ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the members of my Supervisory Committee at the University of Florida, Professors Samuel Andrews, Ellen Haring, and Robert Sherman, for their generosity with time and professional knowledge. Professor Sherman has been my chairman. Throughout my studies at Florida he has lent credence to the view of teaching as a helping profession.

During my years as an undergraduate and graduate student a few teachers—more than others—have informed me and urged me to think. I shall be forever grateful for the good fortune to have been taught by Professors Jack Lane and Elinor Miller of Rollins College, Alan Gewirth and Harold Dunkel of the University of Chicago, and Robert Curran and Hal Lewis of the University of Florida.

Two teachers have had the greatest formative impact on my life. Professor Daniel DeNicola of Rollins College first introduced me to philosophy and philosophy of education. During my years at Rollins and until today he has been something of a mentor and always a friend. Professor Joseph Schwab—recently retired from the University of Chicago and now a director at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions—was once assessed in a national
magazine article as possessing as great a mind as Aristotle
and Leonardo da Vinci. The comparison was not unjust. He
is a modern day renaissance man in an age of specialization.
Officially he was a faculty member of the Departments of
Biology, Philosophy, and Education at Chicago. But there
were few departments in the University which did not often
ask him to give a lecture or offer a course. Among the
many valuable insights that he always imparted to his
students was the fact that the departmentalization of
universities and knowledge is not duplicated in the world
outside. Practical problems arise in the world out of
complex transactions among men, ideas, and things, a web
of transactions that knows nothing of the neat academic
boundaries which separate both the disciplines and the
schools of thought within the disciplines. Thus he was
and is interested in the possibilities of cultivating
eclectic wisdom that would enable its possessors to draw
on diverse bodies of knowledge and modes of inquiry to
meet the pressing problems of modern civilization.

Finally I wish to thank Professor Hoyt Edge of Rollins
College for kindly permitting me to use a quiet office
near the library at Rollins in the Summer of 1974, during
which time I was able to do much of the preliminary thinking
and drafting for this study.

iii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Is Ethics?</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Is Education?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Study</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. TRADITIONAL ETHICAL THEORIES</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotivism</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relativism</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalism</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonnaturalism</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuitionism</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitivism</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS OF MORAL THOUGHT AND DISCOURSE</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL THINKING IN ETHICS</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Respect for Logic</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacies of Irrelevant Evidence</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fallacies</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Respect for Language</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Respect for the Facts of the Case</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Rational Approach to Educational Policy Questions</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. BUSING: AN ISSUE FOR ANALYSIS</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. DISCIPLINE: AN ISSUE FOR ANALYSIS</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of Discipline</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline and Education</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline and Punishment</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of Punishment</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Justification of Punishment</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Forms of Punishment</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Limited Utility of Punishment</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline and Moral Education</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Common Discipline Problems</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher-Caused Problems</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-Caused Problems</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. SUMMARY</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MORAL THOUGHT AND ARGUMENT IN EDUCATION

By

Timothy Earl Ackley

December, 1975

Chairman: Robert R. Sherman

Major Department: Foundations of Education

Education is an inherently normative enterprise. To establish schools is to presuppose that education benefits students and society. A curriculum is knowledge that is presupposed to be worth having. The activity of teaching presupposes that understanding is a value of high order. There are many other values and value questions that are directly connected with education. For example, what moral values, if any, should be taught in schools? Who should receive what kind of education, and how much? And so it goes.

If the considerations above seem obvious, they are also significant. For they focus attention on the fact that educational policy questions are in large measure moral questions as well. This fact in turn calls into prominence the question of whether there can be any rational foundation to moral deliberations. Educators are confronted daily with moral issues. If there can be no rational basis to their deliberations, then the whole process of deciding about educational
issues must be arbitrary at best, and, at worst, in vain.

The purpose of this study is to provide a rational framework composed of objective criteria which will make it possible to resolve complex educational issues fairly and wisely. Discussions about such issues are frequently anything but exemplary of the ideal of rational deliberation. Instead the discussions are usually characterized by conceptual confusion, fallacious argument, disregard for the facts of the case, and misunderstanding of or disregard for the nature of ethical judgment. This study is addressed expressly to these shortcomings.

In Chapter I the significance of ethics for education is illuminated by making explicit some of the implicit normative aspects of the concept of education.

Chapters II and III are designed to improve the readers' understanding of the nature of ethical judgment. In Chapter II a critical review of the major traditional ethical theories is presented. The discussions in that chapter make it clear why none of these theories, of itself, provides a rational basis for ethics which might contribute favorably to the intelligent resolution of educational issues.

In Chapter III a more satisfactory moral point of view is advanced. Through analysis of our ordinary moral thought and language, some of the implicit presuppositions of the concept of morality itself are made more explicit. Foremost among these presuppositions is the principle of impartiality
which obliges us to respect the interests of other persons as if they were our own.

Chapter IV presents some tools of critical thinking relevant to moral thought and argument. And in Chapters V and VI these tools of thought along with the moral point of view advanced in Chapter III are applied to some real educational issues. In Chapter V the current issue of busing public school students for purposes of school desegregation is treated. By using the criteria of logic, clarity of expression, the facts of the case, and impartial moral respect for others, the arguments for busing are shown to outweigh those advanced in opposition to busing. Chapter VI takes up the perennial issue of educational discipline. By breaking this issue down into simpler issues and by again employing the above four criteria, a case is made for transferring discipline from without to within students themselves through the use of interest-based instruction, enforced and explained rules of order, fair and effective punishment for misbehavior, and moral education that aims to develop an understanding of the form of moral reasoning. In both of these chapters the primary aim is to illustrate how moral educational issues can be dealt with intelligently. Their secondary purpose, of course, is to say something of interest and importance about these issues.

In short, the aim of this study is to show that and how it is possible to resolve educational issues on a rational basis.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Ethical philosophy makes a difference to education --the difference of a method that may be adequate to support the values it incorporates; but this theoretical dependence does not mean that the one profession depends upon the other. Educationists need not receive their values from philosophers. They always have the alternative of being philosophers themselves.

--Kingsley Price

Anyone actively engaged or otherwise interested in the enterprise of education knows that educational policy issues are usually controversial and emotion-laden. School desegregation, student discipline, teacher unionization, and text book selection are but a few examples. No matter at what level of formality discussions about such issues arise (from street corner to school board meeting to congressional hearing) the discussions are frequently more confused, emotional, and irrelevant than might be hoped for ideally.

When the debate over complex and controversial educational issues falls short of the ideal of rational deliberation, it does so in one or more of four areas: (1) rules of logic are violated, (2) conceptual confusions arise owing to the use of vague, ambiguous, or unfamiliar words,
relevant facts of the case are overlooked or ignored, and (4) the nature of ethical judgment is misunderstood or misrepresented. This study is written with the aim of leaving its readers more knowledgeable about and consciously aware of the importance of maintaining a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and interests of other persons. For when one is able to remember and use these criteria as guides for formulating one's thoughts and utterances about educational issues, one's chances of thinking and speaking in a more reasonable fashion are increased.

The debate over the merits of busing public school children for purposes of desegregation provides us with a current example of how the breaking of rules of logic can impede the rational discussion of complex educational issues. An argument sometimes voiced in support of busing is that busing for desegregation is the right thing to do because for years segregationists have been busing black children great distances to ensure that they will attend all black schools. But this fact does not of itself justify busing for desegregation. What is missing is a positive reason or reasons for busing. The assumption here is that, if the other side does it, then it must be all right. Such reasoning is an example of what logicians call the fallacy of two wrongs. Two wrongs do not add up to a right.

As I have said, conceptual confusions are a second
common shortcoming in discussions about educational policy questions. Key terms in the particular issue at hand become confused owing to the vagueness, ambiguity, or unfamiliarity of these terms, and the discussions thus become knotted in semantic snarls that can be untangled only by careful analysis and definition of the confusing terms. For example, discussions about the proper type of discipline in schools sometimes never get anywhere simply because the word "discipline" changes meaning as it changes hands in the discussion. One person uses the word to refer to punishment, another person uses the word to refer to obedience to essentially self-imposed rules, and another person uses the same word to refer to unflinching obedience to school officials. Meanwhile none of the discussants seems to notice these subtle shifts in meaning.

Disregard for the facts of the case is a third dialectical deficiency in discussions about educational issues. It is frequently possible to establish both the factual circumstances out of which the issue in question has arisen and the probable consequences of proceeding on each of the alternative courses of action available in the issue. These facts of the case, however, are frequently ignored or overlooked. For instance, in the debate over busing, opponents of busing generally show little interest in the evidence on the effects of segregation or the evidence concerning the effects of desegregation.

And finally, because educational issues are in large
measure questions about what it would be morally right to
do under the circumstances, another shortcoming of the
discussions about such issues is a general misunderstanding
of the nature of ethical judgment. For example, in a
discussion about equal educational opportunity, a white
racist might proudly point out that he is perfectly con-
sistent in not caring about equal educational opportunities
for blacks; since, if he were black, he would not be as en-
titled to quality schooling as whites. The racist's tacit
assumption here, of course, is that consistency alone is
a sufficient criterion for morally evaluating human conduct.
Such an assumption belies a lack of clear insight into the
idea of morality itself. In Chapter II I indicate some
of the shortcomings of the more famous traditional theories
of ethics. And in Chapter III I attempt to clarify the
essential features of the idea of morality itself by ex-
ploring what is implicitly presupposed by anyone who takes
the idea of morality seriously.

The aim of this study, then, is to present to educators
and other interested persons a general approach to dealing
with educational policy issues that more closely approx-
imates the ideal of rational deliberation. To begin this
undertaking it will be necessary to return to one of the
points made in the preceding paragraph, namely, that educa-
tional policy questions are in large measure questions about
what it would be morally right to do under the circumstances.
To see more clearly the connections between ethics and edu-
cation it will be useful to examine the field of philosophy known as ethics and to clarify the concept of education. I begin with the former task.

What Is Ethics?

Ordinary uses of the word "ethics" usually refer to a set of specific rules or general principles of conduct which sanction some kinds of conduct and forbid others. "Business ethics," for example, refers to a code of conduct designed to regulate the acts of businessmen as they affect their customers, employees, competitors, and community. "Medical ethics" refers to a code of conduct to be observed by doctors vis-a-vis their patients and colleagues. In philosophical contexts, however, "ethics" is a more comprehensive term. Here it designates a set of principles that governs the conduct of not just one small class of individuals but the conduct of all rational persons. Ethics is the branch of philosophy whose subject matter is morality. Just as botany is the study of plants, ethics (or moral philosophy) is the study of morality. Ethics is a normative discipline insofar as it inquires into the ultimate worth of the goals that persons seek, and into the propriety of their voluntary acts. Ethics becomes analytical when it seeks to clarify the meaning of key terms in moral discourse, such as "ought," "right," "good," and so on. A further analytical task of the moral philosopher is to ask what ethical statements mean, whether they can be justified, and, if so, how.
Ethics is a practical discipline insofar as its inquiries usually begin in real-life dilemmas that give rise to the question: "What ought I to do?" Ethics is a theoretical discipline insofar as the moral philosopher tries to generalize beyond particular cases, hoping to develop principles that can be applied consistently, not just to a particular type of case, but to all moral problems. As a field of study in philosophy, then, ethics is a discipline in which students study human motives, intentions, ultimate goals, and voluntary conduct via the medium of theories about these. Let us next briefly explore the concept of education.

What Is Education?

By "the concept of education" I mean the general idea of education. To clarify a concept (or idea) is to make explicit the implicit rules which ordinarily govern our thought and language about the concept in question. By looking at the way we ordinarily use the word "education" it is possible to uncover the tacit rules that govern our ordinary thought and language about education and to distinguish education from concepts that are similar in many ways, but yet are distinct enough to be regarded as being significantly different.

When one begins to examine our ordinary uses of the word "education" roughly four general senses of the word can be discriminated. There is first the broad sense of "education" in which what is being referred to is any
learning experience. In this sense of the word practically every experience counts as education. Here we talk about being educated in the school of hard knocks. And we say things like, "My first marriage was a real education."

A second identifiable usage of "education" refers to a field of study, namely, the study of methods and theories of teaching and learning. In this usage a college student might say, "My major is education."

A third sense refers to a process that takes place at an institution of learning. "Schooling" is synonymous with this sense of "education."

A fourth usage refers to the product of schooling. Here we might use the phrase "a high school education" to refer to the kinds of knowledge and dispositions that one normally acquires as a result of having gone to high school.

It is the third and fourth senses of "education" which require further elaboration here. For it is the ethical aspects of the processes and products of schooling that are of moment in this study. One discernible aspect of the third sense is that we do not equate educating with some other similar processes. Consider training and indoctrination, for example. We would not say that a well trained blacksmith was necessarily well educated. Nor would we ordinarily say that someone who had been brought to believe a large number of facts in an unshakeable way (that is, had been indoctrinated) was, therefore, well
educated. The point to be gleaned from these distinctions is that when we talk about education we are talking about intentionally bringing about some kind of critical understanding on the part of students.

What is understanding? Understanding varies with the subject matter understood. For this reason, among others, some thinkers have concluded that "understanding" is a totally context-dependent word with no central meaning.¹ But there seems to be enough similarity among all kinds of understanding to give some meaning, if only a general one, to the word "understanding." People understand the moral rightness of an act, the beauty of a painting, and the validity of a solution to an arithmetic problem. What are they doing when they are understanding each of these things? There are impartial (publicly known and accepted) reasons for saying that an act is morally right, that a painting is beautiful, or that a solution to an arithmetic problem is valid. Knowing what kind of reasons are appropriate to these different subject matters is a part of understanding them. Understanding thus involves broad perspective rather than piecemeal knowledge of seemingly disjoint and unrelated subjects. That is, to understand what kind of reasons are appropriate to different kinds of subject matters implies that one has some overview of the disciplines, a view of their similarities, differences, and connections.

Understanding is also a self-correcting kind of knowledge. It is acquired through open-minded inquiry in which false notions or pronouncements from others are fated to be disproven. Such is seldom the case with training. And such is almost never the case with indoctrinating, unless (and this is the only exception) what one is being indoctrinated to believe is that one must never accept anything uncritically.

An educational process may begin with training, perhaps even indoctrination, but it does not stop there. An educated person is one who has acquired a disposition to act in obedience to some rule (whether it be a rule of arithmetic, art, morals, or whatever) because he understands that it is the correct way to act under the circumstances.

By contrast, the well trained person is one who merely has acquired a disposition to behave in accordance with a rule. No reasons concerning the fittingness of the rule need be understood here. All that is required is a behavioral response. Wittingness is unimportant.

And the indoctrinated person is one who has been brought to believe something in an unshakeable way. How this belief was cultivated is not important. Hence bribery, threats, lies, and so on count as valid means of indoctrinating. And whether the belief held is actually true is not of importance either.

If understanding is one major facet of the concept of education, there is a second major aspect of the concept
of education which also merits notice. This second feature is what R.S. Peters has called "worth-whileness." The point here is that to educate someone is to improve him. "Education," in the schooling sense of the word, refers to a family of processes which has as one of its principles of unity the development of desirable qualities in students. Notice, for example, that it would strike us as sounding odd to hear someone say, "I educate people at my school, but I don't do them any good." The notion of education presupposes the idea of betterment.

This second feature begins to bring into focus the significance of ethics for education. For it now can be seen that the notion of schooling is shot through with ethical presuppositions. Establishing schools, for example, presupposes that education is a good of high order. The activity of teaching presupposes that learning is a good worth helping persons to achieve. A curriculum is knowledge presupposed to be of most worth. These are values presupposed by anyone who takes the process of education seriously.

Notice too that more specific educational questions have a substantial ethical import to them also. For example:

What forms of punishment, if any, are appropriate in an

educational institution? What moral values, if any, should be taught to students? What rights should students have in relation to school authorities? And as concerns education as a product, there are always questions about who should receive what kinds of education, and how much. Given all of the above considerations, then, it seems almost needless to say that educators or other interested persons who wish to work out for themselves where they stand on the perennial and the more topical issues of educational policy can benefit from a study of moral thought and argument.

As was noted at the outset of this chapter, attempts to deal with normative educational issues are frequently characterized by fallacious argumentation, linguistic confusion, disregard for the facts of the case, and lack of understanding of the nature of ethical judgment. The aim of this study is to present a general approach to dealing with educational issues in a more reasonable manner. This approach consists of a theoretical moral point of view and some elements of critical thinking. The moral point of view to be advanced herein will facilitate a better understanding of the nature of ethical judgment. The elements of critical thinking to be discussed herein are included in response to the other common deficiencies in educational policy discussions, namely, disregard for the logic, language, and facts of the case.

Overview of the Study

The next chapter presents a critical review of com-
peting traditional theories of ethics. Occasionally persons uncritically adopt one of these theories or some variation on one of them and then feel secure that this theory, of itself, can supply them with all the guidance and information needed to deal with moral educational issues intelligently. This is unfortunate, since no ethical theory, by itself and irrespective of factual circumstances, can tell us precisely what ought to be done. Moreover, even if we recognize the importance of attending to the facts of the case, none of the traditional ethical theories offers much of an objective basis upon which ethical disputes might be resolved peacefully and wisely. The aim of Chapter II is to illuminate the shortcomings and merits of the major traditional ethical theories and also to put into historical and philosophical perspective the moral point of view advanced in Chapter III.

In Chapter III the idea of morality itself is explored. By analyzing our ordinary moral thought and language it is shown that to conduct oneself morally is to act in obedience to the principle of impartially respecting the interests of other and future persons as if they were one's own interests. At that point in the study the first of the necessary elements in any effort toward the intelligent resolution of educational issues will have been presented, namely, an impartial and objective moral point of view.

In trying to deal with complex issues in education, however, it is not enough simply to know that one ought
always to respect impartially the legitimate interests of others. What are needed in addition are some habits of critical thinking, specifically, the propensities to try (1) to detect and reject fallacious reasoning, (2) to clarify the key terms involved in the issue, and (3) to establish the factual circumstances out of which the issue has arisen and the probable consequences of proceeding on the alternative courses of action available. Accordingly, in Chapter IV a discussion of the nature and importance of maintaining a respect for logic, language, and the facts of the case is presented.

Then in Chapters V and VI the habits of critical thinking discussed in Chapter IV and the moral point of view advanced in Chapter III are combined to illustrate a general approach to dealing with educational issues intelligently. In Chapter V the topical issue of busing for purposes of racial and socioeconomic school desegregation is treated. Chapter VI takes up the perennial issue of discipline in education. In both of these chapters the primary aim is to illustrate how one might go about dealing with educational issues fairly and wisely. Their secondary purpose, of course, is to say something of interest and importance about these particular issues.

In short, then, the aim of this study is to present to educators and other interested persons some criteria for moral thought and argument which can contribute to a more reasonable approach to dealing with educational issues.
These criteria are a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and the legitimate interests of other (including future) persons.
CHAPTER II
TRADITIONAL ETHICAL THEORIES

Of course, what general principles any philosopher happens to espouse is only a biographical fact about him, so far no more important than the ethical values of any other person. But philosophers also try, as part of their professional business, to give reasons for these principles. It is these reasons that make the philosophical enterprise important.

---Richard Brandt

A critical review of traditional ethical theories is appropriate in this study for a number of reasons. First, as was seen in Chapter I, discussions about controversial educational issues are in large measure discussions about what it would be morally right to do under the circumstances. Hence any sincere attempt at resolving educational issues in an intelligent manner is predicated on the hope that there can be some rational and objective basis for ethical judgments. The critical review of ethical theories presented here will attempt to show to what extent, if any, each of the traditional ethical theories offers a rational basis for ethics. This chapter will also help to put into historical and philosophical perspective the moral point of view to be explicated in Chapter III. This chapter is also appropriate in light of the aforementioned casuistic
assumptions of those who adopt any one of the theories to be reviewed here and then take refuge in the belief that they have a pharmacopeia of prescriptions sufficient, in itself, to meet any ethical dilemma that might arise.

Special emphasis in this chapter will be placed on the meaning attributed to ethical language by the moral philosophers in question and how they thought ethical judgments could be justified. By emphasizing the meaning and justification traditionally attributed to ethical discourse, four types of ethical theories can be discriminated. These will be called Emotivism, Relativism, Naturalism, and Non-naturalism. By emphasizing things other than the meaning and justification of ethical discourse, different organizations of ethical theories can be achieved. The organization of a stamp collection, for example, depends on what commonplace one chooses to emphasize. Stamps can be organized by country of origin, face value, size, shape, or whatever. Similarly, commonplaces of ethics other than meaning and justification provide bases for other organizations of theories. But an emphasis on meaning and justification seems the most appropriate for the purposes of this study.

The interest in the meaning and justification of ethical statements is more a modern than traditional concern. Most of the theories to be reviewed here were not formulated after the philosophers in question had first stated explicitly their views of what ethical statements meant and
how they could be justified. Had they done so, their theories no doubt would have been constructed more self-consciously, intelligently, and successfully. As I have said, attempts to resolve educational issues rationally are predicated on the anterior belief that there can be some rational and objective basis for resolving ethical disputes and justifying ethical judgments. By focusing on the philosophers' implicit views about the meaning and justification of ethical statements, we will be able to see more clearly whether and to what extent their ethical theories present a rational and objective basis for the resolution of ethical disputes. Ultimately it will be seen that only one of these theories offers much hope for there being such a rational and objective basis for ethics.

And even that theory does not go far enough in that regard. I begin with what might be called an untheory of ethics, a skeptical view of the meaning and justification of ethical statements.

**Emotivism**

Emotivists (also known as positivists or noncognitivists) hold that ethical statements are basically meaningless and incapable of any kind of rational or objective justification. This school of thought grew out of the historically antecedent beliefs of persons like Auguste Comte and others before him who held that all knowledge of nature is derived from sense experience alone. In Comte's words,
All good intellects have repeated since Bacon's time that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts.¹

The thrust of the emotivist position is the belief that ethical statements do not assert any facts, they merely express emotions. On this basis ethical discourse is held to be meaningless. As two early emotivists put the matter,

This particular use of "good" is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. When so used the word stands for nothing whatever, and has no symbolic function.²

Actually the doctrine of emotivism may be divided into two subspecies. On the one hand, there is the more radical version advocated by A.J. Ayer and others. And on the other hand, there is the slightly less extreme form associated with C.L. Stevenson and others. The heart of Ayer's thesis is contained in the following passage,

But in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgment, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely 'emotive.' It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them....

We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgments. It is not because they have an 'absolute' validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false. And we have seen that sentences which simply express moral judg-

¹Harriet Martineau (trans.), The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1858), p. 27.

ments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain, or a word of command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions.\(^3\)

Ayer's position, then, is that because ethical statements are not empirically verifiable, they are meaningless. While ethical statements appear to be fact reporting sentences, they are instead disguised exclamations and commands that report nothing more than the speaker's emotions. For example, the ethical statement, "Stealing is wrong," really expresses the emotion, "Stealing, Booh!" masquerading as a statement of fact. It conveys no proposition that can be justified in any rational way.

A second, slightly less extreme form of emotivism is associated with C.L. Stevenson. Stevenson argues that while ethical statements convey no verifiable facts, they do serve a legitimate communicative function. They express the speaker's "attitude" about something and are used to evoke the same attitude in others. Like Ayer, Stevenson sees no basis for any rational justification of ethical statements. But he does suggest the possibility of ethical agreement among individuals. Agreement is a possibility insofar as it is possible to change a person's attitude. Changing a person's attitude can be done in one or both of two ways. It may be done by showing that the facts of

the case are not what the person had thought them to be, or by appealing to other overriding attitudes of the person.4

There are some implications of emotivism that merit notice. First, like the emotivists, John Dewey was aware of the fact that ethical judgments call forth feelings. But he argued that,

To take the cases in which 'emotional' factors accompany the giving of reasons as if this accompaniment factor were an inherent part of the judgment is, I submit, both a theoretical error and is, when widely adopted in practice, a source of moral weakness.5

At the center of Dewey's criticism of emotivism is his contention that ethics is primarily a practical discipline. Actual people confronting actual problems are the subject matter of ethics, and its goal is the elaboration of the types of problems that are moral and the formulation of means for their solution. Emotivism involves a misleading abstraction. It focuses on only one aspect of our moral thought and language, namely, the emotive aspect. To assume that feelings are the sole subject matter of ethics is to forget that people do have to choose and act.

A second problem of emotivism is that any forthright emotivist must admit to being a normative cynic. And thus there is reason to question why one ought to believe emotivism, or why emotivists even bother to state their position.

4Charles Leslie Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), Chaps. 1, 2, 4-7, 9.

As C.I. Lewis once wrote,

The denial to value-apprehensions in general of the character of truth or falsity and of knowledge, would imply both moral and practical cynicism. It would invalidate all action; because action becomes pointless unless there can be some measure of assurance of a valuable result which it may realize. And this negation, if it be carried out consistently, likewise invalidates all knowledge; both because believing is itself an active attitude which would have no point if it were not better to be right than wrong in what one believes, and because knowledge in general is for the sake of action. If action in general is pointless, then knowledge also is futile, and one belief is as good as another.\(^6\)

A noteworthy implication of Lewis' point is that any serious emotivist must take the role of a moral cynic in discussions about normative educational issues and hence must assume that the discussions are pointless and objectively irreconcilable. This places the emotivist in a dubious position. For, on the one hand, he wants to ground all prescriptions (including educational ones) on empirically verifiable data. But, on the other hand, if he engages in any normative discussion of why this \emph{ought} to be done, he violates one of his own first principles, namely, that value statements are only persuasive, emotive, imperatival utterances. For example, the emotivist C.L. Stevenson has recommended that educational aims be "straightened out under the guidance of beliefs that are well verified."\(^7\)


His recommendation is predicated, of course, on his empiricist assumption that scientists are somehow best qualified to formulate educational aims. As he puts it, if scientists "won't risk making value judgments, then I'd like to ask who is going to make them."  

Two points should be noted here. First, Stevenson's recommendation wrongly assumes that, because scientists are well qualified to describe for us the way the world is, they are therefore best qualified to prescribe what the world ought to be like. He makes this jump from is to ought without having offered any explanation of how descriptions can be satisfactorily translated into prescriptions, or why a person well versed in the former is best suited to formulate the latter.

Second, there is the point that it is odd that Stevenson or any emotivist should make prescriptions about educational aims. It is odd since Stevenson, as we have seen earlier in this section, wants to claim that value statements are only emotive utterances. His recommendation about educational aims here is not self-contradictory insofar as one subjective emotive utterance is presumably as good as the next. But, if one understands Stevenson's view of normative discourse, one must also understand that the particular value which Stevenson is advancing here must (on his emotivist view) only be one for which we will have either a receptive or

8Ibid.
an aversive emotion. So, never mind what you think about the idea of scientists administering our schools and legislating a new world order, how do you feel about it?

