THE AFRO-ASIAN DIMENSION OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1956-1968

By
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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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To my wife, Susan
A nation such as ours, which has all the attributes to become a power, has the essential obligation to study and explore all the alternatives.

Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes
Subdesenvolvimento e Política Internacional
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE AFRO-ASIAN DIMENSION OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1956-1968

by
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December, 1970

Chairman: Dr. O. Ruth McQuown
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Major Department: Political Science

The central problem of the study is the determination of Brazil's reactions to the emerging states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and its quantification in transaction flow terminology, with an analysis and evaluation of these relations in comparison to Brazil's older, strongly established ties to Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. This involves a chronological account of relations during the period, an inquiry into the images which different sectors of national opinion have held about Afro-Asia and Brazil's role there, and the application of statistical measures of interaction between nations from the Dimensionality of Nations Project to ascertain the relative importance of Afro-Asia in the global range of Brazilian foreign policy through time and to isolate three of the most salient states (Japan, Israel, and India) for case studies. Economic relations with Afro-Asia are covered in trade analysis and studies of interaction in UNCTAD and competition in coffee
and cocoa. Political conflicts with Afro-Asia are explored in policy differences over anti-colonialism, Portuguese Africa, and South Africa.

Changing policy toward Afro-Asia is explained in terms of changes in regime, conflicting images of the role of Brazil in the global system, and cross-pressures arising from Brazil's cross-cutting and only partially inclusive multiple memberships in five political, economic, and cultural groups: Latin America, Western Hemisphere, Western Community, Group of 77, and the Luso-Brazilian Community. Overlapping conflicts and contradictory demands arising from these several memberships result in what may appear to be vacillation or incoherence when judged from a single standard but which is explained by the fact that Brazil is neither fully committed to any single membership nor highly polarized by only highly congruent memberships. Brazilian political and economic interests thus converge with and diverge from those upon which the Afro-Asian bloc has struck a consensus in much more subtle ways than the mere grouping of Brazil with Afro-Asia as a "developing, "Southern," or "Third World" state would suggest.

Within limits of priority imposed by the relatively low salience which Afro-Asia has for Brazil, a summary of current Brazilian goals in these developing regions outside the Western Hemisphere can be drawn up as follows.

1. Increase in trade relations, involving preferably the exchange of manufactured products for raw materials to be used in
Brazil's new industries; otherwise the general expansion of all types of sales to new markets.

2. Defense of national economic interests in competition in primary commodities, notably coffee, cocoa, sugar, and cotton, including persuasion for African states associated with the Common Market to either yield or universalize their tariff preferences there.

3. Encouragement of solidarity among developing countries to negotiate as a group with the developed states for the reversal of unfavorable terms of trade and other economic concessions sought by the Group of 77.

4. Preservation of Portuguese language and culture in Africa to serve as a facilitator for a future Brazilian presence on that continent, under the supposition that the Portuguese territories will eventually achieve independence and that Brazil, while not meddling in Lisbon's internal affairs, should do everything possible to make this emancipation relatively painless and of a nature to ensure the continuation of Portuguese language and culture rather than alienation from them on the part of the Africans.

5. Enhancement of national prestige as a leader among developing states, a rising middle power with a worldwide diplomatic network, utilizing the projected image of a pacific, multiracial, rapidly industrializing tropical civilization.

6. Exchange of technical knowledge in fields such as nuclear power, tropical medicine, tropical agriculture and cattle raising, civil aviation, and architecture.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of relations among developing nations is a field which has only recently attracted interest, as evidenced by trends of research in professional journals and dissertations. Students of international politics have traditionally dwelt on the centers of power, with relatively little concern for areas other than Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China and Japan in Asia. Lesser powers became subjects of study primarily when the lines of regional tension overlapped those of major power tension, as in the contemporary Middle East. Correspondingly these studies, written by authors from the metropolitan areas enmeshed in the larger conflicts, emphasized the relationships of the developing states to the major powers rather than their relationships to each other. The focus on power led almost inexorably to an allocation of research efforts which relegated developing or "non-Western" states to peripheral status and attention. Even in the well-documented area of inter-American relations the dominant framework has been erected by studies inspired by and concentrating on the foreign policy reactions of Latin American nations to American political and economic intervention, the World Wars, or Communist subversion rather than interrelationships.
among the Latin states. While not denying the importance or relevancy of such a great power-centered approach (especially to the great powers), the contention is made here that this methodological bias has retarded the development of a general theory of international behavior by in effect restricting most analysis to the sample of a few powerful states which may not be representative of the universe of states.

Within the last decade the horizons of international politics, like those of comparative politics, have expanded to include non-Western states with a consequent enrichment and growth of the data base, the size of which has been a limiting factor in formulating valid generalizations about nation-state behavior through time. This initial shedding of cultural and academic ethnocentrism was the result of at least two converging currents of thought. The first was occasioned by the independence of Afro-Asian states which championed a policy of nonalignment and sought to forge a Third Force as a vehicle for their interests vis-a-vis the developed states or the Western powers. Just as the birth of these states stimulated a lively academic dialogue on their place within comparative politics under the rubric of political development, so the international relations specialists expounded upon the determinants of a neutralist foreign policy, the viability of the Third Force concept, and the effects which the introduction of so many change-oriented new actors would work on the international
system. The number of the less-powerful states and the vote-power they wield in the United Nations made them a force which both the great powers and international relations analysts found hard to ignore.

The second trend which brought the developing states of Afro-Asia and Latin America within the purview of general international relations theory was an intellectual one, the adaptation of the terminology of systems analysis to the study of relations among nations by such scholars as Kaplan, Deutsch, Boulding, Russett, and Rosecrance. Conceptualization of the complex network of interactions of all states as forming a patterned regularity which is the global system almost inevitably set off inquiries about the existence of subsystems. Since the global system was said to be Europe-centered, the set of subsystems included those operating in a more restricted fashion in other political, economic, or geographic regions. Impetus for this approach to developing areas was added by attempts at regional integration in the Central American Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade

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Association, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, and others, not to mention the much more successful European Economic Community against which their progress could be measured. The subsystem problem became the identification of various types of regional subsystems through empirical verification of transaction flows and their intensities, in much the same way as Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations Project was defining quantitatively the form and content of the global system by identifying and measuring the basic dimensions of the foreign behavior of nations through computer analysis of statistical data. With the research problem thus stated, the methodological path was made clear for the meaningful integration of the relations among developing states into the larger body of international relations theory, in contrast to their former isolated treatment merely as sui generis sets of relationships, archetypical of the course of the study of inter-American relations.

Since the introduction of terms like "subordinate system," "subsystem," and "regional system," along with diverse criteria for their identification, the analysis of relations among developing states within the same region has been furthered and several subordinate systems delineated in the Middle East, Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa,

\[3\] Analogously, the concepts of political development have begun to appear as a bridge to span the persistent chasm between Latin American political studies and the field of comparative politics as it developed during the 1960's.
Southern Asia, and Southeast Asia. Curiously, little similar systemic interest in the Western Hemisphere has been forthcoming to date, perhaps because of the inertia of decades of more traditionally oriented research. The next step in theory would seem to be in the direction of examining interactions between regional systems, and literature of this type is beginning to appear in both systemic and transaction flow models.\footnote{The most significant subsystem essays on developing areas include the following: Leonard Binder, "The Middle-East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, X (April, 1958), 408-429; Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, XII, No. 3 (September, 1968), 231-261; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, XV (January, 1963), 213-235; Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West Africa State System," University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXI (October, 1961), 74-82; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of Southeast Asia," International Relations, II (April, 1961), 143-155; and I. William Zartmann's "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization, XXI (Summer, 1967), 545-564, and International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).}

It is within this interregional research that the present study is set, as an investigation of the relations between Brazil, a member of one regional system, and the states of Afro-Asia, representing other regional systems. The central problem will be the determination of

Brazil's reactions to the emerging states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and its quantification in transaction flow terminology, analyzing and evaluating these relations in comparison with Brazil's older, strongly established ties to Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Although bilateral relations with certain countries will be singled out as especially significant, the primary unit of interaction analysis (Chapter IV) will be the region.

A fundamental preoccupation in regional theory is resolving the problem of operationally defining "region" as a means to classify and group nations. As Russett has demonstrated, several criteria have commonly been employed as differentiating variables: geographical contiguity, social and cultural similarity, similar foreign political behavior, institutional membership, and economic interdependence.  

Because of possible ambiguities arising from this variety of usages and in view of the difficulty of placing precise boundaries on any region, however defined, the choice has been made in the present study to define regions along geographical lines, following the practice of most subsystem theorists. This is feasible because the usefulness here of a geographic determination of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East lies

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7 Supra, n. 4.
not with the precision of boundary delineation or amenability to rigorous intraregional systemic treatment, but rather in the ability of these expressions to describe continents which have traditionally received little attention in Brazilian diplomacy and which, when taken together, make up nearly the totality of the world's developing nations outside the Western Hemisphere. "Africa," unless otherwise stated, will denote only sub-Saharan Africa, including the Republic of South Africa. The "Middle East" will comprehend not only the Levant but also Turkey, Iran, and the Maghreb. "Asia" is taken to refer to non-Communist Asia, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; Brazil neither maintains relations nor has significant dealings with Peking, Hanoi, Pyongyang, or Ulan Bator.

In addition to these three regions, four more are postulated: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the United States, and all other Western Hemisphere countries. The United States, while not a region in normal uses of the term, bulks so heavily in Brazilian foreign relations that it deserves separate treatment. An aggregate of all Western Hemispheric countries (an alternative grouping) would not adequately reflect political, economic, or cultural reality for the purposes of this study, even though a hemispheric political subsystem may be said to exist, formally embodied in the Organization of American States. By following a regional methodology, it will be possible to extract higher level generalizations from the data than those afforded by a conventional
bilateral approach which has characterized the majority of prior studies of Brazilian foreign policy; i.e., policy vis-a-vis the United States, Cuba, the Soviet Union, etc. Then, within the global context of Brazilian relations with the seven postulated regions, the course of relations with Afro-Asia can be measured and charted through time to establish the nature, strength, and duration of any trends. These trends will then be explicated in terms of changes in regime, conflicting images of the role of Brazil in the global system, and cross-pressures arising from Brazil's multiple memberships in several political, economic, and cultural clusters.

The question of the relevancy of such research can be legitimately raised, as it departs from the norm set by most studies of the foreign policy of Latin American nations, in both method and focus. Why should time be taken up scrutinizing relations between Brazil and Afro-Asia? An initial motivation was the above-mentioned scarcity of substantive studies on relations among developing nations of different subsystems, perhaps sufficient reason in itself to demand at least one more case study. Brazil is well suited for such an inquiry because among all Latin American states it is in an objectively advantageous position to carry on significant political, economic, and cultural relations with Afro-Asia and, to the author's knowledge, has in fact been in the forefront among the South American nations in this undertaking. Brazil stands as one of the significant powers among developing nations, as
ranked by size, population, resources, and potential, so the course of its relations, both cooperative and conflictful, with other developing nations outside the Western Hemisphere is of special interest, additionally so because of the stated importance placed on these relations by several administrations and also because of its intermittent ambitions of leadership and prestige among developing nations within and outside of Latin America.

The period from 1956 to 1968 was chosen because, in addition to corresponding roughly to the span between the end of the Vargas era and the time field research was carried out, it was during these 12 years that almost all formerly colonized Afro-Asian nations received their independence while simultaneously Brazil was gradually embarking upon a more active diplomatic style, redefining in many ways the substance and range of its interests. It was therefore during the period under examination that the foundations of an Afro-Asian policy were being set, exposing domestic disagreements, conflicting solidarities, and shifting priorities which are likely to persist in future relations with these regions.

Through this dimension of Brazilian foreign policy some facets of the country's self-identification as a future power may be illuminated, a matter more important than bilateral relations with any single Afro-Asian state. In a world where the gap between developed and developing economies is widening, Brazil with its regional diversity maintains
features of both developing and developed economies, marked by a rising national growth rate and the expansion of insular areas of industrialization surrounded by an unrelenting sea of poverty. The extent to which the foreign policy decision-makers perceive the nation either as developed with some areas of backwardness or as underdeveloped with a few developed zones will heavily condition Brazil's relations not only with the developing states of Afro-Asia but also with the developed members of the Western Community. As the question could be phrased, should Brazil hope to benefit in the long run by retaining its position among the "Proletariat of the Free World" or should it seek leadership of a Third Force to demand concessions from the industrialized states?

What set of interests links it to the West? What set of interests favors greater multilateral cooperation with the Afro-Asian bloc? To what extent can relations with Afro-Asia be formulated separately from policy toward Latin America, the United States, and Western Europe (particularly Portugal)? What levels of priorities are to be assigned? These are a few of the more weighty normative considerations surrounding the Afro-Asian dimension of Brazilian foreign policy, making it useful as a contribution to the body of knowledge about how emerging and potentially great powers elect to make their influence felt on a world scale, achieving greater international recognition and broadening their range of diplomatic activity.

To delve into some of these questions and to assess in loco the state of Brazilian relations with Afro-Asia, field research was undertaken
in Brazil from January to November, 1960, under a Fulbright-Hays grant from the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Written material pertaining to the topic was obtained in the greatest part at the library of the Foreign Ministry, the Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, the Escola Superior de Guerra, the Centro Latinoamericano de Pesquisas em Ciências Sociais, and the Biblioteca Nacional, with use also made of the facilities of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas and the Instituto Brasileiro de Bibliografia e Documentação. To supplement and interpret statistics, accounts, and other written data, over thirty nonstandardized personal elite interviews were conducted with officials or former officials, Brazilian and foreign, with firsthand experience in the relations between Brazil and the countries of Afro-Asia in both private and public spheres to ascertain what these officials considered relevant in the total context of those relations and how they interpreted the events which they had helped to create or in which they were involved. Numerous important insights were gained in this way. Because of personal wishes of the interviewee, several of these sources have been kept anonymous.

The organization of the dissertation goes from the general to the specific. Chapter II describes the patterns in Brazilian foreign policy, emphasizing the years since 1956, in order to spell out the context in which relations with Afro-Asia have been formulated and carried out. The third chapter explores the images which different sectors of national
opinion have held about Afro-Asia and Brazil's role there and gives a chronological account of relations since 1956. In the fourth chapter statistical measures of interactions between nations are employed to determine the relative importance of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East in the global range of Brazilian foreign policy and to isolate the most salient states for case studies. Chapters V and VI cover policy on international issues which are generally considered most important by Afro-Asian states, decolonization, human rights, and economic development, using as illustrative cases Portuguese Africa and South Africa in the first two instances and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and competition with Africa in coffee and cocoa in the third. The concluding chapter theorizes about Afro-Asia as a dimension of Brazilian foreign policy and sets out the Foreign Ministry's goals in those regions.
CHAPTER II

TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF REPUBLICAN BRAZIL

In most treatments of the nations of Latin America, it has been customary to designate Brazil as a separate quantity, not only because of its Portuguese language and culture, but also because of its size, regional diversity, and supposedly more stable and less violent political process.¹ Brazilians themselves have long been aware of what they consider important differences between themselves and Spanish America, dating from the earliest days of Iberian colonization of South America and the Treaty of Tordesillas by which Pope Alexander VI in 1494 partitioned the New World between Spain and Portugal. Such a view emphasizes the unique contributions Brazil can make to international or inter-American relations, as the "third" or Luso-Brazilian America, as contrasted with the English and Spanish-speaking portions of the Americas.²

¹For an argument attacking conceptions of Brazilian politics as inherently more stable than the Latin American norm, see James Busey's "Brazil's Reputation for Political Stability," Western Political Quarterly, XVII, No. 4 (December, 1965), 866-880.

This feeling of uniqueness or perhaps even isolation in the South American context had great effect on the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy during the latter days of the Empire and the first years of the Republic, culminating in the establishment and mutual cultivation of close ties between Rio de Janeiro and Washington. Seldom marred by diplomatic frictions of importance, these harmonious relations came to represent an anomaly in an inter-American system in which the major feature has been Latin American antagonism toward or distrust of the United States. Brazil, on the contrary, in the first 60 years of this century generally adhered closely to American policy and often acted as advocate of the American position vis-a-vis the rest of Latin America. An understanding of the origins and nature of this relationship and the consequent outlook of the Brazilian elite and especially its effect on Brazil's pre-1956 image of world politics is essential to later examination of Brazil's reaction to the emergence of new Afro-Asian nations after 1956.

The Imperial Prelude

Although the United States was the first nation to recognize Brazil's independence from Portugal in 1822, the course of American-Brazilian relations from that date to the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 was marked largely by mutual indifference as the United States pursued a basically isolationist policy, while Brazil was principally engaged in improving relations with Europe (especially France and
Great Britain) and in balance of power maneuvers in the Rio de la Plata area. Great Britain was the diplomatic and commercial center of Brazilian attention in the mid-nineteenth century, partly as a legacy of the colonial period, for one of the oldest alliances in Europe was that between Great Britain and Portugal. In 1833, Brazil maintained 10 diplomatic missions in Europe and 4 in the Western Hemisphere; in 1859, Europe counted a total of 13 Brazilian legations and 157 consular officials, but the Americas were assigned only 7 missions and 37 consuls.3

Upper class cultural patterns and social values in the Empire were taken from European courts, as Brazil attempted to present itself to the world as a predominantly Caucasian nation despite large admixtures of Negro and Indian blood.

Within South America, Brazil’s action was confined mainly to delimiting the border with Argentina by legal means, the creation of Uruguay as a buffer state, and several interventions in the Cisplatine region to protect Uruguayan independence or to ensure the protection of Brazilian interests against Rosas and Argentine caudillismo and instability in general. Brazil also resisted Argentine pretensions of annexing Paraguay in 1849 and was successful in maintaining Paraguay intact as another buffer state after the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), despite Argentine pressure for partition.

Brazilian-American relations in the time of Dom Pedro II revolved around commercial issues and were mutually satisfactory in spite of certain frictions arising out of American complaints regarding treatment of her citizens or ships in Brazil, as well as American insistence on free navigation of the Amazon. During the American Civil War Brazil granted the South belligerency status and allowed both Confederate and Union ships to enter territorial waters and national ports. Several cases of conflict ensued between ships of the contending factions, but the Union maintained diplomatic courtesies and offered official apologies to the Emperor when a formal complaint was lodged. Washington's confidence in the impartiality of the Emperor remained at such a level that President Lincoln, when questioned by European statesmen on the possibility of a mediator in the conflict, reportedly replied that the natural choice would be Brazil. The visit of Dom Pedro II to the Philadelphia Exposition in 1876 and his famous remarks about Bell's telephone further popularized the image of the congenial, enlightened South American emperor.

An important problem in relations between Brazil and both England and the United States (after the Civil War) was Brazil's refusal to outlaw slavery until 1888. Newspaper articles in both Anglo-Saxon

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countries kept the issue under discussion and a cause of tension. About 1880 the American Minister Hilliard, a former slaveowner, was persuaded by abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco to testify in an open letter to the economic and social advantages of abolition. Brazilian protests of foreign interference led to his recall several months later.

By the end of the Empire, then, several principles had come to determine the general outlines of Brazilian foreign policy. For external support and a guarantee of independence, Brazil relied on the relationship with Great Britain rather than the Monroe Doctrine and a much weaker United States. For protection from encroachments on the part of greater powers, Brazil advocated non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes on the basis of juridical procedure, while at the same time not hesitating to use force where its own vital national interests were at stake. While negotiating border settlements, consolidating frontier control, and expanding dominion over disputed areas through the principle of effective occupation, Brazil sought to safeguard its internal order and parliamentary regime against threats emanating from the chaotic instability of the neighboring Spanish American republics.

The Early Republic

Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, of the University of Bahia, has identified three stages of republican Brazil's participation in the
international arena. The period of territorial diplomacy (1889-1917) served to fix the nation's boundaries with neighboring South American countries while extra-hemispheric concerns were relegated to second place, despite Brazil's attendance at the Second Hague Conference, where its polyglot representative Rui Barbosa asserted the rights of small states in international law. The following phase of extra-continental initiation and limited participation in world events (1917-1945) was marked by membership in the League of Nations and participation in the Second World War. Since 1945, Brazil has been undertaking what some Brazilians consider a great power apprenticeship in which an increasingly active foreign policy is used both as an instrument of economic development and as a means of furthering national independence and prestige, anticipating the day when Brazil will take on worldwide interests. Even though continuing problems and changes of regime make such periodization less than comprehensive, this outline is of use as a general orientation and will be adopted in the following discussion.

Between the turn of the century and World War I, Brazil was sufficiently prosperous, adventurous, and domestically peaceful to secure its international position and improve its image abroad. The statesman who would take these prime conditions to lend to Brazilian

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foreign relations a form and content they would retain for decades was
José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, the Baron of Rio Branco, who in his capacity as foreign minister under four presidents (1902-1912) was able to give to Brazilian foreign policy a continuity and direction seldom achieved in Latin America. Because of his accomplishments and organizing powers, Rio Branco has become the "patron saint" of Brazilian diplomacy, receiving almost obligatory references in present-day foreign policy statements, which sometimes are described as emanating from immutable principles he established, which have maintained their validity as standards of conduct despite the passage of time.

The Baron of Rio Branco was born in 1845 as the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, the noted diplomat, senator, prime minister, and foreign minister of Dom Pedro II. After 25 years' experience in various diplomatic posts in Europe and the United States, he came into national recognition through his successful handling of border dispute arbitration cases in the Missões and Amapá regions, winning for Brazil the entirety of the territory in contention. Named Minister of Foreign Relations by President Rodrigues Alves in July, 1902, Rio Branco set about modernizing and streamlining Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Relations), adding a library, map room, new furnishings, and recruiting such talented figures as Joaquim Nabuco and Euclides da Cunha. The staff of the office was enlarged; Rio Branco
found it with only 27 officials whereas in 1859 it had employed 38.  

With the political advantage of having been absent from Brazil for nearly three decades and thus not having made many enemies, Rio Branco accepted the office of foreign minister from each succeeding president only on the condition that strictly internal, partisan matters be kept out of foreign policy. Within Brazil, Rio Branco is best remembered for the approximately 342,000 square miles which he added to the national territory while bilaterally negotiating boundary limits with all the surrounding republics, basing all his claims solely on actual and effective possession of the land, in lieu of whatever legal instruments already existed.  

The Spanish-speaking countries of South America, remembering the distant Treaty of Tordesillas which gave almost all of the continent to Spain, smoldered under the resentment that somehow they had been cheated by creeping Brazilian imperialism. From the proclamation of the Republic, ministers in both Washington and Rio de Janeiro worked toward a common understanding or at least a tacit partnership, departing from the past record of mutual

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indifference. During the 1893 naval mutiny in Rio's harbor, the decisive American stand against possible pro-monarchy intervention by European powers with naval vessels in the Bay of Guanabara was sufficient to assure the victory of the government forces and defeat a return to monarchy. Since this application of the Monroe Doctrine actually contributed to the preservation of Brazilian sovereignty, it is not surprising that the federal government in 1894 dedicated a monument in Rio to James Monroe and confiscated copies of Eduardo Prado's *A Ilusão Americana*, unfavorable to the United States. Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries well disposed toward the United States' role in the Spanish-American War, and the Brazilian Naval Club of Rio sent a communication to the United States Navy, congratulating it for the sea victories. The earlier results of President Cleveland's arbitration in the Missões question also advanced the favorable opinion of his country in Brazil.

Despite his own ties to aristocratic Europe, Rio Branco fully appreciated the growing strength of the United States as well as Brazil's advantages in fostering more amicable relations, from both political and commercial points of view. With tacit or explicit American backing Brazil could hope to be much stronger and more effective in border disputes and entrance onto the world scene. Favorable commercial arrangements

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with the greatest market for coffee exports would be facilitated and the
drive for Brazilian supremacy in South America would practically be
guaranteed success. To this end the Baron, also aware of the ongoing
rivalry with Argentina, used all occasions to stress the common interests
and affinities of the Colossus of the North and that of the south. As
the two "outcasts" of the Western Hemisphere, the United States and
Brazil therefore concluded a type of informal alliance, with the United
States encouraging Brazilian aspirations for leadership within Latin
America in order to afford itself a strong ally for American policy there.

The most dramatic step in this entente was the 1905 elevation
to embassy status of the Brazilian legation in Washington, at a time
when the rank of ambassador was reserved for great powers in their
mutual relations and no other South American country maintained an
embassy in the United States. In choosing Joaquim Nabuco for the first
Ambassador to Washington and consequently the tactician of his new
approach, Rio Branco picked an able representative who became very
popular for his speaking ability and genuine admiration for the United
States, the Monroe Doctrine, and Pan-Americanism. In speaking of a
Brazil-United States alliance through the Monroe Doctrine to counteract
what he regarded as the colonially based European-African-Asian group,
Nabuco affirmed, "To me the Monroe Doctrine means that we detach
ourselves politically from Europe as completely, as definitely as the
moon from the earth. The tenor of this statement and the symbolic transfer of the talented Nabuco from London to Washington signaled a fundamental and lasting shift in the axis of Brazilian foreign policy attention, a change in which the Brazilian government received enthusiastic cooperation from Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root.

Both Nabuco and Rio Branco strongly supported the Monroe Doctrine because they believed that a large, stable, developing, and distant Brazil need not fear United States intervention in spite of the Roosevelt Corollary. In a letter to Graça Aranha, Nabuco wrote, "The Monroe Doctrine lays down a definite foreign policy for the United States which is now beginning to take shape, and it lays down a similar policy for us. Under such conditions, our diplomacy should receive its principal impetus from Washington. Such a policy would be better than the largest army or navy."10

Both states benefited from this partnership. Rio Branco attempted to explain American interventions to Spanish America as altruistic, with basically pure motives, and explicitly invoked the Doctrine on several occasions to strengthen his hand against European powers, notably in the Panther case of 1905 and the Acre controversy

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with Bolivia in which an Anglo-American company was involved. After
the United States' role in Panamanian independence, Rio Branco stated
that he "heartily" approved of Roosevelt's action, sought to gather
diplomatic recognition in Latin America, and offered early recognition
on the part of Brazil. When Colombia requested aid, he advised a
realistic acceptance of the situation.11

Inspired by such mutual gains and the possibilities the Monroe
Doctrine held for Brazil in its expanding international activities, Rio
Branco planned to have the Brazilian delegation to the Fourth Inter-
national Conference of American States at Buenos Aires (1910) press for
adoption of the following remarkable resolution:

The long stretch of time since the declaration of the
Monroe Doctrine enables us to recognize in it a permanent
factor for international peace on the American continent.
For that reason Latin America, celebrating the first efforts
to gain her independence, sends to her great northern sister
the expression of her gratitude for that noble and dis-
interested initiative which has been of such great benefit
to the world.12

Because of the more characteristic opposition of much less enthusiastic
Spanish American countries who had not felt so strongly the potentially
salutary effects of the Doctrine, this proposal was never presented to
the Conference but remains chiefly as an indicator of Rio Branco's degree

11 Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance*, pp. 86-90.

12 Frederic W. Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio Branco, Joaquim
Nabuco, and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910,"
*Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXII (August, 1942), 433-434.
of commitment to the continuation of United States tutelage in Latin America, especially in light of growing American economic and military strength.

Although Rio Branco achieved some measure of success within the Western Hemisphere as a result of this new alignment of forces, Brazil's experiences at the Second Hague Conference warned of future difficulties inherent in the relationship, which allowed the United States to give Brazil special privileges and consideration within the inter-American system or the American sphere of influence, but which also required it as a superior power to be primarily concerned with its own interests vis-a-vis Europe. The United States sided with the established European powers on most issues and ignored Latin America, despite Root's many speeches on behalf of the equality of nations. The subordinate status granted Brazil in the organization of the International Court of Justice came as a rude shock to Itamaraty, accustomed to different treatment in the limited field of Inter-American politics. The cross purposes pursued at the Hague Conference were in accord with objective differences in the wealth, power, and rank of the two countries, which could not be eliminated merely by the subsequent official statements in which Elihu Root and Rio Branco glossed over the disagreements.

Secretary of State Root left office in 1909, and Nabuco died in Washington the following year. Rio Branco died in 1912, but the major trends he initiated continued for decades. The demise of these three
prime movers, however, determined that the alliance and Brazilian support for the Monroe Doctrine would continue in form but without fervor. Despite the efforts of Edwin Morgan, United States Ambassador to Brazil from 1912 to 1933, relations became routine although cordial, lacking the innovations and eagerness which had characterized the first decade of the century, in part because of internal preoccupations of both nations.

Extra-Continental Initiation

World War I worked various effects on Brazil. While German submarines destroyed some Brazilian shipping, the increased European demand for foodstuffs during the later war years and the postwar period brought a measure of good fortune. Brazil declared its neutrality on August 4, 1914, the same day as did the United States. With German torpedoing of Brazilian ships, relations with Germany were broken on April 11, 1917, but Brazil still remained neutral both out of relative weakness and domestic division of loyalties among the many immigrant groups. On June 1, 1917, the Brazilian Congress authorized seizure of German ships in national ports and on October 26 of the same year war was declared with the sinking of another ship, making Brazil the only South American nation to go to war with the Central Powers. Actual participation at that late date, however, was limited to the sending of patrol ships to the South Atlantic and medical missions to France and England but gave Brazil a new feeling of involvement on a world scale.
Besides being represented at the Versailles Peace Conference, Brazil became an active member of the League of Nations and, within its well-developed legal tradition, furnished several distinguished jurists to the Permanent Court of International Justice. During its seven years in the League, Brazil succeeded in being re-elected as a non-permanent member of the Council, an advantage both for itself and the other nations of Latin America which found themselves severely handicapped in dealing with the established creditor powers of Europe. Several times the Brazilian delegate served as President of the Council, where Brazil was determined to speak for the Western Hemisphere in the absence of the United States.

This relatively euphoric state of affairs was shaken in 1926 when in alliance Brazil, Spain, and Poland announced that they would vote to admit Germany as a permanent Council member only if they were allowed permanent membership as well. Since the affirmative votes of Brazil and Spain as non-permanent Council members were necessary for German admission, a crisis developed. Despite some benefits which might have accrued to Latin America as a whole out of the Brazilian demand, the Spanish American states pragmatically supported instead the creation of three non-permanent Council seats for Latin America instead of two.

Itamaraty and the nationalistic President Bernardes remained inflexible to a compromise solution suggested by a special committee
and clung to their impossible pretensions. Brazil vetoed German membership, but faced with widespread criticism and knowing that Germany would likely be admitted in spite of Brazilian opposition it left the League on June 10, 1926. Just as after the unhappy Hague experience, Brazil retreated to the more comfortable, familiar area of Western Hemisphere diplomacy in which it felt more efficacious. This withdrawal increased Brazilian isolation from European and Asiatic political affairs, convincing many sectors of public opinion of the futility of extra-hemispheric interests. Brazilian diplomats in addition were removed from the further experience to be gained in international organization, continuing their preference for idealistic schemes set in high-sounding legal phraseology. 13

Brazil's principal activities in the juridical and mediating fields in the interwar period were the cases of the Chaco War and the Marañón dispute. In the complex secret diplomacy of the former, Brazil tacitly supported Bolivia's demand for a port on the Paraguay River but attempted to keep the war from spreading. The Marañón crisis of 1941 was an unprovoked large-scale Peruvian attack on Ecuador in the disputed Amazon border region. With very weak defenses Ecuador could not resist the occupation of a large part of her territory, while Peru remained belligerent and refused any line of settlement other than the

13 Brazilian Institute of International Relations, Brazil and the United Nations, Rio de Janeiro, 1957, p. 9. (Mimeographed.)
territory effectively occupied. After American entry into World War II, Washington requested Brazil, in the person of her Foreign Minister, Oswaldo Aranha, to assume responsibility for the negotiations. At the Rio meeting of American foreign ministers in January, 1942, Ecuador and Peru were brought together for any solution possible, to preserve wartime hemispheric unity. Since the United States withdrew all support for Ecuador and Peru held the de facto superiority, Aranha, in a pitiful show of justice, demanded that Ecuador accept the Peruvian imposition or receive no more Brazilian or United States aid. Ecuador was literally forced into legitimizing her territorial losses by Brazil acting at the behest of the United States.

The initial vacillation of Getúlio Vargas in choosing sides in World War II and his early news censorship in favor of the Axis powers are well-known. After a period of neutrality, in March, 1941, Brazil gave permission to the United States to build naval air bases in Belém, Recife, and Natal for use in hemispheric defense, specifically vis-a-vis North Africa and the South Atlantic. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, relations with the Axis powers were severed and, with the sinking of more Brazilian ships, that country declared war on August 22, 1942, sending an expeditionary force of over 25,000 to Italy.

**Great Power Apprenticeship and the Domestic Debate over Foreign Policy**

Only after Brazilian participation in World War II did the national political parties begin to conceive of Brazil as an inseparable part of the
world and show greater concern for international problems outside the hemisphere, thus bringing into Congress and the public view some of the foreign policy issues previously reserved exclusively to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.  

In the decade immediately following World War II, under the presidencies of Dutra and Vargas, the topic of foreign policy played a minor role in domestic politics, but after 1955 greater challenges to the traditional foreign policy were posed by industrialization and the rise of nationalism. Under Vargas' direction, Brazilian nationalism, after a late start, had become imbued with economic and welfare overtones and evolved from a purely intellectual phenomenon to a government-supported creed with foreign capital as its principal target. Its most concrete accomplishment was the 1953 establishment of Petrobrás as the state monopoly for exploration and development of petroleum deposits. From 1956 to 1964, nationalism gained converts and influence in policy-formation, being taken over by activists of the political left who condemned foreign economic control (especially that of the United States) as imperialistic and proclaimed that greater attention should be given to economic development, regulation of foreign investment, government intervention in the economy, and diversification of trade on a world scale.  

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Rational, intellectually oriented "developmental nationalism" was fostered with the official creation in mid-1955 of the Superior Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB), a group of former Vargas advisers and nationalists of a wide spectrum of political views, functioning as a graduate-level research council to study problems of development and modernization. Short courses, lectures, and a year-long graduate seminar for military and government officials set an intellectual standard for future theorizing about nationalism and for the first time, departing from the usual academic legal-historical idealistic approach, attempted to apply social science to the definition and solution of Brazilian problems by Brazilians.\(^\text{16}\) Publications and studies of ISEB stimulated a swelling flow of nationalistic writings as well as severe criticism from the conservative press for its increasing emphasis on Marxist terminology, national planning, and socialism. ISEB's policy recommendations for wide reforms were most strongly opposed when they threatened the domestic status quo. Although abolished as subversive by the revolutionary government in 1964, ISEB in its nine years of life provided the foundation for a high degree of consensus on foreign policy aims among large sectors of the attentive public, centering on aspirations for modernization, independence in

international politics, a broadening of relations, and future great-power status. 17

This tomada de consciência, greater popular interest in foreign policy, the establishment of Petrobrás, and the demands of industrialization and an expanded internal market during the Kubitschek years moved Brazilian foreign policy into a transitional phase and marked the decline of the traditional style which Itamaraty had been following since the death of Rio Branco, an approach which has been characterized by one critic as inaction stemming from uncertainty: "All actions have consequences; these are unforeseeable, so we should not act; that is the general principle which governed our Ministry [of Foreign Relations] from 1913 to 1956." 18 This traditional, affective style was invoked as late as 1956 by President Kubitschek when he stated in his annual message to Congress that Brazil's foreign policy was expressed principally through the United Nations and the Organization of American States and reflected primarily Brazil's position as an "American country, member of the Western Christian Community, defender of the juridical equality of states and the peaceful solution of disputes, supporter of


friendly co-existence, and of all active forms of cooperation.  

Foreign policy had been framed in terms of values supposedly worth pursuing for their own sake, broad, permanent "principled objectives" faithfully sought because of a belief in their unconditional validity: obedience to international law, peace, justice, dignity, equality, adherence to treaties, and continuous consultation with the United States on policy questions.  

All of these guidelines were alleged to have been distilled from the traditions of the Empire and the practices of Rio Branco, rooted in the Latin-Christian origins of the Brazilian people, and sanctified by at least a century of experience.

Despite differences in policy recommendations, the critics of the old orientation agree on at least three serious flaws in the former conduct of Brazilian diplomacy and question whether the routine application of immutable principles derived from a different era can adequately represent the realities and enlarge the range of options of a rapidly

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19 Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1956), p. 131. Developmental overtones are much more prevalent in foreign policy comments toward the end of the Kubitschek administration. See, for example, Juscelíno Kubitschek de Oliveira, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1959), pp. 54-55.


21 For an anti-revisionist statement of the traditional position by a diplomat with long experience, see A. Camilo de Oliveira, "Linhas mestras da política exterior do Brasil," Digesto Econômico, No. 143 (September-October, 1958), 113-130.
changing nation in the present international situation. First, the older diplomatic caste and cultural elite are accused of being unconditional admirers and imitators of Europe and the United States, without a critical sense or historical perspective, striving to be as different as possible from the typical Brazilian. In its cosmopolitanism and search for a foreign model, this group became so attracted to its European self-image and so dependent on foreign patterns that it fell into a state of alienation and failed utterly to represent Brazilian interest, concentrating instead on projecting a flattering but false image of Brazil, "for the English to see," as the Brazilian expression for pretentiousness so appropriately phrases it.22 This cultural sentimentality for things European or American led almost directly to support for colonialism or a decided lack of fervor in anti-colonialist statements.23

Second, Brazilian diplomacy has suffered from a strong legal-historical bias rather unrelated to the current demands of international relations and stemming from the fact that in Brazil academic social studies have been comprised largely of law and history, with very little evidence of the modern disciplines of political science and international relations. Apparently, little is being done to remedy this deficiency at

23Infra, Chapter V.
the Rio Branco Institute where diplomats receive their training. Historian José Honório notes that from 1889 to 1964, of 62 full and interim Ministers of Foreign Relations, 48 had earned law degrees; to this fact he attributes much of the juridical stagnation, unimaginative conformity, and lack of initiative evident from the days of Rio Branco to Kubitschek. The type of abstract, legalistic encyclopedism fostered by this education tended to produce professionals who could recite the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia but were unable to frame a concrete program of Brazilian interests in a given situation.

Finally, the critics decried what they felt was an automatic pro-Americanism exhibited by Itamaraty, disregarding important conflicts between American and Brazilian interests and resulting from a misinterpretation of the original intentions of Rio Branco. On occasion, according to a former foreign minister, representatives to international conferences and organizations were merely given instructions to vote in agreement with the United States delegation. Defenders of the necessity to support American positions unequivocally argued that the

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alliance with the United States has no alternative because national security ultimately rests on American deterrent power. For them the primary dimension of international conflict is East versus West; since the United States is the only Western nation capable of containing Communism, other nations of Western culture (including Brazil) must often sacrifice their narrow national interest for the common good and support American policy. Since all developing nations are forced to depend economically on developed nations to a great extent and given the fact that the United States is Brazil’s best trade partner and source of aid, the alliance represents the best of all possible dependencies and an infinitely better arrangement than a doubtful search for new economic ties and an ephemeral solidarity with Third World nations, especially in view of Brazilian treaty commitments to Washington through the inter-American system and the geographical imperative of its proximity to the United States.

Nationalists countered that international politics is by definition the clashing of national interests of separate states, in which each tries to maximize its gains and minimize its losses.\(^{27}\) The primary conflict is not between two opposing civilizations or Christianity versus

\(^{27}\) One of the most logically constructed and informed defenses of a nationalist or neutralist foreign policy was written by the founder of ISEB and published by the Institute: Hélio Jaguaribe, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1958), Part Two.
atheism, but rather between the developed and the underdeveloped nations. In its personal struggle with the Soviet Union, the United States has been admirably successful in converting the defense of the American way of life into the ideology of the "Free World," thus identifying the safeguarding of its interests and values with the preservation of Christianity and Western Civilization. Although Brazil forms part of this entity, its policy options are neither described nor exhausted solely by classifying it as Western and Christian, nor by fatalistically assigning it a permanent position within Washington's sphere of influence. Since the common interests of Brazil and the United States are only partially overlapping, not completely congruent, discretion and autonomy rather than unconditional adherence are imperative, lest Brazil be transformed into a mere instrument of American defense policy to the detriment of its own economic interests as a much less developed, industrializing producer of raw materials, in need of wider markets and higher, more stable prices.

Pointing to the examples of Yugoslavia, India, and the UAR, the nationalists warned that faithful allies are all too often taken for granted while a strategically important nation following a neutralist foreign policy may have a much greater opportunity for favorable negotiation and achieving international prestige through arbitration. This type of appeal was particularly successful against the recent background of scant American concern with Latin American development during
the Eisenhower "banker mentality" years, followed by the marked
upswing in attention subsequent to the disaster of Vice-President
Nixon's 1958 trip and the 1959 advent of Fidel Castro, or the decided
contrast of Washington's flat refusal of Latin American requests for a
"Latin Marshall Plan" in the 1950's as compared with large sums of
aid granted Yugoslavia in the same period.28

The essential change which these professors, journalists,
and diplomats were urging was for the nation to leave the former static
policy of narrow horizons and real or imagined subordination to American
interests and begin a diplomatic offensive in which its international
conduct would be determined by internal events (i.e., development)
rather than imposed by outside interests or pressures. Brazil's time
had come to forge its own destiny, to move from being a país grande to
being a grande país, from being a comparsa to becoming a protagonista
on the international scene, as a continental nation beginning to think
in intercontinental terms. After 1956 an increasing amount of space
was dedicated in newspapers, magazines, and books to polemics on
foreign policy, which reached their highest intensity from 1960 to 1964,
and whose most optimistic aspirations are symbolized by the volume
O Brasil entre as Cinco Maiores Potências no Fim deste Século.29

28 See also Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes, Subdesenvolvimento

29 Pimentel Gomes, O Brasil entre as Cinco Maiores Potências
Brazilians had begun to take seriously the potentialities of future greatness often ascribed to their nation by foreign observers.  

The Kubitschek Years

In a speech to students at Rio's Catholic University in 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek exemplified the new mood, speaking for Brazil and of Latin America, when he cautioned, "We wish to align ourselves with the West, but we do not want to constitute its proletariat." Nevertheless, he was careful to cooperate fully with American hemispheric policy, avoid references to foreign imperialism, and justify the features of a more dynamic orientation as logical, creative extensions of the time-tested traditional lines of conduct to adapt them to new circumstances. Although Kubitschek did take some of the first steps toward making foreign policy serve internal growth, it was only under the aegis of Quadros that the full thrust of the theses of the developmental nationalists made itself felt. Kubitschek's programs were more characteristically mid-range, with an innocuous culturally based, good-will approach which always stopped before causing the clashes that would inevitably occur as Brazil defended its

30 It should be noted that Gomes' predictions are based on similar observations of a former American Ambassador to Brazil. See: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crisis (New York: Reynal and Company 1957), pp. 39-42.

31 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, II, No. 5 (March, 1959), 139.
interests against those of developed states. Rather than engineer a complete readjustment of foreign relations, he insisted that only slight modifications were indicated.

The idealization of the Pan American Operation (PAO) was one of the most imaginative and timely foreign policy initiatives of Kubitschek. Two weeks after Vice-President Nixon received hostile receptions at the hands of mobs in Caracas and Lima during his 1958 tour of Latin America, the Brazilian president sent to Eisenhower an expression of continental solidarity, observing that misunderstandings in American-Latin relations had become evident, necessitating action to recompose the continental united front. Shortly thereafter, Kubitschek proposed the PAO as a completely multilateral developmental effort with the objectives of reaffirming the principles of continental solidarity, defining under-development as a problem of common interest and collective responsibility in the Americas, stabilizing the prices of primary products, increasing available foreign financial and technical assistance, and reaffirming the role of private enterprise in development. The PAO was designed and strongly advocated as an adjunct of Western defense strategy, to strengthen and stabilize Latin America economically, lessen the probability of internal subversion, and thus make possible an increase in Latin contributions to global alliance defense. 32

32 Brazilian government aide-memoir reproduced in Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, I, No. 4 (December, 1958), 119-123.
This plan was well received among the Spanish American presidents and by both Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, appealing as it did to pragmatic reason and defense requirements rather than to impulses of American generosity. After inter-governmental discussions at high level, a Committee of Twenty-One was nominated by the Council of the Organization of American States to devise means for implementing the project. Although Kubitschek's PAO stagnated in committee, under the pressure of circumstances and the change in American leadership the kernel of his idea went on to become the Alliance for Progress, under American sponsorship and more unilateral than originally envisioned. Nevertheless, those Brazilians interested in foreign affairs received vicarious satisfaction from the knowledge that this Alliance had first been framed and presented by Brazil. Through this diplomacy, Brazil moved into a more prestigious political position in the Americas, restarted the hemispheric dialogue with Washington, brought about a long-sought economic reorientation of the previously legally oriented spirit of Pan-Americanism, and helped Latin American leaders to think in continental terms.

The effect of development on foreign policy was also apparent in the pursuit of new export markets, most notably with the commercial mission which visited the Soviet Union in late 1959 and led to the completion in that year of an agreement regulating trade, disrupted since the breaking of relations between Rio de Janeiro and Moscow in
1947. Itamaraty was reorganized to function more efficiently along commercial lines, collecting data, studying the world economic and political situation, and anticipating the creation of new diplomatic missions in Afro-Asia. These activities stemmed from a growing conviction that, in the words of Foreign Minister Láfer,

It is our duty not to remain prisoners of a limited circle which we ourselves have drawn and which impedes us from expanding our exports and gathering the aid which would be most useful to Brazil's development. Without forgetting a single problem of a cultural or political nature, this Ministry will place itself increasingly at the service of the conquest of new markets for Brazilian exports.\footnote{Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Gestão do Ministro Láfer na Pasta das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1961), p. 83.}

\textbf{Política Externa Independente}

The issue of nationalism played an important role in the presidential elections of 1960, turning on the questions of agrarian reform, foreign capital, and an "independent" foreign policy. Campaigning on an administrative-reform platform vague enough to draw support from all sectors of the electorate, Jânio Quadros was elected to the presidency with 48 percent of the total vote to his chief opponent Marechal Lott's 32 percent. This was the greatest absolute number of votes ever gained by a presidential candidate in Brazil and the election of the first opposition candidate since the end of the First Republic. Interest in his foreign policy plans was immediately voiced, as he had been portrayed by the
opposition as too lenient toward American capital, in spite of his advocacy of a "national interest" policy of independence and broad relations to end the country's former obscurity. During the campaign he had visited Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban ambassador to Brazil, but Lott declined a similar invitation. Several weeks after his election he undertook a world tour of nearly three months' duration, including in his itinerary the USSR, the UAR, Yugoslavia, India, and Japan, and interviewing neutralist leaders such as Nasser, Tito, Nehru, and Bourguiba. Conspicuously absent was a visit to Washington, although he had been invited by both Eisenhower and Kennedy. This trip contrasted sharply with the route taken by Kubitschek when president-elect: the United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

During his seven-month term, Quadros, with the close collaboration of his foreign minister Afonso Arinos and presidential advisors (many of the "ISEB generation"), shaped a new activist "international point of view" for Brazil, to gain full advantage of the position the nation had achieved by virtue of its size, population, and level of industrialization, as well as to ease a critical balance of payments and foreign debt problem. In his message to Congress, Quadros made clear the outlines which his administration would follow, including

1. Fidelity to the inter-American system.
2. Respect for the traditional position of Brazil in the Free World.
3. Collaboration with the United States for social and
democratic progress in the Americas.
4. Anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and support for self-
determination of peoples.
5. Recognition of and the attribution of the proper
importance to interests and aspirations common to
Brazil and Afro-Asia, such as economic development,
defense of raw material prices, industrialization,
and desires for peace.
6. Establishment and broadening of relations with the
nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern
Europe.
7. Foreign policy positions fully geared to meet the needs
of internal growth.\(^{34}\)

Reaffirming his dedication to the Western ideological conviction
of Brazil and continuing cooperation with Washington, Quadros maintained
on the other hand that Brazil's only defense treaty obligations committed
it to a continental security pact (Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, 1947) which
had implications in the eventuality of aggression against any member of
the OAS, but did not require it to align itself automatically to one side
or another within the global context of the Cold War, nor even to con-
sider itself a part of that conflict.

Not being members of any bloc, not even of the
Neutralist bloc, we preserve our absolute freedom to
make our own decisions in specific cases and in the
light of peaceful suggestions at one with our nature and
history. A group of nations, notably of Asia, is also
careful to remain on the sidelines in any clash of
interests which are invariably those of the great powers

\(^ {34}\) Jânio Quadros, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional (Rio de
and not necessarily those of our country, let alone of world peace. 35

With this philosophy and its mixed economic and population characteristics, Brazil would be an autonomous force to lessen world tensions and mediate superpower disputes.

On another occasion Quadros affirmed, "No less important today than the traditional bonds tying us to Europe are the interests, aspirations, and points of contact between Brazil and the peoples of Africa and Asia." 36 To the conservative elites, this often-reiterated identification of Brazil as being a "sister nation" with Afro-Asian states of completely foreign culture and traditions rang of heresy, or at best a woefully misplaced emphasis resulting from malicious ideological bias. The "Americanists" feared that this sudden elevation of Afro-Asia and the Eastern Bloc in diplomatic attention would relegate the relations with Washington to second place and ally Brazil in the United Nations with the groups that many of them saw as opponents and detractors of the West with which they identified completely. Some of the conservative groups already viewed nationalism as nearly synonymous with Communism; such plans for disengagement from the Cold War and a break from the tranquil diplomacy of the past led them to decry the imminent "neutralization" and "Africanization" of Brazil, and further


36 Quadros, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, p. 96.
condemn nationalism. Supporters of Quadros' ideas countered with the examples of Canada and Great Britain, much more closely tied to the United States than Brazil, yet willing to follow what they judge to be their own interests in Cuba, Vietnam, and China. As time went by, the clash between these two schools of thought became increasingly acute, aggravated by the deterioration of the domestic political and economic situation.

To implement Quadros' principles, diplomatic and trade relations were opened with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, and Rumania), Ghana, Guinea and several other previously "taboo" or neutralist nations, while trade missions from Eastern Europe, Afro-Asia, North Korea, and Communist China were received and similar missions sent. These ambitious designs engendered some frustrations in two of Brazil's closest partners. West Germany, an important customer, protested so vigorously a planned trade agreement with East Germany that the effort was almost abandoned. Washington was apprehensive not only of Vice-President Goulart's trade mission to Peking and Brazilian willingness to discuss Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations, but also found objectionable Brasília's persistent defense of "non-intervention and self-determination" for Cuba and its resistance to American-sponsored collective action against Castro's regime in its attempts to foment insurrections in Latin America. Quadros' foreign minister has argued that this position, maintained until
the revolution of 1964, resulted from a natural outgrowth of long-established Brazilian mediation between the United States and Latin America, coupled with the long-accepted precepts of non-intervention and self-determination consecrated by OAS treaties.  

