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The Challenge of Globalization, Labor Market Restructuring and Union Democracy in Ghana

AKUA O. BRITWUM AND PIM MARTENS

Abstract: The resulting labor market transformations imposed by adjustment of national economies prompt changes in the organizational strategies of labor movements. Such strategies impact union governance and undermine union democracy. Strategies adopted by the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) and its national affiliates to cope with the fall-out of economic adjustment since the late 1980s included the expansion of union coverage and modifications in internal union structures to improve avenues for female and rank and file interest representation. This paper raises the major features of the challenges posed by globalization and discusses the implications of union extension into the informal economy as a response to these challenges.

Introduction

Studies on trade unions, especially those of the political economy approach, reiterate the importance of trade unions in arresting the excesses of globalization, such as the threat to the environment and increasing global poverty. They also underscore trade unions’ pivotal role in the search for alternative development strategies. The ILO asserts unions role as an important tripartite workplace social partner in its efforts to ensure that globalization is fair to all. Unions role in the solution for world development concerns come at a point in time when the positive benefits of globalization are being questioned in several sectors. The growing amount of literature on the social dimensions of future prospects of globalization shows that many are wary of the so-called benefits of globalization.

Development theories, be they “… conservative, modernisation… or dependency theory …, conceived development as national development” and the nation state constituted the prime focus of national decisions and actions. Nation states set out their priorities for resource use on the basis of some set assumptions about how development should proceed. These priorities set the framework for resource use for production and consumption and citizens’ mode for accessing needs. Present notions underlying neo-liberal economic development, as are being pushed through globalization, re-conceives development as national competitiveness within the global market place. The object of production under globalization is primarily for international markets not for national consumption. This shifts the focus of development from the national to the global, while the State’s space in production gets contracted to private enterprises. Neo-liberal policies absolve the state of its traditional responsibility towards welfare provisioning.

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Re-conceptualization of development and the state’s welfare and economic roles impact production and distribution decisions within countries in ways that challenge the existence of unions’ ability to represent working people.

Improved technologies especially information and communication technologies that have been part of globalization, have caused considerable changes in production modes and relations. A characteristic feature of globalization is the ability of trans-national corporations (TNCs) to split production over several locations across the globe, giving rise to global production systems which allow companies to take advantage of variations in national economic incentives. The improvements in global production systems have been impressive; however they impact work and work relations, compromising the observance of core labor standards. As nations compete amongst themselves to capture foreign direct investments of the TNCs, the content of their labor laws are watered down to the detriment of their workers and the movements that protect their rights.

The ILO’s Director-General on the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, whilst acknowledging the benefits of globalization, expressed concern for its negative social impact on work and working people, deploring the existence of global economic imbalances as “ethically unacceptable and politically unsustainable.” It is the significance of work in the lives of women and men that direct the ILO’s decent work agenda: a set of “policies which not only mitigate the adverse human consequences of economic change, but which also strengthen its positive outcomes for peoples’ lives and their work.” Accordingly the ILO’s 2004 report states that the quality of work is “the ‘litmus test’ for the success or failure of globalization [and] the source of dignity, stability, peace and credibility of governments and the economic system.” It is in this connection that the impact of globalization in undermining the standards of work and job security has implications for its sustainability.

Alterations in the direction and position of production within national development practice and discourse has impacted labor markets in ways that undermined fundamentally trade unionism in several parts of the world. Trade unions have faced a consistent onslaught from globalization policies that usurped labor’s role in production. Employment welfare became antagonistic to the efficient functioning of corporations generating what Streeck and Hassel call a trilemma, where full employment, price stability and free collective bargaining become untenable, any two can be achieved at the cost of the third. Governments and corporations chose to sacrifice collective bargaining under the guise that its benefits are available to a very small section of the working population.

After recovering from the initial shock, unions set to devising strategies to counter the impact of globalization. Union strategies have been influenced by several factors, both internal and external to their national contexts. Internal factors have been historical (unions political role in nation building) or contemporary (the prevailing industrial relations frameworks within which unions operate). The Ghanaian state, since 1983, has been keenly integrating her economy into the global economy. National policy making therefore is geared towards liberalization, privatization, and deregulation justified as making production entities competitive on the global market.

In response to the systematic onslaught on workers’ and trade union rights characteristic under the liberalizing economies, the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) devised several
strategies to respond to the challenges. This paper discusses the implications of some of the major strategies devised by GTUC to respond to challenges posed by labor market reforms. The paper raises some of the critical questions of union governance and internal democracy that have to be resolved if such strategies should achieve their aim of strengthening unions' existence and relevance to their members as it seeks to expand its space and operations within the informal economy. The paper begins by examining the position of labor within the globalized production system, the state relationship with labor generally, and specific forms it has taken in Ghana. Later sections of the paper, which outline the nature of challenges organized labor in Ghana has faced, sets the stage for examining some GTUC strategies and points to issues of union internal democracy. Union strategies hold important lessons for providing meaningful representation and engagement with globalized policies that confront workers in their daily striving for meaningful and sustainable livelihoods. The paper utilizes information from group and individual interviews of trade union leaders and members as well as existing documents such as research reports, historical accounts, and union documents.

Globalizing National Economies

Globalization is used to refer to the unrestrained movement of capital world-wide that has integrated national economies into a unified system of production and distribution. Attitudes towards globalization and its impact are dependent on the claims to its utility, resistibility, inevitability, and novelty. Underscoring the various positions are the convictions of how present liberal global production and production relations can improve the living conditions of the world’s citizens, irrespective of their location, through sustainable use and equal distribution of the earth’s resources. Globalists or ‘globaphiles’ believe that the outcome of globalization is equally beneficial to all who take advantage of the prospects it offers. Global skeptics or ‘globaphobes’ however, point to the existence of poverty, insecurity, environmental degradation, global resource depletion, and climate change as proof of the inherently exploitative nature of globalization and its threat to sustainable development.

Other areas of contention are the presentation of globalization as a dominant, naturally evolving economic form which draws into its ambit all world production processes. Önder, Sutcliffe and Glyn, Gore, Rupert and Smith, Munck, and Buckman all contest this view, arguing that globalization is an imposed phenomenon fuelled by the ideological predisposition of the so-called Washington Consensus. Globalization combines several strands, such as the consensus amongst global economic policy makers who favor market-based development strategies over state-managed ones, the control of G7 states over global market rules, and the concentration of market and financial power in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs) and banks to facilitate its implementation. Others are “… public international financial institutions created to oversee management of economic globalization…IMF, World Bank and WTO …technology …transport and communications.” The successful implementation of globalization was buttressed by the collapse of state sponsored socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

For developing countries located in the economic South, the imposition of globalization was fuelled by the 1980 debt crisis. World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
and WTO negotiations served as vehicles for integrating such ailing, inward looking economies into the global economy. Munck explains that in the early 1980s, the World Bank pointed those nations who dealt with it for solutions to their economic problems to policies which entailed integration with the capitalist market. Their weakened economies forced them to accept SAP conditionalities as the basis for accessing badly needed IMF/World Bank loans. These conditions included state withdrawal from direct production, the privatization of existing state-owned enterprises, and the devaluation of national currencies. Public sector workers were laid off under the misleading name of labor rationalization in a bid to cut government expenditure. Other policy conditions included the withdrawal of state subsidies on social welfare like health, education, and support for agriculture. At present, the IMF/World Bank maintain a strong grip on economic decision making in African countries south of the Sahara. SAPs have been abandoned since 1999 but the numerous programs of the World Bank and the IMF that have replaced it still bear all the hallmarks of SAP in terms of structure, form and processes.

**Labor Within Globalization**

At the fall of the Berlin Wall not only did neo-liberalists celebrate the end of history, they also commemorated the death of work. Improvements in production and information technology had shortened spaces between countries almost rendering borders irrelevant. The drivers of globalization, computers and information technology, demanded minimal labor requirements in the form of highly trained computer experts. With time this assertion has proven to be untrue and globalization’s latest labor force, highly trained computer experts are yet to dominate production processes in developing countries like Ghana. Labor remains central to globalization because the spread of capital is dictated by production and distribution of goods and services, artificial intelligence is yet to supply all the answers for human needs. Globalization however has challenged the justification for labor to secure fair entitlements for its contribution to production.

Neo-liberal economic policy dictates that nation states relinquish their role in production to the more efficient private capital, calling for a re-definition of labor’s position within the production process. Consumer satisfaction directs the goals of national production for global consumption. Under what is generally termed Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), which characterized national development policies in the 1960s and 1970s, the focus of development was national. Countries such as Ghana and Kenya pursued development through industrialization to feed domestic consumption. Önder explains that under ISI national consumption was important to economic growth and workers income crucial in sustaining that consumption. Globalization replaced ISI with Export Oriented Growth and suppressed the interests of labor in favor of capital. Manda and Sen note how economic reforms in Kenya during the 1990s called for adjustments in labor laws that increased the vulnerability of the Kenyan labor force. The immediate post-independence phase in Ghana is characterized as a labor friendly period. The Ghanaian state was engaged in direct production and industries enjoyed protection from external competition. Neo-liberal reforms soured the friendly state-labor movement relations.
When interrogating the position of the nation state within globalization, writers have been concerned about the tendency of neo-liberal principles to undermine national sovereignty and citizenship entitlements. Critics of the various economic packages that accompany financial support to ailing economies of developing countries like Ghana have expressed concern about national ownership of IMF/World Bank economic programs and the tendency to submerge citizens’ voices and welfare benefits in a bid to get market prices right. Citizens who vote governments into power no longer constitute the centre of national policy-making. Neither are their inputs into economic planning guaranteed if they in any way contradict the dictates of World Bank and IMF conditionalities.

The implementation of neo-liberal economic policies depends on state power to curb citizens’ rights in so far as they are incompatible with the profit making interests of transnational capital. Boafo-Arthur, Munck, Abugre, and Harcourt show how the neo-liberal policy prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF were facilitated mainly by the suspension, marginalization, and erosion of the efficiency of democratic institutions as well as the suppression of human rights. Citing Pickel and Austin, Harcourt shows that authoritarian regimes rather than democratic ones are better able to carry out neo-liberal reforms. Boafo-Arthur’s discussions on the introduction of SAP in Ghana conclude that Ghana’s position as an adjustment success was only possible under a military regime that utilized violence to suppress all forms of resistance, including that of workers. He cites several examples of labor repressive undemocratic practices to show how the government of Ghana, keen to ensure that labor demands did not derail the demands of IMF/World Bank conditionalities, utilized force to weaken representative groups like organized labor.

Labor’s fortunes within globalization are undermined by an ideological discourse that upholds profits as a sign of efficiency that will generate the required levels of productivity to sustain economic growth for national development. To succumb to labor demands or interests would render an economy inefficient and directed towards failure. Thus, from a favored position under a production system that produces to satisfy national needs, labor now stands in the way of national progress if it insists that its interests should be considered.

GTUC and the Ghanaian Labor Market

The GTUC, a confederation of seventeen national unions, serves as a major labor organization in Ghana. It emerged as a labor centre in 1946 under Ordinance as a response of the British colonial government to persistent labor unrest. Prior to 1946, most trade unions were short-lived and enterprise based, organized to lead demands for better and fair working conditions. Prominent among the factors militating against the survival and effective operation of unions were the structure of the colonial labor market, characterized by a small waged and skilled workforce, as well as the hostility of private expatriate employers and the colonial government. Its growth as a labor centre was greatly facilitated by labor friendly legislation under the CPP and NRC governments in the early 1960s and 1970s.

Three main sectors within the Ghanaian economy are the agricultural and rural, the urban informal, and the formal sectors. These sectors have varying characteristics which underlie their labor force demands. The rural labor market, which is dominated by the use of family labor, is
influenced by local customs and traditions in employment. Wage determination and dispute settlement processes in the sector follow such customs and traditions. The urban informal labor market is made up of several self-employed and small enterprises and here again family labor dominates. The formal labor market stands out in terms of the fact that employment contracts tend to be subjected to some measure of legislative control. The informal sector accounts for at least 81% of the labor force. The predominant type of employment is self-employment involving almost 59% of the population. The agricultural and rural informal sectors dominate the Ghanaian labor market, employing more than 50% of the total Ghanaian labor force. Much of the rural labor force is employed on small family farm holdings. The private formal sector employs 8% of the Ghanaian labor force and the public sector 6%.48

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Gold Coast (pre-independence Ghana) was an agricultural colony and paid employment was relatively unknown. Agriculture was generally pursued by families and under one person management, usually the male head of household. Most Ghanaians therefore worked on farms that they owned. Private sector wage employment occurred in few sites, such as palm, rubber and cocoa plantations, in the forest regions. Mining also gave paid employment to mainly migrant workers and some from the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.50

The government service provided the main source of wage employment. The majority of such employees were civil servants located in urban centers. In 1952, for example, the Gold Coast had a population of 4,500,000 with a male labor force of 1,500,000. The total number of actual wage earners was about 250,000, with 93,000 working for the Central Government and about 40,000 employed in mining minerals like gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite. The United African Company, the major retailing centre, employed nearly 6,000. There were about 200,000 mostly unskilled workers from Liberia, Nigeria, and neighboring French territories. Expansion in the formal sector labor market occurred with investments in rail and road construction from 1920 to 1930. It created direct employment for artisans, technicians and engineers in Ghana, providing formal urban employment as an alternative to agricultural employment. Railway and road expansion impacted the mining sector, enhancing the geographical mobility of the labor force. The second and most important spate of labor market expansion was experienced immediately after independence from 1957 to 1965 under the CPP regime of Dr. Nkrumah, with massive investments in infrastructure, industrialization, and social programs such as education and health care.54

Labor market expansion in the immediate period after independence (1957-1965) was fuelled by the industrialization program and the policy of Africanisation, a conscious effort to replace all expatriates workers with Ghanaians. The purpose was to effect a complete transformation of the colonial economic system. Formal education received a big push from increases in access and the quality of teaching and learning facilities. The CPP regime injected huge investments into education and health and in direct productive activity and infrastructure. The expansion in state activity as well as the restructuring of the national economy contributed to the shift of labor from the subsistence agriculture and unskilled jobs in rural and urban periphery to technical, industrial jobs in the urban centers. By 1985 public sector employment had increased from about 184,000 in 1960 to 397,000.56
The capacity of the urban formal labor market to absorb labor began to decline in the 1970s due to factors such as changes in government and a corresponding change in political orientation. Declining foreign exchange earnings, as a result of world economic recession and oil price hikes, reduced revenue available to government for pursuing economic expansion. From 1967 to 1972, formal employment declined as both the military regime which overthrew the Nkrumah government and the civilian form that succeeded it undertook to reverse his social and industrialization policies. The expulsion of large numbers of migrant workers, through the infamous Aliens Compliance Order of the PP regime led by Dr. Busia, contributed greatly to reduce the component of African nationals of non-Ghanaian origin in the Ghanaian labor force. Though the policies of the second military regime of the National Redemption Council (NRC) brought some increases in formal sector labor force, its subsequent economic mismanagement undermined all these gains. By the late 1970s, economic mismanagement had caused a reduction in the capacity of the formal public sector to provide jobs and to improve on the quality of the labor force. The private sector was equally affected. Ghanaians moved in droves to work in Nigeria and other African countries. It was under these conditions that the PNDC took over power and set out to implement SAP with the expectation to revive the Ghanaian economy.

Union/State Relations

All ruling Governments of Ghana (GOG) have maintained keen interest in the activities of the GTUC for two considerations: first, the reputation of the GTUC as the most organized social force and its primary role of defending workers’ rights; and second, the proportion of formal sector labor force the GOG employs. Since independence the GOG has remained the major employer of formal sector labor in the country. In 2000, after 16 years of SAP induced privatization, and consequent public sector labor retrenchment, the proportion of Ghanaian workforce employed in the private sector stood at nearly 8%, whilst the state employed 6% in public sector enterprises. The GTUC’s form and functions are underscored by an ideological orientation which insists that the creation and distribution of national wealth is the primary responsibility of government and should not be abandoned to market forces. In the past this belief made it critical of GOG policies, often to the point of mobilizing workers to resist the implementation of any worker hostile policies.

The direction of the Ghanaian economy has therefore dictated state and organized labor relations, producing a checkered record of GTUC/state relations varying from close collaboration to outright hostility and open confrontation. GOG’s interest in the affairs of trade unions has produced policies and practices which according to Panford “often include interfering in internal union affairs, such as union organizing, structure of workers’ associations and the selection of union leaders” or their appointment to key public positions. Co-optation ploys or recourse to physical violence have often been utilized to ensure that favorites or persons personally connected to ruling governments became union leaders. The most notorious were acts by the National Liberation Council (NLC) and Progress Party (PP) which resulted in disbanding the GTUC and the shooting down of three gold mine workers. Panford explains how “the military cum police administration of the …NLC, which toppled the
Nkrumah regime, ... use[d] the police to shoot striking mine workers in 1969.”62 Under the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), vocal workers’ leaders were arrested and detained; some suffered police brutalities.63

The 1970s marked a period when the Ghanaian economy was subjected to unprecedented levels of mismanagement. When the PNDC took over power in a military coup on the 31 December 1981, the country was almost bankrupt.64 By 1983, a culmination of natural and political events in the form of drought, bush fires, repatriation of one million Ghanaians from Nigeria, and withdrawal of Western Aid worsened the already dire economic situation. Shillington notes that: “disposable foreign exchange at the end of 1981 [was] barely sufficient to cover two weeks of imports. ... and there was hardly any commercial bank abroad which would confirm letters of credit for any of Ghana’s local banks.” 65 Ghana’s food stores were depleted and drugs needed to support health care in short supply. The grim economic situation was further worsened by world oil price hikes in 1980-81 which “meant that in the first six months of 1982 Ghana was forced to spend US$100 million, three-quarters of all foreign exchange, on crude oil imports.”66 Aryeetey (1996), corroborating Shillington’s observation, concluded that the economy of Ghana in the early 1980s was ready for any form of reform and the IMF and World Bank provided one which, in the circumstances, appeared as some kind of life line. The recourse to IMF/World Bank SAP however, received stiff opposition from the left-leaning members of the PNDC who had conceived of the military takeover that brought them into power as laying the grounds for a socialist revolution. Their hostility to the turn of events resulted in political tensions and several attempts at counter coups d’état that were foiled. In the end some protesters either fled the country or were detained.67

The broadly populist orientation of the early years of the PNDC prompted the emergence of the community based People’s Defense Committees and its workplace counterpart, the Workers Defense Committees (WDCs). These designations were derived from the central organ of power, the Provisional National Defense Council. The WDCs waged relentless struggles to deracinate corruption at the enterprise level. The struggles directed against management at the enterprise level took three forms.68 The WDCs exposed management in private enterprises who abused labor rights or they subjected management, whose practices they perceived as inimical to the interest of the nation, to ‘revolutionary’ justice. The third form of workplace struggles saw workers attempting to take over or actually taking over joint state and privately owned enterprises.69 Enterprise-based trade unions did not escape the ‘revolutionary zeal’ of the WDCs. The WDCs either subjected the activities of the local union executives to close scrutiny or took over completely the workplace representation of workers.

The central labor confederation, the GTUC, also got its share of the ‘revolutionary’ intrusions that characterized the early years of the PNDC rule. In 1983, the Association of Local Unions (ALU), a coalition of militant local unions based in Tema, the industrial hub of Ghana, with open support from the PNDC, took over the leadership of GTUC. This action severely undermined the legitimacy of the operating structures of the GTUC, especially its governing system. Members of ALU sacked the national leadership, dissolved the Executive Board and set up an Interim Management Committee (IMC) to oversee the affairs of the GTUC. Pockets of resistance from sections of the rank and file were too weak to arrest this move. Relations between the GTUC and the state were tense in 1983. In addition government support for the
The take-over of the GTUC leadership had resulted in a reconfiguration of its governing system and undermined internal democracy. It was against this backdrop that the Ghanaian labor movement faced the labor market restructuring which characterized the late 1980s and early 1990s.70

**Economic Adjustment and Labor Market Restructuring in Ghana**

One role of the state in mediating capital-wage labor relations under globalization is to dampen the cost of labor through the removal of traditional labor protection rights. International competitiveness hinges on the ability of a nation to lower production costs of its labor force through a restructuring of work and the labor market. The main strategies have been privatization of public enterprises and labor flexibility. Labor flexibility is usually justified in the name of economic efficiency, the promotion of economic growth and job creation. Its core measures however are downsizing (reducing the number of workforce required to perform company tasks) and sub-contracting or externalization (where firms only concentrate on their core functions and sublet peripheral tasks to small scale informal operators). Other labor flexibility methods include the modification of jobs, adjustments in working hours, and wage flexibility (where wages are tied to labor productivity).71 Such restructuring is not restricted to the private sector alone; market principles also run in public sector enterprises subjecting the once secure forms of employment to high levels of insecurity.

The notion of fulltime secure wage employment disappears under globalization, leading to varying forms informal work.72 Labor market informalisation is a feature of both developing and the highly formalized western industrialized countries.73 Informalisation has caused an expansion in the forms of work that were hitherto outside the organizational ambit of the trade unions, narrowing union coverage and reducing union density.74 Trade unions find themselves confronted with new types of workers who are not interested in organizing while their traditional core dwindled in the face of labor market restructuring under an ideological orientation that positioned trade unions as protectionist and interfering with market principles. Labor market flexibility provided the answer for curbing trade union liberties detrimental to economic growth.

Ghana’s recourse to World Bank/IMF SAP was the outcome of years of economic mismanagement of a neo-colonial economy weakened by falling commodity prices and oil price hikes.75 IMF/World Bank-induced SAP was introduced in two phased Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP I and ERP II) spanning 1983 to 1986 and 1987 to 1989. SAP policy goals included the stabilization of the economy with special emphasis on arresting the decline in industrial production and exports. Specific labor market-impacting policy demands under ERP I were the devaluation of the national currency (cedi), a reduction of government expenditure, and withdrawal of subsidies on food, agricultural inputs, fuel, and utilities.76 Others were upward adjustment of capital cost and sustenance of positive real interest rates. State owned enterprises were privatized and some labor force within the public sector declared redundant. ERP I also included other labor market restructuring methods like real wage flexibility and long term public sector wage freezes.77
ERP II, the second phase economic reforms in Ghana, was designed to lay the foundation for sustained output growth of about 6% per annum and attain a viable external payments position with a significant development in social services. Macro-level policies included a continuation of ERP I policies, curtailing public expenditure by withdrawing more subsidies, imposing further public sector wage freezes, and transferring state-owned enterprises to private foreign concerns. Trade was liberalized and legislation amended to attract foreign investment. These policies were supposed to increase private foreign investment, expand industrialization and product markets, and promote job creation. Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings, it was expected, would rise to enhance her capacity to service her foreign debts and wean the economy off dependence on foreign aid.78

The Ghanaian economy made dramatic improvements and by 1986, Ghana was hailed as an economic miracle.79 Import liberalization provided domestic firms access to otherwise scarce inputs and equipment while price liberalization allowed firms to pass on their higher costs of production to consumers. The manufacturing sector for example, bounced from decline to growth with real annual growth rate rising sharply from 13% in 1984 to 24% in 1985. The capacity utilization in the sector increased from a low level of 18% in 1984 to 40% in 1988.80

The short spell economic ‘success’ came at a cost, and already in 1986, when the Ghanaian miracle hype was reaching a crescendo in international circles, the social toll of adjustment was too glaring to be ignored. A Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was instituted to offer relief to some social groups identified as vulnerable to adjustment shocks.81 The immediate victims of ERPs I and II included workers in traditionally secure public sector employment where GTUC recruited most of its members. Accounts of the GTUC have therefore focused on how SAP-induced policies of the 1980s to date impacted the labor movement and affected its membership and structures. Others have documented the decreasing membership size and shrinking union funds for pursuing union activities.82 These were the direct result of job losses and work restructuring. Job losses were caused by privatizing state-owned enterprises, whose new owners sought to maximize profits by reducing their work force, and by public sector labor rationalization. Mining sector reforms transferred state-owned mining concerns to private hands. Large scale surface mining, the predominant form adopted by the new owners, displaced rural subsistence farming communities from their farm lands. The privatized mines failed to provide the promised employment for the displaced farm households.

Public sector rationalization became the euphemism for massive labor layoffs from the civil service, local government, and public educational and health institutions across the country.83 From 1985 to 1991, retrenchment and the divestiture of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) caused public sector employment to fall from 397 000 to 156 000. By 1994, the GTUC had lost 40% of its membership to various sector reforms.84 The categories of affected workers were unskilled laborers, artisans, apprentices, farm hands and revenue collectors, the bulk of whom were members of the GTUC.85

Graham, Ninsin, and Panford explain that the introduction of ERP policies into the Ghanaian economy contributed to making the mid 1980s and early 1990s the longest period of acrimonious state/labor relations in Ghana.86 It was during this era that the GTUC faced the stiffest challenge to its existence. Discussions on the trade union situation and working
conditions in the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s give several accounts of how labor rights were flouted with impunity and established labor relations practices manipulated to the disadvantage of Ghanaian workers. Such excesses included the misuse of legal facilities to freeze wages and avoid paying due compensation to retrenched workers. Legislation like the COCOBOD Retrenchment and Indemnity Law, PNDC Law 125 (1985) and the State Fishing Corporation, Re-Organisation and Indemnity Law, (1986), were passed to obstruct the efforts of the National Unions to utilize legal facilities to access the right of retrenched workers to compensation. Where union leaders persisted in their demands they were issued direct threats from ministers of state. Wage levels were determined by government without consulting the established tripartite structures. The Prices and Incomes Board set up under the NRC/SMC was used by GOG to reduce salary and wage levels reached through collective bargaining. Workers’ protests to adjustment conditionalities that sought to reduce social wages were countered with violence.

Domestic private sector enterprises suffered greatly from the effect of liberalized trade, currency devaluations, and high interest rates which undermined their capacity to survive and continue to provide jobs for Ghanaian workers. Practices adopted by private foreign and domestic employers to cope with the impact of trade liberalization on their enterprises informalised formal work relations. Such practices included recourse to hiring casual or contract labor and outsourcing through sub-contracting to informal economy operators. Enterprises used such arrangements to relieve themselves of worker overheads like pensions, annual bonuses, meals, housing and transport subsidies and weekend rest from work. Contract and casual workers have no security of employment; neither do they have social protection.