Another problem with emotivism concerns the concept of an emotion. As has been shown, emotivism equates moral judgments with emotions of approval and disapproval. But what does it mean to "approve" or "disapprove" of something? Does it mean that moral judgments are merely either receptive or aversive gut responses? While it is the case that approval and disapproval often carry with them an affective component, they also seem to acquire this affect from some cognitive basis. Though most people are unable to articulate clearly on an extemporaneous basis the rational foundation for their approvals and disapprovals, this does not preclude the possibility of there being such a foundation. As A.C. Ewing has pointed out, emotions are a psychological component of moral judgments just as breathing is a physiological component of moral judgments. Neither of these, however, rules out the possibility of there being a rational and objective component to moral judgments.9

It is possible, and indeed probable in light of the best available evidence, that each of us carries with him a tacit definition of what is right and wrong, and that we judge acts right or wrong insofar as they are consistent or inconsistent with our definitions. The extent to which

our individual definitions are rationally defensible depends upon our own individual level of moral development. It may come as some small consolation to emotivists to know that this is the view of social psychologists, such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Eliot Turiel, who are studying moral development empirically. More will said concerning their work in the next and other sections of this study.

Relativism

One of the oldest ethical theories is relativism, the view that different groups of people subscribe to different moral principles and that there is no objective reason why one group's moral code is superior to the code of any other group.10 Before pursuing this theory any further, a preliminary conceptual point should be clarified. Two types of relativism may be discriminated and should not be confused. There is first the descriptive claim that moral principles of separate groups are often different in a fundamental way. This claim is an essentially empirical and nonjudgmental one. But ethical relativism makes the further prescriptive claim which says that descriptive relativism is not only true, but that conflicting moral principles held by different groups are equally valid.

One such ethical relativist was William Graham Sumner.

10 Frederick J. Copleston, for example, traces this view back as far as the fifth century B.C. Greek, Protagoras. See Frederick J. Copleston, A History of Philosophy I (London: Burns Oates and Washburn Ltd., 1946), pp. 87-90.
According to Sumner, to say that an action is "right," for example, means nothing more than that it conforms to the folkways of the speaker's group. And Sumner held that there is no standard beyond folkways by which ethical judgments may be evaluated. Philosophers who think they can appraise folkways, he argued, are only giving expression to the preconceptions of their own group's mores.\textsuperscript{11}

This theory presents many noteworthy problems. First, if there is no way to evaluate one moral code against another, the ideas of moral progress and decadence are meaningless in any objective respect. For example, if relativism is correct, the mores of prewar Germany were not objectively better than those of Nazi Germany. They were instead "equally valid." This is not a conclusive objection to relativism, but it is at least an interesting implication, given our ordinary beliefs in the reality of moral progress and decadence.

Another interesting, if also inconclusive, objection to relativism is that, if no moral code is superior to another, the idea of following any moral code is called into question. After all, if all moral codes are equally valid, why obey any of them?

Notice too that on this view a society which permits some people to exploit and abuse their fellow humans arbitrarily without regard for their welfare is no more objec-

\textsuperscript{11}See William Graham Sumner, \textit{Folkways} (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1934).
tional than a society in which all persons treat their fellows with love and respect.

There is one problem of relativism, however, that makes it far less attractive, even to those who are unimpressed by the above implications. Insofar as ethical relativism is predicated on the truth of descriptive relativism, ethical relativism must stand or fall on the empirical validity of descriptive relativism. And many modern social scientists studying social mores have questioned the validity of descriptive relativism. Among these are Jean Piaget and, more recently, Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's cross cultural research on moral development suggests that in every culture all persons move through a six stage sequence of moral development in which each each stage is characterized by moral reasoning that is increasingly more universally applicable, logically consistent, and rationally defensible. He suggests that there are universal standards for moral reasoning. Thus an apparent moral difference between a polygynous culture and a monogamous one might be explained by the fact that large numbers of men in the polygynous culture were killed off by disease which resulted in a surplus of women who wanted to marry. That community then judged polygyny right because it was the only way to secure a husband for every woman who wanted one and thus was

the only way to promote fairness and the general welfare, standards shared by the monogomous group. Kohlberg's sixth and highest stage of moral development consists of general principles of justice that are characterized by "logical comprehensiveness, consistency, and impartiality."

The extensive research of Kohlberg strongly indicates that, even on empirical terms, there may be reason to believe that just the opposite of descriptive relativism actually is the case. That is, there appear to be fundamental moral principles to which everyone would ultimately agree. The factual presuppositions of ethical relativism, then, are anything but certain. And thus relativism cannot rule out the possibility of what it explicitly denies, namely, universal moral principles.

In discussions of educational issues, persons who knowingly or only vaguely hold a relativistic view of ethics are prone to be open-minded to the point of absurdity. With them one value judgment is as good as the next. For example, should schools intentionally try to cultivate such virtues as cleanliness, truthfulness, punctuality, promise keeping, and so on? "Well I don't know," a relativist might reply, "after all this sort of moral education smacks of middle class cultural imperialism." Relativism is an example of an otherwise noble virtue carried to an unfortunate extreme. Just as foolhardiness is an unwise and extreme form of the virtue of courage, relativism is tolerance and understanding carried to the extreme.
Naturalism

Another type of ethical theory that also has ancient historical roots is what may be called naturalism. Numerous moral philosophers have believed that ethical statements are essentially the same as statements which convey no normative judgments. The assumption here is that ethical statements can be verified in a way comparable to that in which the statements of the empirical sciences can be confirmed.

There are diverse ethical theories of value and obligation which fall under the heading of naturalism. Though these theories differ with one another in many respects, they all share the common feature of regarding moral questions as being questions about human nature. Naturalists contend that things are good because it is human nature to want and choose them. And things are bad because people naturally dislike and avoid them.

Naturalistic ethical theories differ in substance according to which natural characteristics of persons are specified as being the referents of ethical terms. Most naturalistic theories are hedonistic, in that they hold pleasure to be the highest value. But here too the meaning of "pleasure" varies from theory to theory according to what is counted as pleasure. On the one hand there is the broad view that the true test of pleasure is whether a
person actually chooses some course of action. The belief here is that nothing more specific can be said about pleasure than that it is the basis of all choices of value. By contrast, other philosophers have discriminated among pleasures and said that some pleasures are of greater moral merit than others. The following are two of the more famous variations on the naturalistic theme.

Aristotle held that, while people may take pleasure in different things, the morally best pleasures are those in which the "practically wise man" delights. These, he believed, were those pleasures which complete the "distinctive nature of man"—this distinctive nature being reason. The practically wise man was one who had developed the theoretical ability to choose between extremes (for example, vanity and humanity, or cowardice and rashness), and who had developed the practical ability to attain his wants. For Aristotle everything in the universe had a specific function or role which it ought to play, depending upon the kind of thing it was. The word "virtue" was used by him in much the same way we use the word "function" today. Thus for Aristotle the virtue of a knife was to cut things, the virtue of a hammer to drive home nails, and the virtue

---


14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1175a21-1176a29.
of man was to be rational. At the heart of this argument is the contention that because man is unique in the world insofar as he possesses reason, the greatest good or end for man is the use of his reason—either through speculation of a philosophical sort or in conducting the affairs of his daily life in a fashion so as to avoid extremes.

John Stuart Mill is another famous figure in the naturalistic tradition. Mill's philosophy of Utilitarianism, which he learned from his father James Mill and from Jeremy Bentham, equated "good" with "pleasurable" and "right" with that course of action most likely to result in the "greatest happiness for the greatest number." He admitted that his principle of utility could not be proved logically, but he believed that this fact presented no real flaw in his theory.

To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct. But Mill believed that the preponderance of evidence was on his side.

The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.


16 Ibid.
In short, the argument here is that happiness is desirable for the reason that it is naturally desired.

Mill goes on to conclude that it is always one's duty to act so as to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Now it might be objected that this inclusion of the notion of duty to others (that is, the greatest happiness for the greatest number) brings something into play beyond naturalistic reasoning per se. Part of this objection has merit, but it is essentially incorrect. It is true that Mill's position is fundamentally different from egoistic hedonism. The latter is a naturalistic ethic concerned only with self-satisfaction, whereas Mill adds a principle of justice. It is, however, a naturalistic theory of justice based on naturalistic reasoning. Notice that the reason Mill gives as to why one should try to maximize happiness for the greatest number instead of for oneself only is that we are naturally inclined to do so, that is, because of,

...the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization.  

Several problems of naturalism in general and of Aristotle's and Mill's theories in particular deserve attention. One problem with the view that empirically observable natural characteristics of human beings are the

17Ibid., p. 40.
only proper referrents of ethical terms is the implication that ethical disputes can be resolved by counting. That is, it can be found out whether an act is right or wrong simply by counting the number of people who do or do not like the idea of the act being done and then comparing sums. While public opinion is often a source worthy of consultation in ethical disputes, experience suggests that minorities sometimes are in the right. Indeed, it is a fact of our experience that the view of a few moral outcasts often subsequently becomes the view of the majority. There must, therefore, be some evaluative criteria for judging actions other than the counting of heads.

A similar objection to naturalism is one which says that, as long as moral goodness is defined in terms of human nature, there is no basis for evaluating human nature itself. To those who view human nature as a completely fixed constant and as a moral paradigm, this objection falls on deaf ears. But to those who view human nature as being malleable to a large extent, this objection is of paramount importance, since their task then becomes one of shaping our environment and experiences so as to produce better people.

Mill's utilitarian prescription to maximize pleasure for the greatest number presents special difficulties. As Moritz Schlick once pointed out, Mill's position,
...makes sense only if he can tell us exactly what it means to say, 'A is three-and-a-half times as happy as B.'

Another problem with Mill's position is its apparent allowance of acts of cruelty which we would ordinarily consider to be immoral. For example, if the happiness of the majority could be shown to be best served by the enslavement of a minority, this would seem to be permissible—indeed obligatory—on utilitarian terms. While it is true that Mill's political tracts show him to have been completely opposed to such acts of tyranny, there is nothing in his ethical theory that would rule them out.

Aristotle's statements about man's unique nature also raise some special problems. Empirical generalizations concerning man's unique natural properties do not, of themselves, provide a basis for establishing any ethical imperatives. While the natural characteristics of man must be taken into consideration in any discussion of the good and the right, more is required than observable facts alone. In the case of Aristotle's naturalistic theory, once the implicit notion involved here that man should develop and use those capacities in which he differs from the rest of the animal world is made explicit, some disturbing consequences follow. For example, as R.S. Peters


has noted, man is also the sole possessor of a prehensile thumb. A part of the good and virtuous life for man, therefore, must be the use of his thumbs.

In defense of Aristotle, it may be replied that there are reasons why man ought to develop and utilize his rational potentialities. Aristotle would have made a more compelling case had he cited these reasons and not relied on his argument from "uniqueness." He may have thought it unnecessary to do so, however, since the question of why one ought to follow reason can only be answered tautologically. Nevertheless, it is a tautology worth remembering. The point is tautological because "following reason" ordinarily means "doing what is supported by the best reasons." Hence to ask "Why should I follow reason?" is equivalent to saying "Tell me the reason why doing what is supported by the best reasons is doing what is supported by the best reasons." It is not unlike saying "Tell me why I should think a triangle has three sides." The point is that anyone who either wants or gives a justification of rationality is already committed to its use whether he realizes it or not. This is so since the notion of justification (that

---


is, giving good reasons in support of some proposition and replying to objections against it) is really a notion from within the framework of rationality (that is, doing what is supported by the best reasons). Thus there is something almost incoherent about asking for or giving a justification of rationality, insofar as to do so is to try to stand outside the framework of rationality while remaining inside.

Aristotle's questionable argument from uniqueness brings into focus the central problem of naturalistic theories of ethics in general. Naturalists insist that conclusions about what men ought to do can be inferred from descriptions of what man is. But it is axiomatic in the study of logic that no elements may appear in a conclusion that did not first appear in the premises from which the conclusion was deduced. The problem with naturalism is that it deduces moral conclusions from empirical statements which contain no moral judgments.22

In the case of Mill's Utilitarianism, for example, this problem can be seen readily if his argument is set forth in symbolic terms. If we let P stand for pleasure, D1 for desired, and D2 for desirable, it can be seen that Mill is arguing that P is D1 and therefore P is also D2.

22This logical problem of naturalism is commonly referred to as the "naturalistic fallacy." For a more complete account of this problem see William K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind, XLVIII (October, 1939), 465-475.
without first explaining why $D^1$ is equivalent to $D^2$ or what necessarily connects the two.

As a philosophy of education and a basis for viewing educational policy issues, naturalism offers both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, naturalists are quick and correct to point out that education should address itself to many of the observable wants and needs of mankind, such as self-preservation, economic self-sufficiency, parenthood, maintenance of satisfactory social and political relations, and the ability to obtain and enjoy leisure.  

However, many naturalists seem to think that they can tell us exactly what ought to be done in educational issues by simply observing what most people seem to desire, irrespective of how well thought out their various desires may be. For example, busing for desegregation must be a bad policy, since most people are against it. This may seem a valid enough argument at first blush, but again, there is a categorial difference between descriptive and prescriptive assertions. People are not simply behaving organisms. People possess discerning and effective mental powers which enable them through deliberation to see the inconsistencies among some of their desires and acts. There is nothing in naturalistic reasoning per se which requires that this mental side of human nature be overlooked. To their credit, Aristotelians do not overlook it. Most naturalistic thinkers,

---

23 These are the aims of education as seen by one of the more famous naturalistic philosophers of education, Herbert Spencer. See Herbert Spencer, Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical (New York: D. Appleton, 1887).
however, are inclined to focus on the strictly observable, behavioristic side of man. Hence today we have educational aims being reduced to "behavioral objectives." Leaving aside all of the well known deficiencies of behavioral objectives, it suffices to say that this kind of naturalism is a one-sided, mechanistic, and earth bound view of man and education.

The narrowness of naturalism can be seen even within its own claims. For example, Herbert Spencer, like most educational naturalists, believed that scientific knowledge was the be all and end all of all possible curricula. But on what nonquestion-begging basis can this educational value be established? The basis for this claim in Spencer's work is that science can best equip us for pleasurable leisure activities. No doubt anatomy, physics, and psychology do enhance one's awareness and appreciation of such leisure activities as sculpture, drama, music, sports, poetry, and so on. But it is also true that there are many persons who have rich leisure experiences who are rather scientifically naive. This suggests that science, even on the naturalistic view of what knowledge is good for, is only one important area of human knowledge. The point to be gleaned from all this is that, in educational contexts as well as others, naturalists often tend to overemphasize the observable, the measurable, the behavioral, the desired, while overlooking the mental, the conceptual, the desirable. Like emotivists, most naturalists wrongly overlook the
free and rational side of man. They both fail to recognize that there may be more of a rational basis to morality than simply emotions (as emotivists assume) or readily observable behavior (as naturalists assume). What that something more is may begin to come into focus in the remainder of this chapter and even more so in Chapter III.

**Nonnaturalism**

In contrast to naturalistic theories, there are two types of ethical theories which are known collectively as nonnaturalism. Separately they are called intuitionism and cognitivism.

**Intuitionism**

Unlike naturalists, intuitionists do not rely on empirical verification for the justification of ethical judgments. Instead it is argued that ethical judgments are self-evident and hence not in need of empirical confirmation. People are able to distinguish right from wrong intuitively. That is, people know they have an obligation not to harm others, for example, even though they are not exactly sure why their obligation is what it is. They know they have such an obligation, but they do not have any precise rational insight into its deriving from applicable moral principles. Ethical awareness for the intuitionist is not the equivalent of logical truth. Rather it is more like spontaneous apprehension whithout the use of logical analysis.
The significant departure made by intuitionism from the rest of the theories discussed thus far is that it brings into play the idea of objective morality. What is known intuitively is not a creation of individual men's minds. Intuition grasps its objects as they are. Notice too that, while a true moral judgment may reveal the attitude or emotion of the agent, the truth it asserts is independent of these affects. Nor do intuitionists believe that intuitions are culturally relative.

Intuitionist theories vary in content according to what is said to be intuited by the philosopher in question, but all intuitionist theories share the bare outlines described above. One of the more, if not the most, famous philosophers to have held such a position was G.E. Moore. In his *Principia Ethica* he argued that goodness was a self-evident notion, subject neither to empirical verification nor reductive analysis. Goodness, he contended, was an indefinable, unanalyzable property, just as yellowness is a property which things either possess or lack.

Consider yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment's reflection is sufficient to shew that those light vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive. Indeed we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colors. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow we actually perceive....

It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things
which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light.... But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other,' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness.\(^{24}\)

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, it must be said that this is an explicit criticism by Moore of those who equate the things accompanying ethical judgments with the judgments themselves. The attack was aimed at naturalists, but it speaks to emotivists as well.

There are several notable difficulties with intuitionism. First, the word "intuition" is often used to give increased credibility to apprehensions that otherwise and more precisely would be called hunches or guesses. If someone were to say, "My guess is that euthanasia is wrong," someone else might reply "Stop guessing and think about it." Yet if the same statement is uttered substituting only the word "intuition" for "guess," it might be wrongly assumed that the speaker is not whistling in the dark but is asserting a profound moral insight. The point is that often the word "intuition" lends grandeur to the most baseless conjectures which could just as appropriately be called hunches or guesses instead of intuitions.

The greatest defect in intuitionism is its inability to facilitate the resolution of moral issues. For instance, in a discussion about the relative merits of trying to

teach specific moral virtues in schools, a person might contend that it would be right to try to foster such virtues as truthfulness, respect for others, and so on because he has an "intuition" that these are desirable character qualities. When pressed to explain or defend their value preferences such persons will simply reply that they intuit that these are defensible values. So far so good. But what if someone else intuits that persons with white skin need not respect the interests of nonwhites?

A fair standard to impose on any ethical theory is to ask how well it explains the facts of what we would typically consider to be moral concerns and how free from contradictions its applications are. By this gauge, intuitionism is a failure. All moral judgments cannot be correct, for many contradict one another. If intuition is the ultimate source of moral judgments, how can intuitionism resolve moral disputes? If there is a criterion for distinguishing a valid intuition from an invalid one, what is it? One intuitionist, Henri Bergson, tried to remedy this difficulty by insisting that the intuitions of superior people (such as Gandhi, Tolstoy, Jesus, and others) can be presumed to be correct. But this presumption, he said, rested on his intuition that these were good men whose intuitions could be trusted. And it thus

---

involved vicious circularity, since what was wanted was a
criterion for judging the correctness of intuitions. In
brief, an inherent shortcoming of intuitionism is its
lack of a coherent means for resolving ethical disputes.

Because intuitionism can provide no procedure for
resolving moral disputes, it often gives rise to the sub-
jectivism that, in theory, it denies. For without cri-
teria for resolving disputes, individuals may take their
own moral intuitions and those of persons who agree with
them to be infallible. What is really right, then, becomes
that which is intuited by me, or fellow wearers of the
old school tie, or fellow dairy farmers, or fellow nazis,
or whoever.

Intuitionism, on first blush at least, is an appealing
ethical theory. It is predicated on beliefs commonly
accepted, namely, that ethical judgments are not merely
emotive whims, or culturally relative folkways, or merely
observable facts. Intuitionism is appealing also in that
it is based on a feature of our ordinary ethical experience,
namely, that we do have insights (intuitions) into ethical
issues, yet we do not have in mind any clear cut moral
principles when we have these insights. That is, we know,
for example, that stealing is wrong, but we are not exactly
sure why. At least we are not usually able to explain
extemporaneously the principles upon which our specific
moral judgments are based. I suggest, however, that our
usual inability to produce such an explanation immediately
is not proof that such an explanation is impossible or that rational moral principles do not exist.

**Cognitivism**

The other of the two major types of nonnaturalist theories is commonly called cognitivism. On this view ethical knowledge is likened to logical or mathematical knowledge. The intuitionist view that the good and right are objective is shared by cognitivists. The intuitionist believes that ethical knowledge is apprehended without the use of critical reason and there are no anterior principles upon which intuitions are founded. Cognitivists assert that ethical principles which are both necessarily true and accessible to human reason do exist. These principles are not exactly true by definition, rather we have a rational insight into their necessity, specifically, insight into the moral necessity of respecting other persons. For example, when we reflect on the matter, we see that it is necessarily the case that we have a duty to keep our promises to others. Perhaps the most famous philosopher to have proposed such a theory is Immanuel Kant.

The preceding discussions of the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson, Sumner, Aristotle, Mill, and Moore have been brief. Such brevity was necessary lest the present study become a multivolume work. The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant will be treated in more detail. This is fitting inasmuch as Kant has had tremendous influence upon nineteenth and twentieth century ethical
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of grasping the supreme principle of morality; and because Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten treats of this topic, and this topic alone, it is an indispensable book for all who profess to think seriously about moral problems. 26

Yet even the space allocated to Kant here can by no means do him justice. His theory is tied to intricate epistemological and metaphysical speculations that cannot be explained fully here. The best that can be done is to try to sort out the essential features of Kant's theory by exploring (1) what meaning he attached to ethical statements, and (2) what he considered to be the fundamental principles of ethics.

As concerns the meaning of ethical statements, Kant believed that they refer to the goodness of a person's will, that is, a person's motives and intentions. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." 27 What makes a person morally good or bad is not what he does, but why he does it. A man who repays his debts solely out of fear of imprisonment is not a


virtuous man, he is merely prudential. And the man who pays his debts out of unreflective inclination (say as a result of operant conditioning alone) acts only in accordance with duty, not from duty. Persons act morally only when they recognize that all people ought to act similarly because it is their duty to so.

Proper conduct is not primarily a matter of attaining happiness. Happiness may accompany the good life; but since all people are inclined to seek happiness, it follows from Kant's distinction between inclination and duty that it can never be one's duty simply to promote his own happiness. The essence of morality consists in obeying the fundamental principle of morality and thereby fulfilling the obligations which are binding upon us as rational beings. What are these obligations? Or, more to the point, what is this fundamental principle of morality?

If this principle determines what is right and wrong independently of what people happen to want or not want, there can be no "ifs" about its commands. That is, statements of the sort "If you want true happiness, engage in so and so" are ruled out. To emphasize the nonhypothetical and necessary nature of morality, Kant called the fundamental principle of ethics the "Categorical Imperative." Kant formulated the Categorical Imperative in a number of ways, each one emphasizing some particular aspect of the imperative. The following are the five major formulations,
1. Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 

2. Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.

3. So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.

4. ...act that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws.

5. ...every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislative member in the universal kingdom of ends.

All of the above formulations assert the same moral law. The differences between them are only differences of emphasis. The first formulation makes the point that universalizability is the essence of morality. The practical effect of this formulation is to proscribe arbitrary exceptions in favor of one's own predilections. Hence one is enjoined to act only maxims (rules of conduct) that go for everyone. That is, a particular rule of conduct is permissible (universalizable) if, and only if, one could agree that everyone confronted with similar circumstances could and should do the same thing.

The second formulation brings into play a helpful guide for aid in moral decisions. One need only ask "What would happen if my action were to become a universal law of human nature such that everyone would necessarily act

---

28 Ibid., p. 38.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., p. 46.  
31 Ibid., p. 51.  
32 Ibid., p. 55.
on it? Would this law destroy itself if it were so imposed?" Kant, of course, is being metaphorical. If moral laws were "laws of nature," questions of obligation would be moot. He is merely raising the idea of natural law here as a practical guide for making decisions. This formulation asks us to stop and think about what would happen if everyone did what we are about to do.

For example, what would happen if everyone were free to break his promises when this seemed the expedient thing to do? The logical and practical effect would be that there could no longer be such an institution as promise making. Arbitrary promise breaking is not a universalizable maxim because it entails willing (1) that it be possible to make promises and have them credited (Why else make them?), and (2) that everyone be free to break promises when it suits his purposes, thus discrediting the idea of promises. Notice that what is morally wrong with universal promise breaking is not just the unpleasant results that would follow, but, more importantly, the logical inconsistency of the idea itself. On this reasoning Kant argued that promises ought never to be broken. Here perhaps he went too far. I shall have more to say about absolute rules shortly.

The third formulation is a further elaboration of what "universalizability" means and how it should serve as a guide to conduct. If one acts only on maxims that go for everybody, then one's choices are limited significantly.
One is limited to those acts which one would not object to having done by everyone and which could, without logical contradiction, be done by everyone. To act otherwise is to particularize arbitrarily one's actions rather than universalizing them. In short, one's choices are limited by a logical respect for the equality of others. When we employ someone (say, a barber, plumber, or an attorney), we treat him as a means. But this is not what Kant wishes to proscribe in this third formulation. Rather it is the treating of another person only as a means which is immoral. To treat a person as a means only is to disregard that person's equality of capability to freely legislate the moral law (that is, the ability to recognize and respect the interests of others). To treat a person as a means only is to treat him simply as a commodity or an object. Examples of such treatment would be slavery and other forms of role stereotyping based on irrelevant criteria. For instance, it would be immoral on this view to regard women as mere commodities whose sole reason for being is to cater to the wants of men. This is so since women are capable of freely legislating the moral law.

The fourth formulation takes up the apparent contradiction between freedom and reason. We have seen that the moral law limits one's choices to those acts which are universalizable. Thus far Kant has been speaking of the moral law as if this "law" were one imposed on us from some external source. He now wishes to rectify that impres-
sion. It is our will that makes the moral law. This is Kant's solution to the apparent conflict between freedom and reason. If people are free, it seems they may do whatever they wish. But, if they must follow the dictates of reason, they must act in certain specifiable ways.

In only a slight overstatement, R.M. Hare has called this issue "the source of nearly all the central controversies of moral philosophy." Kant argues that freedom and reason are not mutually exclusive. We are free to disobey the moral law, insofar as we can do so. But we ought to obey it. And, more importantly, it is of our own making and hence can hardly be thought of as an abridgment of our freedom. We obey the moral law because we know that we contradict ourselves if we do otherwise. This makes it clear that the whole idea of morality presupposes that truly moral thought and action are autonomous. Kant is not appealing to any external authority such as Gandhi, Tolstoy, or Jesus. This view of morality presupposes that men are self-legislating rational beings.

The fifth formulation is a recapitulation of all the previous ones, especially the third. The fifth formulation serves as a practical guide for doing what the third one prescribes. It asks us to think of our fellow persons as forming a community of rational beings, each of whom

---

considers every other person as an end in himself and not as a means to be manipulated. Now the "kingdom of ends" is not actual. It is an ideal. People unfortunately often do use their fellows simply as means. Just as "natural law" was used as a metaphor, the idea of a kingdom of ends is now being used metaphorically. This kingdom of ends includes both "rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the particular ends which each may propose to himself,"\(^{34}\) provided that no special end shall obstruct the attainment by others of their chosen ends.

A few summarizing remarks seem in order. At the heart of Kantian ethics is the notion that moral deliberation requires not simply a consideration of what one wants or what people generally want, but a consideration of what is right. And what is "right" is what is rational. What is rational is a course of action not dictated by arbitrary fiat, but one which the agent could consistently advocate for any person in similar circumstances.

The political implications of Kant's ethics point to a republican form of government. Indeed, in his book, Perpetual Peace, Kant argues for a state in which citizens are treated as equals in the eyes of the law.\(^{35}\) This does not mean that all people should be treated as if they

\(^{34}\)Kant, Fundamental Principles, p. 50.

were alike in every respect, or that the state should try to make them more alike. To treat persons equally before the law, again, means that what goes for one goes for all. It means respecting individual differences and encouraging the development of all capacities that do not lead to the frustration of other persons' interests. And such a state will not permit some citizens to be treated solely as means to the welfare of others.

