international companies.
Since the late 1980s U.S. liberal intellectuals have made significant efforts in different areas to further the knowledge of Cuban history, economy, politics, and cultural production among its citizens. It is in this context that we must evaluate *Music from Cuba*. In the area of popular music, it is an outgrowth of Charley Gerard’s previous collaboration with pianist-arranger Marty Sheller, *Salsa! The Rhythm of Latin Music* (1989, revised 1998), and it follows the same ideological framework of other works on Caribbean music such as *Roots of Rhythm*¹ and books by Peter Manuel (1988, 1991, 1995). It is designed to fulfill the need for texts in English about Caribbean popular music that can be assigned in music history courses in U.S. universities and colleges for this fast growing student population and market.

After a short introduction, the book is divided into eleven chapters followed by a glossary and a bibliography. It covers the history of popular Cuban music, particularly of African origin, in its long and complicated journey to the United States, with forays into the lives of prominent musicians such as drummer Mongo Santamaría, trumpet-player Chocolate Armenteros (written by Richard Davies), saxophonist Jesús Caunedo (by Gerard and George Rivera), charanga-group leader Pupi Legarreta, and trombone-player Juan Pablo Torres. It also includes a chapter on popular music groups that have evolved during the Cuban Revolution, such as Juan Formell’s *Los Van-Van*, and the new musical forms that have been created, such as the *songo* and the *timba*.

Unlike Gerard’s excellent previous book *Salsa!* in which the historical analysis was kept to a minimum, this new book expands on the historical overview of Cuban music of African descent. Gerard explains that this new project began as a biography of Mongo Santamaría. Over time, however, he realized that he wanted to get involved in the “issues of Cuban identity and the difficulties and rewards of moving to a new country using representatives from several generations of Cuban immigrants, instead of just those from Santamaría’s generation” (p. xi). And here is where the book falls onto shaky ground. Although he makes a valuable contribution by documenting the lives of these prominent musicians and denouncing the racism they encountered, the bibliographical sources, which are the basis of his historical analysis, fall short, particularly by omitting excellent studies made by Cuban musicologists, ethnomusicologists, and music historians of the last twenty years. For example, the outstanding collection of essays by Leonardo Acosta (1982) is not included. The heavy dependence on doctoral dissertations written by North American students who have assimilated the theoretical flaws and racial prejudices of their ethno-musicological studies, makes him repeat and copy the theoretical framework of the so-called ethnic approach in

which “folk” music is considered a pure and exotic cultural expression from the past of underdeveloped countries with no relationship to the present and no impact on future development. Although Gerard quotes some technical information from the great Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, it is obvious that he did not understand Ortiz’s approach of the 1950s. For example, Ortiz’s concept of the process he calls *metadstasis* is completely ignored. If he had applied Ortiz’s concept, he would have understood that there are no pure musical forms and that the challenge of historical interpretation and analysis is to see how these forms are created and changed by each social class and generation in different historical periods. Also lacking in Gerard’s analysis is an exploration of how new inventions revolutionize traditional production and dissemination of musical expressions, particularly the invention of the phonograph in 1877 by Thomas Alva Edison. But as this analysis goes further into the dynamics of the historical process, it will confront the commercialization of folk music in the twentieth century – that is, the emergence of the U.S. recording industry and its dissemination through the invention of the radio in the 1920s that has transformed those small companies into the new multinational companies that today control basically all the music that the people of the world listen to.