For Ghana, as for other sub-Saharan African countries, the economic and political principle underlying economic globalization was an injection of SAP to energize ailing economies. It has since taken various forms as country after country struggled to overcome policy failure and increasing poverty. By 2004, some 43 countries, 33 of whom were from sub-Saharan Africa, had moved on from SAPs to the World Bank/IMF HIPC initiative which provided countries considered to have unsustainable levels of debt access to the Growth and Poverty Reduction Facilities (GPRF) on condition that they met some conditionalities. These included the production of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) and evidence of having submitted the national economy to macro-economic policies of free market-oriented reforms (privatization, deregulation as well as production and trade liberalization) that were characteristic of SAP. In 2001, the newly elected government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) announced a decision to access debt relief under the HIPC initiative; an admission that SAP policies had failed the nation. Ghana prepared its first PRSP, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I (GPRS I), covering the periods 2003-2005. In 2004, Ghana reached completion point within HIPC under an enhanced initiative. Again in October 2005, the second PRSP, Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II) covering the periods 2006-2009, was submitted to the boards of the IDA and the IMF.

The fall-out of Ghana’s ERPs I and II was reforms, in the labor market that called into question the benefit of worker welfare to economic growth. Submission to the dictates of World Bank/IMF conditionalities set the stage for Ghana’s integration into the globalized system of production and distribution as a liberalized economy. The underlying policy requirements
introduced during the adjustment periods of the 1980s and 1990s continue to shape the Ghanaian labor market in ways that undermine rights of labor and their movements. Twenty-two years of adjustment in various forms has benefited very few Ghanaians. The first GPRS I, a policy requirement for accessing relief under HIPC, lamented how economic policies of the 1990s had resulted in an uneven economic growth across regions, among socio-economic groups, and along gender lines. The document therefore raised doubts about how a continuation of policies pursued in the 1990’s could improve the socio-economic conditions of the poor in Ghana. A World Bank sponsored evaluation of ERP in Ghana also concluded that adjustment had a negative impact on trade, education, and mining communities.

The policies of ERPs I and II generated an industrial relations environment that was hostile to the existence of unions at the national and enterprise level. These policies were implemented at a time when the GTUC and its affiliated National Unions were engaged in leadership struggles brought on through the ALU takeover. The legitimacy and existence of organized labor were called into question. It required innovative strategies to remain a credible and effective labor organization to continue protecting labor rights in a hostile environment.

SAP in Ghana shook the very foundations of trade unionism, generating what Hyman has described as the crises of workers and interest representation. The three types of crises challenging trade unionism were: the crisis of interest representation, as the labor force becomes increasingly heterogeneous; the crisis of workers, introduced by the decentralization of employment regulation to the company and workplace; and the crisis of union representation, as unions fail to organize key occupations in the dynamic sectors of the economy. The GTUC’s claim to represent the Ghanaian worker was called to question with its overwhelming presence in the formal sector. As informalisation of the formal sector labor market, increased workplace management practices abandoned traditional adversarial approach, raising doubts about union role in workplace dispute resolution. The declining size of the formal public sector labor market shifted the dynamism of the Ghanaian labor market to the informal economy, pushing the GTUC to assume a more prominent role in order to remain credible as the main labor centre in Ghana.

After the shock and disorientation wrought by labor market restructuring to its membership base and presence in national politics, the GTUC and its affiliates set out to re-strategize to deal with the challenges posed by globalization. The three main strategies utilized by the GTUC and its affiliates to deal with globalization challenges fall in line with those identified by Hyman for unions elsewhere. These strategies have tried to deal with the problems of representation by creating structures to improve representation and participation of hitherto neglected categories of workers (e.g. women) and by extending union coverage into the informal economy. The implementation of these strategies was not accompanied by changes to trade union organizing principles and notions of trade unionism. They have affected internal governance systems of the GTUC and the National Unions and therefore impacted union democracy. The next section presents some of these strategies and raises the challenges they pose to internal union governance.
Union Organizational Changes

Within the GTUC’s operating system are three structures, the governing, consultative and administrative wings. The governing structure is the site for union decision and policymaking, whilst the consultative wing, provides union officers contact with membership in whose trust they hold office. It is the administrative wing that services the governing and consultative wings. These two structures of the GTUC, provides its distinct character as a political organization. The consultative structures of the GTUC include the Regional and District Councils of Labor (RCL and DCL). Also located within the RCLs and the DCLs are the Women’s Regional and District Committees which provide avenues for women’s self-organization. The DCLs are the last operating units within the GTUC’s consultative structure and ideally designed to provide channels for the union members outside the governing structures to make inputs into GTUC decision-making. The DCLs also serve as membership mobilizing centers to back union political decisions and actions. In short effectively functioning DCLs are the powerhouse of the GTUC.

The appearance of DCLs in union history dates to 1947, but until 1985 when attempts were made to revive them, they remained dormant in the few districts where they were present. A former Secretary-General of the GTUC explained that the ALU takeover of GTUC leadership in 1982 sounded a warning about the need to improve internal union democracy by strengthening the locals of the national unions and the DCLs. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the DCLs very active in union decision-making and their meetings provided the membership at the district level direct contact with the governing and administrative structures of the GTUC. Discussions at DCL meetings enabled workers to make a direct connection between their living conditions and socio-economic policies of government. Such observations encouraged the Executive Board to intensify the role of GTUC in the general struggles for improved conditions of life beyond the workplace.

Through the activities of the DCL’s, the GTUC was able to fashion out a consistent opposition to the anti-worker impact of ERP, with regular protest memoranda to GOG. A significant outcome was the establishment of a Standing Joint Consultative Committee (SJCC) that served as a direct avenue for union representatives to engage within state policy making apparatus. The SJCC, composed of representatives of the PNDC and the GTUC, dealt with socio-economic and political issues that fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tripartite Committee. This included issues such as the salary freeze imposed in the Budget of 1994. The SJCC created space for direct consultation between government and the GTUC during the turbulent period of adjustment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This enabled members to keep contact with the leadership of GTUC and allowed them active roles in the call for a return to civilian rule. The GTUC used the DCLs as a platform at the district level to collate membership views for the development of a new national constitution and derive inputs into the formulation of the Labor Act (Act 651) of 2003. At present, however, the revitalization of the DCLs have been constrained by the financial standing of the GTUC and the re-conception of the Political Department, making it difficult to mobilize members at the district level as was done in the 1980s and 1990s. The consultative structures serve more as conduits for communicating union decisions from the
The Female Factor in Union Organization

Two peculiar features of trade union membership in Ghana are the heavy formal sector representation and male dominance. These features are in sharp contrast to labor market conditions in Ghana. The proportion of the Ghanaian labor force located in the formal sector is 12% female and 23% male. Adjustment-induced changes caused the formal sector to shrink while the informal economy expanded. At present the informal economy holds about 81% of the Ghanaian labor force. In the formal sector, informalized labor practices created several forms of atypical work blurring the sharp formal/informal economy distinctions. We have referred to the recourse of formal sector enterprises to casual and temporary labor and use of informal economy agents through outsourcing, and sub-contracting. The dramatic decline in union membership in the face of a shrinking formal sector and a fast growing informal economy called for alterations to trade union operating structures to allow for the extension of union coverage to the informal economy and provide its female members better access to union decision-making.

Women constitute an estimated 25% of GTUC membership and hold 12% of union decision-making positions. Representation of women on decision-making structures within the national unions varies from zero in male-dominated unions like the Railway Enginemen’s Union and the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) to a high of 31% for the Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union. The proportion of female labor force located in the informal economy is 85% as against 12% in the formal sector. This does not suggest that females have no need for union representation. On the contrary, they have a greater need, for their working conditions and experiences in the Ghanaian workplace differ in significant ways from that of males. They congregate in fewer occupational categories where labor protection is lowest, they have unequal access to work benefits, and they earn lower wages. Their unequal workplace conditions are compounded by gendered social relations creating additional labor concerns for working women.

The main tenets of strategies outlined by the GTUC to address union gender disparities consist of a threefold affirmative action provisions. The first involved the creation of a special administrative organ, the Women’s Desk, to coordinate women’s activities located within the GTUC and the national unions. The activities of the Women’s Desk are spelt out in a gender policy which is reviewed every four years. Secondly, women’s self-organizing units, the Women’s Wings and Committees, expand avenues for women to access union leadership positions. GTUC and its affiliates, in further pursuit of affirmative action, operate a quota policy which calls for at least 30% of female participation in all their educational and training programs and a reserved seat within union governing structures for women alone to contest.

The women’s self organs operate in tandem with the consultative structures at the regional and district levels, the RCLs and DCLs. The women’s wings and committees have a constitutional mandate to pass on their concerns and decisions to the DCLs and RCLs for action. Decisions of the National Women’s Committee are supposed to feed into Executive Board
deliberations. The potential of women’s self organizing structures is constrained however by financial allocation to the Women’s Desk and a policy orientation that focuses on women and not union gender relations. There has been some improvement in terms of an increase in the number of females ready to hold union office. Female presence in union decision-making has enlarged considerably and there is every indication that the numbers might rise even more. But the women-only focus avoids tackling gendered relations within the structures of the GTUC. Failure of the DCLs to function effectively also constrains women’s self-organization within the districts. Again, the women’s wings and committees have no relations with the woman occupant of the special seat within union decision-making.

**Unionizing the Informal Economy**

The national unions intensified their efforts at extending union coverage into the informal economy, an area where the labor force operates outside the confines of the protection offered by the legal provisions governing labor rights in Ghana. GTUC’s origins have been located in the informal economy despite the large formal sector membership. One of its affiliates, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), which has been affiliated to the GTUC since May 1967, draws its entire membership from the informal economy. These members are a combination of transport owners and drivers. The GPRTU has no collective bargaining functions and operates as a welfare association working to enhance the working conditions of its members and regulate their trade. It acts as their mouthpiece in seeking to influence national policies that will enhance the opportunities under which members operate their transport businesses. The GPRTU also acts as a conduit for accessing state and private bank loans for its members. The remaining sixteen national unions draw their members largely from the formal economy.

In the face of fast dwindling membership in the 1980s, national unions of the GTUC engaged in a systematic and determined approach to organize informal economy workers. The GTUC sets the standard for its national unions to operate in the informal economy through its informal economy desk and policies. The informal economy desk provides technical support in the form of capacity-building workshops, manuals, and networking platforms for unions engaged in the informal economy to share experiences. It has been the expectation that national unions will undertake to do the direct organizational work and identify informal economy groups located within their operational jurisdiction for organizing. In cases of jurisdictional ambiguity, the informal economy groups are given direct affiliation to the GTUC. Two such unions affiliated to the GTUC in 2007 were the Makola Traders’ Union and the Madina Traders’ Association.

The GTUC and its national unions utilize two models for organizing informal economy workers. GPRTU and the General Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU) have used the direct recruitment of individual members whilst the remaining unions organize through existing associations. None so far are organizing informal economy workers as cooperatives. The unions find organizing existing groups cost effective. The approach involves identification of a contact person who convinces an existing informal economy group to accept union affiliation. The
contact person sometimes serves as the main link between the union and the informal economy group.

Since GTUC set out in 1996 to intensify organizational work in the informal economy, twelve national unions so far have engaged in some levels of organizational work in the informal economy. A GTUC—LO/FTF review report on GTUC’s activities in the informal economy revealed that varying levels of commitment and activity in the informal economy produced five categories of national unions within the GTUC.106 GPRTU, GAWU, Timber and Woodworkers’ Union (TWU), and the Local Government Workers’ Union are actively engaged in organizing informal economy groups and seeking to deal with the challenges that organizational work in this sector brings. Others had informal economy members who were not active in union activities or had abandoned efforts at organizing. Some national unions had organized informal economy groups and failed. The last two had never organized in the informal economy. Whilst one category had just identified prospective groups which it might organize, the last had no interest in organizing in the informal economy. Demands from the formal sector-based members leave such national unions no space for engaging with informal economy workers.

National union enthusiasm about organizing in the informal economy is largely dependent on both internal and external factors. The dynamics within the economic sector that national unions organize serve to provide motivation for informal economy organization. GAWU, for example, moved into the informal economy in the early 1970s when plantation agriculture began to use out-grower and small-grower schemes to support its expansion. Internal factors somehow outweigh the external so union capacity (both human and financial) and the perception of union leadership about the utility of informal economy organization to union resources and profile sometimes outweigh the external changes within union jurisdiction of operation. Success in organizing informal economy workers have varied across and within unions. Some obstacles to success have been traced to the inadequate human and material capacity, the expectations of informal economy groups, and labor relations within the informal economy.107

Organizational barriers, once surmounted, bring to the fore problems of representation and union membership rights for informal economy workers. Such rights derive from union internal democracy and the institutional positioning of informal groups within union structures. National unions organizing in the informal economy have faced the problem of negotiating with the formal sector workers for acceptance of equal representation and union rights. Membership location within formal sector-based national unions for informal economy workers is usually confused by dues payment and attachment to unions. Formal economy workers have direct membership through their national unions. Informal economy workers are connected to unions through their associations. Moreover, regularity of dues payment determines voting rights and access to union office. Informal economy members pay yearly associational and not individual dues.

Also problematic is determining the nature of representation to offer informal economy members. Traditional trade union structures are based on a particular notion of work and work relations, a workplace where a large number of workers congregate and have distinct relationship with employers or their representatives. These features do not exist in the informal
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economy which is usually composed of isolated self-employed individuals and micro- to small-scale enterprises employing various forms of non-wage labor, for example family members and apprentices.\textsuperscript{108} In some instances, enterprises are dependent on casual wage labor. Cases of permanent wage labor with distinct employee/employer relations are few. The lack of uniform labor types within the Ghanaian informal economy challenges the traditional trade union mode of organizing labor. As operators struggle to make ends meet, their employment statuses tend to be diffused, straddling employee and employer concurrently. The heterogeneity of labor types and fluid employment status of workers located in scattered and small enterprises produce forms of labor relations that vary across sectors and localities.\textsuperscript{109}

Informal economy labor relations depend on the social norms within which the enterprises are located. These social norms uphold some basic standards of social justice and provide some framework for seeking redress. They allow for employee employer mediation and arbitration through traditional social networks. However they have the tendency to be paternalistic, pandering to norms that privilege males and persons who hold high social positions.\textsuperscript{110} These social norms have turned increasingly commercial as state social provisioning in the form of subsidies has been withdrawn.

National unions, unable to tackle social norms underpinning informal economy labor relations and address the policy environment that impact their livelihoods, resort to service provisioning. Micro-credit schemes, skills training, provision of production equipment, and marketing avenues are some of the services that have been engaged by national unions as a measure of maintaining their informal economy members. Union capacity to satisfy such needs has been insignificant in the face of the enormity of the informal sector and declining union finances.

GAWU’s experience in the informal economy offers some lessons for formal sector-based national unions extending union coverage to informal economy workers. GAWU’s membership profile changed from predominantly formal to informal from 1980, and by 2005 over 50% of its members were the rural self-employed. It was one of the national unions worst hit by adjustment-induced rationalization, restructuring, divestiture, and privatization. Its membership reduced by more than two-thirds from 130,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in 1997. Extension of union coverage to the rural self-employed was in response to informalization in rural plantation agriculture. The necessary constitutional amendments have now been effected to facilitate institutional representation for informal economy workers within union structures. GAWU’s strategy has altered from performing purely collective bargaining for formal sector-based members to include representation, campaigning, and advocacy to pursue national policies and programs that will enhance the livelihoods of agricultural workers. GAWU, together with the GTUC, engaged in a legal battle to have government repeal a law that facilitated the dumping of cheap poultry and rice imports on the Ghanaian market to the detriment of local rice and poultry farmers, the majority of whom are informal economy workers. GAWU, however, remains caught in service provisioning like training and skills development, as well as savings and credit schemes. It is also involved in the promotion of group and pre-co-operative activities, provision of access to appropriate rural and agricultural technology, and community re-afforestation programs. These services are putting a strain on union finances and dampening group moral as GAWU’s capacity to deliver becomes strained.
Organizing informal economy groups in the past has seemed an insurmountable task for the GTUC and its affiliates. However, as informal economy membership within unions grows, representation and membership entitlements within unions pose issues that have to be confronted. These are issues for discussion that call for a re-thinking of union identity and the basis for determining membership entitlements within unions. This review of union membership presents a dilemma for national unions that had hoped that their extension into the informal economy would provide not just an occasion to expand membership but shore up their financial base and intensify their presence on the national political scene.

Conclusion

While globalization is about removing state restrictions on capital, it seeks also to control labor by making believe that social protection and job security are uneconomic and inimical to economic growth. Labor within production is composed of human lives that should not be subjected to the rigid rules of market demands of neo-liberalism. Workers and their movements have been at the negative receiving end as the free movement of capital sought the fastest returns for investments by reducing production costs. The recognition of labor rights within production provides an important avenue for ensuring that globalization benefits are shared by large numbers of the world’s population. Trade unions are well placed to secure a fair distribution of benefits through its worker members. Their ability to do so however derives from their strength, presence, and relevance to their members; all of which are dependent on internal union dynamics.

Union strategies to counter the globalization threat to their existence can be effective to the extent that they lead to stronger unions. It is strong unions that can secure a strong political presence within national policy-making. So far the GTUC’s strategies at reviving the DCLs and improving female representation and participation within union structures have managed to show what potential exists and what tools such strategies offer to improve membership morale for mobilization for union activities. Thus, union entry into the informal economy has also offered occasion for workers to gather lessons about engaging with state policy. The success of these strategies, however, remains constrained by internal union democracy. Questions still remain about real representation of DCLs, the Women’s Wing, and informal economy workers within union structures. Effective representation should provide these sections of the GTUC and the national affiliates equal status within union structures and voice in union decision-making.

NOTES

10. ILO 2004:5.
12. Ibid.
15. See the works of Boafo Arthur, Panford and Graham on the recourse to violence as an essential tool for the implementation of harsh adjustment policies during the late 1980s and 1990s in Ghana.
21. Önder, 1998; Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999; Gore, 2000; Rupert and Smith, 2002; Munck, 2002; and Buckman, 2004.
23. Buckman, 2004: 34.
28. Ibid.
29. ibid.
35. Cowan 1964; Panford, 1994; Britwum 2007b.
37. Önder, 1998; Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Munck, 2002; Abugre 2002; Harcourt, 2004;
42. Boafo-Arthur’s 1999.
43. National unions affiliated to the GTUC as at February 2008 were the Construction and Building Workers’ Union, Communication Workers’ Union, Ghana Mines Workers’ Union, Ghana Private Road Transport Union, General Agricultural workers’ Union, General Transport, Petroleum and Chemical Workers’ Union, Health Services Workers’ Union, Local Government Workers’ Union, Maritime and Dock Workers’ Union, National Union of Seamen, Public Services Workers’ Union, Public Utilities Workers’ Union, Railway Enginemen’s Union, Railway Workers’ Union, Teachers and Educational Workers Union, Timber and Woodworkers’ Union and the Union of Industry, Commerce and Finance Workers.

44. Cowan, 1960; Panford, 1994; Arthiabah and Mbeah, 1996; Britwum 2007b.


50. ibid.

51. Employment policies under colonial administration was sex discriminatory, kept women out of some career tracks and obliging formal sector female employees to give up employment upon marriage or pregnancy ISSER/DPPC 1996 and Britwum 2007a.


53. ibid.

54. Cowan 1960; ISSER/DPPC, 1996

55. ibid.

56. ibid.


60. Panford, 1996; Britwum 2007b.


64. Shillington 1992; Aryeetey 1996.


70. Britwum, 2007b.


73. Munck, 2002.

74. ibid.

75. Shillington, 1992; Aryeetey, 1996; Panford, 1996.
85. Baah, n.d.
97. ibid.
100. ibid.
109. ibid.

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Stakeholder Participatory Processes and Dialogue Platforms in the Mazowe River Catchment, Zimbabwe

CLAUDIOUS CHIKOZHO

Abstract: The introduction of water sector reforms in Zimbabwe was premised on the assumption that all stakeholders would be afforded a chance to fully contribute to the reform process. Neutral dialogue platforms were also expected to be put in place in order to afford various stakeholder groups the necessary space to engage with other stakeholders and have their voices heard. The Mazowe catchment was selected as a pilot project area in which integrated water resources management approaches and principles would be introduced and tested. Among other things, the approach emphasizes improved governance of the water sector through increased stakeholder participation and decentralization of water management responsibilities from central government to catchment-based organizational structures. Relying on evidence from the Mazowe catchment and detailed research carried out in the Nyadire and Nyagui sub-catchments, this paper analyzes the stakeholder participation processes initiated and dialogue platforms created to enhance stakeholder interaction. Results of the study show that the participatory strategies and processes implemented have been generally unsatisfactory and the dialogue platforms were weakened by failure of water user boards to function and effectively engage people at the grassroots level.

Key words: stakeholder participation; governance; dialogue platforms; integrated water resources management; awareness

Introduction

At the global level, issues of water scarcity and shifting natural resources management paradigms have helped to push water onto the priority list of international development agencies. In response to increasing water demand and changing global water resources management paradigms, Zimbabwe initiated a water sector reform programme in 1996. Among other things, the stated intentions of the reform were to improve governance of the water sector, bring about equitable access to water, and decentralize water resources management.
responsibilities from central government to catchment-based water management organizational structures. The Mazowe catchment was selected as a pilot catchment planning project area whose experiences would be used to inform the establishment of other catchment councils in the rest of the country. This paper is based on results from a study carried out to closely follow, analyze and document outcomes of the implementation of water sector reforms in the Mazowe catchment. Major focus is on the utility and effectiveness of stakeholder participatory processes utilized and dialogue platforms created for better stakeholder engagement in the catchment. The study sought to find out the extent of the stakeholders’ participation in the water reform process as reflected through their perceptions and awareness of the water sector reforms. It also sought to find out what programmes and activities have been initiated during the reform process to ensure stakeholder participation and effective dialogue processes. The paper presents lessons of experience from the Mazowe catchment that can be used to inform water sector reforms in other developing countries.

Research Questions and Assumptions

One major assumption guides the analysis in this paper and that is, if properly crafted, dialogue platforms can create the appropriate conditions for better stakeholder engagement and decision-making that enables harmonization of different and conflicting interests in river basin management contexts. In other words, the greater the participation of stakeholders in the planning and implementation of catchment management strategies, the greater the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of the institutions that emerge from water reform processes. Dialogue enables differences and potential conflicts to be better understood by various stakeholders who can then identify potential solutions together by consensus. Three key questions are useful in exploring this assumption. The first one is, which platforms can be best used or developed to implement river basin management initiatives while enabling more meaningful and smoother exchange of ideas, information and experiences among multiple stakeholder groupings? The second one is, what are the real and potential technical and methodological challenges to river basin dialogue processes and how can they be overcome? Thirdly, what sort of capacity building is required to create neutral spaces and facilitate dialogue among competing users and interests? Ultimately, appropriate and neutral dialogue platforms must be created if meaningful stakeholder engagement is to be realized.

Study Methodology

This study mainly utilized qualitative research methodologies to gather the required data or information, even though quantitative approaches were also utilized in cases where it was deemed more practical to do so. The research methodologies used reflect the importance of analyzing the appropriateness of both process and outcomes in public sector reforms. Qualitative perspectives tend to put a lot of emphasis on people’s perceptions, meanings, attitudes, world-views and belief systems. Patton argues that these dimensions require description of what development outcomes actually mean to the respondents, rather than any scaling. In addition, the same event or outcome may mean different things to different people.
In this paper, the analysis of stakeholder participation processes and dialogue platforms in the water sector reform programme relies, to a large extent, on narratives, perceptions and experiences of the people who have been involved in the programme in various ways. An interpretive approach is used to build up a relatively comprehensive narrative relating to the events taking place in the Mazowe catchment, why they happened, how they unfolded, why they unfolded the way they did and the outcomes of the process. A number of research methods were used in data gathering. The methods include review of relevant literature and documents; direct observation through attending catchment and sub-catchment council meetings and workshops; questionnaire-guided surveys; and key informant interviews. Using semi-structured open-ended questionnaires, surveys were carried out to establish the nature and extent of stakeholders’ participation in the Mazowe catchment decision-making processes as the reforms were implemented.

A total of 119 household representatives were interviewed in the Musami communal areas (Nyagui sub-catchment) and 105 were interviewed in the Mutoko communal and resettlement areas (Nyadire sub-catchment). In Musami, the household surveys were carried out in the villages of Mushinga, Shangure, Mavhurume and Darare to reflect communal area stakeholder views. In Mutoko communal lands, household representatives were interviewed from two villages namely, Nyamuzizi and Kanyongo. More household representatives were drawn from villages 53, 68 and 74 in the Hoyuyu resettlement scheme to reflect resettlement area stakeholder views. Households included in the survey were selected through systematic random sampling procedures. This entailed the researcher approaching one household to carry out an interview with the household head and then skipping the next household in order to get a wider coverage of the village concerned. Preference for the interviews was given to household heads if they were available. In the event that the household head was not present, another adult family member would be interviewed.

The study sites

The Mazowe catchment lies in the north-eastern part of Zimbabwe and stretches across the border into Mozambique (see Map 1). According to Williams and Sithole, its total area is 38 900km² which is approximately ten percent of the total area of the country. The Mazowe river itself drains into the lower part of the Zambezi river in Mozambique downstream of the Cabora Bassa dam. Throughout the catchment, one finds various types of property regimes including communal areas; big mines such as Bindura Nickel Corporation in Mashonaland Central and Acturus Mine in Mashonaland East, large estate concerns such as the former Anglo-American owned Mazowe Citrus Estate and huge timber and orchard industries in Manicaland. Communal areas make up a larger part of the catchment in all the three provinces. The catchment is made up of a total of ten sub-catchments namely Upper Ruya, Lower Ruya, Upper Mazowe, Middle Mazowe, Lower Mazowe, Nyadire, Nyagui, Upper Rwenya, Lower Rwenya and Kairezi. The study mainly focused on villages in the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchments for detailed study.
The Nyagui Sub-catchment measures about 4,900 km² covering parts of a number of districts that include Marondera, Goromonzi, Murewa, Shamva and Bindura. It has six water user boards namely, Chikwaka, Chinyika, Marondera, Mubvinzi, Nheweyembwa, and Musami. Data gathering was done in 4 villages lying in the Musami water user board. The Nyadire Sub-catchment measures about 5,431 km² covering parts of several districts, which include Mutoko, Murewa, Mudzi, and Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe. It has eight water user boards, namely, Budga, Ngarwe, Mukarakate, Mutoko, Uzumba, Upper Nyamusanzara, Lower Nyamusanzara, and Maramba-Pfungwe. The study focused on 5 villages located in the Mutoko water user board.