Unsuccessful in its first efforts to re-integrate Cuba into the Western Hemisphere system in the face of what it interpreted as the intransigence of both parties, Brazil under Quadros found itself pressured by a United States desirous of both isolating the Castro government through the OAS and recouping prestige lost in the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Even then Brazil reasoned that an isolation strategy would most likely be counterproductive and force Havana further under the influence of Moscow. Quadros also argued against the breaking of relations on the basis of the right and necessity of all states to maintain communication with each other, especially in time of crisis or disagreement. The best way, then, to protect the hemisphere from Communist subversion would be through social and economic reform rather than police action.

In a March visit, Adolf Berle, Jr., of the State Department expressed concern over this policy and spoke of American investments in Brazil. In April, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon discussed Brazilian foreign relations in the light of financial ties with the United States,

37 Arinos, pp. 75-103.
but Quadros indignantly refused to regard his policy as negotiable in such a manner. 38 American Ambassador Cabot criticized the Cuban policy on several occasions, stressing Brazil's treaty commitments with the West. Quadros, sensitive to all apparent impugnation of his actions, expressed his displeasure at these remarks. The State Department assured all parties that the subsequent replacement of Cabot by Lincoln Gordon was a routine change, but Cabot's denunciations reached a peak just before he left Brazil in mid-August. Clearly the United States was disturbed by the new international behavior of its previously habitually compliant ally, which after 50 years it had begun to take for granted.

Important segments of the population and press, led most vocally by journalist-politician Carlos Lacerda, saw in Quadros' attitude a softness toward Communism and criticized stridently the whole new foreign policy orientation. When the impetuous Quadros decorated Ernesto "Ché" Guevara with the high Order of the Southern Cross as he was returning to Cuba from denouncing the United States at the Punta del Este Conference where sanctions on Cuba were discussed, the denunciations were magnified many times. 39 The Grã Cruz da Ordem


39 Arinos contends that the award served principally as a pretext to communicate to the government of Cuba, at the request of the Vatican, a Brazilian letter requesting an end to persecution of the Catholic Church. See Arinos, pp. 102-103.
Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul was awarded to "manifest our appreciation" for Guevara's "desire to broaden economic and cultural relations with the Brazilian people." This act not only demonstrated Quadros' opposition to "archaic" sanctions, but sources at the Presidential Palace cited it as additional proof that, despite American aid granted Brazil at Punta del Este through the Alliance for Progress, the independent foreign policy remained non-negotiable. Soon after the Guevara incident, Quadros invited Khrushchev to visit Brazil.

In assessing the focal-point role of the Cuban problem in the growing campaign of public and military opposition to Quadros and to certain aspects of his independent foreign policy, Arinos writes:

The transition was very brusque, from Juscelino to Jânio; from Lafer to me. There was no preparation, not even sufficient explanation. The Cuban question, disastrously dealt with by the inexperienced Kennedy government in the United States, dominated the national panorama, provoking a chain of reactions which ran from the religious devotee and the fearful with good faith to the self-seeking without it (self-seeking for political or economic motives), all uniting together in a sort of torrent of panic which shortly placed the new government under the greatest and most unfounded suspicions.

Quadros considered himself the embodiment of the popular will as expressed at the polls; any opposition, compromise, or attempt to

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41 José Leal da Silva, "Por qué renunció Jânio Quadros," *Bohemia Libre Puertorriqueña*, Año 53, No. 50 (September 17, 1961), 66.

42 Arinos, p. 75.
deny him support was a dilution of the desires of the electorate. This was especially the case with his foreign policy, since he had pledged this course in the campaign. His lack of tact, preemptory approach, fitful personality, and the absence of real efforts to reconcile estranged groups contributed heavily to his downfall. His enigmatic resignation on August 25, 1961, precipitated in large part by military opposition to the Cuban policy and particularly the Guevara award, was apparently intended to elicit a popular reaction returning him to office with greater powers and prestige.

His successor João Goulart pursued basically the same independent policy lines until his overthrow by the military on March 31, 1964. Goulart, however, was beset by severe domestic political and economic difficulties such as rampant inflation, suspension of American aid, declining support, and military as well as public distrust of extreme leftist and populist infiltration in the government, becoming clearer as the fateful crisis progressed through 1963 and early 1964. For these reasons and personal choice, foreign relations was not the great point of attention that it had become in the administration of his predecessor.

Friction with Washington reached new heights. Failure to establish responsible, austere fiscal policies resulted in the withdrawal of American credit and assistance. Brazil continued to oppose all sanctions against Cuba and maintained relations with Havana until the 1964 coup; this obstinate stance became a test case or point of honor
in the minds of many nationalists determined to remove every last
vestige of subservience to American guidance. In 1962 a profit remit-
tance law was enacted, limiting to 10 percent of its registered invested
capital the amount of profits a foreign company could return to its home-
land yearly. In the last three months of his regime Goulart threatened
a unilateral moratorium on all of Brazil's foreign debts.

Although Latin America was not neglected, the diplomatic
initiatives in Afro-Asia and Eastern Europe were expanded and official
visits exchanged. The most significant arena of diplomacy for Itamaraty,
however, swung to the United Nations, where Brazil often strove to
enlist the support of other developing countries or to act as their spokes-
man in the solution of common problems. In the opening speech of the
general debate of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly
(September 19, 1963), Foreign Minister Araújo Castro set forth the three
fundamental themes of Brazilian foreign policy—the so-called 3D's:
Development, Disarmament, and Decolonization. 43 This triad of
objectives made possible ample cooperation between Brazil and Afro-
Asia, since they were the general objectives of almost all the neutralist
and former colonial states and formed the core issues of the North-South
international conflict between the developed and developing nations.

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43 João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Desarmamento, Desenvolvi-
mento, Descolonização (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações
Public statements defined this more aggressive posture of Itamaraty, in the words of one foreign minister, as "an internal self-awareness of the Brazilian community, relating to its own identity, its interests, and its purposes, as a conscious national grouping which will not relinquish the command of its own destiny."44 No longer would Brazil be content merely to increase exports to all possible markets; nothing less than a complete revision of the conditions and structure of international commerce was indicated, to eliminate unfavorable terms of trade for producers of raw materials and make commerce a positive force contributing to development. In addition to the efforts of each developing nation should be added the efforts of the whole international community to facilitate industrialization and the mobilization of capital. No less than a form of economic collective security was being advocated to stave off the economic disasters facing the Third World.

Disarmament, besides being connected with the customary, ostensible purpose of reducing tensions and decreasing the probability of nuclear war, was advanced by Brazil in its mediating capacity as a neutral member of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission as a means to divert huge arms expenses to the work of economic development. In combating colonialism, Brazil emphasized that it was opposed as well

44 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI, No. 2 (June, 1963), 273.
to all forms of neocolonialism—political, economic, or police (military)—and urged UN action to defeat these more subtle forms of subjugation to foreign interests which may stand in the way of the autonomous growth and true independence of its weaker members.

Under Goulart, Brazil also defended the necessity of strengthening the United Nations, to reflect more precisely the desires of mankind and allow implementation of the worthy but unrealized ideals propounded in its Charter. Such provisions as would have enabled the specialized agencies to serve as dynamic, successful promoters of development, disarmament, and decolonization were blocked by the fact that the Charter represented a victorious great power interpretation of the results of World War II. The 3D questions had been hindered from solution by an "invisible veto" of the great powers working to defeat passage and execution of resolutions prejudicial to their interest. Laying the blame completely on the supremacy of large, established, developed states in the world organization, Brazil charged that, "The effective implementation of the Charter has collided with the effective Directorate exercised by the Great Powers," and warned of the possible future immobilisme of the UN resulting from this obstructionism.

Of course Brazil did not originate the "3D" issues; what is significant about this position is that it represents a general summation

45 Castro, pp. 27-33.

46 Ibid., p. 28.
and acceptance of the Third World image of international relations by a nation which scarcely six years earlier had officially subscribed almost wholly to the image of international conflict on an East-West Cold War axis. Why did Itamaraty decide to frame its policy in terms of these slogans and use the United Nations as the principal forum in which to accomplish its goals? A statement by the chief Ambassador to the UN specialized agencies at Geneva is very instructive in this regard. In a speech to the National Economic Council, a presidential advisory body, Josué de Castro pointed out that in a case such as policies of the European Economic Community which were contrary to Brazil's interests, Brazil could hope to accomplish little bilaterally, standing alone against much stronger forces. However,

If our position should be in defense of our universal interests, then it will be easy to make ourselves heard. It is not a dichotomizing, isolating action we should have in mind, neither for the great powers nor much less for a dependent power such as Brazil. In that perspective, Brazil established a tripod which, coincidentally, is also a trouvaille, having three words beginning with the letter "d": development, decolonization, and disarmament. These are the interests of Brazil, which makes them coincide with those of the majority of humanity, which is valid. That trilogy constitutes the territory on which are designed perspectives for aggressive action. 47

By universalizing these broad goals through the multilateral semiparliamentary procedure of the United Nations and with the

cooperation of Afro-Asians, Brazil planned to mobilize the developing states and present disarmament, development, and decolonization as of utmost importance to the international community and the only alternatives to death, hunger, and slavery. In the belief that sufficient consensus for agreement on these issues existed among the new nations and in Latin America and with the further conviction that enough pressure could be exerted on the developed states to extract concessions, the Ministry of Foreign Relations began to prepare itself for a role of leadership in restructuring the framework of international politics and economics. The possibility of effective reforms accomplished through the Organization of American States was discounted because of American preponderance in that body and the hemisphere, making the OAS an unfit body in which to resolve problems in which American interests were really threatened. Thus in two important cases, the Haitian-Dominican dispute (1963) and the Panama-United States conflict (1964), Brazil defended the thesis that any hemispheric problem could be taken directly to the UN without passing through the OAS.

According to Keohane, several prerequisites reinforce and aid the exercise of leadership in the General Assembly. These include a drive to upset the international status quo, a broad interpretation of national interests, a high evaluation of the importance of the United Nations for the state's foreign policy, desire for prestige and publicity,
and a foreign policy independent of the great powers. These characteristics were precisely those of Brazil under Goulart, which thus found itself in an objectively excellent position to use the General Assembly to achieve its purposes. That Brazil in fact gave high priority to United Nations diplomacy is shown by the fact that, within the group of 100 states continuously represented in the UN from 1961-1966, it ranked seventeenth in total number of diplomats sent abroad in 1963-1964, but ranked seventh in mean UN delegation size from the sixteenth to the twentieth sessions (1961-1966). If we make the assumption that relative allocation and absolute number of diplomats sent to a post represent an accurate measure of a nation's interest and activity in that post, we can conclude that Brazil exhibited a higher interest and activity in the United Nations during these sessions than would be normal or expected when compared with other states' allocations on the basis of rank orders.


50By "predicting that the n\textsuperscript{th} state on the diplomatic rank list [of total diplomats sent abroad] should have as large a UN delegation as the n\textsuperscript{th} state on the UN delegation list, and so on for all other states," Keohane finds a nearly normal distribution of difference scores in which 80 percent of the delegation sizes can be predicted within ±6, and over half to within a margin of ±2.4. Within this configuration,
The Conservative Reaction

These imaginative and grandiose plans, partially illustrated by Brazilian leadership in preparations for the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, were frustrated in the early stages by the strong reaction of the revolutionary government of Castello Branco to what the military considered the Jacobin excesses of the independent foreign policy of Quadros and Goulart. Immediate moves were taken after the March 31, 1964, coup to return to old alignments and allies. A purge of the Foreign Ministry led to the dismissal of three top diplomats for "subversion" and one for "corruption," while many proponents of "independence" were demoted to lesser posts. Relations with Cuba were broken, Castroite subversion condemned, and Guevara's award retroactively rescinded as part of an all-out effort to repair the strained relations with Washington. Obsessed by anti-Communism and a drive for national security, spokesmen of the

Brazil represents a deviant case, with a delegation 10.6 larger than predicted and a rank order 10 positions higher than expected. Of the eleven "oversize" delegations, Brazil ranks fifth in magnitude of size difference from the predicted value. This finding is more relevant in comparative perspective with the distribution of difference scores of the various continents of the developing areas:

<table>
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<th>Continent</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Zero</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding S. Africa)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (excluding Cuba)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (non-Arab only)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab states</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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Only seven other Latin American states had delegations larger than predicted, none of them as much as +6. Ibid., pp. 145-147.
Castello Branco government applauded the United States in glowing terms, as did Foreign Minister and ex-Ambassador to Washington Juracy Magalhães in his first speech as head of Itamaraty, referring to that nation as "the leader of the Free World and the principal guardian of the fundamental values of our civilization." 51

Returning to the East-West image of world politics, Castello Branco emphasized the need for "interdependence" rather than "independence" within the Western democratic system, while at the same time making distinctions between interests of the West as a whole and those of a specific Western power. 52 According to the policy of the revolution, the principle of sovereignty was to be based on a common political-social system and not political or geographical frontiers (now considered obsolete). 53 The supreme faux pas and most criticized remark of the post-revolutionary period was made by a newly named Ambassador to Washington in a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo: "What is good for the United States is good for Brazil." Nationalists fastened upon this phrase as a synopsis of


52 This attitude provoked cartoons changing Dom Pedro I's famous Grito de Ipiranga cry for independence or death to "Interdependência ou Mortel!" Correio da Manhã, May 25, 1965, p. 6.

what they considered the entreguista policy of Castello Branco toward the United States. \textsuperscript{54}

After sending a contingent of troops to the Dominican Republic to take part in 1965 OAS peacekeeping operations, with a Brazilian general as head of the multilateral force, Brazil strongly supported Washington's idea of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force for collective security operations. Juracy Magalhães made an attempt to drum up additional support in South America, but met with such fierce opposition in all countries but military-ruled Argentina that the Foreign Ministry decided instead to try to institutionalize the Inter-American Defense Board as a Consultative Defense Committee to advise the Executive Council on defense questions. \textsuperscript{55}

Plans of being a bridge between Africa and the West or a leader in the Third World were heard no more. Latin America was again regarded as the proper and natural ambit for diplomatic action, and at first few warm references were made to Afro-Asia above normal diplomatic courtesies. Neutralism, in the view of Castello Branco, necessarily implied passivity, indetermination, immature emotionalism, extortion, and a flight from reality, as well as positions which tended

\textsuperscript{54}Confidential interview with a former cabinet member, October 22, 1968.

\textsuperscript{55}O Globo, November 4, 1966, p. 9.
to be anti-Western. Full backing was again given Portugal in its struggles in the UN over Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. Although economic cooperation and trade with Afro-Asia were deemed mutually desirable, perhaps more indicative of political attitudes was Itamaraty's announced intention to assist the United States in strengthening the OAS to serve as a regional counterweight to offset "domination of the UN by the Afro-Asian countries." 57

The Diplomacy of Prosperity

After the March, 1967, inauguration of President Marechal Arthur da Costa e Silva, another gradual change in orientation could be detected as Itamaraty came under the direction of José de Magalhães Pinto, who as Governor of Minas Gerais had defended the ideals of Quadros' independence policy. 58 In his first major foreign policy address, proclaiming that "Development is the new name of peace," Costa e Silva introduced the slogan "diplomacy of prosperity."

We shall therefore give priority to the problems of development. The diplomatic action of my government visualizes at all levels, bilateral and multilateral, the


expansion of foreign markets, just and stable prices for our products, the attraction of capital and technical aid and, of particular importance, the necessary cooperation for the nation's rapid nuclearization for peaceful purposes. By virtue of geographic conditions, coherent with cultural traditions, and faithful to its Christian formation, Brazil is integrated into the Western world and adopts democratic models of development. We are, however, attentive to the new perspectives of cooperation and commerce resulting from the dynamics of the international situation itself, which has evolved from a rigidity of positions characteristic of the "Cold War" to a situation of relaxation of tensions. Faced with the slackening of the East-West controversy, it makes no sense to speak of neutralism nor of automatic coincidences and oppositions. The only thing that can guide us is the national interest, permanent foundation of a sovereign foreign policy. 59

That the new administration accepted frameworks other than the older stereotyped Democracy versus Communism image was further exemplified by Magalhães Pinto's statements to the Press Club a year later, when he affirmed a belief that the splits in the Communist bloc demonstrate the low importance of ideology in the scientific-technological revolution of today. The watershed among nations has become the degree of development, as shown in the Second UNCTAD Conference when the Soviet Union and the United States often joined votes to resist proposals of the developing states. For Brazil, the Foreign Minister concluded, the greatest threat is not the danger of

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Communism but rather how to accommodate a probable population of 200 million within 30 years. 60

As part of its more nationalistic stance, the new administration immediately de-emphasized the viability and necessity of the Inter-American Peace Force, taking a cautious, typically Spanish American view of the matter in reiterating the values of non-intervention and sovereignty. Great stress was placed on possibilities of full use of nuclear power for peaceful development, including the right to fabricate nuclear explosives for non-military purposes, culminating in Brazilian refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Projects for a tripling of export value and product diversification led to intensified exchange of trade missions, not only with traditional partners but also with Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia. New offices were created to foment increased exports to new markets, most notably the Export Promotion Center of the Bank of Brazil, and the Associate Secretariat-General for Commercial Promotion of Itamaraty. The Commission of Commerce with Eastern Europe, also in the Foreign Ministry, was reorganized. Manufactures and semi-manufactures are regarded as the most promising products, given their higher and more stable prices on the world market, so various tax reduction and finance incentives have been adopted to encourage entrepreneurs to export their

latent capacity and eventually produce a larger share of their output expressly for sale abroad. This strategy has proven especially favorable since Brazil has just advanced beyond the import-substitution phase of its industrialization but does not yet have a large domestic market. In conjunction with this more customary procedure, Brazil has continued pressing for reorganization of international commerce to benefit developing states, through both UNCTAD and GATT.

The Foreign Minister also indicated a security motivation for this heightened effort to mobilize the nation for a "diplomacy of prosperity." Speaking to the Superior War College, a high-level course on national problems for civilian officials and military officers, he underlined the positive correlation between low levels of national income and political violence as well as the high cost and inadequacy of purely military solutions to guerrilla warfare problems.

In other words, the distribution of national wealth should, whenever possible, rise to a higher income level, to avoid impasse and social rigidity surmountable only by violence. Only the tranquility coming from possession of a roof over one's head, employment stability, just wages, and equality of opportunity can produce the climate of security in which the rules of democratic order become viable. In the last analysis, the only secure societies are those whose individual citizens feel secure. This is the reason for the emphasis that I have been giving in the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the problems of development, in obedience to firm directives drawn from the beginning by the President of the Republic. 61 (Italics from the original.)

61 Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria Geral Adjunta para o Planejamento Político, Documentos de Política Externa (de 15 de março a 15 de outubro de 1967), pp. 81-82.
Patterns of Growth and Nationalism

In the 1956 to 1968 period, certain regularities or patterns stand out in what was otherwise a time of rapid and sometimes seemingly contradictory transformations in foreign policy, ranging from the slow-paced legalism of the early Kubitschek administration to hopes for Third World leadership with Quadros and Goulart, the return to anti-Communism and solidarity with the West under Castello Branco, and finally the "diplomacy of prosperity." Perhaps a knowledge of these recent patterns as well as historical trends will allow a more accurate gauging of the probable future directions of Brazilian diplomacy.

The first tendency noticeable was an increase in the size, complexity, and range of activity of the Foreign Ministry, as measured through time by number of personnel, budget allocations, and number of diplomatic and consular posts abroad.

The broadening of relations and activity from 1961 to 1964 is largely responsible for a rapid increase in total personnel during those years, as indicated by Table 1, page 65. This period stands in marked contrast to the very slow growth from 1956 to 1959 and even into 1960, as well as the abrupt cutback occasioned in 1965 by the conservative military government. With the Costa e Silva regime, the figures again show a sharp rise, accompanying a more aggressive, vigorous posture and the opening of several new embassies and legations in Afro-Asia, along with staff increases in other posts and the creation of new
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<td>932</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from the following mimeographed series lists of the Foreign Ministry: *Lista do Pessoal* (1956-1961), *Lista de Endereços* (1962-1968), and *Lista do Pessoal no Exterior* (1962-1968). Figures for each year are taken as close to mid-year as possible, given the intermittent publication of the *Listas*. Honorary consuls, vice-consuls, and special consuls are not included in the statistics on consulates.
 Clearly the tendency is toward expansion of personnel; although progressing at various rates in different years, this resulted in a 1968 total strength over twice that of 1956. If we are correct in assuming that additional staff was hired to meet an additional workload, we have a rough measure of the growth of Itamaraty's activity.

To compare the importance attributed to or emphasis placed upon foreign relations at different times, budget figures were compiled for 1956 through 1968 and are presented in Table 2, page 67. Both the percentage of executive expenditures and the absolute sums assigned to Itamaraty yearly have shown a gradual increase, even though this rising level has behaved in an erratic manner from year to year. The most rapid increases occurred in 1960 and from 1966 through 1968, at

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62 The number of career diplomats rose much more slowly and linearly, from 435 in 1956 to 473 in 1962 and 582 in 1968.

63 Ironically, considering the great public exposure given to the supposed advances of the 1961 to 1964 independent foreign policy in making Brazil known to the world, compared to 1960, Brazil in 1962 was represented abroad in more diplomatic posts but by only four more individuals, while at the same time there was actually a staff decline of four in the principal consulates. Almost all of the early staff increases of 1961-1964 were in the Foreign Ministry itself. Only in 1963 and 1964 did the number of personnel stationed or employed abroad rise appreciably. Did this in part represent the honored practice of empreguismo (hiring of political supporters) or a real need for additional personnel? One can only speculate. One factor which decidedly led to an increase in embassy staff abroad from 1963 to 1965 was the existence in those three years of "Expansion and Commercial Advertising Services" in from 15 to 22 embassies, mostly in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, with the exceptions of Beirut, Tokyo, Moscow, and Warsaw.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Foreign Ministry as Percent of Total Executive Branch&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Dollar Value of Foreign Ministry Allocation (in millions)</th>
<th>Diplomatic and Consular Missions as Percent of Total Foreign Ministry Allocations&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>12.04</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>37.11</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>42.04</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from budget figures given yearly in 1955 to 1967 editions of: Brasil, Diário Oficial. (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional.) Dollar conversion rates were based on the yearly averages of daily free market exchange rates given in: Banco do Brasil, Relatório, Distrito Federal, 1955-1967. The exchange rate for 1968 was that in effect on June 1, 1968.

<sup>a</sup>The Brazilian fiscal year is coterminous with the calendar year.

<sup>b</sup>Executive expenditures average 98 percent to 99 percent of total federal expenditures.

<sup>c</sup>Does not include amounts earmarked as contributions to international organizations or for participation in international conferences.
which times the greatest allocation of funds to the Foreign Ministry relative to other ministries is noted.

Attributing levels of relative or absolute budget expenditures to specific governments is somewhat hazardous, since the 1961, 1964, and 1967 budgets were prepared by outgoing administrations. In addition, the only figures available are those for allotments rather than actual expenditures and year-end budget reductions are common in all ministries. Two important observations can be made, however. In terms of dollar value, total federal budget expenditures allocated grew 435 percent from 1956 to 1968, while allocations for the Foreign Ministry in the same period grew 700 percent, or 1.6 times as rapidly as overall federal spending, indicating a greater degree of relative attention paid to this ministry and consequently, we may assume, to foreign policy. Second, the percentage of Itamaraty's budget set aside for use in embassies and consulates abroad, very low and stable from 1956 to 1961, has now more than doubled since that time. Large increases are again evident from 1966 through 1968, denoting a greater growth rate in activity carried on abroad as opposed to within the Home Office (Secretaria de Estado).

Concomitant with increases in personnel and budget came the opening of new embassies, legations, and consulates to make possible the program of increased relations with the rest of the world. Clearly, as indicated by Table 3, page 69, the greatest expansion in diplomatic


TABLE 3

Total Number of Brazilian Diplomatic and Consular Posts in Selected Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Embassies</th>
<th>Legations</th>
<th>Consulates-General</th>
<th>Other Consulates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a A cumulative embassy or legation is one installed in a country with which formal relations have been initiated, but to which no permanent diplomatic personnel have been assigned. Rather, this post is made subordinate to a permanently staffed Brazilian mission in a neighboring capital.

b Includes consulates, special consulates, honorary consulates, and honorary vice-consulates.
missions and consulates occurred during the first half of the twelve-year period, most of them being installed between 1960 and 1962.

Almost all of the several additions during 1962-1968 took place between June, 1966, and June, 1968. To be more precise, the opening of new representations, far from being a uniform, gradual process, was carried out largely in two roughly year-long spurts or peaks, 1961 and mid-1967 to mid-1968, accompanied in both cases by public pronouncements of the undertaking of a dynamic new style of diplomacy. 64

64See Appendix II for a more complete regional breakdown of these posts. Even greater increases of diplomatic representation abroad, in old and new posts, were originally projected for 1968 but the plans suffered from a lack of funds, especially those required to employ more third secretaries. Itamaraty received authorization for about one hundred more third secretaries than in fact covered by the funds later received. The personnel regulations authorize the following number of career diplomats (Decree Number 2, September 21, 1961):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third Secretaries</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Secretaries</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretaries</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers, Second-Class</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers, First-Class</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the authorized figure of 686 with the actual 1968 total of 582, it can be seen that the foreign service has not yet reached the full strength prescribed in 1961. See Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento de Administração, Divisão de Organização, Serviço Exterior Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Seção de Multiplicação do MRE, n.d.), p. 38. Regarding the level of Brazil's diplomatic activity, it should be noted that in 1963-1964 Brazil ranked twentieth among 119 nations in number of diplomats sent abroad (300), surpassed among non-Communist developing nations only by the UAR (550), India (467), Turkey (392), Indonesia (348), and Argentina (301). In the same biennium, in number of diplomats received it ranked eleventh with 431, exceeded only by the UAR (559) and India (530) among developing nations for which data were available. It shared memberships in intergovernmental
The second major tendency from 1956 to 1968, related to this increase in diplomatic activity, was the economic development orientation which has pervaded and dominated policy formulation under all regimes, as described earlier in this chapter. Even the Castello Branco government, composed of and backed by strong conservative and anti-Communist elements, made clear immediately upon assuming power that Brazil would continue to diversify its trade without ideological distinctions. In actual practice commerce with Eastern Europe and Communist China was continued and in some cases intensified. It can be expected that additional trade, aid, and capital may be sought in Eastern Europe in the future, judging from events during 1968. In September of that year the Bank of Commerce of Czechoslovakia made available, through the Brazilian National Bank of Economic Development, over seven million dollars in credit to be used to purchase Czech industrial equipment. 65 At the same time, the Industrial Bituminous Ore Company was conducting field studies with the Soviet firm Neftechimpromoelexport for equipment financing and technical assistance to exploit large deposits of bituminous shale in the state of São Paulo and to build a huge

organizations with 108 nations, a total surpassed by only four states. Additionally, in 1963-1964 Brazil held a seat on the UN Security Council, being the only non-permanent member elected to that post more than three times in the first two decades of the history of the world organization. See Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brans, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," World Politics, XIX, No. 4 (July, 1967), 646-663.

65 O Globo, October 12, 1968, p. 7.
industrial complex to produce cement, fertilizers, sulphur, etc., all under terms specified by an earlier Brazilian-Soviet treaty. Exchanges of this type find a mutual interest, and Brazilian missions to Eastern Europe and participation in trade fairs there are becoming more common. Nor can Communist China be left out of consideration, for it appeared in late 1968 that the Foreign Ministry was engaged in efforts to reactivate the lagging trade with that nation, carried on via Hong Kong.

A final trend, apparently gaining adherents in most areas of the politically attentive public, is the demand for an "independent" foreign policy which is based on Brazilian national interests in each specific case rather than submissive alignment with or systematic deference to American wishes. This idea is expressed in many ways, with different connotations, but usually can be summarized as the desire for "uma política externa própria"—a flexible foreign policy suited to and tailored for Brazil alone, appropriate to its internal dynamics and able to take maximum advantage from rapidly changing international conditions. The roots of this feeling can be traced to a rising spirit of nationalism and national pride which manifests itself externally through self-assertion and claims to an international status befitting an industrializing, resource-endowed nation covering nearly half a continent and comprising ninety

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67 O Jornal, September 12, 1968, p. 3.
million individuals, ranking fourth in the world in contiguous territorial extension and eighth in population.

This widespread attitude in favor of greater Brazilian autonomy and prestige in world politics was verified by the first comprehensive national public opinion survey conducted in Brazil, sponsored by the Institute for International Social Research in late 1960 and early 1961. Although both the sample public and the interviewed legislators exhibited very high admiration for the United States and regarded Brazilian-American relations at that time as at least moderately satisfactory, strong sentiment favoring cooperation with all countries or all those which wished advantageous relations with Brazil was present among the urban sample and the legislators. A majority of legislators and those of the urban sample holding opinions opposed following the orientation of the United States, while 63 percent of the Congressmen felt that Brazil should be "as neutral as possible" in the Cold War. 68 Observing that large percentages of the legislators (42 percent) and the urban public (36 percent) favored siding with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, while slightly smaller percentages favored siding with the United States (39 percent and 30 percent, respectively), the study concludes, "Considering the fact that Brazil is a traditional ally

of the US, the Brazilians, both Congressmen and general public, exhibit only weak 'alliance-mindedness' when it comes to functional relationships with America in the cold war context."

Unfortunately, later samples to increase the value of this pioneering survey were not forthcoming and valid comparison or generalization is made difficult by the near-absence of scientifically sound political opinion polls and the high proportion of the uninformed public which registers "no opinion." However, in 1967, a prominent, analytical magazine conducted an in-depth, extensive series of interviews with 246 federal senators and deputies (out of a total of 409 deputies and 66 senators in the National Congress). Of those questioned 149 were of the government-sponsored ARENA party and 97 from the opposition MDB. When asked, "What international policy would you adopt for Brazil?" the Congressmen responded as follows:

- 58.5% - Independence in relation to any blocs
- 13.4% - Strengthening of a bloc without ties to the United States or Russia
- 3.7% - Strengthening of such a bloc plus independence
- 2.8% - Neutrality
- 4.9% - Neutrality and Independence
- 5.7% - Unconditional support of American foreign policy
- 0.4% - Support of the United States plus independence
- 7.7% - Other answers
- 2.9% - No answer

Clearly an impressive percentage (83.3 percent) favored an "independent" or "neutral" position, while over an eighth supported in addition the

69 Ibid., pp. 18-19. Negligible opinion favored siding with the Soviet Union.
formation of a "Third Force," over twice as many as advocated
unquestioning obedience to the leadership of Washington. 70 To the
question "Do you see as correct the present American policy toward
underdeveloped countries, especially those of Latin America?" 64.6
percent answered "No" and only 19.1 percent "Yes." 71

Among the military there appears to be evidence of similar
nationalistic convictions, especially among segments of the linha dura
(hard-line) group and the "young Turk" colonel and lieutenant ranks,
some of whom are partial to a temporary military-rule, "Nasserist"
solution to Brazil's problems and rapid expansion of the country's
economic and political power. Generally referred to as the "radicais,"
the linha dura was active in the 1964 revolution and is staunchly anti-
Communist, but some of its members are reluctant as well to have
Brazil be dominated by any other nation and consider themselves the
real revolutionary elements working for social and economic change
and defense of national interests, in conjunction with enlightened
intellectuals. This group traces its ideals to the nationalistic tenente
movements and revolts of the 1920's, but its extent of influence within
the seriously divided body of military opinion is difficult to ascertain. 72

70 Carlos Castello Branco, "Como pensa o Congresso (e como
votaria se pudesse)," Realidade, II, No. 21 (December, 1967), 41.
71 Ibid.
72 For an introduction to the thought of this group see the first
two numbers (1968) of the civilian-military journal, Nação Armada. See
Continuity and Change

This ascendant desire for freedom of action is not likely to be translated into a form of neutralism as professed by various Afro-Asian states in the first years of independence. The term was used by ideologues to describe the 1961-1964 foreign policy, but government spokesmen judiciously refused to label the policy as neutralist, preferring instead to call it "independent," compromised only by Brazil's interests as opposed to a doctrinaire philosophy seeking a theoretical, symmetric mid-point in the Cold War. Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas defined this independence as "that position which does not bow to the interests of one bloc or another, which does not wish to see its international conduct predetermined by an alliance or predecided by certain political affinities systematically considered irremediable."73

In evaluating the employment of the word neutralism in politics of the 1961 to 1964 period, it is important to keep in mind that neutralism very prominently came to symbolize nationalism and independence in certain developing nations precisely at a time when Brazil, after many

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Also Maurício Caminha de Lacerda, "A linha dos duros," Jornal do Comércio, May 19, 1968, Suplemento Dominical, p. 1. The group's highest-placed and most visible leader, General Alfonso Albuquerque Lima, was rumored to be among the possible successors of Costa e Silva in the presidency.

73 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VII, No. 27 (September, 1964), 432-433.
years of unusually close association with the United States, was beginning to reappraise the effects of this partnership on its future economic development and political autonomy. In a sense, both Brazil and Afro-Asia were opening to the world at the same time and, influenced by the political philosophies of the time and common economic conditions, rapidly perceived that world politics resembles more of a multi-sided than a two-sided contest, in which many different values are at stake and each nation is forced to protect those which it deems important. In Brazil's case, the previously overwhelming influence of the United States and especially the American image of international relations was rejected in part as new international contacts were established. The extreme closeness of Brazil to the American position in world affairs until 1961 perhaps made the exploratory efforts seem to Washington much more of a desertion of the camp than they actually were in the long run, when interpreted in the light of the proposition that a nation gathering enough power and influence to enter international relations in its own right will attempt, in degrees that vary with each case, to free itself from the hegemony of the senior partner of the alliance.

Quadros may have hoped for too much too soon. Although he could have taken advantage of his popularity and the propitious moment to build gradually but firmly from the foundations set in the last years of the Kubitschek government, Quadros, with his taste for the flamboyant
and the dramatic, set out publicly at breakneck speed to alter the international outlook of Brazil under executive direction, despite the strong resistance to change exhibited by many diplomats in Itamaraty itself. Seizing on the Cuban issue at a point when Washington's Latin American policy was obsessed by fears of Castro-Communism and opposing Portuguese colonialism in Africa, he managed to touch two domestically explosive subjects and lose the support of important conservative elites who had worked for his election, in addition to antagonizing many military and foreign service officers. His personal eccentricities and resignation succeeded in discrediting what may otherwise have been lauded in his foreign policy program. The ensuing spiraling chaos, demagoguery, and threatening instability of the Goulart years further cast doubts by association on his brand of independent foreign policy. As the pendulum swung to one extreme in 1963 and early 1964, so with the revolution of March 31 it swung heavily in the opposite direction, as if in compensation. Under Castello Branco and Juracy Magalhães, few diplomats spoke up to defend the recent stands so heavily denounced under the energetic return to the old ways.

Like many other developing nations, Brazil is hampered from attaining a more powerful, effective foreign policy by various internal weaknesses. The most serious of these is a low level of industrialization which engenders economic dependence upon foreign markets and limits the capabilities and instrumentalities at the disposal of the
foreign policy decision-makers. Changes in regime have made clear the fact that domestic ideological and political pressures can exert crucial influence on the foreign policy of a given administration. Quadros' case demonstrates how idiosyncracies of a single personality can mold foreign policy, while his overthrow and that of Goulart are illustrations of the tacit veto used by the military commands to impose parameters upon foreign policy options. Severe disagreement over ends and means still marks general discussion of Brazil's role in world affairs, complicated by the central question of the attitude to be taken toward the traditional ally to the north, given the United State's clear predominance in the Western Hemisphere. Administratively, imperfect interministerial coordination and occasional broad latitude granted to individual diplomats have also contributed to preventing the course of foreign policy planning and execution from being completely coherent, calculated, or linear.74

Examined superficially, Brazil's recent foreign policy has seemed to vary from legalistic hesitancy to ideological impulsiveness and to fluctuate indecisively from pro-Western to neutralist to pro-Western,

74 The problem of rationalization and coordination of the activities of all ministries whose operations impinge on foreign affairs was a key concern of Magalhães Pinto, wishing to impart a uniform, coherent orientation to Brazilian positions in functional organizations and bilateral negotiations, under the central direction of the Foreign Ministry. Similarly, wide areas of discretion previously accorded delegates to international organizations constituted a problem attacked by Itamaraty in the 1961-1964 period, along with extensive internal reorganizations aimed at greater efficiency and bureaucratic rationalization.
making generalization or a definitive assessment rather risky. The foregoing continuities of nationalism, diplomatic expansion, trade diversification, and preoccupation with industrialization which were common to all governments of the last decade lend credence to the conclusion, however, that the 1961 to 1964 experimentation in foreign policy, despite what may be regarded by some as its excesses, hit a responsive chord in many sectors of the populace and elite groups and was not merely an exploratory, unproductive aberration, completely rejected by more level-headed leaders after 1964. Although eclipsed by the post-revolutionary government, some of the premises of the Quadros-Goulart years have been generally accepted and were quietly resurrected by Costa e Silva and Magalhães Pinto under the guise of technical and diplomatic questions. Quadros and Goulart, in pushing the same fundamental points of view, had clothed their programs as ideological crusades, thus startling the conservative groups into forceful reaction. The same concepts, stripped of ostentation and the emotional connotations of such expressions as "Third World" or "neutrality" and applied cautiously and gradually by a government with the confidence of the military and internal economic and political support, are likely to be those which will orient Brazil in the future. The days of passive acceptance of a role dictated by economic relationships with developed countries have passed.
CHAPTER III

AFRO-ASIA IN BRAZILIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND POLICY, 1955-1968

Writing in 1955, Ambassador Adolpho Bezerra de Menezes, surveying the state of Brazilian knowledge about "Darkest Africa," concluded that with the rare exceptions of coffee and cocoa planters or scholars, "Africa, for us, is more remote than the lunar craters." Poplar ideas about the neighboring continent were reduced to stereotypes engendered by safari films produced in the metropolitan areas to which Brazilian attention was directed, while notions about Asia were extremely sketchy and vague. Almost no diplomatic or commercial intercourse was carried on with Afro-Asia; between 1945 and 1955, no Brazilian head of state, vice-president, minister or influential senator or deputy visited this region although Brazil received official visits from the President of Lebanon, the Vice-President of India, and the First Lady of Nationalist China. In the same period, the only Afro-Asian dignitary awarded a Brazilian honorary decoration was Farouk of Egypt, not exactly a popular figure in the Third World as it emerged after 1956.

2Ibid., pp. 354-355.
Brazil had clearly done nothing to make itself known in Afro-Asia, much less to elaborate a coherent policy concerning its interests in that area, yet only five years after the publication of Ambassador Bezerra de Menezes' book *Brazil and the Afro-Asian World*, the first to give attention to the topic, Afro-Asia was rather suddenly a point of great contention and controversy as a symbol of Quadros' independent policy and a new front of diplomatic activity. A flurry of discussion about Afro-Asia ensued among diplomats, businessmen, and professors, stimulated by world-wide interest in the end of colonialism and the sudden independence of many new nations. In spite of the relatively high degree of attention accorded Afro-Asia from 1961 to 1964 by various elite groups, interest in the area has been quite low in the populace as a whole, deriving both from the low salience of foreign affairs in the popular mind and the fact that most Brazilians attentive to events abroad concentrate on the United States and Europe, tending as well to acquire from those sources any information or interpretations they may have about Afro-Asia. Before 1960, the dearth of Portuguese-language studies on the area was especially a problem, except for pro-colonialist material from Lisbon. Thus we have the paradox, confirmed by initial contacts in 1961 and 1962, that Brazilians and Afro-Asians view each other primarily through European and American eyes or news dispatches, thus forming of the other party much the same impressions that a European or an American would have.
Public Opinion and Afro-Asia

Very few public opinion polls are available to give an accurate indication of the degree of Brazilian knowledge about or opinions of Afro-Asia, but several of the more reliable can be cited as illustrative of opinion in urban areas. One of the most prominent of African problems in recent years has been the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra, which was given wide coverage and comment in Brazilian newspapers and news magazines. On September 7 through 9, 1968, 16 months after the outbreak of the civil war, a public opinion survey was taken in Rio de Janeiro by the Jornal do Brasil and Marplan. To the question, "Do you know of the existence of a war between Nigeria and the province of Biafra?" 70 percent of the total sample answered "No," although among the upper-income group only 35 percent were unaware of the war. Among the 30 percent cognizant of the conflict, 51 percent had no opinion about which side (if either) was correct in its stand.\(^3\)

The same sample was asked, "Do you accept or not the existence of the Third World; that is, a world formed by neutral and united countries at the same level of economic development?" Of the total sample, 53 percent affirmed belief in the existence of a Third World, 30 percent did not, and 17 percent had no opinion. Among the men, 60 percent replied affirmatively and 29 percent negatively, showing majority acceptance

\(^3\)Jornal do Brasil, September 15, 1968, p. 32. Sample size = 302.
of the thesis, although only 39 percent of the males were aware of the Nigerian-Biafran war, which probably represented one of the concrete facts about the Third World most likely to be known at that time.  

At the time of the 1968 visit of Indira Gandhi to Brazil, in which the position of India as an independent, neutral power was emphasized, the same organizations conducted another poll in Rio de Janeiro in which the following question was asked: "As you know, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, visited Brazil. In your opinion, India has played on the international scene, a role which is . . . ?" To this question, 30 percent of the sample chose the alternative answer "Independent," 24 percent "Favorable to the United States," 7 percent "Favorable to the USSR," and 39 percent "No Opinion." Among the upper-income group, 43 percent answered in favor of independence, 35 percent had no opinion, and 22 percent ascribed to India a role favorable to either of the two superpowers.  

In 1963, a sample of 116 social science, law, geography, and history students at the University of Recife was selected to measure student acquaintance with newly independent African countries and ascertain their opinions on possibilities of Brazilian cooperation with

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4 Ibid.

5 Jornal do Brasil, September 29, 1968, p. 36. The options were listed, sample size = 305.
Africa. Sixty-one percent of the group was classified as holding a "quite precarious" knowledge about Africa, having categorized either Laos or Angola as independent African nations, while only 9 percent were classed as well informed. Only Algeria, the Congo, Nigeria, and Ghana were widely recognized, while 23 percent named Angola as independent. The study concludes that among the students, "There is very limited knowledge ... about Africa in general and the new countries of Africa in particular," despite the fact that their curriculum and majors should have given them greater exposure to foreign affairs than students of other disciplines.

African conceptions of Brazil proved to be equally vague and erroneous. During a visit to Brazil, Joseph Medupe Johnson, Nigerian Labor Minister, declared that Brazil was almost completely unknown in Nigeria before the institution of Quadros' open door to Africa policy. Raymundo Souza Dantas, the first Ambassador to Ghana, in describing the state of mutual knowledge between Brazil and Africa, confirmed, "The ignorance is almost absolute." Another early emissary found

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7 Ibid., p. 8.

8 O Globo, July 18, 1961, p. 3.

"ignorance or contempt" about Brazil on the part of West Africans, but noted a disposition to learn. On a later occasion the African Division of Itamaraty reported that "Brazil, although considered favorably, is almost totally unknown in the African countries."

It was against this type of adverse, nearly virgin background that Brazil began expanding relations with Afro-Asia and the domestic discussion was carried on among concerned sectors of the elites as part of the over-all polemical, theoretical, and analytical debate concerning various components of the new foreign policy orientation. The role of Afro-Asia in foreign policy was seldom considered in isolation or as a problem which could be judged solely on its intrinsic merits. The central international issue at stake, almost always raised by both advocates and opponents of increased contacts, was the effects it would work on Brazil's relationships with the Communist bloc, the industrialized nations, or traditional allies (especially the United States and Portugal).

By virtue of its size, geographical location, historical antecedents, economic potential, and population characteristics, a case can be made that Brazil has the prerequisites to play a larger role in

10 Confidential interview with the author, March 15, 1968.

Africa than any other Latin American nation. Of all the regions of the developing world outside the Western Hemisphere, Africa has stirred greatest interest and debate in Brazilian discussion of foreign relations, both in the popular press and among intellectuals. Many statements made concerning the Third World were in large measure extrapolations from the literature about Africa, applying these generalities to the Middle East and Asia as well and assuming a general uniformity of problems and perspectives. Rather little published material appeared on the Middle East and Asia specifically, as they are farther from Brazil both geographically and in terms of actual experience.

Several principal themes emerge from Brazilian writings on relations with Afro-Asia, each emphasizing a different facet of the topic but not failing to overlap the rest to some degree as arguments were marshalled on one side or another. For purposes of exposition and commentary, six contending approaches to the problem may be isolated and identified: cultural, Luso-Brazilian, economic, nationalist-neutralist, the "Western World"-oriented, and the military. These will each be discussed in turn.

The Culturalists

It was in the study of Afro-Brazilian culture that anthropologists and ethnologists first documented the extensive influence exerted on Brazil by the vast numbers of slaves brought from West Africa, the
Congi and Angola until the traffic was prohibited in the late 1850's. In the fields of religion, arts, music, folklore, language, literature, and family life, the Negro in Brazil and especially in the Northeast and Minas Gerais has imparted to the general culture much which serves to distinguish it sharply from the traditions of the rest of South America and also from those of Portugal. Yoruba and Ewe peoples brought to Bahia introduced their system of deities and rites, which are still worshipped and practiced in the cults of candomble', umbanda, and macumba apparently gaining in popularity throughout Brazil, interweaving with the reverence of Catholic saints to the point of popular confusion. Yemanjá, Ogun, Shangô, Nanã Buku, Oya and others blend with the Christian figures of Santa Barbara, Santo Antonio, and the Virgin Mary. In music, the famous samba, the maracatu, and the baiao are of African origin, as are such instruments as the cuica and reco-reco, particularly in evidence at Carnival time, and the berimbau, whose twanging notes signal the start of the capoeira fight-dance imported from Angola.


Bahian recipes based on coconut, dende palm oil, shrimp, rice, pepper, spices, and other typically West African ingredients have come to symbolize the Brazilian culinary art. African expressions have become an integral part of Brazilian Portuguese, while at the same time the African languages changed the accents of Brazil to make its language quite distinct in pronunciation and terminology from that of Lisbon. Many African words have crept into the speech of the Brazilian without his awareness, common terms such as bengala, cachaca, caçula, canjica, carimbo, careca, dengoso, fuba, marimbondo, moleque, quitanda, xingar, and countless others. These folklore studies, carried on for many years without political implications, provided proof of important African contributions to Brazilian civilization which are far too numerous to cite here, but which were heavily instrumental in conditioning initial Brazilian images of Africa and which were invoked by scholars, writers, and humanists after 1960 to justify reactivation of what they believed to be cultural and historical ties unjustly relegated to inferior status. Commenting on such Brazilian views of Africa, a West African ambassador noted a heavy dose of curiosity, as Brazilians seem to look at that continent as a “wellspring of folklore.”

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15 Interview with Ambassador Henri Senghor of Senegal, September 24, 1968.
One of the less-familiar aspects of the association is its reciprocity, that of Brazilian influence in Africa, particularly along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, to which former slaves returned during the 1800's after winning their independence in Brazil, bringing with them some of the language, skills, and religion which they had acquired during their stay in the Western Hemisphere. Brazilian diplomats and visitors in Nigeria, Ghana, Dahomey, Togo, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon found prominent Catholic families with names like Silva, Almeida, Borges, Gonçalves, da Rocha, and Souza. The Brazilian Quarter of Lagos, with architectural styles reminiscent of Bahian sobrados, the existence of a small Union of Brazilian Descendants (founded 1919), the survival of Brazilian customs, dances, and festivals among these descendants, and the important role assumed by some of them (such as Sylvanius Olympio, Joseph Modupe Johnson, Adetokunboh Ademola, Jacinto Freitas, and Domingos Coco) in the creation and governance of their republics suggested that these nearly forgotten historical ties could be expanded upon for the growth of future political and economic relations. 16

For this purpose, a cultural program was begun, centered in Lagos and concentrating on eventually diffusing Brazilian culture throughout West Africa through the medium of these descendants,

estimated by a cultural attaché to number 15,000 in Lagos and 10,000 in the rest of Nigeria. Through contacts between the embassy and interested Nigerian organizations, a growing cultural interchange has proceeded up to this time, resulting in the formation of a Brazilian Descendants Association in 1963. The greatest publicity was attained by a visit to Lagos of the Vasco da Gama soccer team and the 1963 visit to Brazil of Portuguese-speaking Romana da Conceição, originally from Recife and living in Nigeria for 63 years. Under the joint sponsorship of a Brazilian industrialist with investments in Nigeria and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, she spent three months in the country of her birth, receiving great recognition from news media, writers, and politicians. Despite some nativist reaction, stemming from the clannishness of the descendants and fears that Brazilian activities may tend to retard even further their assimilation, the cultural venture is well regarded by the Brazilian government. A former Ambassador to Nigeria, openly dubious about the efficacy of his country's diplomacy in many Third World nations, especially between 1961 and 1964, enthusiastically praised efforts aimed at these descendants.

This is the precious nucleus thanks to which our cultural influence can eventually find a point of support for later expansion. This is the historic and ethnocultural base upon

\[17^\text{Ibid., p. 215.}\]
which we may dare to conceive a long-range Brazilian policy on the African continent. This is what justifies our political interest, the opening of diplomatic missions, the granting of some modest scholarships, the sending of professors and the creation of cultural centers.  

A second strand of cultural arguments maintains that Brazil is uniquely suited to approach non-white Afro-Asia because it has achieved a racial democracy through lack of racial discrimination and a natural process of miscegenation, which represents the ultimate solution to the dangerous racial problem. Sociologist T. Lynn Smith observes that this characteristic of Brazilian society has been elevated to the status of a national creed.

There has arisen in Brazil what amounts to a veritable cult of racial equality. It numbers among its adherents most of the nation's leading scholars and many of its outstanding political figures. Although not formally organized and possessed of no written creed, two fundamental tenets, both designed to secure racial equality, seem to have general acceptance: (1) under no circumstances should it be admitted that racial discrimination exists in Brazil and (2) any expression of racial discrimination that may appear should be attacked as un-Brazilian.