I always warn students in my “popular music history” course about the shortcomings of the ethnic approach when analyzing historical processes. In the final analysis it will end up being racist, and it fails to take into account the development of national music and national styles in the Caribbean during the nineteenth century. As Gerard’s book condemns racial discrimination against black Cubans on their island and in the United States, it inadvertently discriminates against another national minority, the Puerto Ricans. When he minimizes the Puerto Rican participation in the creation of the new music called *salsa* and attributes its creation to the Cubans, he does not take into account that historically the Hispanic population in New York was mainly Puerto Rican. When the sons and daughters of the Puerto Rican immigrants created their expression born in Spanish Harlem, they took the formal structure of the music industry’s dominant Cuban *son* and fused it with the trombones found in Mon Rivera’s *plena* groups, giving birth to a new musical form with a distinct Puerto Rican national style of singing, but devoid of access to the music industry. I would advise Gerard to listen to Eddie Palmieri’s early recordings and read the work of César Miguel Rondon (1980), where he will find references to musical records showing how a distinctly Puerto Rican-based style in New York City emerged within the format of the Cuban *son* and distinct from the next historical period of Jerry Masucci’s commercialized version of his Fania All Stars.

There is no doubt in my mind that Gerard and other U.S. music historians are honestly trying to disseminate information about Cuban culture and music to better their people’s understanding may eventually bring positive changes
in the U.S.-Cuban relation. Perhaps this is the main purpose of the United States' forty-two-year blockade of Cuba – to isolate this Caribbean nation, preventing the diffusion of the great advances made by Cuban researchers, including those regarding their music, historical development, and centuries-old relationship with U.S. and Puerto Rican music.

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IVELAW L. GRIFFITH
The Honors College
Florida International University
Miami FL 33199, U.S.A.
<Griffiti@fiu.edu>

It has been said that one has to know where one is coming from in order to know where one is going. This is as true for nations or groups of nations as it is for individuals. *Charting Caribbean Development* gives validity to that statement in providing a portrait and assessment of the contours of the political
and economic development of the contemporary Caribbean, highlighting the challenges countries face as they move further into the twenty-first century. Payne and Sutton employ a healthy combination of country- and issue-specific assessments and region-wide analysis in fulfilling their mission to chart the "shifting politics of development within the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean over the past forty years" (p. ix).

The book deals essentially with the Anglophone Caribbean, although it fails to offer any significant attention to Guyana, an important – and problematic – Commonwealth Caribbean state. However, its relevance extends beyond the English-speaking part of the region, especially in relation to regional integration and the international political economy of bananas. Moreover, while several parts of the book have appeared elsewhere over recent years, the authors moved far beyond an assembly of previous articles. Charting Caribbean Development is an intellectual endeavor of two political scientists with a distinguished track record of scholarship in the fields of international relations, comparative politics, and international political economy. Beyond this, they have long and credible records of scholarship and policy advising in the Caribbean. Thus, it is not surprising that this book is well researched and written, with a good balance between description and analysis.

The book highlights several things about the vicissitudes of power and politics in the Caribbean. One is that appreciating the dynamics of Caribbean development requires going beyond the geographic confines of the Caribbean; it requires taking account of the power, interests, and policies of the United States, of middle powers such as Canada, and of European powers; it necessitates understanding that the actions and reactions of individual Caribbean nations and of the region as a whole do not exist in a vacuum, but in circumstances where the Caribbean is constituted by subordinate states that are vulnerable to actors and actions near and far.

In other words there are international systemic dimensions to what happens by, to, and for the region. Thus, a statement about the international political economy of bananas has a relevance that extends beyond bananas: "The Caribbean, especially, the smaller countries of the region, here find themselves particularly disadvantaged, marginalized in the development policy debate, side-lined in the corridors of power and handicapped by small size and economic dependence" (p. 271). Further, the book offers a reminder that Caribbean development studies require an appreciation of more than just politics and political economy as fields of intellectual inquiry, and that they operate on more than just state and regional levels of analysis. Further, it is a work with value not only to scholars of the Caribbean, but also to policy makers within Caribbean state and nonstate entities and to those in state and nonstate entities outside the region that have an interest in it.

In sum, this work is a powerful intellectual treatise on the political and economic development of the contemporary Caribbean that offers
implications for issues the region's political elites will have to face as they contend with challenge and cope with change in the future history of vulnerable states in a subordinate region.