Stakeholder Participation and Dialogue Platforms

Most water resources management theorists and practitioners are generally agreed that demand for fresh water is outstripping supply and that the traditional way of meeting new water needs through increasing water supply is no longer sustainable. A study by the IUCN in 1996 concluded that the population of the Southern African region is projected to double in less than 25 years from 145 million in 1995 and as such, water resources of the region are under siege. The demands being placed on these resources are growing daily, limiting the region’s ability to provide its people with water. Traditional approaches for meeting increased demand for water relied almost exclusively on centralized infrastructure and decision-making: dams and reservoirs, pipelines and treatment plants, water departments and agencies. These old...
notions of water resources management dominated by a supply-orientation and reliance on technical solutions to water problems have been discarded in favor of a governance regime that embraces user involvement in resource management. It is now generally acknowledged that water users and their representatives can make valuable contributions to water management decision-making processes.

**Governance, stakeholder participation and integrated water resources management**

The concept of ‘governance’ has implications for water resources allocation and management. Governance broadly refers to how power and decision-making is shared amongst different actors and groups in society. It is the sum of interactions between civil society and governments. It is thus a word which clearly has a relational dimension that focuses on how civil society and government interrelate, and how that relationship might change in ways that foster better power sharing. It also denotes the use of political authority to exercise control over society’s resources. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argues that governance has to do with mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. In this paper, institutions are defined as the formal and informal organizational arrangements, rules and regulations that influence water management practices in river basin contexts. This broad interpretation of governance can also be specifically applied to the water sector in that the emphasis on stakeholder participation and dialogue is, by implication, an emphasis on ‘good governance’. Stakeholder participation enhances the potential for citizens and groups to articulate their interests and have their voices heard in river basin management decision-making processes.

The decentralization of water management responsibility to the catchment level is an attempt to implement a better water governance framework. The establishment of catchment councils, sub-catchment councils and water user boards is the operationalization of this framework. In this paper, ‘decentralization’ is defined as the deliberate and systematic shift of water management responsibilities from central government departments and ministries to local authorities at catchment, sub-catchment and water user board levels. It is becoming apparent that in the water sector reforms, decentralization, stakeholder participation and dialogue platforms have become both an end and a means to an end as they are expected to lead to increased stakeholder empowerment. But the model of decentralization promoted under the integrated water resources management (IWRM) framework is not a general type of decentralization. It is targeted at very specific functions of resource management and administration. While these functions are systematically shifted from central government to new management structures at the catchment level, central government departments and agencies retain a significant amount of overall authority and responsibility. They have the power to re-possess the authority transferred to the lower level management structures. They also define the rules and regulations that guide the operations of these structures. Therefore, the preferred mode of decentralization in the water sector tends to be de-concentration, a mode that does not offer many opportunities for genuinely empowering water users. De-concentrated
government officials continue to play a more significant role than locally elected representatives at the river basin level.

**Dialogue as a viable option in river basin decision-making processes**

As is the case in the management of most other common property resources, river basin management has become increasingly concerned with bringing in stakeholders to key decision-making processes. When individuals or groups of individuals share water resources as a common property, they are connected in a socio-political, economic and ecological sense. Misuse of the resource by one individual affects other users. It is this understanding of water that works as a catalyst for collective action among communities in water management. It has also led to the growth of the stakeholder-based basin management approaches (a new form of collective action). Thus, many development projects that affect river basins are now subject to more inclusive assessments and decision-making procedures than they were in the past. Opportunities for hitherto, marginalized voices (rural farmers and the poor) to make themselves heard have increased.

Due to the ever-present potential for conflict and diverse views over resource sharing arrangements and practices, one of the cornerstones of stakeholder participation in a river basin context becomes dialogue. Dialogue basically refers to the process of interaction between different stakeholders with a view to addressing specific problems related to competing interests, conflicts, and views on how basin resources should be used or managed. Therefore, dialogue is an option that directly addresses the requirements for stakeholder participation and collective action in water resources management. What immediately becomes crucial is the identification of key stakeholders that would make the dialogue process viable, more meaningful, and effective. It is also important to find ways in which each stakeholder group can participate effectively.

Each river basin is usually constituted by a particular array and configuration of stakeholders whose social, economic and political position gives each of them a unique ability (or lack of) to have their voices heard in basin decision-making and negotiation processes. Due to different ecological, social, economic and political circumstances, stakeholder interactions differ from one basin to another. Wester and Warner argue that it the size of the population in most river basins precludes the direct participation of all stakeholders in basin level decision-making. Thus, questions that usually arise in relation to stakeholders in river basins include: Who should be seen as a legitimate stakeholder? Who should represent groups of stakeholders? Are all stakeholders equal in terms of rights to make decisions affecting the basin? Which stakeholder groups are likely to dominate the decision-making process? What forms of representation are appropriate for different stakeholder groups? Different stakeholder concerns and worldviews on development, participation, and river basins are shaped by where they come from, what scale they operate at, and how they perceive problems facing the resource. Stakeholder analysis is therefore, an essential component in the design of river basin management frameworks. It is also important to identify the stakeholders’ diverse needs and interests and their relative power and influence, especially for low-visibility groups that are traditionally excluded from the public arena.
A few salient points cut across most accounts of dialogue processes. Allen provides a concise summary of these points. He states that dialogue leads to the development of shared understandings by the groups involved through negotiation. It leads to a convergence of interests, and learning about the stakes and mechanisms at work. It also leads to deliberate reflection about mutual interdependence among the conflicting parties. Dialogue is therefore a useful tool where a range of perspectives must be brought to bear on complex issues such as those posed by integrated catchment management, challenges that need to involve multiple stakeholders in making decisions which take account of social, ecological and economic considerations. As the decision-making environment becomes more contested, the need for effective dialogue increases.

Platforms and fora for stakeholder dialogue have to be identified (or created) if dialogue is to become a formal component of river basin management. In some cases, this might mean having recourse to institutional arrangements that formalize participation of stakeholders in key river basin management bodies. Stakeholder dialogue may also be more focused on specific decisions and projects, for example, through environmental impact assessment processes. At another level, stakeholder dialogue may focus on governance arrangements and broad principles. However, successful establishment of stakeholder opportunities and platforms for negotiation does not and cannot take place overnight. It is usually the outcome of years of negotiation and less inclusive decision-making, and the terms of involvement are continuously re-evaluated and re-negotiated.

Catchments, Sub-catchments and Water User Board Areas

A catchment refers to all the land drained by a single river and its tributaries. It is a hydrological zone or physical geographical area of land dominated by one big river into which several smaller rivers and streams flow. It is therefore, the area constituted by all the places from which rainfall run-off flows to the dominant river (river catchment area). The Mazowe River, for instance, forms a big catchment (about 39 000 km2) into which several tributaries such as the Nyadire river and the Nyagui river drain. The characteristics of any river (physical, chemical, biological etc.) are determined by the nature of the catchment and the activities, both anthropogenic and natural, that take place in it. A sub-catchment is a sub-section of the catchment defined by the catchment area of one of the rivers that flow into the major catchment river. The Nyadire river catchment area, for instance, forms a sub-catchment of the Mazowe catchment area. A water user board area is ordinarily a smaller geographical unit of the sub-catchment. Its boundaries are determined by the catchment area of a smaller river or stream that flows into the sub-catchment river. However, there are cases in the Mazowe catchment where water user board boundaries were not determined by hydrological units but by administrative demarcations (wards). The catchment council, sub-catchment council, and water user board committees provide the stakeholder dialogue platforms where water issues and conflicts are dealt with.
The Mazowe Catchment Experience

The water management regime established during colonialism in Zimbabwe systematically excluded the larger majority of people from the decision-making process through the requirement that one had to have a water right to qualify for membership of river boards. Decentralization of water management responsibility to new institutions at the catchment, sub-catchment, and water user board levels has been adopted as a way of correcting these historical inequities. In the long-run, these institutions are also expected to actively lead the information dissemination process. When the Mazowe catchment was chosen as one of the pilot catchment planning project areas, its express mandate was to interpret the principles of the integrated water resources management approach and convert them into specific action plans that would be tried and tested in the catchment before they were replicated elsewhere. IWRM stresses comprehensive river basin management, decentralized water management structures, stakeholder participation, and reliance on the market mechanism, pricing, and technology to promote water efficiency, recover costs, and conserve the resource. In the Mazowe catchment, participation of a wider spectrum of stakeholders in decisions regarding water allocation was expected to make the process more transparent and less conflict-ridden given that the catchment had many water right holders and competition for the available water was increasing rapidly.

By April 1997, the catchment could boast of at least some clearly defined institutional structure that was beginning to operate and spearhead the reforms. On 11 April 1997, the Mazowe pilot project was officially launched. Community-level elections for thirty-two water user boards were subsequently held during the following month. Each water user board nominated two members to represent their stakeholders at the sub-catchment level. Sub-catchment councils met for the first time in June 1997 and nominated two members each who would represent them at the catchment council level. The fully elected Mazowe catchment council officially met for the first time in July 1997 and was expected to meet once every month thereafter. At that time, most of the discussions held by the catchment council centered on how to assist the fledgling water user boards and sub-catchment councils within the original project area so that they could become fully functional.

Media and methods of stakeholder consultation used

Knowledge and information are cornerstones of any dialogue and public participation process. Knowledge and information empowers and capacitates participants in dialogue platforms. Well-informed stakeholders are better placed to make meaningful contributions to the dialogue process. The media and methods of communication or information dissemination used in any public participation programme determine the extent to which stakeholders gain knowledge and information. Therefore, information dissemination has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the dialogue process. Results of observations and surveys carried out during this study to assess the effectiveness of the consultation process in water reforms are quite
revealing. The WRMS secretariat mainly disseminated information through meetings and workshops as well as through the electronic and print media. In the print media, pamphlets printed in English and translated to some of the major local languages such as Shona, Ndebele, and Tonga were produced. Posters in English, Shona and Ndebele were printed and distributed throughout the country. Adverts regarding the water reforms were also placed in all the major newspapers. The electronic media used radio, audio drama and television news items to publicize the reforms. Despite all these efforts, the process has generally been very slow in disseminating information to all people in most catchment areas and results from the data gathered in the Nyadire and Nyagui sub-catchments confirm this conclusion. More than 90% of respondents interviewed in these sub-catchments were completely unaware of the reforms and the new institutions formed.

In the whole of the Mazowe catchment, where distribution records of the information dissemination material were kept, a total of about 12,487 Shona pamphlets, 4,711 English pamphlets, and 2,426 posters were sent out for public consumption. These were sent out through the offices of the District Administrator, Provincial Administrator, the Governor, Agricultural Extension officers, the Natural Resources Board, Commercial Farmers Union, Zimbabwe Farmers Union, and traditional leadership structures. It is debatable and doubtful that this was an effective way of disseminating information because the information did not reach the grassroots level. Where the grassroots people got hold of the pamphlets, they either did not read them or read them without understanding the message conveyed altogether. Advertisements put in the print media are not necessarily effective because many people may not access them. Besides, advertisements do not give room for feedback from the target group such that WRMS could not have established whether or not they reached the intended targets with their communication strategy.

WRMS convened national and catchment-specific consultative workshops. All key stakeholder groups were invited to send representatives to these workshops. The researcher attended a number of the workshops in the Mazowe catchment and also had access to reports of workshops carried out in other catchments of the country. Most of the workshops were well attended and WRMS presented information on the reform process. Participants discussed the information and immediately gave some feedback regarding their views about the reforms. It was assumed that the representatives would then go back and disseminate the information among their constituencies at the grassroots level but there are indications to show that this did not happen. The surveys carried out by the researcher in the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchments indicated there were no systematic report-backs to the grassroots level. As a result, while sub-catchment council members and other stakeholder representatives have been exposed to the major water sector reform issues, their constituencies have, to a large extent, remained unaware of these issues.

**The process of stakeholder consultation**

In each of the workshops held at the national, catchment, and sub-catchment levels, key stakeholders were represented and specific aspects of the reforms were discussed and clarified. Active interaction took place between WRMS, the Department of Water Development (DWD)
and most of the stakeholders and a lot of feedback was provided to WRMS. Most of the people who attended these workshops demonstrated improved understanding of the reform process after the workshops. In 2001 and 2003 when key informant interviews were held with some of the catchment and sub-catchment council members who had attended the workshops, most of them could still remember the key issues discussed and relate them to the ongoing reforms. They generally demonstrated a clear understanding of the rationale for the reforms, key changes made to the water Act, and the role of ZINWA as a newly established institution.

There was not much difference in the level of awareness and understanding between different stakeholder groups. One major draw-back though is that the workshops limited discussions and increased awareness to only workshop participants and representatives from various stakeholder groups. There was no systematic transfer of the knowledge to the grassroots level. Interviews carried out with Rural District Council (RDC) officials indicated that only their representative who attended the workshops was fully informed. The rest of the officials would have only heard about the reforms without getting any detailed information. The same situation prevailed in the communal and resettlement areas where traditional leaders and RDC councilors were aware of the reforms while most of the ordinary people were not well informed.

The electronic media

As part of the awareness campaigns and information dissemination, WRMS ran a 10-minute long drama series in Ndebele and Shona on Radio 2. Advertisements were also shown on television by both WRMS and ZINWA. It is difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of these advertisements as no formal survey was carried out to assess stakeholder reception and understanding of the drama. However, it can be safely concluded that the advertisements could only reach those people with television sets who happened to be watching the television at the particular times when they were shown. In urban, mining and commercial farming areas, the television is effective in that it provides both visual and sound images during information dissemination. But for most people in rural and resettlement areas of Zimbabwe, the television is a luxury that they do not possess. Discussions held with stakeholders in communal and resettlement areas of the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchments revealed that the most effective way to disseminate information in these areas is to use existing communication channels and leadership structures. These include the local governance system, agricultural extension officers, religious leaders, schools and traditional leaders such as chiefs, kraal-heads or village chairpersons. These have closer and constant interaction with the people at the grassroots level. During the study, most of the people who were not aware of the ongoing water sector reforms tended to perceive the reforms as having little to do with their lives. They were therefore, indifferent to the whole process.

Stakeholder analysis

The study revealed that consultation of key stakeholders had not been properly targeted. For instance, it generally targeted all people in the communal and resettlement areas instead of
farmers. Some of the key community figures such as councilors, RDC officials and traditional leaders were invited to the catchment and sub-catchment councils but then these leaders tend to represent political or administrative platforms. If farmer groups had been targeted, they would represent the farming community and this is the group with water issues at heart because water makes a difference in farming. Awareness would have spread through and among people with a genuine interest in water resources management (farmer group networks). Information dissemination through farmer group networks could also have been enhanced by reliance on agricultural extension and Zimbabwe Farmers' Union officials. These agencies are directly involved and interested in water issues and they also have a direct link with the communities.

In addition, observations made by the researcher during workshops and meetings organized by WRMS in the Mazowe Catchment are that the process was not really consultative or participatory. WRMS officials tended to introduce pre-determined ideas, concepts and principles that they felt were good for the reform process and ask participants to debate on them and select those that should be included in the water policy and legislation. Therefore, what really transpired may be called 'guided stakeholder participation' and not genuine participation. Stakeholder participation requires that you identify the problems and solutions with the people involved as opposed to doing it for them. In the case of the Mazowe catchment, consultation would have been more genuine if WRMS had facilitated problem identification with the people and then gotten a consensus regarding the way forward. In this process, use of participatory rural appraisal tools and techniques could have been more useful and effective in identifying water issues and challenges that are more relevant to the stakeholders as well as solutions that the stakeholders felt would be appropriate.

Information feedback processes

One intrinsic requirement of stakeholder participation is that consultation should result in two way communication where there is feedback that shows whether or not the message is reaching its intended target. Any concerns and issues that need clarification for the benefit of the intended audience can then be addressed immediately. This study found out that the feedback system in the Mazowe catchment was relatively good particularly with reference to outputs from meetings and workshops. Minutes of the catchment and sub-catchment council meetings were regularly forwarded to the Ministry of Water and WRMS for their records and comments where necessary. In this way, some of the stakeholder concerns were forwarded to the relevant authorities and the Ministry's responses to these concerns were then send back to the catchment and sub-catchment councils through report backs by WRMS officials at the next meeting. There are instances where Ministry officials were invited to attend the catchment and sub-catchment council meetings so that they could address and clarify certain concerns raised in previous meetings.

However, during the drafting of the new Water Act and ZINWA Act, stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the way the process was handled by the Ministry of Water and WRMS. They ended up feeling that the new legislation was becoming the product of ministerial dictates. On several occasions, stakeholders complained that their participation in drafting the Act was not adequate. At a meeting of the Mazowe catchment council held on 17 October 1997,
when the eighth draft of the water Bill was distributed among the catchment council members, most of them stated that they had never been given the earlier drafts. In 1998, a year later, when the draft water Bill was already being discussed in Parliament, people from the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchment councils were requesting to be educated about the contents of the Bill. Again, they complained that they were being sidelined from a very important part of the reform process. Eventually, in 2001 (four years later) workshops were organized for sub-catchment councils in the Mazowe catchment to be informed on what the Water Act contained. Thus, communication and feedback in relation to the drafting of the new water legislation and some of the statutory instruments was neither smooth nor satisfactory. Essentially, the new legislation was drafted by people in DWD and WRMS without the full contribution of sub-catchment councils. Had that not been the case, then they would have been familiar with its provisions earlier than was the case. In this respect, stakeholder participation was only rhetorical and superficial. It neither began at the grassroots level nor sufficiently filtered down to the grassroots.

**Gender dimensions of participation**

The term gender is often used with reference to the social and economic power relations between men and women. In analyzing access to water, gender and power configurations emerge as important themes. Nemarundwe states that gender relations are socially constructed through meanings and practices, which invest them with particular significance in everyday social interaction. Feminist and political ecology approaches stress that gender differentiation can be traced to a societal division of labor, property rights and power. Participation of women in management structures is considered vital in ensuring that women have a voice in the management of natural resources. The role that women play in the management of water resources within and outside the household is critical to rural economies. Their participation in the stakeholder consultation process is therefore, as vital as their participation in the water management structures and dialogue platforms created.

There is no evidence to show that the dialogue platforms established in the Mazowe catchment were sensitive to women’s participation and the women were generally excluded from the decision-making processes. A gender sensitive consultation process does not only imply participation. It is a process informed by the belief that the problematic category in women development is not the women, but the socially constructed relationship between men and women in which women occupy a subordinate position. The domination of men in decision-making processes for the Mazowe catchment was very apparent. During this study, it was established that all the members of the Nyagui and the Nyadire sub-catchment councils were men. These sub-catchment councils did not have a single woman out of an average of twenty members per sub-catchment council.

The Mazowe Catchment council itself initially had three women out of a total of fifteen members. By 2004, only one woman was regularly attending meetings of the Mazowe catchment council as a member. The other two women were no longer attending. Had the participatory process been more gender-sensitive, it would have created more space for women to assume positions on the catchment and sub-catchment councils. In this way, the women
could have been able to identify their interests, become more informed and aware of the reform process, gain confidence and have their voices heard in the reform process. Perhaps a quota system would have ensured that more women participated. During the socio-economic survey, most of the respondents indicated that they would prefer women to represent them in discussions about water issues. Sixty five percent of the respondents said that women are most suitable to represent the community on water issues. More than sixty percent of the respondents said that women should be responsible for managing water in the community. But while people acknowledge the important role that women play or can play in water resources management, this is not reflected in the water reform program as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of women from the new water management structures.

**Awareness of the new institutions in the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchments**

Asked to demonstrate their knowledge of the new institutions for water management, most of the people revealed that they were not familiar with these institutions. Tables 1 and 2 show the results obtained from the survey carried out on knowledge of the new water management institutions in the two sub-catchments.

Table 1. Knowledge of new water management institutions in the Nyagui sub-catchment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>% knowing the institution</th>
<th>% not knowing the institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catchment council</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-catchment council</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water user board</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINWA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water development association</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of water user board</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 119

Table 2. Knowledge of new water management institutions in the Nyadire sub-catchment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>% knowing the institution</th>
<th>% not knowing the institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catchment council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-catchment council</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water user board</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINWA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water development association</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tables show that most of the respondents in the Nyagui and Nyadire sub-catchments respectively, were not aware of the new institutions formed to lead management of water resources in the catchment. Only six percent of the respondents said that they had ever met a member of their local water user board. The majority of the respondents (92%) said they were not even aware that there is a new water Act for the country. Only eight of the respondents said that they had knowledge of the new water Act. Most of those who were informed about the new water Act said that it had been explained to them at a meeting called for by traditional leaders to discuss other issues not necessarily specific to water. The water user board member in the area had taken advantage of this forum to explain about the water reforms. These percentages reveal a general lack of knowledge regarding the new water management institutions. If the people had been actively participating in the reform process right from the beginning, they would most likely have been much more informed about these institutions than they indicated during the survey.

The water user board problem

Analysis of the new water legislation revealed that the water user board (which is the lowest management unit) is not legally recognized. The new Water Act only provides for the establishment of catchment and sub-catchment councils. One of the negative impacts of this has been that financial support from government and donors has been limited to the catchment and sub-catchment councils. Yet the water user boards also require this kind of support in order to function smoothly. These water user boards were designed to be the vital link between the grassroots and the sub-catchment council in terms of information dissemination. The study revealed that water user board committees sometimes go for long stretches of time without being active or functional. This implies that the link between the higher water management structures and the grassroots level has been broken, thereby neutralizing one of the important dialogue platforms.

Discussion

The study established that there were some instances in which catchment and sub-catchment councils were forced to rubber-stamp decisions made at higher levels. A good example is the draft Water Bill that the Mazowe catchment council felt had been drafted without their contribution. At the end of the day, the Ministry of Water claims that the new legislation was drafted with full contributions from stakeholder representatives when in actual fact the consultation was artificial. Genuine consultation helps to ensure that all relevant views are taken on board and makes implementation easier. The participatory processes utilized have been neither adequate nor effective enough to make a significant difference at the local level. More resources should have been allocated to publicity and community mobilization work.
useful option would have been to employ full-time community mobilization officers who could raise awareness of the reforms among the communities in such a way that the communities become informed citizens who can meaningfully contribute to decision-making in the catchment. Alternatively, the reform could have made use of agricultural extension officers who are already on the ground and are much more in touch with the people. As the assessment of stakeholder participation has shown, awareness of the reform process has remained acutely low at the grassroots levels.

Participatory processes should begin with the grassroots and maintain the momentum gathered. The new water management structures in the Mazowe catchment were formed in top-down fashion and hence, they lack the appropriate grounding at local levels. In addition, existing institutions - traditional, governmental, and non-governmental organizations - were not formally involved in the reform process. Thus, the reform process failed to take advantage of the opportunities that these institutions offer in terms of information dissemination. They must be brought on board for the reforms to be holistic and easier to implement. There is also an urgent need for more awareness campaigns to be carried out at the grassroots level in order for the reform message to spread widely.

Lack of legal recognition for the water user boards significantly diminished the opportunities for linking the grassroots to the formal dialogue platforms created during the reform process. Without the necessary support from the government and donors, most of the water user boards failed to function with the result that information and education about the reforms has not reached the grassroots levels. Only members of the catchment and sub-catchment councils have some information about the reforms yet it is the people at the grassroots level who are expected to be actively involved in managing the resource on a daily basis. Unless the issue of providing operational support to the water user boards is resolved, awareness will remain low and the reform process might not get the cooperation of the people on the ground. The utility of smaller units of management as effective dialogue platforms is lost.

The new institutions were structured to embrace all interest groups. While this ensures that everyone’s voice is given a chance to be heard, it has the disadvantage of making the institutions unstable and decision-making more difficult. The spirit of ‘community’ remains superficial. The interests of different groups, such as commercial farmers, urban councils, resettlement and communal area people, small-scale commercial farmers and miners, for instance, are quite varied. But with the spirit of ‘stakeholder participation’ in mind, these groups were brought together to form the catchment councils, sub-catchment councils and water user boards. A systematic stakeholder analysis process would have revealed that commercial farmers have been using water for agricultural purposes for a long time dating back to colonial times. They are more familiar with modern water management principles than their counterparts from other sectors. On the other hand, most of the communal and resettlement area people have not had a chance to use water on a large-scale commercial basis. Their usual concerns lie in water for domestic purposes and livestock. All the other groups also have their own unique concerns. This makes it very difficult for the new institutions, made up of all these disparate interest groups, to make timely decisions. It might be better to split the institutions
along user group lines and then form an association of these groups where different interests would then be represented in a more informed manner.

Stakeholder participation is a key aspect of water resources management discourses and finding the appropriate institutional mix for effective implementation of the water reforms remains vital. While there are serious stakeholder participation shortcomings in the Mazowe catchment planning process, it is also true that the foundation for further development has already been laid. Through careful orchestration and learning from experiences in the Mazowe and other catchments, it is not too late to improve the stakeholder participation processes in water reform and ensure that some of the basic tenets of good governance are taken on board. The catchment councils, sub-catchment councils, and water user boards are important platforms for dialogue, conflict resolution and information dissemination. What is required is to provide these new institutions with the necessary technical and financial support so that they can carry out their mandate more effectively.