The first systematic treatment of Brazilian-Afro-Asian relations in the post-colonial years predicted that the main future world conflict would be that of race differences and would take place in the uncommitted states of Afro-Asia as they were courted by the superpowers. Condemned


to failure by their colonialist past and racist ideas, white Europeans and Americans would have little chance of avoiding a racial conflict more intense than the ideological Cold War. Brazil could step in to solve the psychological dilemma, "not as an acolyte but as an orchestra conductor," conciliating the antagonistic races by means of a moral example of conduct made possible by the privileged position endowed by its ethnic composition. In the process it would accumulate prestige and perhaps even become a candidate for world leadership after the eventual decline of American power, if its rulers would know how to capitalize proudly on the reality that theirs is a nation of mixed races. Without antagonism, inferiority feelings, or presumptions, the most desirable course of action for Brazil, according to Bezerra de Menezes, would be "practice and example"; publicize throughout the world this existing social situation and base foreign policy plans upon it. 20

This idealistic theme, heavily conditioned by the author's observations at the 1955 Bandung Conference, was echoed frequently through the next 12 years by spokesmen convinced of the urgency of the problem in areas like South Africa, Algeria, Cyprus, and the Middle East, the uniqueness of Brazil's ethnic system, and the probability of Brazilian success in mediation and negotiations to eradicate racism as a threat to international peace and security. Citing Brazil's prestige

20 Bezerra de Menezes, pp. 307-322.
in areas of race conflict, deriving from its domestic racial harmony, Foreign Minister Arinos suggested, "Truly, if Brazil has a concrete contribution to offer at the moment in the field of international relations and human solidarity, it is probably in the racial problem." Historian José Honorio, author of many works on Brazil and Africa, called social and racial equality "our principal political-diplomatic weapon" with which an effective Afro-Asian policy could be waged. Envoys from Afro-Asia find some of these boasts and goals a bit pretentious and occasionally irritating, but are reluctant to offer candid comments on the Brazilian racial situation because of the tenacity with which the national myth of racial democracy is held. It may be readily observed, however, that no career foreign service officers are Negroes nor are many Negroes found in high government positions of any type. A Negro writer was sent as Ambassador to Ghana, but was subject to wide criticism that he was selected primarily on the criterion of race. It is reported that Nkrumah, although pleased with the choice of this talented individual, curtly remarked to a Quadros special envoy that if Brazil really wished to give proof of its racial harmony it would do well to send Negro representatives to important white countries as well.


23 Confidential interview with the author, March 15, 1968.
Exclusive clubs, prestigious occupations, and higher education are dominated almost completely by whites, while Negroes are most likely to be found in menial tasks and the lower social classes. Mixed-bloods occupy various intermediate levels depending, among other things, on the lightness of their skin and their economic position. Interpretations of the 1950 national census show that whites enjoy a higher literacy rate of 59.2 percent as compared to 31.0 percent for mixed-bloods and 26.7 percent for Negroes. Among the literate Negroes only 3.1 percent had completed either middle or upper-level courses of study, as opposed to 8 percent of the literate mixed-bloods and 19 percent of the literate whites. Negroes and mulattoes were also less than proportionately represented among the ranks of employers and those working in the public service. A Negro federal deputy from São Paulo asserted that in the National Congress, of 63 senators none were Negroes and only 3 were of mixed race by "self-identification and admission." Among 409 deputies, only 2 were Negroes and 46 were of mixed blood. Of the hundreds of deputies in the state assemblies a mere 3 were Negroes, in a country which boasts of a population consisting of over 40 percent of

24 One of the most comprehensive studies on the contemporary racial situation in Brazil is Florestan Fernandes, A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes (2 vols.; São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1965).

25 "Os negros na sociedade brasileira," Conjuntura Econômica, XI, No. 3 (March, 1957), 65-69. Since the 1951 Afonso Arinos law against racial discrimination, questions pertaining to race are not included in the census.
Negroes and mulattoes. These statistics do not negate or deny the existence of a high degree of racial tolerance; they demonstrate rather that the lauded racial democracy is still in development rather than existing as an accomplished fact. Reluctance to admit this and maintenance of the myth system in dealing with Afro-Asia impedes frankness and introduces an uneasiness into personal relations.

Some of the predominantly Negro elite groups, such as the Soberano Clube and the Quênia Clube in Rio de Janeiro, have taken the initiative in contacts with African embassies to advance Brazilian-African relations. Also concerned with furthering racial integration in Brazil, these clubs speak freely of their nation's African heritage and try to obtain scholarships for Brazilian students interested in studying in Africa. Beyond the activities of these clubs, however, ambassadors looking for pro-African feelings among Brazilian Negroes, based on color or cultural affinities, found little to justify their expectations. Not only do most Negroes orient themselves as Brazilians rather than Afro-Brazilians or transplanted Africans, but also the mulattoes with aspirations for social ascension conform to the mores of the whites which often include disparagement and rejection of African contributions to Brazilian culture and acquisition of the outward manifestations of

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26 Interview with Adalberto Camargo, June 23, 1968.

27 "Brasil: A escalada do negro," Manchete, No. 763 (December 3, 1966), 63-76.
Western culture. The greatest proponents of Africa-awareness in Brazil have, perhaps not surprisingly, been white intellectuals with ideologues predominant.

In spite of much that is admirable in the "Brazilian solution" to the racial problem, such an example is exceedingly difficult to impart to other more troubled cultures because of the particular historical circumstances which yielded peaceful Brazilian miscegenation as opposed to, say, South African apartheid or violence between Arabs and Negroes in the Sudan. Brazilians acknowledging this obstacle aver that the Brazilian example still stands as evidence that racial tensions need not be the universal rule and as a working relationship which belies both white and black myths of racial superiority. Nevertheless, the central question remains as to what extent miscegenation will be acclaimed by an Africa enthralled with nègritude and racial pride, and faced with the intransigence of whites in Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.

Another component of the Brazilian melting pot which enters into consideration in Afro-Asia relations is the presence of a colony of Japanese numbering 138,637 immigrants and 291,332 descendants in 1958 and concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Paraná. 28 By 1968, estimates of the size of this ethnic group ranged around 632,000,

making this region of Brazil the greatest agglomeration of Japanese outside Japan. First arriving in 1908, the immigrants chose Brazil after emigration to previously popular countries (especially the United States) was curtailed. Initially the stream of immigration, reaching its heights from 1929 to 1934, was aimed at furnishing labor for São Paulo's coffee plantations. With intensive agricultural techniques brought from their homeland the Japanese soon dominated the market supplying vegetables to São Paulo and became prosperous farmers. Although many continue to live in separate communities and successful cooperatives in rural zones, increasing migration to the cities and integration into national culture has been the rule. A few older immigrants have sentimental ties to Japan, but of the younger generations only about 10 percent speak Japanese and 5 percent read the language. Since 1961 very few immigrants have arrived because of increased employment opportunities offered by the industrial development of Japan, coupled with solution of the overpopulation problem which represented the principal stimulus for officially sponsored emigration before World War II.

During their 60 years in Brazil the immigrants have largely overcome the earlier strong objections raised to their presence—alleged militarism, completely alien customs, and community exclusiveness—

29 Interview with Dr. Hiroshi Saito, June 20, 1968.
and have won prestigious positions in society, commerce, and politics. Their contribution to national life has been enthusiastically called "the Japanese example" by Brazil's largest newspaper chain.

In a speech on the occasion of celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the arrival of the first ship bearing immigrant families, President Kubitschek explained in the presence of Crown Prince Takahito Mikasa how positive sentiment toward these immigrants had favorably affected relations between the two countries.

We do not become tired of proclaiming how much the sons of Japan integrated in our midst have grown in our esteem, spreading admirable nuclei of economic vitality. Winning with great difficulty the esteem they enjoy in national public opinion, these tireless creators of wealth multiplied in Brazil so many benefits and so many accomplishments in such a short time that Japanese-Brazilian friendship is today an exponential theme of our international relations.... Fifty years of an immigratory influx of a high degree of productivity have convinced us of the advantages that can come from a new type of immigration in which capital and industry themselves move from Japan to Brazil, as is now happening in the steel industry.

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32 Reproduced in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, I, No. 3 (September, 1968), 177.
In a 1961 opinion survey of Brazilian Congressmen, Japan was ranked as highly as the United States on a "ladder" scale preference system, deriving in large part from the same high opinion generally accorded to the numerous immigrants. The existence of the colony has made each country more salient to the other in spite of the intervening distance and facilitated the development of economic relations and Japanese investment in Brazil since 1955, because the Japanese businessman can count on the atmosphere of understanding already cultivated by the historical experience and size of the colony.

The final element of the cultural defense of greater relations with Afro-Asia describes Brazil as the prima facie example of a successfully industrializing tropical civilization that has learned how to defeat some of the ecological problems faced by Afro-Asian nations and has smashed the myths concerning the alleged inferiority of tropical peoples. Besides transmitting these experiences accumulated over a longer period of independence, Brazil could gain from exchange of ideas concerning similar technical problems faced by other nations of the tropics. In this mutual aid program, Brazil, as the "Africanized West," as the

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34 Interview with Ikuzo Hirokawa, President of Kanematsu do Brasil and of the Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Japonêsa do Brasil, June 20, 1968.
"largest African nation outside Africa," will be able to give that
continent sincere, effective collaboration without deforming its culture
because Brazil's culture is partly African and therefore less likely to
"de-Africanize" the nations with which it cooperates. Nor would
Brazilian assistance appear as another attempt to compromise Africa's
jealously guarded neutrality in the Cold War. This special aptitude
to approach Afro-Asia is enhanced by Brazil's status as a former colony
which never practiced imperialism, freeing it from guilt complexes and
qualifying it to lead a moral crusade in defense of these smaller,
weaker nations of the world, as a way of repaying the moral debt it
owes Africa.

By interrelating its Western and African heritages, said
Quadros, Brazil could become the bridge or link between Africa and the
West to avoid a decisive political split between the two cultural areas
and to present evidence of a synthesis of the values of both. Such
hopes of assuming a crucial mediating role between former colonizers
and colonial peoples by virtue of cultural prerequisites is best


understood as a transference to the global international system of Brazil's traditional intercessory role within the Western Hemisphere subsystem. Lacking in political and economic instruments of policy, Brazil elected to pursue a culturally based policy to establish increased prestige and channels of interaction in both bilateral and multilateral relations, thus laying the foundations for long-range accretion of political and economic cooperation and influence in Afro-Asia. If later conditions should warrant, the innocuous "bridge" imagery could rapidly be substituted by one of Third World leadership, certainly too radical to achieve important domestic support among conservative groups as Brazil was just beginning to reappraise its world position in 1961.

**Lusotropicology**

The second major theoretical approach to Afro-Asia is the Luso-Brazilian, the view that Brazil can best relate to the Third World through Portugal in an Afro-Luso-Brazilian Community erected on the phenomenon which sociologist Gilberto Freyre terms Lusotropicalism—the interpenetration of race, language, and culture which is supposedly peculiar to Portuguese colonization and finds its highest expression in Brazilian racial democracy. Freyre argues that the Portuguese were the only nation able to adapt European values to tropical regions in a harmonious process of gradual fusion rather than destruction of either of the systems in conflict. Because of this creative interpenetration
and experience in tropical areas dating from before 1500, Lusotropical societies should not be confused with the products of the more recent rapine imperialism of racist white powers, which merely attempted to project copies of European states into the tropics while trampling underfoot the cultures of their exploited subjects.  

Brazil, as the foremost member of the "world the Portuguese created," should take advantage of the common sociological situation it enjoys with places like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Macao, and Timor to promote a union of Lusotropical peoples for defense of their type of civilization as a mediator between European civilization and the tropic peoples.

This frame of reference, which also finds exponents in official circles, asserts as a logical consequence that Brazil must therefore collaborate with Portugal in its "civilizing mission" in the tropics, to preclude the "absorption and disappearance of a Lusitanian world, which is our world, whose preservation also is our duty and concerns us, as a people, culturally, politically, and economically."  

To do so would be no more than observing the natural solidarity which a first-born son owes to his father. Through a new type of Commonwealth composed of Brazil, Portugal, and the "overseas provinces," Brazil

38 Gilberto Freyre, Uma Política Transnacional de Cultura para o Brasil de Hoje (Belo Horizonte: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1960), pp. 45-60, passim.

39 José Garrido Torres, "Trópico e desenvolvimento," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI, No. 2 (April, 1969), 231. (Italics from the original.)
should present itself to Black Africa as a product of the Portuguese to which Angola and Mozambique, emerging new Brazils, look for guidance. Only in this way can Brazil defend the threatened common culture, help avert the racial extremism of Negro exclusivists and white segregationists in southern Africa, prevent the extinction of Portuguese culture in Africa, avoid the complete de-Europeanization of the continent, and forestall the absorption of the people of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea by either Communist or capitalist imperialism whose onslaught would be precipitated by a premature granting of independence. To join the anti-colonialist chorus condemning Portugal would be equivalent to a rejection of the valuable Portuguese heritage which Brazil enjoys.

Most advocates of the Luso-Brazilian approach agree with Lisbon that the overseas territories are not colonies but integral parts of the Lusitanian world, part of a singular culture which transcends national boundaries. This world defines Brazil's first circle of loyalty; to ignore it by trying to appeal to Afro-Asia on any other basis would undermine Brazil's best opportunities for self-extension within its own language and culture. Brazilian opinion on the question of the future status of these colonies is in reality seriously divided, representing as it does a conflict between the established "special relationship" with Portugal and Brazil's aspirations as an independent spokesman for the developing world in its own right. A diplomatic official with Afro-Asian experience, including service as consul in Luanda, Angola, referred to
the dilemma as critical: "The case of the Portuguese overseas provinces is surely the most painful of our days for Brazilian diplomacy in Africa." Since it is impossible to separate completely Brazil's relations with Portugal from its objectives in sub-Saharan Africa, this quandary must be explored more fully in a later chapter as an important conditioning factor in Brazil's reaction to decolonization.

**Economic Conflict and Cooperation**

Economic preoccupations were the first stimuli that brought Africa to Brazilian attention in the post-war period, in the form of agricultural producers fearing greater competition in production and marketing of raw materials such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and tropical woods and oils, all suffering from limited elasticity of demand. At first even official reports discounted the possibility of serious agricultural competition in the near future, as did a 1950 technical mission sent from the state of São Paulo to 11 colonies in Western and central Africa to assess future economic potentials. The study concluded that the continent was not a "land of the future," but to the contrary was already nearly stripped of its resources and cursed with infertile land, deserts, disease, harsh climate, and other conditions which would greatly hinder its development into an imminent competitor or customer.

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with the possible exception of rivalry in robust varieties of coffee.\footnote{Rui Miller Paiva, \textit{A Agricultura na África} (São Paulo: Diretoria de Publicidade Agrícola da Secretaria da Agricultura do Estado, 1952), pp. 224-232.}

Within a few years this scepticism vanished as increasing African cocoa and coffee exports began cutting into Brazil's formerly privileged markets. As Brazil was taken by surprise in this seeming turn of events, having failed to anticipate the new competition, it was slow to frame a policy adequate to meet the challenge.

For a while many diplomats and economists were given to the erroneous theory that Africa was able to vie successfully for world markets only because "slave labor" at very low rates of pay was being utilized by colonialists to enable African coffee and cocoa to undersell the Brazilian products. With independence, so the argument reasoned, a freer work system would be introduced and the resultant higher wages would force African producers to compete on a fair basis. In addition, with African independence it was expected that the United States would increase its trade with Brazil while Europe, forced to pay fair prices for raw materials from former colonies, would likely also turn to Brazil.\footnote{Adolfo Justo Bezerra de Menezes, \textit{O Bloco Afro-Asiático e a Posição do Brasil} (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1960), pp. 29-30.} Not only did these premises prove false, but the rapid voluntary association of newly independent nations with the Commonwealth and the
European Common Market confounded those who had predicted a split between Europe and the new Africa. The specter of a united Eurafrika, implying a lockout of Brazilian primary products in Europe, provoked strong condemnatory remarks from Josué de Castro, Ambassador to the United Nations Special Agencies.

Faced with the two monsters, Russia and the United States, Europe will survive only if it has a strong economy. At this point enters Africa, which was liberated only in appearance. Its countries are not political colonies but they are economic colonies, and they have no other choice. That is why they are now our enemies. When we want to shake up the European Common Market, the Africans are not in agreement. We, who talk so much about Afro-Asian policy, about common interests, should see that in that matter the interests are antagonistic. They have interests which they do not wish to yield up and they say that it is the positive inheritance of colonialism, which had so many negative aspects. If they did not have those preferences which they enjoy to export to Europe, they would not be able to compete. 43

With the inclusion of Africa in the World Coffee Agreement and the organization of the Cocoa Producers Alliance, Brazil gained confidence in its ability to compete and lost its earlier apprehensions of being excluded from Western European markets. Industrialization began to reveal the possibility of penetration into the substantial Afro-Asian market, so opportunities for trade were explored by venture-some and imaginative economists and later by Itamaraty itself. The

economic problem was the disposal of manufactured and semi-finished goods produced in factories then running at less than optimum capacity because of a slowly expanding internal market limited most stringently by a national per capita income of a little over 200 dollars. Afro-Asia, along with Latin America, was presented as a natural outlet for such goods, since it was believed that industrialized countries would not purchase large quantities of Brazilian manufactures. Industrialization would best be advanced by simultaneous extension of both domestic and international markets. Concurrent with this trend of thought occurred greater Brazilian-Afro-Asian cooperation through the United Nations to reform the terms of world trade. Gradually, without forgetting conflicts arising from continuing competition for economic markets and aid for development, Brazil saw Afro-Asia less from the perspective of a competitor and more in the potential roles of clients and allies.

The Neutralist Viewpoint

Since the idea of national interest as the guiding principle of foreign policy led to desires for independence in international politics, and since neutralism was the predominant philosophy of disengagement from the struggle between the super powers at this turning point in Brazilian foreign policy, an ideological debate ensued about whether or not the Quadrós-Goulart policy represented a variant of neutralism, and, if so, what consequences for relations with Afro-Asia would
follow. Among the vocal defenders of non-alignment were found those who spoke most favorably of increasing contacts with the Third World, identifying Brazil's political and economic similarities with this group, criticizing its position as a neglected ally trailing along in the wake of the industrialized West, and urging recognition of level of economic development as the watershed in international relations. For these individuals, Afro-Asia interests Brazil because of similar problems in nation-building and eliminating colonial structures.

With the underdeveloped nations of Afro-Asia, Brazil and Latin America form part of the "periphery" of the world, that group of weak nations which could be described in neo-Marxist terms as the "historical proletariat" of the industrialized powers and especially the superpowers (including the Soviet Union). This periphery is characterized by having lacked, over the past four centuries, full power of decision regarding central problems affecting the organization of its political-economic life; "it was organized as a pole which was either passive or dependent on a political-economic system which transcends its borders."44 The peripheral countries are now simultaneously engaged in a common conflict to assert their independence vis-a-vis the center, end neo-colonialist domination, secure world peace, and promote their economic development; in brief, they are

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faced with the task of correcting the distortions brought about by colonialism, solving the economic contradictions between themselves and their wealthy creditor states, and taking firm control of their own national destinies. To gain the initiative, the periphery must unite to present its vindications to the developed center, using the principal weapon at its disposal—nationalism.

In comparison with Afro-Asia, Latin America finds itself in a slightly different situation. Although long independent in a political sense, Latin America still suffers under an economic dependence which, when interpreted as a form of neo-colonialism and when taken in conjunction with its backward social and political structures, fully qualifies it for membership in the periphery and solidarity with Afro-Asia in the pursuit of identical objectives despite different cultures, geographical distance, competition in the production of raw materials, and variations in degree of development attained. Overarching economic rivalries between the regions one finds common problems of national integration, low levels of income and high levels of illiteracy, intra-national regional inequalities, declining prices received for exports, and difficulties in public administration arising from commitment to a large role for the state in national life. According to the nationalist-developmentalist thesis, Brazil, as a key country of the

developing world, had the urgent and essential obligation to serve as promoter of an identification between Latin America and Afro-Asia, regions with comparable problems in nation-building but which had been kept apart by adverse historical circumstances and machinations of the dominant powers. This could most readily be accomplished, on one side, by the employment of Brazil's prestige within South America and, on the other, by increased communication with Afro-Asia in general, but with special attention to "progressive" neutralist countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR which were Third World leaders in advancing unity and class consciousness vis-a-vis the metropolitan areas. 46

Anti-colonialism would be a logical concomitant of such a posture, which was designed not only to confer a position of Third World leadership on Brazil but also and primarily to create an international climate favorable to broad economic and social reform within Brazil, including control of foreign capital, erasure of all vestiges of

46 These particular ideas came closest to fruition under Quadros, who was aware of Nkrumah's theory of diastatic countries; i.e., those key countries of the developing world whose exemplary action would trigger a chain reaction effect and forge unity in the developing world as a whole. These countries were Ghana, Brazil, the UAR, and India. Like plans to further Latin American-African cooperation through Brazilian diplomacy in the Organization of African Unity, the diastatic idea was relegated to intellectual drawing-boards and never was put into practice in the short months of Quadros' presidency even though he, according to indications, unsuccessfully tried to start a dialogue with Nkrumah through a personal emissary.
neo-colonialism, and acceleration of the national self-awareness of which the ISEB generation spoke. Should Brazil fail to take this step as the core of an independent policy, argued the neutralists, it would be condemned to be left even further behind the levels of development reached by the industrialized North which was controlling the flow of international economics in its own behalf. Vigorous defense of anti-colonialism, non-intervention, and the self-determination of peoples, long mere rhetoric of conservative spokesmen of Itamaraty, was now necessary to protect the central value of independence, greater national freedom of choice, which was inherent in the higher per capita income levels being sought and was now being defined in economic as well as political terms.

Thus, for the neutralists, the Afro-Asian policy was very much an extension of the domestic political contest, a way of expanding the scope of the conflict in order to bring into play international pressure judged beneficial to their interests and political philosophies, against the resistance to reform of the traditional, Western-oriented elites. Once this internal opposition was overcome, the ideologues felt that they could continue to rely on the nationalistic support of the masses to continue the attack on the monopoly of international decision exercised by the two superblocks to the detriment of the periphery. Any increase in bargaining power obtained through an Afro-Asian type of positive neutralism would be welcome, but the final goal would always remain
the construction of an international system to facilitate development, to be attained by negotiations with the North through a united front of developing nations spanning the metaphorical Southern Hemisphere.

Interdependence with the West

If the neutralists believed that the Afro-Asian policy should be constructed chiefly as an integral part of the campaign to sever all traces of dependence on foreign centers of political and economic decision, many of their conservative opponents not only rejected the desirability of closer relations with Afro-Asia but also depicted dependence on the West as a valuable asset which did not conflict with Brazil's best interests but rather preserved them. This judgment, most in evidence in the Castello Branco government, betrays very markedly an acceptance of the American image of international relations prevalent during the mid-1950's, a view conditioned by belief in rigid bipolarity, moralizing, and a fear of expansion of Communist power. While the neutralists used economic and sociological reasoning to explain Brazil's great dependency on the United States and Western Europe and condemned it as prejudicial to rapid development, the Western-World-oriented affirmed that such dependency on other Western civilizations was a moral obligation which could not be auctioned off,

47 Such opinions were also affected by widespread admiration for Portugal in this group and consequent acceptance of Portuguese interpretations of world affairs.
as well as a prerequisite for national security from Communist subversion. Any clashes of interests with Western nations were considered secondary to the benefit which would come about from full cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

Not only did these conservatives warn that neutralism is deceitful, frivolous, and immoral, but they also believed that both this phenomenon and Afro-Asian nationalism were inspired and manipulated by Communists as weapons in the war against the West. To them the case of Soviet control in Eastern Europe was much more imperative and pointed than conditions in any colony struggling to free itself from European control, most likely only to become a prime target for Communist imperialism. Any campaign to set Brazil on an anti-colonialist path which would collide with the interests of the United States, Portugal, Great Britain, or France was indeed ill-advised and against the interests of the West as a whole. The conservative viewpoint disagreed wholeheartedly with Quadros' profession of a Brazilian cultural debt to Africa and classified the Afro-Asian rapprochement as his "preposterous creation" which merely encouraged local Communists because it took on anti-American and anti-European features and threatened to transform Brazil from a staunch American ally into an adherent of the abhored Indian line in defiance of solemn treaty commitments to the West. 48

Assis Chateaubriand, former Ambassador to London and owner of Brazil's largest newspaper, radio, and television chain, in an editorial titled "Our Kingdom is not of this Hindu-Arabic World" decried the invitation of several neutralist leaders to visit Brazil as a waste of time conducive to useless academic arguments over Third and Fourth Positions irrelevant to Brazilian reality.

We should realize that for the recovery of Brazil we neither can nor should hope for anything from the United Arab Republic, India, or Yugoslavia. The projected visit of the heads of state of those countries will be a purely touristic excursion destitute of any practical significance. Our salvation depends on the Atlantic Community and Japan. 49

In discussing Afro-Asia, this group emphasized competition in agricultural exports, the unwise inversion of priorities implied in the utopian courting of the Third World, and the alien (i.e., non-Western or non-democratic) values which these other cultures possessed, not to mention the Communist propaganda which could only be encouraged by increased communication with the anti-Western states. It was even less justifiable for the ideologues to turn Brazil into an imaginary colony, much less a vanguard of the "historical international proletariat" supposedly composed of all underdeveloped nations. Economic, cultural, or political identity with the Third World was a demagogical distortion of the facts, since economic underdevelopment in Brazil, merely a

49 O Jornal, April 28, 1963, p. 3.
temporary delay in an industrial revolution, could not be compared with Africa and Asia where progress will require structural and attitudinal modifications on a large scale. Brazil, on the other hand, according to the definition of the Castello Branco regime, is a developed country with pockets of underdevelopment. This perspective changes entirely the point of reference and the conclusions about Brazil's international identifications and solidarities, leading to assessments like that of Ambassador J. O. de Meira Penna.

Our foreign policy should therefore be based on the expectation of an imminent entrance of Brazil into the society of the industrialized and developed nations of the West rather than remaining bound to economic judgments originating from feelings of inferiority.50

So strongly did sentiments of this type pervade the post-1964 reaction to the independent foreign policy and the neo-Marxist terminology of the developmental nationalists that many of the prime movers of the opening to Afro-Asia now feel that an active political role for Brazil in those continents is in the first instance foreclosed by domestic conservative elites (including sectors of the military) who would consider such action "leftist" and perhaps "subversive." In the opinion of a former foreign minister, this fear is presently the greatest single hindrance to penetration of Brazilian influence in Afro-Asia.51 Perhaps,

50 Meira Penna, p. 45.

51 Confidential interview with the author, May 22, 1968.
in retrospect, it is most valid to conclude that although these ideological and Western-oriented global philosophies continue to clash in the contemporary formulation of Afro-Asian policy, elements of both were accepted by Itamaraty under Costa e Silva. With time and experience the thesis and the antithesis have yielded a synthesis, a course of action more suited to Brazilian potentials and possibilities than was either doctrine taken by itself.

Africa in Military Thought

Brazilian military thought, based on a geopolitical approach imposed by the nation's limited conventional capabilities, underlines the fact that while by virtue of its territorial mass Brazil is affected by whatever happens on the South American continent, its unusually long four thousand mile coastline charges it with the mission of watching over the South Atlantic, to be performed in conjunction with the United States and other friendly states such as Argentina. This mission grows naturally from popular recognition of Brazil as a nation which is not only fully facing the sea but geographically "leaning out over it" ("debruçado sobre o mar"), with a population heavily concentrated along the ocean's shores. On the other side of this ocean lies Africa, making Brazil an interested neighboring observer of events in that continent.

High ranks of the military are not indifferent to the significance of Africa in national security, as West Africa falls within the first inner
hemicircle of defense from conventional attack and possible subversion originating outside Latin America. Strategist Meira Mattos, in contemplating an enemy invasion of the Western Hemisphere from West Africa, defines Brazil's geopolitical position as the largest power bordering on the South Atlantic and controller of one end of the 1600-mile Natal-Dakar strait which proved crucial in Western strategy in World War II.

Today we cannot escape the truism which places on the Atlantic coast of Africa the line of immediate coverage of the Brazilian coast. The moment a military power hostile to Brazil occupies Africa's Atlantic coast, at any point from Morocco to the Republic of South Africa, we will begin to feel in our country a climate of intranquility and bellicose pressure without precedent in our history... In the framework of continental defense and Western strategy today Africa concerns Brazil much more than any other area of the universe. It will be there that we will have to protect our own territory from the horrors of war.  

Of all the regions which form Brazil's extended lines of defense, Africa is considered by many to be the most vulnerable to Communist penetration and most likely to become a center of Cold War tensions. The minimum, then, which Brazil must do to defend its approaches from the East is to contribute to the military security of the South Atlantic and promote conditions in Africa which would engender political and economic stability and prevent any state along the Atlantic coast from falling into hostile hands. This task is made more difficult

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by the weakness of African naval and air forces, requiring deterrence from attack provided in part by operation of extra-continental balance of power mechanisms and tacit agreements rather than exclusive reliance on local forces. "We are, in other words," as one diplomat expressed it, "an interested party in an African Monroe Doctrine, which constitutes the strategic basis by which we can demand local respect of the principle of non-intervention and self-determination." 53

General Golbery, instructor in the Superior War College and former head of the Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Intelligence Agency), assigned high priority to Africa in any Brazilian defense activities outside its borders, in view of its susceptibility to subversion by virtue of its social and economic weaknesses.

Combat underdevelopment in backward areas in Brazil and the rest of the continent, cooperate also in the immunization of the young African countries to the fatal infection of Communism, be vigilant and attentive to any Soviet advance toward the Atlantic coast of Africa where the advanced and decisive frontier of our own national security is situated, collaborate by all means to keep it totally free of Communist domination--these are, more or less well-delineated, in a tentative order of decreasing priority, the principal directives which seem to us to be non-deferrable in a Brazilian geopolitics adequate to the present agitated and cataclysmic period, in a struggling world in the throes of a most brutal collision of antagonistic civilizations. 54

53 Meira Penna, p. 149.

To many military officers pondering the problem of effective action around the South Atlantic, the so-called overseas provinces of Portugal appear as excellent bases of operation and points of support in Brazil's attempt to increase its radius of action throughout the world. This is one of the key advantages for Brazil in the proposed "Afro-Luso-Brazilian Community" which Lisbon has recently tried to foster and which an important segment of Brazilian officialdom finds attractive and difficult to repudiate in spite of explicit unfavorable reaction from several African nations. Such a Community, if realized, would comprehend a land area greater than that of Communist China and a population of over 120 million located on four continents, representing, with its economic concessions, a substantial power increment for Brazil through its ally Portugal, with which it already has several military treaties. This Community concept has stirred strong emotions pro and con and become a major issue of Brazilian policy in Afro-Asia, acerbated by the uncertain state of the Portuguese occupation of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, and Macao, resulting in differing estimates of the probable outcome.

**Afro-Asian Area Study Centers**

The rather sudden concern for Afro-Asian affairs and the repercussions which events there were producing for world politics led to the creation of several Afro-Asian study institutes in major cities. The oldest is the Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais, established at the
Federal University of Bahia, at Salvador in September, 1959, initially receiving assistance from both UNESCO and the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The location of this interdisciplinary Center is due in large measure to the pronounced African cultural milieu found in the state of Bahia. The CEAO has maintained an ongoing program of association with African educational institutions since its foundation and specialized in undergraduate and graduate-level historical, geographic, anthropological, sociological, and linguistic courses and research on Africa, African ethnographic patterns in Brazil, and Brazilian cultural traces in West Africa, reaching the apex of its activity between 1961 and 1963. Language courses offered on various occasions have included Yoruba, Arabic, Hebrew, Hindi, Russian, and Japanese, all of which have received very little consideration in other Brazilian universities. Publications of the Centro include several monographs on Africa, intermittent bulletins, and the semi-annual journal Afro-Ásia. Many of the Brazil-Africa cultural exchange programs which came into being, including exchange of students and professors, have been handled and coordinated by the CEAO. Since crippling financial problems encountered in 1964, however, the Centro's course offerings have not formed part of an integrated plan of study or research but have been administered on a non-credit basis.

The most politically important study center is the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos created in April, 1961, as a
graduate-level institute to promote relations between Brazil and the Afro-Asian world. The IBEAA was the unusual product of Quadros' technical staff, the consequence of the fusion of two pro-Third World currents—the relatively apolitical cultural inclinations of the Bahian Centro and the ideological bent of members of the ISEB generation. Directly subordinated to the presidency, the IBEAA with its Consultative Committee of rectors and area specialists from important universities was intended to be nothing less than a Kennedy-style advisory body of national intellectuals to attack a problem area from many disciplines, an innovation in Brazilian politics.

Executive Decree 50,465 of April 14, 1961, which created the IBEAA stated its objectives:

a. Stimulate, develop, and publish cultural, social, political, and economic studies concerning the Afro-Asian world;
b. Facilitate and develop relations between Brazil and the countries of Africa and Asia;
c. Promote the comparative study of the developmental process in Brazil and in African and Asian countries, for the exchange of techniques and solutions adopted, for mutual benefit;
d. Promote university student and professor exchanges between Brazil and the African and Asian countries.

From the very beginning the ideological predisposition of the IBEAA was conspicuous and Africa was the favored continent. Similar organizations were set up to give regional cooperation to the central

\[\text{Interview with Cândido Mendes de Almeida, June 17, 1968.}\]
body, but these enjoyed only a short life at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (Recife), the Universidade do Ceará (Fortaleza), and in a state-sponsored Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos in Natal (Rio Grande do Norte). Only after the resignation of Quadros did the IBEAA start to function, in November, 1961, with an ambitious program of seminars, expositions, debates, and lectures including participation of African ambassadors and representatives from two liberation movements, the FLN of Algeria and the MPLA of Angola. The Institute aided in the preliminary organization of the first economic mission to Africa and sent two delegates to the First Disarmament Assembly in Accra in June, 1962.

The domestic political configuration, however, was unfavorable to the realization of the goals set for IBEAA by the Africanists. Originally designed to operate under Quadros and with collaboration from his circle of sympathetic advisors, it was transferred to the Ministry of Education and Culture in the parliamentary regime which accompanied Goulart's assumption of the presidency and in March, 1962, was made subordinate to the Foreign Ministry. Each of these distinct environments implied a different set of ideas and, lacking the personal support and interest of Goulart, the IBEAA soon found itself cut off from the privileged access to policy formation which was its original raison d'être. A bulletin was circulated and about ten books and a bibliography on the Third World published before the Institute was thrown into a moribund state by the
Castello Branco government, which questioned some of its activities and labeled one of its published works (Axé Opô Afonjá) as subversive. Antipathy toward the Institute exhibited by high officials in Itamaraty, especially those incensed by its anti-colonial positions, almost led to its extinction, which was averted only by the negative repercussions this would produce in Afro-Asia at a time when the revolution was trying to improve its image abroad. Deprived of public funds in 1968 but still subordinate to the Foreign Ministry, the IBEAA presently continues dormant and privately financed with the future possibility of a renewal of funds and cultural activity sponsored by interested universities and stimulated by the revived interest in Afro-Asia under Costa e Silva.

The third and final major Afro-Asian area study program is the Oriental Studies Department of the School of Philosophy, Sciences, and Letters of the University of São Paulo, offering undergraduate and graduate courses since 1963, leading to a degree in Oriental letters. This Department specializes in Japanese studies, but also maintains courses in Russian, Hebrew, Arabic, Armenian, and Sanscrit languages and literature, with some historical and cultural background provided. Of the 117 students enrolled in the regularly offered Arabic, Armenian, Hebrew, and Japanese programs in 1966, 77 were enrolled in the Japanese section and the vast majority of these were descendants of Japanese immigrants. The response on the part of native Brazilians

56 Euêpedes Simões de Paula, "Breve nota sobre o Curso de Estudos Orientais na Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras da
to this pioneering effort has been rather restrained, perhaps due to
competition from courses in the traditionally more popular Western
areas. 57

Area study programs are still novel and not well developed in
Brazil, but it is instructive to note that, to the knowledge of the author,
the above-mentioned Afro-Asian centers are the only such programs in
existence for any world regions although various bi-national cultural
institutes have been functioning for some time. 58 In turn, the origin
of each of these three centers can be traced primarily to particular
domestic factors rather than to generalized intellectual interest in
Afro-Asia: nuclei of Japanese and African culture in the case of the
São Paulo and Bahia institutes and ideological inspiration in the
instance of the IBEEAA. The two centers presently active have an almost

Universidade de São Paulo, " in Primeiro Colóquio Brasil-Japão (São
Paulo, Brasil, 1966), ed. by Eurípedes Simões de Paula (São Paulo:

57 A Japanese social scientist from the University of Kobe
estimated that in 1966 there were only 50 students of the Portuguese
language in Japanese universities; while reflecting the disinterest of
the Japanese in the study of developing regions, he remarked that this
figure is surprisingly low in view of the number of Japanese descendants
in Brazil and the concentration of Japanese investment in that country.
See Yoshiaki Nishimukai, "Estudos brasileiros no Japão" in Primeiro
Colóquio Brasil-Japão (São Paulo, Brasil, 1966), ed. by Eurípedes
Simões de Paula (São Paulo: Secção Gráfica da Universidade de São

58 Mention must be made of the valuable work done by the
Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros of São Paulo which specializes in
the sociology of the Japanese immigrant but serves to publicize Japanese
culture as well.
completely humanistic orientation while largely shunning political studies and involvement; if the IBEAA re-emerges under existing conditions it will likely bear little resemblance to its pre-revolution ideological format.

**Delusions of Grandeur or an Efficacious Policy?**

To many of the enthusiastic Afro-Asianists in the early 1960's, Brazil's obvious credentials as a South Atlantic power, a cultural bridge, a predestined leader of the developing nations, and a moral example of racial harmony qualified it to such a degree before Afro-Asian eyes that as Western Europe withdrew from former colonial domains, independent Africa and perhaps some of Asia would naturally and inexorably turn toward Brazil for cooperation and guidance. This supposedly logical non sequitur arose as a consequence of the fact that the initial controversy often took the form of emotional polemics divorced from a more rational, objective examination of the potentials for conflict and cooperation in the light of Brazil's interests and capabilities within Afro-Asia itself. Much of what was written in Brazil about Afro-Asia and particularly opportunities for leadership there was founded on meager factual knowledge and optimistic illusions ignoring the realities of international politics and economics. It was rather a wishful projection of philosophical or cultural notions about Brazil, fabricated completely within Brazil, and based almost solely on Brazilian problems and perspectives. In the words of a former Ambassador to Ghana, Africa
became Brazil's "capital de sonhos" (dream castle in the sky) in its search for greater influence and prestige, leading to many distortions and unjustified hopes. 59

The Director of the Bahian Afro-Asian Studies Center asserted, for example, that after Kubitschek's Pan-American Operation, Africa lay open to Brazil.

The Negro peoples are waiting for us, in a way. Free of European colonialism, fearful and mistrustful of the offers of assistance made to them, with the firm purpose of imposing Black culture on the world, with a refusal to assimilate the culture which European colonialist peoples tried in vain to impose on their populations, they wish union with us, they trust us . . . we are the natural ally of the Black peoples of Africa . . . 60

Ambassador Josué de Castro was of the belief that a latent diplomatic love affair existed between Brazil and Africa.

. . . Africa has until the present time been holding open a great window for our country, just waiting until someone should go by to begin the courtship which is necessary as a type of diplomatic introduction. 61

Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas also predicted great opportunities for Brazil among the new nations of the Third World.

59 Interview with Raymundo Souza Dantas, September 14, 1968.


These countries turn toward us, seeing in a nation with our demographic mold, with our political tradition, and with our cultural unity an eternal example of attention and often an example for imitation. For this reason, the position of a country such as ours may already be qualified as one of leadership, for leadership is nothing more than the capacity of expressing through one's own purpose and experience the solution of problems weighing upon others.  

Quadros himself felt that, "The great states being born in Africa and Asia must find in Brazil's international maturity the courage they lack to expedite their inevitable emancipation," thus casting Brazil in the peculiar role of inspirational midwife in the difficult process of the birth of the progeny spawned by decolonization. 63 His foreign minister, also impressed with Brazil's supposed power of attraction for Black Africa, declared, "It is not we who are searching for Africa; it is the young African nations which are searching for Brazil." 64 Such euphoric but common expectations were not, of course, borne out by subsequent events and many of the early efforts of Itamaraty in Afro-Asia suffered from this romantic approach, grounded as it was on false images and lack of experience with local conditions. Thus, if Brazilian policy in Afro-Asia appears to lack aggressiveness or deep

62 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VII, No. 27 (September, 1964), 411.
64 Quoted in Meira Penna, p. 149.
purpose, one reason could be that until recently it has been not only a
developing policy, but also a cautious one of information, of "listening
posts" represented by the new embassies and legations opened in those
continents. On the basis of the observations and intelligence gathered
over the last few years, and within the restrictions of economic and
political priorities, a new, more realistic and modest Afro-Asian policy
is being shaped along more pragmatic lines than those embraced during
the Quadros-Goulart years and on a higher level of diplomatic and
commercial interaction than previously exhibited. In turn, a more
propitious information atmosphere exists within Brazil for the limited
interested issue public to form accurate opinions and informed value
judgments about Brazil's relations with Afro-Asia. For a long time,
however, for the mass of the populace Afro-Asia will continue to
symbolize an exotic or unknown world, "more remote than the lunar
craters."

65 In November, 1966, Presidential Decree Number 69 stipulated
that service in Latin America, Africa, Asia, or Oceania was required
for certain diplomatic merit promotions. Elevations in rank to first
secretary require a minimum of two years, and promotions to minister
second class a minimum of four years of assignment to posts in the
above-mentioned regions. This regulation reflects the importance
now being placed on relations with the developing world and also the
fact that capitals in these areas may not be as glamorous and attractive
as those of Western Europe to which Brazilian diplomats have tradi-
tionally been drawn. One consequence of this decree will be that a
greater number of career diplomats will gain experience in Afro-Asia,
a very rare commodity in Itamaraty at the time of Quadros' adminis-
tration.
The Course of Bilateral Relations: 
Historical Overview, 1956-1968

Before 1956, Brazilian representation in Afro-Asia was scanty, a consequence of the modest size and budget of the diplomatic corps, predominance of Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States in national planning, a politically and geographically narrow definition of Brazilian interests, and the prevalence of European colonial control in Africa. In July, 1956, Brazil maintained diplomatic relations in the African continent only with the Union of South Africa and Egypt, with small consular posts in Casablanca, Algiers, Tangiers, Dakar, and Cape Town. Of the 25 major independent non-Communist states of Asia and the Levant, Brazilian diplomatic representation was present in 11, with career consulates in Kobe, Hong-Kong, Shanghai, Calcutta, Bombay, and Istanbul. About that time, however, concerned officials within Itamaraty were beginning to address themselves to the problem, which was becoming clearer with the projected independence of many African nations and the energetic international role undertaken by the Middle East and Asia in the United Nations.

Although Quadros is generally credited with awakening Brazil to the existence and importance of the Third World, some preliminary strides in that direction were quietly made in the administration of

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Kubitschek under the rubric of "Operação Brasil-Ásia." Brazil had routinely exchanged diplomats with major Asian powers for some time—China (since 1893), Japan (1897), Australia (1945), India (1948), Pakistan (1951), Indonesia (1953)—but a more dynamic response to rapidly-moving events on that continent seemed politically imperative and economically useful to alleviate an unfavorable balance of payments situation which appeared during Kubitschek's presidency. In July, 1957, the Ambassador of Brazil in New Delhi paid official visits to South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma with the intention of sounding out the opportunities for increased contacts in Southeast Asia. This mission grew out of a Foreign Ministry policy study on the reorganization and expansion of consular and diplomatic representation in Afro-Asia, the negotiation of treaties, and the dispatch of special delegations for ceremonial and observation purposes. As revealed in the final report of a second official economic and political mission representing various government organs and calling in Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong in 1959, commercial considerations were paramount in this spate of activity which replaced the preceding neglect of the area. Brazilian requirements for rubber and tin, for example,

led directly to the installation by the 1959 mission of an embassy in Bangkok, which also provided Ilamaraty with its first post on the Southeast Asian mainland and a prospective customer. ⁶⁸

As a direct consequence of Operação Brasil-Ásia, relations were begun in 1959 with Malaysia, Thailand, and South Vietnam and in 1960 with Ceylon and South Korea, while in 1959 the legation in Canberra was raised to embassy status. Even this measured attempt to extend diplomatic interchange provoked criticism from the domestic press, as some newspapers declared it utopian and diversionistic. In 1959, Sukarno's visit to Brazil was the first of any Asian head of state; Emperor Haile Selassie's short stay in 1960, abbreviated by an abortive Ethiopian coup, represented the same for Africa. Rather little was modified in Middle Eastern representation, but a legation in Accra and a cumulative legation in Addis Ababa were added in sub-Saharan Africa, while plans were made to initiate relations with Senegal and Guinea. Engrossed in the Pan American Operation, these few ventures which Brazil made into the Third World from 1956 to 1960 were confined mainly to South Asia and remained decidedly subordinate to other foreign policy matters, meriting barely a mention in the Foreign Ministry's annual reports.

1960 was the celebrated "Year of Africa," in which 17 states on that continent gained independence and applied for admission to the United Nations. Such a spectacular event as the birth of so many new nations across the South Atlantic could not but engender curiosity and apprehension in Latin America and particularly Brazil. No longer were these economic competitors mere colonies of Western Europe; they were now legally sovereign entities which would wield considerable vote-power in the General Assembly and specialized agencies and would most probably act in conjunction with the Afro-Asian caucusing group to bring to vote and approval questions which affected their interests. The proportional trend of regional strength within the General Assembly had already become quite apparent. Whereas in 1945 Latin America's share of the Assembly seats was 39 percent, by January 1, 1964, it would be more than halved to 18 percent, while Afro-Asia's participation (excluding Commonwealth associates) would rise from 24 percent to 52 percent in the same period. 69 Such a relative gain in voting strength by a bloc which represented possibilities for both conflict and cooperation in international forums could scarcely go unnoticed by a Latin America already affected by Africa's growing contribution to the world production of raw materials.

Both major candidates in the Brazilian presidential election of 1960 defended the importance of rapprochement with Afro-Asia, not a surprising, radical, or undue development in the context of the international headlines, the nationalistic tenor of the campaign, the challenges presented to the nation by the "winds of change" sweeping Africa, and the circumspect extension into the area already underway. Before his trip through the Third World, Quadros seemed to have had no real interest in Brazilian-Afro-Asian relations, but his careful observations impressed him to such an extent that, when elected, he set out to make these relations a prime component of his independent foreign policy. 70 His foreign minister sees a dual motive in this decision; the first envisioned the popular appeal of this expansion if heralded as a positive act of national independence, and the second stemmed from economic preoccupations which signaled the search for new markets in view of the inelasticity of traditional ones. 71

Quadros' program for Afro-Asia, as developed in consultation with advisors, gave highest priority to Africa, although Asia was not to be neglected. First, reciprocal cultural ties with West Africa were to be accented to overcome the usual Europeanization explanation of Brazil's cultural process and to present Brazil to the world as a nation

70 Interview with Cândido Mendes de Almeida, March 15, 1968.
71 Interview with Afonso Arinos, May 22, 1968.
which has partaken unashamedly of both African and European cultures and races and is therefore in a position to understand and benefit from both sources, as well as to act as mediator if necessary. Brazil was joined to Africa by common cultural and ethnic roots to such a degree, said Quadros, that no amount of approximation and cooperation could ever repay the immense national debt contracted through the sufferings and labors of Negroes in the evolution and enrichment of Brazil's distinctive civilization. This official glorification of the Negro, however slight, had few precedents in recent Brazilian history and disturbed the white cosmopolitans who found it more profitable and prestigious to identify with Western Europe and the United States.

The second point involved the creation of a historical-political-economic linkage to mitigate competition in coffee and cocoa which was detrimental to Brazil, open African markets to Brazilian goods, and build up a store of good will to make possible cooperation in defense of raw material prices. In the political sphere, a study group in Itamaraty was charged with proposing concrete means to advance national goals in Africa and enunciated a maxim which has in general governed Brazilian policy in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—"The active presence of Brazil in the African political complex should be free of any interventionist tendencies or partisan attitudes in local matters or in questions

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not yet settled internationally." This minimal political involvement decision flows from a desire to avoid antagonizing parties to any heated dispute in which Brazil is not an interested member, as well as reinforcing the principle of non-intervention which is designed to prevent large powers from using a conflict on the periphery to advance their own interests to the detriment of those of the local states. Also, if closely followed, this prudent admonition could place Brazil in a position of availability for mediation in cases such as have already arisen in Biafra or may arise in Portuguese Africa.

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74 Such mediation is a role which Itamaraty has been preparing itself to assume, should favorable circumstances and an invitation present themselves, as a means to promote Brazil's prestige in Africa and strengthen the basis for medium and long-range cooperation vis-a-vis developed economies. This availability is recognized in influential quarters, but whether it is even drawn upon depends largely on the wishes of the parties in conflict. Upon the breakdown of Nigerian-Biafran talks in June, 1968, The Economist's Latin American edition suggested editorially that Brazil offer to mediate in the war, given its exceptional characteristics for such an effort and its disinterested political stance of non-intervention. Extra-official Foreign Ministry sources expressed interest and readiness in the possibility, but reiterated as well the necessity for the initiative or request to come from either of the affected parties. Later, in a statement of official policy on the war, Magalhaes Pinto affirmed, "Respect for Nigerian sovereignty keeps Brazil from taking any initiative not agreed to by the federal government of Nigeria in the Biafran conflict episode." Brazil was therefore also safeguarding its amicable relations with Lagos, the most probable victor of the war and the controlling power of the greatest part of Nigerian territory and resources. See, in order: "Una oportunidad en busca de Brasil," The Economist para América Latina, II, No. 12 (June 12, 1968), p. 9. "Brasil
The final phase of Quadros' plan was to forge ties with the Organization of African Unity to allow Brazil to become the linkage between Latin America and Africa and thus push it into the forefront among developing nations. The realization of this bold aim was frustrated in the first instance by the brevity of Quadros' term and the rather low degree of acceptance actually accorded Brazil by African nations, contrary to ideological expectations that African states would welcome Brazil with open arms as a fellow exploited nation. To the contrary, Brazil has always had to be content with the status of ordinary observer at OAU meetings and all-African political and economic conferences.

As partially recounted in Chapter II, within the context of the independent foreign policy, new embassies and consulates were established in Afro-Asia, but most notably embassies in Accra, Dakar, Lagos, and Porto Novo, with cumulative embassies in Addis Ababa, Bamako, Niamey, Nouakchott, and Manila. Consulates were created in Nairobi and Salisbury, soon followed by increases in the number of consulates in Portuguese Africa. Many of these consulates and some embassies, however, never were actually installed for lack of resources or because of political inexpediency.