RANSFORD W. PALMER
Department of Economics
Howard University
Washington DC 20059, U.S.A.
<rpalmer@howard.edu>

This edited volume does not add much to our knowledge of Caribbean economies. It is not written for Caribbean specialists because, for the most part, it regurgitates all the standard characteristics of Caribbean economies and societies that are well known. In this regard, it does not satisfy the expectation evoked by its title. The book is divided into four parts. Part I (Chapter 1) is a brief introduction; Part II (Chapters 2-7) looks at the social and economic characteristics of the Caribbean; Part III (Chapters 8-10) examines special Caribbean issues; and Part IV (Chapter 11) explores prospects for the future.

In Chapter 2, David R. Hicks takes us through the well-worn path of Caribbean geography, concluding that the Caribbean states, “despite their diversity, will need to work together for their mutual economic benefit in order to enter the global economic arena” (p. 26). In Chapter 3, Irma T. Alonso tells us about the social conditions in the Caribbean, drawing heavily on the human development index of the United Nations Human Development Report 2000. Without any statistical analysis of her own, she concludes that “education emerges as the most important variable that needs to be addressed if the Caribbean nations are to achieve higher levels of human development” (p. 40).

In Chapter 4, Alonso and Hicks team up to examine Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico. Here their analysis remains pedestrian. They present a description of each economy, the origins of their gross domestic product, and their trade with the rest of the world, and express confidence that “investments in education will certainly yield important benefits as these countries create modern telecommunication sectors within their economies” (p. 62). Their treatment of the English-speaking countries
follows the same descriptive pattern. Again, they see education as the key: the “English-speaking Caribbean countries with their advanced levels of human development should emphasize the educational resources necessary to develop and support … information services” (p. 84). In Chapter 6, they present a similar account of the Dutch-speaking islands.

Noel Gray's treatment of the countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in Chapter 7 is a refreshing change. It is a departure from the previous chapters because it discusses the relationship between size and development and the advantages that may derive from smallness. Drawing on relevant literature, Gray addresses the issue of the viability of such small economies and suggests that “[viability] is the creation of a complex of conditions conducive to the efficient use of natural and human resources, in an effort to raise the living standards of the population” (p. 104). Gray is careful to caution that the advantages of small size “are merely potential” (p. 109) and can only be achieved with “capable, honest leadership.” He remains hopeful, however, about Caribbean integration, arguing that it “should contribute significantly to … development” but thinks “it is debatable whether Caribbean integration as presently pursued offers a better alternative” (p. 110).

Part III of the book looks at special Caribbean issues, among them, United States-Caribbean trade relations (Chapter 8, by Gregory K. Schoepfle), industrialization and trade (Chapter 9, by Alonso), and drugs and economics (Chapter 10, by Ivelaw Griffith). Chapter 8, a long recitation of the details of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 and other trade preference programs for Caribbean Basin countries, was previously published in a 1997 volume edited by this reviewer, though Schoepfle fails to acknowledge it. He sees the future for the Caribbean in “a deepening of bilateral and multilateral relationships with the hemisphere” (p. 146). Alonso’s discussion of industrialization and trade follows her previous descriptive mode, providing the type of information that one normally finds in annual reports. She does not have much confidence in the future growth of intraregional trade, “given the size, climate, natural resources, and geography of the region” (p. 173). Her prescription is to increase trade with the rest of the world and, in particular, with the United States. She also stresses the importance of promoting service industries and a well-trained labor force to go with it. Ivelaw Griffith’s chapter provides an informative account of the economic implications of drug production and trafficking in the Caribbean, portraying the attractiveness of the drug trade as a derivative of economic deprivation. His analysis of the costs and benefits of the trade underscores the debilitating effect that drugs can have on legitimate economic activity as well as on the diversion of public resources from certain social programs. Although no projection is made concerning what role drug production and trafficking will play in the economies of the twenty-first century, it is clear that such a role will depend on how successful national policy is in reducing poverty and deprivation.
The book’s final chapter, by Claire Nelson, looks at challenges and opportunities for the future. Nelson imagines a high-tech future for the Caribbean but spends a lot of time discussing the obstacles to that future. She sees opportunities in tourism, agribusiness, biotechnology, information, and culture but her prescription for the way forward repeats much of what other people have said. In the end, she believes the destiny of the region lies in the hands of leaders with a vision.