Several objections to Kant's ethics deserve attention. First, it has been argued widely that Kant wrongly ignores the results of action when he claims that the will is the only proper object of praise and blame. Critics of Kant who take this tack usually say things like: "It is obviously bad if someone is killed, irrespective of whether the death resulted from an accident or premeditated murder." To this it may be replied that it is, of course, an unhappy event when anyone is killed by the actions of another. But the fact that we would not ordinarily morally blame someone for taking someone else's life involuntarily suggests that the will (motives and intentions) and not results is the primary object of evaluation in our ordinary moral thought and language. Similarly, we ordinarily would not praise someone whose clear intent was to do evil but whose actions resulted in the saving of lives. And when we stub our toe on a chair and then foolishly proceed to curse the chair, our cursing is mis-directed precisely because the chair lacks the ability to will. These cases make it clear that voluntary (freely
willed) action is the subject matter of ethics and the proper object of moral evaluation.

It should also be pointed out that Kant actually does take results into account in his theory when he insists that maxims be tested for their universalizability. This recognition of the importance of results can be seen in several places in Kant's ethical writings, for example, in the previously discussed issue of whether it is right to break promises. There Kant argues that expedient promise breaking is not a universalizable maxim because,

...it would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.36

That Kant is anticipating the results of universal promise breaking here is made plain by his repeated use of the auxilliary verb "would." Thus, while he downplays the importance of results, he does not wholly ignore them. The role of results in his theory is an anticipatory and ideational one, as opposed to the more important role they play in other theories, such as in one form of utilitarianism which holds that men are moral or immoral precisely insofar as their acts do or do not result in the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Notice that, for Kant, it is not the unpleasant results per se of universal promise breaking

36Kant, Fundamental Principles, p. 40.
that make it wrong. It is the fact that universal promise breaking is a self-contradicting maxim that makes it wrong.

Though the case against Kant for wrongly downplaying the significance of results is a weak one when formulated as it was above, there is a sense in which Kant does seem to overemphasize the purely ideational side of morality. I believe that Kant’s concept of the will wrongly ignores the importance of action in ethics. Kant insists that the only proper object of moral judgment is the will, which for him means motives and intentions. For reasons just elaborated this position is essentially correct. Yet I believe Kant would have done better to include action and sincere attempts at action as equally important ingredients in his notion of the will. This is so, since even on Kant’s view a good will is good only insofar as it aims at universalizable action. As Hastings Rashdall and others have pointed out, the subject matter of ethics is voluntary action.\(^{37}\) The whole notion of “ought” implies “can.” To say seriously that someone ought to do X is to presuppose that X can be done. And the words “ought to do” and “can be done” signify that moral thought and discourse are about action. We ordinarily infer that someone has a good will only when that person actually does and will do the right thing or at least resolutely attempts and will attempt to do so. We ordinarily take it to be a mark of

immaturity, neurosis, or immorality (in the case of sane adults) when someone consistently acts so as to contravene the interests of others and then claims that he did not mean to do so. It is through deliberation and action that men ultimately express their regard for moral norms. In this connection, John Dewey's description of the will seems a more accurate one than Kant's. "Will or character," according to Dewey, "means intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve them." 38

Another objection to Kantian ethics is that Kant seems to think he has proven more than he actually has. Kant sets forth a few particular and absolute rules, such as that promises ought never to be broken. But might there not be cases in which it would be right to break a promise and thereby, for example, help a person in trouble? Kant seems to have overlooked the importance of the facts of the case in moral deliberation. By "facts of the case" I mean the circumstances out of which the moral dilemma has arisen and the best available evidence as to what the probable consequences would be of choosing each of the alternative courses of action available. Given certain circumstances it may be one's duty to break a promise. Kant would have done better to say that we have a prima facie duty not to break a promise, but that there might be

---

circumstances which could justify the breaking of a promise. And as long as the reason a person cites as excusing him from keeping his promise is one that could be cited by any comparable person in similar circumstances without throwing the idea of promise making into disrepute, then this would not seem to violate the categorical imperative. Thus, while the objection to Kant's few absolute rules is valid, the objection does no harm to the heart of his theory, namely, the categorical imperative and universalizability.

C.D. Broad has taken issue with Kant over the question of whether subjective inclinations can be relevant to moral judgments. Broad contends that, while Kant is basically correct in emphasizing duty as opposed to one's personal likes and dislikes, there are cases in which inclinations should be taken into consideration in the making of moral judgments. For example, choosing an occupation is in some respects a moral choice, since one's performance on many sorts of jobs is likely to affect the welfare of others. Teachers, for instance, clearly affect the lives and welfare of their students. They either are or are not enthusiastic about their subjects and jobs. They either do or do not try to find out the interests of their individual students and teach by building upon those interests, and so on. Is it not reasonable to conclude that those considering

becoming teachers should take into account their own likings or dislikings of teaching? Such inclinations are sure to affect one’s future teaching performance and the welfare of one’s students. There do seem to be cases, then, in which inclinations may be relevant ingredients in making moral judgments. Here again, inclinations are a part of what might be called the facts of the case.

John Mothershead has raised a complex logical objection to Kantian ethics. If valid, this objection would deal a serious blow to Kant’s theory. But this objection, I believe, commits something akin to what logicians call the fallacy of equivocation, that is, the objection is persuasive because of a subtle manipulation of the meaning of key words involved. For this reason, it is appropriate that Mothershead’s objection be presented here verbatim:

"Kant argues that our obligation is not only to do certain things and to abstain from others but also to do or abstain for duty’s sake—that is, from a good motive. He also argues that we must be able to do whatever it is our obligation to do. It follows that we must have control not only of our actions but also of our motives. But this is not true. We may be able to pay our debts whether we want to or not, but we cannot produce at will a sense of duty to pay our debts if we do not in fact have this motive. We conclude that either we do not have the duty to act from duty or we are not always able to do what it is our duty to do."\(^7\)

This objection goes to the very heart of Kantian ethics. For what it purports to show is that we have no duty to

act from duty, because we are not able to generate immediately the desire to do so.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's definition of philosophy as "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" serves well here as a warning against the subtle changes in meaning that make this objection seem so plausible. Notice that Mothershead has mistakenly made "motives" mean "wants." When we realize that motives for Kant were not wants (inclinations) but universal attitudes, the objection falls. Kant does indeed say that what makes an action right or wrong is the agent's motive. But "motive" here refers to whether the agent knowingly made universalizability a criterion in choosing his course of action. Mothershead has confused the ability of the will to evaluate rationally courses of action in terms of their universalizability with the inability of the will to alter instantly the inclinations. The will cannot change (not immediately anyway) what we desire, but it can tell us what is desirable. It is from this latter capacity of the will that our moral obligations derive.

H.J. Paton's accolade which was used to introduce Kant's theory serves equally well as a summary. To paraphrase Paton, Kant treats of the supreme principle of morality, and this principle is indispensible for anyone...
who wants to think seriously about moral problems. This is to say that Kant's aim was not to present a few particular moral rules, but rather to provide a more comprehensive fundamental principle of conduct which applied everywhere and always, one which could recommend itself no matter what the situation and which was not too vague to be applied to concrete cases. To a certain extent, he seems to have succeeded. Aside from his questionable inclusion of a few particular absolutes (such as always keeping promises) and his underemphasis of action and the facts of the case, his principle of universalizability is an important step in attempting to establish a rational objective basis for ethics.

In this chapter we have seen that only one of the traditional ethical theories offers much of an objective basis for the resolution of moral issues. And this is a fact well worth emphasizing. For one of the central functions of the idea of morality as we ordinarily think and speak of it is to enable us to resolve moral issues peacefully and wisely. Emotivists consider ethical language to be only subjective emotive utterances without any objective basis. If we adopt relativism, how shall we resolve moral issues, if different moral points of view are equally valid? If we embrace naturalism, how shall we determine which of man's natural capacities ought to be prized most highly? And how shall we convert descriptive accounts of human nature into defensible prescriptive statements. And,
if intuition is to be our guide, how shall we choose between conflicting intuitions?

Kant's cognitivist theory offers at least a partial basis upon which moral issues can be resolved objectively. But at the stage of development at which Kant leaves his principle of universalizability it seems to require only consistency on the part of moral agents. That is, at the level of analysis at which Kant leaves his principle, he seems to suggest that consistency is the criterion against which particular judgments should be morally evaluated. Clearly the criterion of consistency is one which we do presuppose in our ordinary moral thought and discourse. This is exemplified by the fact that persons usually feel compelled to defend apparent inconsistencies in their moral judgments. A school principal who punished the child of a poor black family severely for some act and ignored the very same act when performed by a white child would surely be accused by most persons as having acted inconsistently and hence immorally. Such a principal, if he were a staunch racist, might then attempt to justify his conduct by claiming that, if he were black, he too would be entitled to less freedom and subject to greater penalties for misconduct. This defense presupposes, in a fashion which would make Kant turn in his grave, that consistency is all that is required by the concept of morality. That is, the principal is presupposing that consistency is not just a necessary feature of moral conduct
but that it is a sufficient account of what moral conduct is. While Kant's political writings indicate that he would have recoiled from the idea of consistently ignoring the interests of any class of persons,\(^2\) his principle of universalizability as he explicates it seems powerless to show the racist the error of his ways.

If consistency is a sufficient moral criterion for evaluating conduct, then I may contravene the interests of any group of persons so long as I do so consistently. Since, however, such conduct is such as we would ordinarily consider to be immoral, a more complete account of the idea of morality must be established if this study is to succeed in establishing an objective basis for the fair and wise resolution of moral educational issues.

Taking a cue from the philosophers known loosely as "ordinary language analysts," I shall argue in the next chapter that any account of what moral reasoning ought to be like can be predicated only on what we ordinarily presuppose the idea of morality to be like. In short, I shall attempt to make more explicit what usually remain at the level of only implicit presuppositions in our ordinary moral thought and language. This so called "ordinary language" approach to philosophy is explained in Chapter IV in the section entitled "A Respect for Language." If this approach is successful in the instant concern of making clearer the

\(^2\)Kant, *Perpetual Peace.*
concept of morality, it will provide the most defensible account of what moral reasoning ought to be like that I can envision; for it will not defend the idiosyncratic predilections of any particular individual, but will instead embody that which is tacitly presupposed by anyone who wishes to live in a moral society.
CHAPTER III
SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS OF MORAL THOUGHT AND DISCOURSE

Apart from metaphysical presupposition there can be no civilization.

---Alfred North Whitehead

In this chapter I am going to advance a distinctive moral point of view which can be of benefit in trying to resolve moral educational issues on a rational basis. The philosophical methods that I shall employ will focus on the nature of our ordinary moral thought and language. Since one of the previously discussed ethical theories also emphasized the nature of ethical language but came to the conclusion that no rational basis for moral judgments existed, I shall begin by briefly explaining the differences between emotivism and the moral point of view to be advanced here.

It is argued by emotivists that moral questions are beyond the reach of rational discussion. They maintain that ethical discourse is meaningless because it is emotional and metaphysical, that is, unlike the language of the sciences, it is not based on empirically verifiable facts.

But even science, like all human enterprises, has its metaphysical presuppositions. What scientist, for
example, does not subscribe to the normative presupposition that knowledge is better than ignorance? There is also Alfred North Whitehead's point that, "All scientific progress depends on first framing a formula giving a general description of observed fact."¹ That is, for scientific inquiry to go forward, there first must be some speculative hypothesis advanced by the scientist, one that defines the questions to be asked and serves as a framework for interpreting data. Scientific observations only make sense within some conceptual framework which is in large measure speculative. Of course, as new knowledge is acquired, naive frameworks give way to ones which are more adequate. These, in turn, suggest new questions to be asked and new patterns of experiment.

No human endeavor can have meaning without such presuppositions. No person ever sees, thinks, or talks about the world other than through some conceptual framework, whether he is keenly aware of that framework or not. In this chapter I will not be proposing yet another ethical theory, rather I will be reporting on the conceptual framework that men have found to be necessary for a peaceful and fair social order. That is, I will try to make explicit the public presuppositions that are constitutive of the ideal of moral human conduct. Hence the principles to be explicated in this chapter are not simply the author's

moral philosophy, instead they are norms which have evolved with man. Our ordinary moral thought and discourse are an evolutionary heritage of distinctions, connections, and imperatives that men have found to be worth making over generations. These presuppositions about voluntary human conduct (not unlike scientific presuppositions) are products of the long test of survival of the fittest concept and hence are more likely to be theoretically and practically sound than anything that I or any philosopher might cook up at his desk.

Now an ethical dilemma is one that issues in the question, "What ought I to do?" It is what is ordinarily presupposed by anyone who seriously asks this question that must be explored. One such presupposition is that there are alternative courses of action available to the agent. A second is that, among these alternative courses of action, some would be right to do and others wrong. Why else ask or wonder "What ought I to do?"

To presuppose that some acts would be right under the circumstances and others wrong is to hold that it is possible to give good reasons for choosing one course of action over another. That is, one who asks seriously, "What ought I to do?" presupposes that a reason for doing something cannot be constituted simply by the arbitrary fiat of himself or anyone else. For one who is deliberating seriously about the relative merits of alternative course of action X as opposed to course of action Y in order to choose between the
two is presupposing that there are features possessed by X or Y that would make one of them a proper (morally permissible) choice. Hence there must be some general principle which renders the reasons cited for choosing either X or Y good reasons or bad reasons.

To say that there must be this general principle is only to say that what ought to be done in some particular situation by some particular person ought also to be done by any similar person in similar circumstances unless there is a relevant difference in either the situation or person in question. Once the need for a general principle is recognized, the above principle must be accepted; for it is only an explication of what is meant by "general."

The above principle is also an exemplification of what has earlier been called universalizability herein. In the section on Kant's ethical theory, "universalizability" was seen to mean that what is right for one person to do in a given situation must be right for any similar person in a similar situation. It can now be seen that the standard of universalizability is imbedded in the logic of our ordinary moral thought and discourse. Universalizability casts the bare outlines of the form that defensible moral reasoning must take. That form is consistency. But this formal criterion alone does not tell us enough.

As a formal principle, universalizability is only one necessary (not a sufficient) criterion for evaluating voluntary action. It does not rule out many types of
immoral conduct, rather it only rules out some kinds of immoral conduct. All that it requires is consistency. If, for example, someone decides that all red haired people should be burned at the stake at age twenty-five, he does not violate the idea of universalizability as presently understood unless he burns some redheads before their twenty-fifth birthday or arbitrarily grants some other redheads a stay of execution. What is wanted is an additional criterion that will rule out certain kinds of treatment which, though they are ostensibly consistent, we would ordinarily consider to be immoral.

It has long been a standard objection to Kant's ethical theory that, because it is a purely formal one, adequate moral prescriptions cannot be said to follow from it necessarily. Given the level of development at which Kant leaves his principle of universalizability, this is essentially correct. But I now wish to argue that universalizability, if further explicated, actually does provide something more than the criterion of consistency. That something more is impartiality. "Impartiality" hereafter will refer to the idea that everyone has a prima facie right (that is, ought to be able) to fulfill his wants that do not involve injuring other persons.

The concept of impartiality requires further elaboration if it is to be shown that it is capable of ruling out immoral acts untouched by the criterion of consistency and that it is truly a part of the concept of universalizability.
Equality of rights requires that similar cases be treated similarly and different cases differently. But this is still only a formal requirement which admits of completely variable content, depending upon what differences between persons and circumstances are to count as being relevant.

Or previous study of traditional ethical theories brings to mind a few possible candidates for the title of "relevant differences." Utilitarians, for example, have held that features of persons, circumstances, or acts are relevant to morality insofar as they causally affect the production of happiness. But this position is subject to all the logical difficulties cited in the previous discussion of Mill's ethical theory.

According to relativists, which qualities of persons, circumstances, or acts are relevant to morality is to be determined by the moral code of some particular person or culture. And no code is thought to be any more valid than the next. Since, however, some of these codes might be such as we would ordinarily regard as immoral, to make no distinctions among moral codes is effectively to make no moral distinctions among actions. And hence, apart from the well known difficulties that beset relativism, it is clear that this general position, if correct, would make impossible one aim of the current work. For it is an aim of this study to investigate the possibility of there being an objective fundamental principle of ethics that is rationally defensible.
Now it may be recalled that the logic of our moral thought and discourse excludes that which is arbitrary. But any person's right-claim is arbitrary so long as he alone is permitted to decide what are to count as relevant differences between himself and others. (The term "right-claim" hereafter will refer to the claim made by someone when he claims that other persons ought not to interfere with the action for which his claim is made.) The only way to guard against such arbitrariness, and hence to establish a right-claim on a rational basis, then, is to restrict its content to what is necessarily and hence universally connected with its subject matter, as against what is left to the individual's unilateral whim. And the subject matter of ethics is voluntary human action.

No matter in how many ways a person in making his right-claims to act might choose to describe himself, the description which he cannot reject is that he is a person with purposes that he wants to fulfill. And it is this description that is necessarily and invariably connected with the category of voluntary human action. Hence I infer that every rational person must accept the generalization that all persons who want to fulfill their purposes have the prima facie right to participate voluntarily and

---

2The following discussion of the ethical implications of the normative structure of voluntary human action is derived in large measure from my understanding and interpretation of lectures delivered by Professor Alan Gewirth in a seminar entitled "Reason and Ethics" at the University of Chicago during the Winter Quarter of the 1971-72 academic year.
purposively in transactions in which they are involved. This is so because reason prevents us from denying two similarities among all mature persons, namely, their purposiveness and rationality. "Purposiveness" here means the desire to attain one's ends. And by "rationality" I mean the practical ability to attain most of one's ends if not interfered with by other persons and the theoretical capacity to comprehend the equality of others with regard to their like purposiveness and rationality. (Of course, these descriptions are not completely true of the very young and the mentally infirm. But when the liberty of such persons is restrained it must be in proportion to the extent to which and for the reason that they are incapable of protecting or furthering their own best interests or are unmindful of the legitimate interests of others.) Now our recognition of these similarities among all persons evokes in us the further realization that there must be some relevant difference between ourself and others before we can rationally claim to be entitled to preferential treatment. Finally, we come to see that the only way to avoid arbitrary claims and conduct is to require that the relevant difference cited as a justification for differential treatment among individuals must be acknowledged and accepted by all of the individuals whose interests are affected by the treatment in question. This is only what is meant by an "objective" criterion of moral judgment. Without it, rational morality is impossible, and ethics remains at the level of the
subjective; for then we may claim and do whatever we please, citing any characteristic of ourselves as a justification for our conduct. And the notion of subjective morality is a self-contradicting one. For one of the fundamental presuppositions of the idea of morality itself is that there are impartial criteria which proscribe certain kinds of action. To see why this is so it will be necessary to reveal how the idea of impartiality is presupposed by the idea of universalizability.³

As long as the question of what will constitute a relevant difference between persons is left open, universalizability remains a purely formal principle. Nevertheless, some difference must be cited if a person wishes to justify differential treatment in terms of the idea of universalizability. Now the fact that an act will frustrate the interests of another person to any degree is a prima facie reason, on the part of that person, why the act should not be done. This is simply a conceptual point, since to say that any person P's interests will be frustrated by action Q is to say that P has a reason why Q should not be done.

Now I ask, what kind of reason could outweigh this prima

facie reason for not frustrating someone's interests? The principle of universalizability, I believe, can be shown to embody three criteria that such a reason would have to meet: (1) at least one person's interests will be protected or fulfilled to some extent by the act being done; (2) a relevant difference exists between the person(s) whose interests are frustrated and the one(s) who benefit(s); and (3) this difference is freely acknowledged and accepted by all parties as a relevant one. As regards this last criterion, any differences between persons or circumstances that are cited as being relevant should be made explicit and discussed freely, since people do not always see clearly what is actually at issue in moral disputes.

The first criterion is necessary because an act that did not benefit anyone would be supported by no reason on the part of anyone. And since the act in question is one which we have said will frustrate someone's interests, there is already a prima facie reason for not doing it and no overriding reason for doing it.

The second criterion is only a restatement of the formal sense of universalizability. It requires that differences in treatment be founded on differences between persons and or their circumstances.

The third criterion illuminates the idea of impartiality entailed in the idea of universalizability. This criterion requires that the property or set of properties cited in the second criterion be freely acknowledged and
accepted by all parties affected. The necessity of this criterion can be explained best perhaps by means of an illustration. Suppose a difference is cited as a reason for treating persons X and Y differently. Further suppose that X accepts this difference as such a reason, but Y does not. And, to satisfy the first of the three criteria, further suppose that X will benefit by the treatment in question. At this point the first two of the criteria are satisfied, but the third is not. Because the third criterion is not met, the treatment in question is unjust. For, by the principle of universalizability, X cannot seriously say that it is right for the difference in treatment to occur when these conditions obtain, unless he can also seriously say it would be right for it to occur under the same conditions whenever any two persons are differentiated in the same way, for example, if he were in Y's position and someone else were in his. And this he cannot say, since Y does not acknowledge the difference to be a good reason for differential treatment. That is, were their roles reversed, X could not judge the act to be right, since he would then have to take Y's position of not recognizing the difference in question as a relevant one.

We have now come to what I take to be a rationally defensible fundamental principle of ethics and justice. To wit, differences in treatment among individuals are just if and only if three conditions can be satisfied: (1) at least one person's interests will be protected or fulfilled to
some extent by the difference in treatment; (2) a relevant
difference exists between the person(s) whose interests
are frustrated and the one(s) who benefit(s); and (3)
this difference is freely acknowledged and accepted by all
parties whose interests are affected, taking into account,
of course, the expectable interests of future persons also.

This principle should serve as a general guide in
resolving moral disputes among individuals. And it also
has direct implications for the justice of social insti-
tutions. For insofar as institutions are composed of indi-
viduals and generated and upheld by individuals, the require-
ments for just transactions among individuals can be applied,
with appropriate practical refinements, to operations of
social institutions. More will be said shortly concerning
institutions.

At this juncture it seems appropriate to entertain
objections that might be raised against this analysis of
the idea of morality. First, it might be objected that
this description of persons as being purposive and rational
creates an excessive generality in my moral point of view.
This description of persons is only a universal not a
complete description of any particular person. Any particu-
lar person obviously has many additional features which truly
characterize him, but these are all omitted in my descrip-
tion. Rights-claims are not made by universal features
of people, rather, particular persons make various differ-
ential claims which they ground on specific kinds of descrip-
tions of themselves.

It is, of course, true that many specific descriptions are true of a particular person. The problem for ethical theory is that there are nearly an infinite number of such true descriptions, and the ethical question is how to decide which of these descriptions shall count as relevant ones. If, on the one hand, a person's own justificatory reason for his action is taken as decisively answering the question of relevance, then anything goes. However, the whole point of our ordinary moral thought and language is to subject people's choices to rational evaluation. And hence those choices cannot themselves be made the independent variables for making such an evaluation. Insofar, then, as the basis of evaluation is to be confined in a nonquestion-begging way to what is objective, I believe that the only alternative is to select as the criteria of evaluation those features of any person and his action which, because they are necessarily and universally connected with the category of voluntary action, are impervious to whatever particular purposes he may want to advance.

A second objection might arise from the belief that this moral point of view places too much trust in those whose interests are affected by acts and who, according to the tripartite principle of impartiality, must freely acknowledge and accept reasons for differential treatment. More specifically, in the case of transactions among individuals, the person affected by some act might be just as
arbitrary in refusing to accept some reason for differential treatment as the agent himself might have been had he been free to stipulate arbitrarily any reason as a relevant one.

To this it may be replied that experience teaches us to be more trusting of rational discussion between the parties to a moral issue than license. When persons are not held accountable in some way to others for their actions, they often act in ways which we would ordinarily consider to be immoral. This moral point of view places a premium on the role that rational discussion among individuals can play in establishing relevant reasons for differential treatment and in resolving moral disputes in general. More will be said concerning the nature and role of rational discussion in my general approach to dealing with normative educational issues in the next chapter. At this point it can only be said that I am far more willing to make ethical choices subject to the conclusions reached through open and inquisitive discussion that is guided by a respect for logic, clarity of expression, the facts of the case, and the interests of others than to the unilateral whims of particular individuals.

A similar objection would be that this moral point of view would be impossible to implement in trying to establish just social institutions. That is, it might be inferred that the requirement of mutual acknowledgement and acceptance of reasons for differential treatment could require, on an
institutional level, unanimity among those who would be
the recipients of institutional action before such action
could be justified, for example, unanimity among the governed
before governments could act, unanimity among union members
before a contract could be approved, and so on. And since
unanimity is a scarce commodity, much of the institutional
action which we ordinarily consider to be worthwhile would be
rendered impossible.

But precisely because unanimity is seldom attainable
and institutional action frequently is desirable, rational
men might freely and unanimously decide to formulate a
social contract (constitution) that would provide there-
after for the operation of effective and just institutions.
Majority vote of the parties affected by institutional
action would suffice to justify such action, provided that
the wishes of the majority were enlightened ones adopted
after open discussion of the issue in question, and provided
also that a system of checks and balances is available to
all to prevent a tyranny by the majority over the legitimate
rights of a minority. To set forth in extensive detail
what I believe such a document should look like would
require a separate and lengthy volume on justice. It
suffices for the purposes of this study to say that just
institutions are ones which are generated and upheld to
protect and further the interests of all persons. At a
minimum, it can be said that six general precepts would
likely be contained in such a document. These precepts
would serve as general guides for the drafting of more specific laws and for the establishment and operation of political and other social institutions. I believe that each of these precepts is consistent with and indeed required by the moral point of view advanced in this chapter. 4

First, institutional authority should be thought of as being conditional (as opposed to the absolute authority of a monarch or any other ruler presumed to rule from divine right) and justified only by the need for institutions which will protect and further the legitimate interests of all persons.

Second, institutional decision making should be either based upon or at least accountable to the wishes of a majority of the persons whose interests are affected by the decisions.

Third, majority rule should be thought of as being more than mere rule by the unanalyzed wishes of a majority, since majority wishes of this sort can be as malicious and arbitrary in their effects as the will of any absolute ruler. Majority rule, if it is to stand a better chance of being just and wise, should be the result of public deliberation, that is, open and rational discussion guided

4The following precepts are what I take to be some fundamental principles of justice. Taken together they form a somewhat uncommon and perhaps unique synthesis of ideas. Separately, however, they closely parallel some of the ideas of Brain Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), Chap. VI; R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, Chap. X; and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), Chaps. II and V in particular.
by a respect for logic, clarity of expression, the facts of the case, and the interests of other persons.

Fourth, in a bill of rights, every person should be guaranteed the most extensive set of liberties consistent with similar liberties for all. Included among these liberties would be freedom of expression and assembly, since without these it would be vain to speak of institutional action being guided by or accountable to rational discussion.

Fifth, governments and institutions should be subject to change in an orderly manner, so as to make the fruits of rational discussion effective and revolution unnecessary.

And sixth, inequalities of wealth, power, status, and treatment should be attached to positions that are open to all who aspire to them and who meet objective standards that are designed to protect and further the interests of persons, including the least advantaged.