This inauguration or intensification of bilateral relations was accompanied by other measures designed to appeal to the whole Third World. The naval officer candidates' training cruise on the Custódio de Mello, normally scheduled for Europe, was re-routed to Africa, featuring an on-board course in African affairs and carrying an industrial exposition to 18 African and Middle Eastern ports, the first such Brazilian display in those areas. Afro-Asian cultural institutes were founded and a seminar on African affairs begun for diplomatic personnel stationed at the Foreign Ministry.

Scholarships for African students to receive training in Brazilian universities were sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, financed by deductions from diplomatic salaries over a certain level and in part administered through the Bahian Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais. This program ultimately benefited 22 students from Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde Islands, Sierra Leone, Portuguese Guinea, and Cameroon, who arrived in 1961 and 1962 and specialized in such diverse fields as medicine, engineering, letters, architecture, economics, law, and geology. After 1962, the program was definitively suspended, ostensibly for lack of funds. If continued, it may have proven a valuable project, given the importance of education in leadership formation in Africa and possibilities for Brazilian exchange of information with Africa in such areas as tropical medicine, architecture, civilian aviation, and the arts. Since 1962, the Foreign Ministry has continued its scholarship
program as before 1961, with almost all grants reserved for Latin Americans. Apparently a change in regional emphasis as well as financial difficulties was involved in the discontinuance of scholarships for Africa. However, to increase exposure of Africa to Brazilian culture, Itamaraty has at various times maintained Brazilian professors at universities in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal.\textsuperscript{75}

In international organizations and bilateral contacts, the bases were set for economic cooperation in common export products, typified by the 1962 formation of the Cocoa Producers Alliance with Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Togo, and Cameroon. These same states were, significantly, the first sub-Saharan nations with which Brazil opened relations after 1960. The Alliance was framed to exchange technical data, promote discussion of mutual problems, maintain market price levels, and encourage expansion of the product's consumption.

Political positions were modified to enhance Brazil's image in Afro-Asia, as Itamaraty began withdrawing its former assiduous support for Portuguese colonial policies in Africa and taking a stronger stand against colonialism in general. Observers were sent to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations (1961), the Cairo Conference on

\textsuperscript{75}For purposes of comparison, in 1961, while Itamaraty furnished three professors through cooperative programs in Africa, it sent three to the United States, five to Germany, nine to France, and one each to Austria and Japan. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, \textit{Relatório, 1961}, p. 164.
Problems of Economic Development (1962), and the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations (1964) all of which were attended by few Latin American states.

Several political missions were sent to Africa, the foremost of which was a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Arinos to witness the independence ceremonies of Senegal. A later special mission headed by Federal Deputy J. P. Coelho de Sousa and including three diplomats attended the independence ceremonies of Sierra Leone, afterwards traveling through West Africa gathering political and economic data and delivering a personal message from Quadros to the President of Cameroon. Official visits were also received, including those of missions from Cameroon and Nigeria, the Minister of Labor of Nigeria, the Minister of Economics of Gabon, President Sukarno of Indonesia, the Minister of Food and Agriculture of India, a commercial delegation from the Republic of China, and one from New Zealand, a good-will mission from South Korea, and several Japanese commercial and political missions. Although the level of interaction with the Middle East rose more gradually from 1959 to 1961, the rapidly increased exchange of diplomats and missions with Africa and Asia contrasted sharply with the much lower levels of activity in preceding years but blended in quite well with the general upsurge in Brazilian foreign relations intensity of 1961.

On the administrative level, an area desk for Africa (Divisão da África) was created in the Foreign Ministry, but subordinated to the
Western European General Secretariat, nevertheless constituting, in
the words of Itamaraty, "one more demonstration of the special
importance and attention which the Brazilian government dedicates to
the strengthening of its relations with the peoples of Africa." Many
of these efforts in Afro-Asia, however, suffered greatly from a lack of
continuity of interest and attention during the Goulart years. Even
with Quadros, many of the gestures proved to be ill-founded, uninformed,
or sterile of further results. Such ventures as the inauguration by the
Brazilian Lôide lines of regular bimonthly sea routes to West Africa and
Djakarta to stimulate trade were dropped after a few voyages because
of insufficient cargo. As expressed by José Honório Rodrigues, "There
was an initial impulse, a passionate interest in Africa, but an African
policy, properly speaking, was never formulated."

The spurt of Brazilian attention to Afro-Asia soon revealed
itself to have passed with the resignation of Quadros as the Goulart
government, beset by domestic instability and inflation, struck upon
the issues of decolonization, development, and disarmament but
neglected bilateral relations with the Third World. Goulart planned a
trip to Africa, which never came about because of domestic preoccupations.
In 1963, Brazil made an offer, at a meeting of African finance ministers

76 Ibid., p. 39.

77 José Honório Rodrigues, Brasil e África: Outro Horizonte
in Khartoum, of 20 million dollars worth of credit in cruzeiros in a special trust fund of the African Development Bank for the purpose of encouraging and financing African imports of Brazilian manufactures. This proposed contribution, although it would have represented 15 percent of the Bank's total capital and caused a great repercussion among those present, has not in fact been forthcoming because of Brazil's own financial difficulties. Means of implementing this proposal are presently under discussion between Brazilian and African officials.

The degree of reduction of interest and efficiency in the Afro-Asian policy is depicted in the frustration and discouragement of an Ambassador to Ghana who had hoped for a more aggressive posture in Africa but concluded by mid-1963 that the embassy had become a mere bureaucratic listening-post to which little importance was attached by the government, as neither Goulart nor Itamaraty gave "cobertura" (coverage) to the African embassies. Reflecting upon his African experience while still at his post and contemplating resignation, he wrote,

I intend to emphasize that nothing much was done, within the objective of increasing our commercial relations, in spite of innumerable requests for steps which, I recognize, doubtless could not have been taken without greater studies relating to problems of exchange, payments, tariffs, and freight. It is my duty to note that our embassy was never properly equipped to function effectively. . . . I do not intend to

78Interview with Raymundo Souza Dantas, September 14, 1963.
excuse myself for the things which were left undone, even without having the proper equipment on which to rely, but I cannot help alluding to what our action in Ghana could have been, if we had actually been in a position to accomplish all that was planned.79

This evaluation is made all the more poignant by the fact that Accra was the site of the first Brazilian legation in Black Africa, raised to embassy status three months after its installation in January, 1961.80

Although Quadros was sympathetic toward some of Nkrumah’s philosophy and Goulart and his foreign ministers regularly reiterated numerous abstractions about the Third World, of which Ghana was vociferously attempting to establish itself as spokesman, Brazilian-Ghanaian relations never realized their full potential heralded in the more enthusiastic moments of 1961, despite the existence in and around Accra of well-respected communities of descendants of former Brazilian slaves upon which cultural exchanges could have been built. The omissions and failings in Ghana in spite of seemingly propitious circumstances are symptomatic of general Brazilian weaknesses and disadvantages in dealing with Afro-Asia. Clearly not everyone in the Foreign Ministry was in favor of the "opening to Africa," while some regarded it as an extravagant and unproductive prodigality or flirtation with governments rolling headlong toward socialism. As often observable in Brazilian political life, a lack of consensus in an atmosphere of little urgency


80 Since 1948 Brazil has maintained a legation in Pretoria.
translated itself into impressive statements of intention accompanied by inaction. Lacking the necessary cobertura, or personal interest and support of influentials without which little is accomplished in Brazilian administration (and especially anything novel), the Afro-Asian "new look" and whatever imaginative ideas it embraced were parched by meaningless routine and withered on the vine.

In the judgment of military officers responsible for the revolution of March 31, 1964, the independent foreign policy was the repository of many of the ills which justified the ouster of the constitutional government. The pro-Western response to the Cold War condemned the "neutralism" of the "independent" years, while this veiled hostility toward neutralism was generalized to such an extent that it almost precluded cordial political relations with the Third World. Brazilian action in Afro-Asia was ideally considered to be an extension of Western influence and a contribution to the fight against the spread of Communism, rather than an identification of interests or full solidarity.

Foreign Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha, in a speech opening the general debate of the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (December 3, 1964), described the foreign policy of the new government as conforming to certain concentric circles of solidarity, passing, in order, from Latin America to the Western Hemisphere to the Western Community to universalism (including Afro-
Clearly, identification with Afro-Asia was the most remote and tenuous, passing through three intervening "lines of solidarity" and specified in fourth place. Significantly, Leitão da Cunha began by quoting two excerpts of an important foreign policy address given by Castello Branco at Itamaraty on July 31, 1964, in which the Brazilian president explained his conceptions of interdependence and the general national interest by stating, "The interest of Brazil coincides in many cases, in concentric circles, with that of Latin America, the American continent, and the Western Community." In this original definitive statement, Afro-Asia's place was not specified and was inserted only later under the heading "universalism" in the UN speech, at which delegates from Afro-Asia were present. Castello Branco's passing mention of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia in the previous major speech stressed trade relations and also "fraternal cooperation and full understanding between Brazil and the peoples who recently came into liberty and are ready to maintain it" (emphasis added), thereby underlining the subtle prerequisite that these nations be on guard against the extension of Communist imperialism in their regions.  


82Ibid., pp. 13-14.
In accordance with this philosophy, the revolutionary government gave full moral support to the American position in Southeast Asia and returned to the pre-1961 full defense of Nationalist China rather than supporting discussion of the admission of Peking into the UN as Goulart had done. As a consequence of these anti-Communist decisions, Brazil cut off relations with Cambodia, which had been initiated at the level of legation through Brazil's embassy in New Delhi on May 9, 1961, and later carried on through the embassy in Bangkok. Although this legation had never actually been fully installed, it was abolished by Decree No. 58,633 on June 15, 1966, with Itamaraty alleging lack of reciprocity on the part of Cambodia and citing the accusation that Cambodia was permitting the use of its territory as an infiltration route for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units entering neighboring states. In June, 1964, the government of South Vietnam requested Brazilian aid through the latter's embassy in Bangkok. In response the Brazilian government donated five tons of medical and pharmaceutical supplies which were delivered in September, 1966, with the promise of additional aid, including five thousand sacks of coffee, as "a demonstration of the complete sympathy and moral support of the Brazilian government for the Vietnamese government, in view of the armed

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83 Information gathered at the Foreign Ministry's Divisão da Ásia. In spite of this decree, Phnom Penh was not taken from the official diplomatic list, Lista do Pessoal no Exterior.
aggression which that country has been suffering at the hands of Communist regimes which threaten the peace and the security of the Free World.”

Later that year the Brazilian mission to Saigon was given a permanent headquarters in that capital under a charge d’affairs; it had previously operated out of the Brazilian embassy in Thailand. At the same time the Vietnamese ambassador in Washington was furnished with appropriate credentials to represent Saigon in Brazil.

The impact of security preoccupations and the military viewpoint on the African policy at this time was demonstrated verbally in a definition of the political goal of Brazil in that continent, given by the Assistant to the Secretary-General for Eastern European, Asian, and Oceanic Affairs of Itamaraty in a speech at the Superior War College in 1966.

Attain a solid position among the independent African countries, then use the prestige obtained in order to broadcast in those nations the political and economic principles governing our country—that is, the principles of the Western world—offering in this way a solid contribution to the fight against totalitarian Marxist ideologies in Africa.

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84 Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Relatório, 1966 (Rio de Janeiro: Seção de Publicações da Divisão de Documentação do MRE, 1968), p. 84. The plane which made this delivery was at the same time the first Brazilian Air Force plane to circumnavigate the globe on that route, so the mission represented both an anti-Communist endeavor and a prestige factor for the Air Force.

85 Sérgio M. Corrêa do Lago, p. 13. For similar official positions concerning Asia, see: Isócrates de Oliveira, O Brasil e a Ásia--Interesses e Relações (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1965).
Even if faint echoes of the bridge metaphor could be heard, it was also being made unmistakably explicit that this time Brazil stood well on the Western side of the hypothetical bridge, interpreting Western sentiments to Africa rather than vice versa.

Political and cultural differences aside, there remained possible a degree of economic cooperation with extra-hemispheric developing nations, just as the military government had continued and even broadened trade with Eastern Europe. The mere fact, however, that Brazil and Afro-Asia face common problems of development did not imply identical or even largely congruent interests, and certainly not to the extent that Brazil could aspire to leadership of an Afro-Asian-Latin American alliance which would take on characteristics of an international class struggle. In the peculiar definition of the revolutionary government, Brazil, with its centers of industrialization, is not an underdeveloped country, in spite of its low national income per capita and its high illiteracy rate. Castello Branco argued, "More accurate, therefore, than to classify Brazil as an underdeveloped country would be to consider it as a nation still having regional pockets of underdevelopment. Optimistic as this questionable assessment may be, those who share it would be inclined to view the nations of the

Third World primarily as commercial clients rather than as political partners in promoting major changes in the economic relations between developed and developing states. This was in fact the official point of view of foreign policy decision-makers under Castello Branco.

Although at first apparent omission and neglect seemed to overcome any hope for dynamism in the Afro-Asian policy and spread suspicions of a tacit quarantine of Brazil from the Third World, favorable signs to the contrary soon became noticeable in the Foreign Ministry if not on the part of the President of the Republic and his military advisers. On the occasion of the official visit to Brazil of President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, in September of 1964, cultural and commercial accords were signed and Brazilian-Senegalese relations strengthened on the basis of common bonds, both Negro and Latin. Through the cultural agreement, professors, scholarship holders, musicians and artists, and athletic teams have been exchanged. For the First Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar, in April, 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Relations prepared a special publication highlighting the African contribution to Brazilian culture. Brazil participated in the Festival with exhibitions and judges. Brazil has maintained close relations with Senegal since the establishment of a consulate in Dakar in 1920 (Brazil's first in Black Africa in this century), by virtue of its position as a stopover point on sea, and later air, routes to Europe. Conversely, Senegal's only diplomatic representation in Latin America is seated in Rio de Janeiro.
Although a trade mission of representatives from various governmental organizations visited Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon, and India in 1963, only during the Castello Branco administration did Brazil seem to consider seriously the feasibility of expanding its exports to Afro-Asia. In June, 1966, the National Confederation of Commerce and the National Association of Exporters of Industrial Products sent a private enterprise mission to the Middle East with the inaugural flight of VARIG airlines to Beirut. Later that year a return visit was paid to Brazil by commercial representatives from the UAR, Lebanon, and Kuwait. The only two trade promotion missions Brazil sent to Mid-Africa were those of 1965 and 1966. The first (lasting six weeks) passed through Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Ivory Coast, while the second included South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast in its itinerary. Both groups were sponsored principally by the Foreign Ministry, the Bank of Brazil, and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the first one being made up as well by numerous representatives from private enterprise and led by the Assistant to the Secretary General for Economic Affairs of Itamaraty. Common objectives were the exploratory study of increased commercial exchange between Brazil and Africa, discussion of possible governmental measures to facilitate it, and the establishment of contacts between Brazilian and African import-export firms. The 1965 venture was the first Brazilian trade mission of mixed composition to do simultaneous market research
and promotion abroad and carried with it specimen commercial treaties prepared by Itamaraty to be presented to Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Cameroon for negotiation. The second, smaller mission, accompanied by the head of the Foreign Ministry's African Division, was of a more political nature, to examine potential effects on relations with Black Africa of greater trade with Portuguese Africa and the Republic of South Africa, as well as to study controversial political conditions in southern Africa.

Another important political tour was undertaken in January, 1966, by the Secretary-General for Eastern European and Asian Affairs and the Chief of the Division of Asia and Oceania to all Brazilian diplomatic missions in Asia, with the exclusion of Canberra, to gather data and opinions to frame an Asian policy to protect Brazilian interests as affected by the Vietnamese war. One result of this study was the aforementioned creation of a Brazilian embassy in Saigon, administratively subordinate to the embassy in Bangkok.

With the inauguration of the Costa e Silva government in March, 1967, signs of renewed interest in Afro-Asia multiplied apace. New diplomatic and consular posts were created, with the intent of completing representation throughout Africa, dating back to an honorary consulate installed in Abidjan in June, 1966, and another in Monrovia in September, 1967. In late 1967, embassies were placed in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, the first in East Africa and apparently motivated by the desire to monitor
more closely the activities of the Organization of African Unity and the UN's Economic Commission for Africa, sound out opportunities for new markets, and establish constant contact with the principal coffee-exporting states of Africa. At the same time the Divisions of Africa and the Middle East at the Foreign Ministry were separated from the Western European Bureau and taken to form a Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs (Secretaria Geral Adjunta para a África e Oriente Médio). In October, 1968, the President of the governmental Brazilian Coffee Institute headed a mission to Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to convince East African producers and officials that expansion of world consumption and unity of producers constituted the most effective attack on the problem of overproduction of coffee. Other indications of attention to Africa during 1968 included an official visit of the Secretary-General of Senegal's Foreign Ministry, an exposition of Ghanaian art ("Aspects of the Culture of Ghana") which toured major cities, the arrival of a high-level economic mission from Ghana for a two-week program, negotiations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) to initiate diplomatic relations at ambassadorial levels, and the establishment of relations with the Sudan at an ambassadorial level via the embassy in Cairo.

Transactions with the Middle East gained tempo on the commercial plane with the arrival in 1968 of trade missions from Morocco and Algeria. The visit of Habib Bourguiba, Foreign Minister of Tunisia,
resulted in the signature of a cultural treaty and an agreement waiving the necessity for visas on diplomatic and special passports, as a preliminary step to the exchange of technicians and scientists, professors, artists, and athletes. A planned visit of the President of Lebanon was postponed, but Magalhães Pinto scheduled for January, 1969, an official trip to that country, which had received a visit in 1966 from Costa e Silva in his capacity as Minister of War.

Asia was an area of high priority in the "Diplomacy of Prosperity," as evinced by Magalhães Pinto's visits to India, Pakistan, and Japan after attending the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi in February, 1968, signing a cultural treaty with Pakistan and a commercial accord with India as well as inaugurating the first meeting of the Brazilian-Japanese Mixed Economic Commission which was created in the previous year to oversee the expansion of trade and Japanese investment in Brazil. After election as president, Costa e Silva had also taken a trip through the region to set in operation his new Asian policy by acquiring observations in loco and making personal acquaintances with government officials in several countries. Trade missions from Pakistan, South Korea, and Japan, together with visits from Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of Thailand, the Minister of Justice of Ceylon, and the Vice-President of the Philippines indicated an unprecedented degree of attention turned toward Asia, complemented by cultural treaties with Thailand and India and plans to locate a
Brazilian embassy in Manila and a South Vietnamese embassy in Rio de Janeiro to allow more direct contact with those states.

If the 1961 to 1964 Afro-Asian policy was based on sentimental-cultural ties and ideological-political objectives, and the 1964 to 1965 biennium was characterized in the main by ostensible indifference or omission, the policy from 1966 to the present has a pragmatic, medium and long-range set of objectives as part of Brazil's drive to win new markets and increase the value of industrial exports, without losing sight of limitations on its interests and capabilities in Afro-Asia. Another facet of this new phase is the promotion of unity among developing nations in negotiating for concessions regarding terms of international trade and aid for development. Although this recent approach to Afro-Asia has no ideological or Third World overtones, its aggressivity promises greater and more intense relations than achieved during the Goulart years when abundant verbiage about the so-called "política afro-asíatica" produced rather little in bilateral relations and international organizations. It appears that Brazil has now accepted the desirability of more vigorous diplomacy in Afro-Asia, moving in the direction of an informed policy suitable to each case rather than predicated on either pre-conceived ideological abstractions or reflex actions traceable to policies pursued toward traditional allies.
CHAPTER IV

DIMENSIONS OF BRAZILIAN RELATIONS WITH AFRO-ASIA

Recent efforts to concretize the notion of an international system have yielded increasingly sophisticated attempts to manipulate statistical data concerning the relations of nations in order to arrive at quantitative measures which can be employed to define either the characteristics of the international system or bilateral relations between a given pair of states, searching for regularities in what may otherwise be observed only as a bewildering perplexity of nearly simultaneous transactions of varying intensity.¹ The most comprehensive undertaking in this respect is the Dimensionality of Nations project (DON), concerned since its inception in 1952 with both cross-national classification of all nations on the basis of 236 internal variables and the definition of the dimensions of interaction between and among nations, each for specified periods of time.² When the massive data collection

¹See the statistical pattern-searching technique described and employed by Steven J. Brams in his "Flow and Form in the International System" (Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966) and "Transaction Flows in the International System," American Political Science Review, LX, No. 4 (December, 1966), 880-898.

²For background information on DON, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Dimensionality of Nations Project," in Comparing Nations, ed. by
on these two phases of the project is complete, correlations between
national attributes and international behavior will be run to discover
any statistically significant relationships.

A major contribution of DOM has been to identify and specify
some measures for the major dimensions of the dyadic behavior of
nations; i.e., the behavior exhibited by two states as one acts in
relationship to another, as the dyad (Brazil→India). According to a
summary of preliminary DON findings,

The behavior of a nation towards another varies along eight
major dimensions:
salience--low to high salience involving treaties,
translations of its literature, tourists, non-
intergovernmental international organizations,
etc.
emigration and communication--low to high
UN voting--none to high similarity in UN voting
exports--none to relatively many
foreign students--none to relatively many
international organizations--few to many co-memberships
official conflict behavior--none to much
diplomatic representation--none to relative high representa-
tion.\(^3\)

Despite the scarcity of statistics on such transactions in
Brazil, the application of some of these indicators to the analysis of
Brazilian-Afro-Asian transaction flows from 1956 to 1968 can yield
additional information pertinent to full examination of the development

Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan (New Haven: Yale University Press,

\(^3\)Rudolph J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations
of relations. Available data lends itself to the measurement of four dimensions of Brazil's transactions with Afro-Asia: diplomatic representation, salience, emigration and communications, and exports. 4

By measuring the relations along these dimensions it will be possible to ascertain the relative position of Afro-Asia in the context of Brazil's range of foreign relations at a given time, as well as to determine patterns and regularities or change through time as congruent with or independent of change of government. Thus we will have a rough measure of what could be termed Brazil's "level of attention" to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia as indicated by variables shown to be most significant in describing dyadic relationships. 5

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4 No official figures exist concerning foreign students in Brazil, while ascertaining the percentage of Brazilian students abroad which is in Afro-Asia would be a monumental task. Official conflict behavior toward Afro-Asia, as measured by either violence or negative communications, is negligible. Intergovernmental organization co-memberships, on which data are readily available, have been omitted because each nation places differing emphasis on each membership it possesses according to the value it ascribes to that particular organization; i.e., not all nations in an organization are equally active and influential. Additionally, such shared membership figures would represent only channels for potential interaction rather than accurate indicators of an actual level of communications and influence exchange, although it is known that organizational ties "provide most nations with far greater access to the outside world than do diplomatic ties," as shown by Alger and Brams in "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," World Politics, XIX, No. 4 (July, 1967), 652. An extensive comparison of UN voting records will not be given here, but international issues central to Brazilian Afro-Asian relations will be analyzed in chapters V and VI with reference to positions held in UN debates and voting.

5 A similar quantitative method is used to augment and interpret conventional historical data in Bruce M. Russett, Community and
Rather than setting up a dyadic-type matrix of relationships between Brazil and all Afro-Asian countries, given the relatively low level of relations between Brazil and many of these states, a variant regional approach will be employed. Seven world regions have been delineated, largely on a geographical basis and perhaps somewhat arbitrarily: the United States (USA), other Western Hemisphere (OWH), Western Europe (WE), Eastern Europe (EE), sub-Saharan Africa (Africa), Asia and Oceania (Asia), and the Middle East and North Africa (ME). After presenting and analyzing the data on a regional level, to place Afro-Asia in the context of the totality of Brazil's transactions on a particular indicator, the Afro-Asian nations scoring highest on that measure will be isolated and significant patterns of the relationships explored. In the final portion of this chapter, Brazil's relations with some of these most salient states will be investigated.

**Diplomatic and Consular Representation**

If it is conceptualized that the diplomatic corps and staff of a state represents, in normal daily activity, the principal channels or

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6The inclusion of the United States as a "region" is justified primarily because it bulks so disproportionately large in these measures and certainly should not be grouped with Latin America. The inclusion of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel in their respective geographic zones may be criticized from cultural, political, or economic points of view, but this classification follows the administrative division of labor within the Foreign Ministry.
units which the nation has at its disposal to communicate politically with the outside world, and if it is further recognized that for most nations the size of diplomatic corps is restricted by economic or other considerations, it follows that each nation will tend to deploy its diplomats most heavily to capitals of highest priority in its foreign relations (i.e., those with the greatest workload) and then to capitals of lesser importance to its purposes, in descending order of priority. By comparing the diplomatic staff allocations which state A makes to state B or to a region with the total number of diplomats allocated worldwide, one measure of the relative political importance attributed by state A to state B or the region in question is obtained.

Examination of the pattern of representation by region over time, shown in Table 4, page 160, reveals the gradualness with which changes in emphasis have come during the twelve-year period, with marked stability of relative position most fixed from 1956 to 1958 and even into 1959. The most noticeable gross trends have been a decline in the percentage of the personnel in the United States and Western Europe, with Latin America holding steady and an increase in the percentage stationed in Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia, a consequence of diversification of relations begun in 1959. All increases and decreases, however, are fluctuating rather than linear. Regarding the actual effects of the independent foreign policy on representation in Afro-Asia, although new embassies and legations were created and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>39.6</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<td>31.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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Sources: Compiled from the following mimeographed series lists of the Foreign Ministry: *Lista do Pessoal* (1956-1961) and *Lista do Pessoal no Exterior* (1962-1968). Figures for each year are taken as close to mid-year as possible, given the intermittent publication of the Listas, and include personnel employed as non-professional assistants as well as Brazilian diplomats. Consular personnel are excluded, as are honorary and in absentia representatives.
personnel sent, the percentage of individuals allocated to Asia in reality declined steadily between 1960 and 1964, while the Middle East showed a slight relative gain of 2.0 percent and Africa increased only 1.8 percent in relative position, a modest amount considering the very few diplomats (3) in that region in 1960. For these three regions in 1956, we find a total allocation of 12.3 percent of all personnel in embassies and legations abroad; the corresponding figure for 1964 is only 13.9 percent, not a very impressive relative increase in bilateral diplomatic relations when juxtaposed with the enthusiastic statements of intention about Afro-Asia issuing from certain official sources during the 1961 to 1964 span. In the general expansion of Brazilian diplomatic representation from 1959 to 1964, it is not stretching the point too far to assert that Afro-Asian capitals were little more than able to hold their relative positions as a group or as three separate regions, despite the fact that more personnel were deployed there as new posts were opened.

The situation after the revolution of 1964 now appears in a slightly different perspective. Curiously, contrary to governmental statements idealizing the Western World and in spite of a slight decrease in personnel abroad, the figures for 1965 and 1966, when compared with those for 1964 or even 1963, demonstrate small but definite general decreases in the proportion stationed in the United States and Western Europe and general increases in Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia. Under
the revolutionary government, the percentages allocated to the United States and Western Europe in 1966 reached the lowest points from 1956 to 1966, while those to Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia attained figures higher than or nearly as high as those observed at any other time during the same decade. The years of 1967 and 1968 illustrate the political results of the diplomacy of prosperity—again with slow declines evident in the USA and Western Europe, and slight gains for the other five regions. By 1968, diplomatic personnel in Afro-Asia had come to constitute 19.3 percent of all those abroad, almost reaching one-fifth and embodying a considerable increase from the 13.9 percent figure of 1964. The allocated percentage for Afro-Asia grew much more rapidly between 1964 and 1968 than during the política externa independente, and to all indications this percentage can be expected to continue rising at a moderate rate.

Within Afro-Asia, rather high concentrations of personnel in prominent capitals has been the rule, with lesser states receiving meager or token (cumulative) representation. In August, 1968, for example, the embassy in Tokyo employed one-quarter of all Brazilian diplomatic personnel in Asia, while Bangkok accounted for one-eighth and Taipei, New Delhi, and Seoul each constituted about one-tenth of the total. In the Middle East, representation is somewhat more dispersed and even, with Beirut leading with 17 percent, followed by Cairo (16%), Tel-Aviv (13%), Damascus (12%), and Ankara (10%). In both regions,
five embassies employ over two-thirds of the Brazilian diplomatic personnel in the region. A diplomatic representation of only 30 (with assistants) was found in sub-Saharan Africa, a decided increase over previous years but still less than the staff maintained as such well-established embassies as London (45), Montevideo (42), Paris (38), Buenos Aires (38), Bonn (31), and only one more than the staff in Lisbon. The African embassies and the Pretoria legation each have five or six on the staff, except Addis Ababa with three.\(^7\) Because of this paucity of representation (only 11 diplomats, if assistants are excluded), many of Brazil's important political contacts with Africa have been effected through the United Nations. Although the world organization will continue to be the site of much communication of this nature, Costa e Silva's diplomatic expansion program was designed to allow more direct, bilateral ties with a greater part of the Afro-Asian bloc.

Consular posts are established in a country as the volume of transactions increases and justifies the addition of specialized non-diplomatic staff. As the level of transactions between Brazil and Afro-Asia is a rather small fraction of Brazil's world-wide transactions, few consulates have been established in these areas and diplomatic intercourse has been the predominant form of relations, with the exceptions

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\(^7\) All figures in this paragraph were taken from the Foreign Ministry's *Lista do Pessoal no Exterior* of August, 1968.
of several states which support trade flows with Brazil. Examination of the consular network through time (Table 5, page 165) reveals generally lower proportions of personnel in Afro-Asia than the diplomatic chart (with some exceptions in Africa), partly because in countries of little consular traffic, consular functions are taken over by the embassy. This, for example, is the cause for the Middle East's low percentage in 1967 and 1968.

By consolidating the diplomatic and consular data (Table 6, page 166), a more complete measure is obtained of the percentage enjoyed by Afro-Asia of the Foreign Ministry's personnel resources allocated abroad, 1956-1968, thus also circumventing to some degree the problem of consolidation of diplomatic and consular functions. This combined set of statistics shows that, as gauged by the Foreign Ministry's choices of deployment of personnel under its control, Brazil's channels of communication to Afro-Asia were wider in 1967 and 1968 than at any other time during the period under study. Between 1966 and 1968, the number of representatives present in Afro-Asia increased 32.4 percent, while the much-vaunted opening to Afro-Asia yielded an increase of only 17.3 percent between 1960 and 1962, with only 19 more individuals present in Afro-Asia in 1962 as compared to 1960. These findings, however, unfortunately do not allow further inferences about either the volume or the content of political transactions flowing through the institutional provisions which were enlarged
TABLE 5

Distribution of Brazilian Consular Personnel in Consulates and Consulates-General Abroad, by Region, 1956-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from the following mineographed series lists of the Foreign Ministry: Lista do Pessoal (1956-1961) and Lista do Pessoal no Exterior (1962-1968). Figures for each year are taken as close to mid-year as possible, given the intermittent publication of the Listas, and include non-professional support personnel employed as well as Brazilian consular officials. Diplomatic personnel are excluded.
TABLE 6
Brazilian Diplomatic and Consular Personnel Allocated to
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, 1956-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Percentage of all Personnel Abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from the following mimeographed series of the Foreign Ministry: *Lista do Pessoal* (1956-1961) and *Lista do Pessoal no Exterior*, in the same manner as Tables 4 and 5.
after 1966. It is interesting nonetheless that in August, 1968, 45.1 percent of Brazil's representation in Afro-Asia was located in Asia and Oceania, 35.5 percent in the Middle East, and 19.4 percent in Africa. In the same month, 30.8 percent of the Asian personnel were found in Japan, and 44.5 percent of those in sub-Saharan Africa were in either South Africa or Portuguese Africa, the latter a fact which has been noted by Africans engaged in eliminating colonialism and racial discrimination from the continent and suspicious of Brazil's defense of Portugal and its "wait and see" attitude toward South Africa. If all personnel in South Africa, Portuguese Africa, Israel, Japan, and Australia are subtracted from the statistics for geographically-defined Afro-Asia, the percentage of all personnel worldwide which was present in 1968 in what may be called the "Third World" or developing Afro-Asia by United Nations definitions was a mere 10.6 percent, scattered among 22 embassies, 10 cumulative embassies and legations, 1 consulate-general, and 2 consulates (not including some honorary consulates), the latter two existing in name only and without staff.

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8 Incidentally, the total of Brazilian diplomatic and consular personnel in Portugal is 2.3 times that of all in Black Africa, excluding South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, a fact which indicates the much greater saliency of Portugal and is quite significant in the consideration of Brazilian policy toward questions affecting Portuguese Africa.

Some conception of the other side of the relationship can be gained from the nature of Afro-Asian representation in Brazil. In mid-1968, Afro-Asian states counted 140 diplomatic and consular representatives in Brazil, including 12 honorary consuls. Of this number, 59.2 percent were accredited from Asia, 28.6 percent from the Middle East, and 12.2 percent from Africa. Japan had the most numerous representation, making up 29.3 percent of all Afro-Asian representatives and 49.5 percent of those from Asia, with an important consular network extending throughout Brazil. The typical Afro-Asian state (Japan excepted) having representation in Brazil supported an embassy in Rio de Janeiro with a staff of four diplomatic or consular personnel, headed by an ambassador also accredited to other South American states. Thus for smaller Afro-Asian states, the embassy in Rio de Janeiro serves as a "listening post" for Latin America, and in several cases the first embassy established by that nation on Latin American soil.

Five states (Lebanon, Syria, Israel, South Africa, and Nationalist China) make use of honorary consulates to extend their representation. Only one state, South Africa, maintains relations at the level of legation, while in turn Pretoria is the site of Brazil's only legation in Afro-Asia. Embassies with larger than average diplomatic staffs (five or more) are those of Nigeria, the UAR, Japan, Nationalist China, South Korea, the Philippines, and India. Again, compared with the total number of diplomatic officials received by Brazil in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília,
diplomatic officials from the developing areas of Afro-Asia number only 58, merely 8.8 percent of the total and fewer than those representing the United States in those two cities, although these Afro-Asian missions compose 27 percent of all foreign missions physically present.

Salience

Transactions which the DON project has identified as indicators on the salience dimension include official decorations, treaties, and tourist travel, all measuring the degree of prominence of one country in the relations of another. Brazil, like many nations of Latin culture, has made extensive use of the awarding of medals to distinguished foreign citizens as a means of generating diffuse good will and recognizing contributions to international understanding made by the individual upon whom the honor is conferred, with the ulterior motive of strengthening relations between Brazil and the country of the recipient. An analysis of patterns emerging from this conscious, intentional bestowing of awards, with attention to geographical areas favored, will show to what extent awards have been employed as foreign policy instruments in Afro-Asia as compared with the other four regions.

The National Order of the Southern Cross, with various degrees or ranks, is Brazil's highest decoration with which a foreigner may be

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honored. Between January 1, 1956, and December 31, 1967, approximately 2600 of these awards were bestowed, as indicated by Table 7, page 171. The majority of these were received by citizens of other Latin nations, either in the Western Hemisphere or Western Europe, with West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States also figuring high. In the twelve years shown, Afro-Asia ranked low in its percentage of all awards granted, with a total of 10.4 percent. The seven highest-ranking Afro-Asian states combined accepted 74.2 percent of that figure—Japan (35%), Lebanon (9%), Iran (7.4%), Israel (6%), UAR (5.5%), Indonesia (5.6%), Ethiopia (5.6%). Remaining states whose citizens have received the Cruzeiro do Sul are Syria, Morocco, Turkey, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and India. Most of these conferrals were made to government officials, often as a result of official visits. Half of all the awards granted to Africans were given in 1961 and 1962, presumably as part of the "opening to Africa" program. Similarly, the high number of medals given in Asia in 1967 (36, or 25% of all awards received by Asians, 1956-1967) could be a consequence of Itamaraty's new interest in that continent, an effort to improve Brazil's image across official channels.

Although treaties are essentially institutionalized agreements through which a greater or lesser flow of transactions may be achieved or to which much or little attention may be paid, the recognition that they do serve as formal channels for strengthening relations leads to
TABLE 7

Conferrals of the Ordem Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul, by Region, 1956-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conferrals</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Ceremonial, "Lista dos Agraciados com a Ordem Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul, Atualizado até Dezembro de 1967," Rio de Janeiro, 1968. (Mimeographed.) The compilation includes only those surviving, to the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry, on December 31, 1967. An advance in rank (second award to same individual) is regarded as a separate award in this table.
the conclusion that the signing of an agreement with a specific foreign country represents a deliberate decision to broaden or consolidate formal ties with that country within the field of activity specified by the document. Since this element of independent choice is present, despite differences in economic and political import between a treaty with, for example, Senegal and one with a major power, bilateral treaties serve as one indicator of saliency. Any nation which does not conclude agreements without purpose will seek to associate itself by treaty with other nations where its interests appear to lie. Apart from problems introduced by differences in volume of transaction flows in trade, aid, etc., measured elsewhere in this chapter, the more treaties state A has with state B, the more salient B is to A.

As made evident by Table 8, page 173, only 9.1 percent of all bilateral agreements to which Brazil is a signatory, concluded since January 1, 1950, and in effect on June 1, 1968, were signed with Afro-Asian states. If we deduct the 10 treaties with Japan and the 7 with Israel from the totals for Asia and the Middle East, respectively, only 12 treaties or 3.8 percent of all concluded remain as the total for developing Afro-Asia.\footnote{Ten agreements now in effect were concluded before 1950, with Afghanistan, Nationalist China, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, and Japan. The year 1950 was chosen as a cut-off date because it coincided roughly with the granting of independence to colonial peoples which began following World War II. Had the calculation been based upon the totality of Brazil's agreements now in effect (some dating from the early days of the First Republic), Afro-Asia's share would have been considerably reduced.} This low incidence attests to the lack of
TABLE 8

Bilateral Agreements Concluded by Brazil Since January 1, 1950, and in Effect on June 1, 1968: Distribution by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Agreements</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The official treaty list, Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Divisão de Atos Internacionais, "Relação dos Acôrmos em Vigor, Por Países," Rio de Janeiro, 1968. (Mimeographed.) Included in the compilation are tratados, acôrmos, protocolos, convenções, convênios, ajustes, notas reversais, and troca de notas.
substantial volume in Brazilian dealings with developing Afro-Asia, reflecting as it does the existence of insufficient intercourse to require regulation by mutual consent.

Most of the agreements extant are commercial and cultural, with Cameroon, Senegal, the UAR, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Nationalist China, and Korea. Until the present date, cultural agreements were those most commonly completed with Afro-Asian nations, but more tangible commercial agreements are now ultimately sought by the Foreign Ministry to further trade relations. Between 1941 and the end of 1965, Brazil signed 34 cultural accords, of which 7 were with Afro-Asian states, a share of over one-fifth, which is considerably greater than the 9.1 percent participation of Afro-Asia in agreements of all sorts from 1950 to 1968. A significant number of treaties with Afro-Asian states were either pending ratification, signed, or projected during 1968, including cultural agreements with Liberia, Ghana, Tunisia, India, and Pakistan (in addition to the other seven mentioned above), a commercial agreement with India, a technical cooperation accord with Australia, and a multiple entry visa arrangement with South Korea, all with the objective of providing a ready institutional support for the greater activity in those areas which is anticipated with the growth of Brazilian representation there.

Although determined primarily by factors other than the state of political relations between governments (given at least a satisfactory state of amicability), the number of tourists from state A which visit state B has been demonstrated by DON to be the most reliable indicator of the salience of B to A. Statistics on the number of Brazilian tourists visiting foreign nations have not yet been collected, but a provisional survey has been taken by the Brazilian Travel Company (a government-sponsored autonomous agency) of the number and nationalities of foreign tourists entering Brazil at border check points from 1962 to 1966. These inquiries, shown in Table 9, page 176, include all foreigners entering on a "tourist" visa, which would exclude diplomatic personnel, businessmen, official delegations, and students. As would be expected, nearly all of the tourist flow originates from the United States, Western Europe, and Latin America, the first two being developed regions which contribute disproportionately to world tourist traffic, and the latter ranking high because of its geographical proximity. Afro-Asia is the origin of only 2.0 percent to 4.3 percent of all foreign tourists, not surprisingly, because the relatively few travelers from those continents would most probably frequent the metropolitan centers. Thus the maximum inflow of tourists from each of these areas to Brazil is also quite small in absolute terms; in 1966, when Afro-Asian tourists reached a high of 4.4 percent, the following numbers were registered: Africa--399, Asia--2,838, and Middle East--2,665. All of Afro-Asia taken together
TABLE 9

Foreign Tourists Entering Brazil, by Region of Nationality, 1962-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Tourists</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>98,371</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>104,809</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>125,118</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>102,919</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>133,336</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Empresa Brasileira de Turismo, "Dados Estatísticos," Rio de Janeiro, April, 1968. (Mimeographed.) According to an EBT estimate, the statistics account for at least 95 percent of the actual total of foreign tourists entering Brazil by air, sea, or land.
averaged approximately 3,100 tourists annually for the period, which is one-tenth the number which arrived from the United States in 1966.

Besides making clear the low salience which Brazil has for Afro-Asian countries, the statistics show a high degree of concentration of national origin among African and Asian tourists, with the Middle Eastern travelers slightly more evenly distributed. From 1962 to 1966, between 97.6 percent and 100 percent of the African visitors came from the Republic of South Africa. The national distributions for Asia and the Mideast are given in Table 10, page 178.

Japan supplies an average of nearly two-thirds of all Asian tourists, which is in keeping with size and importance of the Japanese colony in and around São Paulo, as well as the level of income in Japan, allowing more Japanese citizens the opportunity to travel abroad than encountered in most Asian nations. Australia and Japan combined have consistently furnished between 70 percent and 80 percent of all Asian tourists visiting Brazil, or 77.5 percent of the five-year Asian total. The volume of tourists for other Asian countries in the entire period is quite reduced; Nationalist China (580), the Philippines (358), and India (272) are the only ones with totals over one hundred. Similarly, Israel and Lebanon stand out distinctly as the Near Eastern states which contribute most heavily, together averaging 70 percent yearly. Nevertheless, other states with over one hundred tourists for the period are more numerous than in Asia: Iran (536), Jordan (495), Turkey (436), Syria (369), Saudi Arabia (261), and the UAR (138).
### TABLE 10

National Origin of Asian and Middle Eastern Tourists Entering Brazil, 1962-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Yearly Percentage of Regional Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist China</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 9.
Emigration and Communications

The most accurate indicator for the communications dimension is emigrants A→B/A's population, but complete statistics on emigration from Brazil to Afro-Asia are practically unobtainable and, if located, would surely be so diminutive as to be devoid of significance. On the other hand, Afro-Asians have immigrated into Brazil in the 13 years under study. According to official immigration data, of the total immigration of 276,874 which occurred between 1956 and 1961, 20.2 percent came from Afro-Asia. Of this latter group of a little over 56,000, 70 percent was made up of Japanese, 9.8 percent of Lebanese, 5.8 percent of Israelis, and 4.9 percent of Chinese. The remaining 9.5 percent was scattered among 23 nations, with most coming from the Middle East (the UAR, Syria, Iran, Morocco, and Turkey). The African nation with the most immigrants in the above period was the Republic of South Africa with 111; only 11 other immigrants from Black Africa were registered, with the nationalities of the Sudan and Ethiopia.13

Clearly, the most highly ranked nations on the communications dimension, using the immigration indicator, are Japan, Lebanon, and Israel. The Japanese community has already been described, but it is necessary as well to note that the sizable numbers of immigrants from

the Middle East have formed important organized Jewish and Arab communities in large Brazilian cities. In all three cases there appears to be a significant positive relationship between immigration on one hand and intensified general relations on the other, including salience, diplomatic relations, and exports. Combined, Japan, Israel, and Lebanon accounted for 85.6 percent of all Afro-Asian immigrants, 1956 to 1961, 61.7 percent of all Afro-Asian tourists received, 1962 to 1966, and 50 percent of all Cruzeiro do Sul awards to Afro-Asian citizens from 1956 to 1967, and, as seen below, a high percentage of the total communications flow to Afro-Asia.

A second emigration and communications indicator is efficacious in further measuring the extent and nature of communication between Brazil and Afro-Asia, statistics on international telephone and telegraph traffic. The telephone statistics, presented in Table 11, page 181, represent the international traffic handled by all International Telephone and Telegraph, S. A. agencies throughout Brazil, but since they include

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14Since 1961, the Japanese influx has dwindled considerably, but Brazil still keeps an Immigrant Selection Service for the Far East in its Tokyo embassy and in the consulate-general in Kobe, the only such agencies it has in Afro-Asia.

15Mail A→B/A's mail to all foreign nations is also used as a DON communications measure, but in Brazil no records are kept of the destination of outgoing mail, nor does Brazil submit to the Universal Postal Union any data which would be adaptable to this measure. Such persistent difficulties limit the application of the DON approach to studies of transactions between developing nations, where interest in producing such statistics (either accurately or at all) is minimal.
TABLE 11

Regional Distribution of International Telephone Traffic to and from Brazil, January, 1966--June, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Calls</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>38,978</td>
<td>55.45</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>45,674</td>
<td>51.74</td>
<td>27.57</td>
<td>18.91</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>26,426</td>
<td>49.68</td>
<td>25.77</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Calls</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>45,679</td>
<td>58.30</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>49,682</td>
<td>57.13</td>
<td>26.07</td>
<td>15.59</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>28,264</td>
<td>54.94</td>
<td>27.20</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics obtained at the Rio de Janeiro office of ITT Comunicações Mundiais, S. A., representing 93 percent of all Brazilian international telephone calls.

a January-June.
only 93 percent of all Brazilian international calls, they can suggest only ratio relationships rather than correct absolute totals of all message units actually sent and received by Brazil from January, 1966, to June, 1968.\(^\text{16}\) Afro-Asian participation in these communications figures is by far the lowest encountered on any of the measures; reaching a peak of only 1.66 percent in 1967 on calls sent and a peak of 1.12 percent in the first six months of 1968 on calls received. Further, the familiar pattern of predominance exercised by several countries reappears. In 1966, Lebanon received 59.2 percent of all calls to the Mideast and sent 46.8 percent of all Mideast calls to Brazil, while the corresponding figures for Israel are 36.3 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively. The traffic for 1967 shows similar patterns, and for both years these two nations combined averaged about 95 percent of the traffic from Brazil to the Mideast and 82 percent of the traffic in the opposite direction. In Asia for both years Japan accounted for 78 percent of the Asian-bound calls from Brazil and 93 percent of all Asian calls to Brazil, rivaled only by Hong Kong (9.9% and 4.3%) and Australia (6.5% and 0.5%), all three totaling an aggregate of 94.4 percent.

\(^{16}\) The worldwide telecommunications network of ITT makes its records suitable for such analysis. However, ITT does enjoy exclusive rights to traffic from Brazil to the United States, so the USA-bound figures are representative of the true total but indicate a higher percentage of all calls than those actually sent to the United States, given the missing 7 percent scattered in some manner among the six other regions.
of all Asian calls from Brazil and 97.4 percent of all to Brazil. Calls
to and from Africa had more scattered destinations and origins but were
too few to analyze meaningfully.

Available telegraph statistics, also from all ITT agencies in
Brazil, are less comprehensive, composing only 38.5 percent of all
Brazilian international telegraph traffic inflow and outflow. Nonethe-
less, because the ITT agencies handling international traffic are dis-
persed in principal Brazilian cities, these figures may also be taken as
samples suggestive of ratio relationships. Presented in Table 12,
page 184, the telegraph figures show greater percentage consistency
within region through time than do the telephone statistics, partly by
virtue of higher total message load, and because of this more extensive
use may be taken as better indicators of relative levels of message
flow. Again African traffic is negligible, averaging only 0.3 percent of
total outflow and 0.1 percent of inflow. Outgoing messages are directed
more to Asia, but most incoming originate in the Middle East, whereas
the statistics on telephone traffic showed a more evenly balanced flow
in both directions. The Afro-Asian share of all traffic is slightly higher,
a peak of 3.3 percent of all messages sent in the first half of 1968, and
an inflow peak of 2.2 percent in 1967. The same high degree of con-
centration persists, with Japan receiving 77.5 percent of all Brazilian
messages to Asia and sending 83 percent of all Asian messages to
Brazil in 1966 and 1967, followed by Australia (5.5% and 3.5%) and
TABLE 12

Regional Distribution of International Telegraph Traffic to and from Brazil, July, 1965—June, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Telegrams</th>
<th>Outgoing from Brazil</th>
<th>Percentage of Telegrams from Brazil to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>139,710</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>285,050</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>288,284</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>158,317</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Telegrams</th>
<th>Incoming to Brazil</th>
<th>Percentage of Telegrams to Brazil from:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>168,258</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>338,412</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>351,029</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>196,379</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics obtained at the Rio de Janeiro office of ITT Comunicações Mundiais, S. A., representing 38.5 percent of all Brazilian international telegraph messages.

<sup>a</sup>July-December.

<sup>b</sup>January-June.
Hong Kong (4.3% and 0.3%), an aggregate total of 87.3 percent of all messages sent to Asia and 86.8 percent of all Asian messages received by Brazil. In the Middle East, Israel dominated the traffic in 1966 and 1967, with 67 percent of all Brazilian telegrams to the region and 79.3 percent of all Mideast telegrams to Brazil, followed by Lebanon (15.4% and 1.0%) and the UAR (6.5% and 15.7%), an aggregate total of 88.9 percent of all outgoing telegrams and 96 percent of all incoming telegrams. In Africa, South Africa in the same years averaged 55 percent of the African-bound flow and only 2.4 percent of the traffic from Africa to Brazil.

The conclusion is thus inescapable that the emigration and communications dimension of Brazilian-Afro-Asian relations reveals a very low level of interaction, in both absolute and relative terms. If Israel, Australia, Japan, and South Africa are excluded as developed nations, the developing Afro-Asian states accounted for merely 4.9 percent of total immigration, 1956-1961 (mostly from Arab nations and China) and only 0.48 percent of all incoming telegrams and 0.7 percent of all outgoing telegrams in 1967.

Exports

A goal of Itamaraty since the Kubitschek government and independent of changes of regime, the winning of a place for Brazilian exports in Afro-Asian markets has more recently become an important component of the diplomacy of prosperity and so deserves detailed
examination. With Operação Brasil-Ásia and the Gondim Mission of 1959, Brazil's most plausible initial prospects seemed to be in South Asia, but Quadros' spotlighting of Africa soon pre-empted the center of attention for that continent and struck the imagination of a few venturesome industrialists and economists who held that as long as the domestic market remained one of restricted demand, Brazil's industrialization was hampered. If manufactures could be sold to Africa, not only could the rate of industrialization be accelerated, but the country would also benefit from higher export and foreign exchange earnings (along with stabler prices) and enjoy a wider range of products than the domestic market alone would stimulate, and at a lower cost of production. Any increase in sales of raw materials, of course, would also be welcomed. For several years these arguments fell on deaf ears and were considered idealistic by most exporters, firmly oriented toward traditional buyers and reluctant to gamble as long as the American and Latin American Free Trade Association markets remained favorable.