**Conclusion**

This paper raises a number of critical issues in stakeholder participation and river basin dialogue processes that need to be continuously teased out and regularly re-visited as water reform programmes are implemented. There is need to think carefully about the kind of dialogue platforms created to facilitate decision-making in river basin management. The platforms created should enable free and faster flow of information among various stakeholders and at different water management scales. This also requires effective coordination between the different management scales, for instance between the sub-catchment and the water user board and down to the grassroots level. Different social groups will have differing capacities to meaningfully participate and therefore the need for systematic gender-oriented stakeholder analysis becomes critical. This analysis enables river basin authorities to understand and take into account the needs and capacities of various social groups. These groups include women, men, and the poor whose voices may not be easily heard in the river basin dialogue processes. Gender-oriented stakeholder analysis partly provides responsible government agencies with a mechanism for ensuring that constraints to meaningful participation are identified and addressed in order to create more neutral and equitable platforms for dialogue.

**Notes**

3. IUCN, 1996.

References


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Medicine and Anthropology in Twentieth Century Africa: Akan Medicine and Encounters with (Medical) Anthropology

KWASI KONADU

Abstract: Since the 1920s, there has been a foreground of fluctuating perspectives on indigenous African medicine and therapeutics in the medical anthropology of Africa. These circular perspectives in medical anthropology have stubbornly focused on the ubiquity of “witchcraft,” the natural or supernatural basis of African therapeutics, integration between biomedicine and indigenous systems of healing, but have failed to excavate African perspectives on or the relevance of these issues in the background of African societies. This essay argues the failure to locate African perspectives on therapeutic matters that may or may not be important concerns in African societies is the quest for “ethnographic cases” that lend themselves to issues in the field of medical anthropology rather than African knowledge and perspectives of the field (i.e., Africa). The Bono, an Akan society of central Ghana, provides but one of many significant case studies in the encounter between African therapeutics and medical anthropology in the twentieth century, and an African perspective on the substance of those foregoing issues in the (medical) anthropology of Africa.

The healer must first have a healer’s nature... [he or she] who would be a healer must set great value on seeing truly, hearing truly, understanding truly, and acting truly... You see why healing can’t be a popular vocation? The healer would rather see and hear and understand than have power over men. Most people would rather have power over men than see and hear.

—Ayi Kwei Armah, The Healers, pp. 80-81

Introduction

In twentieth century southern and eastern Africa, “traditional” medicine was the dominant healing system and often regarded as the more appropriate mode of treatment by specialists and recipients. Stretching from Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia to Cameroon, Nigeria, and Ghana, indigenous African healing systems remained highly utilized by large segments of the (rural) populations surveyed. These perspectives on and use of indigenous medicine were shared by parallel populations in geographically distinct places such as New Zealand, Hawaii, and the United States among persons of African ancestry. Overall,

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i2-3a3.pdf

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indigenous healers in Ghana and elsewhere rarely translated their knowledge of medicine into social practices that emphasized the omnipresent dichotomies of “spiritual” and “natural” disease causation nor did their praxis revolve around the debates on witchcraft and the existence or denial of African “medical systems” found in medical anthropology. Akan healers in central Ghana, and I would suspect elsewhere, were unaware of and perhaps would care little about the substance of those debates. Since the 1920s, there has been a foregroup of fluctuating perspectives on indigenous African medicine and therapeutics in the medical anthropology of Africa. These circular perspectives in medical anthropology have stubbornly focused on the ubiquity of “witchcraft,” the natural or supernatural basis of African therapeutics, integration between biomedicine and indigenous systems of healing, but have failed to excavate African perspectives on or the relevance of these issues in the background of African societies.4

This essay argues the failure to locate African perspectives on therapeutic matters that may or may not be important concerns in African societies is the academic quest for “ethnographic cases” that lend themselves to issues in the field of medical anthropology rather than African knowledge and perspectives of the field (i.e., Africa). This contention is critical for it argues for a strategic distinction between two sites of knowledge production—field of medical anthropology and the “field” of Africa where fieldwork is conducted—on the larger canvas of global health issues using the local case of the Bono (Akan) therapeutic system of Ghana. Contextually, global health issues in Africa were conditioned by the failed structural adjustment and Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, collapsing health structures, the emergence and spread of HIV/AIDS, the global confrontation between pharmaceutical companies and African governments, and the lawsuits brought by pharmaceutical multinationals against these governments for seeking less-expensive drug alternatives. The guidelines issued by the World Health Organization (purported to ensure the sustainability and safety of the sixty billion dollars herbal medicine industry) were more than humanitarian as issues of herbal medicine—poisonings, heart problems, addition of steroids to plant medicines, poor plant quality and collection practices—continue to plague the United States, China, and Europe. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry spent $4.1 billion on drug research and development in the 1990s and consumers purchased in excess of eight billion dollars. Since 74 percent of the chemical compounds of the 119 known plant-derived drugs have the same or related use as the plants they derive, this pharmaceutical industry exploits medicinal “claims from alien cultures” in the “discovery” of new drugs.5 As industries in the United States and Canada, the European Union, and Japan become more knowledge-intensive, and “as what constitutes national wealth shifts from the natural resource endowments toward the acquisition, manipulation, and application of knowledge,” the ownership and marshaling of indigenous knowledge in and by African societies have perhaps never been so crucial.6 In the consideration of the foregoing, and as the “Western” world extracts African medicinal knowledge to be brokered between academic and business interests and African ministries of health perpetuate colonial ideas of “traditional” medicine, the contention of this essay could not be more timely.

In this essay, I use the Bono, an Akan society of central Ghana, because they provide but one of many significant case studies in the encounter between African therapeutics and medical anthropology in the twentieth century, and an African perspective on the substance of those
foregoing issues in the (medical) anthropology of Africa. The Bono have occupied an ecological zone between the dense forest and the savannah and, more importantly, have maintained an ancient and complex “ethnomedical” and nutritional system since at least the 1000 CE. After centuries of refinement, the therapeutic basis from which indigenous Bono healers contemporarily operated were dynamic and often did not function in the manner prescribed by or constructed in the minds of anthropologists, and indigenous healers appeared to draw upon a composite spiritual-temporal perspective in their day-to-day healing work uncluttered by the foregoing preoccupations in (medical) anthropology. The potentialities of the indigenous therapeutic system offer an invaluable therapeutic option in addressing issues of health and healing in Ghana. Moreover, the Bono case implies that knowledge produced on such systems are less the realities on the ground than they are the representations of “authorities” who fail to fully grasp an unmediated picture of healing (in village or urban life) with and without the presence of the anthropologist, medical doctor, or NGO worker over time. In the last few decades, the ways in which indigenous (medicinal) knowledge has been “discovered” by these brokers of knowledge is cynically remarkable, and the appropriation and reduction of that knowledge for vested academic and pharmaceutical interests calls into question the vital issues of representations, authority, causation and therapy dichotomies, and the ubiquity of witchcraft.

The (Medical) Anthropologist and the Akan

In medical anthropology, it has become somewhat popular nowadays to have cultural “conversations” about medicine and healing in ethnographic representations of those therapeutic “non-systems” studied. In these ethnographic representations, the ultimate goal is some sort of negotiation “between the insider and outsider perspectives.” Yet, as this goal or the mode of illness conversations seeks the foreground of healing discourses, vital issues that threaten this very same quest are simultaneously pushed to the background. Two of these key issues will suffice. First, relations of inequality and power are glossed over and presented as a given, that is, white university doctors or professors linked to “established” educational or medical institutions are supported by grant-giving agencies to conduct research in African or largely African populated societies in which enslavement and colonialism are a part of the living fabric and memory. Whatever research related discussions or conversations occur, they most likely are “artificial dialogues” configured by the power relations historically situated, in the broad and multilayered scope of historical encounters, between the African and the European. The intent here is not to reduce the matter of research to white power and African subjugation, but rather to remind us that race (variously defined) is itself ubiquitous in ethnographic encounters in Africa and its Diaspora and cannot be simply ignored in any serious consideration of those encounters.

Robert Pool mentions, as one of several constraining factors, a fragment of this issue of power relations; however, this fragment is presented as a featherweight contender in the super heavyweight fight of his conversations about illness. Perhaps, his preoccupation with “witchcraft” obstructed this issue during his mediated dialogues. Secondly, Paul Brodwin talks much about the goal of ethnographic research as one of representation between “insider” and
“outsider” perspectives, yet he does not say much about money in terms of limited options in the availability of biomedicine for most of the rural population that he studied in Haiti. He also does not say much about his payment for witness treatments and consultations, which calls into question what actually occurred during his fieldwork and the dubious picture of village life he presents. In other words, Brodwin wrote as if he was absent from village life when his presence alone affected whatever normalcy existed prior to his periodic arrivals. This is not to suggest that anthropologists have the power to shift the meaning of an entire medicinal system by their mere presence, but that the representation of those systems by such researchers is not the reality they purport but a snapshot conditioned by their foreign presence and the fulfillment of academic interests. Brodwin’s aim, therefore, appears to have not been one of clarifying the reality of healing in rural Haiti but rather a convenient ethnographic exercise linked to issues in medical anthropology.

The emergence and life of a “Western” anthropological project was more than simply “framed by the [supposed] superiority of European and American science and industrial development and by the colonialist context of research.”10 This project was and is an embodied vehicle of the views and values of those who desire or claim global hegemony in politico-economic and military terms. Therefore, as Sally-Anne Jackson argues, nineteenth century imperialism and biomedicine, which was re-imagined as tropical medicine, were inseparable and the intimate relationship between disease and empire, in terms of ailing African bodies constructed as vectors of infection, allowed for African exploitation and colonial imposition.11 The diseased African body, cast as “other” or alien through the introduction of co-colonizing diseases such as tuberculosis, necessitated the denigration and suppression of “efficient indigenous healing systems in operation” and expedited the expendability of those from that “afflicted continent.”12 The very nature of the “Western” anthropological project strongly suggests that “Western” (social) science has a direct relationship with European interests and imperialism, and the global presence of the former is an expression of European expansion. As such, the proposition “that indigenous/folk/local groups should determine... their own historical destiny—with the anthropologist as facilitator or broker”—has been heralded and unquestioned.13 Even among those who question this belief, they have also “fail[ed] to escape the Western hegemonic mentality that they criticize.”14

In the medical anthropology of Africa, the ideas of W. H. R. Rivers and C. G. Seligman, both medical researchers who became anthropologists, have immense implications since the orientation of Rivers’ (1924) work became a widely used model (and some still employ it now) in “ethnomedical” research. For Rivers, death and illness were defined as afflictions and misfortune and the study of health and disease was reduced to his conceptions of witchcraft, sorcery, and magic—conceptions which, no doubt, were rooted in the long history of witchcraft and related phenomena in the European experience and imagination. The primary concern was with the disease—wherein the person was viewed as a diseased organism—and its magical, superstitious sources in terms of an unyielding obsession with magical theories of disease causation as the basis for indigenous therapeutic systems. This same orientation figured prominently in the works of V. M. Turner and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Evans-Pritchard’s studies, precisely his work on the Azande published in 1937, became the framework which others have used to fit their data linked to “witchcraft” in Africa. Evans-Pritchard studied under C. G.
Seligman, who wrote the foreword to his text on the Azande, and in that same text Evans-
Pritchard wrote, in spite of contradictory statements throughout, “witchcraft is ubiquitous” for
“the Azande attribute sickness, whatever its nature, to witchcraft or sorcery” and secondary
causes are “associated with witchcraft and magic.” His study on the Azande might be
oversimplified here, but that study’s concern or obsession with witchcraft parallels those
anthropologists before and after him who have had a similar overriding focus.

Evans-Pritchard noted that the “royal class” detested their European colonizers and “were
useless as informants,” suggesting that those who were useful informants were receptive or
yielding to European conquest which surely made a difference in the value and volume of
information obtained during his cumulative twenty month stay among the Azande. The recent
works of British anthropologist Robert Pool, who spent time in the Wimbum town of Tabenken
(Cameroon), resurrected Evans-Pritchard and propagated the model set forth by W. H. R.
Rivers, and his devotees, when he concluded, “in the final instance everything boils down to
witchcraft” in Wimbum and apparently in African etiology. According to Pool, witches are the
ultimate cause of all (significant) illness, misfortune and death, and given his acceptance of the
long-standing dichotomy between “natural” and “supernatural” etiologies, he argues that
Wimbum etiology is personalistic (“supernatural”) and the “Wimbum do not have a medical
system” at all.

Based in the Bono town of Bonkwae (Takyiman) during his study of the Primary Health
Training for Indigenous Healers (PRHETIH) project, Peter Ventevogel also concluded that Akan
medicine was not a “real system” because of its highly externalizing and diffuse character. The
issues of the existence (or denial) of indigenous African “medical systems,” theories of natural
and supernatural or personalistic disease causation and therapy, and the ubiquity of witchcraft,
which undergird the foregoing, saturates the discourse on African therapeutics and culture. In
fact, these issues have become the discourse in (medical) anthropology.

For the Akan, Robert Sutherland Rattray’s collected works on the Asante, an Akan society,
are considered “a monument of colonial ethnography and manifestly a major source,” and are
utilized as one of several baseline sources for Asante and general Akan studies. In 1921, the
then Gold Coast Government chose Rattray as the first head of the Department of
Anthropology. In the capacity of British colonial anthropologist, he traveled to areas formerly
under Asante control and documented aspects of socio-political organization and indigenous
“religious” life. Rattray’s work focused on the Asante and, in the several chapters dedicated to
festivals and Bono “religious life” in Takyiman, he, like his anthropological predecessors, went
in search of the “gods” and even requested that one be made for him to take home to Britain.
Rattray did not attempt to explore the indigenous medicinal system nor its conceptual
underpinnings. Instead, he contended that religion was inseparable from other facets of life and
regarded the Takyiman area as a place “hitherto untouched by the anthropologist and hardly
opened up to the European, [and which] should be the ideal ground upon which to study Akan
customs and beliefs”.

In the 1930s, Margaret J. Fields, a British colonial anthropologist intrigued by the new
“witchcraft” shrine movement in Ghana, spent time at the Bono town of Mframaso (20 miles
north of Takyiman) at a “witch-catching” shrine. She generalized from this experience and
concluded, “According to African dogma sickness and health are ultimately of supernatural
“origin” and “organic illness is almost always attributed to witchcraft, bad medicine or sin, seldom to worry and stress.” In the latter part of the 1960s, Dennis Warren came to Takyiman as a Peace Corps science teacher at the Takyiman Secondary School. Warren later conducted his doctoral study on Bono “disease, medicine and religion” and concluded the “religious system” had nothing to do with the majority of Bono disease lexemes or Bono diseases, which were conceptual, and that the vast majority of Bono diseases were defined in terms of natural causation. Warren’s argument here and elsewhere for “natural” rather than “supernatural” disease causation marked a shift from previous anthropologists, but only formed part of the fluctuating or circular contentions in anthropological understandings of African disease causation and therapy. Warren found that the most serious and common diseases were linked to the stomach, head, and malaria, and the highest-ranking causes were associated with (impure) blood, dirt and a dirty body, and insects (e.g., germs and mosquitoes). The anatomical location of most diseases were in the skin or internal; disease prevention strategies included eating good food, a clean living environment, drinking good water, and bathing twice a day, while the most frequently named medicines and ingredients consisted of ginger, varied peppers, water, and lime. The baseline data for Warren’s study derived from nearly 1500 “disease names organized into a 12-level taxonomic system expressed by one venerated Bono priest-healer [Nana Kofi Donkor].” The data gathered from Nana Kofi Donkor was compared with data from other informants within the same community; this approach used more than one informant as a reliability check on initial and primary informants, “the most important being Nana Kofi Donkor of [Takyiman].” In addition to the construction of his disease classificatory scheme, Warren argued that spiritual causations of disease do occur but naturally caused diseases did not have structural or functional relationships with Bono “religion” (what he termed Onyamesom), hence, his dichotomy between “spiritually and naturally caused diseases.”

Peter Ventevogel, who conducted his studies on the effects of the PRHETIH program, argued, “the literature on Akan medicine lacks real consensus on the indigenous nomenclature of nutritional diseases… [and] indigenous disease names cannot be substituted unproblematically by Western disease terms.” The PRHETIH program was established in 1979 as a project to “train” indigenous healers in some of the fundamental techniques employed in the biomedical system. The project collapsed in 1983 and was later revived in 1991. Evans-Anfom commented that the outcome of an evaluation of the PRHETIH program “should help in determining how trainable the traditional healers are.” Interestingly, Evans-Anfom neither considered nor questioned how “trainable” were biomedical practitioners, who appear to be hegemonic and the most hostile toward attempts aimed at “cooperation” (whatever that means). In sharply criticizing Warren, Ventevogel concluded:

It became clear to me that the indigenous knowledge is not readily available in the minds of the informants, ready to be ‘discovered’ by the anthropologist… The Techiman-Bono ethnomedical classification system can be seen as an attempt to formalize a system that is not formalized in its nature… Akan traditional medical knowledge is not a solid body of knowledge. It differs from town to town, from healer to healer, from day to day. Akan medical knowledge is partially idiosyncratic and is embedded in an externalizing medical system.
Ventevogel’s study compares well with those of Robert Pool, and both noted the few key informants used by Warren and argued that the anthropological understanding of indigenous knowledge was produced and reproduced in an interplay between informants, interpreter, and researcher. However, their conclusions were at odds with those of Helga Fink, who studied in a Bono area but whose work drew heavily on Warren’s dissertation and classificatory scheme, and Van Dalen, whose study in a Bono town revealed that disease was always the effect of certain natural and spiritual happenings rather than spiritual or natural (causative) factors. In challenging G. P. Murdock’s dichotomy of natural and supernatural theories of illness causation and Pool’s assertion that “everything boils down to witchcraft” in African ethnomedicine, Edward Green, a colleague of Warren, attempted to advance his indigenous contagion theory with the claim that major (contagious) diseases in African societies are naturalistic or impersonal. Green, Warren, Van Dalen, Fink, Ventevogel, Pool, and others, no doubt, follow a long tradition of anthropological dichotomists who have argued for either side of the natural-supernatural coin, or claim the coin itself is worthless in their verdict on African medicinal systems, systems long regarded as synonyms for “witchcraft.”

On “Witchcraft” and the Akan Case

Many African nations “still retain Witchcraft Acts promulgated during the colonial era,” and in Botswana, for instance, its “witchcraft proclamation” aimed at “diviners” rather than herbalists was passed in 1927 and remains in legal force. On this historical phenomenon, the discourse on “witchcraft” in the African context is often silent as a pragmatic and ideological consideration in ethnographic “conversations” about illness and therapy. The resuscitation of Evans-Pritchard recently by Robert Pool, among several others, argues that there is no such thing as African medical systems since everything in those non-systems are ultimately embedded in and explained by “witchcraft.” In Bongmba’s attempt at an interpretation of the phenomenon of “witchcraft” among the Wimbum—in one of whose towns Pool conducted his study—he notes the conceptual and contextual translation difficulties surrounding the Limbum terms of bfui, brii, and tfu employed to differentiate the varied phenomena consolidated under the term “witchcraft.” The fact that the Wimbum and perhaps other Africans have come to use non-Limbum vocabulary from other parts of Cameroon as well as English terms, such as witchcraft and sorcery, in their “attempt to make sense of what it means to be human” in a capitalist and homogenizing global order suggest the “borrowed” use of “witchcraft” is no more than semantical or misappropriated nonsense.

Though Bongmba criticizes what he considers to be Evans-Pritchard’s imposition of Azande thought in terms of epistemological superiority, it was writers such as Eva Gillies who concluded that the Azande or other Africans do not attribute diseases to witchcraft or sorcery for these “actors” make distinctions between different kinds of illness and between levels of etiology and pathogenesis. Even those who argue that “beliefs and practices related to medical care should be subsumed under the domains of religion, magic or witchcraft,” while contemplating Evans-Pritchard’s contribution to polemics debates on rationality, have merely created ideational structures conducive to their own thinking and offering such creations as the reality. In Murdock’s global survey of the ethnographic literature using criteria derived from
medical science and anthropology, he found that witchcraft was “practically universal in the Circum-Mediterranean region but surprisingly rare elsewhere in the world.” According to Murdock, this region includes “Caucasoids,” “the Afroasiatic, Indo-European and Maro-Sudanic,” and is distinct from the “region of Sub-Saharan Africa” offering “essential confirmation to a single region” based on overwhelmingly high witchcraft ratings. “Witchcraft,” Murdock wrote, “is important among about a third of Africa’s peoples but is absent in about half of them.” These findings offered by Murdock—however flawed by his creation or use of the above “ethnic clusters” and his reliance on studies which largely sought the exotic and supernatural—sketches a picture that does not support the “ubiquity of witchcraft” or that everything in African etiology boils down to “witchcraft” propositions.

Among the Bono, the discourse on “witchcraft” finds little solace but rather an opportunity for clarification. Bayie (“witchcraft”) is a power or energy with intent used positively or negatively, and writers often translate it as “witchcraft” (the act itself). Abayisem as well as the Fante ayen is also employed, and the former refers to “witchcraft” or (a)bayie matters, issues, and cases (nsem). According to Akator, bayie derives from the phrase ebeye yie (“it will be good or all right”); if this is the case, then we must reconsider the exclusive “witchcraft” connotation the term obayifoo (pl., obayifoo; one who does bayie) seems destined to have. The phrase, according to Akator, is an optimistic utterance made to give hope and direction for one who needs to consult the obayifoo. In the Bono area of Takyiman, abayi-bonsam is the male “witch” who does or uses bayie, while obayifoo, a gender-neutral term that applies to either sex, is used for the female. The (female) obayifoo usually outnumber the abayi-bonsam, and the abode of the obayifoo is in the female line of the family where the most damage occurs among the obayifoo’s own blood relatives.

The idea that obayifoo are powerless outside of their own clan, possess an organizational structure akin to Akan polities, and desire and feed on blood suggest that abayi is a metaphor embedded in, yet antithetical to Akan social order, which is rooted in the abusua (mother-centered family or clan) itself synonymous with mmogya or blood. One may never know who is an obayifoo, even the obayifoo themselves—as one may be born this way or do the work of an obayifoo unconsciously. Nana Kwasi Appiah, one of my informants, argued that “witchcraft” was inborn or inherited with a capacity for positive ends, but it is the person’s mind or the factor of intentionality that shapes bayie into something negative. Confessions by obayifoo are usually made after they have been caught by one of many “abayifoo-catching” obosom (“spiritual agents” or “emissaries” of an Akan Creator) called obosombrafoo (pl., abosommerafoo). If an obayifoo does not confess, they are spiritually executed by the obosombrafoo prior to a warning of some sort to elicit a confession. The confession appears to be cleansing and medicinal, and akin to the Akan protocol involved in greeting someone: though the person may live next door, he or she must state his or her “mission” or intent for visiting in order to cleanse the social space and prepare it for positive interaction. A confession, though perhaps stating the obvious to others in a way similar to a neighbor stating why he or she is visiting, may operate within the same line of reasoning as the Akan greeting protocol.

Nonetheless, there was a shift from the tete abosom (ancient Atano abosom) to the increased popularity of abosommerafoo in the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. This shift corresponded to (a) the decline of Asanteman (Asante nation) in the late
nineteenth century and British colonial imposition; (b) instability in Akan society largely occasioned by colonial rule; and (c) the upsurge of what became the cocoa industry, which facilitated the rise and popularity of the abosommerafoo, the majority of which came from northern Ghana and Burkina Faso. The spread of the abosommerafoo paralleled the spread of migrant workers who came from northern Ghana, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere. In 1879, cocoa plants were successfully cultivated in the Akwapem area of Ghana’s Eastern Region. The Gold Coast government took control of this industry by 1890. The cocoa industry’s emergence led to not only sharp declines in palm and coffee products, but also occasioned one of the most crucial changes of the twentieth century in Akan (and Ghanaian) society. Thousands of farmers became prosperous and created tremendous income gaps between them and the urban professionals, subsistence farmers, and underemployed migrant laborers.48

The outward expansion of the cocoa industry from the Akwapem area caused a migration of farmers who sought new lands for cocoa trees and cocoa regions depended on tens of thousands of migrant laborers who came from northern Ghana, Burkina Faso and elsewhere.49 The increase in the use of abosommerafoo, such as the Tigare obosom from Yipala in northern Ghana, mirrored the increase in the cocoa cash crop that brought heavy social tensions as many farmers cultivated this crop and challenged the social structure that provided security for its members.50 Major socio-economic changes usually alter a society’s disease patterns, and the expansion of cocoa farming in southern Ghana provided a stimulus for opening roads and clearing forestlands for agriculture, which further facilitated the breeding of the mosquito that is the major vector of falciparum malaria.51 The logic that industrialism, economic growth, and increased living standards produces better health conditions, as suggested by Patterson, seems problematic and inconsistent.52 As Patterson himself notes, with urban growth there has been a decline in human life and health, and with higher incomes consumers could choose nutritious foods or white bread, sugar, tea, tinned milk (for infants), and other foodstuffs of dubious value.53 The phenomena of deforestation and commercial lumbering, which began in the 1880s, allowed sunlight to reach pools of water creating favorable breeding conditions for malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Though the above transformations presented specific challenges to indigenous healers and their practice, the Bono have maintained an allegiance to their ancient Atano abosom despite the shifts in Akan society and spiritual practices, and still regard the obosomfoo as senior to the okomfoo.54 The obosomfoo attends to the abosom and provides healing services, and, in this matrilineally inherited but male position, he oversees the “shrine” attendants, including the gender-neutral role of — another category of indigenous healers. The abosomfoohene (“head obosomfoo”) for Takyiman “state” obosom Taa Mensa (Tano Mensa; “Taa” is the contraction of “Tano,” as in the Tano River) has a position of authority above all individuals inclusive of the Takyimanhene (“male leader of the polity”). This social configuration and the role of its spiritualists in healing individual and community ailments suggests a strong concern with order and balance, including those that use bayie (so-called “witchcraft”) for nefarious ends, and this concern forms part of larger perspective on indigenous medicinal knowledge and its dimensions and challenges.
Akan Perspectives on African Medicinal Systems

In reducing African medicinal systems to “witchcraft,” global readers and Africans consume such anthropological or colonial renderings of those systems and, invariably, fail to appreciate the layers of indigenous (medicinal) knowledge possessed by various members of a community and the ideational basis of the systems’ approach and therapy. In the Bono therapeutic system, there exist key spheres in production, transmission and deployment. The three primary and overlapping spheres include those at the level of core and basic knowledge, specialized and in-depth knowledge, and peripheral knowledge. The first sphere corresponds to the core-basic knowledge shared by most, if not all, community members and the basis upon which those members plan and do. Here, “core-basic” refers to what is fundamental and widely known within the indigenous medicinal system, and at an essentially basic level of knowledge and aptitude, though there are those who are an exception to this general observation. For instance, a “majority of the population [still] prepare and use their own herbal mixtures,” and thereby exhibit agency in the process of addressing their health needs. Informal interviews among the youth of Takyiman found that they were very knowledgeable about many medicinal plants and their functions, in addition to revealing the names and utilities of at least six of the most effective and frequently used medicines cited by indigenous healers in the Takyiman district.