The book has two bright spots: Noel Gray’s analysis of the problems of smallness in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and Ivelaw Griffith’s discussion of the impact of the drug trade on economic behavior in the Caribbean. The rest of the book is a disappointment because it is largely descriptive and tends to cover old ground. Moreover, the prescriptions for the future are not new and are too general to be helpful to those who make economic policy. This book is more likely to be useful to those who are studying the Caribbean for the first time than to those who are familiar with the economic research on the region.


GLENN R. SMUCKER
Smucker Consulting
3153 S. Superior Street
Milwaukee WI 53207, U.S.A.
<grsmucker@aol.com>

This ethnographic study is based on a year and a half of dissertation research in the southern peninsula of Haiti, not far from Jérémie, in 1995-96. The primary focus of study is traditional associational culture in rural Haiti, especially self-initiated peasant groups. Such traditional groups are presented as qualitatively different from external initiatives to promote grassroots organizations as a tool of development. Smith notes that local peasant groups have been largely invisible to outsiders, and their very existence contradicts outsider notions that Haiti has no real civil society (p. 3).

Smith addresses important spheres of rural Haitian life, focusing her field studies on two forms of traditional culture. In addition to her exploration of peasant organizational life, she makes copious reference to songs of derision
and humor. This song tradition, known as *chante pwen* (literally "point" songs), is marked by acerbic social and political commentary. Smith makes a thematic link between peasant groups and satirical songs, arguing that they are closely related domains of struggle.

Musical genres based on pointed social commentary are common throughout the Caribbean. As Smith notes, Haitians are quick to improvise such songs in a broad range of public arenas such as footpaths and crossroads, agricultural work parties, pre-Lenten Mardi Gras festivities, Lenten-period *rara* processional bands, political rallies, hotels, and peasant organizations. She also documents political songs composed by Haitian refugees interned at Guantánamo Bay in the early 1990s and politically controversial lyrics of recording artists such as Boukman Eksperyans and Manno Charlemagne.

Her treatment of songs of derision is a very useful contribution and could well have been elaborated into a separate study. The song texts would have benefited from a more consistent effort to capture the salty language and creative use of metaphor in the original Creole texts. In some cases, the strategy of translating the basic idea rather than a more literal rendering has the effect of distorting the meaning.

Most of this book is devoted to an analysis of local peasant organizations and peasant views of development, democracy, and the good society. Peasant organizations in the study include cooperative labor groups and local civic associations. The study site was well selected in view of its rich diversity of indigenous labor groups including various festive labor societies. This long-term study of traditional labor associations helps fill a notable gap in recent cultural studies of rural Haiti and serves as a valuable complement to other recent efforts to examine both "indigenous" and "induced" forms of local association (Smucker & Dathis 1998:53-55, 79-81; Smucker & Thomson 1999:14-16).

Smith presents her material as a critique of foreign development efforts and outsider tendencies to view traditional peasant groups in negative terms, "what they are not, do not have, and do not do" (p. 3). To counter such views, she describes the workings of traditional collective labor arrangements, including agricultural work parties known as *konbit* and *köve* in Haitian Creole, small labor exchange groups called *atribisyon*, and larger festive labor groups called *sosyete*. The study also describes *gwoupman peyzan*, peasant groups of more recent origin that emerged from externally initiated development programs but retained traditional cultural elements of labor exchange and mutual aid.