In the interim the Foreign Ministry continued studies on the problem, which still remained relegated to the status of a curiosity item during most of Goulart's term. The first two commercial missions to sub-Saharan Africa and other inquiries defined the limits of Brazilian

trade possibilities in the area. Several obstacles interposed themselves, the most obvious of which was the low value of the sporadic commercial exchange then actually carried on with Africa, affording few existing links on either side upon which a flourishing trade could be built. In most cases Brazilian penetration would be forced to begin almost from bare traces. A further difficulty in trade expansion has been to determine which African goods could be purchased by Brazil because most African countries prefer bilateral exchange agreements to convertible currency arrangements, given their deficiencies of foreign exchange. Lack of return freight also has created greater shipping expenses.

It has long been customary to emphasize the non-complementary nature of the Brazilian and African economies, competitive in coffee, cocoa, timber, certain ores, diamonds, and other basic products. This observation conceals the wide range of other important products which could profitably form the core of a dynamic trade flow, as well as ignoring the fact that Brazilian-African trade has traditionally been based upon exchanges of Brazilian rice, corn, sugar, tea, menthol, nuts, tobacco, cotton, and sisal for African copper, asbestos, cobalt, and phosphates, all raw materials. According to conclusions of trade reports, an industrializing Brazil could also find in Africa excellent sources of supply for its growing demands for crude petroleum, aluminum, natural rubber, cassiterite, zinc, tungsten, lead, vegetable
and essential oils, pyrethrum, calcium phosphates, soda ash, gum arabic, tanning extracts, and cloves, in sufficient quantity to finance easily African imports of Brazilian goods up to a value of $250 million. In return, discovered the commercial missions to Africa, the nations across the South Atlantic expressed a lively interest in acquiring from Brazil the following manufactures and semi-manufactured items: fabrics, clothing, shoes, refrigerators, stoves, household appliances, lathes and machine tools, steel pipe, electrical and construction materials, agricultural machinery, canned goods, paints, and chemical and pharmaceutical products. This potential sales list contains ample possibilities for cooperation despite partially non-complementary economic systems, especially since Brazil and Africa are both attempting to diversify their trade.

Even granted this substantial list of commodities, incipient as it may be, serious impediments remain, not the least of which is the somewhat oligopolistic control over African trade exercised by a few predominant trading companies from the former colonial powers. Such well-established, powerful groups as Unilever and Compagnie Française de L'Afrique Occidentale maintain a firm grip on the African market in a


wide range of products, enjoying as well the brand preferences of the consumers, habituated to the articles traditionally offered. In several cases, Brazilian sales to West Africa had to be consummated through the main offices of these British and French firms, which tend to favor doing business with their own nationals. This resistance to redirection of commercial practices is less marked in states in which trade has been nationalized in government hands, as is the case with Ghana.

Another difficulty in the way of greater Brazilian-African trade flows has been preferential tariff treatment accorded many African states by either the European Common Market or the British Commonwealth, an arrangement which, from the Brazilian point of view, not only impedes sales of Brazilian finished goods to Africa but also permits competitive African raw materials to enter the ports of Europe without the customs duties which similar Brazilian products must face. The Associated African States and the Malagasy Republic, composed of the twelve former French colonies plus Togo, Cameroon, the Congo (Kinshasa), Ruanda, Burundi, and Somalia, enjoy such advantages in importing European articles that outside competition has been largely excluded. Since agreements between Great Britain and African nations of the Commonwealth are designed primarily to protect African goods arriving in Great Britain rather than British exports to Africa, Brazilian prospects for exports to Commonwealth members are more favorable and have aroused greatest recent interest in the Foreign Ministry, being the
paramount reason for the creation of the embassy in Nairobi in 1967. Trade missions are now planned for the East African region, as well as economic and commercial departments for various embassies in sub-Saharan Africa. 20

Within the limitations imposed by the foregoing restrictions, the Foreign Ministry considers that several mid-African nations offer conditions which could lead to "a regular and continuous commercial exchange" across the South Atlantic, in addition to the established trade with South Africa. 21 The most attractive new market for Brazil has been Nigeria, with its population of 60 million, an impressive economic potential, a minimum of preferential ties to Europe, and colonies of Brazilian descendants. Although the Biafran conflict has made hazardous any conjectures about Nigeria's economic future, Itamaraty hopes to build up a substantial trade exchanging manufactures for Nigerian petroleum and natural rubber. Nigeria is already the site of a unique Brazilian venture which occasioned this level of commercial

20 In 1968 the Banco do Brasil had 17 trade specialists working for the Foreign Ministry on a requisition basis in embassies and consulates abroad. In what were considered key areas for trade expansion, the only Afro-Asian post provided with such a specialist was the consulate-general in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique. Commercial promotion does exist in other Afro-Asian posts, but with specialists of lesser rank from other government branches.

interest. In 1962, President Pery Igel and Director Rubem Rogério of Ultragas, a large São Paulo-centered company processing, bottling, and distributing natural gas, took the initiatives with Mobil Mediterranean and Given Lorensen of Norway to form the Pan African Gas Distributors in Nigeria with the commercial name of Sungas. This company, administered by Ultragas of Brazil, has become one of the largest of its kind in Nigeria. 22 Initially importing all equipment from Brazil, Rogério discovered that the 1200 tons of industrial goods—stoves, gas refrigerators, gas bottles, washing machines, sewing machines, fans, mixers, and blenders—which he exported to Nigeria sold very easily, making him an enthusiast in increasing Brazilian-African trade, even in the face of transportation problems caused by lack of a regular sea route to West Africa, an undertaking he recommended because it would encourage trade in the long run even if several of the first voyages had to be made with little cargo. 23

The next most appealing area, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, is the Congo (Kinshasa) and Zambia, which can supply Brazil with important nonferrous metals. The final major new market to be

22 Interview with Casério B. Ceschin, Regional Director of Ultragaz, Rio de Janeiro Region, and General Manager of Nigerian operations (1964), September 16, 1968.

penetrated is English-speaking East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), a region which formerly possessed only the most remote, indirect maritime connections with Brazil. This problem of transportation facilities constituted a serious impediment in trade expansion until the Foreign Ministry prevailed upon the Brazilian Loíde to charter new routes to Afro-Asia to expedite programs generated by the diplomacy of prosperity. The lack of regular, direct sea routes greatly increased delay and transportation costs to delivery points, as goods for Africa had to be transhipped via New Orleans, New York, Tangiers, Dakar, or Cape Town. This unpredictability not only discouraged Brazilian exporters with ambitions to trade with Africa, but also left purchasers in doubt concerning the future acquisition of repairs or spare parts. To expedite steady trade the Loíde started a monthly West Africa route in February, 1968, with scheduled stops in Dakar, Conakry, Monrovia, Abidjan, Accra, Lome, Lagos, Luanda, and Cape Town, with optional ports included when service is required. East Africa is to be served from ports in South Africa and Mozambique until such a volume is attained as merits a direct linkage. An additional favorable sign was the August, 1968, creation of the Afro-Brazilian Chamber of

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Not only did cargoes face circuitous routes before recent changes, but as late as 1965 West Africans who desired to trade with Brazil found it necessary to travel to Dakar to have trade documents officialized, because the Brazilian embassies in Accra and Lagos had no consular service. Since that time, the embassy in the Nigerian capital has been charged with consular duties.
Commerce in São Paulo, through the initiative of Brazilian exporters and with support of the Bank of Brazil, to serve as an information center and clearing-house between Brazilian exporting firms and African importers, counting on the proffered collaboration of African embassies, the São Paulo Confederation of Commerce, and the National Association of Exporters of Industrial Products.

If it is true that "Brazil faces Africa," yet only very recently have direct transportation routes come into existence, in the case of Asia, much greater distances intervene to reduce the frequency and magnitude of commercial relations, while there are very few non-commercial ties which could stimulate trade. As in Africa, there is a partial non-complementarity of economies, but Brazil has sold coffee, sugar, frozen and canned meat, iron ore, essential oils, textiles, watches, machine tools, electrical domestic appliances, Diesel and electric motors, and drugs to Asia, while importing tin, natural rubber, gums and resins, and industrial products (from Japan). With the outstanding exception of Japan, these exchanges have been intermittent and irregular, since Brazil's only real commercial efforts to date have centered in Japan and Hong Kong. Its products are not well known outside that area and suffer greatly in quality competition with those of better-known suppliers such as Japan, Hong Kong, Communist China, Great Britain and the United States, which are furnished with adequate means for distribution and service. Brazil also has been unable to offer
attractive credit facilities on equal terms with these nations, a drawback which is unlikely to disappear rapidly.

The long-term prospects for Asian trade appear to be improving under government incentive, with the broadening of commercial promotion (including participation in trade fairs) and the inauguration in October, 1967, of the Lóide’s Orient route, the first regular Brazilian maritime communication with Asia. This line will make stops in Luanda, Cape Town, Durban, Lourenço Marques, Beira, Singapore, Manila, Hong Kong, Kobe, Osaka, and Yokohama. Every other month the route proceeds via Sydney and Melbourne, with service for Pakistan and India if sufficient trade develops through the mechanism of recent treaties. Like the new African line, the Orient experiment will carry floating demonstrations of Brazilian products, including catalogs, with the support of diplomatic missions abroad and accompanied by representatives of the Bank of Brazil and the National Confederation of Industry.

The Middle East has been the area of Afro-Asia in which the least has been done for export promotion, although trade with Lebanon was advanced with the establishment of an entrepôt in Beirut’s free port by the Brazilian Coffee Institute and a Varig airline route to the same city (1956), where Itamaraty also maintains a commercial promotion service through the embassy. Brazil purchases half of its petroleum imports from the Middle East, largely in trade for coffee, but finds that
where the best petroleum sources lie (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait) it has no products to offer and so suffers an unfavorable credit balance. Conversely, where its coffee sales are most successful (Lebanon), it finds little to buy and accumulates an undesirably large surplus balance. The only Mideastern nations with which Brazil has trade treaties are Lebanon and Israel, in spite of years of diplomatic presence in other countries of the Levant and Maghreb. Brazil has yet to conduct serious studies of the economies and commercial structures of states in these regions. To date, one trade mission has visited the Middle East, composed in its entirety of representatives from the National Confederation of Commerce and National Association of Exporters of Industrial Products, who visited Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic in June, 1966, in the attempt to obtain a Beirut entrepôt for distribution of Brazilian manufactures throughout the Middle East, a project which has since stagnated at the inter-governmental level.

To remedy these deficiencies, the Foreign Ministry has planned trade missions for the region, the first scheduled for 1969 and slated to stop in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, and Iran to establish contacts for the placement of manufactures in these states with which Brazil has experienced unfavorable trade balances, yet has

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reason to hope for greater participation in import statistics. If future relations should warrant, these nations could readily be included in the Lóide's new Afro-Asian lines.

Officials of the Bank of Brazil's Export Promotion Center are confident that the new promotional and transportation measures will eventuate in a greater share for Afro-Asia of Brazil's gross export volume and a decided rise in the proportion of Brazil's export value which is composed of manufactured and semi-manufactured items. They are also encouraged by Australia's initiative, through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in granting tariff preferences of 15 to 25 percent for quotas of manufactured articles from developing nations and have striven to make industrialists aware of this opportunity. In the final analysis, the increase of industrial exports to Afro-Asia is contingent upon the development of an aggressive export mentality among Brazilian industrialists and businessmen, the lack of which has invariably been singled out by trade missions as a prime factor impeding more dynamic trade expansion in Afro-Asia. The director of the Foreign Trade Department of the Federation of Commerce of the State of São Paulo reports receiving a "great volume" of inquiries from Afro-Asian importers (mostly from Hong Kong and Japan) interested in Brazilian

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26 Interview with Bazílio de Carvalho Sampaio, Secretário de Gabinete da Gerência de Exportação do Centro de Promoção da Exportação, CACEX, Banco do Brasil, October 8, 1968.
exports, but the customary circulation of this material has brought "little repercussion" from Brazilian exporters. A modification of this passive attitude is indispensable to the attainment of the government's objective of trade development and diversification into new markets, but this modification has to date been painfully slow.

Patterns apparent in the regional distribution of Brazilian exports between 1956 and 1967 (Table 13, page 198) show a gradual tendency away from previous reliance on traditional markets in the United States and Western Europe towards a degree of diversification of trade through sales to Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia. The position of Latin America has fluctuated through time to the extent that no clear trends may be discerned other than the low trough from 1959 to 1963. The United States has plainly given way to Western Europe as the dominant customer, reversing a long-standing rank order. The most significant change in the other four areas, generically referred to as "new markets," has been the increase in trade with Eastern Europe, a growth in dollar value of 181 percent from 1958 to 1967, a decade when the value of trade with Afro-Asia increased by only 53.5 percent. Although the value of all exports to Afro-Asia exceeded that to Eastern Europe by nearly 32 million dollars in 1958, by 1967 the value of goods shipped to Eastern Europe nearly equaled that of those to Afro-Asia.

27 Interview with Gilberto Machado, August 6, 1968.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value in Billion Dollars</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
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<td>43.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>1.21</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>37.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.60</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>33.1</td>
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<td>41.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

The Afro-Asian component of Brazilian exports has remained relatively unimportant, fluctuating between a low of 4.6 percent (1956) and a high of 7.2 percent (1966), with Asia making up yearly six-tenths or more of these aggregate percentages. Examination of the degree of export concentration by region shows a great amount of national variation between years, but several nations consistently retain first position for each area over the period. Table 14, page 200, shows the rankings of the major trading partners in Asia and the Middle East from 1962 to 1967, with Japan and Hong Kong the only important markets in Asia and Lebanon, Algeria, and Morocco leading the Mideast. Africa's statistics indicate South Africa as the principal customer by a wide margin, receiving up to 97.5 percent of all exports to sub-Saharan Africa. Sales to other African nations have been occasional and of low value; even incorporating South Africa, sales to sub-Saharan Africa in 1967 amounted to only 13 million dollars or about one-third the value of Brazilian exports to Belgium and Luxemburg. The five top-ranking states in 1964 and 1967 (Japan, Lebanon, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Algeria) accounted for, respectively, 81 percent and 79 percent of all Brazilian sales to Afro-Asia in those two years, not untypically since the five largest purchasers have usually been importing about four-fifths of the aggregate total for the three regions. If we exclude Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel to determine the magnitude of Brazil's exports to developing Afro-Asia or the Third World
TABLE 14

Destination of Brazilian Exports to Asia and the Middle East, 1962-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>55.7</td>
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<td>54.3</td>
<td>59.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td>18.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist China</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>94.5</td>
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<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morroco</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 13.
in 1967, we are left with a figure of 45.2 million dollars, only 2.7 percent of its global total.

For Brazil's main partners in Afro-Asia, trade with Brazil represents a minute percentage of their global imports and even less of their exports. Japan, South Africa, and Lebanon from 1962 to 1966 counted Brazil as the source of about 0.5 percent of their imports, while Hong Kong could claim Brazil for approximately 1.0 percent. Only Japan sent as much as an average of 0.5 percent of its exports to Brazil, whereas the remaining 3 counted under 0.06 percent for all years.28

When compared with the export patterns of Latin America taken as a region, the Brazilian statistics adhere rather closely to the norm for exports to Afro-Asia, excluding Communist China. As an economic region, from 1965 to 1967, Latin America sent, respectively, 6.6 percent, 6.5 percent, and 7.0 percent of its export total to Afro-Asia, while in the same years Brazil registered 5.5 percent, 7.2 percent, and 7.0 percent. Brazil directs a slightly higher percentage of its trade to Africa and the Middle East and less to Asia than does Latin America as a region, while concentrating its Asian sales much less on Japan but relying for its African exports much more on South Africa.29


It is not the present level of sales to Afro-Asia which has attracted Brazilian attention, but rather the potentialities for future sales of manufactured merchandise which, as many Brazilian industrialists and exporters see it, would find few purchasers in the industrialized states. The share of manufactured and semi-manufactured commodities in total Brazilian export value has been rising steadily since 1960, climbing to 8.63 percent in 1967, or an absolute value of 142.7 million dollars. If all manufactures and semi-manufactures are considered as a group, this category in 1967 ranked second among all classes of exports, behind coffee (44.3%) and ahead of cotton (5.8%), cocoa (5.1%), and sugar (5.1%). To all indications this share will continue to grow with the program of government incentives for exportation of manufactures and with further industrialization.

To ascertain whether Afro-Asia has in fact been the "natural outlet" for manufactures as expected, an analysis of the latest available exportation statistics (1967) is in order. Presented in Table 15, page 203, the former Chefe da Divisão do Oriente Próximo, with experience in India and Pakistan, expressed such widespread sentiments in the Superior War College in 1963, alleging that Europe definitely would not purchase Brazilian manufactures, only coffee, minerals, and raw materials. Therefore, Brazil must penetrate into Afro-Asia, aided by the simpatia it enjoyed among Afro-Asians who would see it as an example to follow. Textually, "If we are thinking in terms of industrialization, as we said before, we should also think about markets. And these, obviously, can be found only in underdeveloped areas or those with progress inferior to our own." See Jorge de Oliveira Maia, O Mundo Afro-Asiático (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1963), pp. 22-23.
### TABLE 15

**Distribution of Exports of Brazilian Manufactures, by Region, 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent of Brazil's Manufacture Exports Going to Region</th>
<th>Percent of Imports from Brazil in Manufactures</th>
<th>Value of Brazilian Manufacture Imports (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>37,856,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>70,250,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17,673,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>910,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>794,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Oceania</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>15,004,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>148,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

these figures demonstrate that almost half of the manufacture sales abroad were made in Latin America, over one-quarter in the United States, and one-eighth in Western Europe. None of the new markets was an important outlet for such goods, with the exception of Asia, where 66.6 percent of the sales went to Japan and 20 percent to India. Almost all of the Japanese manufactured imports were various types of pig iron and India's were almost entirely composed of ethyl alcohol. Nearly 65 percent of the manufactures shipped to Africa went to the Republic of South Africa, with another 25 percent going to Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia. The Middle Eastern totals are insignificant, representing the sum of scattered and isolated sales. In 1967 developing Afro-Asia purchased only 4.3 million dollars worth of manufactured goods from Brazil, a mere 3.0 percent of all manufactures exported. Of this $4.3 million, 66.4 percent was accounted for by the alcohol shipment to India, an exceptional purchase by a country which has not traditionally been an habitual or important trading partner.

Obviously, despite trade missions and statements of intentions, Brazilian-Afro-Asian trade has remained at low levels and continues to be made up principally of exchanges of raw materials, with Japan as the sole anomalous case. In 1967, only 6.1 percent of Africa's imports from Brazil were manufactures and almost no manufactures went to East, Central, or West Africa, so highly regarded by advocates of Brazilian-African trade, but rather almost all of this type of commodities were
placed in the politically controversial areas of southern Africa, a rule generally observed in previous years as well. Developing Asia's manufacture imports stood at 31.2 percent of its total imports from Brazil, a fact explained by unusually high sales of alcohols to India and Hong Kong. The Middle East, with its very low volume of manufactured imports, reached a proportion of 3.9 percent. None of these percentages or absolute values would be conducive to optimism concerning rapid success in expanding sales of industrial products in developing nations of Afro-Asia. To the contrary, taken in and of themselves, they strongly suggest that Brazil's most promising markets for these products will be found in Latin America (especially within the Latin American Free Trade Association), the United States, and Western Europe, in that order. Opportunities for significant expansion of a regular trade in manufactures with Afro-Asia will come only as the result of careful, long-range planning, with success most likely in Hong Kong or states in various stages of industrialization—South Africa, India, Australia, and Japan, those which received 91 percent of all Brazilian manufactures and 68 percent of all Brazilian exports sent to Afro-Asia in 1967 and are likely to be those which will most justify continued interest, even if promotional efforts and new transportation routes add

31 Similar analysis of export structure from 1964 to 1966 leads to the same conclusions; i.e., 1967 is not a "deviant" year but illustrates ratios and rank orders now becoming fairly well established.
new customers to the list. \(^{32}\) Other nations which may be expected to carry on substantial trade with Brazil in the future include Lebanon, Algeria, and Morocco, all of which up to the present have imported raw materials almost exclusively but now show signs of interest in manufactures. Various optimistic plans have been formulated to gain a foothold in other new markets including the proposed construction in Pakistan of an instant coffee factory which would commit itself to process only Brazilian coffee.

**Dimensional Summary**

I have tried to demonstrate the usefulness of a quantitative approach in the study of foreign policy as an additional analytical tool which can both gauge generalized uniformities of international behavior of the subject state toward other states and detect the strength, extent, and direction of its change through time. Through the use of applicable measures from the Dimensionality of Nations Project, it was possible to

\(^{32}\)A general notion of the relative importance attached to various Afro-Asian countries as prospective trading partners by trade-promotion officials is obtained from a Bank of Brazil request to the International Trade Center (UNCTAD-GATT) in Geneva for market research in Afro-Asia on specified Brazilian industrial products, including clothing, domestic appliances, drugs, paint, chemicals, machine tools, pumps, agricultural machinery, and road-building equipment. The countries or areas specified, in descending order of priority, are South Africa, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Israel, the Philippines, India, Nigeria, Singapore, Lebanon, Kenya, Hong Kong, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Morocco, Ghana, region of the Persian Gulf, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Nationalist China, and Senegal. Japan is not included because Brazilian-Japanese commercial relations are well developed. See Bazilio de Carvalho Sampaio, "Promoção das Exportações Brasileiras e do Frete em Navios do Loíde Brasileiro—Relatório pelo CEPEX, MRE, e Loíde."
define various levels of prominence in Brazilian foreign relations held by each of the seven specified geographical regions under study and concentrate upon the positions held by Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, thus analyzing each dimension of Brazil's international behavior towards Afro-Asia within the general context of its gamut of bilateral behavior relationships with all states. The levels of prominence of Afro-Asia or the degree of Brazilian attention to Afro-Asia may therefore be expressed in percentages of Brazil's global transactions or as ratio relationships in comparison with other regions. The results of this approach are summarized and presented in matrix form by region and dimensional measure in Table 16, page 208, in descending order of the aggregate percentages for Afro-Asia (i.e., the relative prominence of Afro-Asia) on each measure.

These figures, all of which measure Brazil's actions toward Afro-Asian nations, indicate a low relative prominence for those regions in the whole scheme of Brazilian foreign relations. The highest level of prominence is in diplomatic representation, followed by combined figures for diplomatic and consular personnel, both of which are functions of Foreign Ministry interest in the area, which, as we have seen, varied through the 1956 to 1968 period, reaching its height in 1968. The first five measures concern the level of government-initiated or inter-governmental activity (administrative behavior), while columns six and seven are indicative of the more limited extent of largely private commercial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>Diplomatic and Consular Representation</td>
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<td>Cruziero do Sul Awards (1968-1967)</td>
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<td>Treaties (1950-1968)</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>Consular Representation (1968)</td>
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<td>Exports (1967)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Outgoing Telegrams (1967)</td>
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<td>Asia and Oceania</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and communications activity (private international relations, in Rummel's terms). The fact that all the measures of government-initiated activity rank above exports and telegrams would seem to signify that Brazilian-Afro-Asian relations are in a state of development in which intergovernmental or political relations are more salient than such society-wide, relatively non-institutional ties as trade, mail, student and tourist exchange, translations of literature, etc. The chief exception to this rule may be emigration from Afro-Asia to Brazil, a flow which has not been reciprocal and which in the past involved principally Japan and the Levant. This influx of immigrants appears to have heightened the salience of Japan, Lebanon, and Israel for Brazil, just as the presence of many Portuguese immigrants underlies in part the particular attention which Itamaraty has been giving to the events in Portuguese Africa.

On practically all measures, Asia ranks first in degree of prominence, followed in turn by the Middle East and Africa; in only two instances is this order broken, in diplomatic and consular representation taken individually, by reason of the administrative expedient of charging most Middle Eastern embassies with consular functions rather than establishing separate consulates to handle the present level of transactions. Within each geographical region the transaction flow is directed largely to one or two states, namely Japan, Israel, Lebanon, and South Africa. These are the states with which Brazil maintains significant bilateral relations. With the majority of the developing nations of
the Third World, relations have been somewhat more intense and conflict and cooperation more evident in international organizations, especially the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. In the following pages the bilateral relations with some of these most salient states will be briefly examined, and in subsequent chapters the discussion will shift to two issues which have been pivotal in multilateral relations between Brazil and developing Afro-Asia, colonialism and economic development.

Three Case Studies

Three of the Afro-Asian nations with which Brazil has had the closest contact, as measured by the DON dimensions, are nations which are not members of the Afro-Asian caucusing group in the United Nations nor can they be classed economically as members of the Third World in a developmental sense. As Russett demonstrates conclusively in empirically defining international regions, in many respects Japan, Israel, and South Africa are most atypical politically, culturally, and economically of the geographic regions in which they are situated. On the basis of their trade, cultural, and political relations, all closely linked with the Western Community grouping, Russett asserts that Israel, and more surprisingly Japan, however, belong with the European countries on every criterion except proximity (and Israel is not really so distant). . . . If the world of the next several decades is to see a very general kind of agreement
and common interest among the Western industrialized countries, with interests that come increasingly into conflict with the non-Western underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa, Israel and Japan, now "have" states, are much more likely to be aligned with their rich developed fellows than with their geographical neighbors. 33

South Africa, in many ways an internationally isolated outcast from even the old Commonwealth groupings, is a case sui generis which defies general classification, although the politically dominant segments of the population are largely Western European and the economy is considered developed by United Nations evaluation. With respect to South Africa, Russett concludes, "It is of course precisely the efforts of its white government to keep the country from becoming socially and culturally Afro-Asian that has produced the present political tension." 34

Because of the peculiar circumstances and the political implications surrounding the South African case, relations between Brazil and Pretoria will be discussed more at length in the following chapter. In addition to Japan and Israel, the nature of Brazil's relations with India will now be considered briefly to illustrate various facets of Brazilian policy toward Afro-Asian states at diverse levels of development as well as to throw light on the unique characteristics which determine each case.


34 Ibid., p. 31.
Japan

Close relations with Japan date from the first wave of Japanese immigrants which entered Brazil in 1908, a circumstance which heavily influenced the subsequent development of relations between Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro, leading most immediately to the creation of a Brazilian embassy in the Japanese capital in 1909 and the development of an accompanying embryonic flow of trade. The economic importance of the large immigrant colony and the favorable image it now enjoys among the Brazilian public, as noted previously, contribute a positive spillover to relations between the two nations. In the words of Crown Prince Akihito in an address to the Brazilian Congress in 1967,

I think that the strong links between our countries have a special characteristic not found in Japanese relations with other nations—a characteristic which had its origin in the year 1908 when Brazil opened its doors to Japanese immigrants whose descendants here now number 600,000. 35

Most tangibly, the colony's presence has facilitated the cultural programs of the Japanese embassy and the consulate-general in São Paulo with the collaboration of groups such as the Sociedade Paulista de Cultura Japonêsa, the central organ of the immigrant groups, whose purpose is to raise the cultural level of the colony and promote Brazilian-Japanese relations. A sister organization, the Aliança Cultural Brasil-Japão, is composed largely of Brazilians. Similar associations

are active in most centers of Japanese settlement in the states of São Paulo and Paraná, many involving Brazilians of other than Japanese descent although immigrants and their descendants predominate.36

Besides providing a diffuse feeling of good will, the existence of the colony has yielded some concrete benefits for Brazilian-Japanese relations, not the least of which was the establishment of USIMINAS under the guiding hand of Yukishigue Tamura, the first of four Japanese descendants to be elected to the position of federal deputy. This steel-producing company, the largest single Japanese investment in Brazil, was begun in 1957 in Minas Gerais as a mixed-capital joint venture with 40 percent participation on the part of the Japanese government, a proportion which has since been effectively reduced by the growth of the company while Japanese capital investment remained constant. USIMINAS is now the second largest steel-producing center in Brazil, with an output exceeded only by the Volta Redonda complex.

Although several companies such as Kanêbo do Brasil and Lâmpadas Sadokin are based on Japanese-Nissei cooperation, with Japanese technical assistance, local Nissei capital, and mixed management, these examples are few and account for a small fraction of Japanese investment in Brazil, which started in 1954 and has been expanding steadily since that date. Of all independent capital entering Brazil

36Interview with Yoshinori Nuimura, Vice-Consul for Cultural Affairs, Japanese Consulate-General, São Paulo, June 21, 1968.
from 1963 to 1967, including that furnished by international institutions, Japan supplied 14 percent of all direct investment in currency and equipment and 6 percent of all loans in currency and for the financing of imports. In 1968, 70 Japanese firms had a total of 230 million dollars invested in Brazil, or fully 38 percent of all Japanese capital invested outside the home islands. The 35 large Japanese factories in Brazil contrast sharply with the few existing in Argentina (2), Peru (4), and other South American countries. One of these factories, that of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries of Brasil in Rio de Janeiro, is the largest shipyard in the Southern Hemisphere and in 1968 completed construction of the heaviest vessel ever built in Brazil, launched in the presence of the Ambassador of Japan. Other important firms are found in the fields of textiles, electronics, machinery, agriculture, photography, and finance, with the range of products and services becoming more diversified.

Although a much greater percentage of total Japanese foreign investment than foreign trade is carried on with Brazil, commercial interchange is assuming greater weight for both states. Between 1964

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39 Interview with Ikuzo Hirokawa, June 20, 1968.
and 1967, Japan climbed rapidly from twelfth to seventh in rank among
the major purchasers of Brazilian exports, with a trade based principally
on the exchange of Brazilian coffee, hematite, pig iron, and cotton for
a wide variety of Japanese manufactured goods. Brazil continues as
Japan's most important trading partner in South America. Since the
upsurge in the intensity of relations between the two countries, starting
about 1956, a frequent reciprocal exchange of official trade missions
(often at ministerial level) has proceeded on a regular basis, along with
good-will and cultural missions. Within the background of Japan's
need for raw materials which derives from its ecological situation and
Brazil's requirements for manufactured products and capital goods,
likely to increase with the growth of industrialization, future prospects
for intensified trade appear promising and have aroused interest in both
countries, as have discussions about new Japanese investments, carried
on within the framework of the Brazilian—Japanese Joint Economic
Commission inaugurated in February, 1968. From the Brazilian point
of view, according to Minister of Planning Hélio Beltrão who visited
Tokyo in 1968 to obtain additional credit for the importation of Japanese
products, the value of trade with Japan may triple in relation to 1967 in
only several years as a result of successful talks aimed at exporting
more iron ore and coffee to that country.\footnote{\textit{Jornal do Brasil},
July 16, 1968, p. 13.} Presently, the balance of
trade has been in Brazil's favor.
Plans are also going forward to use Japanese skills in the service of the expansion and diversification of Brazil's trade. In 1968 Caio de Alcântara Machado, President of the Brazilian Coffee Institute, personally visited Tokyo to negotiate an agreement with the Mitsubishi industrial complex, whereby the latter firm will become the sales agent for Brazilian coffee throughout Asia with the exceptions of Australia and New Zealand. According to the BCI, this agreement is expected to double coffee sales in that region rapidly, by allowing Brazilian exporters to take advantage of Mitsubishi credit and distribution facilities. The Secretary-General for Commercial Promotion of the Foreign Ministry has also requested two Japanese experts in world commerce to tour Brazil to encourage an aggressive, informed export mentality among businessmen.

Japan has been a steady source of technical assistance, although no general written agreement on such cooperation has been signed by the two countries and despite the fact that most Japanese foreign aid of this type has been concentrated to a high degree within Asia where Japan finds its most profitable trading area and potential sphere of influence. The most notable Japanese contributions to Brazilian

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development have been in the form of technical experts and scholarships for study in Japan. Since 1961 approximately 400 specialists have been furnished upon Brazilian request in such fields as tropical medicine, agriculture, telecommunications, electric power generation, and textiles, with Japan exhibiting special interest in recent Brazilian efforts to develop the Northeast and Amazon regions.  

According to enthusiasts of this partnership, there exists a natural complementarity between economically developed Japan with its high population density and developing Brazil with very low population densities in the virgin Amazon and Center-West regions, a complementarity which could best reach fruition through the establishment of centers of Japanese colonization in frontier zones. As part of the program to integrate these areas into national life in the face of the reluctance of native Brazilians to migrate inland from the coast, the federal government and those of various states have already established two dozen such nuclei in the regions served by SUDAM and SUDENE, and are considering the possibilities for new centers in view of the interest in this enterprise demonstrated by Japanese colony representatives in São Paulo. Future expansion in this direction of rural colonization will emphasize the immigration of Japanese with technical or

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44 Consulado Geral do Japão (São Paulo), "Emigração Japonesa no Brasil," São Paulo, June, 1968, p. 3. (Mimeographed.)

45 Interview with Manoel Orlando Ferreira, May 21, 1968.
agricultural experience but must contend with the firm decision of the Foreign Ministry to keep the colonization of the Amazon in national hands. Illustrative of this jealous safeguarding of the national sovereignty were the establishment of an Amazon Division in Itamaraty and the 1968 Foreign Ministry veto of an official Japanese request to send a scientific expedition into the Amazon, amid speculations in certain quarters of Japanese designs for obtaining a foothold in the little-explored region. This development is perhaps best understood in conjunction with the unfavorable Brazilian reaction to the Hudson Institute for Defense Analysis report outlining a plan for international development of the Amazon Basin by means of the formation of huge lakes, as well as lingering suspicion of Japanese motives in some sectors of public opinion which recall Japanese plans for expansion in Latin America prior to World War II and fear a recurrence at Brazilian expense.

Great differences in language compounded by the obscurity of Japanese and Portuguese among international languages have kept to small numbers the flow of students between Brazil and Japan. Only one or two Japanese yearly travel to Brazil to pursue their studies, while less than ten Brazilians annually go to Japan to study at their own expense, according to one estimate. For the purpose of strengthening

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46 O Jornal, September 25, 1968.

47 Interview with Yoshinori Nuimura, June 21, 1968.
relations through the descendants in Brazil, Japanese provinces offer graduate fellowships to the children of emigrants from each province and the government in Tokyo offers yearly eight fellowships of three years duration, in practice distributed to three native Brazilians and five descendants. In addition, six enterprises in Japan maintain industrial scholarships for Brazilians and the Japanese Foreign Ministry offers three or four trips to Japan each year for colony leaders. In this way the total number of Brazilians going to Japan to study oscillates between 50 and 60 per year, in contrast to the much greater attraction exerted by universities and schools in the United States and Western Europe. 48

The inauguration of the first twice-weekly VARIG flight to Tokyo on June 28, 1968, carrying Senhora Costa e Silva and Minister of Planning Hélio Beltrão, represented not only the initial scheduling of a Brazilian airline to Asia but also an indication of the increasing volume of travel between Brazil and Japan. 49 Antedating the establishment of a Japanese air route to South America, the VARIG effort is one of several manifestations of heightened Brazilian interest in relations with Japan, which to all appearances will remain at a higher level of

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48 Interview with Hiroshi Saito, June 20, 1968.

49 In advertising the new route VARIG concentrated on informing Japanese immigrants of the new ease and speed in visiting their former homeland, even utilizing television commercials completely in Japanese in major Brazilian cities.
saliency in Brazilian foreign relations than any other Asian nation for some time to come.

Israel

Relations with Israel can be traced from November 29, 1947, date of the partition of Palestine, as former Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha in the position of President of the UN General Assembly actively defended the creation of a Jewish nation-state, for which he is still remembered among the Israelis. For the next 15 years Brazilian-Israeli relations followed a friendly but routine course, predicated largely on the sizable number of Jews residing in Brazil and upon Israel's status as the Christian Holy Land. Religious considerations, from the beginning in the forefront in Brazil's posture toward Israel, were evident in Itamaraty's early advocation of international status for Jerusalem, in line with the orientation of the Vatican, and its recognition of Tel-Aviv rather than Jerusalem as the capital. Not only were Brazilian representatives sent to Tel-Aviv, but the embassy personnel were also carefully instructed not to visit partitioned Jerusalem in an official capacity, to lend as much endorsement as possible to a possible future special status for the beleaguered Holy City. The 1958 creation of a consulate-general in Jerusalem also obeyed political-religious motives,

50 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, I, No. 3 (September, 1958), 167.
principally designed, in the words of the Foreign Minister, "to give to Christianity a demonstration that Brazil understands the importance of its role as the largest Catholic power in the world . . ." 51

In 1962, with the signature of a Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation, Israel began a program of foreign aid to Brazil, similar to projects already undertaken in Afro-Asia to gain support for the Israeli position in the Middle East conflict in response to successful Arab appeals to neutralist nations. Israeli assistance to Brazil has been concentrated in the Northeast's drought polygon in conjunction with DNOCS and SUDENE and in Rio Grande do Sul, involving Israeli and Brazilian scientists in joint field research on water exploration, irrigation, and development of strains of hybrid seeds suited to the local climate, all skills which the Israelis have been able to develop in the demanding ecology of their native land. Technical advice has also been furnished Brazil in establishing experimental agricultural cooperatives to colonize rural areas in the interior of states such as Ceará, Piauí, and Rio Grande do Norte, with the expectation that these farms will serve as pilot projects for later duplication elsewhere as part of the federal government's programs to utilize presently barren land and to encourage the population to leave the heavily inhabited seacoast. As an adjunct to the field-oriented programs, Israel has given 70 fellowships

51 Ibid. In the subsequent years, this post has not had an official designated to fill it.
to Brazilians for graduate study of agriculture in Israel. Plans are also going forward for greater cultural exchange under a 1959 treaty and for a direct twice-weekly air route between Israel and Brazil, as part of an upsurge in Israeli interest in Latin America, signaled in part by the 1966 visit of President Zalman Shazar, the first Israeli head of state to visit Brazil.

New and significant avenues of cooperation were opened by the series of discussions and agreements culminating in May, 1967, in the "Agreement on the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes," to provide for exchange of technicians and information between the two countries, both of which opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as restrictive of their autonomous development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and announced intentions to diversify as much as possible their foreign sources of nuclear supply and assistance. Areas of collaboration already include the radiation of foods and seeds for preservation, sterilization of harmful insects, use of radioisotopes to discover underground water, studies on the prospecting and processing of uranium and other fissionable materials, and experimentation with different types of reactors. Other fields are to be explored by future

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agreement. In 1968 Israeli scientists were working under this treaty in São Paulo, Piracicaba, and Recife. 54

Regarding Arab-Israeli conflicts, Brazil has traditionally assumed a position of guarded but not indifferent neutrality dictated both by the remoteness of the situation from Brazil’s primary interests and the real potentials for domestic political repercussions inherent should a stand solidly backing one party or the other be taken, provoking protest from either the Jewish or the Arab immigrant organizations located in major cities. Neither would Brazil wish to jeopardize its growing trade and good relations with states on either side of the dispute, which politically affects its vital national interests only in general terms as a danger to world peace in the event of a possible future escalation and Soviet-American confrontation. To demonstrate its continuing concern with the Mideast situation and its neutrality, Brazil has maintained an infantry battalion with the United Nations Emergency Force since its inception in 1956, a gesture based on both political and religious motives. Although the Foreign Ministry has been careful not to make its Middle Eastern policy a cause for internal controversy, Brazilian diplomacy has been active on several occasions in suggesting peaceful solutions for conflict resolution in the area, usually supporting direct Arab-Israeli

54 Brazilian-Israeli nuclear cooperation has disquieted some officials of the Arab League, who interpret it as embodying military objectives. See, for example, Correio da Manhã, July 28, 1968, p. 1.
negotiations, Arab recognition of Israel's legal right to existence, a
just settlement of the refugee question by Israel, international status
for Jerusalem, and a cessation of the regional arms race (necessitating
great power cooperation).

Since the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, Brazil has further
supported the withdrawal of Israeli troops from areas occupied during
the hostilities, as a necessary precondition to fostering an atmosphere
of conciliation in which successful bargaining may take place. During
this crisis, Brazil presented to the Special Emergency Session of the
United Nations General Assembly a peace formula incorporating the
above points in addition to proposing a multi-lateral Peace Conference,
under UN auspices, of all powers responsible for peace in the area.
Presented in person by Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto, this plan
found some support from other states but the subsequent course of
events and tensions precluded its implementation.

India

Although India and Brazil, by virtue of their resources, area,
population, and potential, are among the most important of the developing
nations, their antipodal positions on the globe and intervening distances
were factors that until recently retarded the development of close bilateral
relations despite significant cooperation which has taken place in the
United Nations and its specialized forums such as the Eighteen-Power
Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Conference on Trade.
and Development. Brazil's embassy in New Delhi was established in October, 1948, relations having previously been conducted at legation level. In the mid-1950's a career consulate was created in Bombay for the express purpose of carrying out an agreement with Lisbon to protect Portuguese interests in India in the absence of diplomatic relations between the latter two states. In conjunction with the embassy and a consulate in Calcutta, the Bombay consulate provided diplomatic and consular assistance for the Portuguese immigrants in India, estimated to number one hundred thousand. From 1955 to 1960 this diplomatic mediation was one of the most important Brazilian activities in India.

Whereas in 1959 Brazilian diplomatic personnel and staff in the New Delhi embassy numbered eight, in addition to four officials stationed at the Bombay and Calcutta consulates, by 1968 the New Delhi staff had shrunk to seven and the only Brazilian consular service available outside the embassy was through an honorary post in Calcutta. For purposes of comparison, during the same month of August, 1968, Itamaraty had an embassy staff of nine in Bangkok and eight in Taipei and Seoul, all capitals of less international status. Thus India has not bulked

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large in Brazilian diplomatic relations when compared with other smaller developing Asian states whose ties to Brazil are actually more recent.

India maintains an embassy in Rio de Janeiro, one of two it has in South America. This mission therefore serves as a listening post in Latin America, especially with regard to activities of Peking, and a distribution point from which to disseminate material or information explaining India's positions on important issues. Other official functions of the embassy are limited; for example, only 15 to 20 visas yearly are granted to Brazilians, most of whom are diplomats. Less than half a dozen Indian immigrant families live in Brazil, and few Indians (under 100 per year) enter the country for business or tourist purposes. Significantly, all the printed material the embassy uses for public distribution is in English or Spanish, not Portuguese.57

Trade between the two nations has likewise been negligible, with the singular exception of the sale to India of nearly seven million dollars worth of Brazilian rice in 1966, a transaction accomplished with American help and occasioned by the inability of India's traditional suppliers to furnish sufficient quantities of the grain. More typically, commerce has been based on the exchange of Brazilian alcohol, carnauba wax, oils, and extracts for Indian resins for making shellac, with the

57 Interview with Khalid Halim Siddiqi, Cultural Attache, Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, August 29, 1968.
value of exports to India falling well under an average of 150 thousand dollars annually from 1956 to 1965. Since 1965 the prospects for increased commercial interchange have been heightened by mutual realization that in many ways the developing economies of the two countries are actually complementary, in both raw materials and industrial products. A notion of the possibilities which could be envisioned for this type of trade is seen in the conversations surrounding the 1964 tour of Brazil by an Indian commercial mission which expressed interest in acquiring a wide variety of manufactured goods which Brazil could provide, such as cargo ships, scales, tractors, cranes, pigments, and industrial machinery. In turn the Brazilians demonstrated a desire to import Indian cattle and other products if a regular trade flow could be brought about, which necessitated solution of the perennial problem of dependable transportation between the two nations, a problem which the Rio Grande Line offered to solve should a minimum freight value of $15,000 to $20,000 be attained. 58

As a delayed result of the exchange of trade missions in 1963 and 1964, the first commercial treaty between the two countries was signed in New Delhi in February, 1968, during the visit of Magalhães Pinto to the Second UNCTAD Conference. Through this document and accompanying discussions both governments pledged themselves to

explore all feasible means to stimulate trade, stipulated the mutual concession of most-favored-nation privileges, and agreed to exchange technical information on common problems of economic development. One of the greatest remaining obstacles to trade, that of irregular maritime transportation, is to be removed by joint efforts to undertake new sea routes.

The September, 1968, visit of Indira Gandhi to Brazil, the first of any Indian head of government, yielded several tangible benefits. In a lengthy communique Magalhães Pinto and Prime Minister Gandhi reaffirmed the opposition of their governments to a nuclear nonproliferation agreement which would hinder any developing nation from making full use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful programs or from conducting independent nuclear research for such programs, a position which both states had assumed during their participation in the General Assembly debates on the subject. As if to underscore this common stance, agreement was reached on the essential content of a nuclear cooperation pact regulating the exchange of technical information and scientists and commerce in fissionable material. Brazil and India, possessing substantial reserves of thorium, are in a similar stage of atomic energy development and are following the Canadian line of nuclear research, which makes reciprocal assistance feasible and foretells a promising, mutually beneficial exchange program, as
contemplated by Brazilian diplomats. The actual signature of this treaty was delayed until a draft could be submitted to and approved by the Indian Cabinet, a formal constitutional procedure.

A third treaty, signed during Gandhi's tour of the Foreign Ministry, promoted cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges, establishing a supervisory bi-national commission for this purpose. One outcome of this approach to increased relations was the inauguration in early 1969 of a chair of Brazilian Studies at the University of New Delhi, to be shared with the University of Bombay. Sponsored by the Brazilian embassy, the professorship is the first of its kind for Brazil in Asia and may be interpreted, at least in part, as an attempt to utilize the common link of former Portuguese colonization of both countries and the continued presence of many Portuguese-speaking Asians on Indian soil in Goa, Daman, and elsewhere. Whether the 1968 flurry of treaty-making produces fundamental change in the routine of Brazilian-Indian relations remains to be seen; perhaps the forces of distance, tradition, and economics still preclude it. The bases, however, have been set and interest evinced by both parties. For Brazil, it appears that the future of relations with India is contingent upon the success of the new Asian policy, the systematic cultivation of ties with Asia in

59 Interview with Renato Mendonça, Brazilian Ambassador to India, November 11, 1968.
order to multiply markets for Brazilian exports and diversify the sources of aid for economic development. It is within this framework that the rapprochement has been designed, to expand Brazil's commercial and scientific horizons and to make Brazil known in India.
CHAPTER V

DECOLONIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BRAZILIAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Decolonization, the raison d'etre of Afro-Asia's newly independent states, was a cause they carried into the United Nations with a nearly unanimous persistence to use the pressure of world public opinion on behalf of their drive to evict Western powers from areas in which they had so recently exercised nearly unquestioned dominance. Self-determination and its concomitant, anti-racism as a reaction to colonialist white superiority over non-white, rapidly become the issues around which the new members of the organization found a high degree of cohesion as special committees were established to report on developments in non-self-governing territories and anti-colonial resolutions were regularly brought to the forum of the General Assembly. The "Year of Africa" in 1960 witnessed both the entrance into UN membership of 16 African states and greatly increased use of the UN as an anti-colonialist platform and pressure-point with the approval in December of that year of the landmark General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," submitted by 43 Afro-Asian countries. This declaration, passed 89-0 with nine abstentions,
marked a watershed in United Nations politics by placing the sanction of the Charter squarely behind the decolonization forces which had hitherto labored with insufficient votes to hope to effect the passage of a strongly worded resolution except in cases of overt conflict such as Algeria and Cyprus, because of the requisite of a two-thirds majority on certain types of questions regarding non-self-governing territories. Discussions on the status of other dependent areas including Morocco and Tunisia had been carried on without the approval of a resolution clearly favoring their independence.

With the 1961 creation of the 24-member Special Committee on Colonialism (Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), the alignment of forces swung more heavily against the Western powers, which had possessed crucial procedural and membership advantages in the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and had been able to use these bodies to minimize the impact of the colonialism issue and protect the status quo.

As the decolonization process eventuated in UN membership for eight more African states between 1961 and 1963, the opprobrium of General Assembly censure focused sharply upon the governments of Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia (after 1965) in their attempts to force white minority rule on the black populations of southern Africa,
via the fiction of "overseas territories," the imposition of apartheid, and the unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain, respectively. Portugal had been under attack for its colonial policies since its admission to the UN in 1955, but became the target of much greater pressure after Resolution 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961, which called upon the Portuguese government to grant independence to Angola in the wake of anti-government violence and repressive response in that colony. In the face of growing militant opposition to its intransigence, Portugal stood firm in the legal position that all matters in Portuguese Africa were, according to its constitution, internal affairs of the unitary, sovereign Portuguese state and not subject to internationalization under Article 73 of the Charter regardless of the geographical location. Portugal has consistently demanded the right to be the ultimate authority over and on all affairs within its constitutional borders, including such questions as the desires for independence of the peoples of Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique and the ultimate goal of a united multiracial pluricultural society based upon Portugal's civilizing mission in tropical regions dating to the late fifteenth century. Thus, in Lisbon's interpretation, the Portuguese presence in Africa is not imperialism, colonialism, racism, or exploitation in any form, while all supposed "liberation movements" are directed by hostile African states aided and abetted by outside powers, most
notably the United States and the Soviet Union, perhaps with the intent to manipulate these "artificial nationalisms" to their own ends.¹

The Republic of South Africa's problems in the UN can be traced to Resolution 616 (VII), adopted by the Seventh General Assembly on December 5, 1952, stating that the racial segregation policy of apartheid is inconsistent with the obligations of UN members under Article 56 of the Charter to carry out policies promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."²

The resolution also established a commission to study South Africa's racial policies. After the Sharpeville incident of March 21, 1960, in which heavily armed South African police massacred unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against the pass laws, the onslaught of world condemnation for apartheid increased in vigor and volume as South Africa's

¹ For a development of these and other arguments see Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira's Política Externa Portuguesa (Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1965) and his As Nações Unidas e Portugal (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Olímpica, 1961), both composed principally of his many United Nations speeches and press conferences on the anticolonialist movement against Portugal.

² Two earlier Assembly resolutions, Resolution 44 (I) and Resolution 395 (V), dealt more specifically with the treatment of persons of Indian origin within South Africa. Questions regarding South Africa's administration of South West Africa by virtue of a 1919 mandate under the League of Nations have been discussed since the First General Assembly, with early consensus on the position that the disputed territory should be placed under the UN trusteeship system. South Africa has refused this solution and hinted at intentions of eventually annexing the territory.
government simultaneously underlined its determination to strengthen white supremacy and completely suppress non-white demands for equality. On April 1, 1960, the Security Council adopted Resolution S/4300, calling upon the government of South Africa to abandon apartheid in favor of "measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality." This was to be the first of dozens of resolutions passed during the 1960's to condemn apartheid and deplore South Africa's adamant disregard of the General Assembly's repeated requests for a revision of this doctrine. Significant Assembly resolutions of this decade included Resolution 1761 (XVII) of November 6, 1962, in which the General Assembly requested members to institute full diplomatic and economic sanctions and Resolution 2145 (XXI) which legally terminated South Africa's mandate over the territory of South West Africa on October 27, 1966, and transferred the administration of the territory to the UN. Neither resolution could be given binding status or effective implementation because of great power hesitation and refusal of the Security Council to declare that a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" existed which could be subsumed under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter to justify full sanctions or the use of force.