The second sphere corresponds to specialized and in-depth knowledge that is associated with the specialists who function ultimately to maintain the coherency and expand the development of the community as it principally relates to holistic health and healing. Those specialists were the indigenous healers who represent the institutions of abosomfoo, akomfoo, and nnunsinfoo (“herbalists”). Almost all of the indigenous healers interviewed agreed—with the exception of one who qualified her response—that there was a clear distinction between nyansa (wisdom) and nimdee (knowledge). In terms of the procedural relationship between wisdom and knowledge, wisdom was older than knowledge and one could not acquire knowledge without wisdom. However, it appeared that knowledge was considered heavier or more substantial than wisdom for reasons that one was born with the capacity for knowledge but knowledge had to be learned and developed, and thus it grew, accumulated, and became “heavy” as a result of one’s journey through life.

The third and last sphere of peripheral knowledge refers to information about a people’s existence at varied points and events in their lives. This sphere is “static knowledge” that lacks the dynamism or “lived” characteristic of the core-basic and specialized and in-depth spheres, and archives aspects of the first and second spheres similar to how a camera captures the image of a person or event. The picture only re-presents a finite moment in the life of that person or event, and clearly is not the person or event; nor can the picture attempt to embody the person or event as a living entity or experience. The picture merely archives that finite moment, which, interestingly, in and of itself, may contain a vast amount of information and insight well beyond the moment that it visually captures. Numerous narratives or kind of information can potentially be preserved within a single photo or another documenting and archiving mechanism. Yet, even photos and archiving mechanisms spoil, corrupt, or even corrode over time, hence, acknowledging their inherent limitations. This peripheral knowledge, although
significant, has been the nature of all (medical) anthropological writings, and the still pictures
they have purported in the field and documenting media of anthropology must always be
(re)evaluated in juxtaposition to the “core-basic” and “specialized” knowledge in the fields of
Africa.56

The above spheres of indigenous medicinal knowledge all share an ideational basis that
further questions the ubiquity of “witchcraft” proposition and the common anthropological
understandings of African therapeutics. The ideational basis of indigenous African medicine
suggests a holistic approach to balanced health and other human circumstances and this basis
considers the variables of family, way of making sense of the world, vocation, ecology, and
cultural environment while placing a high value on the human being.57 In one of Mandeng’s
interviews with an elder healer in Cameroon, that healer explained, “the living and the dead,
we all live in the same world.”58 Instructive and simple are these healer’s words, yet the
dichotomization in the theories of African illness causation and treatment well represented in
the literature remain quite pervasive.59 If this dichotomy were an academic journal, it would
appear from the literature that many writers have active or perhaps lifetime subscriptions in
terms of buying into the supposed “naturalistic” and “personalistic” explanations of disease
and the therapeutic strategies deployed.60 A few have constructed three categories of illness
causation, namely, natural, preternatural, and supernatural to explain the parallel physical,
“magical,” and “ritual-sacrifice” dimensions of each respective category, while most have
remained vigilant on the natural-supernatural antagonism.

Guided by the belief that the anthropologist’s first task is “to find the simplest taxonomy
for causality beliefs” and that to “depersonalize causality” reflects an “evolution of culture,”
Foster, among others, argued the principal etiologies of “non-Western medical systems” were
personalistic and naturalistic in nature.61 Painted on a neat canvas as irreconcilable opposites,
these two primary etiologies have been criticized as “inappropriate and unnatural
categorizations” undermining “a more emic approach,” and as “enormous reduction” that fails
to examine health and sickness ideas “as they are in the usually exigent context of social
action.”62 Moreover, the naturalistic-personalistic dichotomized model is deficient not only in
terms of addressing how practitioners and patients conceptualize illness and therapy, but in
terms of also explaining health behavior and perceptions in situations where multiple health
systems are utilized by members of a given society. If a society does not distinguish what
researchers call “separate levels of reality,” then why do these same writers present that society
in terms of “natural” and “supernatural” worlds?63 The main idea which emerges then from the
varied perspectives riddled by the natural-supernatural dichotomy is that complexities of life,
whether health related or not, are often crudely forced into one generalization or another
without regard for the ways in which real people approach and resolve health and healing
circumstances during their life cycle(s).

Pervasive or not, the dichotomization of African societies and the ideational basis of their
therapeutic systems are commonly unrealized in the praxis of indigenous Bono or Akan
healers.64 Accordingly, one can say, “Both the organic and the spiritual aspects of the disease are
taken into consideration… [and that the human being] is a compound of material and
immaterial substances, which makes the maintenance of a balance between the spiritual and
material in [humans] a condition for sound health.”65 However, to correspondingly claim, “[T]he
practice of medicine is closely tied up with the practice of religion in Africa,” confuses indigenous concepts of medicine and healing through the use of the alien variable of “religion” with its untangled linguistic and cultural baggage.66 The Bono ideational approach to healing is based on a composite spiritual-temporal perspective rather than a “religious” grounding, and that perspective is found in other African societies. For instance, the Bântu-Bakôngo notion of n’kisi (“medicine”) is complemented by the concept of “self-healing power” as “the biogenetic package of power that is received at the moment of conception in the mother’s womb.”67 This package is not only the key to one’s health, but it is the excellent healer since it is both creative and generative. For the Bântu-Bakôngo, sickness is the abnormal functioning capacity of one’s self-healing power caused not by bacteria or virus, but by the loss of the body’s balance or energy.68 The cure is perceived in terms of wholeness and the therapist (n’niâkisi or m’fièdi) “believes that therapy is essentially grounded in both flesh and spirit,” a process of restoring self-healing power.69 In Nigeria, Offiong concluded, “It seems proper to assume that religious [i.e., spiritual] factors are intrinsic to healing.”70 In the Ivory Coast, Memel-Fotê found that—among the Mande, Gur, Kru, and Akan—the comprehensiveness of indigenous medicine was characterized by “its broad conception of health, sickness and cure, itself linked to the idea of life,” and indigenous “medical theory [was] that man’s nature is not only physical but also mental and spiritual.”71

Noticeably, Ghanaians have been described as “ambiguous” with confused attitudes towards indigenous (medicinal) systems and Western (medical) institutions because of the “fatal impact of irreconcilable social systems and cultures.”72 This ambiguity is a cultural and ideational phenomenon, and its powers compel even academic “authorities” in Ghana to proclaim, “it is for us scientists to throw the light of science on the herbalist’s art, and lay a more pragmatic and scientific basis for his practice.”73 This pronouncement is not an anomaly for it is wholly consistent with others that passionately declare, “healing with herbs cannot continue to be just an art” since “African methods were wholly trial and error.”74 Many of these scholars, however, fail to either recognize or accept that there has always been a demystified “scientific” process to indigenous medicine in addition to the vast knowledge of medicines acquired through close observation of nature and animals’ application of those medicines, trial tests on animals and sometimes humans, and practical experience accrued over centuries.75 More importantly, it is the misguided pronouncements of Ghanaian scholars on the issue of indigenous medicine and the gestation and propagation of “witchcraft” driven anthropological understandings of “traditional” medicine that provided a dubious setting for current debates of “integration” or “cooperation” between indigenous and biomedical systems.

Integration versus Cooperation

Some have argued struggles, resistance, adaptation, critique, negotiation, and appropriation have characterized the encounters between indigenous and “Western” medicine, but these processes have all reduced indigenous systems to “things.” Correspondingly, individual herbs were objectified through “Western” analytical concepts, bio-chemical analysis, randomized clinical trials, creation of patents for bio-chemical substances, and marketing those substances as drugs and nutritional supplements. In this context, the debate with regard to the
“integration” of indigenous therapeutic systems (specifically their varied categories of healers) into national health delivery systems in Africa remains a discourse captured by seemingly irreconcilable ways of thinking, cultural behavior, and sensibilities. Irrespective of the argument that the distance between “Western medicine” and “non-European folk medicine is a product of post-nineteenth century medical science,” the lives of African people are decisively affected by the contestation that exists between the two. Given that African ministries of health and medical schools still propagate colonial attitudes towards indigenous healers, and missionary and government school curricula nurture those perceptions, it is not surprising then to find ambiguity harbored in the minds of Ghanaians, and the Akan in particular, especially with regards to matters of indigenous healing. Part of this ambiguity is itself rooted in the ways in which colonial rule both heightened so-called “witchcraft” tensions, altered disease environments, and affected the search for and value placed upon viable therapeutic options.

At the turn of Ghana’s political independence in the 1960s, a leading anthropologist among the Bono (Akan) argued, “the introduction of Western institutions has not resulted in conflict between culture or between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ segments of culture, but rather in accommodation.” Warren’s perspective, and other anthropological understandings of indigenous medicine, facilitated the first of several integrative health projects and shaped the “integration” of indigenous healers with biomedicine in Africa. In the 1970s, Ghana was one of the first to host health initiatives such as the Damfa project funded by USAID in Greater Accra, the Brong-Ahafo Rural Integrated Development Project (BARIDEP) project funded by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in the Kintampo district, varied United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) sponsored training projects, and the Primary Health Training for Indigenous Healers (PRHETIH) project which operated between 1979-1983 in the Takyiman district. Several projects of a similar nature were initiated in the Bono inhabited districts of Berekum and Dormaa based upon the PRHETIH experience and the film initially entitled Bono Medicines (1983) and later renamed Healers of Ghana (1996). Many indigenous healers who participated in the PRHETIH program soon discovered the “one-way” nature of PRHETIH as well as analogous efforts (e.g., the Damfa project). This realization was confirmed by project facilitators who noted how sessions on herbs were the best received while those sessions that “consisted primarily of advice or description” were least welcomed.

The above experiences have engendered multiple arguments and proposals. Some argue that integration is pragmatically impossible but some form of cooperation in areas where both indigenous and “Western” medicine complements each other is feasible. Others propose that integration or collaboration could lead to a reconciliation of the unsettled encounter between indigenous African and “Western” medicines and the cultural frameworks in which they are embedded. In other words, the renewed interest in and debate about the integration of indigenous medicine and “biomedicine” has its origins in and is a synonym for the historic encounters between adherents of both approaches to health and healing. Integration or not, African governments continue to place demands on indigenous medicine to “go modern” by way of scientific rationality, some biomedical doctors recognize healers as potential allies in the fight against AIDS, and pharmaceutical companies and similar agencies exploit indigenous
medicinal knowledge (through intellectual property rights conventions) under the auspices of “collaboration.”

Perhaps the barriers to integration are in fact substantial and the benefits are unproven, as some have argued. Proposals to provide on-the-job training for young health professionals with indigenous healers, for public education to rectify the popularized false perceptions of indigenous medicine, to utilize indigenous healers as part of a global disease reporting systems for emerging diseases, and to create a two-tier medical school system may be missing a vital point. The conjuncture of views and propositions on integration or collaboration suggests what is really at work is a recasting or reduction of indigenous medicine as a mechanical, lifeless, and inhuman adjunct to biomedicine with a “one-size-fits-all” approach that neglects the fact that physiologically, emotionally, spiritually, and ideationally no two human beings are the same. In effect, indigenous medicine will become like biomedicine and since we are dealing with “two different medical paradigms,” as Hedberg and Straugård observed, integrative attempts to compartmentalize the “empirical” and the “spiritual” and, subsequently, disregarding the latter will only engender an inadequate version of “modern medicine.” In this context, Foulkes’ contention that indigenous African medicine is a system that is “irreconcilable with our own” (i.e., “Western” or “bio-medicine”) seems more intelligible though there are those who believe that there is compatibility “in the domain of contagious disease.” Surprisingly, the relatively high levels of collaboration among indigenous healers themselves in places such as Cote d’Ivoire — Ghana’s western neighbor and home of several Akan groups—do not form part of the discourse nor do they figure in proposals for health projects in African societies. Rather than efforts to further collaboration and efficiency among indigenous healers who serve much of the general populace, we are left incarcerated by the idea that “traditional healers are a poorly organized group of people with only a low formal education, and therefore cannot be regarded as equal partners with Western health care workers who are well trained and embedded in powerful institutions.” Lastly, one cannot simply imitate or import, in the African context, the stories of “integration” between “traditional” and “biomedical” specialists in the Asian countries of China, Vietnam, and Singapore.

The way the “cooperation” discourse is framed, indigenous healers and the medicinal system they represent are problematized—that is, there is a problem “training indigenous healers” and integrating them into the biomedical system. In that framing, “cooperation” or “integration” is never stated as a process of creating a new system wherein both participate on agreed upon terms or that biomedical workers “integrate” the indigenous system, particularly if that system represents and is responsive to the overwhelming majority of the population. Rather, the “cooperation” or “integration” debate has been unilateral with the biomedical system being both the source and the destination; this situation has been glaringly demonstrated by the health projects initiated in several Bono districts. It would seem more sensible to “integrate” into a indigenous system that is embedded in the thought and pragmatic structure of society than to do the same with an external (and antagonistic) system, such as the biomedical one, which is imported and removed from the majority of the people, and only accessible to a few financially well-off, urbanized individuals. This debate, however framed, appears to be a distraction from the real issue: the inherent and unbalanced power relations...
embedded in society, and the marshaling of human and other resources towards the substance of people’s lives. It is not that unequal power relations make therapeutic pluralism impossible, but that very social arrangement, often evident in widening socio-economic disparities, does not marshal the same levels of resources to support indigenous therapeutic options used by large parts of the citizenry.

At the cultural or ideational level, both the indigenous and the biomedical systems are irreconcilable at their very core. The notion of “integration” seems misguided and the idea of “cooperation” (whatever that means) appears more feasible if both systems acknowledge and accept their areas of expertise and limitations, perspectives and cultural foundations from which they operate, and are genuinely concerned about the difficult but necessary task of being human. The fact is medical training in Ghana and other parts of the world traditionally focus on disease diagnosis and management rather than on preventative medicine and health promotion. The lesser focus on preventative medicine and health promotion has historically constituted the very underbelly of biomedicine. It appears, therefore, serious introspection for biomedical systems existing in Africa is an imperative before any pragmatic consideration toward cooperation or collaborative efforts between those systems and indigenous ones. In rural Haiti, the competing ideologies of Catholicism and Protestantism unite and consolidate their assault toward Vodun adherents and specialists as their “demonic inverse,” and yet, Haitians continue to seek out and utilize the latter’s therapeutic services.89 In Ghana and other parts of Africa, the collaboration between the truncated nation-state and its political and medical instruments engaged in their own assault through policy, propaganda, and resource misallocation. Yet and still, the cultural views and values of its vast majority, particularly rural dwellers, as well as many “educated,” “un-schooled,” and Christian or Muslim individuals alike seek out the therapeutic services of indigenous healers. These peoples negotiate socio-political circumstances as best as they can through what they know, and it has become clear to me that their intergenerational knowledge has not brought them this far because it is solely or most importantly hinged on the fear of “gods” and the nocturnal activities of witches.

Conclusion

Ventevogel concluded, “medical knowledge is not a thing or a fact, it is the outcome of a historic process,” and postulated, “constructing an ‘ethnomedical’ system resembles taking a snap-shot of a certain place at a certain time.”90 Though Ventevogel’s notion of a “snap-shot” lends itself to our discussion of peripheral sphere of indigenous knowledge (i.e., capturing what exists in a delimited historical and cultural context), he is really insinuating that the Akan medicinal system is not what it was a hundred years ago nor will it be the same a century from now. The boundaries of what constitutes “Akan medicine” are becoming blurred. However, Minkus’s findings on Akan medicine twenty years ago, Maier’s findings from the literature related to Asante (Akan) medicine almost two centuries ago, and what eighteenth and nineteenth century writers observed on the Gold Coast (contemporary Ghana) still holds true among many Akan communities.91 This does not mean Akan medicinal knowledge is static or resistant to refinement, but has been one of continuity in medicinal practices aligned with spiritual-temporal convictions held over the centuries. The boundaries of what constitutes
“Akan medicine,” as opposed to Mossi or Dagomba medicine, are sometimes not easy to discern because of movement, interaction, and incorporation of varied skills and techniques related to health and healing. This development, however, reveals the significance of the Bono cultural and ecological zone as a point of (medicinal) knowledge convergence among varied African societies and implies an internal pan-African knowledge base among West Africa therapeutic systems—a development borne of historic processes in the “field” of West Africa.

Out of historic processes and encounters also came the fluctuating and, at times, divergent, perspectives on the “naturalistic” or “supernatural” basis of African therapeutic systems in medical anthropology and a reduction of those systems to an ubiquitous “witchcraft.” I have argued this development came out of a continuous failure to locate African perspectives on the substance of such realities in African societies, and that failing emerged from a quest for “ethnographic cases” and issues of “witchcraft” and “supernatural” etiologies in the field of medical anthropology rather than the field of African knowledge and perspectives. Our discussion has placed that failing and its importance into proper and broader context. In so doing, this essay also sought to clarify some of significant realities linked to health and healing in Akan societies and since these societies were sites of “integrative” health projects for several decades, those realities contributes a valuable perspective on issues of “witchcraft,” disease causation and therapy, and on the integration or cooperation debate in medical anthropology. An Akan perspective on those issues suggests a strategic distinction between two sites of knowledge production—field of medical anthropology and the “field” of Africa where fieldwork is conducted—on the larger canvas of global health issues. Such a distinction revealed “witchcraft” was more ubiquitous in the anthropological literature than in the “field” of Africa. Anthropological approaches to and understandings of indigenous medicine constructed the “integration” debate and the key factor of incompatibility. The medical anthropology of Africa will remain constricted by its history unless it exorcize its obsessive quest for supernaturally charged medicines, magic, gods, and witchcraft.

Notes

4. “biomedicine” and its variants (e.g., biomedical, allopathy, conventional medicine) refer to the use of biological, biochemical, physiological, and other basic “scientific” assumptions to address issues in clinical medicine, particularly as it relates to an almost obsessive focus on the body as a biochemical contraption that is the source and site of disease or sickness
7. See Konadu 2007.
12. Ibid., pp. vi, 5.
20. Rattray, 1923, pp. 5-10.
34. Pool 1994a; 1994b.
36. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp. 43, 45-46, 52.
41. Ibid., p. 48.
42. van der Geest 1984, p. 60; Murdock 1980, p. 8.
44. Brempong 1996, p. 44.
49. Ibid., p. 7. The Gold Coast government in 1947 established the Cocoa Marketing Board, which determined the optimal conditions for producers, fixed prices locally and for distribution to the world market, and appointed agents who bought cocoa from farmers.
on behalf of the board. The board was or currently is the only authority to market cocoa outside of Ghana and the Kwahuhene is the head of the board.

50. Ventevogel 1996. Tigare is both a suman and an obosom, and the latter is a more recent development according to traditions found among the Bono. According to oral historical sources, Tigare was a suman used primarily by hunters, as a hunter found it in the forest, and as a suman it did not “possess” its custodian. A Tano obosom extracted clay from the Tano River, in addition to other ingredients, and placed the composite substance on the Tigare suman, transforming it to an obosom.

52. Ibid., p. 8.
53. Ibid., pp. 6, 9.
56. The spheres of indigenous medicinal knowledge detailed here also exists in other African and African-descended societies, such as those in Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania, and Haiti, and among healers in the Bolivian Andes and Amazon. See Betti 2004, p. 3; Dokosi 1969, p. 119; Mandeng 1984, pp. 4-6; Swantz 1990, p. 11; Brodwin, 1996, pp. 2-3; Vandebrock et al. 2004, p. 838.
58. Mandeng 1984, p. 245.
65. Opoku 1978: 149.
66. Ibid., pp. 148-49.
68. Ibid., p. 39.
69. Ibid., p. 49.
70. Offiong 1999, p. 129.
75. Opoku 1978, p. 150.
77. Meyers 1976, p. xii.

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Who Ruled by the Spear? Rethinking the Form of Governance in the Ndebele State

SABELO J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Abstract: The current intellectual stampede over issues of governance in Africa has given birth to ahistorical evaluations of the crises bedeviling the African continent. Pre-colonial traditions and cultures have been unduly blamed for bequeathing politics of disorder on the post-colonial state without being carefully studied separately. This article offers a rebuttal to the emerging ‘African exceptionalism’ thesis that blames pre-colonial traditions and cultures for the bad governance systems being witnessed in Africa. It is a nuanced and systematic interrogation and rethinking of the Ndebele system of governance in the nineteenth century. The article arrives at the conclusion that one cannot generalize about pre-colonial African systems of governance as they were not only diverse but also complex, allowing for good governance and bad governance to co-exist uneasily and tendentiously across space and time. As such the single-despot model preferred by many Eurocentric scholars is too simplistic to explain the complexities and diversities of African political systems. Even post-colonial despotic rulers cannot justify dictatorship and violation of their people’s rights on the basis of pre-colonial African traditions, cultures and histories because human rights and democracy were organically built into pre-colonial African systems of governance as this case study of the Ndebele demonstrates.

Introduction

One of the earliest attempts to understand the ontology of African political systems and the forms of African governance is the collaborative anthropological work of M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard. In this work, sweeping generalizations were made about diverse African societies to the extent that African forms of governance were divided into centralized and decentralized forms. Centralized forms were seen as undemocratic and decentralized were reduced to democratic governance.1 The achievement of independence by African states that was attended by problems of deepening democracy and increasing participation of all citizens in political processes elicited new interests in understanding African political systems and why democracy was difficult to institutionalize in Africa. A number of explanations emerged including Eurocentric and Afrocentric pessimist paradigms that blamed African pre-colonial traditions for bequeathing authoritarian forms of governance and disorder on the continent. For
instance, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz linked the crisis of democracy with African culture that allowed for patrimonial forms of governance. Chabal and Daloz emphasized continuities of pre-colonial political traditions across the colonial and postcolonial periods as important in explaining current failures of governance in Africa. To them, the crisis of governance in Africa is one of “modernity rooted in the deep history of the societies in which it is taking place.” Sounding apologetic of the contribution of colonialism to the current failures of democracy in Africa, Chabal and Daloz argued that “time has long passed when we, Westerners, had to expiate the colonial crime of our forefathers.” Instead, they posited that the essential feature “most important to emphasize is the significance of continuities in the political practice from the pre-colonial period.” To them, colonialism failed to overcome “the strongly instrumental and personal characteristics of traditional African administration.” Their conclusion was that African cultures were ontologically hostile to good governance and effective administrations.

The thesis of continuities between precolonial political systems and African traditions into the postcolonial period is countered by scholars like Mahmood Mamdani and Peter P. Ekeh who emphasize the contribution of the legacy of late colonialism to problems of democratization in postcolonial Africa. According to Mamdani colonialism bifurcated colonial populations into citizens and subjects. This became the beginning of hierarchized citizenship determined by race within which white settlers enjoyed citizenship rights and Africans as subjects suffered under decentralized despotism called indirect rule with the African chief at its apex. Colonialism ossified Africans’ identities into rigid ethnic groupings and sealed these through legal coding. This created many problems for Africa. In the first place it meant that African nationalism developed as ethnic consciousness. In the second place, it created the intractable problem of the ‘native’ and the ‘settler’ which is sometimes termed the national question. In an endeavour to install democracy, many postcolonial regimes concentrated on de-racializing civil space while at the same time reinforcing decentralized despotism inherited from the colonial state at the local level as recognition of African traditions and customary law. Mamdani’s arguments resonates with those of Peter Ekeh who argued that colonialism introduced two public spheres (one for whites and another for blacks) that resulted in Africans imbibing bourgeois ideologies, making them to “fight alien rulers on the basis of criteria introduced by them.”

My concern in this article is to rebut what I will call the ‘continuities thesis’ between precolonial systems of governance and the postcolonial because this gives ammunition to some postcolonial African dictators to justify their non-accountable styles of governance and blatant violations of human rights on the basis of African tradition. Even long presidential incumbency by one person and life presidencies are justified on precolonial tradition. The ‘continuities thesis’ is founded on a false impression that democracy and human rights were brought to Africa by people from the West. The case study of the Ndebele state is used here to rebut the ‘continuities thesis’ on democracy without necessarily ignoring the ‘inventions of traditions’ by colonial regimes as well as African nationalists and postcolonial governments that has compounded African problems. The main weakness of the constructivist paradigm that gave birth to the ideas of ‘inventions of tradition’ in Africa is that it tended to privilege white agency
over that of Africans. African creative agency was sacrificed at the altar of missionary and colonial agencies.

One of the glaring gaps in the debate on governance in Africa is the lack of nuanced studies grounded on precolonial African political systems of governance. There is a general belief that precolonial governance was nothing but a long night of savagery and violence within which the spear played a fundamental role under what Carolyn Hamilton termed “terrific majesty.”

Writing about the Ndebele south of the Limpopo River, Peter Becker saw nothing in them but a “path of blood” in their trail of violent conquests. Thus besides rebutting the ‘continuities thesis,’ this article is a thorough revision of the earlier characterization of the Ndebele system of governance. It reveals Ndebele notions of democracy and human rights in the nineteenth century.

Mathew T. Bradley defined democracy as “a configuration of governance molded by general values, biases, prejudices and nuances of a given culture.” Like elsewhere, precolonial notions and practices of democracy and human rights were informed by diverse African histories, African traditions and were expressed in different languages and articulated in different idioms. Denial of rights and freedoms permeated precolonial conflicts since not all African precolonial governments were democratic or respected human rights. The common reality was that democracy and human rights co-existed uneasily and tendentiously with authoritarianism, patriarchy and militarism. But few scholars who chose to study African systems of governance during the precolonial era tended to use the single-despot model that was not confirmed by historical realities on the ground in Africa.