If operationalized, these precepts would result in nations and institutions in which fundamental policy would be either directly determined by or at least accountable to the enlightened choices of a majority, and in which anyone would have the right to criticize and dissent from policies established by the majority. (This does not mean freedom to "dissent" in the sense of disregarding such policies, but in the sense of having the right to criticizing them and to attempt to persuade rationally the majority that they are wrong.) Institutional operations are doubtless simpler, tidier, and perhaps even more efficient when they
are not determined by or accountable to majority rule. But all of the imaginable alternatives to majority rule present even greater potential dangers than complexity, untidiness, and decreased efficiency. My insistence upon enlightened majority rule and the right of minority dissent is based upon the impartial moral point of view advanced in this chapter and my belief that individuals encouraged to participate in rational discussions are, in the long run, the best judges of what is good for them. The precepts enumerated above would effectively serve to operationalize the idea of respecting the interests of others as if they were one's own. The excesses of nations and institutions in which these precepts have not guided institutional operations are manifest. In modern times alone, they range in declining degrees of disgrace from the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia to the poorly paved streets on the South Side of Chicago.

Returning to objections to this moral point of view, a third objection might be that it would render the specific institution of criminal justice inoperable, thus making laws unenforceable. A judge who is about to pass sentence on a convicted criminal realizes that the criminal's interests will be thwarted, and hence he (the judge) must cite a difference between himself and the criminal that would justify thwarting the criminal's interests. The difference that the judge must cite, of course, is that the criminal has broken the law, while he has not done so himself. But the judge
seemingly cannot rely on this difference as one that would
justify his passing sentence on the criminal. For if their
roles were reversed and he were the criminal, he, like the
criminal, would still not want his freedom diminished.
This objection, like the previous one, is addressed to my
requirement that differential treatment be based on relevant
differences accepted by all parties concerned. And since
the criminal does not accept the difference cited, the judge
seemingly cannot pass sentence. For were he in the crim-
nal's place, he also would reject the difference cited by
the judge.

To this objection it may be replied that the sentencing
of a criminal should come only after it has been fairly
established that a crime was committed, that is, after an
impartial law designed to protect or further the interests
of all was broken. Now the fact that the criminal does
not accept his guilt as being a difference between himself
and the judge which would justify the judge's passing sentence
is of no matter. The criminal's argument here is duplicitous
because he wants to appeal to the principle of impartiality
only when it suits his interests. And this, by definition
of the principle in question, he may not do. For in breaking
a just law, he has broken the rules of the moral language
That is, it is duplicitous for the criminal to assert that the impartial rules of the game apply only when it suits him.

Finally, it might be objected that this moral point of view is defective insofar as it sets up an unattainable ideal of perfect rationality and constant impartiality. No one has ever been fully rational or impartial in making each and every one of his moral choices, and it is therefore foolish to found a moral point of view on the premise that men ought to do that which no man ever has.

To this it may be replied that, if men do not always act from a sense of impartial duty, they nevertheless always should. And perhaps men always see the rightness of doing so, if in many cases only dimly like the vision of a half forgotten dream. That no man has attained the ideal of always conducting himself in obedience to the principle of impartiality is not a conclusive refutation of that principle. For the true function of a moral ideal is a paradigmatic and practical one, namely, that of encouraging us on--if not to perfection--at least to improvement. The whole

---

5The phrase "moral language game" is a bit of jargon invented by moral philosophers. It is not meant to suggest that morality is anything less than a serious matter. Rather, one who plays the moral language game uses moral rules seriously and hence acknowledges that, like the rules of a game, such rules apply to his own conduct as well as to that of the other players. For a more detailed analysis of the moral language game and its implicit rules see, e.g., Alan Gewirth, "Must One Play the Moral Language Game?" American Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (April, 1970), 107-118.
point of morality is to prescribe what men ought to do, as opposed to describing what men do, the latter being the province of the social sciences. In defending his own ethical theory against charges of other-worldliness, Kant left little room for improvement in stating the case for idealism. I shall be content to rely on his words in defense of the moral point of view advanced in this chapter as well.

...the idea of a pure world of reasoning as a totality of intelligences to which we ourselves belong (although we are at the same time members of the world of senses also), still remains a useful and proper idea for the purposes of a rational faith. Even though knowledge ends at the border of this idea, this faith still is useful to awaken in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the splendid ideal of a universal realm of ends in themselves (of rational beings), of which we can be members only if we conduct ourselves painstakingly according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature. 6

Two central points have been advanced in this chapter. It has been argued that the concept of morality itself, as persons ordinarily think and speak of it, entails two important features. They are important, that is, if we are to take morality seriously and the moral issues that confront educators daily. The first of these points is that a truly moral decision is one that is universalizable. That is, it is a decision which, without logical self-

contradiction, one could will to become a universal policy to be followed by all comparable persons in similar circumstances.

The second point is that genuinely moral decisions are also ones which are impartial. To act impartially is to act in a way that is freely agreed to by all parties to an issue, not simply a way that you alone choose. This means, in practice, that one ought to respect the interests of others as if they were one's own in considering and discussing what ought to be done.

This impartial moral point of view, however, is far from a sufficient basis, by itself, for the intelligent resolution of complex issues in education. What is wanted ultimately is not just an impartially achieved agreement to such issues, but an agreement that is achieved through rational discussion, as opposed to one that is ostensibly achieved impartially but which is also achieved as a result of confusion over what is at issue, specious argumentation, or ignorance about the facts of the case. Accordingly, the next chapter explores some aspects of critical thinking which, when combined with this moral point of view, comprise a more complete approach to complex issues.
CHAPTER IV
THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL THINKING IN ETHICS

The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightening and lightening bug.

--Mark Twain

Discussions about controversial issues in education are frequently characterized by fallacious argumentation, conceptual confusions over what is really at issue, and ignorance about the facts of the case. If one wishes to deal with moral educational issues rationally, what is needed in addition to an impartial respect for persons is some practical knowledge of how to deal with these troublesome aspects of controversial issues. Therefore, I want to advance not just a particular moral point of view in this study but a more comprehensive approach to moral deliberation. This approach is characterized by a respect for the interests of others plus a respect for logic, language, and the facts of the case.

A Respect for Logic

To exhibit a respect for logic in moral disputes is to try to think and argue validly and to try to detect invalid arguments made by others. A respect for logic means
thinking for oneself, as opposed to relying on easy substitutes for thinking, such as blindly accepting the pronouncements of some authority, imitating others, following an unscrutinized moral code, blindly following one's emotions, and so on. I want now to discuss some of the most common diversions which can prevent people from thinking for themselves about the central points of an educational issue.

These diversions are what logicians call fallacies. A fallacy is any unsound mode of arguing that appears to require assent and to be decisive of an issue, when, actually it is not. There are two general kinds of fallacies that occur frequently in discussions about educational issues, fallacies of irrelevant evidence and linguistic fallacies. Fallacies of irrelevant evidence appeal to evidence that seems to be decisive of the issue in question, but which really is not. Linguistic fallacies also seem to prove some point, but they too actually do not. Their persuasiveness stems from a subtle obsfuscation of the meaning of key terms involved in the argument. Let us examine first a number of the most common fallacies of irrelevant evidence.

Fallacies of Irrelevant Evidence

One such fallacy is the argumentum ad hominem. Ad hominem arguments are essentially an appeal involving the personal circumstances of the proponent of some idea in an abusive way. Instead of attacking a person's idea, theory, bill, or whatever, the person himself is attacked. Example: "There can be no truth to the educational philosophy of
Jean Jacques Rousseau, for Rousseau was a scoundrel and a
loafer who lived off of wealthy women like a prarsite."
This argument is fallacious because the whole argument
consists of an irrelevant attack upon Rousseau instead of
the merits of his educational philosophy. The personal
history of a man, his character, and his socioeconomic
position are not inevitable determinants of the validity
of his reasoning.

A second type of argument that appeals to irrelevant
evidence is the argumentum ad veredundiam, an appeal to
authority. This fallacy is almost the previous one in
reverse. It occurs when a person attempts to validate
an idea simply by citing the fact that some "authority"
agrees with the idea. An appeal to an authoritative source
is not in itself fallacious. The testimony of a recognized
authority (in his area of competence, of course) is relevant
and useful if his reasons for believing what he does are
given also. An appeal to authority becomes fallacious
when it is used to stifle discussions about some issue.
Example: To settle an educational issue in Europe during the
middle ages it was often sufficient to show that Church
doctrine was in agreement with one side of the issue and
not the other.1 This kind of appeal to authority served
only to stifle discussion, not illuminate the pros and cons

1See, e.g., Edward J. Power, Main Currents in the
p. 300.
of the issue in question.

Another kind of argument involving an appeal to irrelevant evidence is the argument that two wrongs make a right. This argument occurs when someone defends himself against charges of wrongdoing simply on the grounds that, if the other side does it, then it is all right. Example: "Opponents of busing cannot possibly object to long bus rides for purposes of desegregation, since only a few years ago blacks were being bused up to 60 and 70 miles in some areas just to get them to segregated schools." This argument rightly points out the hypocrisy of those who object to long distance busing only when it is used for desegregation. But the fact that segregationists caused students to ride buses over long distances is not, of itself, conclusive evidence of why long bus rides should be used to desegregate schools. There may be reasons why long bus rides for purposes of desegregation could be justified, or there may not. But, in any case, the fact that a practice is used by parties on opposite sides of an issue is not a justification of the practice.

Another fallacy of irrelevant evidence is called the fallacy of the straw man. This fallacy consists in attributing to one's opponent a position different from the one he really holds and then attacking that position, as if it were the opponent's true position. Example: In arguing against federal aid to education, U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater once wrote,
I agree with lobbyists for federal school aid that education is one of the great problems of our day. I am afraid, however, that their view and mine regard the nature of the problem are many miles apart. They tend to see the problem in quantitative terms— not enough schools, not enough teachers, not enough equipment. I think it has to do with quality: How good are the schools we have? Their solution is to spend more money. Mine is to raise standards.²

Now who has actually ever argued that all that was needed to improve American education was more of everything? Senator Goldwater has chosen to try to make it appear that proponents of federal school aid are totally preoccupied with spending money for more of everything while being completely uninterested in the quality of schooling thus obtained. Unhappily this is a frequently used ploy in moral and political argument. The trick is to oversimplify an issue by attributing a false and untenable position to one's opponent. But it is a trick, and should be recognized as such by discerning minds.

Another irrelevant evidence fallacy is the argumentum ad populem, an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the populace. Instead of presenting evidence and sound arguments to support a case, one appeals to the passions of the masses. Senator Goldwater offered an example of ad populem argument when, immediately following his previously cited arguments against federal aid to education, he went on to write,

And I suspect that if we knew which of these two views on education will eventually prevail, we would know also whether Western civilization is due to survive, or will pass away.\(^3\)

The Senator never tells us how or why western civilization will crumble as the result of federal school aid. And, of course, his saying it does not make it so. But what it does do is to make federal aid to schools seem to be a very subversive and disastrous notion, without giving any actual evidence to that effect. The appeal is not to reason and evidence but to the passions of the populace.

The argumentum ad misericordiam, or appeal to pity, is another fallacy of irrelevant evidence. This is an argument that tries to support or attack some proposition by appealing to the emotion of pity, rather than dealing with the merits or demerits of the proposition itself. Example: "Busing is a moral outrage. Imagine the gall of those ivory tower social experimentors who think nothing of depriving tiny children of their God-given right of freedom." Children, tiny or otherwise, are entitled to a finite amount of freedom like everyone else. Whether busing violates the rights of anyone is an appropriate topic for discussion in the busing issue. But to introduce the fact some children are "tiny" and their rights are "God-given" can only serve to stir up passions, instead of exploring the question of whether busing actually violates anyone's

\(^3\)Goldwater, loc. cit.
The false analogy is another fallacy that involves an appeal to irrelevant evidence. Both logical and illogical thinkers make use of a device known as analogy. In schematic form analogical reasoning runs as follows:

A has a certain cause, effect, or characteristic C.
B is similar (analogous) to A.
Therefore: B also has the cause, effect, or characteristic C.

The proper use of analogies is as explanatory tools which can sometimes quickly clarify an unfamiliar subject. This use involves comparing the abstruse subject, say electric current, with a more familiar subject, say a flow of water. Obviously the usefulness of analogies in this regard depends entirely on how well their comparison between the abstruse and the familiar is founded and on how far that comparison may safely be pushed. The point at which analogies become fallacious is the point at which the comparison made is offered not as an explanation or speculative hypothesis but as conclusive proof of something. If an archeologist should uncover, on a hill overlooking the site of an ancient city, the remains of a foundation of a building much larger than any of the other buildings nearby, he would be justified in inferring tentatively (taking the results of similar but more well preserved findings elsewhere as analogues) that he had found a temple. But no archeologist could ever claim, on this basis alone, to have conclusively proven the existence of a temple at the
site. The fallacy of false analogy arises, then, when it is assumed that some point is conclusively proven simply by appealing to a comparison. Example: "The idea of tenure for teachers is a farce. It is completely antithetical to the free enterprise system that has made America great. You don't see General Motors granting their employees tenure, do you?" Notice that this argument relies entirely on a comparison for proof of its conclusion that teacher tenure is a bad idea. It compares institutions that are similar in some respects but which are also fundamentally different in other respects. For example, teachers and auto workers both work for a living. On the other hand, schools aim primarily at fostering learning and a disposition to act in obedience to what is learned; whereas the auto industry aims primarily at making a profit. Tenure protects a teacher's freedom to learn and teach about new and perhaps controversial bodies of knowledge. And this is clearly of paramount importance to his on the job teaching performance. The on the job effectiveness of an auto worker, however, is less dependent on such liberties. Again, analogies are useful explanatory tools, but, by themselves, they prove nothing.

The fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc—after this, therefore because of this—is another fallacy involving an appeal to irrelevant evidence. The mistake involved in post hoc reasoning is in assuming that, if some event follows closely on the heals of another, then the first event must have caused the second. The fact that two events
occur in sequence is far from conclusive proof that the first is the cause of the second. The seasons succeed one another with perfect regularity. Nevertheless, summer is not the cause of autumn. We are prevented from making this mistake by our knowledge that the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of the ecliptic is the real explanation for the changing seasons. An example of post hoc reasoning in education would be, "Violence has followed the implementation of court ordered busing plans in Boston, Pontiac, and elsewhere. Therefore, we may conclude that violence is the inevitable result of busing students from diverse cultural backgrounds to the same school." But violence has not followed busing everywhere. And even if it did, this would not be proof of the conclusion that busing necessarily causes violence. Perhaps there are factors that are not necessarily connected with busing per se which have lead to the violence in some areas. It was once thought that tropical night air somehow caused malaria, since those who contracted malaria were invariably people who had been out in the tropical night air. Eventually the anopheles mosquito--which is dormant during the day and active at night--was discovered to be the real culprit. Hence today tropical night air is no longer feared. If the factors that actually have lead to violence in some areas where busing has been ordered can be identified, then perhaps busing will also be less feared.

Another diversion from the relevant points of an issue is the fallacy of speculative argument, also known as the
hypothesis contrary to fact. Here an assumption is made which does not coincide with the facts of the case. This assumption is then elaborated speculatively. That is, the consequences that would have been if the assumed conditions had been actual and not fictitious are elaborated. And finally a conclusion relating to the actual facts of the case is drawn from the speculative hypothesis. Example: "If the Higher Education Act of 1972 had not proscribed racial and sexual discrimination in colleges receiving federal funds, the Supreme Court would have handed down decisions having the same effect. Therefore, the passage by Congress of the Higher Education Act of 1972 was an insignificant event." In point of fact, the Higher Education Act of 1972, irrespective of what someone else might have done had it not been passed, has forced many American colleges and universities to alter significantly the racial and sexual composition of their student bodies, faculties, and staffs.

The fallacy of begging the question is the last fallacy of irrelevant evidence that I will discuss. This fallacy arises when the very point which is to be established in the conclusion of an argument is assumed to be true in the premises. A person is said to "beg" a question when he takes for granted or asks others to take for granted the very point which is ostensibly being proved. Example: "Johnny's learning problems are a result of his inferior genetic endowment. For all black students are slow learners, as
Johnny's case clearly proves." Notice that this argument gets nowhere. It is circular. It begins and ends with the assumption that Johnny's learning problems are the result of his race. And this assumption is never substantiated by evidence or reasoning.

**Linguistic Fallacies**

All of the above fallacies are potential distractions from the real points of an educational issue. Each involves an appeal to irrelevant evidence. The fallacies that will be discussed next can be equally distractive, but their fallaciousness is rooted in linguistic confusions. Linguistic fallacies result from the use of ambiguous or vague terms in such a way that an argument may seem to prove some point when actually it does not.

Ambiguity arises when a term is used that has more than one ordinary meaning, and it is not clear which of these meanings the speaker intends. If someone says, "That is no mean dog," there are at least two possible inferences which a listener might draw. This is so since, among the various meanings of the word "mean," there are two which would make sense in this context. These are (1) vicious, and (2) low in quality. Hence the statement about the dog could be construed to mean either that the dog is not vicious, or that it is not low in quality (breeding perhaps). The best defense against misinterpreting what someone actually means when he uses a potentially ambiguous term is to try
to list the alternative possible meanings and then either ask the speaker or, if he is not present, try to figure out contextually which of these meanings is really intended by the speaker.4

Vagueness is a condition arising out of the use of a term whose limits of application are not distinct or precise. "Middle-aged" is a term that can easily cause vagueness. It is ordinarily understood to refer to just one thing, namely, those years comprising the middle of an average natural life span. But to say that a person X is middle-aged is still not to say anything very distinct or precise about his age. Obviously at ages 5 and 95 one is not middle-aged, and at 40 one is. But what about 30 or 55? Here again the best that one can do is to try to discern how the speaker is using the term in question.

There are numerous kinds of linguistic fallacies, but only those that occur frequently in moral thought and argument are of immediate significance here. The first of these is known commonly as the fallacy of equivocation. In this kind of argument a conclusion may seem to follow when actually it does not. The argument's persuasiveness stems from changing the meaning of a key term in the argument such that the term starts out meaning one thing and ends up meaning another. Example: Some critics of modern education

---

4This technique is described and illustrated in more detail in John Mackaye, The Logic of Language (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Publications, 1939), pp. 125-140.
have attacked the basic activity of teaching itself. Their attack is based on the claim that teaching is often ineffectual, and other teaching is harmful. The claim that teaching is sometimes ineffective is sound. To see this point we need only remind ourselves that the word "teaching" has both task and achievement uses. Its task use refers to the activity of trying to bring about learning. The achievement use refers to such tries as are successful. And the claim that some teaching is hurtful is also sound. Everyone knows or has heard of a teacher who stifles his students' desire to learn, or who unduly restricts their freedom, or does any number of other objectionable things. Now, from these two sound premises about some kinds of teaching, the critics go on to argue that teaching is irrelevant at best and, at worst, harmful. For example, Carl Rogers writes, "Hence I have come to feel that the outcomes of teaching are either unimportant or hurtful."5 And W.R. Wees makes the same claim in his book entitled Nobody Can Teach Anyone Anything.6

What makes this attack on an otherwise respected endeavor so plausible is the grain of truth it contains about some kinds of teaching and its equivocal use of the word "teaching." The grain of truth is that some teaching


6W.R. Wees, Nobody Can Teach Anyone Anything (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1971).
is ineffective, and some teaching is harmful. But what makes the argument fallacious is that it draws a conclusion about teaching per se from premises which only tell us about some kinds of teaching. That is, the meaning of "teaching" changes in mid-argument from some kinds of teaching to teaching in general. A rule to remember in connection with the fallacy of equivocation is "one meaning per word per argument."

A second type of linguistic fallacy is called quibbling. This fallacy also involves ambiguity. It occurs when two or more people are arguing some point and the meaning of a key term changes every time it changes hands, thus resulting in misunderstanding and a "pointless" discussion. Example: "Joe, I tell you that men aren't equal. Use your eyes! Do you see the equality of mankind? Do you find in your experience that people have equal abilities or equal characters? Everyone is different from everyone else." Joe replies, "Just a minute, Bill. Men are equal. The equality of mankind is the foundation of our democracy. No man has the right to think of himself as being better than another. No one is entitled to special privileges. And no one should suffer discrimination simply because of his race, creed, color, or sex. This is the basis of our legal system, which says that people are equals before the law. Should a legal decision depend on the color of a man's skin or on whether he is a better carpenter than most other carpenters?" Bill answers, "No, Joe, a legal decision
shouldn't depend on the color of a man's skin or on his talents and skills. And of course no one is entitled to special privileges. But I still say men are not equal." Notice that Bill is talking about one kind of equality, namely, empirical sameness, while Joe is referring to prescriptive equality, that is, the fittingness or justness of treating people equally. In a sense this is really not an argument at all, since for an argument to go forward there must first be an agreement between the participants as to what is at issue. There was no such agreement between Joe and Bill, for they were using a key word in two different ways. The meaning of "equality" was changing as it changed hands. Their quibbling might more appropriately be called a verbal dispute.7

A third type of linguistic fallacy is one known commonly as the fallacy of figure of speech. This fallacy occurs when words, phrases, or statements which are being used figuratively are interpreted literally. This fallacy is closely allied to the previously discussed fallacy of false analogy. It may entail a directly intended analogy, in which case it really is the same thing as the false analogy, or it may entail some figurative metaphor. Example: "Memory is the tablet of the mind upon which our experiences are indelibly inscribed." This statement must be under-

7In a series of Cambridge University lectures, Gilbert Ryle has shown that many of the great "problems of philosophy" are, in large measure, high-flown verbal disputes. The merit of these lectures is Ryle's adeptness at grasping such problems before they become airborne. See Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
stood as being a figure of speech. If the statement is taken literally as being a proven fact about the psychology of learning, the reasoning that follows will surely be fallacious.

The last linguistic fallacy I want to discuss is the fallacy of bifurcation or false dualism. This fallacy arises from the fact that a number of words in the English language often appear in pairs designating opposites or extremes of a scale. Examples are "black-white," "rich-poor," "true-false," and so on. What we often fail to remember is that usually various gradations comprise a spectrum from one extreme to the other. From rich, for example, there are numerous degrees of declining wealth that lead ultimately to poor. When such opposites are mentioned in an argument, and the argument proceeds as if there were no middle ground between them, the fallacy of bifurcation is committed. Example: Thomas Hobbes failed to conceive of any intermediate forms of government between the extremes of anarchy and authoritarianism when he argued that the only way to achieve peace and security in a state was to surrender our liberty to an all-powerful sovereign. The fallacy here consists in assuming that the question is strictly an either-or matter, when, in fact, other alternatives are available.

The linguistic fallacies and the fallacies of irrelevant evidence discussed above are those which are most likely to occur in moral issues in education. There are
other fallacies that are as distracting and confusing as the ones above, but they occur less frequently in our moral thought and argument and hence will not be treated in this study.8

Fallacies are pitfalls into which any of us may stumble in our own reasoning or be dragged into by the reasoning of others. Just as signs are erected along a highway to warn motorists of potential dangers, so the discussions of fallacies in this chapter may be regarded as danger signals posted to warn readers of potential hazards in moral thought and argument. So real and commonplace are these dangers that Bertrand Russel once suggested (albeit not in total sincerity) that most people ought to be discouraged from trying to reason at all:

I conclude, therefore, that logic ought to be taught in schools with a view to teaching people not to reason. For, if they reason, they will almost certainly reason wrongly.9

But we all reason. To be conscious is to connect various items of information and draw inferences from them. The question, therefore, is not one of whether we should reason (a question to which a negative answer would be self-contradictory, given the meaning of "should"), but

---

8 There are several good sources for readers wishing to study fallacies in greater number and detail. Among these are Stuart Chase, Guides to Straight Thinking (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956); and W. Ward Fearnside and William B. Holter, Fallacy, the Counterfeit of Argument (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1959).

whether we shall do it well or badly.

In man's long struggle for existence, reason has been his primary instrument of survival. Man's subjugation of the animals and his limited control over the forces of nature have been possible only because reason has enabled him to turn to his own advantage what otherwise might have destroyed him. This does not mean that man has learned to employ reason to its fullest advantage.

Only in one field of human endeavor, science, has reason been used to anywhere near its fullest efficacy. Scientific inquiry is the best example of reason in action. It has resulted in ever greater theoretical knowledge and practical technology.

But it is our social (moral and political) rationality or our lack of it which will determine in the end whether these scientific achievements will be harnessed for humane purposes or whether they will be utilized for the annihilation of human culture itself.

Unless methods of rational inquiry are applied outside the sciences, social ideals and, more particularly, educational aims will remain in the dubious company of prejudice, fantasy, and confusion. If we misconceive the nature of moral thought and argument, so also will we stumble in the use of moral discourse. And if we are unclear about the meanings of the terms that lay down the ideals which are to guide our lives, there can be no clarity in the ideals themselves and no settled direction to the conduct of our
The fallacies of irrelevant evidence discussed here are a major source of confusion in discussions about educational issues. To avoid these fallacies one does well to learn the most common ways in which irrelevance can intrude unnoticed and to ask of any argument: What is the point to be established by the argument? What is the evidence upon which the conclusion is based? In short, what is being derived from what? It is by knowing and being on guard for the common ways in which irrelevance can slip by undetected that one becomes better equipped to avoid falling prey to fallacies of irrelevant evidence.

The linguistic fallacies are even more subtle pitfalls. Ambiguity and vagueness are slippery problems. To avoid them one must try to keep the meanings of the key terms involved in issues clear.

A Respect for Language

Accordingly, I will next touch upon that form of thought and exposition specifically designed to help persons clarify language, namely the process of analyzing and defining. I will discuss formal definitions first and then explore the group of clarificatory techniques loosely known as ordinary language analysis.

Aristotle is thought to be the first person to have explored the process of defining in detail. Hence the basic method of formal definition is still commonly referred to as Aristotle's method. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, Bk. II.
to as "Aristotelian." This process is known also as definition per genus et differentia, that is, definition by genus and difference. Together, the genus and difference are the heart of any formal definition. The genus names a class to which the term being defined belongs, and the difference discriminates that particular term from all other members of the same class. An example of this kind of definition could be used to clarify the meaning of the term "monograph" as follows: A monograph is a book (genus) about one subject (difference). Selection of a relatively broad genus for a definition places a heavy burden on the difference. If, for example, "A chugger is a thing which..." were the opening words of a definition, how easily could a difference be formulated to distinguish "chugger" from every other kind of "thing?" Surely "fishing lure," or, better yet, "top-water fishing lure" would be a more serviceable genus. There is, of course, another and opposite danger to be encountered in selecting a genus. When the genus is narrowed too far it may lack clearness because it has become too esoteric. Hence, if I begin to define the term "Royal Coachman" as a "dry fly pattern," I may not be clarifying the term at all for a person who does not know dry flies from nymphs, bucktails, or streamers. What is wanted ultimately is a genus large enough to be familiar to the listener and yet narrow enough to permit a difference of reasonable brevity. Sometimes, however, this ideal is unattainable. Under such circumstances, a chain
of supplemental and successively more precise definitions must be used. This process might be used to define "cantilever bridge" as follows: A cantilever bridge is a bridge whose span is formed by two cantilevers projecting toward each other. And a cantilever is a beam or structure supported at only one end.