Smith clearly has great sympathy for the plight of peasants and struggles of the poor for a better life. She also assumes an interpretative stance that accentuates harmonious elements of peasant culture and de-emphasizes elements of local social conflict. In so doing, she perhaps unwittingly
distorts the social and political context of local grassroots organizations in rural Haiti. After all, ethnography is very much about context.

In effect, downplaying local social conflict also means downplaying the social significance of traditional forms of solidarity – forms that are indeed commonly overlooked or undervalued by development practitioners. It would have been helpful to have more information regarding personalities (e.g., kinship) among group members, group strategies for conflict management, and who nongroup members were and their proportion of the local population.

In view of Smith’s interest in social change and the politics of development, it would also have been useful to take note of other indigenous forms of group solidarity in addition to labor arrangements. Elsewhere in rural Haiti, traditional forms of mutual aid and collaboration include rotating credit groups (sang or sol), rara processional societies, secret societies, other religious groups, and burial societies.

The subtitle of this book mentions community organization, but Smith does not really address the thorny issue of “community” in rural Haiti. She appears to take it for granted without establishing a clear definition beyond that exemplified in the groups she studied and local practices of “respect” and mutual aid. This merits treatment since in rural Haiti, as in other parts of the Caribbean, there are few community-wide nexuses of solidarity based on rural jurisdictions or geographic borders.

Smith explicitly critiques other accounts of rural Haiti that are based, in her view, on notions of cultural deficit or “counterprogressive” and “irrelevant” culture (p. 4). In so doing, however, she is unduly dismissive of serious ethnographic studies that cannot simply be painted with such broad strokes. Further, it is incorrect to state baldly that “current development ideology” is at odds with collective labor practices (p. 181) or to suggest that rotating labor groups discourage individual innovation.

Smith is quite correct in noting that few researchers on Haiti have studied traditional forms of associational culture in any depth. Her fieldwork confirms once again that traditional forms of collective labor have not disappeared in rural Haiti. Finally, her work is of particular interest to Haitianists because there are so few recent studies based on long-term fieldwork in rural Haiti.

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This collection constitutes a valuable addition to the growing literature on West Indians in New York City. The essays strike a balance between describing the history of West Indians in New York, their contributions to the city, and the complicated relationship they have with the essentializing and monolithic images of race found in the United States. This is a great deal of ground to cover, but the volume handles the challenge admirably, beginning with an introduction by Nancy Foner that nicely frames and develops the issues, reviews the literature, and discusses directions for future research.

The book is organized around three themes: "Gender, Work, and Residence," "Transnational Perspectives," and "Race, Ethnicity, and the Second Generation."

The section on "Gender, Work, and Residence" takes both historical and demographic approaches in order to address the development of West Indian communities in New York City and their contributions to the city's economy. Irma Watkins-Owens describes the first wave of West Indian migration in the first part of the twentieth century. Her work develops a portrayal of the contributions of women to the West Indian community, offering a much-needed revision of the emphasis on the role of men in representations of West Indian migration to New York. Suzanne Model's article, which explores the occupational niches of West Indians, shows that many of the gendered trends documented in Watkins-Owens's chapter continue in contemporary New York and challenges the claim that West Indians are an exceptionally entrepreneurial immigrant group. Kyle D. Crowder and Lucky M. Tedrow examine the residential patterns of West Indians, and show how their communities emerged in the parts of the city with high concentrations of African Americans, leading to residential segregation from other groups, particularly non-Hispanic whites.

Part II, "Transnational Perspectives," opens with an article by Linda Basch, who emphasizes two dimensions of transnationalism: deterritorialized nation-state building and dual incorporation. Her treatment of these ideas is grounded in the integration of local politics and ideologies in New York with
U.S. politics and the politics of Caribbean nations. Importantly, she explores the interaction of ideologies that emerge as West Indians act upon ties to two nation-states, for instance, West Indians gaining U.S. citizenship in order to lobby for changes in the United States' policies toward the Caribbean. Karen Fog Olwig’s article then explores how the transnational ties that West Indians create extend far beyond New York in the United States. She addresses the need to explore where immigrants move when they leave New York, and the role of New York City in the maintenance of family networks that extend across the United States and the Caribbean.