On August 7, 1963, however, in Resolution S/5386 the Security Council agreed that sufficient disturbance of international peace and security did exist to call upon "all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to
South Africa. As the situation developed, a Special Committee on Apartheid created in 1962 reported on events in South Africa and on the effectiveness of the requested sanctions, weakened by the uncooperative attitude of South Africa's major trading partners, which have actually increased their non-military trade and investments. Afro-Asian efforts to expel Pretoria from the United Nations for Charter violations have also come to no avail.

Regarding the imposition of sanctions, a somewhat different configuration of forces has evolved in the case of the 1965 unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and Salisbury's insistence upon maintaining white minority rule. In the face of Afro-Asian demands for mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, the General Assembly on November 11, 1965, adopted Resolution 2022 (XX) which condemned the Rhodesian racial practices as a "crime against humanity," urged Great Britain to intervene, and implored all states not to recognize or assist the minority government. The following day the Security Council in Resolution 216 also condemned the minority regime and recommended non-recognition and non-assistance from all states. On November 20, 1965, in a much more strongly worded declaration (Resolution 217), the Security Council affirmed that the continuance of the Rhodesian situation would be a "threat to international peace and security," classified the unilateral declaration of independence as "having no legal validity," called upon the government of the United
Kingdom to "quell this rebellion of the racist minority," and called upon all states not to recognize or deal with the government of Southern Rhodesia, in particular to do their utmost to break economic relations and institute an embargo on arms, equipment and military material, oil, and petroleum products.

In December of 1966, the Security Council determined in Resolution 232 that the Rhodesian situation still constituted a threat to international peace and security and under Charter Articles 39 and 41 declared broader selective mandatory sanctions. This decision obligated member states to cease importation of Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins, and leather while at the same time refraining from exporting to Rhodesia any type of military hardware, aircraft, motor vehicles, oil, or petroleum products. On May 29, 1968, by means of Resolution 253 the Security Council expanded the sanctions to include a comprehensive ban on trade with Rhodesia in all commodities of any type. A considerable degree of compliance with the sanctions has been forthcoming from nearly all states, with the crucial exceptions of Portugal and South Africa. To circumvent the embargoes against them, however imperfectly observed, Pretoria and Salisbury have developed a close working relationship within which the Portuguese masters of Angola and Mozambique are not strangers. Such a viable, stable, and mutually reinforcing system of economic and political
interaction has been established among these three pariah regimes and with the neighboring countries of Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana that an independent subordinate state system has emerged in Southern Africa, greatly increasing the probability of the survival of the minority regimes and further retarding possibilities for successful international intervention against any one or all of them. ³ Each of the three outcast governments has reaffirmed dedication to present policies and none shows signs of impending internal collapse in spite of the invective poured upon them by the militantly anti-colonialist states. Military ties among the three have been strengthened, with prospects for additional cooperation in the future. South Africa, the dominant and richest member of the group, appears least vulnerable militarily and economically (and even economically vital to the West), while beleagured Portugal has been able to retain a firm hold on Angola and Mozambique, continued guerrilla campaigns notwithstanding. Meanwhile the Western great powers whose involvement is decisive evince only tangential interest in the racial side of the problem, and the stridently anti-colonialist forces in the United Nations find themselves without effective power and incapable of advancing beyond the relatively unproductive resolution syndrome at which Portugal and South Africa have scoffed for several

³For an interesting elaboration of this point see Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, XII, No. 3 (September, 1968), 231-261.
years. The manner in which this tense stalemate will resolve itself appears uncertain, but the answer is more likely to be found in future developments in Southern Africa rather than in New York.

Against the background of Afro-Asian attempts to isolate Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia and in view of the supreme anathema that their governments represent for most Afro-Asian nations, the present chapter will explore Brazilian policy toward these states as both an illustration of Brazilian policy on colonialism in that period and as special cases within the general policy, cases highly suggestive of how the Brazilian government has assessed its interests in the continent across the South Atlantic. Instead of emphasizing degrees of policy differences through time between Brazil and certain Afro-Asian states, radical or moderate groupings, or caucuses as measured in such statistics as UN voting, the thrust of this analysis will be aimed at the bilateral relations between Brazil and the three governments in question, with special attention to Portugal and South Africa. Afro-Asian antagonism toward these regimes has been, with few significant exceptions, so unremittingly and uniformly intense that it will be considered as a given group property for the purposes of this study. Brazilian policy, on the other hand, has frequently been replete with evidence of domestic doubt and vacillation, especially with regard to Portuguese Africa (which is more salient domestically), but also concerning what type of relations Brazil, as a nation professing true racial
democracy, should pursue with South Africa, whose government practices the most extreme form of racism based on theories of racial incompatibility.

**Brazilian Policy on Colonialism in the Postwar Decade**

Initial lack of Brazilian interest in the problems of dependent peoples after World War II is seen in its failure to participate in the San Francisco Conference debates in Committee II/4 on the documents which became the core of Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the United Nations Charter, regulating the trusteeship system and advancing the thesis of certain stipulated responsibilities of colonial powers toward the inhabitants of their colonies, paramount among which were the promotion of their well-being and preparation for their independence. Not having kept abreast of developments in the mandate system since Brazil left the League of Nations, the Foreign Ministry did not anticipate the coming demand for independence which was soon to sweep the European colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  

4 Its attention was occupied principally by inter-American affairs as it had been for the previous two decades. In common with many Spanish American states, Brazil was reluctant to adopt an unambiguously consistent anti-colonialist stance in international organizations because of the cultural

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attraction which the colonial powers of Europe held for the Latin elite classes, the group Wagley terms the Metropolitan Upper Class.  

This generalization applied to Brazil to a greater extent than to many other American republics (such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Haiti), being given additional weight by the exceptionally close relations existing between Rio de Janeiro and Washington since the days of Rio Branco. Brazil repeatedly seemed to follow Washington's lead in colonial matters, a stance not uncongenial to the Metropolitan Upper Class from which its diplomats were drawn almost exclusively before the installation of a broader-based recruitment and examination system in 1946. As anti-colonialism was readily employed by the Communist bloc for purposes of discrediting the West, Brazilian delegations to the United Nations in its early years regularly supported the colonial powers or abstained, even while verbally advocating the rapid granting of independence to dependent territories as a matter of idealistic principle. To ease the strain between these two conflicting policies, Brazil typically defended the creation of an atmosphere of patient moderation and tolerance within which the administering powers themselves could best promote the eventual autonomy of colonial peoples as provided for within the peaceful, legal framework of United Nations institutions. So carefully did Brazil avoid any language that could be considered

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prejudicial and offensive to its Western allies that to all appearances
the Foreign Ministry considered anti-colonialism mainly from the per-
spective of its implications in the Cold War struggle. In this frame of
reference the national interest was clear—effective support for the West,
with whom, after all, emotional ties were much stronger than those few
links Brazil may have had with emergent Afro-Asia, unfamiliar regions
then considered more as competitors than as allies in any sense. 6
Brazil's own transition from colonial to independent status was both too
remote in time and too dissimilar to that of Afro-Asia to provide any
sense of solidarity.

Even when Cold War issues were not at stake, Brazil, by taking
a strict juridical orientation, resisted intervention of international
organizations into colonial disputes. Several such instances occurred
within the inter-American system and separate from obvious ramifications
in the East-West conflict when Guatemala and Argentina (with overtones
of self-interest) attempted to bring the status of British Honduras (Belize),
the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), and the Guianas under the sur-
veillance of the Western Hemispheric regional organization. At the

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6 Taking advantage of this attitudinal set and Latinité, France
frequently requested and usually received Brazilian support in its colonial
difficulties in the United Nations, as it did that of other "moderate"
Latin American states with Francophile leanings. Latin sympathies also
produced Brazilian and general Latin American support for Italian interests
in the disposition by the General Assembly of its former colonies after
World War II.
Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, 1948, Guatemala introduced the topic "European Colonies in America," and after its consideration by a subcommittee the Conference declared the "just aspirations" of the American republics that the colonial status of these dependencies of extra-hemispheric powers be ended. A draft-resolution establishing an American Committee on Dependent Territories to find peaceful ways of decolonizing these areas and to report on their progress was approved, with the abstention of the United States, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Brazil.

João Neves da Fontoura, speaking in his capacity as head of the Brazilian delegation, stated that an inter-American conference was not the "appropriate forum for debating a question that affects the interests of countries outside the continent," countries which had solemnly assumed the obligation under the United Nations Charter and machinery to prepare all dependent territories for self-government. Neither could the American states arrogate jurisdiction and condemnatory rights to themselves when international courts of justice had the function of deciding legal questions and the United Nations possessed adequate procedures for peaceful political solutions. A declaration to this effect was inserted by Brazil into the Final Act of the Conference.7

Similarly, when the same anticolonial issue was raised at the March, 1951, Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington, Brazil abstained from voting on the proposal as presented because it contained language which, according to the Brazilian delegate, might have been interpreted as hostile to several Western European powers and therefore become ammunition for Cold War propaganda. The draft, which dealt with the status of the aforementioned territories should the European administrator fall to Communist imperialism, was also judged by the delegation to be redundant and inopportune, but it was adopted with American and Brazilian abstention.  

During the first decade of the United Nations' operation, Brazil blended its traditional support of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of states with a conciliatory role directed to peaceful solutions and gradual emancipation, which, in the political conditions of the times, meant in practice acceptance of interim compromises and acquiescence to the established powers and rights of the administering states. In 1947, for example, Brazil was a strong proponent of the


Brazilian Institute of International Relations, Brazil and the United Nations, pp. 70-71.
position that Article 73 (e) of the Charter could not be interpreted to require obligatory transmission to the ad hoc Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories of information by colonial powers on conditions within their colonies, nor did this Committee have the competence to analyze political (as opposed to social) information. With the colonial powers, Brazil argued that transmission of information must proceed on a purely voluntary basis, a view not shared by many Latin American states. Although Brazil later evolved under Vargas (1950-1954) to a position which favored stronger United Nations supervisory powers over administered territories, it continued to demonstrate an inclination to abstain when a particular colonial power was singled out by name in an even mildly condemnatory resolution and to advance conciliatory resolutions expressing hopes for and confidence in just and equitable settlements leading to greater freedom for the colonies and attained through pacific resort to mediation, arbitration, adjudication, or bilateral negotiations, in conformity with the principles outlined in the Charter. This cautious approach characteristically reaffirmed United Nations competence in such matters but also had the deliberate advantage of not antagonizing the major colonial powers with which Brazil desired good relations by limiting that competence to spheres which did not seriously interfere with their freedom of action. This

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was the implicit Brazilian rationale in the important questions of the independence of Morocco, Tunisia, and later Algeria, in which consideration of concrete political power realities and interest took precedence over abstract principles of anti-colonialism and self-determination. Although the latter were not abandoned by any means, they were pursued with considerably less than full vigor. 10

Brazil, Portugal, and Portuguese Africa: The Controversial Triangle

When in December, 1955, Portugal was admitted to the United Nations as part of a package compromise involving 15 other states, Brazil was one of its co-sponsors and most faithful allies. Cooperation with Portugal was assured by the sentimentality and affectivity long pervading Luso-Brazilian relations, a romanticism which evoked common historical, cultural, and linguistic ties to solidify (or perhaps justify) a common stand internationally. As described in 1957 by João Neves da Fontoura, Foreign Minister from January to July, 1946, and January, 1951, to June, 1953, "Our policy toward Portugal is not a 'policy.' It is a family affair. No one plays politics with his parents or siblings. He lives with them, in the intimacy of kinship and sentiment. In difficult

times each one searches for support and counsel among his loved ones. Without rules. Without treaties. Without recompense. By virtue of kinship.\footnote{11} According to this interpretation Brazil, as a faithful son, had a moral debt of unconditional support which it owed Portugal in return for Portugal's role in constructing the Brazilian civilization.

The legal groundwork enshrining this special relationship which was to have great implications in Brazil's future African policies was the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, signed in Rio de Janeiro on November 16, 1953, ratified a year later, and promulgated by the Brazilian government in January, 1955. Through this document both parties expressed their desire to "consagrate, in a solemn political instrument, the principles which orient the Luso-Brazilian Community in the world," attributing this desire to a realization of "the spiritual, moral, ethnic, and linguistic affinities that, after more than three centuries of common history, continue to tie the Brazilian Nation to the Portuguese Nation, from which results a most special situation for the reciprocal interests of the two peoples." The most important articles of the Treaty were three.\footnote{12}


\footnote{12} The treaty's text may be found in Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Divisão de Atos, Congressos e Conferências Internacionais, Brasil-Portugal: Tratado de Amizade e Consulta (Coleção de Atos Internacionais, No. 357) Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Publicações do MRE, 1955.
Article One

The High Contracting Parties, with the intention of reaffirming and consolidating the perfect friendship which exists between the two brotherly peoples, agree that, in the future, they will always consult each other on international problems of their obvious common interest.

Article Two

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to grant to the nationals of the other special treatment which will make them equal to its own nationals in everything which is not directly regulated contrariwise in the constitutional provisions of the two Nations, [equal] in the juridical, commercial, economic, financial, and cultural spheres, with the protection of the local authorities being as broad as that granted to its own nationals.

Article Eight

The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to study, whenever opportune and necessary, the means of developing the progress, harmony, and prestige of the Luso-Brazilian Community in the world.

The Treaty was to be in effect for ten years after its ratification, with optional renewal every ten years thereafter. It depended for its effectiveness upon the passage of complementary domestic legislation to expedite some of its provisions; the slowness of this legislation in appearing in Brazil was a measure of the divided state of opinion as to the relative advantages of "equal treatment" when, among other things, Portuguese citizens and activities in Brazil far outweighed Brazilian citizens and activities in Portugal. A bi-national commission established in June, 1957, was to coordinate conclusions on treaty implementation reached by separate national committees. The joint declaration of the presidents of the two states in creating the
commission gave an indication of the early role of the Treaty in the area of foreign policy, where enabling legislation was not necessary.

The Treaty of Friendship and Consultation has already had its practical and creative projection, causing a more fruitful and intimate collaboration of the two Governments in the field of foreign policy, continuing to tighten the traditional ties that unite them and the interdependent interests of the vast Portuguese-speaking world. Portugal and Brazil, in the consumption of a conception in which national ideals and interests find their place in the broader framework of common ideals and interests, are taking their position, hand in hand, in world politics. 13

Despite any other manifestations of anticolonialism which may have animated the governments of Café Filho (1954-55) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), their sympathy was solidly on the side of Portugal in its tribulations in the United Nations. Café Filho, in an official visit to Portugal in April, 1955, to attempt to broaden the execution of the Treaty to all Portuguese-speaking regions of the world, glorified the discoveries and civilizing mission of the Portuguese nation at a banquet offered by Portuguese President Craveiro Lopes.

We have clear knowledge of all that we owe to Portugal, from the discovery of our country and its incorporation into the civilized world to the efforts and struggles of its national formation. . . . This is but a minor detail in comparison to a much wider debt, which is the debt of the human race itself to this country. 14


Alluding to questions raised in the General Assembly concerning the Portuguese territories in Africa the Brazilian president explained,

The concern shown recently by Brazil when disquieting threats hovered over Portuguese territories was nothing but the spontaneous fulfillment of a fraternal duty, which should prevail not only in moments of rejoicing but equally in difficult times... It is never out of place to call attention to the trait of generosity of the Portuguese, to bring about in all continents a labor of civilization which in practice has been much more useful and beneficial to others than to themselves. 15

Referring to the Treaty and what he termed the identical origins and aspirations of Portugal and Brazil during an official visit to Brazil of Portuguese President Craveiro Lopes in 1957, Kubitschek observed the appropriateness of the unique solidarity provided for by the 1953 document.

We Portuguese and Brazilians have a single national soul and our desire of union is a nostalgia for the primordial union. Tying ourselves so strongly together on the international scene we are doing nothing more than reuniting and welding together the fragments of that same common soul which was dispersed in the astonishing epic of Portuguese expansion in the world. 16

15 Ibid., p. 68. An illustration of the attitudinal set of Café Filho during this visit is his revelation years later in an interview that while visiting the Castelo de Guimarães, historic birthplace of Portugal, he was so overwhelmed emotionally by the experience that his personal physician accompanying the group saw it necessary to give him immediate treatment to ward off a possible heart attack. See "O Ultramar e Bastião Avançado da Comunidade," O Mundo Português, June 23, 1968, Second Section, p. 1.

Effusive sentimentality, father-son relationship metaphors, idealization of the "glorious past" of Portugal, the unity of interests, and the concept of an immeasurable Brazilian debt toward Portugal were constants in Luso-Brazilian relations during the terms of Café Filho and Kubitschek and were investments which paid off handsomely in Brazilian support in what was largely a unilateral obligation as Portugal invoked the Treaty to criticize Brazil privately whenever the latter failed to consult with Lisbon on "international problems of their obvious common interest." Such a situation arose in October, 1957, when Brazil became co-sponsor of a General Assembly resolution creating an Economic Committee for Africa without consulting Portugal, whose Foreign Minister Paulo Cunha felt that such a committee would be harmful to Portuguese interests and made a complaint to the Brazilian Ambassador, based upon the Treaty, even though it was not in full operation at the time.\footnote{Álvaro Lins, Missão em Portugal (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1960), pp. 8-9.}

According to Horacio Láfer, Foreign Minister from August, 1959, to January, 1961, Kubitschek's clear instructions to Itamaraty were that in any case and especially in difficult ones, Brazil should vote with Portugal in international organizations, while in regard to the controversial questions of Angola and Mozambique Láfer himself felt that the best policy would be to second the Portuguese decisions on
how to handle the issue. 18 The irony of this state of affairs was that Portugal expected, and usually received, Brazil's involvement and assistance with its own votes and speeches and whatever help it could muster in Latin America when Portuguese Africa was discussed in the United Nations but at the same time Salazar and his foreign ministers assiduously avoided any Brazilian involvement, presence, or influence in Portuguese Guine, Angola, or Mozambique while not failing to employ set phrases about the "Portuguese-speaking world." Álvaro Lins, Ambassador to Lisbon during most of the Kubitschek administration (from December, 1956, to October, 1959), was keenly aware of what he saw as Brazilian responsibilities and possibilities in the overseas territories and suggested to Itamaraty the desirability of promoting trade and cultural relations with these areas, but without stimulating or provoking their eventual drive toward independence. The many studies which the Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon sent to the Foreign Ministry on the subject urged the government to prepare for an active role in the future of these colonies which, reported Lins, would one day be independent Portuguese-speaking nations. If his advice on contact and trade was ignored by Itamaraty, the reaction of the Portuguese government was even more unfavorable. 19 The classified set of "Notas

18 _O Globo_, December 9, 1961, Special Supplement on Portugal, p. 15.

19 Lins, pp. 272-279.
Interpretativas" which was drawn up in 1958 by the two governments to regulate the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation defined the Treaty as taking in all of Brazil's territory but specifically excluded from the "Community" the overseas territories of Portugal, a point which Lisbon made unmistakably clear in high-level diplomatic discussions. 20

Despite this unequal yoke of obligations and privileges, the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations aided the cause of Portugal by subscribing to and defending the thesis of "overseas provinces" and maintaining the discretionary and voluntary right of any administering power to yield or withhold information on the territories within its jurisdiction, under Article 73 (e) of the Charter, the latter point somewhat of a reversal of the more anticolonialist stance of the second Vargas period before Portugal was admitted and began to draw criticism. Most probably with an eye toward safeguarding Portugal's interests, although France's colonial problems certainly did not go unnoticed, Brazil voted and lobbied whenever possible in such a way as to have sensitive colonial issues declared substantive questions which would require a two-thirds vote for resolutions, thus purposively hindering

20 Ibid., pp. 378-379. It is revealing to note that Lins, who finally broke with Kubitschek over what he considered the subservience of Brazilian policy to the wishes of the Salazar dictatorship, was replaced in 1959 as Ambassador to Lisbon by Francisco Negrão de Lima, whose views were much less likely to offend the Portuguese government. Lins subsequently carried on an unsuccessful public campaign to discourage Kubitschek from paying an official visit to Lisbon in 1960 and then became an authorized spokesman for elements of the anti-Salazar Portuguese immigrants in Brazil.
the efforts of the Afro-Asians to bring greater pressure or condemnation upon these colonial powers. 21 Such was the case when the question of transmission of information on non-self-governing territories by new members (and particularly Portugal) was raised in January, 1957, in the Fourth Committee by anti-colonialist states which maintained that the General Assembly had clear responsibility and proper jurisdiction to determine which new members had an obligation to transmit reports. Ceylon, Greece, Liberia, Nepal, and Syria submitted a draft resolution to establish an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly for this purpose. Brazil, in completely rejecting the arguments of the anti-colonialist group, cited the Portuguese constitution as an authoritative source to determine the unity of all the national territory, favorably compared the situation in Portuguese Africa with the historical unity between Portugal and Brazil from 1808-1821, and, in short, defended Portugal as ably and in the same manner as did its own representative. Thus a two-pronged thesis was espoused: regarding all identification of non-self-governing territories, the state responsible for the administration of its territory had the right to determine its constitutional status while the Assembly was incompetent (following practice since 1946); in the specific instance of Portugal additional, unique factors were marshalled

21 The nucleus of the European self-image of the Brazilian Metropolitan Upper Class was their cultural and historical links to Portugal and France, with whom they would much rather identify than any of the nations of Africa, Asia, or the Middle East.
to show that ever since "Portugal took her civilization overseas,"
Portuguese territory had been "a cultural and psychological whole, a
single unit" without discrimination as to race, color, religion, or social
condition. The Brazilian representative concluded that his delegation
could not find "any concrete reason for disagreeing with the Portuguese
Government when it states that Portugal does not administer Non-Self-
Governing Territories." 22

Although the disparity between official characterizations of
Brazil as an anti-colonialist nation and systematic support of positions
which tended to postpone the end of colonialism could be satisfactorily
maintained in the political atmosphere of the United Nations until 1958
or 1960, some delegates experienced misgivings about the continued
viability of such ambivalence when subjected to certain rising pressure
from African nationalism as demonstrated in the April, 1958, Pan-
African Conference in Accra and the anticipated admission of many new
African members in the near future. An anti-colonial consensus was
making itself felt in the world organization, and in a wider range of
cases the colonialist powers and their allies found themselves less
capable of obtaining majorities to defend their interests. 23

22 United Nations, General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Fourth
Committee, Statement Made by the Representative of Brazil at the 617th

23 For an empirical treatment of this consensus, see Edward T.
Rowe, "The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations,"
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII, No. 3 (September, 1964), 209-
230.
the impending defeat of the overseas provinces device as a means to keep the status of the Portuguese territories from becoming a subject of censure, a Brazilian senator serving as delegate to the Thirteenth General Assembly noted in his report to the Senate that a revision of the nation's policy on colonialism was imperative to adapt it to clearly emerging trends.

The time has come for us to reconsider the middle of the road policy that always directed our action as we confronted situations generated by the nationalistic expansion of the African peoples. Without endorsing, of course, the extremism of the Arab-Asian group we can conciliate our course of action with the irrepressible dynamism of the political tendencies of the continent in the face of the obsolete and isolated conservative attitude of some administering powers. Otherwise we risk remaining isolated when other countries are reviewing their policies to fall into line with the reality that is daily being expressed in that organization. 24

In August, 1960, on the occasion of the celebrations marking the five-hundredth anniversary of the death of Prince Henry the Navigator, Kubitschek made an official visit to Portugal and signed six treaties designed to operationalize further the ideas of community enunciated by the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, regulating tourist exchange, passport visas, juridical assistance, diplomatic and consular representation, extradition, and questions pertaining to individuals holding citizenship in both states. The Brazilian president, again as always

in similar ceremonies, emphasized the special character of Luso-Brazilian relations by stating to Portuguese President Américo Tomás, "We have not merely diplomatic or cordial relations, but family ties. We are a unique case in the world." He also referred to a "solidarity which transcends material interests, which is even independent of our volition, which is stronger than our will—the solidarity of kinship, the solidarity of the cradle, of the first hours of development." 25

Concrete ramifications of this primordial solidarity on Brazilian policy were seen later that year in the voting on the first General Assembly resolution which focused specifically upon the Portuguese colonies. Although Brazil voted in favor of the historic Declaration on Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) and Resolution 1541, enumerating principles to guide members in determining whether or not an obligation existed to transmit information on Non-Self-Governing Territories under Article 73e, it voted against Resolution 1542 of December 15, 1960, which listed all Portuguese overseas possessions by name and declared that Portugal had the obligation to transmit information on them. In casting one of the six negative votes Brazil isolated itself with Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, and the Union of South Africa because its delegation held that since principles for determining obligations to transmit information had already been set

forth and a Special Committee of Six existed to study such principles, it was inappropriate for the Committee on Information to discuss the transmission of information by Portugal and for the General Assembly to single out Portugal for noncompliance, as the decision whether or not to submit information rested with the individual member state. This stand was clearly coherent with principles Brazil had espoused since Portugal's admission, but what was remarkable was its willingness to vote negatively when 12 Latin American states supported the resolution and 5 abstained, as did the United States and the United Kingdom.

Some Brazilians hoped for a stronger stand on Portugal when the outspokenly anti-colonialist Quadros succeeded the Lusophile Kubitschek on January 31, 1961. In his public statements and ambitions concerning Africa, the new Chief Executive made clear his intentions of unambiguous anti-colonialism, as in the message to Congress.

We are a people of all races in which color, religion, and political affiliation are irrelevant and the individual stands on his personal worth. We do not accept any form or type of colonialism or imperialism. It can be affirmed with the most absolute sincerity that Brazil will strive so that all colonial peoples, we repeat, all, without exception, attain their independence in the shortest possible time and in conditions which best permit their stability and progress.26

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Kubitschek, by contrast, had trod much more lightly upon this issue, giving merely cautious passing mention to anti-colonialism of any style in his major policy addresses and programs, almost as if anti-colonialism were a trival ephemera which did not merit Brazil's interest beyond passive observation and de jure recognition of new states. Quadros consciously sought to use an anti-colonial posture as an ideological instrument to increase Brazilian prestige among African nations for cooperation in development, but his plans to vote independently on matters affecting Angola and to follow Africa events without consultation with Lisbon clashed with strong pro-Portuguese opposition in most politically important sectors of society, the large Portuguese immigrant organizations, and the Foreign Ministry itself as for the first time Brazilian support for an increasingly isolated Portugal was openly questioned. The result of this severe divergence of opinion was that Brazil sometimes abstained and sometimes voted against rather than with Portugal from 1961 to 1964, leading Salazar's regime to devise various expedients to attempt to recover the lost vote.

The first test of Quadros' philosophy and resolve came in early 1961 as the Security Council and General Assembly discussed the outbreak of nationalist rebellion in Angola. After the divided Council failed to act on a draft-resolution initially introduced by Liberia, the matter was referred to the General Assembly with Brazilian approval. However, Brazil did not immediately state its position on the problem,
basing its actual vote, in the phrasing of the Foreign Ministry, on the "duty of concluding the conversations with Portugal according to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation."²⁷ (Emphasis added.) These conversations were accomplished via the visit to Lisbon of Foreign Minister Arinos, returning from the independence celebrations in Senegal, and their conclusion, in the official interpretation of Brazil made public on April 14, left the Brazilian government "entirely free to accompany the development of the African situation, according to its firm anti-colonial and anti-discriminatory policy, outspokenly favorable to the self-determination of all peoples."²⁸ In the General Assembly vote of April 20, Resolution 1603 (XV) as passed 73 to 2 with 9 abstentions called upon the government of Portugal "to consider urgently" measures to bring independence to Angola in accordance with Resolution 1514 and created a subcommittee of five members to conduct inquiries on Angola. Although Brazil supported the first part of the resolution, it attempted unsuccessfully to convince the 36 Afro-Asian sponsors to modify or eliminate the second part, finding it "inoperative, excessive, and conducive to useless complications, as in the cases of the commissions on Hungary and Southwest Africa."²⁹ As the sponsoring group remained


²⁹_Ibid._, p. 70.
intractable, Brazil abstained on what could be considered either as a technical point or as a desire to protect Portugal's freedom of action in Angola.

The following month Francisco Negrão de Lima, Ambassador to Lisbon, visited Angola at the invitation of the Portuguese authorities and publicly uttered only praise for what had been accomplished there. Although his final report to Itamaraty remained veiled in secrecy, his well-known pro-Portuguese partisanship led to some criticism in Brazil on the basis of probable lack of objectivity in assessing the situation as it pertained to the national interest. Nevertheless, in December, 1961, Brazil supported two resolutions of the General Assembly, the first recommending UN assistance for Angolan refugees in the Republic of the Congo and the second condemning the non-compliance of Portugal in the transmission of information and its refusal to cooperate with the Committee on Information. The second resolution also established a Special Committee of seven members to investigate conditions in the territories and formulate recommendations to the Assembly. Although Brazil now agreed to the concept of an investigatory committee, its delegation stated that the word "deplored" would be preferred to "condemned" as applied to Portugal's non-compliance.

Resolution 1671 (XVI) passed by 67 votes to 0 with 11 abstentions, and Resolution 1699 (XVI) passed by 90 to 3 with 2 abstentions.
The year of 1962 marked a watershed of sorts in Brazilian policy on Portuguese Africa as Itamaraty under President Goulart and Minister San Tiago Dantas sent out orders, dating from Quadros, to advance gradually with a firmer anti-colonialist line to avoid attrition of Brazil's image in Afro-Asia because of hesitancy in taking a clearer stand when Portugal, in African interpretation, was left as the only example of unrelenting, white, foreign-imposed colonialism. Even while appreciating and understanding Brazil's unique position, most Afro-Asian states expected an evolution in this stance and observed that many moderate states appeared to base their statements in general debate on the tenor of the presentation of the Brazilian delegation. To some extent, then, the Brazilian position was pivotal in the tone of debate if not in the outcome of the votes.

The classic definition of the Foreign Ministry's position at this time was carefully phrased by Chief Delegate Afonso Arinos in January, 1962, as he opened the General Assembly plenary debate on Angola, tracing the position of his country to two factors: Brazil's "most special" historical and cultural ties to Portugal and its traditional anti-colonialism evolving from racial brotherhood, geographic position, economic interests, and a conviction that anti-colonialism was, with disarmament, one of the two great problems of the century. Classifying

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31 Interview with a former Brazilian delegate to the United Nations Fourth Committee, October 29, 1968.
the situation in Angola as worsening and dangerous to the maintenance of world peace, Arinos warned that a military solution as proposed by some would not solve the impasse but that a peaceful outcome would be facilitated should Portugal recognize the right of the Angolans to self-determination and prepare the administrative and legislative reforms requisite to the granting of self-government. He urged Portugal itself to "assume the direction of the movement for the liberty of Angola" and to "accept the natural march of history." In this area Brazil felt a definite responsibility to assist Portugal in the pacific resolution of her colonial conflicts, to assure the survival of Portuguese language and culture in Africa and harmonious relations within the Portuguese-speaking world, relations which could only be strained by prolonged armed struggle. 32

Routine in its call for compromise and moderation, this important policy statement differed sharply from previous ones in that the friendship with Portugal ("laços especialíssimos") was no longer construed to require either tacit or explicit support for Portuguese colonialism while Brazilian defense of independence for the territories was said to be designed to protect the enlightened long-run interests of Portugal, even if Lisbon should choose not to acknowledge the fact. Desirous of

32 The speech, which was given widespread domestic publicity, is reproduced in San Tiago Dantas, Política Externa Independente (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1962), pp. 195-200.
maintaining friendship with Portugal yet defending the independence of Portuguese Africa, to which Lisbon did not concede the remotest probability, Brazil was running the risk of falling between two stools. This clearly announced position greatly disturbed Lisbon and pro-Portuguese elements in Brazil but equal Afro-Asian obstinacy precluded a coveted role as moderator. Indicative of the political climate of the Sixteenth Assembly was the failure to gain general acceptance of a Brazilian idea aimed at seeking a conciliatory rather than a mutually inflammatory formula via a non-condemnatory resolution which would have asserted that no state need feel its sovereignty infringed in allowing on its soil an investigating committee duly established under the Charter by the General Assembly and would have urged Portugal to cooperate with the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola and expressed hopes that Portugal would take adequate measures to grant independence to Angola as other European states had granted to their non-self-governing territories on the African continent. 33

33 Consistent with its long-established blanket policy against the use of force as a means to settle territorial disputes, Brazil protested the December, 1961, Indian occupation of Goa, Daman, and Diu, a position shared by few Afro-Asian states, less concerned with legal questions and more with matters of principle relating to Western colonial enclaves entrenched for centuries. To emphasize Brazilian solidarity with Portugal in this matter, the official protest was delivered to U Thant by the head of the Brazilian delegation in the company of Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira. Under Kubitschek, Itamaraty had generally accepted the Portuguese interpretation of conflict with India over these territories as well as protected Portuguese interests in India after they severed relations, so the 1961 protest conformed to past practice.
The actual draft-resolution as it came before the Assembly was supported by Brazil, although it was considerably broader and stronger in coverage than the preferred Brazilian version, because it did not "condemn" Portugal but rather "deplored" that country's lack of cooperation and "deprecated" its repressive measures while reaffirming the "inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence" and urging Portugal to institute reforms leading to independence, while at the same time requesting all member states to refrain from lending Portugal any assistance which might be used to suppress the Angolans. 34 The record on Portuguese Africa during the remaining years of Goulart's presidency reveals a notable and curious ambivalence, as the delegation abstained on all the important resolutions in the General Assembly but cast votes against Portugal twice in the Security Council, always speaking in favor of independence for the territories but on occasion resorting to abstention on procedural grounds to avoid open condemnation of Portugal. Such painful inconsistency was a function of changing figures in the Foreign Ministry and the United Nations accompanied by great domestic resistance encountered whenever a vote contrary to Portugal was cast for the supposedly gratuitous purpose of appealing to the anti-colonialist bloc. The latter bone of contention was in reality an international ramification of the domestic

34 General Assembly Resolution 1742 (XVI), January 30, 1962, adopted 99 to 2 with 1 abstention.
political struggle between conservatives and developmental nationalists, with neither able to gain the upper hand in what had rapidly become the number one issue of the Afro-Asian policy. As a consequence the Foreign Ministry was the focus of powerful cross pressures.

An example par excellence of the lengths to which this conflict was carried within the executive branch itself has been documented by historian José Honório in discrepancies existing between two separate printings of the presidential message to Congress in 1963. The wording of the first printing in reaffirming Brazil's anti-colonialism stated

We have recognized and will continue to recognize the right to independence of all colonial peoples and the obligation of colonial and administrative powers to accelerate the preparations for independence, including that of Angola and the other overseas territories of Portugal as well as South West Africa. (Emphasis added.)

The second version casually omitted the portions of this sentence relating to Portuguese Africa and South West Africa, reportedly at the behest of Foreign Minister Hermes Lima to avoid offending the Portuguese and the vocal Portuguese sympathizers in Brazil, a pressure group which according to Honório was responsible for substantial modification in Brazil's UN position on Angola after 1961 through well-coordinated domestic opposition to any votes or remarks antagonistic to the aims of the Salazar regime in Africa.

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36 Interview with José Honório Rodrigues, September 17, 1968.
As if to accent further the internal divisions over policy, the most unequivocal stand against Portuguese colonialism ever taken by Brazil was assumed in the presence of the Portuguese Foreign Minister that July in the Security Council, leading to a nadir in relations between the two countries. Representative Carvalho Silos, while still recommending avoidance of drastic measures which would serve merely to antagonize Portugal and preclude conciliation, spoke clearly in favor of the independence of the territories, which Brazil no longer accepted as overseas provinces and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Although he reaffirmed the responsibility felt by Brazil in the matter and placed the services of its diplomacy at Lisbon's disposal to expedite a peaceful evolutionary granting of self-determination, the Brazilian representative went so far as to warn that his country would be forced to harden its policy, should Portugal fail to reconsider its actions in Africa.\(^{37}\) As a follow-up to this declaration Brazil voted to favor Resolution S/5380 which stated that Portuguese policies represented a threat to peace and security in Africa and called upon Portugal to take steps to end the colonial wars and transfer power to freely elected representatives with a granting of independence. The resolution also requested all states to refrain from offering the Portuguese

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government any assistance, arms, or military equipment which could be used to pursue colonial wars.

The Security Council speech was applauded by those who, like José Honório, felt that Brazil could not "approach Africa arm in arm with Salazar" in harness for his objectives but that it could cooperate fully with independent Portuguese-speaking nations on the opposite shores of the South Atlantic. Although there were some sympathizers of Holden Roberto's União das Populações de Angola and Mário de Andrade's Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, these were rather few and restricted largely to the intellectual class of journalists, professors, and authors who energetically denounced tacit complicity with the Portuguese as constituting submission to "sentimental blackmail" through a Lusitanian Community into which Brazil would enter belatedly "as a dupe just to pay for the broken china."

To this reduced group, failure to support the Angolan liberation movements was tantamount to a betrayal of all the ethnic and biological elements which were absorbed from Angolan Negroes who helped give Brazil its unique racial and cultural cast, as well as a fatal stumbling block to desirable growth of Brazilian prestige in Africa.

38 Honório, p. 367.


40 Even after Eduardo Mondlane formed the Frente de Libertação de Mozambique in 1962 and launched armed struggle the following year,
Brazilian books and magazines circulating comparatively freely in Angola gave the Portuguese-speaking Africans an opportunity to become acquainted with Brazil, but curiously, either because of lack of interest or a conspiracy of silence the anti-colonialists attributed to pro-Portuguese groups, no similar literature from or about Portuguese Africa found a readership in Brazil. Even at the height of Goulart's independent foreign policy little information about Portuguese Africa and the conflicts there was published in Brazil and the items which did appear usually were either noncommittal wire releases or adhered to the Portuguese line, the most notable exceptions being campaigns undertaken by the staid Estado de São Paulo and the populist Última Hora of Rio de Janeiro to publicize the nature of the liberation struggle and assist its leaders in finding the support they were hoping for in Brazil.41

From 1961 to March, 1964, a group of exiled young Angolan students in São Paulo, several with scholarships from the Foreign Ministry, formed the nucleus of the resistance movement in Brazil under the name of the "Afro-Brazilian Movement for the Liberation of Angola"

Angola remained by far the most salient of the territories of Portuguese Africa for Brazilians because of greater proximity to Brazil in both geographic and cultural senses.

41A publishing house noted for leftist ideological and developmental nationalist studies released a collected volume of poems and stories written by black Portuguese-speaking Africans but it enjoyed only narrow circulation. See João Alves das Neves, ed., Poetas e Contistas Africanos de Expressão Portuguesa (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1963). Several of the works of Mário de Andrade were published in the short-lived magazine Paratodos.
(MAPLA) and with the collaboration of journalists, professors, students, and intellectuals. In correspondence with Mário de Andrade, the leaders of MAPLA proposed to counteract the strong pro-Portuguese propaganda (which promptly labeled them as Communist) and establish a climate of public opinion conducive to the exertion of Brazilian suasion upon Lisbon to expedite the independence of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. Laboring under a double burden, the sparsely equipped organization was forced to contend not only with diffuse pro-Portuguese sentiment and ignorance about conditions in the territories but also with the growing inclination of their ideological Brazilian associates to combine the African and Cuban problems as one, a trend which Mário de Andrade judged counterproductive for the movement. The principal sources of effective cooperation came from a prominent São Paulo daily, the Foreign Ministry under San Tiago Dantas, and interested African embassies in Rio de Janeiro but proved insufficient to impel the group beyond the status of a mere exile movement with little impact on the politically relevant sectors of public opinion.  

If certain nationalist activists were encouraged by the hardening of the policy toward Portugal during the last year of Goulart's regime, other influential and more traditionally oriented politicians were dismayed by the turn of events, which they considered one more irresponsible deviation

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42 Interview with Paulo dos Santos Matoso Neto, June 20, 1968.
from established patterns in national political style. Typical of such reaction was the report presented to the Senate by the delegation of observers from that body to the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly, criticizing the recent evolution of policy (and particularly the Security Council vote of July) as harmful to the national interest and a retreat based merely upon doubtful political considerations which did not adequately take into account such factors as the special relationship with Portugal, the place of Portuguese Africa in national security, the advantages Portugal could afford in expanding exports to Europe, and the tenacity of the Africans in protecting their own economic privileges in Europe against Latin American penetration. 43

The 1964 revolution was generally regarded by the Lusophiles as a triumph over the so-called Afro-Asian group in the Foreign Ministry which was antagonizing Portugal and sabotaging the Community ever since the early days of Quadros' presidency. The actions of the military government bore out this expectation as the more vocal anti-colonialists of Itamaraty were quietly removed from positions of power and the chief Brazilian delegate to the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva was called home to explain the position of his delegation and most pointedly the rationale behind Brazilian accompaniment

of several African delegations which left the conference hall after Portugal requested the floor. Under the name of "Inquérito Policial Militar do Grupo Angolano" and reputedly with supervision from agents of Salazar's PIDE (International Police for Defense of the State), intelligence officers of the CENIMAR (Secret Service of the Brazilian Navy) imprisoned and interrogated MAPIA activists and other African students because of their participation in a pro-liberation movement, occasioning the intervention of several African embassies to secure the release of their affected nationals. The results of this investigation were delivered in documentary form to the Supreme Military Tribunal for evaluation.44

From the first days of the revolutionary government, Foreign Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha declared that the policy of Brazil would be one of defense of Portuguese interests, and after four months of the new regime he counted the improvement of relations with "beloved Portugal" as one of the most important accomplishments of the Foreign Ministry under his direction.45 In the United Nations Brazil made it clear that it would begin to vote with Portugal on questions concerning its possessions in Africa.


In a graduation address at the diplomatic corps' Rio Branco Institute on July 31, 1964, President Castello Branco touched officially for the first time a topic long discussed in private circles as he suggested that a possible solution to the national dilemma of anti-colonialist sentiment clashing with special ties to Portugal might be found in the "gradual formation of an Afro-Luso-Brazilian Community, in which the Brazilian presence would strengthen the system economically."46 This conception had been championed for several years by Gilberto Freyre, a fellow Northeasterner, as "a federation with common citizenship and a number of other common rights and responsibilities."47 During Goulart's regime, however, the Brazilian government was reluctant to consider such a plan publicly for ideological reasons and Portugal remained hesitant about allowing Brazilian penetration into the overseas provinces, although former Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas revealed in commenting on Castello Branco's speech that such a triangular Community had in fact been the subject of earlier "very interesting conversations" between the two states in 1962 but that Brazil had then taken the position that this integration could occur only after Portuguese


Africa had gained its independence. The new political configuration in Brazil coupled with greater international resistance to Portuguese colonialism, not to mention the outbreak of fighting in Mozambique, produced by the end of 1964 a set of circumstances in which Brazil dropped its insistence on the prerequisite of independence (stressing instead the dangers of "premature disengagement" and "new imperialisms") and Portugal began to ponder the merits of the Community in maintaining itself as an African power after 400 years of attempts to keep Brazil out of its African possessions. A transformation in the basic tenor of Luso-Brazilian relations was becoming discernible, as President Castello Branco expressed the belief of his government that Portugal was giving birth to new Brazils in southern Africa.

Regarding the Portuguese policy in the overseas [provinces], Brazil, although confirming its position on the issue of self-determination, expresses its conviction that Portugal will be able to resolve its problems in the spirit of its historical traditions, traditions which directed the formation of the Brazilian national soul and gave shape to the type of multiracial society dominant in Brazil. The confidence of Brazil in the civilizing mission of Portugal therefore derives from the consideration of concrete facts, proven by sociology and by history.

On August 5, 1965, two months after a productive official visit to Brazil, Portuguese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira formally


49 Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento Cultural e de Informações, Textos e Declarações Sobre Política Externa (de abril de 1964 a abril de 1965), p. 35.
proposed in a news conference in Lisbon the expansion of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation to encompass all of Portugal's overseas territories, eventually integrating the two nations into a huge Luso-Brazilian Community which would afford Brazil free ports, markets, and resources around the world, should the necessary treaties be negotiated and ratified. This reversal of position, garnished with the usual rhetoric, contained two points upon which serious discord would arise. The first, in the guise of reciprocity in delineating common borders, stipulated that "When we place without restrictions all that we are and have at the disposition of Brazil, we assume that Brazil will also accept without restrictions all we are and have." This precondition and a reference to "the whole Portuguese nation" indicated that Brazil was being requested to stamp its approval without reservations on Portuguese colonialism in Africa by becoming part of it. The second consideration, all the more ominous because of its imprecise formulation, centered on what Franco Nogueira cryptically called "common external action for the guarantee and defense of the territorial, cultural, and moral estate that belongs to both [nations]," a phrase which in the context of further explanations was taken to imply an eventual military alliance as the ultimate desideratum. Portuguese insistence that the Community was primarily political in nature did little

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to quell the apprehensions that should the concept develop further, Brazil might find itself morally implicated or physically involved in Portugal’s colonial wars and by association in its dealings with South Africa. After the offer became known, higher officials in the Foreign Ministry and the Army as well as leaders in Congress were prone to praise the advantages of the plan in Brazil’s emerging global economic strategy, but to others misgivings about the unforeseen political and military ramifications of what could become a Pandora’s Box dictated more scepticism and cautious circumspection.

Brazil’s impetus to action came after the November, 1965, visit to Portugal of the President of the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), who was given a tour of Angola and Mozambique

51 During Franco Nogueira’s trip to Brazil in June, 1965, this Community concept was discussed in confidential meetings with officials of the Castello Branco government. Although it is difficult to establish the date when both parties considered the undertaking feasible, it appears that discreet Portuguese soundings began soon after the foreign policy course of the revolutionary government became known and that the leadership of the revolution was ideologically predisposed to the general principle. The more troublesome question of a military alliance was another matter, for although there was a modicum of interchange between the armed services of the two countries, it did not yet extend beyond occasional exchange of visits and decorations or the attendance of officers in technical schools in the other nation. The Portuguese military, however, would welcome any assistance it could receive in Africa and looked favorably on an alliance with Brazil. See, for example, the suggestive feeler addressed to the Brazilian military shortly after the revolution by the Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Navy, Vice-Admiral Armando de Roboredo: "Aspectos militares da comunidade luso-brasileira," Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Series 82, Nos. 7-9 and 10-12 (July-September and October-December, 1964), 279-288,
at the unanticipated invitation of the Salazar government and returned home with hopes to revise commercial agreements to initiate a promising triangular trade to facilitate Brazil's penetration into the markets of the European Free Trade Association and southern Africa. Publicizing what he saw as the achievements of the Portuguese in the metropolis and in Africa, Garrido Torres reasoned that through the formation of an intercontinental political and economic Community Brazil could strengthen the ideal of racial tolerance which was threatened in Africa, obtain a guaranteed market for manufactured exports, and enhance national security. This point of view corresponded closely to those of Foreign Minister Juracy Magalhães, Pio Correia (Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry), and Donatello Grieco (Associate Secretary-General for Western European Affairs), who, in conjunction with Hélio Scarabotolo of the Ministry of Justice, were the prime movers in the events which led to the start of negotiations with the General Directors of Political and Economic Affairs of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in Rio de Janeiro in May of 1966.

As signed in Lisbon on September 7, 1966 (Brazil's Independence Day) the consequent treaties provided for a wide range of cooperation in various fields, supplanted all previous treaties in those areas, and were hailed as a logical continuation of the process which also led to the 1953 signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. A cultural agreement regulated educational, scientific, and artistic exchange,
including the granting of scholarships and fellowships, for the objective of reinforcing and integrating common cultural values. A bi-national economic commission to stimulate trade was created by the commercial pact which also permitted the establishment of free ports in the territory of either state, encouraged the formation of joint ventures by Brazilian and Portuguese entrepreneurs, and sanctioned trade fairs or expositions for promotional purposes. A Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation covered the exchange of students, specialists, and information in the sciences according to programs to be elaborated by the two governments at a later date.

Even before this set of documents was approved by the Brazilian Congress suspicions were voiced about the still undefined intentions of the government concerning Angola and Mozambique, identified in the phraseology as an integral part of Portugal. A series of apparently interrelated incidents lent credence to the contention that, official denials to the contrary, Brazil was becoming engaged in those territories. In September and October a high-level mission visited Angola and Mozambique as part of an interministerial project started five months earlier to sound out prospects for the placement of exports in southern Africa; rather than return directly to Brazil the group stopped in Lisbon for consultations with the Brazilian embassy concerning their impressions of Portuguese Africa, last visited by the ambassador in 1965. In United Nations debates the Brazilian delegation avoided as much as possible
any discussions of colonialism and voted against a General Assembly resolution which strongly condemned Portuguese policy in its territories, requested all states "to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal," and appealed to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to refrain from granting any financial or technical assistance to Portugal as long as the colonies should be maintained. 52

In January, 1967, a diplomatic crisis was precipitated when the naval officers' customary training cruise on the Custódio de Melo scheduled a week's stopover in Angola while no independent African nation was to be visited despite repeated invitations by the Ghanaian ambassador for a visit to Ghana instead of Angola. 53 Rumored secret military pacts with Portugal in exchange for copper and petroleum concessions in Angola, the tone of statements on Portuguese Africa made by President-elect Costa e Silva in Lisbon, and general governmental ambivalence on the subject produced concern on the part of the

52 General Assembly Resolution 2184 (XXI) passed on December 12, 1966, by a vote of 70 to 13, with 22 abstentions. In casting a negative vote Brazil sided with Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. Significantly, in his statement opening the general debate of the General Assembly's twenty-first session (on September 22, 1966) Juracy Magalhães did not even allude to the issue of colonialism.

ambassadors from Algeria, Ghana, and Senegal and the charge d'affaires of the United Arab Republic, who went to the Foreign Ministry as a group to request a definition of the official position on colonialism and Portuguese Africa. Unsatisfied by the reply received and of the belief that the Custódio de Melo episode portended an impending shift from covert to overt support of Portugal, they distributed to the press a memorandum on their inquiry in an unconventional gambit to generate a wave of public reaction favorable to their purposes. 54 Obviously irritated, Foreign Minister Magalhães refused to comment on the ambassadorial note because "it abandons all the normal rules of communication between governments," but added that there was no basis for preoccupation about the state of relations with Africa since that continent was shown great interest and attention by Itamaraty. 55 This response also failed to dispel the doubts entertained by the ambassadors and, in fact, by the governments of several other African nations since the signing of the Lisbon accords and continuing Brazilian interest in and research on trade with Angola and Mozambique, an aim whose political implications could not be disregarded, especially when understood in relation to the opinion prevalent in the Foreign Ministry

54 Correio da Manhã, January 7, 1967, p. 2. The rumor which sparked fears of military collaboration originated with an unconfirmed report that Brazil was prepared to serve as an intermediary for the sale of combat aircraft by West Germany to Portugal for use in Angola.