The formal or Aristotelian mode of definition has been subjected to some criticism by modern semanticists. As a means of organizing knowledge in the various disciplines, formal definitions are indispensable. They are also valuable checks of a student's personal comprehension of a hard to master concept. But, by themselves, they are only one of a number of useful tools for clarifying language. Among the alternative tools are the use of examples, synonyms, etymology, and a form of exposition known loosely as "ordinary langage analysis." The reader is likely to be familiar with all of these tools to some extent, save perhaps the last.

Ordinary language analysis is really a set of interrelated techniques of analysis that, together, form a general approach to trying to clarify and improve the language we ordinarily use to express our thoughts. I would be justified in calling these separate tools a method only insofar as they all bear a strong family resemblance to each other in their focus and technique, even though they are the products of several different thinkers.

As a result of a series of personal experiences and a
long train of philosophical developments, in the 1930's Ludwig Wittgenstein, a Viennese philosopher, began to believe that the proper function of philosophy was not to discover new truths about reality, truth, or goodness, but rather to untangle the verbal webs we weave in trying to think and talk about such matters. Wittgenstein argued that ideas and the language we use to express them have meaning only in the context of the tacit rules which govern our ordinary language. If we want to understand the idea of pain, for example, we must look at how we ordinarly use the word "pain." In one of his many verbal experiments, Wittgenstein asks us to,

Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant...but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain—in short he uses it as we all do.11

Would we want to say of such a man, simply because he could not spout a definition of "pain," that he did not know what the word meant? The fact that most of us would be inclined to answer "no" to this question suggests that the meaning of a word is its use.

According to Wittgenstein, the central problems of philosophy are linguistic. What one must do, if one wishes to get at the nature of unclear concepts, such as pleasure, justice, truth, and so on, is to explore the rules that govern our ordinary talk about these ideas. Where we go

astray in trying to understand ideas is in losing sight of the rules of the game we are playing. Our failure to understand is like the confusion that would be caused in a chess game if one of the players were suddenly to begin making checkers moves with his chess pieces, or if he began moving his bishops as if they were knights, his queen as if it were a bishop, and so on. "A main source of failure to understand," said Wittgenstein, "is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words."12

For example, one chief cause of confusion in the field of ethical theory is the fact that we seldom take time to explore the logic of ordinary moral discourse and contrast it with other sorts of discourse. Many statements that look alike grammatically are actually governed by different contextual logic. Consider, for example, the following sentences:

1. Killing persons is punishable by law.
2. Killing persons is ghastly and revolting.
3. Killing persons is morally wrong.

In each sentence the subject "killing persons" is qualified by a predicate. The grammar is the same in each, but the logic is different. Unless one notices the difference in the kinds of sentences these are, one might wrongly slip into thinking any number of things. For example, one might think, as naturalists do, that it is possible to

---

12Ibid., p. 49e.
confirm the truth of sentence 3 in the same way that one can confirm the truth of sentence 1. Or one might think, as emotivists do, that sentence 3 is like sentence 2, in that all it does is express our emotions about killing persons.

We have here three different kinds of statements. The first reports an empirical fact, the second expresses personal emotions, and the third makes a moral judgment. In the ordinary language view of philosophy as a therapeutic activity, the philosopher's task is to map out such different sorts of language so that we do not get lost by straying from one territory to the next, thinking we have been in only one territory all along. That is, the job of the philosopher is to make explicit the implicit rules that govern our ordinary use of different sorts of language. Of course, in a sense, we already know these rules, because we use these various different kinds of language correctly most of the time. It is when we unwittingly violate the rules and confuse these categories of discourse that the need for philosophy arises.

We recognize our mistakes only when we see that our statements lead ultimately to conclusions that sound odd or absurd. If, for example, we were to equate the concept of morality with the concept of emotion, as emotivists do, and to assume that there can be no rational way to resolve moral disputes, we might conclude a moral argument by saying, "You go on feeling your way about euthanasia, and I'll go on
feeling my way about it." If this statement strikes us as sounding odd, perhaps there is a difference between the language of morality and the language of emotions.

Gilbert Ryle has called such mistakes "category mistakes." In this instance, by losing sight of the distinction between our ordinary talk about morality and our talk about emotions, we confuse the category of morality with the category of emotion. Ryle's best known work is his book, The Concept of Mind. 13 In this book he brings this general method of ordinary language analysis to bear on the problem of clarifying the frequently confused concept of mind. According to Ryle, most philosophical discussions about mind commit the category mistake of not differentiating between "things" and "dispositions." Ryle is out to attack here what he sees as an error committed by Rene Descartes. Descartes held that mind and matter were two different substances which belonged to the same whole, in the sense that, together, they made up what we call a human being.

The problem with this view is that it systematically misleads us into assuming that the logic of the language we ordinarily use to talk about physical phenomena (bodily activities, for example) is just like the logic of the language we use to talk about mental phenomena. The simplest way to describe this error is to say that, although the body can appropriately be regarded as a thing, the mind is not a

thing at all. This can be seen if we take care to analyze the use of those words we ordinarily use to refer to operations of the mind, such as "knowing," "doubting," "believing," and so on. A study of the many ordinary uses of these words reveals that they do not refer to the operations of any tangible thing, but to the exercise of various human capacities or dispositions. The mind can thus be regarded not as a substance with a specifiable location, but rather as a set of dispositions.

But what then is a disposition, if it is not a thing? "Solubility" is an example of a disposition. To say that sugar has solubility is to say that if we put sugar in water, under normal conditions, it will dissolve. Solubility is thus not a thing but a characteristic, a disposition, a tendency to dissolve when placed in water. Similarly, "knowing," "doubting," "believing," and so on are dispositions. They are observable tendencies, characteristics, or potentialities. For example, to say that a student knows something is to say that under certain conditions (perhaps a test) he is able to give a performance of a certain kind. This performance is observable. It reveals not the operation of a secret hidden entity, but the exercise of a particular capacity or disposition. Accordingly, the view that mind is some mysterious thing is as implausible and potentially confusing as holding that solubility is a ghostlike thing possessed by sugar. The view more compatible with the logical geography of our
ordinary language about mind is that mind is nothing more
or less than a set of dispositions.

Through the ideas of Wittgenstein and Ryle, we have
seen developing here a general method of inquiry. It is
a method that involves trying to lay bare the implicit rules
that govern our ordinary uses of different kinds of language,
so that we do not confuse these different kinds of language
and thereby confuse issues.

A specific tool that is frequently used in this general
method is called the "paradigm case." This involves trying
to relieve confusion by examining paradigmatic (that is,
model or classic) cases of the ideas we wish to clarify.
This method enables one to observe and list common features
displayed by the paradigm chosen. If we were trying to
clarify the idea of "morality," as indeed I was trying to
do in Chapter III, we might try to cite a statement or
question that almost everyone would consider to be a moral
one and then try to tease out the salient features of the
statement or question. (This is what I did by investigating
the presuppositions of the question, "What ought I to do?"

Susan Stebbing once used this technique to criticize
a passage in Arthur Eddington's landmark work in physics,
The Nature of the Physical World. In this book, Eddington
describes a world of physical objects all with their tiny
solar systems of electrons moving about atomic nuclei.
He goes on to point out that the actual amount of space
occupied by matter in all objects is quite small compared
to the empty spaces between particles. While this may seem a shocking proposition at first, it is nevertheless a scientifically accurate statement. And, stated as it is here, it is one that is fairly easy to comprehend. But Eddington went on to make statements that have only served to confuse high school physics students trying to comprehend the idea of an atomistic physical world. It was these ill-considered statements that drew Stebbing's critique. An example is Eddington's discussion of the "perils" of stepping on to a wooden floor, which, like everything else, is not "solid:"

The plank has no solidity of substance. To step on it is like stepping on a swarm of flies. Shall I not slip through? No, if I make the venture one of the flies hits me and gives me a boost up again; I fall again and am knocked upwards by another fly; and so on. I may hope that the net result will be that I remain steady; but if unfortunately I should slip through the floor or be boosted too violently up to the ceiling the occurrence would be, not a violation of the laws of Nature, but a rare coincidence.  

Despite the validity of the proposition that physical objects, including wooden floors, contain more space than particles, we must regard Eddington's language here as unfortunate, since it is likely to be misleading to persons new to the subject. It is more likely to cause confusion about than understanding of the point which Eddington is presumably trying to drive home. Eddington lost sight of the tacit rules that govern our ordinary thought and discourse.

---

about "solid" objects such as wooden floors. As Stebbing pointed out, our understanding of "solid" is derived from our ordinary experience with and talk about just such articles as wooden floors, formica table tops, and so on. A wooden floor is a paradigm of the idea of "solid." And stepping on a plank of a wooden floor is not in the least like "stepping on a swarm of flies." Eddington is like the man who suddenly starts making checkers moves with his chesspieces. His antics may seem humorous to us in retrospect. No doubt Eddington used the metaphor of the swarm of flies with humorous intent, but he failed to appreciate that by making such an odd statement, he ran the risk of generating more confusion than understanding.

Another technique of ordinary language analysis is what I shall call the "related case." This involves listing cases that seem closely related to the idea one is trying to clarify and then asking linguistic questions concerning how we think and talk about these related cases. The purpose of this technique is to mark off distinctions and connections and thereby bring into fuller relief the idea that is being clarified. If, for example, one were trying to get clear about the idea of "education," one might ask questions like those asked in Chapter I. For instance, would we say of a well trained race horse that he was well

---

This technique, like all of the ordinary language techniques, is only a variation on the central theme of trying to uncover the rules that govern our ordinary language. This particular technique is a handy one, because usually we are in agreement about what "we would say."

The last technique of ordinary language analysis that I want to discuss is what I shall call the "contrasting opposite case." This method involves using the paradigm case in reverse. Just as one can use paradigms to get at salient presuppositions of a concept, one can contrast a concept that one wants to clarify with what is clearly an opposite case. If, for example, one were trying to get at the nature of "justice," one might examine acts that we would ordinarily say are clearly unjust (the act of burning all red heads at the stake was used in Chapter III) to see why we think they are unjust, that is, to see what characteristics of our tacit knowledge of justice such acts violate.

By "a respect for language," then, I mean the disposition to try to get clear about what is meant by the key terms in moral issues in education by carefully analyzing and defining them. For if the meanings of the terms that refer to the ideals in our lives are unclear, then there is no clarity to the ideals themselves and, hence, no rational direction in the conduct of our lives. The techniques of analysis and definition discussed in this chapter can
be of great help in trying to clarify and to resolve complex educational issues.16

A Respect for the Facts of the Case

It should be stressed here again that the moral point of view of impartiality, of itself, is an insufficient basis for the resolution of controversial educational issues. This chapter is designed to elucidate the other minimal ingredients that must go into any serious effort at the intelligent resolution of such issues. Among these ingredients are a respect for logic, language, and what I will call a respect for the facts of the case. It simply is not possible to plug in the principle of impartially respecting the interests of others and to receive *ex nihilo* a just and wise resolution of some particular complex issue. If, for example, one is deliberating about the moral propriety of desegregating public schools, one must take into account, among other things, the factual events which have led to the current state of affairs in American schools, the effects of ongoing segregation, and the best available evidence concerning the probable consequences of desegregation.

By "the facts of the case," then, I mean (1) the identifiable circumstances out of which a particular moral dilemma has arisen, and (2) the best available evidence as to what the probable consequences would be of proceeding on each of the alternative courses of action available in an issue. A respect for the facts of the case means a propensity to try to find out what the facts of the case are and to face them, as opposed to hoping that the facts are what one wants them to be, or, worse yet, inventing one's own to suit one's purposes. The facts of the case take on significance in moral educational issues in one or both of two ways.

First, there is the type of case in which the issue is completely or in part a means-end dispute. If, for example, there is a dispute about the worth of a certain course of action A that is alleged by its proponents to lead to a desirable result R, it is often possible to obtain evidence of whether in fact this sort of action has in the past produced such results as R, and whether in the future it is likely to do so. Notice that in such instances the facts of the case that are of most interest are those that describe the probable consequences of proceeding on alternative courses of action.

On the other hand, the facts of the case that describe the circumstances out of which a moral educational issue has arisen take on significance when what needs to be done is to match concepts with facts. If, for example, a school
board is faced with the question of whether to suspend a student for some offense, say, vandalism, it would need first to clarify and define the concept of vandalism, and then to try to determine fairly if the student's acts actually amounted to vandalism.

A respect for the facts of the case, then, is a disposition to try to find out as much as possible about the circumstances out of which an issue has arisen and the best evidence of what is likely to result from proceeding on each of the alternative courses of action available.

A Rational Approach to Educational Policy Questions

In this chapter I have enumerated three objective criteria to be observed in dealing with educational issues. These criteria plus the moral point of view of impartially respecting the interests of all persons form the basis of the general approach that I wish to recommend for dealing with educational issues. This approach involves breaking complex issues down into numerous simpler questions will be one of three general kinds or an admixture thereof. These kinds are: (1) conceptual, (2) empirical, and (3) normative.

A conceptual question is one that can be answered by analyzing and defining the key concepts in the question in a way consistent with what I have called a respect for language. An example of such a question would be: Is education (concept) a discipline (concept)?

An empirical question is one that can be answered by appealing to relevant observed or observable evidence in
a way consistent with what I have called a respect for the facts of the case. An example of an empirical question would be: Have teaching machines increased reading performance levels in Florida schools?

A normative question is one that can be answered by appealing to some presupposed human value. In the case of moral questions, I believe the appeal ought to be to the principle of impartiality explicated in Chapter III. This means evaluating alternative courses of action in terms of how they are likely to affect the legitimate interests of everyone concerned. Clearly this will involve attending to the facts of the case and the concept of morality, but the emphasis here is on the normative and not simply the empirical or the conceptual.

Even when one breaks complex issues down into more manageable simpler questions the "simpler" questions may still be complex insofar as they still contain elements of the three kinds of questions just explained. In trying to formulate a school policy concerning the issue of whether to allow students to wear their hair as they choose, one might consider some simpler issues one at a time. For example: Do students have a legal right to wear their hair as they choose? Should students have the moral right to wear their hair as they choose? This second question combines all three of the basic kinds of questions. The concept of a moral right would need to be clarified. The terms "should" and "moral right" call attention to the
normative aspects of the question. And surely one would want to consider the empirical circumstances out of which the issue has arisen, the consequences of allowing students to wear their hair as they choose, and the consequences of not allowing them to do so.

Finally, since all of the answers offered in response to the various simpler question will be arguments so to speak, one should always try to bear in mind the question emphasized in the section of this chapter entitled "A Respect for Logic," namely, "What is being derived from what?"

The approach to educational policy questions that I am advocating, then, involves (1) breaking down complex issues into simpler and more manageable questions, (2) identifying these simpler questions as to their kinds of elements, (3) answering these simpler questions in ways consistent with what I have called a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and the legitimate interests of all persons, and (4) trying to resolve the central issue in hand by drawing on what has been learned by answering the simpler questions. This approach is illustrated in the next two chapters.
CHAPTER V
BUSING: AN ISSUE FOR ANALYSIS

All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation.

--Chief Justice Warren E. Burger

In this chapter I am going to attempt to demonstrate the general approach to dealing with educational issues that is advocated by this study. For this purpose I have selected for analysis a contemporary moral issue in education, namely, the issue of whether to bus public school students for purposes of racial and socioeconomic school desegregation.

Busing has been one of the most controversial issues of educational policy in the 1960's and 1970's. In the hope of turning some of the heat generated by the busing controversy into light, I will sort out the major arguments for and against busing and try to evaluate them in terms of how well they seem to reflect a respect for language, logic, the facts of the case, and legitimate interests of other persons. I will discuss the arguments for busing first.
The arguments for busing can be seen more clearly if they are viewed in reference to the factual circumstances out of which the busing issue has arisen. Therefore I want to begin by briefly recounting the facts of the case that have led up to this issue.

The issue of busing arose out of a perplexing situation in which it was becoming increasingly clear that there was something seriously wrong with public education for blacks in America. Social scientists began to compare national averages for black student achievement and attitudes to those of white students. Black parents began to feel that there was a large disparity between the quality of education offered in the all or predominantly black schools their children attended and white schools. And by the early 1950's social scientists had gathered a body of evidence which suggested that segregated education was harmful to black children. Taking judicial notice of this evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1954 that,

...in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.\(^1\)

The evidence that the Court accepted suggested the solution to the problem, desegregation of the schools.

Thus in the years since 1954 the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have sought to dismantle segregated

\(^1\)Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
school systems. The method of desegregation has been left to the discretion of local officials. In communities where school officials have chosen to do little or nothing to desegregate their school systems, local NAACP chapters have filed suit asking that officials be ordered to formulate viable desegregation plans or else be held in contempt of court. In communities where school officials have been the most intransigent, judges have been forced to devise local desegregation plans themselves. Frequently these plans have included busing, since segregated housing patterns make busing the only way to obtain desegregated schools in many areas.2

The basic argument in favor of busing is a complex one that is based partly on a factual claim and partly on a normative claim. The factual component claims that separate schooling generally results in lower achievement scores for minority students. The normative component claims that minority students are as entitled to quality public education as whites, and, under the factual circumstances, desegregation (including busing where necessary to achieve it) is morally in order.

If the factual side of the claim is true, then I think the normative argument is compelling. Our society places a premium on the skills acquired in schools. And

---

education is therefore an indispensable good which we bestow upon our young, one which will affect them all of their lives. Busing, I believe, is consistent with the considerations raised in Chapter III. It was seen there that the heart of the idea of morality and just institutions is the notion of respecting impartially the legitimate interests of all persons. It is from this moral point of view that proponents of busing contend that busing should be used where necessary to desegregate schools and thereby promote greater equality of educational opportunity. Let us next explore the empirical side of this claim in more detail.

Perhaps the research evidence accepted by the Supreme Court in 1954 was a bit sparse, but the far more extensive research conducted subsequently would call for the same decision. Since 1954 widespread inquiry has been undertaken to determine the effects of segregated schooling on minority achievement. The results of these studies point to permanent damage done to black students by racial and socioeconomic isolation in schools. Of special significance is the fact that the evidence further suggests that the school environment variable which is most closely related to black achievement and attitudes is not curriculum, facilities, or teachers, but it is the percentage of middle and upper class white students in the classroom. Apparently the presence of high achieving students has a positive influence on students who had been previously surrounded by
predominantly low achieving students.  

Thus far then, the case for busing seems to be a sound one. For as we have seen in Chapter III, differences in treatment among individuals are just only when they are designed to further or protect the interests of some person(s), are based on a relevant difference between the persons treated differently, and this difference is accepted by all parties affected as being one that would justify such differences in treatment. The facts of the case are that segregated schooling is harmful for blacks. And thus many blacks are opposed to segregated schooling and are in favor of desegregation, even when busing is necessary to achieve it. Hence the moral burden is on the opponents of busing to convince proponents of busing why middle and upper class whites should be allowed to continue to enjoy superior schooling.

And so let us now consider the case against busing. Together, the various arguments against busing seem to form a strong case for not busing students. But, when analyzed and evaluated individually, they make almost no

---

case at all. Most of the arguments can be dealt with by exploring the facts of the case. Some also require linguistic clarification. A few commit errors of reasoning. And, because without desegregation many black children are sure to receive less than equal educational opportunity, the case against busing also is not compelling on moral grounds.

One commonly raised objection to busing is that it often requires large numbers of children to be bused long distances at great inconvenience. In reply to this objection U.S. Senator Walter Mondale, among others, has pointed out that until recently there were counties in Georgia and Mississippi that bused black children up to 90 miles one way to get them to segregated schools.\textsuperscript{4} Senator Mondale's reply to this objection ignores the real point of the objection, namely, whether busing really necessitates long and inconvenient bus rides for large numbers of children. If the Senator's response is offered as a conclusive refutation to this objection to busing, then it commits the logical fallacy of arguing that two wrongs make a right. Just because segregationists once bused children long distances at great inconvenience is not a compelling reason, of itself, why anyone else should do so. The Senator's point is relevant, however, insofar as it points out the hypocrisy of those who would rather bus black children around the world than desegregate their schools, and who complain

\textsuperscript{4}U.S. Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (February 28, 1970), S2652-2653.
about long bus rides when they are used for desegregation. However, one need not be in favor of long bus rides for purposes of preserving segregation to be against long bus rides for purposes of ending segregation. That is, there are reasons other than a desire to preserve a dual school system why some parents might not want their children to be bused long distances.

The question of whether busing actually requires long bus rides at great inconvenience is essentially a factual one, if conceptual and normative agreement can be reached to the effect that a bus ride of thirty minutes or less is not "inconvenient." The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recently did a study to determine if busing for purposes of desegregation usually requires long bus rides. Their study, done on a nationwide basis, included the most recently desegregated school systems, such as Charlotte, Richmond, Denver, etc. Their results:

...before the Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision, pupils averaged over an hour on the bus. When the desegregation plan was carried out, however, bus trips were cut to a maximum of 35 minutes. Similarly, the Richmond decision would call for average bus rides of about 30 minutes, which is less than the current average in an adjacent district not involved in the decision. Where pupils are bused for the first time, trips are rarely long. The average travel time reported seems to be 20-30 minutes. Trips of half an hour or so would not bring the pupil home much later than if he walked from a neighborhood school.5

---

Though there may be isolated instances of long bus rides for purposes of desegregation, this is not the case usually. And in those few cases where long bus rides do occur, the length of the rides is not a necessary consequence of busing *per se*. When children leave home early and return late or travel circuitous routes, it is usually because authorities refuse to provide enough buses. The local and federal officials who refuse to provide enough funds for buses so that individual bus routes could be shortened are largely responsible for these isolated cases. In this regard, President Richard Nixon acted duplicitously in impounding funds appropriated for busing and other educational emergencies requiring financial aid (The Emergency School Assistance Program) on the grounds that he opposed busing because it required long inconvenient bus rides.

A second common objection to busing is that busing requires excessive transportation of students and hence creates serious risks to their safety. This too is essentially a factual claim that may be substantiated or refuted by available evidence. As we have just seen, busing for purposes of desegregation seldom requires bus rides longer than 20 to 30 minutes, and it never *need* do so. However, by definition, students are bused in busing programs, and hence the safety of all busing is called into question. The facts are that, of all the possible ways for a child to get to school, riding a school bus is by far the safest. The National Safety Council's *Accident Facts* show that
busing is more than twice as safe as any alternative way of getting to school, including by walking, by motor cycle or scooter, by bicycle, by other motor vehicle whether driven by parent or student, or by a public conveyance other than a school bus.\(^6\) Thus the claim that busing creates avoidable safety risks to students is unsupported by the facts of the case.

A third objection to busing is that even if desegregation actually results in enhanced scholastic achievement on the part of the minority students, as its advocates hope it will, it is reasonable to expect that white student achievement will be proportionately decreased. The implicit assumption here is that, if black students gain in performance as a result of classroom desegregation, then whites must decrease in their performance as a result of being mixed with lower performers. If it were the case that busing decreased white student achievement levels, some sort of evaluation of the good and bad effects of busing would have to be made to evaluate busing's overall propriety. But this type of comparative evaluation is rendered unnecessary by all of the evidence available concerning the effects of desegregation on black and white achievement. In every case study of the effects of desegregation on black and white students done thus far, white

---

student achievement has been either unchanged or slightly enhanced.\footnote{See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew, Elizabeth L. Useem, Clarence Normand, and Marshall S. Smith, "Busing: A Review of the 'Evidence,'," The Public Interest, 30 (Winter, 1973), 88-118.}

Another objection to busing claims that busing simply has not worked. There are two variations on this theme. Sometimes what is meant by this objection is that busing has not improved race relations among white and black students. But whether busing has or has not improved racial harmony is not conclusive evidence of whether busing has "worked" or not, since racial harmony was never the primary objective of busing. Rather the central purpose of busing has been to desegregate schools and promote greater equality of educational opportunity and thereby bolster black achievement. Of course, it is to be hoped that black and white students will end up understanding and respecting each other more as a result of busing. But if they do not, the fault will lie less with busing than with politicians, school officials, and parents who tacitly or overtly encourage children to maintain social segregation.

The second variation on the theme that busing has not worked is more to the point. The claim here is that busing has failed to bolster black achievement. This claim is based on a now famous study of the evidence on the effects of busing. In this study, social scientist David Armor
concluded that busing had little or no salutary effect on black verbal and quantitative achievement. 8

The selection and interpretation of statistical data is tricky business. Conclusions drawn from statistical data must be treated with the same degree of critical scrutiny that was outlined in the section called "A Respect for Logic" in Chapter IV. The question which I want to pose concerning the Armor study and which one must try to bear in mind in connection with all statistical propositions is "What is being derived from what?" Armor's report focuses primarily on a voluntary busing program in Boston called METCO. He compares the achievement of the 1500 students involved in the METCO program with 82 control students. From this sample, Armor eventually concludes that,

The available evidence on busing, then, seems to lead to two clear policy conclusions. One is that mandatory busing for purposes of improving student achievement and interracial harmony is not effective and should not be adopted at this time. 9

Now even a brief examination of Armor's study reveals two serious methodological problems with it. First, the study has far too small a sample to be predictive of anything on a nationwide basis. But worse, this small sample is not even what it is purported to be. A test of the effects

8David J. Armor, "The Evidence on Busing," The Public Interest, 28 (Summer, 1972), 90-121.
9 Ibid., 116.
of busing on black achievement should compare an experimental group of black students who are bused to desegregated schools with a control group of black students who are not bused and do not attend desegregated schools. In variance to this procedure, however, Armor compared a group of children in the METCO program most of whom were bused to desegregated schools with another group of children many of whom were also bused to desegregated schools. It develops that 34 of the 84 "control" students in the Armor study attended desegregated schools. And many of these were also bused to their schools. The "experimental" group of METCO children were all in desegregated schools, but not all were bused.

Not suprisingly, Armor found few achievement level differences between his experimental and control groups. In a very real sense, Armor's study is not a test of the effects of busing at all, for it never treats busing as an independent variable. The question, then, of whether busing has succeeded in bolstering black achievement cannot be answered by Armor's study.

However, there is a growing body of evidence collected under more scientific conditions which suggests that, when certain conditions obtain, busing does result in significant
gains in black verbal and quantitative achievement levels.\textsuperscript{10} The conditions that appear to be necessary ingredients for such gains in black achievement are: (1) equality of access to the school's resources, (2) classroom, not just school, desegregation, (3) desegregation beginning in the early grade levels, (4) substantial desegregation of both student bodies and staffs, and (5) the avoidance of strict ability grouping.\textsuperscript{11}

Another largely factually based objection to busing is that there is a viable alternative to busing, namely, compensatory education. Compensatory education involves the use of special teachers, facilities, and or curricula for disadvantaged students. There are two errors in viewing compensatory education as a viable alternative to busing. First, this view assumes that the sole purpose of busing


is to increase the academic achievement of black students. While this is the primary aim of busing, it is not the sole aim. Altered aspirations and attitudes are secondary aims of busing.