The third part of the book, “Race, Ethnicity, and the Second Generation,” addresses the interaction of U.S. racial ideologies and accompanying discrimination with the development of concepts of identity among West Indian immigrants and, importantly, their children raised in the United States. Reuel Rogers explores the relationship of West Indians to the categories of West Indian, African American, native born and foreign born, and challenges homogenizing, essentializing representations of categories such as African American. His article argues against the notion of Afro-Caribbeans choosing between different racial identities; instead he focuses on the dynamic processes of how Afro-Caribbeans think about and experience their identities in relationship to transnational ties and racist ideologies in the United States. Mary C. Waters analyzes the different identity constructions that emerge from contact between West Indian and U.S. conceptions of race. Such identities interact with gender and class in complex ways that challenge ideas of straight-line assimilation. In particular, second-generation West Indians confront prejudice and discrimination that act to shape daily life and, as a result, spur negotiations between three different self-identifications: American, ethnic American, and immigrant. Vilna F. Bashi Bobb and Averil Y. Clarke write about the loss of “hope” and “optimism” in this second generation. They explore the structural issues that influence the relative success of immigrant groups. This includes the ways in which ideas about education promoting success and ideas of racism limiting success interact. They point out that first-generation West Indian immigrants have different concepts of race based on their experiences in the Caribbean, whereas those in the second generation lack that experience and formulate their ideas of race in relationship to their identity on the basis of U.S. ideologies. Milton Vickerman looks at the ways West Indian ideas of blackness differ from U.S. ideas of blackness, and points out that West Indians challenge the essentializing and monolithic U.S. perspective on race. Despite the challenge West Indians pose to the dominant racial ideologies of the United States, this challenge has not overturned the ideologies, but is acting only to slightly modify them. Philip Kasinitz’s article, which concludes this collection, discusses how West Indians tend to be seen relative to blacks rather than to other immigrant populations, and argues that in many
cases the racial ideologies that have labeled West Indians as blacks have also tended to cloud the study of West Indians as immigrants by focusing on their blackness rather than their immigrant experiences.

I have only one minor criticism. At certain points in the book, representations that define West Indians on the basis of country of origin and which relate the category "West Indian" to "black" hide the fact that many West Indians in New York, particularly in the borough of Queens, are of Indian descent. Whether or not this undermines any conclusions reached in the book is an empirical question that remains to be addressed. To be fair, however, the need for study of the growing Indo-Caribbean community in New York City (particularly in Richmond Hill, Queens) is an issue that Nancy Foner raises in her introduction.

This is a fine collection that serves as an excellent introduction to the issues and literature about West Indians in New York City, an important contribution to the study of transnationalism and immigration, and a stimulus for taking research on these issues in new and exciting directions.


JOY MAHABIR
Department of Africana Studies
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook NY 11794-4340, U.S.A.
<jmahabir@ic.sunysb.edu>

Detailed research on Indo-Caribbean culture and society is relatively new in the field of Caribbean Studies, and Munasinghe's book is an important intervention. This study explores the personal and sociopolitical factors that inform constructions of East Indian identity in Trinidad. By examining the terms "East Indian," "Creole," and "Trinidadian" through the theoretical lens of ethnicity rather than race, it shows the contradictory and complicated nature of these terms, especially when the academic and sociopolitical discourses surrounding them intersect.