55 Correio da Manhã, January 10, 1967, p. 3.
that the rebellions faced by Portugal represented agitation fomented by and supported from neighboring states rather than an authentic indigenous self-determination movement.

The Costa e Silva government inaugurated in mid-March brought a new configuration of personalities and policies founded on a somewhat different set of assumptions about international politics than that held by key officials in the previous administration, an alteration which extended to the relations with Portugal. In contrast to their predecessors, Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto and Secretary-General Sérgio Corrêa da Costa were sceptical about the effects of the treaties on the national interest, an uncertainty which manifested itself in a lengthy postponement in ratification after the agreements had been approved by the Congress in July. Itamaraty, newly engaged in an expansion of trade and communication with Afro-Asian states, was now more sensitive to the effects of the Portuguese policy on its image among the states with which it was planning to negotiate in the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and in other UN agencies to elaborate a common economic stance vis-a-vis the developed states. Hence the problem was no longer simple, for it was necessary to weigh the benefits accruing from the projected cooperation with Portugal against those expected should Brazil attain leadership among developing states in New Delhi (as was hoped), at a time when the consequences of each course of action were still unclear. It was felt
by several important officials in the Foreign Ministry that a political approximation with Portugal at that inopportune time would seriously endanger the opportunities for economic collaboration with anti-colonialist governments. These same officials were also concerned about the extent to which, if the whole set of treaties became operative and was invoked, Brazil would be under pressure of commitment to comply with a possible future request from Lisbon for troops or war material to be used in Africa, a concern voiced by the 1966 mission to Angola and Mozambique.

Diplomatic tensions reached a height and dissension came to public notice during the October, 1967, visit of Franco Nogueira for the annual meeting of foreign ministers envisioned by the Lisbon agreements. Nogueira returned to the Portuguese capital disappointed by the change in Brazilian political climate, having been told politely but firmly that the Costa e Silva government, while not favoring the use of violence in the decolonization process, considered that the ideal solution in the case of the overseas provinces would be an eventual plebiscite to allow the inhabitants to determine their future political status in much the same manner as France had finally managed the disposition of the Algerian question and that preparations for such granting of self-determination should be undertaken immediately. The Portuguese Foreign Minister had, to all appearances, been desirous of continued support in keeping the colonies under control, including perhaps certain types of
military aid. Although both governments, under fire from the Brazilian press, soon thereafter issued statements denying the existence of secret military clauses in the treaties, increased pressure both for and against ratification bore down upon Itamaraty as a result of doubts raised by the quasi-public airing of national differences after several years of relative harmony at the official level. The sense of the talks was conveyed by the careful wording of the joint communiqué, which spoke of a mutual desire to intensify relations in the fields of culture, science, technology, and commerce but discreetly avoided any mention of political positions (which were habitually included in past communiques). Even the exchange of the notes of ratification was not made on what would have been an appropriate occasion, had the Brazilian government been so inclined.

 Barely a week after Costa e Silva gave his approval by executive decree to the Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation, one of the least controversial of the treaties, on January 18, 1968, the discord within the Foreign Ministry again rose to the surface with a news "leak" that a firmer policy toward Portugal was being formulated to protect national interests against the concession of excessive advantages to Portugal or the Portuguese in Brazil through the commercial treaty. According to the same source, a policy brief advising greater opposition to Portugal's

African policies was being drawn up by high-level diplomats to guide Costa e Silva in a reorientation on the colonies question.\(^{57}\) This restructuring of policy was denied in an interview to a large, pro-Portuguese daily by Corrêa da Costa (said by many to be one of the most active in opposition), who also announced the imminent ratification of the remaining treaties, which in fact took place on March 21.\(^{58}\) The prolonged indecision and the nearly successful campaign of the anti-colonialists, carried on with unusual publicity, ended with the reaffirmation of traditional Luso-Brazilian solidarity, but only after internal resistance so reminiscent of the Quadros-Goulart years that some pro-Portuguese Brazilians were prompted to wonder if the revolution's purges had actually passed over Itamaraty and the "Afro-Asian" group of younger diplomats they blamed for the delay. In the end, however, the attraction of Portugal and the Luso-Brazilian concept overcame any propensity to deal with Afro-Asia which would have been contrary to Portuguese interests, even though the participation of Brazil in the colonial wars was precluded.

No small part in the decision to ratify was played by the attractiveness for Brazil's programs of commercial expansion and economic development of the proffered concessions and privileges in Angola and


\(^{58}\) O Globo, February 5, 1968, p. 3. Corrêa da Costa, absent from the ratification ceremonies, was sent to London as ambassador in June.
Mozambique, which were to serve as markets for manufactures, sources of supply (for low-paraffin-content petroleum, copper, phosphates, uranium, etc.), entrepôts for the important South African market (among others), and an area for foreign investment. The discovery of high-quality petroleum deposits in Angola opened a substitute source for this commodity which had formerly been exported almost exclusively from the politically unstable Middle East at the cost of highly unfavorable balances of trade with the oil-producing states, which purchased little in return. An additional coveted energy source was made available by another simultaneous ratification, that of the Cooperation Agreement on Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, signed in June, 1965, through which Portugal, a major producer of uranium, offered (at Brazilian request) to supply Brazil with substantial quantities of the element without any notification of or consultation with the International Atomic Energy Commission, because of what Nogueira termed "the intimacy of the relations between the two countries." Embarking on an energy program which stressed nuclear power development yet possessing

59 In 1966 and 1967, Brazil's exports to South Africa were nearly double those to Portugal, which has been a very minor trading partner with an average of only $4.5 million in yearly imports from Brazil between 1960 and 1967. Exports to Angola and Mozambique in 1966 and 1967 totaled $1.17 million dollars, composed largely of agricultural products but with a significant component of manufactures. Brazil has a well-equipped consulate-general in Lourenço Marques and a consulate in Luanda, but none in independent Black Africa.

60 O Mundo Português, August 14, 1968, p. 4.
domestically only reserves of relatively low-yield thorium, the Costa e Silva government saw nuclear cooperation with Portugal as a means to secure both fuel and technology regardless of any future measures adopted by the nuclear powers under the Non-Proliferation Treaty which both Brazil and Portugal opposed. Compared to these many pragmatic and tangible advantages any conceivable detriment to economic relations with anti-colonialist Afro-Asian states caused by closer ties to Portugal would seem of little import. Citing the cases of the United States, France, and Great Britain, Foreign Ministry economic officials now privately refuted as a chimera any correlation between Brazil's position in the UN on Portuguese questions and the penetration of its goods into Afro-Asian markets.

The occasion of the celebrations commemorating the five-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Pedro Cabral, the discoverer of Brazil, was chosen by Costa e Silva, in the words of Geraldo Eulálio, Associate Secretary-General for Western European Affairs, as an opportunity "to give a complete demonstration of our affection and friendship for the Mother Country." The effusive festivities and adulations were carried out in Portugal with the participation of the Brazilian delegation of three Ministers (Foreign Relations, Air Force, and Navy), numerous diplomats, journalists, and academicians, accompanied by

a flotilla of 4 destroyers with over 1,000 crewmen and nearly 100 officers, commanded by Rear Admiral Coelho Lobo, a Portuguese descendant of strong pro-Portuguese sympathies who had also commanded the controversial voyage to Angola in 1967 and who favored strong ties between the navies of the two countries to make them "owners of the whole South Atlantic" by virtue of bases in Brazil, Portuguese Guinea, and Angola. A joint parade of Marines from the two countries marched past the monument to Cabral and the military ministers attended the unveiling of a monument to soldiers killed in combat in the overseas provinces, also inviting the Portuguese Secretary of the Air Force to visit Brazil and making the arrangements for regular exchange flights between the two air forces as a beginning to intensified contacts. Referring to the success and cordiality of the conversations concerning the execution of the Lisbon treaties, Magalhães Pinto revealed with satisfaction upon his return, "We have practically no problems with Portugal on the bilateral level and have a good understanding with respect to common international problems."  

Various indications signaled a growing interest in Angola and Mozambique, one of the most symbolic being the journey in June via Lisbon of a specially selected Brazilian national soccer team to engage

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62 See his interview in O Mundo Português, June 12, 1968, p. 4.

in competition against a team representing Portugal to inaugurate the Salazar Stadium in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, a choice of location calculated to have political connotations, as did the four-day layover of the school-ship Custódio de Melo in the same port seven weeks later. Simultaneously the Banco do Brasil was studying the opening of branches in Lisbon and Luanda, Angola. In May the Brazilian Lóide lines began a regular sea route to Luanda and Lourenço Marques as part of a comprehensive plan to encourage trade with Afro-Asia, while four months thereafter the president of Petrobrás announced in a press interview the possibility that his company might invest capital in petroleum prospecting and drilling in Angola in order to save domestic reserves and at the same time produce refined petroleum derivatives for the international market.

An ever-growing number of influential Brazilians are traveling to Portuguese Africa and returning with impressions that the region is indeed racially unique and incomparable to countries affected by black nationalism or white racist minority rule, that Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique can adequately be described only by a theory which posits "four Africas": Arab, Black, White-minority, and Portuguese. Many of these observers are struck by what they interpret as a lack of

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65 O Globo, September 24, 1968, p. 17.
independent nationalistic conscience among the tribes and marked economic and social progress, which, when combined with the presence of Portuguese culture and a life-style they see as somewhat reminiscent of their own nation's earlier history, almost invariably leads them to take either a moderate or a pro-Portuguese position on the controversial aspects of the issue. The Salazar government, by sponsoring tours for well-chosen individuals (sympathetic politicians, journalists, and businessmen), made very effective use of this affinity reaction right after its 1965 offer to expand the Community to include the territories, and several of those so favored have become the most ardent supporters of closer ties and the thesis that Brazil also has something at stake in the survival of the common language, customs, and culture in Africa.

Recently more Brazilians have been going on their own initiative for such purposes as journalistic reporting, agricultural study, or commerce, all facilitated and encouraged under the Lisbon agreements and likely to serve as reinforcement for future approximation.

In international forums Brazil gave additional proof of a more vigorous defense of Portugal's colonial policies, putting it in the awkward position of habitually reaffirming its "traditionally anti-colonialist stand"

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66 See, for example, the interviews of Senator Vasconcelos Torres and Deputy Cunha Bueno, who subsequently became active spokesmen for the Community concept in Brazil: "A África Portuguesa vista por um senador brasileiro," Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No. 490 (April, 1966), 210-211 and "Declarações do deputado brasileiro Dr. Cunha Bueno, ao regressar da visita a Angola e Moçambique," Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No. 492 (June, 1966), 276-278.
yet either voting with Portugal or failing to condemn the conditions in the only remaining colonies. In the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran, April 22-May 13, 1968, Brazil was the single state to vote against a draft resolution passed in the First Committee to condemn all colonial regimes and particularly Portugal for continued refusal to implement General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the termination of colonialism and also to declare the Committee's support for "firm determination of liberation movements of peoples in their struggles for freedom and independence" and its recommendation to the Conference" to appeal to all states and organizations to give political, moral, and material assistance to peoples struggling for freedom and independence." In the plenary session Brazil abstained on the whole of this resolution (Draft Resolution VII) but voted against Preambular Paragraphs Five and Six which referred to the "legitimate armed struggle being waged by the populations under Portuguese domination" and Operative Paragraph Three which expressed support for liberation movements. Brazil's position contrasted quite sharply with that of the


68 United Nations, General Assembly, International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, April 22-May 13, 1968, Provisional Summary Record of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, 11 May, 1968, at 3:30 PM, A/CONF. 32/SR. 24. Draft Resolution VII was approved by a vote of 54 to 0 with
developing Afro-Asian states, only one of which (South Vietnam) abstained on the resolution as a whole, in as much as Brazil adamantly refused to denounce Portugal or condone the use of force in the pro-independence movements. Summing up Brazil's participation in the conference for a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, Ciro de Freitas Vale, head of the delegation, stated this succinctly.

Brazil was totally on the side of Portugal, that is to say, opposing everything that was aimed at the Portuguese nation. While others abstained, we took a position compatible with our traditions, our fidelity to the kindred Motherland, and the special instructions we received from Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto. 69

With the September, 1968, stroke of Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar and the ascension in his place of Marcelo Caetano, Magalhães Pinto went to Lisbon for conversations with the new administration and a visit to the ailing former head of government, amid speculations that he would take advantage of the opportunity to hint that Brazil would look favorably upon a change in Portuguese policy to lessen tensions in the overseas territories. Although he spoke with Caetano for two hours, Magalhães Pinto denied having suggested any policy modification because "it is not up to the Brazilian government to interfere," adding, however, that it was obvious that Portugal was determined to maintain

25 abstentions. Preambular Paragraphs Five and Six were approved by a vote of 42 to 1 with 27 abstaining, and Operative Paragraph Three was approved by 53 to 5 with 21 abstentions.

the status quo. As far as Luso-Brazilian relations were concerned, the talks were auspicious and indicative of continuing cordial relations. 70

On November 29 Brazil suffered its greatest isolation ever experienced in the General Assembly when colonial matters were voted upon as it sided with Portugal and South Africa to cast one of the three votes against Resolution 2395 (XXIII) which, among other things, condemned Portugal's failure to grant independence to its territories, appealed to all states to grant the inhabitants of these territories "the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights," reiterated an appeal to all states to cease granting to Portugal any assistance which helps it to prosecute the colonial war, and deplored the foreign financial activities obstructing the territories' self-determination. 71 Brazil's willingness to isolate itself in this manner from even the Latin American states (only Ecuador abstained) derives in part from the orientation taken since the Lisbon accords, but more than this, as a long-run tendency, it has resulted from a reluctance to change position since 1964 in the face of a mounting anti-colonial consensus which has focused on Portugal, the first and the last of the colonial powers, and has finally pressured all other Western states into at least abstaining regularly rather than voting against even the strongest

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70 O Mundo Português, October 13, 1968, p. 2.
71 General Assembly Resolution 2395 (XXIII), approved by 96 votes to 3 with 13 abstentions.
resolution. For Brazil the decision whether to abstain or vote in the negative was uniquely difficult, and at least in 1968 it was deemed more desirable to support Portugal and suffer Afro-Asian criticism than abstain on a technical or substantive point and avoid the criticism. The official rationale for this vote was that it placed Brazil in a better position to persuade Portugal to compromise at some future date, an aim which justified the attrition of the national image.\(^2\)

Although up to this point the policy toward Portuguese Africa has been explained as a function of a varying mixture of affectivity and considerations of the national interest, a final domestic element must be added—the existence of a large, well-organized colony of Portuguese immigrants and first-generation descendants centered in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Recife, and Belém, a group whose influential members are so numerous and well placed that a pro-Portuguese journalist once rather aptly described it to a new Portuguese Ambassador as "a nation

\(^2\)Under present domestic conditions a "yes" vote is not a viable option (as it was before the 1964 revolution), but depending upon the context of the resolution and considerations in Brasília-Lisbon relations, abstention is. This was shown by Brazilian abstention in General Assembly Resolution 2507 (XXIV) of November 21, 1969, almost identical to Resolution 2395 (XXIII) except for going further to recommend Security Council action to end colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa. It was adopted by 97 to 2 with 13 abstentions. As the situation polarizes it will most likely be increasingly difficult for Brazil to vote against future resolutions, so the 1968 strategy may not be repeated because of the negative reaction it generated in the UN without any compensating shifts in Portugal's policies.
inside another nation. 73 Conceptually the colony fits into the picture as an important linkage group whose activities and privileges, combined with certain attitudinal characteristics of Brazilian society, place it in a position different from that of a mere pressure group; it is rather, as Karl Deutsch defines the term "linkage group," a "group with links to the domestic system and with some particular links to the international or foreign input." 74 The emotional, financial, and political links to both Brazil and Portugal which the colony possesses make it uniquely able to be a significant shaping force in the formulation of Brazil's policy toward Angola and Mozambique, a factor which, although not determinant, strongly reinforces the predisposition of the foreign policy elite to be responsive to the demands of Portugal over those of the African states on the colonialism issue.

The domestic opinion environment within which the colony exercises its political role is one of diffuse but palpable good will, based upon an idealization of Portugal's part in the creation of Brazilian national unity and culture, an image which in the popular mind has been transferred onto the Salazar government. 75 A Rio de Janeiro newspaper

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75 In Brasília there is a "Monument to the Portuguese Immigrant."
working with Marplan took a sample survey of public opinion in that city about the Salazar government in September, 1968, showing results highly favorable to Salazar. To the question "In your opinion, is the Oliveira Salazar government a dictatorship or not?" 54 percent replied that it was, 26 percent that it was not, and 20 percent did not know. To secure an over-all evaluation the survey asked, "As you see it, has the Salazar government been good or bad for Portugal?" A total of 68 percent responded "good," 8 percent "average," and only 6 percent "bad," while 18 percent had no opinion, meaning that those with a favorable image of Salazar outnumbered those with an unfavorable image by nearly 13 to 1. 76

The Portuguese immigrant enjoys legal advantages no other immigrant has attained, in addition to his more rapid assimilative history deriving from similarities in language, religion, and life-style between his old and new homelands. According to the Estatuto dos Estrangeiros, Portuguese have been required to reside in Brazil for only one year to be eligible for naturalization, but all other foreigners must meet a five-year minimum. Special rights have long been granted to resident Portuguese, culminating in Article 199 of the Constitution of

76 Jornal do Brasil, September 22, 1968, p. 22. N = 310. This newspaper is not considered to be heavily committed on either side of the Portuguese question, but members of the management have recently been regaled with trips to Portugal and medals in typical Salazar strategy.
1967 (as amended October 17, 1969) which states that individuals of Portuguese nationality in Brazil will be able to enjoy the same rights as native-born citizens if Portuguese law extends reciprocity to Brazilian citizens in Portugal. An outgrowth of the Community concept, this provision had already been applied to Portuguese nationals in several areas, among others the right to practice law, purchase rural property, and to remain in Brazil permanently or become a citizen without a professional classification. Even the extension to resident Portuguese of the right to vote and be elected is being implemented under the Garrastazu Médici government.

The formal national organization of the colony is coordinated at the top by the Conselho Superior da Colônia of the Federação das Associações Portuguesas e Luso-Brasileiras, which in February, 1968, had enrolled under it 183 clubs and institutions, most of which were differentiated on the basis of the region of Portugal from which the members came and the region of Brazil in which they lived. The statutes of the Conselho Superior state its purpose (Article 3) as the stimulation of the spirit of "Portuguesism" of the colony by "taking steps by all means so that the Portuguese residing in Brazil maintain all their bonds to the Motherland" and "exalting Portugal and Brazil through their historical roots, with the objective of establishing a force to contribute

decisively to the creation of a Luso-Brazilian Community. '78 The membership being scattered, there are state Conselhos where agglomerations of immigrants are found, but according to Article 2 of the statutes the headquarters must always be in the same city as the Portuguese embassy, an important provision approved by the Brazilian authorities. The pro-Salazar elements (strongest in Rio) have long exercised the leadership of this and all major subordinate organizations and exert pressure to exclude critics of Salazar from membership to maintain ideological purity. 79 Publicly and officially the Conselho and the Federação, as innocuous immigrant organizations, take no part in Brazilian politics but confine their attention strictly to the colony's internal matters such as social services and preservation of regional folklore. In reality, these bodies are hotbeds of activity in supporting policies suggested by the Lisbon government and criticizing anyone who so much as questions those policies, refusing to admit to debate the future status of Portuguese Africa. Among the immigrants a sense of attachment to Portugal (and not incidentally ipso facto to its government) is fostered by appealing to homesickness (saudosísmo), family ties, and nationalism, working not only through the associations but also via weekly newspapers such as O Mundo Português and A Voz de


79 Interview with Fernando Quiroga, opposition leader in Brazil, October 17, 1968.
Portugal (subscribers to the Portuguese-government-controlled Agência Nacional de Informações) and radio stations such as Radio Veracruz in Rio. Several prestigious newspapers and magazines (including O Globo, O Cruzeiro, and Manchete) have been won over by the colony and take strongly pro-Portuguese and pro-Community stands, defending as well the Iusitanian presence in Africa.  

At the elite level the colony works on an informal basis through an intricate network of personal contacts with the many Brazilian businessmen, authors, professors, bankers, military officers, legislators, and diplomats sympathetic to the Community, thus gaining both access to political and financial decision-makers and a source of pro-Portuguese interviews to be published. At crucial junctures public opinion campaigns have been launched with notable success, in cases like Goulart's 1963 attempt to restrict the quota-free immigration of Portuguese, the controversial 1967 statements of African ambassadors, the delay in ratification of the 1966 Lisbon treaties, and the 1969 visits of Caetano

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80 Theophilo Andrade, director of O Cruzeiro, was the first Brazilian journalist to be granted a formal interview by the new Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano and was actively involved in promoting the projection of Brazil into Africa through Angola. See Theophilo Andrade, "Visita a Marcelo Caetano," O Cruzeiro, XL, No. 41 (October 12, 1968), pp. 114-115.

81 Several important Brazilian spokesmen for the Community ideal are not Portuguese descendants and the most outspokenly pro-Portuguese journalist in Brazil is a Brazilian, Alves Pinheiro (editor of O Mundo Português and former chief editor of O Globo), whose editorial opinions are indistinguishable from those of the colony leaders for whom his paper serves as a mouthpiece.
to Portuguese Africa and Brazil. Important colony leaders approach the Foreign Ministry itself, invoking the inevitable "traditional bonds," to register requests or complaints and ask for statements of position from the Foreign Minister, which are often published in the colony press and serve to bring more attention upon policy toward Portugal than it would otherwise receive. Against this torrent of propaganda and in this climate of public opinion the minority democratic opposition-in-exile has had very little success; their few newspapers suffer from limited circulation and financial problems, while the widely circulated colony press discredits them as traitors, renegades, moral vermin, and worse, equating as it does loyalty to Portugal with absolute loyalty to Salazarist principles (including the integrity of the empire). This multifaceted set of tactics has served to generate more diffuse support for Portuguese policy among immigrants and native Brazilians and made a change in policy on Portuguese Africa more difficult and politically risky than it would be if the issue were not so salient and volatile domestically, to the point of being played upon during election campaigns.

82 Rodrigo Leal Rodrigues, President of the Federação, addressed a letter to Magalhães Pinto to express the displeasure of the colony over the visit of Indira Gandhi and traced this "grief" and "sadness" to India's seizure of Goa in 1961, not a surprising communication if it is recalled that the Portuguese government openly criticized Pope Paul VI's 1965 visit to India and boycotted it in the press for the same reason. See, "Indira Ghandi foi uma visita indesejável aos portugueses," O Mundo Português, September 29, 1968, Segundo Caderno, p. 3.
in areas of Portuguese concentration and above all in Rio. The colony as presently constituted serves to amplify and re-echo Portuguese propaganda in Brazil, at times taking on the features of an arm of Lisbon's foreign policy.

For these reasons the close affiliation between the colony leadership and the Portuguese embassy is of particular significance as the colony's linkage to the foreign input. At the April 19, 1968, inauguration of the new members of the Conselho, Federação President Leal Rodrigues observed that the Conselho had never failed in support for the Portuguese Ambassador and called for a sustained effort of the colony to present to the national public more information about Portuguese Africa as the principal goal for future activity. Replying to his remarks, Portuguese Ambassador José Manuel Fragoso, who presided over the session and inaugurated the new conselheiros, underlined the necessity for unity over personal quarrels within the colony and an "intimate connection" between the Conselho and the embassy in defense of the "superior interests of the Fatherland," adding for clarification, "It happens that at certain times the embassy can and should be in a better position to point out what these superior interests are," a relationship he euphemistically characterized as "collaboration, understanding, confidence" rather than service. 83 Congratulating the new directors, the

83 O Mundo Português, April 28, 1968, Segundo Caderno, p. 10.
Ambassador wished them success in their duties and pledged that "in the execution of these tasks, these most high tasks of patriotic concerns, you will not lack the support of Portugal, of its government, and of its representatives in Brazil." The established system of mutual consultation and assistance continuing under this type of understanding has been the basis for colony-embassy relations, at least once involving a financial subsidy with the more than $130,000 granted over a five-year period by the Portuguese government to Rio's Real Gabinete Português de Leitura, a colony-run cultural center and library well respected among Brazilian scholars and engaged in the expansion of Luso-Brazilian relations on an educational plane.

The Consensus on Portuguese Africa

Brazilian intellectuals and diplomats in furthering the image of their country abroad have long felt frustration at the obscurity of their native language, which, although it presently counts well over 100 million native speakers (more than the number enjoyed by French), is practically unknown outside Brazil, Portugal, and the Portuguese colonies. Elsewhere it passes for a fractured dialect of Spanish. The resultant sense of cultural isolation explains why most Brazilians seriously contemplating the future presence of their country in Africa

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84 Ibid.
have been intrigued by the existence of a similar culture in Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique as well as by the fact that ranked by number of speakers, Portuguese is the third European language in that continent. Progress in this direction has been hindered by mixed reaction to unyielding Portuguese colonialism, one of the greatest obstacles to the emerging Portuguese-speaking Commonwealth as far as Brazilians are concerned. A most difficult psychological situation has thus been thrust upon Brazil, an approach-avoidance reaction in which the undeniable attractiveness of these territories for self-projection invites action but the controversial and nearly universally condemned colonial wars are a repellant factor and counsel prudence. In the interim, with the future status of the territories in doubt, the Foreign Ministry has been faced with the painful choice of which degree of involvement best serves national interests, now that complete aloofness has been ruled out since the ratification of the 1966 treaties. Portuguese military superiority and the failure of a strong African nationalism to emerge prolong the awkward problem, as both Lisbon and liberation leaders appeal for Brazilian understanding and assistance in the struggle, further complicated by the determination of white residents in Portuguese Africa to continue the counter-insurgency even if Lisbon’s efforts should falter

for financial reasons, leaving open a door for South African intervention to consolidate white supremacy and safeguard its regime, a possibility which can not be ruled out.

Senegalese President Leopold Senghor suggested in Rio de Janeiro in September, 1964, that the most constructive solution to the deadlock would be the concession of a period of transitional home rule and then independence to avoid the type of relapse suffered by the Congo. He further suggested that the preparatory transitional period be carried out within the framework of a Community relationship with Brazilian participation. 87 Brazil and African diplomats regard this as a feasible alternative should some flexibility be introduced into Portuguese policy, allowing Brazil to serve as mediator between Lisbon and Black Africa, a nonsuspect associate in training the territories for self-government and development, or the principal component of a UN trusteeship administration. Regardless of ideology, proponents of a more vigorous African diplomacy are unanimous that Brazil only stands to lose should Portuguese language, culture, and religion disappear from Africa in post-independence repudiation, political chaos, or racist foreign intervention. The differences in opinion arise over the question of how this way of life can best be preserved in the interests of all the

inhabitants and how Brazil's moral responsibilities can be met. What would otherwise be agreement has broken on the rock of Portugal's obduracy.

Barring radical domestic political change, Brazil can be expected to continue rejecting Portuguese requests for decisive and overt assistance in keeping the empire intact, as did the Costa e Silva government in its cool reaction to the public appeal made by Prime Minister Caetano himself in an April, 1969, visit. The Garrastazu Médici government inaugurated in October, 1969, appears no more likely to compromise itself so clearly with colonialism. On the other hand, it will most probably proceed cautiously with the policy of limited political involvement and refusal to condemn Portugal so as to protect its unique position of availability for mediation, aware that with the independence of the territories Brazil could become the major influence in Portuguese-speaking Africa and the chief pillar of a huge Community based on three continents.

Human Rights, Nonintervention, and Trade in Relations with South Africa: The Attraction of Opposites?

Brazil's international affirmation of its professed creed of racial equality has led it to take the initiative in several declarations in favor

88 A desire to continue close cooperation with Portugal was indicated in several ways, among them the choice for Ambassador to Portugal of Professor Gama e Silva, well-known defender of the Community concept and former Minister of Justice active in extending the rights of Portuguese residents in Brazil.
of human rights and against racial discrimination, beginning in the post-World War II years with participation in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (brought to vote with a speech by the Brazilian delegate) and leading up to its role in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), which it was the first to sign. Brazil's characteristic self-assurance and high moral tone on such racial matters was evident in Foreign Minister Juracy Magalhães' address opening the general debate of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, in referring to the 1965 Convention.

Within the boundaries of Brazil, indeed, small need would be felt for such a document, since Brazil has long been an outstanding, and in fact I would be tempted to say the foremost, example of a true racial democracy, where many races live and labour together and freely mix, without fear or favour, without hate or discrimination. Our hospitable land has long been open to men of all races and creeds; no one questions, or cares, what may have been a man's birthplace, or that of his forebears; all enjoy equal rights, and all are equally proud of being part of one great nation. While the new Convention is, therefore, superfluous insofar as Brazil is concerned, we nonetheless welcome it as a useful pointer to other countries placed in less favourable circumstances. And I would hereby take this opportunity to suggest that racial tolerance should be exercised by all races towards other races: to have been sinned against is no valid reason for sinning against others. May the Brazilian example, and the moderation without effort, easy tolerance and mutual respect in our racial relations be followed by all multiracial nations.89

Although Brazil was among the first nations to decry South African apartheid as contrary to Articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations Charter and although it has continued to denounce this extreme form of racial separation, its non-interventionist stand independent of changes in domestic regimes has equally consistently been invoked against any retaliatory measures beyond an embargo on all military equipment. General mandatory sanctions are, in the Brazilian view, an inappropriate method of handling the situation and, in common with direct military intervention as now requested by most African members, an approach which would be counterproductive in the anti-discrimination campaign by calling into question the authority of the United Nations when many powerful member states would certainly refuse to institute sanctions or condone invasion by either guerrilla or regular forces. Not regarding the situation itself as an imminently serious threat to international peace and security, Brazil has favored the creation through education of an anti-apartheid world public opinion climate to force revision of the white regime's program and has therefore opposed all attempts to eject South Africa from world organizations, break diplomatic and trade relations, and sever land and sea transportation routes, all in the attempt to maintain clear channels of communication between South Africa and the rest of the globe, keeping open the possibilities for peaceful endogenous political change stimulated by exogenous opinion which could not be effective in an atmosphere of isolation. In resolutions contradicting
this philosophy Brazil has either abstained or voted with stated reservations concerning the objectionable paragraphs, which were usually precisely those most favored by the Afro-Asian majority.

On South African control of South West Africa, the Brazilian thesis has been that the League mandate, with all obligations still binding, was transferred to the United Nations and that any change in the international status of the territory can take place legally only through the world body. Because this question is clearly international and falls within the competence of the United Nations, Brazil has either co-sponsored or supported draft resolutions to resist the extension of apartheid into South West Africa, transfer administration of the territory to the United Nations, and establish a council to administer it until independence, thus striking a pose very similar to that of most Afro-Asian states.

In bilateral relations with Pretoria, however, Brazil has aroused the suspicions of Africans since Quadros' days by trying to further cordial relations simultaneously with both Black Africa and South Africa. Even during the height of the independent foreign policy the economic potential of South Africa attracted Brazilian attention as well as over three-quarters of its exports to sub-Saharan Africa. Although in 1962 the Senate was able to stall for a time the nomination of a minister plenipotentiary to head the legation in Pretoria, the Foreign Ministry was letting it be known without fanfare that in its interpretation universal
relations and trade really meant precisely that, in spite of uneasiness in the United States over relations with the Soviet Union or criticism from Africans over relations with South Africa. The consensus was expressed by the editorial staff of an important economic journal which, in surveying national interests in Africa, advised moral support for the African bloc but counseled opposition to sanctions which would be ineffective, prejudicial to United Nations prestige, and injurious to a favorable and growing trade relationship.  

The Castello Branco government, somewhat less reluctant to incur African displeasure, proceeded to seek new ways to increase trade, drawn by the possibility of large manufacture sales and a very favorable trade balance. Between 1964 and 1966, exports to South Africa increased by over 25 percent. The year of 1966 highlighted several ironies in Brazilian policy, as South African Foreign Minister Hildgard Müller and H. Kotzemberg of the Ministry of Economic Affairs arrived in Rio to discuss trade expansion with officials of Itamaraty barely one month before the start of the United Nations Human Rights Seminar on Apartheid in Brasília, a symposium both largely organized and hosted by Brazil. Although in December Brazil voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 2202 A (XXI) which, among other things, appealed to all states to "discourage immediately the establishment of

closer economic and financial relations with South Africa, " its own growing trade had qualified it as the Latin American state which exported the most to that same republic, leading by 62 percent the combined total of Argentina and Mexico, the closest rivals. 91 This statistical fact did not go unperceived by the ardent opponents of apartheid, as a Brazilian trade mission returned in October from a fact-finding tour in South Africa related to the July discussions with Muller and Kotzemberg. The special group's report was frankly optimistic about prospects for greater commerce, an opinion contrasting with the modest outlook seen for the Negro republics on the itinerary. 92

Acting upon these recommendations the Foreign Ministry arranged for participation in the 1967 Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg and with an investment of $110,000 obtained orders for over three million dollars worth of merchandise, much of this in manufactured goods such as lathes. 93 The rented space for the 1968 show was doubled and in three days orders totaling nearly three million dollars


93 Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes, Promoção Comercial e o Itamaraty (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1968), p. 3.
were received for lathes alone (an item not manufactured in South Africa) in addition to other machinery for heavy and light industry. 94

Interest in the new market grew rapidly to such an extent that in the 1970 Johannesburg International Exposition 40 Brazilian enterprises from seven states displayed their products for importers from South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, and other areas. Various surveys of the potentials of the market for Brazilian-made products revealed excellent demand for garage equipment, hydraulic motors and lifts, machinery for plastic and textile industries, hospital supplies and equipment, bicycles, bathroom fixtures, and mining equipment. Brazilian industrialists also anticipated the placement of railroad equipment, ocean freighters, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals in the trade spurred by the recently begun Loíde shipping route to major South African ports and other incentives of the Brazilian government, including the opening of a trade section in the legation at Pretoria. 95

To improve their balance of trade with Brazil, running at 14 to 1 in their disfavor, the South Africans opened a commercial office in Rio de Janeiro in late 1967 to discover complementary areas in which Brazil could regularly import South African products besides small quantities

94 Personal interview with J. N. van Schalkwyk, Commercial Secretary, South African Legation, Rio de Janeiro, August 29, 1968.

of gold and asbestos. For this purpose a revolving credit fund of five million dollars was set up in the Brazilian National Bank for Economic Development by the South African government for application to Brazilian purchases of capital goods and services. Under this program South African officials expect only a limited trade in consumer goods but excellent growth in primary and capital sectors, encompassing as well such technological cooperation as South African mineral prospecting and mine establishment for Brazilian companies. These same commercial officials feel that although spontaneous contacts from Brazilian businessmen are few and of little import, the weight of the political question of apartheid has not posed an obstacle in business dealings with Brazilians even though Pretoria's official racial policy is clearly diametrically opposed to the Brazilian ideal.

South Africa has been using Brazilian enthusiasm for greater trade in manufactures to gain penetration into South America, in an economically feasible and politically controversial attraction between racial opposites which, it is hoped by Pretoria, may diversify its sources of supply, improve its image in Latin America, further differentiate the politics of apartheid and the economics of international trade, and counteract the trend toward its complete isolation advocated by Afro-Asian states. As the first step in a publicity campaign the South African Ministry of Information in 1968 invited two Brazilian journalists to visit the country, the first such official trip of any South American reporters.
Their six-day tour was published with rich illustration by a popular news magazine. The article reflected the policy line of the South African government without the slightest criticism of apartheid, which was explained by quotations taken from an official publication and conversations with white supporters of the system, who stressed the higher living standards thereby assured the Bantus. Not a single hint was given of the controversial aspects of apartheid or United Nations action on the issue in what was to that time the most inclusive presentation of South Africa to the general Brazilian public, occasional newspaper reports and editorials notwithstanding.96

On February 23, 1969, a weekly flight of South African Airways from Johannesburg to New York via Rio de Janeiro was begun after months of planning, in spite of a request from the United Nations Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa through the Secretary-General urging Brazil and the United States to reconsider. Replying that a total boycott of South Africa would benefit only the racists and fail to alleviate the condition of the oppressed, Brazil sent a high-level delegation including Edmundo Macedo, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Hélio Beltrão, Minister of Planning, on the inaugural flight to discuss trade with South African

96"O país do Doutor Barnard, " Manchete, No. 844 (June 22, 1968), pp. 116-130. This magazine also publishes reports on Portuguese Africa which corroborate Lisbon's points of view and favorably compare the overseas territories with Brazil.
officials and businessmen, certain to be entering Brazil in greater numbers because of the new route. About the same time Magalhães Pinto had talks in Brazil with South African Foreign Minister Müller, which led to rumors of a political-military anti-Soviet South Atlantic defense pact between the two states and including several others of the Southern Hemisphere, a report causing considerable embarrassment to the Brazilian government, which under African censure denied ever considering such a treaty and sent a note to this effect to the President of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid. Even this episode did not diminish Brazilian ambitions to cooperate economically with South Africa in the face of ever more vocal Afro-Asian criticism. As in the case of Portuguese Africa, concrete advantages have taken precedence over political or racial considerations which are remote to Brazilians, however real and proximate they may be to the Afro-Asian experience.

**Rhodesia**

As the Rhodesian case involves more than strictly internal considerations with the unilateral declaration of independence, Brazilian policy (like that of many Western states) has been somewhat more favorable to the Afro-Asian point of view than its policy on South Africa and Portuguese Africa, even if it has not taken a form fully congenial to the demands of the anti-colonialist bloc. Brazil's dealings with Rhodesia were always minimal, hence no less was suffered by not
recognizing the Ian Smith regime or refraining from opening a consulate already authorized in Salisbury. While condemning with most UN members the repression of the Negro majority, Brazil refuses to agree with most Afro-Asian states and numerous Latin nations that international force or support for liberation movements is the only effective answer to the problem, abstaining as well from singling out Great Britain as responsible for the onset and prolongation of the problem or Portugal and South Africa for rendering sustentative assistance to the white-dominated government.

Even while holding in principle that a total embargo of non-military goods is productive only of hardships for the whole population rather than being an instrument for the eventual realization of political reform, the Brazilian government issued decrees to implement within the national territory provisions of the mandatory sanctions declared by the Security Council in Resolutions 232 and 253. Perhaps the relative lack of economic importance of Rhodesia to Brazil has made compliance with the sanctions less painful and the consistency between words and deeds easier to achieve than in relations with South Africa, as total exports to Rhodesia from 1964 to 1967 inclusive were only $118,000 as compared to $41.1 million for those to South Africa. Until mandatory comprehensive sanctions were declared, Brazilian exporters were disposed to improve upon this figure without regard for politics or moral theories of racial justice, but under present conditions Foreign
Ministry plans have been temporarily shelved. In South Africa and the Portuguese colonies Brazil has given ample demonstration of its ability to discount as immaterial any Afro-Asian protests over closer relations, but the unanimous comprehensive sanctions verdict of the Security Council on May 29, 1968, posed an obstacle which it would not circumvent with Rhodesia.
CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC CONFLICT AND COOPERATION WITH AFRO-ASIA

If Brazil's anti-colonialism has proved less than fervent, on the issue of economic development it has exhibited a higher degree of consistency and recurrent ambitions to emerge as a spokesman or leader of the underdeveloped states as on several occasions it cooperated with Afro-Asian countries to attempt a united front vis-a-vis the developed states to create an international climate conducive to development through organizations such as GATT, UNCTAD, and the International Coffee Agreement. Much of the multilateral contact between Brazil and the developing nations outside the Western Hemisphere has occurred in conferences and negotiations about agricultural exports or problems of economic development, topics which weighed heavily in motivating Quadros' opening to Africa and still form the core of Itamaraty's dealings with those regions as development remains the prime concern of national foreign policy since its emergence as a dominant theme under Kubitschek, its elevation as one of the "3D's" with Goulart, and its continuation in Costa e Silva's diplomacy of prosperity. In conjunction with most Afro-Asian states, Brazil has been a vocal advocate of reversing the unfavorable terms of trade suffered by producers of raw materials,
stabilizing international prices of agricultural commodities, increasing the amount of bilateral and multilateral financial aid available on soft terms, creating a United Nations Capital Fund and an Agency for Industrial Development, internationalizing the right to resources on or under the sea bed to benefit less-developed countries, and promoting nuclear disarmament for both world security and the release of resources to employ in reducing the growing gap between the metaphorical North and South.

The general coincidence of positions on these broad issues in the dramatic confrontation with the industrialized states may obscure the numerous ways in which Brazilian interests actually run counter to those of most Afro-Asian states when finer points are discussed and compromises sought beyond agreement on principles as vague as the "collective economic security" once proposed by Brazil in the General Assembly. Mixed conflict and cooperation in relations with Afro-Asia arise from divergent interests inherent in competition in the same or similar agricultural exports and Brazil's status as an economy with strong areas of industrialization and considerable future potential not possessed by the majority of the Afro-Asians. These differences persist and reappear in spite of common group interests subsumed under the epithet "Third World" which is often taken to include Latin America.

A global appreciation of some of the economic conflicts of interest may be gained by examining briefly the record of Brazilian
participation in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and comparing Brazilian positions with those assumed by other members of the caucus group of 77 developing states. Subsequently a comparison of policies and interests will be made in international negotiations concerning coffee and cocoa to illustrate agreements and differences which have characterized interaction with Afro-Asia in more narrowly restricted agricultural issues in which Brazil has demonstrated a serious concern.

Brazil and UNCTAD

Having supported greater intervention of the United Nations into the flow of capital and technology to developing nations since the early years of the world body, Brazil was sympathetic toward the concept of establishing a permanent forum to deal with trade as the chief instrument to promote development and as one of four Latin American participants in the June, 1962, Cairo Conference on Problems of Economic Development played a central role in the events which led up to the convening of UNCTAD by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations through Resolution 917 (XXXIV) of August 3, 1962. In preliminary meetings as a member of the 32-nation Preparatory Committee Brazil was active in constructing a common united front with the United Arab Republic, India, Nigeria, Ghana, Indonesia, and Algeria, thereby building prestige among important developing states and imbuing its economic goals with a neutralist political cast. As preparations for the
first meeting of the Conference progressed, Brazil, considered by some as among the countries predestined for leadership, became a principal articulator and moderator in the drafting by 75 developing countries of a Joint Declaration presented to the General Assembly on November 11, 1963, expressing their recommendations and expectations for the forthcoming Geneva talks. This collaboration was accomplished over some internal resistance within the Foreign Ministry from officials who were reluctant to oppose the United States (the nation's chief creditor) so frontally and deviate from the traditional low-key relations of the previous half-century as the need for renegotiation and refinancing of the external debt was apparent and the national economic position was weakening. Additional uneasiness was felt by this predominantly East-West oriented group because the Soviet Union initially used the UNCTAD idea to attack the Kennedy Round which Washington favored over the Geneva plans.

The política externa independente forces in national diplomacy, however, were aiming for precisely such a decisive confrontation with Washington in particular and the industrialized states in general in the ingenuous hope that Brazil, lacking the capability to bargain bilaterally with the United States from a position of economic and political power, could take advantage of the pseudo-parliamentary politics of the General Assembly to gain greater economic independence or concessions from the United States by virtue of mobilizing the Afro-Asian states in a multilateral
drive against the entrenched privileges of the North. In short, the Brazilian goal before the Geneva conference and during its first week was to appeal to the Afro-Asians to support Brazilian action which was certain to evoke American disapproval. The optimum outcome in the opinions of some diplomats who doubted the efficacy of any business-as-usual, GATT-type negotiations would have been complete polarization between North and South, an abrupt breakoff in the middle of the Conference with a walkout of the 77, and a new radicalized hard-line unity of the developing states under Brazilian leadership with headquarters in Brasília if possible, but if this were not feasible under the sponsorship of a more radical Afro-Asian member. Success in such a long-shot endeavor, besides changing the face of world commerce, was expected to have domestic repercussions propitious to thorough-going reforms, which was well within the program to make use of foreign policy to effect internal change.

To this end Brazilian policy within Latin America in meetings in São Paulo, Brasília, and Alta Gracia (Argentina) was to establish and express a Latin unity through a Special Latin American Coordination Commission (CECIA), resisting American efforts to broaden economic discussions to evolve a regional platform for all members of the Organization of American States, a procedure which would have tended to inhibit an independent Latin stance at UNCTAD since the United States took a negative position on UNCTAD from the very start. The impression was
not lost on Washington when at a ministerial-level gathering of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in São Paulo João Goulart neglected to mention the Alliance for Progress and concentrated instead on the imperative to treat the root of the development problem rather than place faith in palliatives, implicitly emphasizing Latin cohesiveness over bilateral hemispheric cooperation with the Colossus of the North.

Brazil's design in Geneva was to link the Latin and Afro-Asian blocs, but this was prevented by the March 31 revolution which dictated a brusque and immediate mid-course shift in policy at UNCTAD after its first week, effectively removing Brazil from the ranks of the spokesmen for which the Goulart regime had been aiming and restricting the cooperation with Afro-Asia for ideological motives as the revolutionary government repudiated what they termed the "neutralist" cast of the previous government. For this reason Brazil's participation at the Conference itself turned out to be considerably less radical than planned although opposition from inside the new regime was sufficient to deter a complete about-face.

To evaluate Brazil's position at UNCTAD I and compare it with the positions of other developing states, a voting study was carried out using all of the nominal roll call votes of the Conference in which abstentions or negative votes were recorded, a total of 38 roll calls. Since all of the measures were sponsored by developing states and
favored their interests, numerical values were assigned each vote as follows: yea (+2), absent (0), abstain (-1), and nay (-2). All states which were absent on more than four votes (i.e., about 10 percent of the total number of votes) were omitted to minimize error through distortion. A Conference score was thus obtained for each participant, with the maximum possible range running from +76 to -76; the higher the score, the greater the state's agreement with the theses of the Group of 77. 1

Actual scores ranged from a "perfect" 76 (obtained by 36 states) to the United States' -52. To allow comparison of regional scores with Brazil's, the means and medians were computed for each region as geographically defined earlier, but omitting in each region the geographically Afro-Asian states which cannot be classified as developing on the basis of their scores (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) or those developing states which had scores deviating widely from their group's mean (Nationalist China, Thailand, and Turkey). The results are presented in tabular form in Table 17, page 323, and indicate the high degree of cohesion displayed by Afro-Asia as well as marked

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1 The votes computed were the following:
- General Principles: 1 through 12, 14 and 15.
- Special Principles: 1, 4 and 5, 7 through 9, 11 through 13.

The countries omitted from analysis by the four-vote absence guideline were Albania, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, El Salvador, Ivory Coast, and South Vietnam.
agreement on the issues voted upon, with the mean for all of developing Afro-Asia with the three deviants excepted falling at 74.3. In sharp contrast stood Brazil with a score of 61, lower than any other Latin American state and all Afro-Asian developing states except the deviants Turkey (56), Thailand (53), and Nationalist China (45), all of which are not neutralist but American allies, with Turkey actually being the highest-scoring member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

**TABLE 17**

Selected Group Scores on Issues Before UNCTAD I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of States</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Median Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Bloc(^{a})</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\)Includes Cuba.

Starting the Conference with ambitions of leading the developing states, Brazil finished by trailing as a consequence of five abstentions, indicating, inter alia, reservations of the revolutionary government on important principles concerning tariff barriers against primary products, stabilization of commodity prices, new preferential general non-reciprocal concessions from developed to developing countries, elimination of
regional vertical tariff preferences "enjoyed by certain developing
countries in certain developed countries," and adoption of special
measures to favor the least-developed states. These reservations can
be explained most generically by the new government's conciliatory
attitude towards the West in general and the United States, France,
and West Germany in particular to mend relations after the frictions
caused by the two previous regimes. Nevertheless, as significant as
Brazil's fringe position in the countries of the Group of 77 may be, its
separation from the major developed states was even clearer and more
pronounced. The 13.3 point deviation from the Afro-Asian mean or the
8.7 point deviation from the Latin American mean seem small when
paired with Brazil's deviations from individual OECD states such as
the United States (113 points), Great Britain (86 points), West Germany
(80 points), Japan (69 points), France (57 points), or any of the other
OECD states whose Conference scores ranged from 56 rapidly down-
wards. The 1964 Geneva Conference which dramatically documented
the magnitude of the North-South split also saw Brazil take an economic
position which, although more "South" than "North," made it impossible
to classify neatly into either group. It is precisely this fact that con-
stitutes yet another dilemma in relations between Brazil and developing
Afro-Asia.

On the eve of UNCTAD II in 1968 the reappraisal of relations
with Afro-Asia was underway and foreign policy officials were psychologi-
cally more disposed toward close cooperation than during the earlier days
of the revolution when the restrictive formula was "cultural and political fidelity to the Western democratic system" and good relations with Washington were of the highest priority. The Costa e Silva government in its more nationalistic spirit was less hesitant to cross Washington but was still careful to divest economic developmental problems of ideological implications by approaching the issue pragmatically as if it were an overriding global problem amenable to a technical solution free of Cold War political overtones. Accordingly, in a speech to the General Assembly on September 21, 1967, Magalhães Pinto felt obliged to issue a political disclaimer concerning the national role as a member of the Group of 77.

In the concerted action undertaken by UNCTAD there is no place for ideological motivation, which would vitiate its meaning. The seventy-seven nations, united by common interests, make up a group for the attainment of clearly defined and specific goals, exclusively linked to the promotion of economic development. It is strictly in this sense and in full awareness of our responsibilities that Brazil participates in the group.²

Not all political sectors, however, evidently felt that such a reliable "safe" distinction could be kept, for even though the Brazilian diplomat Azeredo de Silveira had been elected president of the 77's coordinating committee to prepare the October, 1967, ministerial-level

Algiers Conference and had been accorded praise by other representatives, Magalhães Pinto's plans to attend the Algiers meeting which was to prepare a unified front were abandoned after he was admonished not to go by the National Security Council.