Second, and more importantly, this view presupposes that black achievement can be significantly bolstered by segregated compensatory education. (Compensatory education without busing is perforce segregated in many areas, owing to present housing patterns and attitudes in America.) And this presupposition is completely contrary to the evidence on the effects of segregated compensatory education. The largest comprehensive nationwide survey of diverse compensatory education programs concluded that,

...the compensatory programs reviewed here appear to suffer from the defect inherent in attempting to solve problems stemming in part from racial and social class isolation in schools which themselves are isolated by race and class.12

These findings are only consistent with the evidence cited earlier concerning the relationship between various school environment variables and minority achievement. That is, the most significant of these variables is the socioeconomic and racial makeup of the students in the classroom.

Another factually based objection to busing claims that persons of all races simply prefer racial segregation to integration. This claim about human nature is made usually

by such segregationist groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the White Citizens Council. The claim is what must be evaluated, however, and not its source. This claim is based on the observable fact that widespread racial segregation does exist in America and indeed throughout the world. But a more scientific approach to the question of human nature concerning racial segregation versus integration reveals that, as in so many other areas of human activity, early childhood environment is closely related to adult preferences. Research conducted by educational psychologists shows, for example, that people who attend racially integrated schools and colleges are much more likely to welcome continued racial integration in their housing, work, and so on, and for their children. Whereas segregated schooling typically helps foster racist and separatist attitudes. \(^{13}\) If, then, preferences for segregation and integration are determined largely by childhood experiences, and if we are concerned with providing equality of educational opportunity, then we should attempt to create an integrated environment for our children which will result in both more equal educational opportunity and a desire on the part of future adults to continue to foster this equality.

Another objection to busing claims that increases in

student violence at desegregated schools outweigh any benefits that busing might produce. That violence does sometimes follow new busing programs is an undeniable fact. Everyone has heard of racially inspired fights between students or between students and staff members. But the post hoc ergo propter hoc argument that busing has been followed by violence in many areas is not proof that violence is an inevitable consequence of busing.

It is instructive to note that violence has occurred in only some newly-desegregated schools and not in others. This suggests that violence need not result from mixing pupils from diverse cultures. The schools of Mobile, Riverside, and Berkeley, for example, were desegregated by busing without any resulting violence. Yet elsewhere teachers spend more time separating fighting students than teaching. The principal difference (no pun intended) between these contrasting results seems to lie in the determination of school officials and parents in the peacefully desegregated systems to create a climate where a heterogeneous student body and staff can learn to work and play together peacefully. And it also seems clear that those schools with the worst violence problems brought the trouble on themselves through a combination of naivete, intransigence, and stupidity. In an article that deals in part with the

problem of busing-related violence, Charles R. Cooper cites a newly desegregated high school in Edgefield, South Carolina as a classic example of the sort of school in which violence is likely to erupt. The name of the school is Strom Thurmond High School, the nickname of the school's athletic teams is the "rebels," the school's fight song is "Dixie," and Confederate flags are flown at all school functions. Cooper and others have concluded that, while violence has indeed followed busing in some areas, violence is not an inevitable result of busing per se. Instead, if school officials and parents will make a sincere effort to anticipate and rectify any conditions that are sure to provoke many students, then desegregation can be achieved peacefully.

Even our highest elected political leaders have not been immune from saying untoward things about busing. The violent resistance of white students and more often white parents to court ordered busing has very likely been encouraged to a large degree by those politicians who have stated publicly their objections to busing at a time when they know full well that busing must still go forward and that their comments can have no constructive effect. (A constitutional amendment passed by Congress and ratified by legislatures or conventions in three fourths of the states is the only means of preventing busing; and

attempts to pass such an amendment have failed in the past, owing to the view held by most members of Congress that such an amendment would be antithetical to the 6,000 words preceding it.) An example of this lack of leadership and inflammatory rhetoric is the comment made recently by President Gerald Ford. Just as emotions were beginning to cool in Boston where violent demonstrations had followed the implementation of a local court ordered busing plan, President Ford announced at a news conference that he was "personally opposed to the Court's decision." This remark served no constructive purpose, save perhaps a self-serving one of enhancing the President's popularity among persons already opposed to busing. (The President's popularity had shortly before taken its first plunge downward in the public opinion polls, presumably because of deteriorating economic conditions and his granting of a pardon to his predecessor.) Enraged that the President would make such an untimely remark, Boston Mayor Kevin White said that Mr. Ford had "encouraged false hopes and fanned the flames of resistance that will almost inevitably lead to further disruptions in Boston...." Shortly thereafter a new anti-busing rally was being planned, blunt racist messages were scrawled on many South Boston walls, and busing boycott leader,  

17 Ibid., 38.
State Representative Raymond Flynn, rejoiced that, "with the kind of things coming out of Washington these days, we just may not have busing to worry about much longer."18

The arguments against busing that have been examined thus far were subject in large measure to empirical confirmation or refutation. Two also contained fallacious reasoning. The final objection to busing that I want to discuss involves a more complex claim which contains conceptual, factual, and normative elements. This is the contention that busing violates parents' right of freedom of choice. It is clear from the way the phrase "right of freedom of choice" is used by opponents of busing that it is supposed to mean that parents ought to have the right of freedom to choose what public school their children will attend. The question, then, that I want to explore is whether, under the present circumstances of American life, this right claim is one which should be respected.

It seems appropriate to begin by briefly further clarifying the claim itself. First let us be clear about what a right is. A definition suggested by John Plamenatz seems to report accurately what we normally mean by the term "right" when we use it as a noun in our ordinary moral language. According to Plamenatz, a man has a right whenever,

...other men ought not to prevent him from doing what he wants or refuse him some service he asks for or needs.19

18Ibid.

This definition is a good one because it illuminates the important features of rights. The appearance of the word "ought" in the definition signifies that "right" is a word used in moral contexts. How people ought to act is, as we have seen earlier, the basic subject matter of ethics. A right morally entitles the bearer to a certain kind of conduct on the part of others (often noninterference) or to some other good.

Freedom is a concept closely related to the concept of a right. There are many uses of the word "freedom," but the kind of freedom we are concerned with in this particular issue is social freedom, as opposed to, say, free will. By social freedom I mean freedom from restraint or coercion imposed by some other person(s). The following definition, I believe, accurately reports what we ordinarily presuppose in our use of the word "freedom" in this sense. I shall say that a man has freedom to do or have what he chooses when these two conditions obtain: (1) no social restraints exist to prevent or discourage him from doing or having what he chooses; and (2) he has the natural ability to do or have what he chooses. Notice that both of these conditions must obtain before we would ordinarily

---

20 There are, of course, nonmoral uses of the word "ought," such as the predictive use in which we say that something ought to happen as a result of something else. Plamenatz makes it clear in his essay, however, that it is the moral use of "ought" which is involved in right claims.
say that a man had freedom to do or have something. Natural
ability alone does not decide the question of freedom.
For example, we are naturally able to kill other persons;
but, owing to social restraints against killing, we are not
socially free to do so. Nor is a lack of natural ability
necessarily an abridgment of freedom. We are naturally
unable to walk upside on ceilings. But we would not say
that any abridgment of freedom as involved in this lack
of ability. Similarly, a lack of social restraints alone
does not give us freedom. There are no social sanctions
against flying to Mars. We simply are unable to do so.
But without the ability, despite the fact that no social
sanctions against Mars flights exist, we would not ordi-
narily say that someone was free to fly to Mars. Because
such a statement would strike us as sounding odd, we may
infer that such a statement would violate the implicit
rules that govern our ordinary uses of the word "freedom."
When we say that someone is socially free to do or have
something, we normally presuppose that he has the ability
to do or have that thing and that no social restraints
exist to prevent or discourage his having or doing the
thing in question. Let us turn now to a synthesis of the
concept of rights and the concept of a right of freedom.

The right of freedom of choice is a particular right
claim that claims the freedom to send one's child to what-
ever school one wants. But it raises the more general
question of how much freedom any person should be granted.
H.L.A. Hart's answer to this question is, I believe, a sound one. To wit,

...any adult human being capable of choice (1) has the right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint, and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons.21

Any other approach to the question of how much freedom everyone should be allowed does violence to the fundamental principle of morality explicated in Chapter III which says that differences in treatment are permissible (and hence can be said to be not "coercing or restraining") only when (1) such differences benefit some person(s); (2) such differences are based on a relevant difference between the parties in question; and (3) this difference is freely acknowledged and accepted as being relevant by all parties affected.

Now this claim to a right of freedom of choice by opponents of busing is, I believe, a misapplication of the universal moral right of freedom, for it exceeds the morally permissible parameters for being such a right. As we have just seen, the moral limits of this general right are that one is free to do or have what one wants only insofar as what one wants to do or have does not "injure other persons" against their will. Drawing upon what we know about the

effects of segregated schooling, we can state the nature of the injury done to other persons by the right of freedom of choice in the following syllogistic fashion:

Major Premise: Segregated schools for poor black students are inherently inferior in terms of student achievement levels.

Minor Premise: The right of freedom of choice would result in no busing and hence continued segregated schooling in many areas (due to present attitudes and housing patterns).

Conclusion: The right of freedom of choice would result in inferior schooling for poor black students.

Opponents of busing, of course, claim that it is they who are really injured by busing. It is for this reason that they raise this rights claim in the first place. But our previous analyses of all the foregoing arguments against busing failed to detect any real injury necessarily connected with busing per se.

The so called right of freedom of choice, then, is not consistent with the view that everyone should be granted the greatest amount of freedom consistent with similar freedom for all. For the practical effect of granting parents the right of freedom of choice would be to prevent poor black children from having the higher quality schooling received by middle and upper class whites in their segregated schools.

When measured against the requirements of the moral principle of impartiality, the moral shortcomings of this right claim are readily apparent. It should be noted first that this claim is made almost exclusively by middle and
upper class white parents who want to send their children to segregated neighborhood schools. Now because the practical effect of granting them this right would be to deny poor black students access to the higher quality schooling enjoyed by white students, it is clear that the white claimants, whether they realize it or not, are asking for preferential treatment in the form of better schooling for their children. This is so since the facts of the case show that whites have access to higher quality education than is accessible to blacks when busing is not employed. But in making this claim to preferential treatment for their children white parents have failed to establish any relevant difference between themselves and blacks that would satisfy the second and especially the third conditions of the principle of impartiality. Most blacks certainly do not accept this differential treatment as being in any sense justified. Unlike white parents, most blacks have consistently favored integrated education,\(^\text{22}\) even when busing was necessary to achieve it.\(^\text{23}\)

As concerns the claim to a right of freedom of choice

\(^{22}\)E.g., a large national sample of black parents responded 78% "yes," 9% "no," and 14% "unsure" to the question, "Would you like to see the children in your family go to school with white children or not?" See Peter Goldman, Report From Black America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 178.

\(^{23}\)According to a nationwide Harris Poll taken in March, 1972, blacks wanted busing where necessary to desegregate schools by a ratio of about 5 in favor to 3 against. See Louis Harris, "Antibusing Attitudes Harden," The Boston Globe, April 10, 1972, p. 2.
made by most white opponents of busing, then, it can be said that the claim is consistent with neither the idea of equality of treatment and individual liberties, nor the moral rules for granting preferential treatment.

A very few whites make a more bluntly racist contention in this regard. Unlike the typical white opponent of busing, they freely acknowledge that without busing blacks are probably doomed to receive inferior schooling. To meet the arguments of those who would claim that this is a cruel and immoral position to take, such racists merely reply that they are being perfectly consistent because if they were black they too would be entitled to less than equal educational opportunities. But the racists' claim here wrongly assumes that consistency is all that is required by the idea of morality. If it were a sufficient basis, then we would all be morally free to ignore or contravene the interests of any group of persons, as long as we did so consistently. To reiterate the example from Chapter III, we would be acting morally on this view if we burned all red heads at the stake and not just some red heads. It is clear, however, that we would not ordinarily consider such conduct to be moral. When the logic of the racists' claim is made explicit, it is clear why consistency alone does not assure the moral rightness of one's acts.

What can be said about the few black parents who oppose busing on the claim to a right of freedom of choice? At first blush, one might conclude that the children of
such parents should not be bused. After all, this would only be taking into account the wishes of the group on whose behalf desegregation is presumably advocated. But such is not the case. Desegregation is advocated on behalf of black children, not their parents.

The salient question that lies behind this issue is why parents are allowed to control the actions of their children at all. The answer, I submit, is that parents are ordinarily granted rights over their children for the same reason we ordinarily grant anyone rights of another person, that is, we believe it will be in the best interests of the person placed in the subordinate position.

There are a few well known instances in which we do not leave some decisions that are crucial to the child's welfare at the unilateral discretion of the parent. For example, we require by law that all children go to schools that meet certain standards. And we make extreme punishment or other forms of cruelty illegal. The obvious presupposition behind such laws is that children are persons not chattel and that they are entrusted to the supervision of their parents primarily because it is felt that this will be in their own best interests.

As a result of their own isolation, anxieties, and misgivings, some black parents may not want their children to attend desegregated schools. But these wants are not the primary consideration in this issue. Rather it is the interests of black children that are of importance here.
For it is in virtue of the presumed benefits which accrue to children from parental authority that parents are justified in having any control over children at all. Hence the test of whether black parents ought to be granted the right to send their children to segregated schools is what it always is, namely, "Is such a right beneficial to the children?" It is beneficial for poor black children to attend segregated schools only if one is willing to view such things as crippling verbal and quantitative deficiencies, racist and separatist attitudes, high drop out rates, and feelings of not being able to make it in a hostile white controlled world as being benefits.

It is interesting to note that one of the staunchest defenders of individual liberties against governmental tyranny in the history of political philosophy, John Stuart Mill, almost seems to have foreseen this aspect of the busing controversy when, in his renowned On Liberty, he eloquently stated the case for the government taking an active role in protecting the welfare of children:

A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs. The state, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all others taken together.... It is in the case of children that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfillment by the state of its duties. One would almost think that
a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his exclusive control over them...\(^{24}\)

In this chapter I have attempted to bring the general approach to dealing with educational issues advocated by this study to bear on the contemporary issue of busing. The approach in this case involved evaluating the simpler separable pros and cons of the issue in terms of the extent to which each of the arguments for and against busing seemed to reflect a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and the interests of all concerned parties. In each case the procedure involved trying first to ascertain whether the argument being considered was an empirical, conceptual, or normative one or some combination thereof. Once the claim was identified as to its kind, I tried to evaluate it in terms of its compliance with the applicable evaluative criteria. When, for example, the claim under consideration contained an empirical component I attempted to ascertain the extent to which the claim accurately reported on the facts of the case. When the claim contained a conceptual component I attempted to clarify the key concept(s) involved. When the claim contained a normative element, I attempted to make clear the extent to which the claim reflected an impartial respect for the interests of all persons. And, because each of these claims was

an argument, I tried to clarify in each case what was being derived from what, with the aim in view of establishing whether the conclusions drawn were warranted by the premises advanced.

In terms of their individual respect for the interests of all persons, logic, language, and the facts of the case the arguments advanced in support of busing outweigh those offered in opposition. On this basis, then, I have come to the tentative (that is, open to new arguments) conclusion that busing is one legitimate means of striving to attain ever nearer practical congruity with America's theoretical commitment to equality of treatment.
CHAPTER VI
DISCIPLINE: AN ISSUE FOR ANALYSIS

It is a commonplace of educational theory that the establishing of character is a comprehensive aim of instruction and discipline. Hence it is important that we should be on our guard against a conception of the relations of intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the aim, and on the lookout for the conditions which have to be provided in order that the aim may be successfully acted upon.

--John Dewey

In this chapter, like Chapter V, I am going to try to bring the approach advocated by this study to bear on another controversial issue in education. The issue in this case, discipline, is even more complex than the last one. Just as it would be impossible to analyze the game of baseball without talking about fielding, pitching, hitting, and running, it would be impossible to analyze the topic of discipline in education without also discussing a number of constituent topics which are themselves enormous, such as authority, responsibility, punishment, and moral education. I will begin by briefly describing the issue, or at least what appears to be at issue.

Discussions about discipline usually call forth catchwords and phrases like "permissiveness" and "the permissive society." These locutions are indicative of a transfor-
mation that has taken place in American society with respect to child rearing. Among the strict and stiff beliefs that the early Puritan settlers of this country brought with them was the notion that dictatorial authority by parents and schoolmasters was necessary to "break the child's will" if he was to grow up with a righteous conscience.

But, with the advent of modern psychology and especially Freudian psychoanalysis, there came an almost 180 degree shift in thinking about discipline. Americans were told by child psychologists that any form of discipline could and probably would cause serious damage to the child in the form of inhibitions, hatred, and rebellion. And thus was born a hands off, "let them be happy" school of thought. The disciplinary metamorphosis was complete. Now it was the children's turn to be the dictators.

Unfortunately the extremes in this transformation have become the poles in the current debate over discipline. Hence the widespread assumption seems to be that the issue of discipline essentially involves a choice between prohibiting things and permitting them. In the mouth of someone like Max Rafferty, the expression "the permissive society" makes one believe that its user considers it a good thing, for its own sake, to prohibit things, and a bad thing to permit them. In the mouths of people on the other side, it gives one the impression that to permit anything is to strike a blow for liberty and justice,
and that, in A.S. Neill's words, "...to impose anything by authority is wrong."¹

In this chapter, instead of taking one side or the other in this controversy, I hope to indicate and then follow a plan of operations that will proceed from a more telling point of view than is represented by the ideas and practices of the contending parties. As long as the issue of discipline is formulated as a question of simply whether to be more prohibitive or permissive, the debate over that issue is not likely to be very productive. If, however, we advert to a prior level of analysis of the concept of discipline itself and its connections with some key related concepts, including general education, punishment, and moral education, then perhaps we will be able to establish what kinds of (as opposed to merely whether) things ought to be prohibited and permitted.

If this plan is successful it will enable me to clarify the importance of discipline in general education, the proper role of punishment in maintaining school discipline, and the significance of discipline in moral education. In each of these areas I will try to draw out some general policy implications of these conceptual distinctions and connections. And in a final section I will explore some of the causes and possible remedies of several specific disci-

pline problems that frequently arise in schools.

The Concept of Discipline

There are roughly five general ways we ordinarily use the word "discipline." A brief review and comparison of these uses reveals at least two salient features of the concept of discipline. The first of these uses refers to "a branch of knowledge." Here we speak of physics, biology, mathematics, and so on as being disciplines.

Second, there is a use which refers to "training that seeks submission to some body of rules or principles." For example, we sometimes speak of the process of military basic training as being discipline training.

Third, there is a use that refers to "the product of such training." Here, for example, we speak of well disciplined troops.

Fourth, there is a use that refers to "the body of rules or principles themselves." To continue the military context, it may be noted that we speak of military discipline.

And fifth, there is a use that, like the second use above, refers to training which results in submission to some body of rules or principles. The difference here is this use refers to corrective training which occurs only when the trainee breaks one of the rules or principles in question. This use, then, is synonymous with "punishment." Here we speak, for example, of disciplining misbehaving students.
A thread that is common to all of these uses and which unites them is the idea of submitting to rules or principles. This notion is plainly evident in each use, save perhaps the first. Even there it becomes readily apparent when one realizes that bodies of knowledge are called disciplines presumably because learners in these fields must learn and obey the rules or principles which structure these fields of knowledge. By the "structure" of the disciplines I mean the kinds of thinking and procedures that distinguish one body of knowledge from another.

Notice too that the idea of learning is very much a part of these several uses. This is not too surprising when one discovers that "discipline" is derived from the Latin infinitive, discere, which means "to learn."

At the center of the concept of discipline, then, is the general idea of submitting to rules or principles which define something that is supposed to be learned. What is supposed to be learned can be any identifiable body of knowledge from philology to dry fly fishing.

We ordinarily distinguish between two general types of motivation leading to a person's submission to rules or principles. The distinction here is between self-imposed discipline and discipline imposed by others. In the field of education one frequently hears it said that education is a process of transferring discipline from without (from teachers, parents, et al.) to the individual himself (self-discipline). To see if this is a tenable axiom, and I
believe it is, it will be useful to view the concept of discipline in the context of general education.

**Discipline and Education**

If teaching and learning are to go forward successfully there must be a submission on the part of the student to two kinds of rules. These are (1) the rules of decorum that set the stage for teaching and learning, and (2) the rules that structure the subject matter to be taught and learned. The former are simply rules of order that make it possible for information and opinions to be exchanged freely. The latter are the rules which define the way(s) of thinking and kind(s) of procedure(s) that are constitutive of the subject matter in question. It is to be hoped ultimately that the student's submission to these rules (both the conditional and the structural) will be self-imposed. To see why this is so it will be necessary to make the idea of self-discipline clearer.

I think we would ordinarily say that a student's submission to the rules of learning was self-imposed if the student viewed the subject matter to be learned as being either something of intrinsic interest to him or else as being something instrumentally worth learning in order to be able to understand or do something of more direct interest to him. An example of the first type of submission would be the student who somehow becomes intrigued by the night sky and undertakes to learn something about astronomy. An example of the second type of submission would be a
college student who, upon deciding to go into physical education and coaching, sets himself upon the task of taking and passing all of the courses required for a degree in physical education, even though many of these courses may be of no direct interest to him.

I have spoken thus far as if the distinction between submission based on direct interest and submission based on instrumental interest were hard and fast. Actually there is often overlapping here. Even in the case of the student who wishes to study astronomy, not every detail of astronomy will be of felt interest to him. Yet such details may be necessary if he is to learn other details which are of more immediate interest to him. Hence it is more accurate to think of self-discipline as being a submission to rules which may fall anywhere along a continuum of interest ranging from that which is predominantly intrinsic to that which is predominantly instrumental. The residual and uniting feature of all such cases is the aspect of interest. Self-discipline is a submission to rules that is motivated primarily by the student's felt interest in either what is to be learned or in what is to be made possible by some means-end learning.

By contrast, discipline imposed by others involves a submission to rules that is motivated primarily by other persons' desires, urgings, threats, and so on. It is true, of course, that the motivation in such cases is not completely from without. A student genuinely may wish to please his teachers, parents, or other authority figures. Or he
may simply wish to avoid their censure or punishment. He may also be reacting to peer pressure. Or perhaps external awards have been attached to the learning process by parents or teachers. For example, a student might be promised some material good if he maintains a certain grade point average. This is not the same thing as our student who is willing to endure courses in kinesiology and anatomy to become a physical education teacher and coach. For, while the aspiring coach probably wishes he did not have to take these courses, he recognizes that a reasonable case can be made for their inclusion in his studies. Thus the end in this case is not as alien and unrelated to the means in the way that a material reward, a threat, peer pressure, and so on are unrelated to learning. Our aspiring coach is interested in most aspects of physical education. Only these few courses are not of immediate interest to him. And even in the case of these courses, he sees their relevance. Whereas the student who has been promised some material good for maintaining a certain grade point average has not been given any reason to become genuinely interested in any part of the curriculum. His interest in the total curriculum could easily be completely instrumental. This is to say that he need have no felt interest in what is being learned at all.

To sum up, then, in all cases where discipline is imposed by others the learning that transpires is not motivated primarily by any interest in the subject matter per se. Instead the student is motivated by others playing upon...
his desires and fears through the use of things that are unrelated to what is being learned.

The distinction between self-discipline and discipline imposed by others brings into sharper focus the educational significance of the concept of interest. In John Dewey's words,

It is hardly necessary to press the point that interest and discipline are connected, not opposed. (1) Even the more purely intellectual phase of trained power--apprehension of what one is doing as exhibited in consequences--is not possible without interest. Deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest. Parents and teachers often complain--and correctly--that children "do not want to hear, or want to understand." Their minds are not upon the subject precisely because it does not touch them; it does not enter into their concerns.  

Dewey's point is that discipline in education that is imposed by others is artificial. It sets up an artificial connection between what is wanted or feared and the submission to rules. Prizes and pain present very general and extrinsic objects of desire and aversion that are tacked on to the learning process in a meretricious way. Hence what is learned is not just the subject matter at hand but an instrumental attitude about learning, an attitude in which learning is not perceived as being interesting and enjoyable but as being only so much drudgery to be put up with in order to avoid censure or obtain unrelated rewards. If, then, education is to avoid this kind of pejorative attitude toward learning, educators must become skilled at

---

detecting, building upon, and broadening the interests of individual students.

It is important to note also that self-discipline is not just a means to becoming educated. For if one of the goals of schooling is to produce persons who will go on learning throughout life, then self-discipline is also an end of education. This is what is meant in the description of education as both a means and an end. Self-discipline is an end of schooling because we seek to produce in our schools persons who will go on learning on their own without artificial inducements and in spite of serious obstacles because they have come to view learning as an enjoyable thing. This, then, is another reason why teachers should try to teach by building on student's interests thus making learning a happy experience, one that will be continued after artificial motivations are removed.

I hasten to add here, however, that by emphasizing the importance of teaching by building on interest I am not endorsing the view that the child's felt interests should be the primary guides for determining curriculum content. Educators cannot be concerned only with what catches a child's attention and absorbs him. Insofar as the school is presumed to stand in loco parentis (that is, in place of the parent) educators must also be concerned with what is good for the child. The teacher hence must be concerned with what is in the child's interest as well as what the child is interested in.
Obviously if what was in the child's interest always coincided perfectly with what the child was interested in, there would be little need for departments of curriculum and instruction in colleges of education. But the coincidence here is far from perfect. For what is in the child's best interest frequently does not interest him. And things which are of interest to him, say shooting birds with an air gun, may be of little value in terms of his best interests. These facts plus the fact that children's interests tend to be sporadic and evanescent at an early age strongly suggest that the points of entry into the curriculum, not the curriculum itself, should be tailored to the child's felt interests.

There are a number of ways teachers can build on interest. Most of them require close contact with the student. (This is a strong argument in favor of keeping student/teacher ratios low.) A standard preliminary step in building on interest is to interview one's students and elicit from them what gets their attention, what their hobbies are, what absorbs them, in short, what interests them. This knowledge then enables a skilled teacher to find and point out connections between what is to be learned and the student's interests. A simple example would be the arithmetic teacher who, upon learning that a student is interested in baseball, uses problems in computing earned run averages, batting averages, and so on to sharpen the student's skills at multiplying, dividing, and handling decimals.
Another way to build on (and in this case, evoke) interest is to pose perplexing problems to students. This may be done in subjects that are familiar to the students as well as in those that are unfamiliar. In the case of the familiar, skilled teachers are sometimes able to point out to students things they did not know about the subject or inconsistencies in their beliefs about the subject, with the resulting effect being that dissonance is generated in the student's mind which he will seek to alleviate by learning more about the subject. The teacher might be said to be inciting learning in such cases. He is exposing insights, connections, inconsistencies, and possibilities heretofore unseen by the students with the hope of creating wonder and ferment. To take an example from the field of moral education, imagine the student whose moral reasoning has not progressed beyond the "my country right or wrong" level of reasoning. Presumably some dissonance might be created, interest evoked, and learning facilitated by asking the student to ponder questions like: If you had lived in Germany during World War II, would it have been morally better to support the Hitler regime or to try somehow to escape or disregard the authority of the Nazi government?

It is also frequently possible to structure one's teaching so that the resolution of one perplexing in some field leads to the recognition of a new interesting problem to be explored. To take an example from the field of astronomy, suppose that one's students have just found out
that the reason why planets and other satellites in space which are all really "falling objects" do not fall into the body whose gravity is causing their fall is that they have attained sufficient momentum to maintain their orbit without falling into the larger body. This is a nice problem and a satisfactory solution. But the solution poses another nice problem, namely, who or what put the falling objects into their orbits?