The book begins by reviewing, perhaps in too much detail, some of the central academic debates concerning ethnicity. Understanding ethnicity as historically and socially constructed, Munasinghe then traces the historical evolution of East Indian identity in Trinidad, convincingly explaining the way
in which colonial classifications of race and color shaped early discourses on ethnic identity, and making the important observation that colonial power manipulations played a deliberate role in creating and perpetuating the conditions for a political power struggle between Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. This divisive colonial stratagem informed the discourses that separated East Indian identity from a perceived national Trinidadian identity. Munasinghe asserts that by challenging these older discourses through dynamic strategies of reinterpretation and re-creation, East Indians have managed to formulate new political and national identities. These new identities are interrogated through fieldwork conducted in Central Trinidad in the village of Cambio, which is largely, but not exclusively, East Indian.

Chapters 5 and 6 offer an engaging description of village life in Cambio. Embracing the heterogeneity and contradictions inherent in the villagers’ articulations of identity, they present a solid exploration of social and ethnic relations. Elements intrinsic to this exploration include family and communal relations, gender relations, dwelling spaces, and patterns of material consumption. Munasinghe argues that Indian culture is constantly being redefined or creolized, although current discourses on creolization have not acknowledged these processes of re-creation in Indo-Caribbean communities, and despite the fact that Indians may not necessarily use the term “Creole” to describe themselves. While political and ethnic rhetoric in Trinidad maintains the separation between “East Indian” and “Creole,” actual social relations in Trinidad dispute this division. Munasinghe’s sensitive examination of family structures shows that Indo-Caribbean patterns are interwoven with Afro-Creole, Euro-Creole, and American ones, creating arrangements that are complex and diverse, and never fully nuclear or extended. As she follows the interconnection between family dwellings and changing family relations, she reveals some of the intricate dynamics central to Indo-Caribbean family structures by focusing on details as well as general trends in order to present a comprehensive interpretation. Observing several families, Munasinghe shows how discourses concerning identity in Cambio are generated through negotiations of financial conditions, communal beliefs, and personal agency. From the living patterns of the Cambio villagers, she concludes that East Indians in Trinidad actively participate in processes of creolization that make them “East Indian in an irrevocably Trinidadian fashion” (p. 181).

Chapter 7 analyzes postcolonial constructions of national identity, showing how Afro-Creole identity was promoted as the only legitimate Trinidadian one. After independence, leaders like Eric Williams represented Indian culture as marginal to an emergent national culture, prompting Indian leaders to search for alternative models that fully included Indo-Trinidadian culture in redefinitions of Trinidadian identity. As Munasinghe considers these models, she is aware of the changing historical and political events that determine them; she notes that during her research the idea of an Indian
as prime minister was “unthinkable” (p. 247), yet a few years later, in 1995, this became a reality.

Munasinghe’s arguments about the reconfiguration of national Trinidadian identity might have been enhanced if she had investigated and incorporated the political insights of the villagers of Cambio in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. Many of the relevant points mentioned earlier are not fully elaborated in these last three chapters, and the perspectives of the villagers are no longer emphasized.

The nuanced and perceptive arguments made in Chapters 5 and 6 about constructions of Indo-Trinidadian identity are somewhat attenuated in the final chapters by Munasinghe’s insistence on retaining the mechanical and reductive binary represented in the title of the book. She claims that “Indo-Trinidadians reject the callaloo model of national culture, in which all ingredients blend into one taste, in preference to the tossed salad, in which all the ingredients maintain their distinctive flavors” (p. 269). Factors such as class positions, education, and alternative political formations and ideologies, if sufficiently examined, might have led her to consider the limitations of her paradigm. Overall, however, the significant and compelling insights on Indo-Caribbean familial and communal structures contribute to making this text requisite reading for the study of processes of identity formation in the Caribbean.