A single-despot model of African governance systems is inadequate because African societies were very diverse in their ontology, thus defying simple generalizations. Each of the pre-colonial societies had unique sets of rules, laws and traditions suitable for particular contexts and historical realities. These rules, laws and traditions, commonly termed customs, formed the basis of how people would live together peacefully as part of a community, state and nation. Earlier African formations like those of Egypt in North Africa, Nubia and Axum in North East Africa, Ghana, Mali and Songhai in West Africa, and Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, produced different political and economic systems of governance relative to their environment of operation as well as historical circumstances of formation.

Because of their magnitude, they all evolved complex systems of governance that could hardly fit into a single-despot model.

**The Ndebele and historiographical debates**

The Ndebele have attracted a lot of studies ranging from those by precolonial travelers, missionaries, colonial officials, anthropologists, novelists, poets and historians. What was widely reported was their reputation for what was considered to be ‘bloodthirsty savagery,’ ‘martial spirit,’ ‘splendid despotism’ and ‘noble savages.’ These descriptions captured contradictory representations of the Ndebele within British colonial imaginations. Within the colonial imagination, the Ndebele fell victim to exotization and demonization. Later writings on the Ndebele were heavily influenced by early literate observers’ writing on the Ndebele and missionary records became primary records for later academic works on the Ndebele.
The major historians who have written on precolonial Ndebele history are Kent Rasmussen on the Ndebele South of the Limpopo, Terence Ranger on Ndebele politics during the scramble period; Ngwabi Bhebe on missionary activities in the Ndebele state; David Beach on Ndebele-Shona relations, Julian Cobbing on Ndebele history from 1820 to 1896; Pathisa Nyathi on the Ndebele history from 1820-1896; Enocent Msindo on Ndebele-Kalanga Relations from 1860s to 1980s, Bjorn Lindgren on Ndebele ethnicity, Ray Roberts on Ndebele royal family, and my own work on Ndebele political system and their notions of democracy and human rights. Except for my work, the theme of democracy is avoided in the writings on Ndebele history save for a focus on revision of Ndebele-Shona relations which were described as characterized by violence by colonial writers bent on justifying colonialism. Among all these writers, Cobbing produced a more comprehensive revisionist study of the Ndebele history, though the issue of governance and democracy was not his central concern. Despite the fact that Beach alluded to the myths dominating articulations of Ndebele history and tried to explode some, he continued to describe the Ndebele state as a ‘mfecane’ state that was organized along military lines. Msindo’s recent writings accept old-fashioned descriptions of the Ndebele state as militaristic and authoritarian to the extent of seeing my concern with democracy and human rights among the Ndebele as “a Zansi/Nguni-centric view of Ndebele history, which defends pre-colonial political misdemeanors.”

The scholars who continued to emphasize Ndebele politics as a terrain of violence failed to distinguish between two phases in Ndebele history. The first phase of Ndebele history running from 1820-1840 was dominated by migration and violence and covers the turbulent years of the ‘mfecane.’ The second phase of Ndebele history running from 1841-1893 saw the Ndebele transforming themselves from a life of migration and violence to a new full-fledged settled heterogeneous nation on the Zimbabwean plateau. Violence became minimal and Beach used this to explain the resurgence of Shona power. The distinguishing features of this ‘settled phase’ and its processes of consolidation of Ndebele power included a ceaseless search for consensual governance. The issue of rights and human rights that were pushed to the peripheries of politics during the formative stage of the state now came to the centre the state politics. The actual realities of power shifted during the ‘settled phase’ to the control of the means of production which superseded the control of the means of violence as the base of wealth, power and privilege. Major institutions such as amabutho (age sets) which were largely geared towards the military, were quickly civilianized to suit the exigencies of a less aggressive environment on the Zimbabwean plateau.

Robert Moffat, a London Missionary Society (LMS) agent and long time friend of Mzilikazi Khumalo tried to appropriate all positive changes in the Ndebele state as products of his missionary efforts including the reduction in offensive wars. All positive changes in Ndebele politics were to him attributed to his interventions and interventions of Christian God. The civilianization process also saw the practice of celibacy being relaxed. These reforms meant that those Ndebele men who were renowned for courage and prowess in warfare were permitted to marry and build villages for themselves. The king allowed the right to marry and to establish a family to be accorded to many people during this phase of Ndebele history. Renowned fighters found themselves settling down to carry out civilian oriented duties like administering the segments of the Ndebele state, since the state had expanded greatly.
The office of the king was transformed and ritualized leading Julian Cobbing to write of the rise of an ideological glorification of the person of the monarch. The king assumed the role of a successful rain-maker, administering a system of grain production, distributing cattle, and heading a cult of ancestor worship. At this time the king’s importance was best described in ritual terms. The king became the “rainmaker in chief” and “a collector of charms and medicines designed not only to secure rain but to protect the state against the machinations of its enemies.” On top of this, the king administered justice, maintained a monopoly over the important long-distance trade to the South, and distributed the proceeds of tribute and of raiding. As put by L. Vail and L. White, Mzilikazi was no longer the absolute and arbitrary tyrant of “European travelers” tales. The king became involved more in ivory trade and spiritual satisfaction of his people.

A strong aristocratic group emerged, quite different from that which had held power because of its military prowess in the 1820s and 1830s. Achievement or meritocracy was increasingly replacing ascriptive status in the Ndebele state. Commenting on this new power development, Cobbing noted that without king “there would have been an inchoate collection of feuding chieftaincies.” However the king was no longer able to exercise absolute power with this new development. Relatively strong subsidiary chiefs and headmen who maintained a great deal of independent wealth and power based on personal ownership of cattle and achievement had emerged. ‘Royalisation’ was taking new forms via marriages to women of royal blood. As the power of this group increased, kingship vigorously ritualized itself to the level of ideological glorification through veneration of the king’s ancestors who were invoked and propitiated in national ceremonies as the state’s protectors.

The refugees and captives of earlier decades and those who were acquired in the southwest now coalesced into a nation, broadening the heterogeneity of the Ndebele state. Some of them assumed powerful positions as chiefs and commanded a lot of respect from the king. Under the abenhla (those from the North) social strata that formed south of the Limpopo River, there emerged a third additional social strata of amaHole. AmaHole were those people who were assimilated into the Ndebele state within the Zimbabwean plateau. They were the latest entrants into the Ndebele society. The top and proud Zansi (those from the South) who left with the king from Zululand became a minority only identifiable through their Nguni isibongo (surname) such as Mkhize, Gatsheni, Khumalo, Mkwananzi, Sithole and Gumede.

Democratic spaces opened up in line with new social and political realities. The Ndebele society became more tolerant, accommodative, and open to the reality of the numerical dominance of non-Nguni groups. These non-Nguni groups were gradually accorded more and more rights so as to placate them. Raiding which had been relied upon as an economic as well as a political ploy was changed. Raiding lost much of its attributes as an economic ploy and became largely a political ploy meant to weaken neighbours of the Ndebele and to punish the recalcitrant chiefs. In the words of David Beach, raiding became target-specific.

Power and Governance Structures

The Ndebele system of governance crystallized around the person of the king (inkosi). This reality led some scholars to misinterpret this to mean that the Ndebele king was despotic and
dictatorial. There is no doubt that the Ndebele king was powerful, but not to the extent of becoming an absolute monarch with all power concentrated in his hands. The Ndebele society had developed very elaborate mechanisms which acted as checks and balances on the power of the king. The hierarchy of power facilitated communication between the leaders and the ordinary people. It also facilitated communication between the lesser chiefs and the senior leaders up to the king (see Fig. 1).

**Fig. 1. Hierarchy of power in the Ndebele state**

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Inkosi (King)  
↓
Indunankulu Yesizwe (Prime Minister)  
↓
Umphakathi (Inner Advisory Council)  
↓
Izikhulu (Outer Advisory Council/Council of Prominent Men)  
↓
Izenduna Zezipaba  
(Provincial Chiefs)  
↓
Abalisa (Headmen)  
↓
Abmanumzana (Homestead Heads)
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Figure 1 demonstrates that even though the Ndebele king was at the apex of a power hierarchy he was not an autocratic ruler with absolute powers. Other powerful officials were active in the governance of the state as well checking absolute dictatorship. These included the *indunankulu yesizwe* (prime minister/head of the government). The king became largely a ceremonial head of state. During Mzilikazi’s rule, Mncumbatha Khumalo occupied this post and even acted as a regent after his death in 1868. Mncumbatha was described by the Ndebele as *umqamelo wenkosi*, which meant the pillow of the king. He was so described because the king relied on him for advice. He acted as a deputy to the king. He represented the king on various important occasions and could sign treaties on behalf of the king as happened in 1836.

The Ndebele king did not rule by decree. State policies were subjected to serious debate, and meetings were considered important in deciding the future of the state. A loose group of the king’s personal confidants comprising inner advisers, collectively termed *umphakathi,*
played a crucial role in determining state policy. They also deliberated on the difficult judicial decisions. Another set of advisers of the king were a large group of the state’s prominent men collectively termed izikhulu. It was through these two councils that the ordinary Ndebele people were able to participate in the government of their country. Umphakathi and izikhulu operated as representative councils. The members of these councils, however, were mainly rich people, rather than ordinary persons. They were not freely chosen by the people, their positions were largely hereditary.

In theory, the king was the head of state, head of government, religious chief, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the supreme judge of all criminal cases. In practice, however, the king was basically a ceremonial head of state in all these posts and a source of unity in the state. There is need to note that there was always tension between forces of centralization and those of decentralization of power. The Ndebele king tried to keep as much power in his hands as was possible, but the leaders of izigaba worked tirelessly as well to gain more and more power and increasing influence in state affairs. It was these people who practically commanded the armed forces during military assignments. They also determined outcomes of difficult judicial decisions. While the king could differ with the views of his advisers on a number of issues, he was often forced to endorse the popular views of his advisers.

The leaders of izigaba rather than the king were the practical representatives of amahlabezulu (the ordinary population). The king had to listen to their views in order to keep in touch with the popular sentiments of his people. Chiefs of izigaba were initially appointed by the king especially during the inception of the state and the formation of specific izigaba as the state grew. Provincial chiefs, however, had to work hard to cultivate the allegiance of the people within the territorial area of their rule. Upon the death of an appointed chief, the king’s power to appoint another chief fell away as the deceased chief was to be succeeded by his eldest son from his senior wife (indlu enkuleni). If the senior wife failed to produce a son, other sons from junior wives were accepted as successors.

Despite all these elaborate mechanisms of governance in the Ndebele, the system of governance was not fully based on consensual politics. It was characterized by a mixture of democratic tendencies on the one hand, and aristocratic, autocratic and/or militaristic tendencies on the other. Tension, competition, jealousies, and violence also characterized Ndebele system of governance.

Kinship was one major ideology in the Ndebele state that was a source of both strength and weakness. Both Mzilikazi and Lobengula were known for suspecting their own relatives to be their worst enemies and for harshness towards male royals, giving rise to the popular Ndebele idea of a blood brother as umfowethu (umfo means enemy). The whole idea of a royal house limited the chances of ordinary people to participate fully in the governance of the state and to attain higher posts. Only those connected to the royal family could readily attain the posts of senior chiefs.

Politics in the Ndebele state were not open to competition as in modern day democracies. Power was hereditary, that is, confined to royal houses. While the Ndebele conceded that power was to be contested, they never tolerated opposition to the incumbent leader. Their popular ideology was alikho ilanga elaphunga elinye lingakatshoni (no sun has ever arisen before another one had set). The Ndebele emphasized that power belonged to those with power. The
ruling Khumalo house was praised as *ndlangamandla* (those who rule because of their power). Mzilikazi ruled until he died of old age without a clear successor. The Ndebele feared even to mention the issue of succession when Mzilikazi was still alive.

The Ndebele governance was also characterized by patriarchal ideology. Patriarchy referred to a form of domination based on strictly personal loyalty to a father-like ruler who invoked the sanctity of tradition to justify his acts. Ndebele patriarchal ideology exalted the leadership of older men. Women, young men, and captives, generally stood outside the centre of power. The Ndebele king was a ‘father’ figure and the people he governed conveyed their respect by referring to themselves as his ‘children.’ Political life was acted out in terms of personal relations rather than in terms of depersonalized and institutionalized law. The Ndebele considered themselves as one family (*uMthwakazi*) and the family was an idiom through which political conflict and alliances were expressed.

White observers tended to emphasize the existence of injustices and cruel punishment among the Ndebele without a clear analysis of Ndebele notions of justice and punishment. Rhodesian colonial officials, especially the Native Commissioners, wrongly assumed that Africans brought cases to them because they offered a superior kind of justice that was far much better than that offered by African pre-colonial governments. Others argued that among the Ndebele democracy and human rights were unknown because the judiciary system was characterized by only two forms of punishment, that is, fines and death. Robert Moffat described the Ndebele system of justice as “tyrannical in the strictest sense of the word” and that the king’s word was law. All these were distortions and falsifications of the Ndebele notions of justice and punishment.

In the Ndebele state, notions of justice and punishment were closely intertwined with Ndebele customs and traditions. Political leaders of the state performed both administrative and judiciary roles. In the execution of justice the political leadership summoned the wisdom of other traditional officials in society such as *izanusi*, *izinyanga*, *izangoma* (diviners, wise men and magicians respectively). At times even the services of the religious shrine such as Njelele were sought to establish justice.

*Amacala* (criminal cases) were basically divided into two categories, that is, *amacala amakhulu* (serious crimes) and *amacala amancane* (minor crimes). The serious crimes included *ukubulala* (murder), *ubuthakathi/ukuloya* (witchcraft), *amacala ezombuso* (political crimes) and *ubufebe* (prostitution and adultery). The king commonly dealt with serious crimes whereas minor crimes such as *ukweba* (theft) and *inxabano emagumeni/emizini* (domestic misunderstanding) were dealt with by either *abalisa* (headmen) or *izinduna* (chiefs) depending on the gravity of the case within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Even *abamnuzana* (heads of households) could deal with very minor cases without the interference of either a headman or a chief.

A clear system of justice ran from the household up to the state level and there were clear channels and mechanisms of dealing with various crimes and punishment. Conflict resolution mechanisms were also available to cater and protect both communities and private interests. While an attempt was made to achieve even handed justice in the Ndebele state, the judiciary system, like other state institutions, was prone to abuse and manipulation by the ‘big men’ such as the king, chiefs, headmen and senior men to the detriment of others.
Witchcraft was considered to be one of the most serious offences equal to murder. It was considered prejudicial to the lives and property of others in society. Death and illness were not considered to be natural among the Ndebele. They were attributed either to the anger of amadlozi (ancestral spirits) or witchcraft. Diviners and magicians usually raised accusations of witchcraft (ukunuka abathakathi) and their allegations usually led to trials.55

In many occasions those who were accused of witchcraft were punished by death. The Ndebele public ideology has it that umthakathi kancengwa uyaphohozwa ngenduku (there was no sympathy for wizards and their fate was execution).56 A number of examples help to strengthen this view. In 1880 Lobengula had his own favoured sister, Mncengence killed because he thought she was responsible for the barrenness of the royal wife, Xwalile.57 In a separate occasion, Xukuthwayo Mlotshwa, the chief of Intemba, had nine people of his own family executed because he suspected that his illness was caused by them.58

Despite the emphasis in the Ndebele public ideology that witches’ punishment was death and that there was no sympathy for them, it is also evident that among the Ndebele doubtful and unproven charges of witchcraft did not lead to execution. Instead, unsubstantiated accusation of witchcraft led to banishment away from the mainstream of the Ndebele society. Villagers were reluctant to harbour suspected witches and a place of refugee came into being for the victims of such charges at a place called eZihwabeni between Solusi and Plumtree.59 Amagusu amnyama (dark forests) of Matebeleland North were also places ‘where witches were thrown to live.’60 In these places of exile, those accused of witchcraft were supplied with meat and grain from the state coffers.61

The other serious crimes were those related to political crimes (amacala ezombuso). Those accused of these crimes faced serious consequences. The clear case in point was that of 1840-1842 known as the Ntabayezinduna crisis.62 Mzilikazi descended mercilessly and ruthlessly on his close relatives, including his own children and his wives, because they were accused on political grounds.63 Political opposition and harbouring political ambitions were considered as criminal.

The prominent and powerful members of the Ndebele society tended to manipulate and abuse their power and positions in the umphakathi and izikhulu to eliminate one another by accusing each other of witchcraft and plots against the king. The accusation of witchcraft was used as a political weapon in moves for favours. One of Mzilikazi’s closest confidants, Manxeba Khumalo (the son of Mkaliphi Khumalo) was executed in August 1862 on a charge of witchcraft elaborated by his rivals in the umphakathi. In 1854 Mpondo, another of Mzilikazi’s confidants was executed because he was accused of witchcraft.64 The real crime, however, was that they were too close to Mzilikazi to the extent that they generated jealousy from their colleagues who also wanted to be nearer to the king.

During the crisis of 1870-1872 following Lobengula’s controversial accession to the throne, prominent men like Mtikana Mafu and Thunzi Ndweni who were respected by Mzilikazi were eliminated after being accused of being witches and for plotting against the king. Lotshe Hlabangana, a close confidant of Lobengula was in 1880 accused of witchcraft by his rivals. He survived execution at that time only to be executed in September 1889 on a charge of having misleadingly commended the Rudd Concession of 1888 to Lobengula.65

Despite all these executions, Tabler (one of the early literate observers on the Ndebele history) pointed that Mzilikazi was not as despotic and tyrannical as portrayed other white
observers. He criticized the use of western Christian standards to evaluate the Ndebele justice system. To him, Mzilikazi was influenced by public opinion to carry out executions for witchcraft offences.\textsuperscript{66} Even among Ndebele oral tales, Mzilikazi is portrayed as \textit{inkosi ebunene} (a sympathetic and kind king) and is said to have pardoned a number of accused people whom public opinion wanted severely punished or executed. It was even mentioned by some informants that if ever a criminal, including those accused of murder and witchcraft, happened to run away to seek asylum in the capital, he or she became immune to further harassment or execution.\textsuperscript{67}

Some of the methods used to punish offenders, such as piercing through anus of an offender with a sharp stick and tying stones around the neck of an offender before being thrown into water (mentioned by observers like Robert Moffat) were horrific, though rare. What emerges from the above is a hierarchy of rights and governance running from \textit{umuzi} (nuclear or extended family) under \textit{umnumzana} through \textit{imizi} (villages) under \textit{abalisa} (headmen), through the \textit{izigaba} (provinces) under \textit{izinduna} (chiefs) to the \textit{ilizwe} (kingdom) under the overall administration of \textit{inkosi} (king).\textsuperscript{68} These arrangements in the Ndebele state, like every facet of Ndebele life and work, were shot through with political import. There were complex dialectics between egalitarianism, competition, tensions, clan and family intimacies, mutual assistance, communalism, co-existing with domination, violence of the ‘big men,’ seniority, aristocratic, and militaristic tendencies, under-pinned by patriarchal ideology and an all embracing ideology of kinship.\textsuperscript{69}

Accountability and Legitimacy

A closer look at the governance styles of many Nguni pre-colonial societies tempts one to argue that pre-colonial leaders were more accountable for their actions than some present day African leaders. This argument is vindicated by the work of such scholars as Claude Ake and Joseph Cobbah who uncovered that pre-colonial leaders were accountable even for natural disasters.\textsuperscript{70} Among the Ndebele, proverbs and praise poems reflected popular expectations of the subjects about their king and the government generally. Ndebele oral literature was also an embodiment of Ndebele claims against their state and leaders as well as a tale of criticism of some of the actions of the king and all those in power.\textsuperscript{71} The king and his chiefs were expected to be generous with food and productive resources. They were also expected to provide protection against enemies and drought.\textsuperscript{72}

For the king to remain a legitimate ruler, he had to be very humane in his dealing with his people. The Ndebele clearly expressed their fear and respect of their king while at the same time celebrating their king’s ability to ‘eat’ his enemies.\textsuperscript{73} Mzilikazi was respected by his people mainly because of his ability to build the Ndebele state, his ability to outwit leaders like Shaka and Zwide, and his ability to seize cattle from his enemies for the benefit of the Ndebele. All these qualities of Mzilikazi’s rule were expressed in his praise poems. No Ndebele doubted Mzilikazi’s legitimacy because he was the undisputed builder of the Ndebele state.

The Ndebele king’s legitimacy was enhanced by judiciously distributing wealth to his people in consultation with other influential men in the state. The chiefs were also obliged to grant some material support to their subordinates. This patron-client relationship had the
potential of making and unmaking of kings. Political power and economic wealth were interdependent. Mzilikazi and Lobengula safeguarded their secular power through the strategic redistribution of cattle and land to their followers. The simple logic of clientage ensured that no one escaped accountability to the governed in the Ndebele political hierarchy.74

Some previous scholars distorted the whole issue of property rights in the Ndebele state. One traditional argument was that the Ndebele king owned all the cattle and all the land as his personal property.75 This was not true, bearing in mind that the king owned land in trust for his people. The right to own property as an individual as well as in association with others was embedded in Ndebele society. Cattle were owned at two levels, that is, individual level and communal level. Inkomo zamathanga referred to privately owned cattle, whereas inkomo zebutho or inkomo zenkosi referred to communally owned cattle.76

Land was available to every Ndebele person. The king and his chiefs distributed land to their followers. Land among the Ndebele was neither sold nor bought and every member of the state was entitled to it. The people who lost land to the Ndebele were those who decided to migrate rather than accept Ndebele rule. The Ndebele on arrival in the southwest embarked on a limited national re-organization policy and this process saw some communities like those of Malaba being moved to Tegwani River, and those of Mehlo being moved from the headwaters of Khami River to Dombodema.77 The idea behind the process was not to deny these people their land but rather the Ndebele intended to create a defence zone against the Ngwato using these Kalanga families. Above all, the people who were incorporated and assimilated into the Ndebele society were allocated land and other resources and in return were expected to obey laws, customs, and traditions of the Ndebele. They had to serve in the army and to attend the annual inxwala ceremony.78 The inkomo zebutho/national herd or communal herds (inkomo zenkosi) were different from the king’s personal cattle. They were also different from the privately owned cattle/inkomo zamathanga. The differences lay in the fact that the communal herd was state property and while they were under the overall administration of the king, even the king could not use them for his private affairs. It was this state herd that was distributed to the provinces for people to tend and for those without cattle to benefit from them in the form of manure, milk and meat. The power of the king to distribute cattle gave rise to an ideological glorification of the person of the king, especially among the poor who happened to benefit materially from these cattle.79

Among the Ndebele cattle (inkomo) constituted a vital branch of production as the ownership of cattle determined social status and their acquisition was the major long-term economic objective of all Ndebele males. The Ndebele acquired cattle mainly through raiding and breeding. The cattle, which were seized through raids, were first of all taken to the king for him to distribute to his people. Cattle also expanded by natural growth. It was through the distribution of cattle that the king was able to boost his popularity among his followers. Baines watched the arrival of the raiders from Gutu at Gibixhegu in 1870 and he pointed out that they were fairly distributed following “tolerably equitable principles.”80

The accountability of the Ndebele leaders was usually expressed during indlala (famine), where they had to provide food to the people. The king and his chiefs usually distributed cattle and amabele (millet, sorghum and maize) to the starving people. The king and the chiefs kept grain in secure places so as to distribute to their people during times of crisis.81 Indlala among
the Ndebele was not just considered as a natural occurrence. Causes were to be sought for it. Thus, besides distributing cattle and grain to the starving people, the king was also obliged to investigate the causes of famine. If the famine was caused by *isikhongwana/intethe* (locusts), the king and his chiefs had to look for medicine and if the famine was caused by lack of *izulu* (rain), the king had to send people to the rain-shrines like Njelele so as to get an explanation.82 In this way, the Ndebele leaders tried by all means to be accountable to their people.

Religion played a very significant role in cementing legitimacy of the king. The Ndebele kings were important religious leaders. The *inxwala* ceremony was partly a festival of unity serving as a means of maintaining the power of the king over his people. The numerous men and women who assembled around the capital for *inxwala* ceremonies also came partly in order to renew their allegiance to the kingship, politically to the person of the king, and spiritually to the memory of the royal *amadlozi* as national ancestral spirits.83 As a result of the central role played by the king in the religious affairs of the Ndebele state, the kingship quickly acquired a deep-rooted religious significance.

Ndebele society however, was not classless even though communalism was common. There were the powerful royals and the weak, captives and non-captives, senior and junior, old and young, women and men, able-bodied and disabled, and elderly and the youth, etc. Power in general was stored in unequal human relations that were underwritten by an ideology of lineage seniority and kinship.84 In the upper level of the Ndebele state was the royalty who comprised the king and his relatives constituting a ruling aristocracy. The royalty indeed enjoyed privileges and rights that were far above other groups in the Ndebele society. They were the richest as they were given cattle by the king so as to make sure they did not constitute a threat to the king. The royalty received reflected authority from the king. They were the prominent members of *umphakathi*. Mzilikazi’s brother-in-law, Maqhekeni Sithole and his cousin, Mncumbatha Khumalo, held influential positions, whereas Lobengula’s brothers: Ngubongubo, Sibambamu, Nyanda, Muntu, Silwane, Fezela and Mahlahleni were prominent as his inner advisers.85

Below the royalty were the *Zansi* (those from the South) who consisted of those people who left with Mzilikazi from Zululand in the 1820s and their descendants. This group of people in the Ndebele society formed an aristocracy and claimed a number of privileges and rights far above other groups with the exception of the royalty. The senior chiefs in the Ndebele state were drawn from this group. They had power because they suffered with the king during the turbulent years of the *Mfecane* and they had fought for him in various battles of the migratory phase.86

There was the *Enhla* group within the Ndebele society who comprised the Sotho and Tswana people and occupied a position below the *Zansi*. Mzilikazi incorporated these into the Ndebele state before crossing the Limpopo River. They had suffered with the king since they accompanied the king up to Matabeleland. The *Enhla* also had a claim to positions of authority and power too based on their longer association with the *Zansi*. They largely occupied positions of headmen under the *Zansi* who occupied positions of chiefs.87

Below the *Enhla* were the *Hole* group, which consisted of the Kalanga, Rozvi, Nyubi, Nyayi, Birwa, Venda and other indigenous people of the southwest who were incorporated into the Ndebele state mainly in the 1840s. Some early observers had a wrong impression that the *Hole*
were treated as slaves in the Ndebele state. The Hole were subordinated to the Zansi and Enhla groups socially and politically. Even though they were belittled and looked down upon by others, they were not really enslaved to the Ndebele. After all, they were the largest group in the Ndebele society. By the 1890s, up to sixty per cent of the inner Ndebele state was of Hole origin.

