a. Failure to recognize the agro-socioeconomic factors that limit the
 production efforts of the small farmers; furthermore, there was
 hardly any knowledge on their crop systems, needs and
 preferences, available resources, and expectations;

b. There was no agro-economic field data supporting the recom-
 mendations that the extension agents could use for specific con-
 ditions;

 c. Farmers had no participation, whatsoever, in the technology
 innovation process; researchers did not consider the needs and
 expectations of those farmers when planning "their" research, and
 farmers were not included in the evaluation of new technologies.

d. Lack of competent professionals in the research and extension
 activities, and also lack of incentives and motivation or the
 technical staff in the system;

 e. Difficulty in working within a rigid bureaucratic environment
 subjected to political turnarounds and without the opportunity of
 making decisions that could be promptly executed for the good
 and normal functioning of the system.

 Through the identification of the deficiencies in the system, it
 was determined that the interrelationship farmer-extensionist-researcher
 would be indispensable for planning and conducting a program of
 technology generation and validation that would be suitable to the
 needs and resources of farmers. This interrelationship would also be
 necessary to insure an effective transference process of new tech-
 nologies.
 The next step, as part of the solution to the problem previously
 described, was to establish a new research institute (ICTA), autonomous
 and with enough budget, oriented to the identification and solving of
 agricultural production problems that small, limited-resource farmers
 face. It's organic law assigns ICTA the responsibilities of academic
 training of its technical staff and the promotion of new technologies.
The Rockefeller Foundation and the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) supported the establishment of this new research
institution.