When considered from an economic perspective the Brazilian position in 1968 at New Delhi overlapped that of 1964 on most points and added new ones as Magalhães Pinto, the first speaker representing one of the 77 in the plenary conference, roundly condemned the developed states for their resistance to UNCTAD, their systematic refusal to put into practice the recommendations of UNCTAD I by making concessions on the basis of already completed technical studies, and their apparent lack of concern for problems to peace posed by the poverty experienced by two-thirds of the world's population. Brazil went to New Delhi with high hopes, the third largest delegation (surpassed only by Japan and India), and instructions from the Foreign Minister to place the blame for any failure of the Conference squarely upon the industrialized states should they continue a rigid line with no willingness to grant concessions. Elected president of the 77 at the Conference for its final and decisive phase (succeeding representatives of the Philippines and the Ivory Coast), head of the Brazilian delegation Azeredo da Silveira aggressively attempted to maintain a viable consensus among the group around the minimum program agreed upon in Algiers with his own delegation's opinion that a total and generally acknowledged failure would
be preferable to acceptance of half-measures which would do little more than perpetuate the disagreeable status quo. When the recalcitrance of the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as schisms inside the 77 foreclosed significant progress, Azeredo da Silveira in an impassioned condemnatory speech in plenary session and in a press interview declared that the miserable results of the Conference for the developing states were due to the refusal of the developed nations to face the problem seriously, adding that given this seemingly perennial attitude the 77 would do well to create a permanent organization of developing countries to be the counterpart of the OECD.

3 In an unusual retroactive declaration the Brazilian delegation announced at the seventy-seventh plenary meeting of UNCTAD II that Brazil was withdrawing its reservations on General Principles Seven, Eight, and Fifteen approved by UNCTAD I so that it could go on record (somewhat belatedly) as fully supporting all the Principles enunciated in UNCTAD's first session. In reversing the votes of the Castello Branco government, Costa e Silva's administration was putting itself on consistent footing congenial to Brazil's more assertive role in UNCTAD II and its interaction with Afro-Asian states in defense of precisely those principles on which the Castello Branco government had abstained.

4 Although this chain of post-revolutionary events is strikingly similar to that planned for by some Foreign Ministry leaders under Goulart, several Brazilian news publications have not neglected to point out that Brazil's hard-line international position in these issues and nuclear development is not paralleled by credible internal measures in the conduct of economic and financial policy. Several such sources, alluding to Rui Barbosa's flamboyant but ineffectual oratorical performances at the Second Hague Conference, suggested that shunning the "Eagle of the Hague complex" and more realistically entering into bilateral negotiations rather than self-defeating revolutionary multilateral proclamations might produce more of substance for the nation. See the editorial in the Jornal de Brasil, October 3, 1963.
Far from demonstrating unanimity of goals and purpose between Brazil and Afro-Asia, UNCTAD II, like the first Conference, revealed that as one of the "relatively-developed" of the developing countries, Brazil has a set of interests which only partially coincides with those of the "typical" Afro-Asian state, although all of the 77 had the avowed purpose of translating into reality the recommendations of UNCTAD I. The "all-or-nothing" thesis which envisioned full and united institutional political pressure to solve the complete range of problems plaguing the 77 at one fell swoop found little support among Afro-Asians, who taken as a group showed an inclination to be amenable to less ambitious piecemeal gains sufficient to weaken the South's actually precarious cohesion when detailed proposals were being discussed. At the Conference African states were ill-disposed toward taking part in a wide-ranging effort to push for across-the-board solutions or condemn the European states with which they already enjoyed preferences merely to advocate that these Common Market or Commonwealth-based advantages be either abolished or spread to encompass all their competitors in Latin America and Asia. Several Afro-Asian delegates (including India's), claiming to belong to the majority sentiment, offered rebuttals to Silveira's pessimistic conclusions about the Conference, leaving Brazil rather set apart from even some Latin American states in a division which became so pronounced within meetings of the 77 that Silveira made it clear that he was prepared to resign as president of the
group should the conciliatory pacifist viewpoint prevail with a consequent lack of desire to censure the North and proclaim the breakdown of the negotiations. Brazil came away from the Conference embittered by what its diplomats termed Afro-Asian "capitulationism" which frustrated the outcome hoped for by the Foreign Ministry as regarded the internal politics of the 77 and masked the unwillingness of the North to negotiate effective solutions for international economic inequities. 5

Following the trade expansion in manufactures theme of the Costa e Silva government, Brazil was the most vocal in proposing a new system of general non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences on the part of all developed countries for any manufactured and semi-manufactured exports originating in developing countries (a "new international division of labor"), eventuating in the adoption of Resolutions 21 (II) and 25 (II), the first unanimously establishing the general validity of the principle and a committee to study its implementation and the second (over opposition of developed states) calling for an investigation of restrictive business practices adopted by private enterprises of developed countries. The creation of a universal preference system is one of Brazil's main objectives in UNCTAD, for along

with India and Argentina, Brazil stands to benefit most from its operationalization; in 1963 Brazil ranked second among all developing states in value of manufactures exported with nearly one-eighth of the total manufactures exports of developing countries to its credit. Nor are the probable consequences of such a general system on the Europe-Africa vertical preference arrangement overlooked, as Brazil hopes to use the global non-discriminatory system it favors as a wedge to eliminate the discriminatory preferences which European manufactures enjoy in Africa in order to allow its own manufactures greater access.

To most Afro-Asian states, at a much more primitive industrial level, the manufactures preference issue as seen by Brazil either does not demand great emphasis or is strictly ungermane to their economic realities; it was to this least-developed group that the OECD members purposively tried to appeal in the Second Committee by offering concessions in the low-value manufactured products they exported while excluding from consideration a list of higher-value manufactures which interested the most-developed among the 77 (Brazil included), thus almost successfully endangering the common front of the 77. The Africans (and some Asian and Middle Eastern states) remained unconvinced of the merits of the general scheme as proposed by Brazil when compared

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to their own present status, so were more in favor of merely expounding the idea as a general principle but less concerned about establishing a special committee to study its implementation, although the latter was finally agreed upon.

Other divergences derive from Brazil's semi-industrial condition, including a resistance to the arguments of the least-developed states that they should receive special treatment throughout UNCTAD's sphere of competence because of their lower per capita income and more limited possibilities for industrialization. This conflict presents the other face of the manufactures preference issue. Having one of the larger merchant marine fleets among the 77, Brazil is notably more sensitive to questions bearing upon the distribution of freight tonnage between exporter and importer nations, freight rates, and other items of "invisible trade" as well as any measures taken to encourage the development of national merchant marines in developing nations, since Brazil is planning both to build up its own fleet and export vessels to buyers throughout the world and concedes high priority to activities in the UNCTAD's Committee on Shipping. Still along the same lines, Brazil is more concerned than most Afro-Asian states about empowering UNCTAD to stimulate the growth of trade among underdeveloped states of different geographic regions, which would complement the Foreign Ministry's recent commercial ventures into Afro-Asia, with substantial Latin American trade assured by membership in the Latin American Free Trade Association.
These differences in industrial progress aside, the fact that Brazil will remain for some time principally an exporter of raw materials means that much time will have to be spent by its diplomats in efforts to stabilize the international price structure in raw materials such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and sugar, all of which entail competition with Afro-Asian producers. To illustrate the chief agricultural rivalries we now turn to the two commodities over which the greatest friction with sub-Saharan Africa has arisen, coffee and cocoa.

**Coffee**

As the historically dominant producer of coffee, the most important agricultural commodity in world trade, Brazil has a vested interest in maintaining price stability for this source of nearly 35 percent of its export earnings in 1969, with figures of 40 percent to 55 percent registered in recent previous years. Since Brazil supplied an estimated 85 percent of the world's coffee at the turn of the century, unilateral retention policy (valorization) measures proved capable of exerting satisfactory leverage on the international price structure at least until great crop increases and decline in demand during the Depression combined to yield an excess-supply crisis which was further aggravated by World War II. After the war generally favorable market conditions followed for a decade until the huge crop of 1957-1958 made it clear that because of a general rise in production worldwide (accompanied by a decline in the power of Brazil's semi-monopoly) supply would soon
begin to outrun demand. In 1957 at Brazil and Colombia's impetus, seven Latin American producers signed an export quota agreement which was expanded a year later to become a regional pact among 15 Latin nations. A producers' agreement including most African exporters and counting on the cooperation of colonial powers was reached in 1959 and renewed yearly until succeeded by the International Coffee Agreement between exporters and importers which came into force on October 1, 1962, for a period of five years.

Among the producers of the ICA the basic cleavage of interests is found between Latin America as a region where arabicas and mild coffees are grown and Africa where the harsher robustas predominate, a variety which has cut deeply into the Latin share of the market. Brazil, traditionally the spokesman for Latin interests, was the supplier of 56 percent of the world's green coffee exports in 1949, a year in which Africa's contribution by weight amounted to only 13 percent; a substitution involving increased blending of the cheaper robustas with arabicas in instant coffee and better quality control on the part of the Africans initiated during the 1950's threatened by 1966 to reverse the relationship and put Brazil on the defensive, for the Africans had captured 31 percent of the market while Brazil's percentage had gradually dwindled to slightly less than one-third. The acceleration of this trend, in conjunction with

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imminent price downturns, was the reason why Brazil was the chief sponsor of an international agreement and made great efforts in 1959 and 1960 to persuade the Africans to join, augmenting multilateral channels with bilateral communication to the Inter-African Coffee Organization initiated with the July, 1961, signature of the "Declaration of Rio de Janeiro" to provide for discussions on product commercialization, production control, and the strengthening of the agricultural sectors of the signatories' economies.

During the eight-year life of the ICA (as renewed in 1968) several points have been persistently in dispute between Brazil and the African coffee producers, chiefly the Ivory Coast, Uganda, Malagasy Republic, Cameroon, Congo (Leopoldville), Kenya, and Tanzania. 8 Some of these countries have been displeased that a Brazilian has been serving as Executive Director of the Agreement's Council since its inception, first João de Oliveira Santos (1963-1968) and then Alexandre Beltrão (previously of the New York office of the Brazilian Coffee Institute and President of the Pan American Coffee Bureau), because of the Africans' fear that a Brazilian in this central position would just reinforce his country's dominance and point of view in the market negotiations.

8 Ethiopia's case is unique, as a producer of mostly unwashed arabicas which is outside Commonwealth and Common Market preference systems, so its interests coincide more nearly with those of Brazil than do those of the other countries.
Contemporary market conditions have been characterized by a near-balance between total quota allocations and world import requirements, with most producers handling a surplus as world coffee consumption grows by only 2 to 3 percent per year. In these circumstances jockeying for annual quota adjustments has been vigorous, as a slowness in the expansion of demand has usually made an almost zero-sum game of the adjustment procedures with each state aware that a permanent expansion of its allowance will result in at least a partial reduction of the allowance of another country and vice-versa. With quota assignments also related to price fluctuations, as the market price of a certain variety of coffee moves upward in comparison to any of the others the producer becomes eligible for a temporary quota increase on the basis of selective gains. Both of these stipulations result in annual quota competition between Brazilian arabicas and African robustas, heightened by the African push for higher quotas on the basis of greatly increased production and future potential, incapacity (relative to Brazil) to store large quantities for extended periods, and the upswing of the price of robustas in relation to that of Brazilian Santos 4. Ever since the signing of the Agreement, the Africans have been edging up on Brazil in percentage of the world's green coffee exported, a gain which, although not as spectacular as that of the 1950-1961 period, has led them to demand that Brazil yield some of its quota as the single largest benefactor. The selectivity system of
temporary quota increases has benefitted the Africans more than the Brazilians, so the former wish to translate their temporary gains into permanent increases. Brazil has resisted this and has tried to hold its advantage dating from the original quota allotments based on world ratio relationships of 1961 sales upon which the Agreement was formed, giving Brazil 39.5 percent of the total and Africa 20 percent, figures which no longer reflect production or export reality (now more favorable to the Africans). Through the terms of the Agreement, then, Brazil has been capable to some extent of stemming the African onrush but incapable of stopping it entirely, as it was required by the 1968 Agreement to reduce its quota by 1.9 percent. In negotiations during August of 1969, on the other hand, Brazil was successful in a coalition with Colombia and Central American producers in weakening the selectivity system as it benefitted the Africans, but only against stiff opposition from the latter and the consumers.

Brazilian officials are of the opinion that much of the increase in consumption of African robustas has resulted from non-quota unrecorded sales of a clandestine nature, including the so-called "tourist coffee" (re-exported to the intended destination from a third country under false pretenses), and have been calling for stricter controls and checks on the agreement to halt circumvention by what Executive-Director Beltrão estimated as a million sacks between October, 1967, and October, 1968,
with higher figures in the previous years. Brazil is also strongly in favor of stabilizing the market near the present export ratios by instituting all the effective controls possible on production and stimulating economic diversification through the Diversification Fund (long a Brazilian goal), which would in reality affect Africa more than itself because Brazil has been following successful programs of production control (eradication and diversification) unilaterally with more emphasis and persistence than have the Africans, a trend which combined with minimum export price programs actually contributed to the decline of Brazil's relative position in total sacks exported but if counterbalanced by equal African efforts would tend to strengthen their economies, curb worsening global over-production in relation to demand, and also not incidentally help Brazil keep its dominant position somewhat more easily even if in return for African cooperation it and probably Colombia would have to yield a small part of their quotas. Brazil, along with other Latin American members, is anxious to receive greater assurances from the Africans that they will abide strictly by the letter of Agreement and Brazilian officials have criticized them privately in strong terms for what they interpret as failure to do so.

A perennial cause for disagreements between Brazil and African coffee producers since 1957 has been the tariff discrimination system.

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9O Jornal, September 13, 1968, p. 5.
under the Treaty of Rome and the Yaounde Convention whereby the Common Market nations allow duty-free access to their domestic markets of coffee from the associated states of the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo, Central African Republic, Malagasy Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Senegal, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Ruanda, Burundi, Somalia, and, since 1968, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, encompassing well over 90 percent of the African coffee production, while Brazilian and other Latin American coffees must pay varying ad valorem duties of up to 9.6 percent to enter the Common Market. Supported by other Latin American states, Portugal (in defense of its Angolan interests), and Ethiopia, Brazil has led the fight in denouncing the association as harmful to non-associated producers, distorting to world price levels, destructive of international competition, and a mockery of the principles laid down by UNCTAD. Brazil maintains, basing its reasoning on OAS studies, that abolition of the tariff barrier would place the Latin coffees on more nearly equal entrance terms with the Africans' with a consequent increase of sales volume and revenue flowing directly from the lowered price of Latin coffee in the Common Market which mere elimination of the tariff would bring. Brazil has also attacked the tariff as restrictive of expanded world coffee consumption and made this point a plank in its campaign against world "underconsumption" of coffee launched in 1968, utilizing as previously Article 47 of the Agreement
("Removal of Obstacles to Consumption") to call for elimination of import barriers as contrary to the Agreement itself.

The Africans, while accepting the Brazilian Coffee Institute's thesis that the future stabilized production-consumption relationship should be attained by raising consumption as high as possible in old and new markets rather than merely lowering production, were not ready to go along with Brazil in condemning the European tariff as a principal cause of "underconsumption" nor to support an amendment to Article 47 presented by Brazil during the 1968 renegotiation of the Agreement to request importers to refrain from creating new commercial barriers against coffee and to reduce present barriers against the commodity in order to increase consumption. The Common Market as usual ignored these Latin protests and went even further in a discriminatory direction by including the three above-mentioned English-speaking East African states in the arrangement in 1968. The tariff question thus became one of the major obstacles in the negotiations for pact renewal, and in the end the Agreement was extended for another five years without Brazil, Africa, or the Common Market changing policy, even though the Common Market nations agreed in principle to a gradual lowering of tariffs.  

10 The limited validity of the common Brazilian affirmation that the tariff discrimination favors the Africans heavily is demonstrated by the fact that according to official French statistics, Brazilian participation
The second and more serious dispute upon which renewal of the Agreement almost foundered was that between Brazil and the United States over Brazil's rapidly growing exports of soluble (instant) coffee to the United States, reaching a value of $23.3 million in 1967, only the third year on that market. Brazil turned to exporting soluble as a means of using its low-quality, otherwise non-exportable beans to compete with the African robusta incursion into the American trade, seeing as well a unique opportunity to build up a profitable industry based on an abundant raw material to realize increased and more stable exchange earnings on the basis of the added economic value and use of an otherwise largely wasted inferior product which lost most of its disagreeable taste characteristics in the soluble-making process. An additional benefit was gained because under the Agreement exports of soluble coffee, while figuring as part of a member's quota, are not subject to price controls as are sales of green coffee through the

in French coffee imports climbed from 16 percent in 1967 to 23.8 percent in 1969 while the African suppliers' percentage fell. In the case of coffee, at least, promotion campaigns and stressing quality differential has proved effective in making inroads into Africa's most important markets and the Common Market country with the highest tariff (9.6%). Conversely, during the same period African robustas gained at the expense of Brazilian coffees in the United States market where tariffs are not a consideration.

selectivity system. The end result was an ability to enter the American market with an instant selling at a lower price per pound than that produced by American plants using the usual higher-quality, higher-price green coffee.

Despite profits made by American regional brand and private-label roasters in using the Brazilian solubles in their blends, the larger companies (roasters and green coffee importers) filed complaints with the State Department, alleging that Brazil was engaging in unfair trade practices and circumventing the Agreement by in effect subsidizing the soluble industry (exempt from export taxes which fell upon green coffee) and thereby undercutting the American industry and placing it in very unfavorable competitive circumstances. Reacting to strong pressures the State Department began contacts with the Brazilian government on the problem and bilateral talks were begun in late 1966. As no agreement was reached, at the urging of the American coffee trade and against Brazilian wishes the matter was dragged into the Agreement, thereby purposively raising the stakes.

The American position soon became that of pressuring Brazil to create an export tax on its own soluble so that its soluble exports would enter the United States market on an equal footing with American-produced solubles of Brazilian origin. This demand was a step beyond conventional protectionism because in forcing Brazil itself to levy the duty the United States was using its power position as the largest
Brazilian customer to avoid the stigma of placing the duty itself and also perhaps to guarantee that Brazilian soluble exports to any other market would not be able to compete there on more favorable terms than American-produced soluble then making an appearance in foreign markets. When Brazil showed great reluctance to accept this solution, the United States laid out the options: either the new Agreement with the above terms or no Agreement and untaxed soluble. This unpleasant choice was what Washington (and the large coffee concerns) hoped would make Brazil yield.

Brazil considered the soluble industry of the highest importance and a test case of the resistance of the United States and developed countries generally to manufactured exports originating in developing countries. Given the blatant techniques employed by the Americans, soluble became a nationalist issue and, according to Minister of Industry and Commerce Macedo Soares, Brazilian diplomats were prepared to go as far as non-renewal of the Agreement in the protection of national interests. 12

Because this deadlock entailed grave dangers for the life of the Agreement and the American position was seconded by most major importers, it had decided ramifications on Brazilian-African relations in coffee. Although it appealed to the Africans for support on the grounds

that their industrialization of agricultural products would also be prejudiced if the American challenge went uncontested and similar pressures appeared in other commodities, Brazil found itself isolated because the Africans' low-level industrialization made the problem irrelevant to them while concrete short-run interests dictated attention to the renewal rather than concentration on what was in their opinion not a matter of principle but a side-issue of a monetary value insufficient to justify the risks inherent. With most Latin producers also of a similar mind, particularly Guatemala and Colombia, Brazil was unable to muster significant producer support while the United States readily found support among consumers.

Brazil's willingness to endanger the pact to defend the soluble industry was not well received by the Africans, many of whom are more dependent on coffee for exchange receipts than is Brazil. The specter of the pact's demise might well have served to arouse latent African discomfiture in the knowledge that although they are gaining in world sales Brazil retains a powerful ultimate advantage over them because despite recent reduction in excess productive capacity it maintains about one full year of the world's coffee supply in exportable stocks which in the absence of an Agreement could be used in a price war or for outright dumping as a devastating retaliatory measure. Brazil is still in a much better position as the single supplier of one-third of the world's total exports to influence prices unilaterally, but the several
African nations would be comparatively helpless with their relatively less-diversified economies. Should a pre-1953 type of producers' arrangement, for example, again become necessary, Brazil would be furnished with a considerably more potent arsenal of economic weapons than would the Africans, who need not be reminded of the fact. Thus in the soluble affair while the Brazilians privately criticized the Africans as capitulationists and desirous of concluding an Agreement at any price, to the Africans the Brazilians were irresponsible and rash for rocking the international trade boat so wildly for a minor issue. The differences in economic development between Brazil and Africa kept the conflict from widening to the consumer-producer dimension, while through it all the Africans were well aware that any disadvantage thrown onto the Brazilian soluble in the American market would lead the smaller roasters to include less Brazilian soluble and more African robusta in their instant and freeze-dried blends which were gaining favor with the American coffee drinker. Should Brazil be forced to impose its own duty on soluble exports to any destination, the African robusta producers would actually be the chief benefactors in markets throughout the world.

Faced with the very real American threat and lacking any effective backing among producers, to save the pact Brazil agreed to concede to the inclusion in the new Agreement of a special Article 44 which forbids any member from exporting soluble or processed coffee
under more favorable conditions than those enjoyed by the green coffee for which the Agreement was originally designed. Passing back to the bilateral level, the dispute was resolved by additional American pressure in the form of a Senate amendment to the legislation authorizing participation in the ICA, stipulating that the United States would be obliged to withdraw from the agreement should discriminatory action be taken against American coffee interests. To avoid taking any internal steps to provoke drastically lessened sales of its soluble in all foreign markets, in March, 1969, Brazil announced that an export tax of 13 cents per pound would be levied on the soluble shipped to the United States, a solution provisionally accepted by the State Department.

Cocoa

For Brazil, participation in the world cocoa market assumes different perspectives and interests than does its situation in the world coffee trade. Contrary to the massive role played by its coffee as a source of about three-quarters of a billion dollars annually in foreign exchange, cocoa exports (originating largely from Bahia state) have remained at $85 million or less in recent years, or approximately 4 percent of total export value. This figure has been sufficient to keep Brazil in third place among producers, following Ghana and Nigeria, with the Ivory Coast a close fourth, even though Brazil's share of total world production by weight dropped from 20.8 percent in 1957-1958 to 12.9 percent in 1966-1967 while West Africa's rose from 57.2 percent to
71.4 percent. Expressed in terms of interest in the market, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast combined during the 1960's produced from 4.1 to 8.7 times as many tons of raw cocoa yearly as Brazil, with cocoa and its derivatives averaging 69 percent, 18 percent, and 19 percent of their total recent export value respectively. As in coffee, the fundamental split among producers is between Brazil and Africa but with cocoa Africa is by far in the dominant position and Brazilian cocoa takes a minority status domestically and internationally. Rather than being a factor to lessen economic conflict with Africa, this fact has actually heightened it because of the very different stakes involved during negotiations for a world cocoa agreement, unsuccessful since their origins in 1956 because of a three-way wrangle among Africa, Brazil, and the major consumers--the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.

Within the Cocoa Producers Alliance (COPAL) the conflicts between Brazil and West African members--Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Togo--have been most frequent over price, quotas, and Common Market and Commonwealth tariff preference systems, sometimes constituting as much of a hindrance to the negotiation of a pact as group disagreements with consumers. The Brazilians have usually held out for higher minimum prices per pound than have the Africans and have

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more consistently expressed the view that the consumer states should finance the buffer stock, a demand the consumers reject. The Brazilians took the price issue to such an extreme that the June, 1969, talks which had crystallized around the general acceptance of a package deal providing for a price range of 20 to 29 cents were brought to a precipitous and unexpected close when Brazil suddenly introduced and stood firm upon a proposal for a range of 25 to 34 cents, which met with prompt consumer rejection. Although this was the clearest instance of Brazilian inflexibility on price, at a time when prices were at a ten-year high, previous negotiations had been hampered by the same problem which earned for Brazil the criticism of consumers and West Africans alike.

Brazil considers itself as somewhat of a future challenger to the Africans on the market, because through the Comissão Executiva do Plano de Recuperação Econômico-Rural da Lavoura Cacaueira (CEPLAC) the national government has been pursuing a program to encourage the growth of cocoa exports to a figure of at least 100 million dollars annually. Accordingly in discussing quota-determination systems Brazil has tried to defend procedures which favor itself as a producer whose production was falling in the short run during the mid-1960's but which expects to glean a rising share of the world market in the 1970's. This has taken the concrete form of defending initial quota determinations covering averages over longer periods of past production than the Africans
suggest, in order to bring into play harvests of earlier years when Brazilian production was relatively higher, while at the same time (and especially in the late 1960's) favoring a flexible system of future readjustment of quotas geared to recent production and reconsideration of criteria rather than binding all producers to old ratios. This essentially amounted to a plan to extract the maximum feasible advantage from previous, more favorable crop years while avoiding the future stabilization of the market in any way unfavorable to its interests as a contender. The Ivory Coast, also anticipating a greater share of the market, has followed this reasoning, but established producers such as Ghana and Cameroon feel that this thesis would speed the undercutting of their position. Brazil, in short, is trying to make certain that a future cocoa agreement does not retard growth of its share in the cocoa market as the Coffee Agreement has tended to retard the Africans' in coffee.

In producers' agreements (begun as a result of its suggestion) Brazil has been successful to date in being able to negotiate rights to export most of its production, occasionally at notable African expense, as in the 1964-1965 and 1965-1966 seasons when the methods used to arrive at basic export quotas so clearly favored countries whose production was falling that President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast was led to remark, "We are struggling to get more justice in this quota system, for it is not possible that a country like ours can stock four-sevenths of its production when certain countries like Brazil have only
had to stock a third or two-fifths of their production." The Ivory Coast, where cocoa contributes nearly one-fifth of the gross export revenue, found itself stocking a greater percentage of its production than did Brazil, an only slightly larger producer to whom cocoa is of marginal importance. To make matters worse, as difficult as cocoa is to stockpile in tropical zones, Brazil has greater storage facilities than the Africans, among which only Ghana has a sizeable capacity. Even the fact that the Brazilian Temporão variety of bean has a different harvest cycle from the African types caused complications and conflicts of interest in the crop estimations necessary to assign quotas or even decide the dates to bracket quota years, eventually set as running from October 1-September 30.

As in the coffee negotiations, Brazil regularly has attacked preferences granted to associated states of the Common Market and Commonwealth as discriminatory and restrictive of the expansion of world consumption. Contrary to the African practice, Brazil exports most of its cocoa and derivatives to the United States (71 percent in 1967) but less to the Common Market (24.5 percent in 1967), where the expansion of demand is generally conceded to be more promising and where Brazil would like to gain a greater share of the cocoa trade than the 1 percent it had in 1965 as compared to the 12 percent of 1958, a rapid

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decline it blames upon the tariff barriers but that the Africans attribute to other causes. With American and Ecuadorian support and claiming to be motivated by a desire to reverse the progressing trend toward regional preferences which violated the spirit of UNCTAD resolutions, Brazil in the 1967 UN Cocoa Conference split the producing countries severely in the middle of negotiations by presenting without previous consultation with other COPAL members an amendment to eliminate or suspend preferential tariff arrangements. Combined with the producer-consumer dimension of conflict, this insistence was sufficient to preclude possibilities for agreement.

In rather heated tones the West Africans retorted by practically accusing Brazil of lack of good faith in suddenly introducing a gratuitous amendment on a sensitive question at a late stage in a conference about a single commodity when preferences as a broad field could best be treated privately within COPAL or the 77 and not apparently deliberately used as an obstruction to threaten agreement. While the Ivory Coast accused Brazil of reneging on previous agreements mutually arrived at during the Algiers Conference to settle the preference question as a whole before taking up individual commodities, Ghana as the world's largest producer in which prices are a domestic political issue was even more candid in declaring that it could not countenance "some delegations," for which cocoa was not of vital interest, reducing the labors of the Conference to an "academic exercise."

Episodes such as this serve as useful instruments for Brazil for several purposes not directly related to an immediate cocoa pact. Brazil is obsessively determined to destroy the discriminatory ECM tariffs by whatever multilateral means necessary and stalling on the cocoa talks is one method of pressuring the Africans because cocoa is not so vital to Brazil that it cannot afford to use cocoa as an integral part of a general strategy to extract concessions from African competitors regarding their special economic relations with Europe, concessions which would also apply to coffee which is of transcendent importance. This could be successful if the associated states are split internally even though the Ivory Coast is the only major producer of both coffee and cocoa among them. As with price ranges, Brazil can afford to ask for more, barter, and then wait for the Africans to come around because they are harder-pressed to get an agreement. In torpedoing the more recent talks of December, 1967, and June, 1969, Brazil may also have been allowing itself time to advance its output before initial quotas are fixed in order to enter at a higher level. Against this opposition Africans privately threatened to retaliate in kind in the International Coffee Agreement to reverse the tactic where Brazil was most vulnerable, but the effectiveness of this plan would have been questionable since the coffee Committee, Summary Records of the First to Thirteenth Meetings Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 29 November to 19 December, 1967 (TD/COCOA.2/Ex/SR.1-13), 1 May, 1968, p. 102.
market is so greatly dominated by a single seller and a single consumer as the more diversified cocoa market is not. Also of dubious viability as a means to escape what the Africans see as Brazilian obstructionism would be a suggested alternative agreement encompassing only West Africa and the consuming countries or even a Common Market-based agreement which would not include the market variables represented by the United States and Brazil.

Of much more consequence to Brazil than to the Africans have been the consumers' attempts to prevent any producer from granting special price treatment to exports of cocoa products (such as instant cocoa) in order to sell them below going world prices, a demand uncomfortably closely related to the soluble coffee question which left Brazil isolated in the ICA and which Brazil resists in cocoa as a matter of principle and precedent. In West Africa only Ghana has a cocoa-processing industry of promising capacity for cocoa butter, powder, chocolates, and animal feed, which is ultimately intended for export, but even Ghana was not as concerned with the matter as Brazil by virtue of being much more constrained to attain a price stabilization scheme for raw cocoa than to hold out over what was for it an extraneous and hypothetical problem. For Brazil the basic ground rules of the cocoa agreement cannot be separated from its stands on coffee and are, in fact, planned to reinforce those stands. This tendency is made plausible by American positions in cocoa similar to those it holds on the soluble
issue, such as refusal to cover instant cocoa within the ambit of the agreement in order to be better able to apply strong unilateral measures as it deems expedient. Strains within the Cocoa Alliance, then, are produced not only because of divergent, internally determined national interests but also by the fact that for Brazil the principal consumer frame of reference is represented by the United States while for the West Africans it is Western Europe.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: AFRO-ASIA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although they are now slowly acquiring a logic of their own, Brazilian relations with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were from 1956 to 1968 heavily conditioned by Brazil's well-established patterns of interactions with those states with which it had maintained close economic and political ties prior to 1956 as well as during the 12-year period which saw the gradual extension of its diplomacy and trade into Afro-Asia and increasing contact with Afro-Asian representatives through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is therefore in relation to the main body of Brazilian foreign relations that the narrower scope of the Afro-Asian policy must be interpreted by a multi-dimensional approach which takes into account the conflicting interests and priorities which beset this peripheral dimension of foreign policy as the varied similar and diverse national interests vis-à-vis Afro-Asia in the major issue areas examined are associated with the central context of Brazilian relations with Latin America, the United States, and Western Europe.

Brazil's multifarious interactions with other states may be conceptualized as occurring or being mediated through sets of international
multiple-group affiliations or cross-cutting memberships defined by common economic, political, and cultural interests which tend to reinforce each other on some international issues and clash on others, creating dilemmas and cross-pressures for foreign policy decision-makers, much as multiple group memberships of individuals can produce tensions or conflicts of interest within their various groups or within their own attitude structure. ¹ The diversity of Brazil's international behavior and the legacy of its history place it in five groups which are relevant to this study because of the implications they engender for relations with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Each membership, while roughly delimiting Brazilian interests in regard to certain issue areas, also entails internal conflict with other group members because of divergent interests since Brazil differs somewhat from the mean characteristics of each group. Likewise, each membership implies solidarities that may conflict with solidarities arising from one or more of the other memberships.

The most established of all the memberships, imposed by geography, culture, and history, is Brazil's status as a Latin American nation, exercising bloc dominance by virtue of the skill of its diplomacy, the enormity of its territorial extension, and the magnitude of its

¹ For an elaboration of this theory at the individual and group levels, see, inter alia, David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).
population, accommodating within its borders 47.3 percent of the area of the South American continent and over half of its population. In international forums Brazil has traditionally been one of the spokesmen for the Latin bloc and in the opinion of some observers may even rival the United States for paramountcy on the South American continent within several decades. All Brazilian governments in recent times have stressed the high priority granted to Latin America in national diplomacy but the growing inclination has been to regard level of activity in the area not merely as an end in itself but also as a means to greater prestige outside the hemisphere and particularly in Afro-Asia. Counterbalanced with this ambition of using Latin America as a spring board to a worldwide role is the necessity to safeguard the national image intraregionally by vocally defending Latin interests against African interests in commodity conferences on coffee and cocoa, among others. Aside from the broader scope of its international aspirations and ultimate capabilities, Brazil has experienced conflicts of interest with Latin American states within the Organization of American States and the Latin American Free Trade Association, reflecting differences in economic development and ideology, buttressed by the long association with American policy and a prevalent national attitude depicting the country as significantly different from Spanish America, both of which set Brazil's perspectives somewhat apart from the Spanish American norm and contribute to its occasionally deviant behavior.
Evolving out of the first affiliation as an expansion to the hemispheric level is Brazil’s participation in the inter-American subsystem, epitomized by the Organization of American States and encompassing as well bilateral relations with the United States. Within this set of interactions we can place the traditional alliance with Washington which gave to some of the foreign policy elite an image of world politics resembling that of the Americans, extending most importantly to Cold War matters and even perceptions of Afro-Asia, as well as the predominant position of the United States in national economic and political policy toward other nations.

Of greater consequence for relations with Afro-Asia is Brazil’s strong self-identification as a member of the Western ethnic, cultural, and political Community, deriving from historical antecedents as well as the pro-European cultural affinities of the upper classes which found greater prestige in emulating American and European styles than in developing uniquely national tastes or outlooks. What the operationalization of this amorphous sentiment meant, as far as Afro-Asians were concerned, was decidedly impeditive of closer relations, leading to Brazilian conservative acceptance of the ideological pro-Western interpretation of its role in the Cold War, the primacy of the East-West conflict as the dimension of world tension within which the parameters of foreign policy had to be constructed, suspicion of neutralism as tending to favor international Communism, and tacit support for Western
colonialist powers as they came under attack from Afro-Asian members of the United Nations. The erosion of this attitude set has been very gradual, because even during the years of the "independent foreign policy" the vast majority of Brazilian intellectuals preferred to "aspire upward" internationally by emphasizing the nation's backgrounds as an offshoot of Europe rather than the cultural or ethnic contributions of Africa, as does Haiti. Although most pronounced as public policy during the Castello Branco regime, this manner of interpreting the Western affiliation has been a persistent variable in relations with Afro-Asia since the independence of the new states and has been noted by African representatives in Brazil. On the other hand, if Brazil has been unable to sympathize fully with the emotions of négritude and anti-colonialism neither has it fallen victim to white chauvinism, for its contemporary racial composition is neither typical of the Western nations nor similar to that of tropical Africa.

Nor is Brazil a typical Western nation in terms of political or economic development, because its characteristic political style and low per capita income classify it clearly as a developing state, a primarily agricultural but rapidly industrializing state which has many economic interests opposed to those of the developed members of the industrialized Western grouping institutionalized economically in OECD and militarily in NATO. Within this fourth group membership, now most concretized in the Group of 77, Brazil has found common cause
with Afro-Asian states in attacking developmental problems and in mediation between the NATO and Warsaw pact spokesmen as a non-aligned member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (now comprising 26 nations) meeting in Geneva since 1962. On the other hand, while promoted by common interests vis-a-vis the developed states and a Brazilian desire to expand trade in manufactures, cooperation with Afro-Asian states has been restricted, as demonstrated in the last chapter, by competition in agricultural exports, divergent views on tariff preferences, and the general consideration that Brazil is more economically developed than most Afro-Asian states and so possesses a different range of concerns on questions of international economic policy.

Brazil's isolation from Afro-Asian support because of its relatively developed condition was effectively illustrated in the politics surrounding the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. An advocate of nuclear arms limitation in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference and a leader in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibited the proliferation of nuclear weapons into Latin America, Brazil refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and criticized it as an imposition by the sponsoring nuclear states on the non-nuclear powers because it did not provide for any real sacrifices on the part of the former in return for the responsibilities and obligations undertaken by the latter. Further, according to Brazil, the treaty
contained no clear commitment by the nuclear powers to press for further measures to reduce their own arsenals but it did throw restrictions upon the peaceful uses of atomic energy by non-nuclear states, particularly in the field of explosions for peaceful purposes, a controversial point which Brazil initially tried to make appealing to other developing states by terming the document a piece of "technological neo-colonialism" and presenting the matter as a danger to the right of industrializing states to develop their own independent technology. Few non-nuclear states rose to this device so it was abandoned in early 1968 and Brazil, partly in response to American requests, ceased its lobbying efforts but maintained firm unilateral opposition to the NPT. Not only did the hoped-for Afro-Asian opposition practically melt by the time the General Assembly voted on the treaty in June, 1968, but the African bloc also indicated its readiness to exchange votes in favor of the NPT for Western approval of the liberation of South West Africa from South Africa's control. Although such a tradeoff never actually materialized, the reversal of priorities was unmistakable; the nuclear question which Brazil considered a vital interest was for the Africans quite secondary while the opposite was true in regard to South West Africa. In the vote on the resolution, only two African states voted negatively (Tanzania and Zambia) and 16 Afro-Asian bloc members abstained (Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Guinea, India, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Ruanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda). To most of the Afro-Asians halting proliferation was more important than safeguarding a supposed right that was beyond their means to exercise.

Brazil's fifth and final membership which touches upon its relations with Afro-Asia is in the Luso-Brazilian Community, the as yet inchoate but evolving association of Portuguese-speaking territories encompassing Brazil, Portugal, and the latter's overseas territories. For Brazil, however, this growing affiliation has been a two-edged sword. While recently providing inroads into Portuguese-speaking Africa with the expectation of a more important future role, the relationship has had its embarrassing moments by subjecting Brazil to Afro-Asian criticism for what may appear to be complicity in the last outstanding examples of colonialism. Brazilian officials have labored under the dilemma of what type of policy would best suit national interests in the only other Portuguese-speaking parts of the developing world while at the same time avoiding loss of face vis-a-vis anti-colonial states of Afro-Asia.

The outcome of these cross-cutting international memberships on the Afro-Asian policy is that Brazil is heavily cross-pressured because the multiple and overlapping memberships it possesses in disparate groups are only partially inclusive and so produce recurrent contradictory demands, overlapping conflicts, and resultant indecision which may appear to be uncertainty or vacillation, particularly in
low-saliency regions such as Afro-Asia where the remoteness of the
issues (with the possible exception of Portuguese Africa) from the
attentive public combined with Itamaraty's traditional secrecy give
foreign policy elites wide latitude for choice as far as domestic pressures
are concerned. What may appear to be incoherence judged from a single
standard is explained by the fact that Brazil is not fully committed to
any one membership, nor is it polarized by only highly congruent member-
ships; thus in 1966 Brazil almost simultaneously received the South
African Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economic Affairs in Rio de
Janeiro and sponsored the United Nations Seminar on Apartheid in
Brasília, as in 1968 it opened new embassies in sub-Saharan Africa
while standing alone to defend Portugal's colonial policy at the United
effect of such heterogeneous cross-cutting affiliations has been to
moderate the Brazilian position on most issues, to inhibit adherence to
a rigid, doctrinaire polar position on any single issue, with the NPT as
the most outstanding, nationalistic exception within which Brazil has
almost completely isolated itself. Hence Brazil, part "Western" and
part "non-Western," part developed and part underdeveloped, was
unable in the light of the full range of its own interests to give complete
solidarity to the Afro-Asian interpretation of the ultimate consequences
of even the widely accepted "Disarmament, Development, Decolonization"
slogan which the Brazilian delegation itself had articulated, preferring in
opposition to the majority of the Afro-Asian bloc to oppose the NPT, differ with Afro-Asian members of the 77 on important economic points, and tacitly defend Portuguese colonialism.

Brazilian economic and political interests converge with and diverge from those upon which the Afro-Asian bloc has struck a consensus in much more subtle and complicated ways than the mere grouping of Brazil with Afro-Asia as a "developing," "Southern," or "Third World" state would lead one to assume, even though the ideology of the government in Brasília at any given time may modify that convergence or divergence slightly by emphasizing the set of interests implicit in one membership as opposed to another or by pursuing different versions of the national interest within any one membership. Viewed in this manner it is not surprising that the crisis of identification, the new emerging balance of countervailing membership pressures, should have been so severe from 1961 to 1964 as Brazil first began actively to expand contacts in Afro-Asia and behind the Iron Curtain while reappraising the state of relations with its traditional associates in the light of new global ambitions, rising nationalism, and internal demands for development. Far from being immune to this reappraisal, the so-called "Afro-Asian policy" of the developmentalists was very much a result of it but at the same time never developed sufficient independent force to free itself from the constraints imposed by Brazil's four other memberships. Hence there were hesitancies, contradictions, and reversals originating
not only in misjudgments about Afro-Asian reality but also most fundamentally in resistances encountered via the other memberships and those who judged events in terms of those more salient memberships.

In conjunction with the higher saliency given to Latin America, the United States, and Western Europe by the weight of historical affiliations, other factors merge to relegate Afro-Asia to an inferior plane in Brazilian diplomacy and trade. The first set of limiting factors is economic; aid for development and trade for foreign exchange reserves must come largely from the industrialized states—Japan included—while developing Afro-Asia's role in the present rapid trade expansion, even in manufactures, will remain of much lesser importance in comparison, perhaps even "symbolic" as one high-level Foreign Ministry official charged with these relations confided to the author. Accordingly, whatever diplomatic and commercial effort Brazil can muster for trade expansion will be directed toward the markets with the greatest inherent probability of successful return. This is not to say that Afro-Asian-directed commercial activity has not grown or will not grow, for precisely the opposite has been the case, and with good success. It is merely to affirm, on the other hand, that the benefits to be garnered from the Afro-Asian economic policy are long-run benefits which will be realized and further developed as Brazil takes on global interests but which for the short run will be treated as merely supplementary in relation to the greater promotional effort invested in the larger
traditional markets. The reciprocal is also true for the Afro-Asian states in that Brazil's power of economic or political attraction for them is quite limited relative to that of the developed metropolitan areas. In this respect Brazil lacks the internal capacity for a powerful Afro-Asian policy, being restricted to meagre or token representation in several areas because of the nagging question of economic priorities.²

On the political and cultural levels, Brazil can nevertheless be expected to expand its representation in Afro-Asia and its interaction with these regions because a global diplomacy is an integral part of the national self-image as a future power, a vision which the younger Foreign Ministry officials and the "hard-line" elements of the military, among others, have taken quite seriously. The domestic political situation can not be entirely discounted, however, for some leftists still tend to identify the Afro-Asian bloc with the "international proletariat" while the traditionalist, national-security-conscious right still has qualms about the ideologies that bloc espouses and the anti-Western positions it takes. Both of these attitudes are overreactions

²Among developing states of different geographical regions low saliency is not a problem characteristic just of Brazil's relations with Afro-Asia. For descriptions of the low levels of bilateral relations between Africa and members of the Asian caucusing group despite well-known cooperation at the United Nations, see Fred R. von der Mehden, "Southeast Asian Relations with Africa," Asian Survey, V, No. 7 (July, 1965), 341-349 and Richard L. Park, "Indian-African Relations," Asian Survey, V, No. 7 (July, 1965), 350-358.
related to assessments erroneously made by the "independent foreign policy" theorists in anticipating an overwhelming Afro-Asian response to the slightest Brazilian advance and by the leading officials of the 1964 revolution who feared ideological contamination from those same states. The reality proved to be something else, but a sense of "left-ness" still pervades an aggressive, active diplomacy in Afro-Asia in the minds of traditionally oriented politicians and statesmen. The rising nationalism evident in recent foreign policy, the intensification of the North-South conflict, the "non-political" technical approach to UNCTAD, and the strictly economic nature of the post-1964 approach to Afro-Asia have served to attenuate somewhat the doubts of this group. A final settlement of the independence question in the Portuguese colonies would also be likely to have a stabilizing effect as well as removing one of Brazil's principal handicaps among the Black Africans.

The present militarily supported regime of Garrastazu Médici is following the general Escola Superior de Guerra slogan of "Security and Development," which in practice has meant a varying mix of conscious attention to the Western Community (especially the United States) for national security and simultaneous collaboration with developing countries (including those of Afro-Asia) to reach common stands on developmental problems. Although not a foregone conclusion, it may be hypothesized that some future, more leftist-nationalist, and perhaps civilian government might de-emphasize the security aspect and widen
the multilateral political cooperation with other developing states, finding itself in an objectively more-accepted position to compete for leadership to enhance its image both domestically and abroad. 3

Within the foregoing considerations as to the relational position of Afro-Asia within the full range of Brazilian foreign relations, a recapitulation of current Brazilian goals in or vis-a-vis these developing regions outside the Western Hemisphere can be drawn up as follows, without implying a given order of priority.

1. Increase in trade relations, involving preferably the exchange of manufactured products for raw materials to be used in Brazil's new industries; otherwise the general expansion of all types of sales to new markets.

2. Defense of national economic interests in competition in primary commodities, notably coffee, cocoa, sugar, and cotton, including persuasion for African states associated with the Common Market to either yield or universalize their tariff preferences there.

3. Encouragement of solidarity among developing countries to negotiate as a group with the developed states for the reversal of unfavorable terms of trade and other economic concessions sought by the Group of 77.

4. Preservation of Portuguese language and culture in Africa to serve as a facilitator for a future Brazilian presence on that continent, under the supposition that the Portuguese territories will eventually achieve independence and that

3Basing their conclusions on ideological evaluations of the domestic accomplishments of the Costa e Silva government, many of the proponents of the 1961-1964 rapprochement with Afro-Asia openly doubted the sincerity of the 1967-1968 overtures to those same areas via UNCTAD, characterizing the shift in policy as mere "window dressing" for the sake of appearances but unsupported by elite attitudes which would make real political cooperation viable.
Brazil, while not meddling in Lisbon's internal affairs, should do everything possible to make this emancipation relatively painless and of a nature to ensure the continuation of Portuguese language and culture rather than alienation from them on the part of the Africans.

5. Enhancement of national prestige as a leader among developing states, a rising middle power with a worldwide diplomatic network, utilizing the projected image of a pacific, multiracial, rapidly industrializing tropical civilization.

6. Exchange of technical knowledge in fields such as nuclear power, tropical medicine, tropical agriculture and cattle raising, civil aviation, and architecture.

Some of these objectives may require time for full realization and new ones may be added or substituted, but at present at least the above have emerged from the statements and actions of policy makers.

The exact form the Afro-Asian policy will assume in the future is difficult to determine because Brazil, historically speaking, is just beginning to emerge as an actor in international relations and has not yet elected a definite, clear course of action. Much depends upon how Brazilians evaluate the national interests in Afro-Asia as separate from or related to Brazil's older Latin American, Western Hemisphere, Western Community, and Luso-Brazilian Community memberships and priorities. This is why the Afro-Asian policy of Brazil serves as a useful case study of the types of conflicts of priorities inherent when a large developing nation tries to redefine and recast its international role, weighing the attraction of traditional patterns of behavior against the expected benefits to be gained from an alternative course of action.
Such a study also reveals the problems hindering closer relations among developing states as a group or especially among developing states of different geographical regions, casting doubt on the operational validity of the term "Third World" beyond rather narrow economic limits prescribed by the particular national interest of each developing state. In the absence of military or national security considerations, the economic factor appears to be the most important in relations among developing states, usually acting to divert their attention away from each other and toward the richer nations for trade and aid purposes, as measured in the flow of trade and diplomatic personnel.

It has been suggested by some critics of national foreign policy that Brazilian diplomacy's traditional bent for compromise solutions, "muddling through," and institutional, juridical means for solving international problems has been a hindrance to the achievement of its goals. Paradoxically, given the presently conflicting nature and levels of priority of Brazil's interests in Afro-Asia, that balancing act is quite understandable in this specific case and may prove to be Brazil's strongest point in the medium and long runs.
APPENDIX I

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS STUDY

Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Executive-Director of the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, former Chefe do Departamento de Política do Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, Rio de Janeiro, March 15, May 14, and June 17, 1968.


Manoel Orlando Ferreira, former Director of the Conselho Nacional de Economia and Director of the Centro Nacional de Produtividade na Indústria, Rio de Janeiro, May 21, 1968.

Ikuzo Hirokawa, President of Kanematsu do Brasil and of the Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Japonesa do Brasil, São Paulo, June 20, 1968.


Renato Mendonça, Ambassador to India, Rio de Janeiro, November 11, 1968.

Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes, Ambassador to Pakistan and subsequently Secretary-General for Commercial Promotion of the Foreign Ministry, Rio de Janeiro, January 25 and October 30, 1968.
Paulo dos Santos Matoso Neto, former leader of the Movimento pro-Liberção de Angola, São Paulo, June 20, 1968.


Eduardo Portella, former Executive-Director of the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, Rio de Janeiro, November 1, 1968.

Fernando Quiroga, director of newspaper Duas Bandeiras and Portuguese opposition leader in exile, Rio de Janeiro, October 17, 1968.

Antonio Carlos Konder dos Reis, Federal Senator (ARENA) from Santa Catarina, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and delegate to UNCTAD II, Rio de Janeiro, September 20, 1968.


José Honório Rodrigues, historian and former Director of the Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, Rio de Janeiro, September 17, 1968.

Hiroshi Saito, professor at the Escola de Sociologia e Política of São Paulo, and Technical Director of the Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros, São Paulo, June 20, 1968.

Bazílio de Carvalho Sampaio, Secretário de Gabinete da Gerência de Exportação do Centro de Promoção da Exportação, CACEX, Banco do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, October 8, 1968.


José Garrido Torres, former President of the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico and President of the Lowndes Bank, Rio de Janeiro, October 14, 1968.

APPENDIX II

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IN 1956, 1962, AND 1968
## Diplomatic and Consular Posts

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Wayne Alan Selcher was born July 18, 1942, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In June, 1960, he graduated from Middletown Area High School and in June, 1964, received the Bachelor of Arts in Spanish, magna cum laude, from Lebanon Valley College. Attending the University of Florida on an NDEA Title VI fellowship, he received the Master of Arts degree in Latin American Studies from that institution in August, 1965. After completing course work and comprehensive examinations for the Ph. D. in Political Science he spent ten months in Brazil on dissertation research through a Fulbright-Hays grant. Presently he is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Elizabethtown College.

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate’s supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1970

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Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

Dean, Graduate School

Supervisory Committee:

Chairman

[Signatures]