To Bjorn Lindgren, the words Zansi, Enhla, and Hole, were taken to convey a sense of ethnic rigidity which ranked the Ndebele state into castes. His anthropological research resurrected the old-fashioned reading of the Ndebele society in terms of castes. The reality is that people continuously moved across these categories as they negotiated new alliances, usually by marriage, merit, and loan of cattle. A respectable Hole was able to move closer to the Ndebele chiefs and could become richer than a relative of a chief who had fallen into disfavour. In the Matshetsheni isigaba, a Zansi man called Sinanga Khumalo was succeeded as a chief by a Hole man called Ntuthu Msimang. Ntuthu was succeeded by another Hole, Swina Nkala.

One controversial issue that made early observers describe the Ndebele society as an authoritarian state was that of existence of captives or domestic slavery. In 1829, Robert Moffat mentioned Hurutshe children who were kept by one of Mzilikazi’s brothers as slaves. The Ndebele practiced capturing of individuals as well as groups to incorporate into the Ndebele society. However, European observers emphasized the existence of captives as down-trodden slaves among the Ndebele. Such literate observers like Cooper-Chadwick, Kirby and Posselt mentioned Ndebele raiders commonly came with children and women as captives. These captives are said to have had their hands tied behind their backs to ensure that they did not escape. The captives were first of all brought and paraded before the Ndebele king in the capital. The Ndebele king had the duty to distribute the captives. The females who were old enough to be married were immediately distributed among their captors, especially chiefs. The king took a percentage of well-selected captives to reside in the capital and to work as royal servants. These selected captives were termed imbovane. Those who remained at the capital as servants of the king received the best treatment, which led them to be fanatical supporters of the king.

Ngwabi Bhebe noted that any Ndebele man of substance such as amaqhawe (those who excelled in the military duties) who wanted to have a young captive, female or male, could ask for permission from the king. Permission was granted only on full understanding that the applicant had the means of looking after a captive. The king was really concerned about the welfare of the captives. If the request was successful, the applicant would take the captive to his own home where the latter became, to all intents and purposes, a member of his ‘master’s’ family rather than a slave.

Thomas Morgan Thomas described the social conditions of the captives in the Ndebele society as very humane involving being given good food and being allowed to establish a family and to marry just like all other people. Giving credence to Thomas is Ngwabi Bhebe who noted that even some captives enjoyed being Ndebele to the extent of voluntarily translating their totems from Shona to Sindebele. He gives examples of the Shumbas who changed to Sibanda, Nyangas who changed to Nkomo, Gumbos who changed to Msipa, Shiris who changed to Nyoni, Dzivas who changed to Siziba, Shokos who changed to Ncube and the Moyos to Nhliziyo.
Thomas Morgan Thomas who worked among the Ndebele through the Matabeleland Mission from 1859 to 1870 noted that among the Ndebele, "the African slave is almost his master's equal, and enjoys from the beginning the privileges of a child; and looks upon his master and mistress as being in every respect his parent again".100

Thomas added that in the Ndebele state servitude did not “convey the true idea of a slave” because the captives could leave their patrons and live wherever they liked within the Ndebele kingdom and could even be masters on their own right.101 Captured boys, instead of being kept as slaves as they grew up, were drafted into Ndebele *amabutho* and underwent the same stages as any Ndebele boy. Captured girls too grew up into womanhood in the same way as other Ndebele females and were either married by their own adopted fathers or by other men. They were similarly regarded for *lobola* (bridewealth) purposes as the daughters of the captor.102

The issue of the existence of slaves in the Ndebele state becomes an issue in early colonial law records, including instances of the Ndebele keeping as slaves people captured on the Zambezi as well as disputes concerning the slaves brought into the Ndebele state by the Gaza queens who were married by Lobengula. Some later colonial civil cases concerned the slaves of chief Mabikwa.103 However, the fact that this issue appears from the early colonial law records reflects that the precolonial Ndebele traditional forms of oppression and domination of some group of people over others were now designated as slavery. Even some forms of patron-client relationship between the royalty and their captives could now be seen and interpreted as a form of slavery.

The other issue to consider is gender relations as an aspect of governance. The Ndebele state was a male-dominated society and as such women were perpetually considered to be minors (*abesintwana*).104 Their custody before marriage was vested in their fathers or eldest brothers where the fathers were deceased. Upon marriage, the custody of women was transferred to that of their husbands. Women were always subordinate to men.105 Women were not allowed to partake in national issues such as war and they were not represented in the public forums such as *umphakathi* and *izikhulu* where national issues were debated and discussed. Politics was a preserve of men. Women could however affect national policy and politics in general indirectly through their husbands, brothers and sons who were prominent in the Ndebele state.106

Women were not a monolithic group of dominated and oppressed people in Ndebele society. The categories of women followed the pattern of the social division or stratification of the Ndebele society into *Zansi*, *Enhla* and *Hole*. At the top were royal women such as the sisters, wives and daughters of the king. There were daughters, sisters, and wives of *amaqhawe* and other prominent men such as chiefs who were also influential. There were also daughters, sisters and wives of *Enhla* men as well daughters, sisters, and wives of the *Hole* men. At the lowest level were captives who were still undergoing probation. Within the top ranks of women, there was also the hierarchy of senior and junior wives. Taken together, these divisions afforded women different rights and privileges and were affected differently by male domination and oppression.107

The royal-affiliated women, like their male counter-parts, received reflected power though not equal to that of their royal brothers.108 It is unfortunate that the mothers of Mzilikazi and Lobengula died before their sons had become kings, so that we do not know about their
privileges. With a focus on the Zulu *amakhosikazi*, Jennifer Weir has shown that royal women actively participated in state institutions. She noted that among the Zulu, royal women were placed in positions of authority in the *amakhanda* and were invested with a degree of authority and autonomy, because of their age and freedom from ritual constraints. Weir built her case from the works of Sean Henretta who is one of the modern researchers to take exception to andocentric interpretations of pre-colonial leadership, and Carolyn Hamilton who challenged the view of women as a homogenous group marked by universal subordination.109

The general insights drawn from other Nguni societies such as the Zulu and Ndwandwe, makes it clear that the mothers of Shaka and Zwede had privileged positions in society. When Nandi (the mother of Shaka) died she received a state funeral whereas Ntombazi (the mother of Zwede) was renowned for keeping the heads of the kings whom her son had killed. Helen Bradford was very critical of the dominant attitude among previous researchers to simply view Nguni societies as models of hierarchical patriarchy in which men dominated both domestic and public affairs. She was also very critical of the tendency to see royal women as mere mothers, aunts, sisters, and wives of kings and chiefs. Bradford pointed to the dangers of taking at face value andocentric versions of the South African past. Bradford concluded that the consensus on female subordination and powerlessness was a twentieth century creation.110

In the Ndebele state, we learn of some few exceptionally influential women like Lobengula’s sister, Mncengence who enjoyed reflected power and authority from her brother, though she was eventually accused of witchcraft and killed. She stayed in the capital, and possessed a lot of cattle just like men. She was consulted on Lobengula’s matrimonial affairs and as a favoured sister of the king, she had the privilege of advising the king on state politics.111 The other influential woman was Lozikheyi Dlodlo, a senior wife of Lobengula. Marieke Clarke who is working on a full biography of Lozikheyi, has pointed out that she was as powerful as any man in the Ndebele state. The king trusted her to the extent that she was given control over the sacred state medicines. Lozikheyi lived in the capital where she was the head queen. She led other queens in dances during crucial national ceremonies. Lozikheyi was also a renowned rainmaker. During the fall of the Ndebele state she played a crucial role in the resistance of 1896 through making war medicines. She became a focal point of Ndebele opposition to British rule. The place known as koNkosikazi in Matabeleland North was named after this powerful woman.112

The king’s daughters were another group of women who enjoyed privileges beyond that of ordinary women in the Ndebele society. The daughters of both Lobengula and Mzilikazi enjoyed some privileges far above other women. It was in line with the wider stratification of the Ndebele society for them to be married to the *Zansi* and more so to wealthy chiefs.113 Royal women were widely used for political purposes by their brothers and fathers. Both Mzilikazi and Lobengula deployed their daughters in the creation of alliances between the powerful and wealthy chiefs and the royal house.

Even alliances between powerful states were cemented through the use of royal women. A case in point is that of the alliance between the Ndebele royal family and the Gaza royal family made by Lobengula and Mzila. Mzila sent more than ten women to be married by Lobengula including his daughter Xwalle. Mzila in turn married women from the Ndebele state.114
The *Enhla* women enjoyed the ‘privilege’ of being married by the influential and rich *Zansi* men, although the *Enhla* men were not allowed to marry *Zansi* women. *Zansi* and *Enhla* men generally looked down upon *Hole* women. However, the social stratification that divided the Ndebele society did not succeed in stopping the proud *Zansi* men from having illicit relationships with *Hole* women and subsequently produced belittled offspring termed *incukubili* (half-breeds). It is crucial to note that both Mzilikazi and Lobengula’s policies of state expansion and consolidation emphasized increments to their population and social harmony within the state. This entailed encouraging intermarriages among different people of the Ndebele society.

The underlying idea of marriage among the Ndebele was that marriage was not a contract between two people, but rather a pact between the families of the man and the woman which formed a bond of friendship between the members of such families. At times pre-arranged marriages were made although they were rare. The lowest grades of women in the Ndebele state were the captives. They did not enjoy the privilege of being married to men of their choice.

**Conclusion**

What is clear from this systematic rethinking of Ndebele governance is that it was a complex mix of egalitarianism, communalism, tensions, competition, co-operation, clan/family intimacies, and mutual assistance. This co-existed with domination, violence of ‘big men,’ seniority, authoritarianism, aristocratic and militaristic tendencies. All in turn were underpinned by patriarchal ideology and an all-embracing ideology of kinship. This complex situation permitted both respect for human rights as well as their violation. As a result of the complexity of this system of governance, it defies the simplistic single-despot model. There is a lot that constituted good governance co-existing uneasily and tendentiously with bad governance. So, post-colonial African dictators are not justified in claiming to be ruling according to African tradition. Eurocentric scholars are also wrong in trying to justify post-colonial crises of governance on the basis of pre-colonial way of doing things in Africa. Perhaps the crisis of governance in postcolonial Africa has more to do with the legacy of late colonialism as argued by Mamdani. This needs another study to closely explore it.

**Notes**

1. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940.
3. Ibid. p. xviii.
4. Ibid. p. 11.
5. Ibid. p. 13.
8. Ibid.
10. In Benin, the Marxist oriented dictator Mathieu Kerekou when challenged to live power after a long presidential incumbency, he challenged the pro-democracy forces: ‘Have you ever heard or seen a retired king in Africa?’ He explained that Africa you can only see tombs of kings, which means it was a tradition for kings to die in power.


18. Decle 1900; Moffat 1842 and Wallis 1945.


27. According the practice of celibacy, a man could not be allowed to marry and found a family without having proven his prowess in war. Men used to serve in military service for up to 40 years before being allowed to marry.


32. Cobbing 1976, p. 44.

33. Cobbing 1976, p. 64.

34. See Mhlangazanhlansi 1944, p. 27. The combined number of AmaHole was estimated to have constituted 60% of the Ndebele population.

35. Ibid.


39. Mncumbatha signed as treaty with the colonial government at the Cape on behalf of the king, demonstrating how the king trusted this principal of his government.


41. This is a popular saying among the Ndebele speaking people about the a mutual way of accepting defeat in an argument and acceptance of popular will to prevail over one person’s opinion and thought.
43. Ibid.
44. This is a common Ndebele proverb warning those who are too politically ambitious to wait for the reigning leader to disappear from the political scene for them to take over. Kings never retired. They died on the throne.
45. The Khumalo royal family praise names encapsulated how they came to be rulers including how Mzilikazi squared up with the feared Zulu king Shaka and defied his oppressive tendencies.
58. Ibid.
59. Historical Manuscript TH2/1/1 Thomas Journal, 12 April 18180.
61. Historical Manuscript LMS ML1/2/A Robert Moffat to Tidman, 25 December 1862.
62. There is a mountain just outside the city of Bulawayo as one goes to the east where it is said that as the Ndebele settled in Matabeleland some overzealous chiefs like Ngudwane Ndiweni installed Nkulumane the eldest son of Mzilikazi as king of the Ndebele because they thought the king had died. For two years Mzilikazi was missing with another group of Ndebele followers because their journey to Zimbabwe followed two paths. One of the reasons given for this somehow rebellious act was that the Gundwane group wanted to celebrate inxwala ceremony and this could not be done without a king who is supposed to lead the ritual activities. The narration goes on to state that Mzilikazi eventually appeared and was very angry that these people had installed his son as king while he was alive. His response included sentencing a number of chiefs to death who were then executed in this small mountain. This is the Ntabayezinduna crisis.
63. Mzilikazi is said to have even killed his rebellious son Nkulumane but this was not supposed to be known by the mainstream Ndebele community. So the popular story was that the heir apparent was taken to his maternal uncles in line with Nguni traditions. But when Mzilikazi died in September 1868, Nkulumane was nowhere to be found, confirming that he was killed alongside the rebellious chiefs.
64. Cobbing 1976, pp. 155.
67. Interview with Chief John Sangulube, Brunapeg, 10 April 1995.
69. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
75. This erroneous argument was later used the British conquerors to engage in primitive looting of Ndebele cattle and Ndebele land on the false basis that they had defeated king Lobhengula who was the owner of all these properties.
81. Ibid.
82. Ranger 1999.
83. Zambezi Mission Record 1, 1898-1901, p. 15.
84. Wylie 1990.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
91. Lindgren 2002, pp. 54-60.
92. Ibid.
95. In the 1990s, a new pressure group emerged in Matabeleland under the name Imbovane YamaHlabezulu led by the late Mr. Bekithemba John Sibindi. Imbovane referred to those captives who were well selected to work as royal servants. In political terms, however, it meant a small ant that ate maize through barrowing into it until it gets rotten.
98. Thomas 1864, pp. 235-238.
100. Thomas 1864, p. 238.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid. pp. 230-238.
103. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004, pp. 84-86.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid. The Ndebele public ideology was that umfazi kalaHole, meaning for marriage purposes men could marry across the social divides with ease.

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Colonialism within Colonialism:
The Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary and the British Colonial Administration of the Nigerian Middle Belt

MOSES OCHONU

Introduction

This paper explores three interrelated issues; the origins and development of a Hausa-Caliphate imaginary in the intertwinements of caliphate and British discourses and its subtle entry into official British colonial policy in northern Nigeria; how the search for administrative coherence prompted British colonialists to craft an administrative policy envisioned to normalize and spread this Hausa-Caliphate socio-cultural and political model to the Middle Belt; and the on-ground unfolding and implementation of this policy in the non-Hausa speaking part of the Middle Belt. ¹

This colonial administrative project of politico-cultural uniformity sought to make the Middle Belt more like the Caliphate sector, which was deemed more suitable for the British administrative policy of Indirect Rule.² It was not aimed at achieving cultural sameness for its own sake but as a vehicle for ultimately strengthening Indirect Rule in all of northern Nigeria. This was largely a pragmatic administrative project, although pre-existing British and Caliphate narratives about the sociology and politics of northern Nigeria contributed to its formulation as an ideology of colonial rule. But the accentuation of ethno-cultural difference was indispensable to Indirect Rule. How then did difference and homogeneity co-exist in British colonial administrative practice? To tease out the paradox in the British creation of both ethnic difference and functional cultural homogeneity is not to suggest that the British consciously thought about or crafted these ideas in those terms; that would concede more coherent intent and intellectual deliberateness to British colonialists than they actually exhibited in their encounter with Africans. The argument here is that the two fundamental prerequisites of Indirect Rule—ethnic difference and a pre-existing, centralized system of rule—necessitated the creation, witting or unwitting, of both difference and politico-cultural sameness across northern Nigeria, using the colonially-approved Hausa-caliphate model as a reference. The most notable site of this colonial policy was the Middle Belt, which, while possessing the desired ethnic difference, lacked the

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centralized political and cultural institutions and symbols of the emirate system, deemed crucial to Indirect Rule.

To illustrate this British colonial phenomenon of using a Sokoto caliphate idiom to “civilize” those considered not civilized enough for Indirect Rule, I will focus the empirical discussion and examples of this paper on the Tiv-Idoma (Benue) axis of the Middle Belt. The choice is informed by the fact that this was a part of the Middle Belt where Hausa was not spoken or understood to any significant degree and where Caliphate culture had not penetrated as much as was the case in other parts of the Middle Belt. As a result of these interpellations, this colonial policy of engineering administrative sameness was more contested here, and its outcome a lot messier than was the case in the Hausa-speaking parts of the Middle Belt.

The literature on colonial political constructions of ethnicity in Africa has focused largely on the emergence of politically charged ethnic categories as a function of colonial practices and ideologies of ethnic differentiation for the purpose of Indirect Rule. Ethnic and cultural difference was central to Indirect Rule because of the centrality of tradition and customs to its working. The standard argument identifies a key site of struggles over ethnicity and culture: the bureaucratization of “created” or reified ethnic difference, the witting and unwitting imputation of privilege and marginality into these categories of ethnic difference, and the colonial and postcolonial appropriation of difference as a claim-making device by Africans. It is argued that European colonialisms, for a variety of reasons, were obsessed with ethnic and cultural difference among their African subject populations; that they proceeded to make cultural difference the centerpiece of colonial administrative policy; and that the legacies of colonial ethnic differentiation have been tragic for postcolonial Africa, inspiring ethnic hatred, civil war, fierce political competition, and even genocide.

For Nigeria, James Coleman argued as early as 1958 that the divide-and-rule ethos of Indirect Rule compartmentalized the “diverse elements” of the Nigerian area and subsequently made national unity difficult. Emmy Irobi asserts that Indirect Rule “reinforced ethnic divisions.” Echoing the same thesis, Davis and Kalu-Nwiwu remind us that “the structure of British colonial administration” and the drawing of arbitrary boundaries delineating “[ethnic] territo[ries] restricted development of a national consciousness within the broad expanse of Nigeria’s borders.” Indirect Rule is analyzed as a catalyst for ethnic differentiation and the postcolonial problems of national unity that are rooted in it.

This argument correctly identifies colonial administrative and anthropological practices of ethnic and cultural differentiation as sites from which much of contemporary African ethnic politics and conflicts emanate. However, the creation and bureaucratization of ethnic and cultural difference was not the only preoccupation of colonial powers in Africa—or, for our purpose here, northern Nigeria. Integral to the British colonial project of cheap, convenient, indirect administration was a utilitarian and ideological preoccupation with the simultaneous creation of ethnic difference and cultural homogeneity. Ethnic and cultural difference was not always a colonial administrative asset. It was not in post-conquest northern Nigeria. Integral to the British colonial project of cheap, convenient, indirect administration was a utilitarian and ideological preoccupation with the simultaneous creation of ethnic difference and cultural homogeneity. Ethnic and cultural difference was not always a colonial administrative asset. It was not in post-conquest northern Nigeria. Although Indirect Rule was founded on amplified ethnic and cultural difference, its implementation, as this paper will demonstrate, ran into problems in the Middle Belt area precisely because of an actually existing ethno-cultural difference, a difference that the British deemed unsuited, if not injurious, to the goal of convenient, cheap, and coherent administration. Subsequently, both
cultural difference—which was indispensable to Indirect Rule—and the engineering of homogeneity, considered necessary for a uniform implementation of Indirect Rule in the region, came to simultaneously and contradictorily sit at the heart of British colonial administrative policy in northern Nigeria.

This contradictory British commitment to a functional cultural homogeneity was a catalyst for administrative crises, ethnic suspicion and conflict in the Middle Belt. This paper argues that the pursuit of an instrumental, albeit illusive, politico-cultural homogeneity through the ironical enlistment of an Indirect Rule system underwritten by a supposed hierarchy of ethnic and cultural difference was fraught with serious problems and that it had serious consequences for both colonial power relations and inter-ethnic group relations.

Unlike historians of Africa and northern Nigeria, scholars of British colonialism in South Asia have long recognized the existence of British-supervised indigenous colonialisms or sub-colonialisms. The princely states of British India were political contraptions that exemplified this arrangement. In several of these states, the British recruited or recognized pre-existing martial and princely races, Muslims in many cases, and gave them significant administrative sway over Hindu peasants. Although this divide-and-rule administrative mechanism was founded on pre-existing configurations of power, it recognized, for the purpose of British rule, a British-approved power structure rather than the indigenous socio-political norms of the Hindu peasantry. Official adoption of Hindu political institutions and traditions would have conformed better to Indirect Rule in its pure form. But its implementation as an administrative policy would have been expensive, inconvenient, and messy. Hausa-Caliphate sub-colonialism in the Nigerian Middle Belt was thus not unique or without precedent in British colonialism. In fact, the expedient policy of instrumental homogenization in northern Nigeria appeared to have been transferred from British India. In 1931, when Donald Cameron, who had recently assumed the governorship of Nigeria, embarked on an extensive administrative reform to dismantle the emirate-modeled administrative policy and restore autonomy to the Middle Belt ethnicities, he accused his predecessors of having formulated a flawed “policy….of thinking of the [northern Nigerian] Muslim emirates in terms of the Indian States.” What made the fallouts of sub-colonialism more dramatic in northern Nigeria than in India was the newness of the arrangement in the former—the previous absence of an established, uncontested Hausa-Caliphate suzerainty and influence over the Middle Belt.

I begin with a mapping of the convoluted historical processes through which Hausa-Fulani identity and its associative connotations emerged. This discussion will pay prominent attention to the emergence of the Sokoto Islamic Caliphate and the ways in which it transformed Hausa identity and conflated it with a notion of imperial citizenship and privilege. I will then discuss the ways in which Sokoto Caliphate Imperial imaginations of itself and the Middle Belt—articulated in Caliphate writings—and the narratives of European travelers and explorers meshed to produce a British colonial knowledge system that privileged the notion of a paradigmatic Hausa-Caliphate politico-cultural sophistication and its supposed Other—the backward Middle Belt. Finally, I analyze the implementation of a colonial policy founded on the Caliphate-Hausa imaginary and on the necessity for Middle Belt conformity to it; the on-ground manifestation of this administrative policy in Tiv and Idoma Divisions; and the crisis and contests that it triggered.
Hausa: More Than a Language

Hausa is not just a language; it is a category that has become synonymous, and now correlates, rightly or wrongly, with certain ways of acting, expressing oneself, making a living, and worshipping God. Hausa now carries with it a constellation of cultural, economic, and political connotations. As a language of trade and social contact in West Africa, and as the language of an ethnic group known as Hausa, it approaches what Ali Mazrui calls a cosmopolitan language. The presence throughout much of West Africa of people who speak Hausa as a second language, and the role of the Hausa language as a lingua franca in much of northern Nigeria, speaks to the utilitarian importance of a language whose intertwinement with trade and itinerant Islamic practices dates back to a remote Nigerian antiquity.

The Hausa inhabited the savannah grasslands of West Africa, hemmed between the Songhai and Bornu Empires. A receptacle of influences from both empires since perhaps the 15th century, Hausaland, then politically constituted into several Hausa city-states, remained largely defined by the linguistic primacy of various dialects of the Hausa language. After the Fulani Jihad of 1804-08, the variegated existence of the Hausa people was subsumed by the Sokoto Islamic caliphate, which was largely constituted by the territories of the old Hausa city states.

The terms “Hausa,” “Hausawa,” and “Kasar Hausa,” denoting the language, people, and land of the Hausa respectively are actually fairly recent coinages; their modern usage probably originated from the writings of Othman bin Fodio, leader of the Fulani Jihad who, before and during the Jihad, homogenized the Hausa-speaking but autonomous peoples of the different Hausa states in what he defined as an undifferentiated collective of bad Muslims. The peoples of these states, and ordinary Fulani migrants who lived in them were more likely to refer to the Hausa States’ citizens by their state of origin, e.g “Katsinawa,” for those from Katsina; “Kanawa” for those from Kano; “Gobirawa” for those from Gobir, etc. Following Dan Fodio, his brother, Mohammed Bello, discursively formalized “Hausa” as a term of reference for the inhabitants of the former Hausa states.

The Fulani Islamic reform jihad of 1804-08 superimposed a central political and religious authority on the fragmented Hausa states of present-day Northwestern Nigeria and, through conquest and discourse, disciplined them into one politico-linguistic unit. More importantly, the Jihad inscribed Islamic piety as one of the most important markers of Hausa identity. Thus, as John Philips argues, to be Hausa gradually came to mean that one was a Muslim, even though not all Muslims in the Caliphate were Hausa and not all Hausa were Muslims. What the Jihad did was to initiate the process of homogenization and the construction of a politically useful narrative of Hausa identity, a narrative which was underwritten by religious and cultural associations.

The religious content of the Hausaization process was coterminous with the new fortune of Islam as the defining ideal of citizenship within the Sokoto Caliphate, whose core was Hausaland. The new Fulani rulers and their minions adopted the language and culture of their Hausa subjects as well as the administrative infrastructure of the conquered Hausa (Habe) kings. By this process, most of the urbanized Fulani became Hausa in linguistic and cultural terms, although a quiet co-mingling of the two peoples had been taking place before the Jihad. Thus, despite the protest of many Hausa people today about the use of the term “Hausa-Fulani”
to describe the Hausa speaking peoples of today’s northern Nigeria, it is a historically valid terminology, and it seems that their protest rejects the recent appropriations of the term by Southern Nigerian intellectuals rather than its historicity. For the purpose of this paper, however, I will use the term “Hausa” to denote this compound ethnic category.