To sum up, the points of entry into the curriculum should be tailored as far as possible to coincide with students' interests. This is so because such an approach is more likely to lead to the most fruitful and nonartificial type of self-discipline learning. And self-discipline is also constitutive of one of the primary ends of education, namely, the propensity to go on learning after one's years of formal schooling are finished.

**Discipline and Punishment**

The picture painted thus far of discipline in education has been a rosy one envisioning students fast at work at the business of learning about things that have been made of some interest to them. But every teacher, no matter how adept at his craft he may be, encounters student misbehavior. There are steps short of punishment that can be used to maintain order, such as ignoring minor mistakes, gesturing, verbally requesting a misbehavior to stop whatever he is doing, counseling, and so on. These measures
will be explored later in this chapter in connection with several of the more commonplace school discipline problems.

Occasionally, however, these steps will be insufficient to meet the demands of the situation. In this section I want to discuss punishment as a means of maintaining submission to the rules of order in schools. Specifically, I am going to clarify the concept of punishment, justify punishment's existence in schools, explore the effects of different forms of punishment, and mark off the limits of punishment's disciplinary utility.

The Meaning of Punishment

If this section is to be about punishment, it seems appropriate to attend first to the conceptual matter of clarifying what punishment is. If one wishes to grasp the central idea of punishment, there is first of all a loose sense of the word that must be acknowledged. In this sense of the word, "punishment" simply means any stimulus that a person seeks to avoid or escape. Thus educational psychologists, for example, speak of punishment as being any pain inflicted in order to teach students rules not yet known to them. Or, in nonschool contexts, we might say that a boxer took a lot of punishment in the ring from his opponent. The point is that this loose sense of the word is broader than the central sense of "punishment" that is of interest to us here. It is this more central sense that
I now will discuss.  

Consider the student who is made to stay after school for having set off a firecracker in study hall. This sort of case seems to be exemplary of the kind of punishment that is of importance in maintaining order in schools. What are some of the salient features of this paradigm case? Notice first that this sense of "punishment" involves the imposition of a penalty. That is, punishment involves inflicting disagreeable experiences (in this case, staying after school). Notice too that this sense of "punishment" requires that the penalty inflicted be a consequence of the punishee's having committed some offense (in this case, disrupting study hall). Finally, notice that the penalty is inflicted by someone in authority (in this case, school authorities). To overlook these last two aspects of punishment places us back in the realm of any disagreeable experience being counted as punishment. The central idea of punishment, then, may be defined as the imposition of a penalty by an authority for having committed an offense.

The Justification of Punishment

It is one thing to understand what punishment is. It is something else to give justificatory reasons for why punish-
ment should exist. This question is largely a normative one concerning the right to punish and the rights of punish-
ees. But there are also conceptual points that will need to be made along the way, such as clarifying the two major theories of punishment. And there are some empirical points to attend to concerning the effects of punishment on students and the legal rights of students with respect to punishment.

In general, there are two theories concerning why punishment should exist. These are the utilitarian and retributive justifications of punishment. Utilitarians argue that punishment should serve some useful end; that is, it should be used to bring about some desirable result, such as reform of the offender, deterrence of similar offenses, and so on. The utilitarian view is epitomized in the following statement by two modern legal scholars:

Since punishment consists in the infliction of pain it is, apart from its consequences, an evil; consequently it is good and, therefore, just only if and to the degree that it serves the common good by advancing the welfare of the person punished or the rest of the population.  

At least two objections to this justification seem fairly obvious and, therefore, deserving of attention. First, it might be objected that this view of punishment

need not take into account excuses. This is so since it seems clear that punishment would have the strongest deterrent effect if it were common knowledge that all behavior of a certain sort would be punished, irrespective of excuses.  

The utilitarian can defend against this objection on three grounds. First, the fact that all behavior of a certain kind would be punished would not deter from crime many persons whom we would excuse otherwise, for example, the insane, the misinformed, persons acting under external compulsion, and so on. Second, punishment of this sort could possibly increase offenses by breeding disrespect for the kind of law which punishes the insane, ignorant, and coerced. Third, such punishment would have the unhappy result of breeding insecurity among the populace. Who would dare to drive a car, for example, if first degree murder and the accidental running down of a pedestrian were both punished by the same punishment? For all these reasons, then, utilitarians are sympathetic to excuses, and hence this objection does not pose a serious threat to the utilitarian view of punishment.

A second fairly obvious objection to this view of punishment is that utilitarians justify too much. What if

---

a particular crime becomes common and none of the criminals can be caught? Would it not be allowable or even obligatory on the utilitarian view to punish an innocent person, if a charge could be so framed that he would be universally thought to be guilty by the populace? Would this not have the same deterrent effect sought by utilitarians?\(^6\)

This objection has merit insofar as it draws attention to the overemphasis of results (as opposed to the motives and intentions of agents) in utilitarian ethical theory in general. But it is not a very damaging objection to a utilitarian justification of punishment. For the utilitarian's defense is a conceptual point. What is being justified here is punishment, nothing more, nothing less. And punishment, by definition, is administered only to persons who have committed an offense. Thus this objection to a utilitarian view of punishment is essentially beside the point.

The other traditional justification of punishment is the retributive theory. On this view the justification for punishment is that when a person commits a crime he violates the ideal of equality of treatment among persons, that is, he wrongly tips the scales of justice in his favor. Hence to perpetrate a crime on someone else is to invite the same crime on oneself. That is, if the scales of impartial justice are to be returned to perfect balance, offenders

\(^6\)This objection is raised by E.F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 65.
must be punished in exact proportion to the severity of the offense committed. The author of this view is Kant who asked,

What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality (illustrated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that is, the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the other. Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself. Only the law of retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment....

To summarize, the retributivist holds that it is a basic principle of morality that pain or loss should be caused to persons who have done wrong, with a severity corresponding to the gravity of their offense. Here again there are some objections which come to mind quickly.

First, one might think that this view constitutes little more than a formalized procedure for revenge. But such is not the case. Actually retributivists view all persons as autonomous beings worthy of respect. They evidence their respect for offenders through punishment which, in a sense, the offender has "earned." That is, retributivists believe that people who harm others could and should do otherwise. And thus, a rational person who commits an offense must not be allowed to profit from his misdeed. It should be noted too that retributivists are generally willing to

---

stipulate that an offender's guilt and punishment should be decided fairly by persons not directly affected by the offense in question. Retributivism and revenge, then, are not the same things.

It might also be objected that the notion of punishing someone in proportion to the gravity of his offense raises some serious practical problems: what to do with the rapist, the blackmailer, and so on. But the retributivists can reply that it is not so important that the offender be repaid in kind as it is important that he be repaid in proportion. And, while it might be difficult to rank crimes in order of their gravity, such a task is not impossible. In fact, we normally do so anyway.

These, then, are the two principal justifications for the existence of punishment. How relevant are these reasons for punishment to the educational setting? The utilitarian view seems better suited to the business of schools. This is so since schools unlike courts are in the business of education. That is, if the business of schools is education, then punishment in schools would seem to make the most sense if it could be shown that it had some deterrent and or reformatory effect on student misbehavior thus helping to maintain the conditions of order necessary for teaching and learning. This is a utilitarian view of punishment, for it focuses on the beneficial results to be obtained from punishment rather than restoring balance to the metaphysical scales of justice. The retributive view seems somewhat misplaced in educational
contexts for two reasons. First, it is not concerned with any effects that might result from the use of punishment which might facilitate or disrupt the educative process. And second, it assumes something about offenders that may not be true of students, namely, that they are autonomous beings just as adults are presumed to be. Evidence compiled by most psychologists studying personality development, such as Piaget, Williams, and Kohlberg, suggests that children are not fully but only potentially autonomous beings. Hence it seems unfair to hold them to the same standards expected of adults or, more precisely, to punish them as if they were adults.

Is this utilitarian justification of punishment in education compatible with the moral point of view explicated in Chapter III? I believe it is. For it is predicated on the view that teachers and students ought to be free to pursue their interests in teaching and learning without disruptions from disorderly students. I do not mean to imply by this statement that punishment can teach students moral respect for the interests of others. In fact, most of the research on punishment in education indicates that punishment is basically ineffective in this regard. What punishment can

---

do, however, is deter and reform disruptive behavior.

So much for the rights of the teacher and orderly students, what of the rights of the punishee? For reasons made clear in Chapter III a person who has broken a rule or law designed to protect or further the legitimate interests of all cannot object to punishment per se, since to claim that only his interests need be respected is a duplicitous defense. But what he can object to, insofar as he is still a person and not merely an object to be used as a means only, is that he not be punished in a fashion any more unpleasant than that which is likely to deter similar offenses and reform the punishee's behavior. These constraints on the uses of punishment are what is required by the idea of impartiality. They limit the severity of punishment to that which is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of all persons.

This is an appropriate place to point out that, if a student is charged with a serious offense which will draw a stiff penalty, he should be allowed—like anybody else—to try to prove his innocence or diminished responsibility, if he wishes to do so. This right is consistent with the democratic approach to the running of social institutions advocated in Chapter III. Among the democratic precepts enumerated there was the view that every person should be granted the most extensive set of liberties consistent with similar liberties for all. The right to defend oneself against charges of having committed a punishable offense must be one such liberty. For without a guarantee of this liberty, social
institutions may charge, convict, and punish any person who may have made himself unpopular with institutional authorities, irrespective of his guilt or innocence of the charge brought against him. This moral right, then, is a safeguard against arbitrary institutional coercion and tyranny. It seems appropriate to mention here also that this moral right has been made a legal right by a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases. Together, these cases effectively extend to students in public school disciplinary proceedings the basic rights of due process normally accorded adults in legal proceedings. In the Tinker case, which involved the suspension of a number of students for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War, the Court ruled that the students had been wrongly deprived of their right to free speech. The Court went on to declare that public school students are "persons" in the eyes of the constitution and are hence entitled to First Amendment rights.9

In Goss v. Lopez the Court ruled that public school students have a right to the minimum procedures of due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment before they may legally be suspended from school. In practice this means, at a minimum, that the student and his parents must be given prior notice of the student's suspension. The student and parents must be given an opportunity to be present at a hearing

before a school administrator who will determine if a suspension should be imposed. The administrator is not required to permit the presence of legal counsel or to follow any hard and fast judicial rules. However, he must provide statements of the charge(s) against the student, and he must permit the student or others whose presence is requested by the student to make statements in defense of the student. Finally, the administrator must notify the student and parents of his decision and, if suspension is imposed, his reasons for the suspension and the number of days of the suspension. The only exception to these procedures permitted by the Court relates to cases in which a student's presence poses a clear and immediate danger to persons, property, or the academic process. In such cases, the notice and hearing must follow the suspension as soon as practicable.10

In Wood v. Strickland the Court went a step further and ruled that a school official is,

...not immune from liability for damages...if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.11

These, then, are the basic common-law facts which teachers should be aware of, as well as the statute laws that govern

10These procedures were drafted by Columbus, Ohio school officials (the defendants and losers in Goss) and have since been adopted by most school districts in the country. See, "Student Suspensions," Nation's Schools and Colleges, 2 (April, 1975), 33-37.

11Quoted in Ibid.
school punishment in the teacher's own state.

In discussing the justification for punishment thus far I have been assuming that punishment can protect the interests of other persons in the classroom. I should point out that there are actually three ways in which punishment can do this. First, there is the conceptual point that, when punishment takes the form of exclusion, the unruly student is no longer present to disrupt others. And there is empirical evidence to support the assumption that punishment can protect the interests of others in two more ways. This protection is accomplished by (1) the deterrent effect on disorderliness that the existence of punishment can have, and (2) the reformative effect upon behavior of unruly children that punishment can have.

As concerns deterrence, the best available evidence suggests that punishment has the greatest deterrent effects when misconduct is punished dispassionately, consistently, quickly, and in moderation.12

The reformative effects of punishment are less substantial. Here the evidence suggests that punishment alone has little lasting effect on improving the behavior of unruly students. Short term changes can be produced by punishment.13

12These are the conclusions of the largest study of the deterrent effects of punishment. See Jerome S. Kounin, Paul V. Gump, and James J. Ryan, "Explorations in Classroom Management," Journal of Teacher Education, 12 (1961), 235-246.

But here again, there is no evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that punishment can improve a student's moral reasoning. It can only make him behave in a more orderly fashion for a while. Presumably, if there is any reasoning behind such changes in behavior, it is what might be called prudential reasoning, as opposed to moral reasoning. That is, the student comes to realize that, if he wishes to avoid penalties, he must not disrupt the efforts of others in the classroom.

It should be noted too, however, that punishment can have the effect of reinforcing a student's view of the school as being an institution whose main concern is forcing him to do things which are of no interest to him. This is apparently especially true of cases in which school officials try to use fear tactics to maintain order by frequently threatening students with harsh penalties even though they have not yet done anything wrong.14

While punishment alone seems to have only short term effects on conduct, reward (especially in the form of praise) does seem to have significant and more lasting effects on conduct.15 This fact calls into prominence at least two


noteworthy points. First, desirable behavior should be praised from time to time. And second, punishment, if it is to have a more lasting effect, might be joined with a means of making restitution which could subsequently be praised. This approach would seemingly have a better chance of shaping more socially acceptable behavior than punishment alone.\textsuperscript{16}

The Forms of Punishment

Having clarified the meaning of punishment and presented good reasons for the existence of punishment in education, I will take up next the question of what forms of punishment seem most appropriate for the educational setting. The question of what forms punishment in education can take is a conceptual and empirical matter. The question of what forms it should take is largely a normative and empirical matter. I begin with the former conceptual considerations.

In general, punishment in education may be divided into two forms: (1) the infliction of pain and (2) the removal of reinforcers. Examples of the former would be verbal reprimand, dirty looks, and corporal punishment. Examples of the latter would be cancellation of social club membership, expulsion, not being permitted to sit near friends in class, loss of a prestige symbol (such as being a patrol

\textsuperscript{16}Indeed, research by Hunter seems to confirm this hypothesis. His studies suggest that punishment coupled with restitution and reward has a more lasting effect on behavior than punishment alone. See Michael Hunter, Reinforcement (El Segundo, California: TIP Publications, 1967).
guard or caretaker of the classroom pet), and so on.

The distinction between these two forms of punishment is not hard and fast. A spanking which is clearly a case of inflicting pain might also be construed as a removal of a reinforcer (love) when administered by a teacher with whom a student has a warm relationship. It is probably more accurate, therefore, to conceive of these two forms of punishment as existing along a continuum rather than being dichotomous. Thus the difference in this distinction lies in which form of punishment one chooses to emphasize. I turn now to the normative and empirical questions of what forms of punishment should be used in education and how they should be administered.

In terms of its deterrent and reformatory effects on student behavior, the infliction of pain has very little utility, according to the best available evidence. And it should be noted also that the use of this form of punishment frequently produces unwanted effects, such as alienation of the students, increased hostility toward school officials, and student approval of misbehavior. The unwanted effects seem to be the result of the degrading and personalized aspects of the infliction of pain.\(^\text{17}\) It is hard to use this form of punishment (for example, reprimand, dirty look, spanking) in an impersonal way. There is evidence which

suggests that when personal hostility in administering any kind of punishment is held to a minimum the punishment produces more wanted effects and less unwanted ones.\textsuperscript{18}

As a general rule, the infliction of pain form of punishment should be used only as next to the last resorts in those cases where a student's misbehavior is firmly entrenched and other forms of behavior modification have been exhausted to no avail. (The last resort would be suspension, a punishment which, as will be seen shortly, is more a case of withholding reinforcers than inflicting pain.) My contention that the infliction of pain should be used only as a next to the last resort is based on a conceptual point and an empirical point. It was seen earlier why punishment in education is justified by its deterrent and reformative effects which can help to maintain the conditions of order necessary to teach and learn. And the facts of the case are that the infliction of pain form of punishment often produces undesired side effects and minimal desired effects. Other more effective types of punishment, therefore, should be exhausted first.

When, as a next to the last resort, the infliction of pain is used there are some guidelines which might help make this form of punishment less likely to produce the undesired side effects which it might otherwise spawn. As was noted above, research suggests that the personalized

\textsuperscript{18}Tbid.
nature of this form of punishment contributes to the undesired side effects it often produces. In general, then, the guideline should be to try to use this form of punishment in as impersonal a way as circumstances permit. In the case of reprimands sarcasm should be avoided. For example, it seems better to say to a bothersome student, "Johnny you would do better to be quiet while Alice is speaking," than to say, "Johnny you can't keep your big mouth shut can you?" In the case of corporal punishment, it seems reasonable that it be administered by a "designated hitter," someone not directly involved in the case. This will make the punishment less of a personal affair. And it will help to ensure that the punishment causes no more serious physical pain than the momentary sensation intended.

Generally speaking, the second form of punishment, the removal of reinforcers, is a more reliable form of punishment in education. Unlike the infliction of pain, when a reward is withheld and ways are specified to regain it, an important social lesson can be learned by the student. The lesson is that he must assume responsibility for the consequences of his acts. If he wants some reward, he knows what must be done to earn it. If he contravenes the interests of others in the school, he also knows what will happen. Whatever sorts of experiences he undergoes in this regard, he brings on himself. There will be no emotional fanfare if and when he interferes with the interests of others. Instead, quickly, consistently, and unemotionally he will
be denied some good which he might otherwise have expected to receive.

There are, of course, as many specific ways of utilizing this form of punishment as there are things which students find reinforcing. I take this opportunity to discuss two commonly used procedures in this category which educational research has shown to have a high degree of success in producing deterrent and reformative effects on student behavior. These are the so-called "time-out" (or dismissal) and "exclusion" (or suspension) procedures.

The time-out punishment involves isolation from the group. When this procedure is adopted the teacher announces early on in the school term that the principle of mutual respect will be in force in that classroom. By this it is meant that the teacher is there to teach, the students there to learn, and that these interests are not to be frustrated arbitrarily by anyone. Hence the teacher must treat the students with respect, never humiliating them. And the students must not violate the teacher's freedom to teach nor their classmates freedom to learn. When an infringement occurs, the teacher simply points to the violator, and he removes himself from the room without fanfare to some previously delegated isolation area. The student must remove himself under this arrangement, but he is also free to return just as soon as he feels he is ready to respect the interests of others.

While it often takes time for such a procedure to be
accepted by students as one which is in all of their best interests, once it is seen as such, it can work very well as a means of maintaining classroom order. First, it immediately removes the disorderly. And second, it has substantial deterrent and reformative effects on student behavior. Research suggests that there are some variables that can make this procedure a failure or success: First, removal from the class must indeed be perceived by the student as punishment. If the student is able to talk to friends who pass by in the hall or motion to friends in the classroom, then the time-out procedure is not a removal of a reinforcer, it is merely an exchange of one enjoyable experience for another. Ideally, then, the student should be banished to a dull unstimulating room. Second, the instruction in the classroom to a significant degree must be addressed to the felt interests of the students, otherwise their presence in class will not be perceived by them as a loss when they are sent outside. And last, the chances of this system working are, of course, greatly enhanced, if the punitive consequences for misbehavior have been previously agreed on by the teacher and students.

Exclusion (or suspension) is a punishment similar to the time-out procedure. The difference between the two is that, in the case of exclusion, the student is sent home and

for a specified length of time. This is usually perceived by students as a serious measure. It is estimated that about one in every 500 students will need this type of punishment to impress upon him the seriousness of his misconduct. Systematic exclusion seems to improve (reform) individual students' behavior in about 99 percent of the times it is used. One might think that staying in school is not rewarding to most students and that suspension is thus not punishing. Research indicates, however, that for most public school students, including disorderly ones, school is rewarding and exclusion is effective in deterring disorder and in producing more acceptable behavior among the disorderly. Common sense suggests that some of the variables which contribute to the success or failure of time-out procedures probably also obtain here, that is, interest based instruction, prior agreement, and so on. (Incidentally, as concerns the importance of prior agreement, it is a good idea as a practical matter to review school rules on a periodic basis with all factions of the school population represented as reviewers, that is,

---


students, faculty, and administration.  

I think suspension should be used as the ultimate or last-resort punishment for the following reasons. It is clear that any exclusion from school necessarily interrupts the student's classroom education. If a misbehavior is weak in his studies, his missed classes may well doom him to failure. Also suspension, of itself, cannot help to diagnose and remediate the underlying causes of a student's misbehavior. Third, suspension is a powerful label that not only stigmatizes a student in the eyes of his peers and school authorities, but also, as a part of his record, may jeopardize his later academic, vocational, and social pursuits. And fourth, if a child's homelife is less than desirable, or if his parents are not at home much of the time, suspension will place the child in circumstances which may make the punishment less effective than might otherwise be hoped for.

To summarize this discussion of the forms of punishment, then, I would like to suggest that teachers consider using reward removal punishments when punishment seems to them the only way to maintain order. The infliction of pain should be avoided if possible. And, when this form of punishment is deemed necessary, it should be imposed in as

---

impersonal and unemotional a way as possible. And suspension should be used only as a last resort.

The Limited Utility of Punishment

Punishment is one means of maintaining the conditions of order necessary for teaching and learning to go forward successfully. It accomplishes this end by deterring and reforming misbehavior and, in some cases, by removing the misbehaving student from the classroom or school. Punishment is sometimes counted on to do more than this however. Specifically, it sometimes is hoped that punishment will contribute significantly to the moral development of students. If punishment alone is counted on to do the job here, too much is being hoped for.

Punishment can deter and reform misbehavior. It can teach students that privileges entail responsibilities. And it can even teach them that they should respect the interests of others. But the "should" here is more likely to be a prudential than a moral one. What punishment cannot be counted on to do is to teach students why the interests of others ought to be respected on moral grounds. It is true, I suspect, that punishment does in a few cases prompt students to think about why certain principles of conduct ought to be observed. But surely individual instruction and counseling stand a better chance of accomplishing this end. Punishment, then, should be relied on only to produce orderly behavior. If schools seek to foster some understanding of why
one morally ought to respect the interests of others, then something more is needed. That something is moral education.

**Discipline and Moral Education**

Moral education is a topic whose importance and complexity cannot be done justice in this brief section. It is a subject that deserves the attention of educators everywhere, though I am certain it does not deserve most of the literature that has been produced in this field in the past. In this section I will be content to try to clarify what I take to be some of the basic practical implications for moral education of the moral point of view explicated in Chapter III. Most of what I am going to say will be based on analysis of the concept of morality. This section, then, will focus primarily on normative and conceptual matters. Though a few empirical matters will also be discussed as they relate to the nature of moral development and practical methods of

---

Readers who are new to this topic and wish to pursue it in greater depth than space permits here will find countless books and essays written on the subject. Among all of the ones with which I am familiar, however, I can recommend only a few wholeheartedly. Most of the more empirical works in this field are dated and hence do not take into account the best available evidence concerning the nature of moral development. Most of the more theoretical works in this field contain philosophically inaccurate and/or inadequate accounts of the concept of morality. The following are works that are both up to date and philosophically sound. In the sphere of relevant empirical research see Theodore Sizer (ed.), *Moral Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); plus Derek Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971). In the theoretical realm see John Wilson, N. Williams, B. Sugarman, *Introduction to Moral Education* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968). And for a succinct treatment of practical techniques see John Wilson, *Practical Methods of Moral Education* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972).
moral education.

I begin with the central point about the kind of discipline to be sought in moral education. There are numerous motivations which might prompt a person to submit to the principles of morality. He might act out of fear of the legal sanctions imposed on immoral behavior. He might act in response to peer pressure. He might act so as to please his parents or other authority figures. But in all such cases the agent could only be said to be acting in accordance with (not in obedience to) the principles of morality. This distinction recalls into prominence the point made earlier in this study that, as Kant put it, the only thing that can be called good in itself is a good will. As was shown in Chapter III, a truly moral agent is one who wittingly makes the principle of universalizability conceived at the level of impartiality his primary criterion for morally evaluating alternative courses of action. The moral person autonomously imposes upon himself these constraints because he understands that this is the moral thing to do. He does so not merely because he wishes to avoid penalties, to please others, or for any other hypothetical reason. He does so for the categorical reason that he has developed an understanding of the idea of morality itself.

It must be stressed that autonomy (or self-discipline) is a developed disposition. Infants have no understanding of the concept of morality. They are only dimly aware of the existence of other persons. And they have no insight into
the effects that their acts can have on other persons. As we mature we embrace different forms of reasoning about why we ought to act in a particular way. At one level of development we seek primarily to satisfy our own desires. At another we become preoccupied with pleasing our parents. Later we become concerned to do that which our culture of country seems to demand. And eventually, with proper stimulation, we acquire some insight into the nature of the concept of morality, that is, an insight into the formal principles of morality, such as consistency and impartiality.25

If, then, moral self-discipline resulting from an understanding of the concept of morality is what is ultimately to be desired as an outcome of moral education, let us look at how such understanding might be fostered. I believe that two features of the concept of morality provide the basic keys to how in general moral education ought to proceed.

Since, as was shown in Chapter III, the essential features of the concept of morality are implicit in our ordinary moral language, what I am going to do is to try to tease out two of the main features of this language and point out some of their practical implications for moral education.

25This overview of moral development is based on the best available evidence on the subject compiled and interpreted by Lawrence Kohlberg. See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Towards a Moral Order," Vita Humana, 6 (1962), 11-33. A convenient summary of Kohlberg's views can be found in Wilson et al., Introduction to Moral Education, op cit.
The first of these features is what R.M. Hare frequently has called "prescriptivity."26 This feature can best be described by saying that moral judgments are ones that we are supposed to act on. If this seems a painfully obvious point, it is, nevertheless, one that has significant implications for moral education.

One implication is that no teacher is likely to be very successful in stimulating moral development if he is not himself visibly trying to live up to the moral point of view he is advocating. This does not mean that a teacher who, like everyone else, occasionally succumbs to temptation and violates one of his own moral principles cannot be a successful moral educator. Saintliness is not a prerequisite for success in this field. But hypocrisy is likely to ensure failure. If a teacher is visibly upset with himself over his transgressions which are not everyday occurrences, then little harm is likely to be done. But if he plainly regards his own misdeeds with equanimity, then his chances for success are likely to be diminished.

There are other implications of the prescriptivity of moral language which are perhaps even more significant. One of these is that moral education is not the same thing as teaching facts. The goal of moral education is to get students to adopt a way of life. Adopting a set of moral principles is what the students will have done if their moral education

has been a success. This choice of a way of life is clearly something different from being able to recite some body of facts, say, the capitals of the 50 states. The most common example of the teacher who looses sight of this distinction between kinds of knowledge is the one who tries to teach his students to accept as fact a set of specific moral rules. This "bag of virtues" approach aims only to inculcate obedience to a number of particular rules, such as lying is always wrong, stealing is always wrong, telling the truth is always right, and so on. But when, for example, students come to see that it might be right, under certain circumstances, to tell a lie, they can easily become disillusioned with the idea of morality. The realization that what were taught and accepted as immutable moral facts are not really that at all can be a consciousness piercing and destabilizing experience. Under such circumstances students may regress to a state of moral nihilism in which they think that all talk about morality is subjective and relative and hence meaningless.