STÉPHANE GOYETTE
2380 Wyndale
Ottawa, Ontario, K1H 7A6, Canada
<stephanegoyette.com>

This book, as both the editor’s foreword and the author’s preface make clear, is far more than a translation by Mufwene of Chaudenson’s book, Des îles, des hommes, des langues. Instead, it is a thoroughly revised adaptation in English of Chaudenson’s original book, an essay on the genesis and development of French-based creole languages, as well as that of the societies where they are spoken. This adaptation was written with considerable input from Mufwene, who was assisted in the (difficult) task of translation by a group of three graduate students. Chapter 1 is an exploration of the etymology of the word
créole and its semantic fate in different Creole-speaking societies. Chapter 2 is an overview of creole languages and societies, mostly French-based. Chapter 3 is an overview of various theories regarding the origin of creole languages. Chapter 4, in many respects the central chapter of the book, outlines in great detail the early social and demographic history of plantation colonies. This leads smoothly to Chapter 5, where Chaudenson’s theory of linguistic creolization is presented, with emphasis placed both on linguistic features of seventeenth-century spoken French and on the linguistic consequences of the acquisition of this colonial variety of French by slaves, stressing the near-total absence of direct influence from the slaves’ languages to the emerging creole. Chapter 6 explores the applicability of this theory of creolization to aspects of culture other than language, explored in the three following chapters: music in Chapter 7, cooking in Chapter 8, folk medicine and magic in Chapter 9, oral literature in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 summarizes the basic points of the theory, with further arguments. The book ends with a bibliography and an index of names and concepts.

For Anglophone readers, having Chaudenson’s thinking available in a single English-language book is most convenient. However, it must be said that the translation leaves something to be desired, and as a native speaker of French, I encountered many gallicisms (cuisine where cooking would have been a more appropriate translation of French cuisine, for example) and stylistic infelicities, whose sheer number make the prose of this book laborious, and occasionally quite opaque, reading. This is not helped by the tendency to repeat the same information several times across the book in a seemingly haphazard fashion or to briefly examine problems in chapters whose main focus is quite unrelated; for example, on pp. 267-68, in the chapter on oral literature, clear opposition is expressed to the idea that the use of “body” (corps) as a reflexive might be due to substrate influence. The index, from this point of view, is of limited help: there is no entry on reflexivity anywhere, and readers wishing to know Chaudenson’s position on the topic would literally have to read through the whole book to find the two pages on “head”-reflexivity. On the plus side, the book is quite free of typos (“Accadian,” on p. 331, was the only example I found).

Much here will be familiar to readers of Chaudenson and Mufwene’s earlier work. This is so true that a novice to creole studies reading this book might be forgiven for assuming that no objections have ever been raised, no debate has ever surrounded most of the key points raised by them in this book, and that all future scholars will have to do is cross a few ts and dot a few is. Creole scholars who know something of the field, however, will be well aware that many of the main facts and arguments presented in this book are highly controversial. No effort appears to have been made, unfortunately, to present rival views and theories adequately, much less to engage them seriously. A typical example is found on pp. 267-68, on the use in many
creoles of the word "body" as a reflexive pronoun: Chaudenson argued in favor of a French origin, because of the presence of this feature in some French dialects. This despite the fact that the use of "body" as a reflexive pronoun is quite alien to any variety of non-creole American French, which, considering Chaudenson's own emphasis on the importance of such non-creole comparanda (p. 148), seems to weaken his own theory considerably. Worse still, in no French dialect is the word for "body" used to the exclusion of the reflexive pronoun, and the same is true of other languages claimed by Chaudenson to possess the same structure, such as Homeric Greek. This is in contradistinction to the situation found in French creoles: almost nowhere has a reflex of *se/soi* survived and *corps*, where it exists, is the only reflexive element of the language. The structures of French and French creoles are thus quite unlike one another: add to this the absence of any similar such structure in non-creole North American French varieties, and the idea that there might be a historical connection between the two appears implausible, to say the least. Indeed, one suspects Chaudenson would savage any claim of substrate influence based on evidence this weak. Be that as it may, however, this narrow focus does make the book less valuable than it might have been.

This book is a convenient summary of Chaudenson and Mufwene's beliefs on creole genesis, and is of some worth on this account and on account of its extensive bibliography; however, despite its title, it definitely could not serve as an introduction to creole studies.