How much better it would be, instead of trying to teach specific moral rules, to try to teach about general moral principles. If, on the one hand, students start out thinking teachers have a complete set of ready made answers to moral questions and then some of these answers eventually appear to the students to be dubious at best, then they probably will not want to discuss moral questions at all. On the other hand, if teachers do not treat morality as a batch of pre-packaged facts but as a way of life defined by general princi-
pies to be chosen by students for themselves with the help of teachers, then one of the essential ingredients for moral education will be possible, namely, communication.

I do not mean to give the impression that students should be allowed to think and act any way they choose, or that moral education is simply a matter of letting students discuss moral questions. Children are bound to go through what Kant, Piaget, Kohlberg and others have called the heteronomous stage in the development of their moral reasoning. At this stage they take answers to moral questions to be given, that is, to be simply a matter of what their parents, schoolmasters, and other authority figures in fact do permit or prohibit. The point I want to make here is that to take a hands off, no rules, let them be happy approach will be of little help to children in terms of helping them to pass on to the autonomous stage of development at which they do their own thinking.

The imposition of rules in schools is not simply a regrettable necessity for maintaining order. It can be a useful part of the preparation for moral autonomy. For what ultimately has to be learned is moral thought. And nobody can do moral thinking unless he has some notion of what a moral principle is. Therefore, it can be beneficial to grow up in a system of enforced moral rules. As they are able to comprehend them, students should be helped to understand the reasons for the rules, that is, they should be helped to see the general principles behind the rules. Also teachers
should not shy away from taking a position on moral issues that become topics of discussion in the classroom. Instead teachers should try to articulate the thought processes they have gone through in making their judgments. It is no good hiding one's own moral judgments on important issues. To do so may give the impression that either one thinks the issues are unimportant or that one thinks that one position is as good as the next on such issues. If we are open, honest, and clear headed in our own moral thinking, then perhaps our students will pick up the art more easily.

If the reasons behind school rules and teachers' own moral judgments are made known to students when they show some interest in them, students will at least gain some insight into the form of moral reasoning, that is, the characteristics of consistency, prescriptivity, impartiality, and so. Students may later adopt and reject different parts of the content of the school's rules and their teachers' moral opinions, but they will at least have learned the form of a moral principle. Thus whereas to focus on cultivating conformity to a stiff set of specific rules can stifle moral development, to take a no rules approach can be equally unfortunate insofar as it places the child in the bewildering and disadvantageous position of having to start from nothing.

The second major feature of moral language that I want to call attention to is what I have called "impartiality" in Chapter III. As in the case of prescriptivity, I want to draw out some of the policy implications of the
fact that moral language has this second feature. Since impartiality means respecting the legitimate interests of others as if they were one's own, it is an essential part of moral education that students should become able to do this. This involves three identifiable skills which, though inter-related, are psychologically different enough that I will list them separately.

The first of these skills is a part of what I have earlier called a respect for the facts of the case. This is the ability to discern what the consequences of one's acts are likely to be. That this is an important objective of moral education can be seen when we realize that we would hardly consider our efforts at moral education a success if our students frequently did the most disasterous things with the best of motives. This skill is what John Wilson has labeled GIG in his shorthand list of the components of moral thinking.27 Basically this skill is fostered by ordinary methods of general education designed to impart a general knowledge of the world. For purposes of moral education, it might be an improvement to relate information and topics covered in the normal course of things to the kinds of choices that will eventually have to be made by students. For example, in teaching an American history lesson about a past presidential election, why not have the students vote and discuss among

27 John Wilson, Practical Methods of Moral Education, pp. 24-25.
themselves their reasons for voting for one candidate rather than another? Such an approach could enhance student interest in the subject matter and thereby enhance both their general and moral education.

The second skill which is a part of impartial moral thinking is what I shall call empathy and what Wilson calls EMP.28 This is the ability to discern the feelings of others and how one's actions will impinge upon them. That this ability is a goal of moral education can be seen by the fact that we surely would not consider our efforts at moral education a success if our students unintentionally but frequently hurt the feelings of others.

I shall suggest three ways among many that this ability could be fostered by schools. The first way involves the use of imaginative literature. Literature can help people to learn to understand other people's feelings. This is an argument in support of including in the curriculum literary works that portray the effects of human actions on human feelings.

A second method of promoting empathy would be to give students an opportunity to project themselves into rich hypothetical worlds created by their imaginations. This can be accomplished through the use of role playing and role

28Ibid., pp. 22-24.
taking in socio-drama. 29

A third method (if it can be called that) would be to let children know when they are being annoying. Many parents and teachers have read or heard about the beliefs of some psychologists who contend that at all costs one must not be cross with children. How much better it would be, if parents and teachers when annoyed by a child's conduct would let him know it—with out, of course, resorting to an emotional outburst. Children thus might gain some insight into how their acts impinge upon the feelings of others.

The third and final ability necessary for impartial moral thinking that I want to discuss is the ability to comprehend and use the logic of ordinary moral thought and discourse. Such an understanding is a necessary part of impartial moral thinking because it is this logic which forbids us to respect only our own interests. As was pointed out at length in Chapter III, we cannot, if we are thinking morally, consider only our own interests. Instead we are enjoined by the concept of morality to respect the interests of others as if they were our own. How can an understanding of this logic be fostered?

This is a question that psychologists ought to be working on, and a few are. Probably the most useful technique for fostering an understanding of the logic of moral thought

and discourse is the case study method. This approach involves presenting to students a case involving a moral dilemma and then eliciting and facilitating their discussion of it. The point of such case studies is to develop skills of reasoning and an understanding of the formal features of moral reasoning, namely, prescriptivity, consistency, impartiality, and so on. Lawrence Kohlberg is perhaps the best known proponent of this approach. Kohlberg's empirical research suggests that all persons move through a six stage sequence of moral development, and further that the case study method can force a student to recognize the inadequacy of his present mode of reasoning and to move up to a more functional level, that is, one which is more consistent, impartial, and so on.

Kohlberg uses primarily hypothetical cases. However, actual historical and contemporary cases also can be used. And the use of actual cases has the advantage that, in addition to sorting out the issues and principles involved, students become familiar with a set of facts that may be of some use to them later.

The view of moral education which I hope emerges from this section, then, is one that envisions enabling students

---


31A useful collection of issues published on an ongoing basis is available through Public Issues Series (Columbus, Ohio: American Education Publications, new booklets added continually).
to understand the formal features of the concept of morality. This can be done in a number of ways and settings, some of which I have covered here. I believe that, if students and their teachers better understood the formal character of morality, there would be little need to worry about the content of students' moral thinking. For if their thinking is wittingly prescriptive and impartial, the content will look after itself.

Some Common Discipline Problems

In this final section I want to explore several of the most frequently occurring kinds of specific discipline problems in schools. The number of actual and potential discipline problems in schools is as vast as the number of transactions which do or could occur among students, teachers, other school officials, parents, and other persons with whom students might come in contact. For purposes of brevity I am going to discuss only those problems which occur most frequently. For purposes of coherence I will categorize these problems according to who is the primary cause of the problem. Because this is not a study about discipline per se, and because prospective teachers will comprise most of the readership of this study, I am going to discuss only teacher-caused and student-caused problems. It is these problems over which teachers have the most control.

Teacher-Caused Problems

I begin with the fundamental point about teacher-
caused discipline problems which is that students are persons whose dignity ought to be respected. Teachers sometimes engage in a number of activities which, because they ignore the student's dignity, cause discipline problems. One such example is the teacher who alienates his students by not calling them by the names they prefer. Some teachers refer to their students as Mr. or Miss. Others insist on addressing their students by their last names only. Still others call their students by their official names when, for example, Theodore prefers "Ted." And too, teachers sometimes make no effort to get the pronunciation of a name right. In all such cases the student is denied the harmless right to be known by the name and image of himself which he believes himself to be. To disregard a student's name is to relegate him to the status of an indiscript object to be called whatever one wants. The residual question here is what reason a teacher possibly could advance to justify constantly calling a student by any name other than the one which is most likely to facilitate a friendly relationship between teacher and student.

A second commonplace teacher-caused problem involves touching students. Some teachers make the mistake of patting, pinching, or otherwise touching students of the opposite sex. Not only is such conduct unnecessary (perhaps even sick), it can make the teacher appear ridiculous to many students. And, when a boy or girl imagines (or perhaps correctly perceives) that his or her teacher is romantically interested in him or her, only trouble can follow. Occasionally, too,
teachers will poke, push, or otherwise physically prod students to hurry them along at some activity. What would happen if the student reciprocated with equal or greater force? Presumably the teacher would not take what he otherwise thoughtlessly gives. Such teachers are taking advantage of a purely imagined and potentially alienating hegemony over their students. It is better to express oneself in less physical ways.

A third example of teacher-caused problems is the teacher who relies heavily on sarcasm as a means of classroom control. If, however, students were to address the teacher in a like manner, they would undoubtedly be sent to the principal's office with an angry note citing their impudent behavior. Students are bound to view a one way street of verbal abuse as an unfair double standard. By using sarcasm the teacher runs the risk of alienating not only the student involved but the remainder of the class as well. If a teacher feels that a verbal reprimand is necessary, it seems better to do so in an impersonal way, and in private if possible.

A fourth teacher-caused problem involves the teacher who thinks it is sufficient to teach by simply lecturing to his students in a ready-made fashion, as if they were universally interested in the subject matter as presented. I have pointed out earlier why teachers should try to detect, build on, and broaden students' felt interests. No other approach is likely to avoid alienation, to facilitate genuine
learning, or to foster a disposition to go on learning after one's years of formal schooling are over. To ignore this fact is to assume that one's students are mere objects whose felt interests and long term best interests may be ignored.

There are other ways that teachers can cause discipline problems, but these four commonplace examples suffice to illustrate the fundamental point about all such cases. This point is that teachers should treat students as persons who, like everyone else, are entitled to be treated with respect. In Chapter III it was shown that the principle of impartiality requires us not to treat persons in ways that we could not consistently will to become universal laws. The fact that teachers clearly would not themselves wish to be subjected to uninteresting lectures, sarcasm, physical prodding, and being called by unpreferred names suffices to show that these are all immoral practices. And as a practical matter they serve no worth while educational aim either.

**Student-Caused Problems**

Let us look first at the class of student-caused discipline problems that could be called minor irritations. I have in mind here those sorts of cases in which students seem to be bent on making school "interesting" for the teacher. These are the kinds of little annoyances which in heavy doses or over extended periods of time can become big annoyances. Examples are sassing, excessive talking that is unrelated to the subject being studied, constantly blurting out answers, and so on. In all such cases it is to be hoped that the minor
irritations can be dealt with effectively before they become major ones.

Probably the most commonplace disruption in this category is excessive talking. Before I discuss some steps which can be taken to alleviate this problem, I want to insert the point that total classroom silence is seldom possible given the energetic nature of children. But when two or more students persist in chattering away to such an extent that they become a real annoyance to the rest of the people in the classroom, the following approaches may prove helpful. An initial step is to let silence reign. When the talkers hear only themselves they may shut up. If this fails, center attention on their conversation without appearing unduly disturbed. Ask them if they would like to share their conversation with the class. It may be that they have something significant to offer. If not, that very fact may be so painfully obvious that they will be quiet.

If either of the above fails, it may be necessary to isolate the students by asking them to take seats in the classroom far removed from their companions. If after isolation one of the two strikes up a new conversation with another student, it is time to give a clear and firm, though not sarcastic, verbal reprimand which reminds the student that he is distracting 20 or 30 other people with his behavior.

Should all of the above fail, dismissal from the class will be necessary. Of course, a private talk should be
arranged with the student shortly thereafter to try to find out why the student is being disruptive and nonattentive.

A second major category of student-caused problems is the failure to meet the most basic responsibilities expected of the students. I am referring here to such problems as tardiness, absenteeism, not doing homework, and so on. Clearly in such cases the student has not accepted his responsibilities as being worthwhile activities. Hence a private talk may help to find out why the student is not meeting his responsibilities and what can be done to make them seem more worthwhile to him. What is to be done beyond this will depend upon the particular offense and the circumstances surrounding it.

As concerns tardiness, it is first of all important that "late" be clearly defined by the teacher early on in the school term. Students will thus know if they are expected to be in class before, at, or shortly after the bell. Second, a one-time tardiness is hardly a capital offense and is probably best ignored. If, however, tardiness is a more frequent occurrence, a preset policy should require either a written explanation from the student or an oral explanation after class. It is usually a mistake to discuss the whys and wherefores of a student's tardiness during class time. It will only distract the class. If his explanation is implausible or unsatisfactory, a minor penalty may be in order, such as being required to wash blackboards after school for a few hours.
In the case of absenteeism, if the teacher has reason to believe that the student's absence was unnecessary, he will need to work with the student and parents to try to alleviate the problem. An attempt should be made to make school a more interesting and inviting place to the student. Meanwhile the student must not be allowed to profit by unnecessary absences. Often students will "play sick" to avoid examinations or term paper deadlines. Punishment will be in order in such cases. Punishments which employ school work per se as the unpleasant experience to be imposed as a penalty should be avoided. The implicit message that this kind of punishment communicates to the student is that he is supposed to think of school work as being essentially an unpleasant experience. Perhaps it would be better to punish absenteeism by requiring students to help clean up rest rooms, teacher lounges, hallways, and so on during their free time after school for a few days. It would also be wise to reinforce positively their good attendance in the future by showing some personal interest and happiness in their presence.

In the case of undone homework, it is first of all important that efforts be made to ascertain why the work is not being done and to try to correct the problem. In any case a wise teacher will announce early on whether students achieving a certain grade point average will be exempt from doing homework. And before taking any punitive action, a teacher should be sure that his reasons for requiring homework of the particular student in question are valid. It
may be necessary to lower some students' grades for not doing homework. But this approach will have little effect on the student who is unconcerned with grades. In such cases other forms of punishment will be more effective, such as distasteful after school work and so on.

Questions of honesty constitute another major category of student-caused problems. Permanent "borrowing" of fellow students' school supplies, blatant lying about reasons for tardiness and absenteeism, and cheating on tests are the most common examples. In any of these areas, a discussion with the student about the dishonesty (immorality) of his actions is in order and should be pitched at his level of development and comprehension. This means that students should be helped to see, insofar as they are able, the inconsistency and selfishness of dishonesty. As concerns other steps, I shall focus on what I suspect is the most common misdeed in this category, namely, cheating on tests.

I begin with a point about the teacher's and the school's culpability here. Cheating is often the result of a pressurized atmosphere in which the student is expected to perform beyond his capabilities. It may be viewed as heresy by some, but it might be better to allow a student who clearly is trying to learn to take a test only at a time when he has a good chance of passing it. Needless to say this approach envisions individualizing instruction and evaluation to the maximum extent possible.

But what shall be done when tests must be given to
everyone in the classroom at the same time? Two schools of thought seem to predominate here. On one view it is argued that the honor system of no policing is best and that trust will be repaid with honesty. Other teachers think it necessary to police the test-takers closely. The problem with the former approach is that it may permit a few students to cheat and to get away with it. The problem with the latter is that it treats the entire class as if they were all cheaters.

If a test is important (and why else give one), every student should have an equal chance for success. This is obviously not the case if some students use smuggled notes or any of the myriad other methods of cheating. Thus I think a happy medium of surveillance is justified. The teacher need not be constantly on patrol walking from desk to desk, thereby branding everyone as suspect. It will suffice, I think, to take a seat which offers full view of the students and to watch their actions in a relaxed and unobtrusive manner.

In spite of the precautions I have just outlined, a student may still be undeterred and may be caught cheating. Decisive action will be in order to deter other similar offenses and to impress upon the cheater the seriousness of his misdeed. Of course, a private talk with the student is likely to help reveal why the student felt it necessary to cheat. And it may also reveal to the student the ultimate inconsistency of cheating. In terms of punishment, at a minimum, a zero on the test will be called for to prevent the cheater from benefiting from his transgression.
Violence is another category of student-caused problems. I have in mind here fights between or among two or more students and student assaults on teachers. In the case of student versus student fights teachers have a responsibility to try to break them up, insofar as the school assumes responsibility for the safety of students. If the students are big enough to present real problems to a single teacher trying to separate the combatants, a wise teacher will get help before intervening. Fighting students should be counseled to determine what caused the fight and what might be done to prevent future altercations. The school should make a sincere effort to avert fights by eliminating from the school things which are likely to annoy a segment of the student body and which serve no educational purpose. An example would be Confederate symbols that annoy black students in southern schools.

Punishment for fighting should not be light, since fighting obviously can result in serious harm to students and can totally disrupt the academic process. The older the student (and presumably more rational therefore) the more severe should be the punishment. The precise form of punishment will depend on the student's culpability in the fight and his past record. Fighting students are frequently suspended for a few days, but surely this is too severe a punishment for a first offense, for reasons elaborated earlier concerning the serious effects of suspensions on students.

Much of the recent increase in student assaults on teachers is no doubt the fault of teachers and other school
Schools across the country are being racially and socially desegregated for the first time. If all of these schools' students are not made to feel welcome by the actions of school officials, then, it is the officials who are the instigators of the violence in their schools. School officials, as was noted earlier, also bring trouble on themselves by touching students unnecessarily. Officials also make a mistake when they accept a challenge hurled by an angry student. Such acceptance is not only immature it is risky, since adults may be sued for inflicting bodily harm on minors when a confrontation could have been avoided.

What should be done when a student attacks a school official? The official himself should try as far as possible to protect himself without inflicting unnecessary harm on the student. This may range from complete physical passivity in the case of a slap from a young girl to no-holds-barred self-defense in the case of an attack from an overgrown male high school student. The rule, hard as it may be to remember under the circumstances, should be to use the minimum force necessary to protect oneself. A hearing will be in order to assess the student's culpability in the attack. But, if and when punishment is deemed to be in order, it should not be light. A suspension of not less than 10 days will probably be in order to deter similar offenses and to impress upon the student the seriousness of his misbehavior. And it is serious, for the whole schooling enterprise is in danger when school officials cannot feel reasonably secure from...
physical assaults.

The use of illegal drugs is the last category of student-caused problems that I will discuss. Between 30 and 50 percent of the secondary school students in America use illegal drugs at least occasionally. 31 This fact alone should prompt school officials everywhere to take the time to become lay experts on the use of illegal drugs so that they can tell students exactly what the physical, psychological, and legal consequences are likely to be of using any of the more well known types of controlled substances. 32

I hasten to add that many students undoubtedly use drugs to reduce the pressures of school. Thus school officials should make a sincere effort to alleviate the pressurized atmosphere that can be caused by unhealthy forms of competition.

But irrespective of the various reasons that lead students to drug use, when that use becomes known to school officials, they have a legal and moral responsibility to report what they know to parents and legal authorities. Both of these responsibilities are predicated on the fact that the school assumes responsibility for the safety of its


students. Usually punishment for drug related cases in schools is worked out on a cooperative basis between school and judicial authorities. I believe that in most drug use cases punishment is inappropriate. Therapy administered by well trained personnel is probably the best approach.

When students deal in drugs, however, they not only endanger themselves, but they present a real obstacle to the school's responsibility to protect and educate its students. The punishment for drug dealing should be determined by the danger of the drug in question. For example, some type of mild reward removal may be sufficient in the case of a student caught selling a few marijuana "joints" while on campus. A student caught selling amphetamines or barbiturates is certainly in line for at least a lengthy suspension. Anyone selling a drug more dangerous than this, say heroin, is selling sickness and death and must loose his freedom for as long as his detention is necessary to protect society from him.

Summary

Discipline has become an overriding concern of today's teachers. It is a broad and complex topic which, unfortunately, is usually debated in a narrow and simplified way. Too often the issue of discipline in education is conceived as an issue of whether schools should be more prohibitive or permissive places. In this chapter, instead of taking one side or the other in this debate, I have tried to clarify the concept of discipline and its connections with some key related
educational concepts.

This approach made it possible to see more clearly (1) the significance of discipline in general education, (2) the role of punishment as a means of maintaining and fostering discipline in schools, and (3) the significance of discipline in moral education. These sections of the chapter were what I have called "separable questions" in Chapter IV. These separable questions provided telling perspectives on the overall complex issue of discipline in education. Once the conceptual, empirical, and normative distinctions and connections made possible by these sections were clear, I then drew out some policy implications from them. And finally, because in each of these sections it was possible to speak about practical implications in only a general way, I included a final section on some of the most frequently occurring kinds of specific school discipline problems.

The view of educational discipline which this treatment has helped to bring into focus transcends the poles of the prohibitiveness versus permissiveness debate. Instead a picture of schools has emerged in which discipline is transferred from without to within the students themselves through the use of interest-based instruction, enforced and explained rules of order, fair and effective punishment for misbehavior, and moral education that aims to develop an understanding of the form of moral reasoning.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

Should ability grouping be adopted? Should hyperactive students be treated with drugs? Should students be bused to achieve racial and socioeconomic desegregation in the public schools? What sorts of punishment, if any, ought to exist in schools? These are the sorts of normative educational policy questions that confront educators and other concerned citizens daily. If we are to take such questions (and indeed the entire schooling enterprise) seriously, we must attempt to resolve them in a rational fashion.

However, discussions about such issues are frequently anything but exemplary of the ideal of rational deliberation. Instead the discussions are usually characterized by conceptual confusion, fallacious argument, disregard for the facts of the case, and misunderstanding of or disregard for the nature of ethical judgment. This study has been addressed to these shortcomings.

Chapters II and III were designed to improve the readers' understanding of the nature of ethical judgment. In Chapter II a critical review of the major traditional ethical theories was presented. The discussions in that chapter made it clear
why none of those theories, of itself, provides a rational basis for ethics which might contribute favorably to the intelligent resolution of educational issues. Only Kant's cognitivist theory presents a very favorable picture in this regard by introducing an objective norm, namely, universalizability. However, at the level of analysis at which Kant leaves his principle of universalizability, it seems to require only consistency on the part of agents. And, as was seen in Chapters II and III, consistency is only a necessary not a sufficient basis for morality. For it remains to be shown why we would not ordinarily consider a person to be moral who consistently contravened the interests of others.

In Chapter III, through analysis of the logic of ordinary moral thought and language, some of our implicit presuppositions about morality were made more explicit. In this manner it was possible to see that the criterion of consistency is only one presupposition of the concept of morality. It was shown that what also undergirds the idea of morality is a more stringent criterion, namely, the principle of impartiality. This principle obliges us to respect the legitimate interests of others as if they were our own.

The principle of impartiality is not a hypothetical norm contingent upon the idiosyncratic predilections of any particular individual. It is instead a necessary feature of the idea of morality itself, a criterion for conduct that men have found over the ages to be worth observing. It is
what is presupposed (if only dimly in many cases) by anyone who seriously asks the question, "What ought I to do?"
Strictly speaking, then, no new ethical knowledge has been advanced herein, instead I have tried only to arrange and to make more clear that which we already knew tacitly.

Misconceptions of or disregard for the nature of ethical judgment are not the only ways in which people depart from the ideal of rational deliberation in attempting to grapple with educational issues. Fallacious argument, conceptual confusion, and disregard for the facts of the case are also problem areas. Accordingly, in Chapter IV three aspects of critical thinking related to these problem areas were discussed. The first of these was a respect for logic. A respect for logic is a disposition to think for oneself and not to rely on easy substitutes for thinking, namely, persuasive but fallacious reasoning. In short, a respect for logic means trying to ascertain what is being derived from what in any argument.

The second aspect of critical thinking discussed was a respect for language. This involves trying to get clear about precisely what is meant by the key terms involved in an educational issue by carefully analyzing and defining them. If an issue is to be resolved intelligently, there must first be some mutual agreement about what is at issue.

The third aspect of critical thinking discussed was a respect for the facts of the case. This is a propensity to try to establish as far as possible and to the extent
that seems relevant the identifiable circumstances out of which an issue has arisen and the best available evidence of what the probable consequences would be of proceeding on each of the alternative courses of action available. These aspects of critical thinking and the moral point of view of impartiality are applied to a complex educational issue most efficaciously by breaking the issue down into separable and more manageable questions and then trying to answer those questions in a way consistent with what has been called a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and the legitimate interests of others.

In Chapters V and VI this general approach to dealing with educational issues was brought to bear on two real educational policy questions. In Chapter V it was seen that, when measured against the criteria just described, the arguments in favor of busing public school children for purposes of racial and socioeconomic desegregation have more merit than the arguments advanced in opposition to busing.

In Chapter VI, by breaking the complex issue of educational discipline down into separable questions, it was possible to establish the importance of self-discipline in education, the proper role of punishment in maintaining discipline, and the significance of self-discipline in moral education.

Complex educational issues will always be with us. Those of us who desire to resolve them in a fair and wise fashion grope for some methods of inquiry and principles of
ethics which would make that task possible. Clearly no hard and fast, step by step method can be established which, in mathematical fashion, will produce a fair and wise resolution for every issue deductively. This is the case for the patent reason that there is no hard and fast common structure to issues.

What one is left with, then, is the hope of finding some general common features among issues, that is, elements shared in common by all complex educational issues. These common elements, I believe, are their conceptual, empirical, and normative aspects. In this study I have tried to advance some useful objective criteria for dealing with these elements. These criteria form an approach that consists in (1) breaking issues down into separable and more manageable questions, (2) identifying these simpler questions as to their kind, and (3) trying to answer them in a way consistent with what I have called a respect for logic, language, the facts of the case, and the interests of other persons. Without these criteria there can be little objective basis upon which to distinguish relevance from irrelevance, sense from nonsense, fact from fiction, or right from wrong. And confusion, ignorance, or violence will rule where reason might have. With them the presuppositions of serious moral thought and argument and normative educational policy questions take on the significance they deserve in a world inhabited by beings capable of a discerning and effective use of reason.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


213


"Boston's Ordeal By Busing," Newsweek, LXXXIV (October 21, 1974), 37.


Ewing, A.C. "Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics," Mind, LII (April, 1944), 120-141.


--- 

**Ethics and Education.** Atlanta: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1966.


*Public Issues.* Columbus, Ohio: American Educational Publications. Published on an ongoing basis.


Rogers, Carl. *Freedom To Learn.* Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969.


--- 


U.S. Congressional Record. 91st Congress, 2nd Session (February 28, 1970), s2652-2653.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Timothy Earl Ackley was born in Massillon, Ohio in 1947. He was raised in Southeastern Ohio on a small dairy farm roughly equidistant between those two cosmopolitan hubs of culture, Crooked Tree and Dunganin, Ohio. He was educated in the public schools of Ohio and Florida. He received his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees from Rollins College in 1970 and 1971. He received his Doctor of Philosophy Degree from the University of Florida in 1975. His graduate major was philosophy of education. His minor was philosophy.

Mr. Ackley's primary academic interests lie in exploring normative educational issues. His avocations include several sports, especially basketball and fishing. While completing this study, he has served as a part time instructor in the Graduate Program in Education at Rollins College.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Robert R. Sherman, Chairman
Associate Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Samuel D. Andrews
Assistant Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Ellen S. Haring
Professor of Philosophy

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1975

Dean, College of Education

Dean, Graduate School