The Islamization of Hausa identity is perhaps best underscored by the fact that post-Jihad Hausa identity became synonymous with assimilation into an Islamic consciousness that was packaged, consecrated, and policed by the Jihad leaders and the inheritors of their authority. Thus, the Maguzawa, Hausa traditionalists who either managed to escape the Islamizing influence of the Jihad or became dhimis who traded Jizya tribute for Caliphal protection under Islamic law, were excluded from the post-Jihad narrative of Hausa identity. Although maguzawa has an etymology rooted in the Islamic distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, and in a Hausaized rendering of this distinction, and although its use to distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim Hausa, and between urban and rural Hausa, was fairly current in the precolonial period, it acquired additional valence in the post-Jihad period as Islam and its shifting interpretations and consensuses became more central to the definition of Hausa identity. The cosmopolitan nature of Islam in West Africa meant that being Hausa became more and more about Islamic piety and an ability to speak the language than about any originary affinity with Kasar Hausa or Hausa ethnic ancestry.

By expanding the frontiers of a cosmopolitan Islamic tradition, the Sokoto caliphate enhanced the cosmopolitan and incorporative character of Hausa, enabling non-Hausa members of the Caliphal Islamic community to become Hausa in geographical contexts that lacked Hausa ethnic heritage. Indeed, because of the socio-political importance that the jihad invested Hausa with, it became, at least within the Sokoto Caliphate, a political identity denoting belonging, acceptance, privilege, and access. Being Hausa in the Caliphal context cost little. Islamic piety, an acceptance of the religious orthodoxy of the Caliphate founders, and an ability to speak Hausa even as a second language granted one entry into Hausahood. It thus became an appealing identity from a purely pragmatic perspective. Geographic proximity (but not necessarily contiguity) to the Hausa heartland in today’s Northwestern Nigeria as well as Islamic piety facilitated social and political access to an increasingly coveted Hausa identity.

A plethora of cultural, attitudinal, and performative indicators sprung up to reinforce the linguistic and religious indicators of Hausa identity. It is this constellation of cultural, religious, economic, and political indices and significations that I call a Hausa-Caliphate imaginary. Steven Pierce argues that this amplification of Hausa identity as a total worldview and way of life is underwritten by the belief among the inheritors of the Sokoto Caliphate Islamic tradition that “Hausa identity...also encompassed particular ways of making a living...notably Hausa people’s fame as traders...and a particular approach to agriculture: certain technologies, certain modes of labor mobilization.” As a result of these associative reification of Hausa, being Hausa or becoming Hausa gradually came to denote being or becoming many functional things; Islamic conversion or reaffirmation was only the beginning point, as well as the fundamental action, on the path to becoming Hausa.

The cumulative outcome of the transformation and elaboration of Hausa as a category of identification was that Hausa became even more fluid and context-determined than it had been prior to the Jihad. This fluidity and indeterminacy that came to characterize Hausa identity was
crucial because it reinforced the power of the Hausa language and Islam as the supreme indicators of belonging, relegating autochthony to the background. The spread of Hausa linguistic and religious influence made Hausa a category of power, since anyone whose claim to Hausa identity was consecrated by the invocation of these attributes could potentially enjoy the privileges and status that came with being regarded as Hausa in “non-Hausa” contexts like the Middle Belt. Because the Caliphate was marked out by Islam and its local lingua franca, Hausa, the acquisition of these attributes rightly or wrong associated one with the might, attributes, and privileges of the Caliphate. In the Middle Belt, these attributes functioned as a metaphor for the Sokoto Caliphate and its emirate or Fulani system of political administration, as Alvin Magid has called it.18

This was the situation that the British met in 1900, when Frederick Lugard declared the Protectorate of northern Nigeria. The associational attributes of Hausa had been fairly settled in and out of the Caliphate. In the Caliphate it functioned as an idiom of unity for a multi-lingual religious community. Outside the Caliphate in the Middle Belt, the Hausa language was welcomed and adopted by many for its communicative utility and for the commercial access that it facilitated into a vast trans-regional world of exchange. The religious associations of Hausa identity were however widely rejected in the Middle Belt.

The Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary In Precolonial Middle Belt

The British came to northern Nigeria desirous of identifying and collaborating with a group of rulers representing a cultural and political entity that they deemed “civilized” and sophisticated enough to be partners in the colonial project. The Hausa-Caliphate worldview and those who best represented it—the Hausa-Fulani emirs and the Caliphate aristocracy—were recruited into this role. In this British thinking, little thought was devoted to the perception of the Hausa-Caliphate worldview in the Middle Belt.

The British had, through the writings of explorers, missionaries, and other European adventurers, acquainted themselves with the political, economic, and administrative technologies of the Caliphate as well as with what being Hausa-Fulani connoted within the Caliphate. What they seemed either not to know or not to have paid attention to are the precolonial struggles that occurred on the Caliphate’s non-Muslim frontiers (the frontier Middle Belt communities) over conversion to Islam and/or submission to the control of the Caliphate. These struggles helped establish the reputation of the Hausa-Caliphate socio-religious and political system in the Middle Belt.

As ambitious agents seeking to extend the sway of the caliphate to the non-Muslim areas of northern Nigeria attacked the sovereignty of states in the Middle Belt, the category of Hausa came to simultaneously assume the position of a feared and awe-inspiring political presence. The various peoples of the Middle Belt devised numerous strategies to either keep Hausa-Fulani Caliphate slave raiders and state-builders at bay or to selectively bow to their sway in the interest of peace. For instance, as Michael Fardon explains in regard to the Chamba engagement with the Fulani encroachment on their domain, these inhabitants of the Middle Benue hills and plains managed to co-exist, albeit uneasily, with militant Fulani settlers and proto-states through the careful alternation of the strategies of calculated and half-hearted submission and
quiet self-assertion. The Tiv kept Hausa-Fulani Caliphate agents in check by carefully monitoring their activities on the frontiers of Tivland, by attacking their isolated outposts and trade caravans, by strategically interacting with them, and by building a feared warring infrastructure founded on the infamous Tiv poisoned arrow. The Doma, a branch of the Agatu Idoma had to adopt an ambivalent survival strategy against the raids of Hausa-Fulani Caliphate agents from Keffi. They, like the Chamba, had to succumb to some measure of Hausa-Fulani influence as a gesture of political self-preservation.

What obtained in the precolonial period, then, in terms of the Middle Belt’s engagement with Caliphal expansion, was a series of complex stalemates, fluid accommodations, and tense, frequently violated treaties of co-existence that Nengel calls the Amana system. These stalemates and negotiated tribute-payments in exchange for peace were not only desired by the Middle Belt polities but also by the raiding emirates. Wars were difficult and expensive to execute; armies were difficult to recruit and maintain; repeated raids resulted in diminished booty; and endless war detracted from other matters of statecraft. So, the emirates, especially those on the Caliphate frontiers, had a vested interest in some form of negotiated co-existence that ensured the supply of slaves and economic goods to them as tribute. Of course, self-assertion and rebellion on the part of a Middle Belt subordinate was often met with fierce military retribution. These precolonial relational tensions created ambivalences of resentment and fear-inspired accommodations among Middle Belt peoples. Kukah sums it up this way: “Around the Middle Belt, the [Hausa-Fulani] Jihadists seemed more preoccupied with slavery, economic and political expansionism than the spread of the [Islam]. As a result, all forms of alliances came into being, but economic considerations were paramount.”

Although, as Kukah argues, the winning of converts to Islam in the Middle Belt gradually took a backseat, the spread of Islamic and Hausa-Fulani cultural influence did not. And although this was truer for the frontier non-Muslim communities of the Southern Kaduna and Bauchi corridors than it was for the Benue Valley, the fate of Doma and Bagaji in the southernmost part of the Middle Belt shows that Jihadist aggression and Caliphate influence spread to all of the Middle Belt. In fact, Doma and Bagaji, two Agatu Idoma states, would become satellite vassals of Zazzau in the mid-19th century by a combination of military defeats and strategic self-preservation through the acceptance of Caliphate influence and quasi-control. Caliphate slave raiding and the spread and policing of Caliphate culture was assured in the Middle Belt because of the influence and military might of the southern Fulani sub-emirates of Keffi, Suleja, Lapai, Nassarawa, and others, and because of the presence of numerous other enclaves of garrisoned Hausa-Fulani settlements in the Middle Belt.

It is this pre-existing, rather complicated, status of the Hausa-caliphate worldview, with all its cultural and religious corollaries, that the British encountered in the Middle Belt at the turn of the twentieth century. It is not clear if the British understood the troubled precolonial status and semiotic resonances of Hausa as a socio-political category in the non-Muslim sector of northern Nigeria. If they did, it didn’t stop them from crafting a colonial policy that privileged the emirate system of administration and social organization and sought to spread it to the Middle Belt, where several ethnic groups had either resisted it or were suspicious of it.

It should be acknowledged that the Hausa-Caliphate imaginary was not the only ethno-symbolic system that the British admired in northern Nigeria. There was for a time what one
could call a Jukun imaginary in the colonial officialdom. It was founded on the ancient Jukun (Kwararafa) kingdom which, in its heyday, conquered territory as far as Kano and much of the Middle Benue region. The British fascination with the Jukun imperial system lasted into the 1930s and spawned many quasi-ethnological and historical writings by British colonial officials and their underlings, the most notable of which is *A Sudanese Kingdom* by C.K. Meek, the official anthropologist of colonial northern Nigeria. However, as Margery Perham, herself a major actor in the northern Nigerian colonial scene, noted, the attitude of the British was largely one of “mournful fascination in studying this relic of an empire.” Although the northern Nigerian colonial bureaucracy had at one time toyed with the idea of reviving the “imperial technique” of the Jukun, “the hope was not fulfilled” because the Jukun system did not offer an administrative model “except that of decay.”

Hausa was not selected for a functional role in British colonialism a priori; nor was there a dearth of other candidates for the role. However, an Hausa political imaginary was, as far as the British were concerned, the only viable candidate, and, as a matter of historical fact, the Hausa model was the only one that made it into the administrative toolkit of the British, all other fascinating indigenous cultural and imperial systems having been discarded or discredited by the fact that their military and political power had been subsumed by the Sokoto Caliphate or had collapsed before the caliphate’s emergence.

The British embrace of the Hausa-Caliphate system was the product of a convenient confluence of administrative expediency and prior understandings of the sociopolitical system of the Caliphate. The British veneration of the Hausa-Caliphate model of social, political, and economic organization was consistent with a British colonial fixation on the administrative utility of so-called martial races and their assumed ability to act on behalf of the British as agents of socio-cultural tutelage and as proxy colonial administrators. This ideological component of British colonialism in northern Nigeria originated, as earlier noted, largely from India, where the system of identifying and using “martial races” had been in operation in the British Raj for more than a century.

**Caliphal and British Origins of the Hausa Imaginary**

As indicated earlier, the British pioneers of the colonial enterprise in northern Nigeria were interpreting the protectorate through the lens of earlier experiences which bestowed a utilitarian political importance on the idea of a ruling class, a higher race, and other similar categories. This ethnological taxonomy was inspired by similar British classifications in India. However, there were two important factors that reinforced the British functional preoccupation with sociological and anthropological categories in the northern Nigerian area. The first factor was Caliphate imperial discourses which represented the Caliphate-Hausa formation as a benign hegemon and the Middle Belt as its subordinate Other. The second was the elaboration of these discourses by British travelers and, subsequently, colonial ethnographers, a process which was not teleological but is nonetheless discernible.

The first major effort to discursively delineate the Sokoto Caliphate as an exclusive religious and political community and to define its Other was the *Infakul Maisuri* of Mohammed Bello. That important piece of Caliphate writing is best known for its exposition of what one
may call the Caliphate mind; its explanation of the theological and political vision of the Caliphate; its detailed narration of the course of the Jihad; and its discussion of the epistolary efforts to place the Caliphate above Bornu in the hierarchy of state Islamic piety. Much less known is the fact that Mohammed Bello’s *Infakul Maisuri* was the first treatise to articulate a Sokoto imperial hegemony over some areas of the Middle Belt. In the section dealing with states, kingdoms, and peoples, Mohammed Bello brings within Caliphate administrative jurisdiction several areas of the Middle Belt. For instance he defines the emirate of Zauzau as encompassing “many places inhabited by barbarians”—barbarians being a derogatory euphemism for the non-Muslim peoples of the Middle Belt located on Zauzau’s frontier.30 He projects Zauzau’s sway all the way to the entire Gbagyi country, the Bassa plains in the lower Benue, and as far south as Attagara (Idah) in Igala country.30 The oral traditions of the Bassa and the Igala do not attest to these claims, nor do any written non-Caliphate sources.32 Mohammed Bello imagined his imperial sway to include the Niger-Benue confluence zone of the Middle Belt, telling Clapperton: “I will give the King of England a place on the coast to build a town….God has given me all the land of the Infidels.”33

This semi-imperial vision may not have been an accidental occurrence. There appears to be a contradictory assertion of the Caliphate’s benign hegemony over the Middle Belt and an affirmation of the Middle Belt’s alterity in the *Infakul Maisuri*. The travel journal of Hugh Clapperton, the first British traveler to visit the Caliph in Sokoto, corroborates Mohammed Bello’s imperial vision.34 It also shows that this may not have been an idle imperial fantasy but a part of a strategic, if misleading, cartographic and discursive exercise by Clapperton’s aristocratic Caliphate informants. Clapperton journeyed through the Sokoto Caliphate in the 1820s, reaching Sokoto in 1825 and befriending Sultan Bello, son of Usman dan Fodio, who had succeeded to the throne at the latter’s death in 1817. It was Clapperton who brought excerpts from the *Infakul Maisuri* back to England in 1825.35 Mohammed Bello was Clapperton’s biggest source in his discussion of the non-Caliphate world of the Middle Belt.35 More importantly, Clapperton’s maps of the Caliphate and its Niger-Benue frontier, the first to be published in Britain, were drawn for him by Mohammed Bello, given to him from Mohammed Bello’s collection by a member of his household, and drawn by Clapperton or others on the instructions of Mohammed Bello himself.35

The maps and their accompanying narratives reveal a strategic inclusion of the Niger-Benue zone in the sphere of influence and jurisdiction of the Sokoto Caliphate, and a simultaneous Othering of the human communities of that zone. The Kwara River, for instance, is presented as the “largest river in all of the territories of the Houssa[Hausa].”44 Beyond the equation of the Caliphate with Hausa, this discourse, and the cartographic imagination that it may have sought to concretize, amounted to the discursive annexation of vast territories in the Niger-Benue confluence and Kwara non-Caliphate areas into the Sokoto Caliphate realm. How much of this cartographic and discursive annexation comes from Clapperton and how much came from Mohammed Bello and his other caliphate informants is not clear.

However, the trajectory of knowledge production and transfer from the Caliphate to the British in the early 19th century seems fairly clear thus far: the Caliphate’s representation of itself and its values and of the peoples on and outside its frontiers made it into the canonical knowledge base of Britain regarding northern Nigeria. It is unlikely that British views on the
people of the Middle Belt were shaped solely by Mohammed Bello’s characterization of the Middle Belt as a land of barbarians since the British had their own distinctions between the centralized Islamic Caliphate and its non-Muslim, politically fragmented others—views which were largely formed on account of the narratives of European travelers. What is clear is that there was a coincidental—and instrumental—convergence of Mohammed Bello’s and British travelers’ characterizations of the Caliphate/Middle Belt dichotomy. The two narratives reinforced each other and sustained British and Caliphal imperial imaginings of the Middle Belt and its peoples.

Much of Clapperton’s materials made it to London after Clapperton’s death in 1827 through Richard and John Lander, the next British travelers who journeyed to Sokoto and met the Caliph. Clapperton had left instructions before his death that Richard Lander, who was his servant, take possession of all his materials and deliver them to the Colonial Office, which sponsored the Sokoto expedition. The Lander brothers would later depend on Clapperton’s connections to the Caliphate leadership for sustenance, logistical help, information, and investigative and cartographic guidance.

As mentioned earlier, Clapperton drew the first known British map of the Sokoto Caliphate based on information provided to him by Mohammed Bello, and thus initiated the tradition of equating the Sokoto Caliphate and its frontiers with “Houssa [Hausa] Territory,” as he called it. This cartographic and descriptive convention seems to have stuck in subsequent British travel writing on the Caliphate as subsequent British travelers relied on the pioneering work of Clapperton and the Lander brothers. The British were subtly investing the Caliphate and its fringes in the Middle Belt with a Hausa-emirate imaginary. This reification of a growing notion of precolonial Hausa-Caliphate hegemony was important for the subsequent veneration of Hausa as veritable socio-linguistic category of colonial rule in northern Nigeria.

Subsequent British travelers relied on earlier depictions and accounts of the Sokoto Caliphate’s symbolic and physical relationships with the Middle Belt to reinforce impressions of Hausa-Caliphate primacy. An accumulated body of British-produced knowledge emerged from a succession of European explorers who traversed the Benue Valley, the Plateau, the hills of Southern Kaduna, and the Adamawa hinterland. The pronouncements and claims of these explorer-travelers underwrote initial British insights into the sociological makeup of northern Nigeria. The travelers either submitted their findings to the Colonial Office, published them in Britain, or both. The most famous of these explorers was Dr. Baikie, whose observations about the people of the Middle Belt often bordered on social Darwinist contempt. For instance, in 1854, he described the Tiv ethnic group who, along with the Idoma, Bassa, Junkun, Igala, and other groups, occupied the lower Benue valley as an: “unfortunate tribe [whose] being against everyone, and everyone against it, has rendered it extremely suspicious of any visitors, their crude minds being unable to comprehend anything beyond war and raping…the Mitshis as far as we could judge, are wilder and less intelligent than any of the African races with whom we had intercourse except Baibai and Djukuns.”

Baikie’s words above represent the articulation, however crudely, of a certain negative perception of the Tiv in particular, and the peoples of the Benue Valley and Niger-Benue confluence area in general. The evolutionary insinuations in Baikie’s description of the Tiv, the Middle Belt’s largest ethnic group, and the largest non-Hausa ethnic group in northern Nigeria,
is symptomatic of a larger strategic perception in which the people on the margins of the Caliphate and ‘outside’ the Hausa zone emerged as definitive Others. Baikie’s representational universe, and his allusions, must be understood as part, and a culmination, of a subtle, stealthy process of inscribing the Sokoto Caliphate’s geographical and sociological space as the administrative core of northern Nigeria. This characterization could only emerge convincingly through the simultaneous and contrapuntal characterization of its periphery — the Middle Belt.

Baikie’s use of the derogatory Hausa epithet Mitshis to describe and demarcate the Tiv as a people is instructive. It is possible that in the mid 19th century, when most ethnic groups were named by their more powerful neighbors or by regional hegemons, Baikie was using Mitshis as a purely descriptive term. It is therefore possible that his use of the term is not implicated in the demeaning associations inherent in the Hausa term Munchi, which he corrupted into Mitchis. Baikie’s affirmatory amplification of the meanings associated with the Hausa/Fulani name for the Tiv, however, reads like a conscious effort to flesh out and give evidentiary and observatory credence to what essentially was a nomenclature connoting the supposed aggression, cattle-snatching, and xenophobia of the agriculturally-inclined Tiv.44 Baikie’s detailed description of the Tiv as a “wild,” uncivilized, and unintelligent people belies the possibility that he was a neutral repeater of an existing cliché. The uncanny congruence between his descriptions and the anecdotal associations surrounding the Hausa word Munchi is too carefully constructed to be a mere rhetorical coincidence.

As specific as Dr. Baikie’s rendition of the Tiv personality was, its preoccupation with comparison and deviation must inform any critical understanding of his and other British explorers’ thinking. This cultural narrative, which served to erect a hierarchy of evolutionary maturity (or lack thereof), operated on two levels; it utilized both absence and presence. First, by casting the Tiv as the wildest and least intelligent of the peoples of northern Nigeria, Baikie’s observations indict the entire non-caliphate sector of the region for a supposed racial and cultural inferiority. That he positioned the Tiv in particular at the lowest rung of this ladder of evolutionary backwardness does little to diminish the larger indictment handed to the Middle Belt. Second, Dr. Baikie’s absent referent and comparative framework in this elaborate collage of cultural backwardness is clearly the Sokoto caliphate, described by most 19th century British explorers as the core of northern Nigeria.

The caliphate, both in its geographical, ethno-linguistic, and religious connotations, represented the unspoken paradigmatic cultural formation in the evolutionary hierarchy that was slowly emerging through British discourses about the northern Nigerian area. These narratives presented civilization, as far as its possibility in Nigeria was concerned, as being synonymous with Hausa acculturation. The Sokoto Caliphate occupied the upper perch of an emerging socio-political evolutionary ladder, with the Tiv and others like them at the bottom.

Indeed, Baikie’s observations about the Tiv, Idoma, and other peoples on the lower Benue and Niger confluence regions fit into a continuum of cultural hierarchy that European travelers to northern Nigeria in the 19th century erected and used to make sense of their observations. There is no evidence that there was an ideological or programmatic conspiracy on the part of the 19th century European explorers of northern Nigeria with the expressed purpose of subordinating the Middle Belt to the Caliphate. However, since explorers often organized their materials and their subjects in light of the earlier observations of other European travelers, who
were sometimes compatriots, Baikie’s ethnic and cultural categories, and the ways in which they foreground a pre-existing European perception of northern Nigerian historical sociology, is a significant subject for interrogation.

Before Baikie, Hugh Clapperton and Heinrich Barth both traversed the Sokoto caliphate in the early and mid-19th century respectively. The former visited both Kano and Sokoto, the headquarters of the Caliphate. The latter was in Borno, Kano, Zaria, Katsina, and parts of Bauchi. Richard Lander and his brother, John Lander, also undertook a quest for the ‘mouth of the Niger River’ in 1828-29, a mission designed to fulfill the dreams of Richard Lander’s mentor, Hugh Clapperton, who died near Sokoto in 1827 on his way to “discover” the source of the Niger. Other European explorers and sponsored adventurers traversed the Sokoto Caliphate in the early to mid-19th century. The journals of these European travelers are insightful as much for what they do not reveal as for what they do. The marginal presence of, and, in some cases, the erasure of the non-caliphate world of dar-al-harb (the abode of war), from the narrative of these travelers constitute the genealogical foundation of the discourses of Baikie and other explorers of the precolonial Middle Belt region. In these narratives the “pagans,” as the vast humanity of the Middle Belt are often represented, make occasional appearances as abodes of slave raiding by powerful, relatively civilized, Muslim emirates presiding over the dar-al-Islam (abode of Islam).

A notion of the Middle Belt’s peoples’ inferiority to the peoples of the Caliphate began to take shape under the weight of these representations, which were very influential in Britain as anthropological references on the Middle Belt. As E.P.T Grampton puts it, “there was a general belief [in colonial circles] that pagans [Middle Belters] were of inferior stock.” Such is the subordination of the Middle Belt to the Hausa-Fulani Caliphate cultural zone in colonial discourse that some scholars believe that British colonialism and Indirect Rule helped “institutionalize” what they see as a structural inferiority of non-Muslim peoples of the Middle Belt.

The British administrative valorization of the Caliphate Islamic political tradition emerged even before the conquest of northern Nigeria was completed, a clear indication that the narratives of British explorers, which were heavily dependent on Caliphal representations of Fulani power, influenced later colonial administrative policy that privileged the Caliphate model. In 1902, before the conquest of Sokoto, Frederick Lugard, commander of the British conquering force and the future Governor of northern Nigeria and Governor-General of Nigeria, signaled that the British regarded the Hausa-Fulani Islamic political institutions of the Caliphate as the administrative model for all of northern Nigeria:

The future of…. this Protectorate lies largely in the regeneration of the Fulani. Their ceremonial, their coloured skins, their mode of life, and habits of thought appeal more to the native population than the prosaic business-like habits of the Anglo-Saxon can ever do...nor have we the means at present to administer so vast a country. This then is the policy to which in my view the administration of northern Nigeria should give effect: viz to regenerate this capable race......so that......they become worthy instruments of rule.

Lugard was repeating and enunciating the dual British justification of the British adoption of the Hausa-Caliphate model of colonial administration: one was racio-evolutionary; the other was logistical expediency and pragmatism. Lugard’s wife, Flora Shaw, a major contributor to
early colonial policy, saw the Fulani as an “aristocratic,” race. They were “European in form,” had Arab blood, which “penetrated as far as climate could allow” and were of “races… higher than the negroid type.” Most importantly, they were a conquering and ruling race that occupied their present location in the Central Sudan by “driv[ing] the original inhabitants] Southwards” into areas that the “higher type could not live.” This fundamental misunderstanding of precolonial political realities in the northern Nigerian area—the early assumption that Fulani migrants and conquerors, either as nomads, adventurers, or Jihadists, had conquered or defeated the peoples of the Middle Belt and had established a recognized, undisputed regional political hegemony—inflected future British administrative policies and choices in northern Nigeria. These policies, understandably, treated the Middle Belt—even areas of it that had not physically encountered the Hausa-Fulani operatives of the Caliphate, not to speak of being conquered by them—as precolonial vassalages of the Caliphate. In fact, Lady Lugard believed that the Fulani were destined to rule over the peoples of the Middle Belt: “The ruling classes [of the Fulani] are deserving in every way of the name of cultivated Gentlemen, We seem to be in the presence of one of the fundamental facts of history, that there are races which are born to conquer and others to persist under conquest.”

Once the narrative of Fulani-Caliphate political primacy was established, the formulation of colonial policies and discourses that subordinated the Middle Belt to that administrative paradigm followed. The Middle Belt’s status as a periphery had to be discursively formulated, so that “civilizing” and preparing its peoples for Indirect Rule through the infusion of Caliphate-emirate symbols and agents would be possible and appear legitimate.

Civilizing the Periphery

The conflation of Hausa identity with a host of cultural and political practices and attributes had a profound effect on colonial administration in the non-Hausa speaking parts of the Middle Belt. Its manifestation resulted in a de facto bifurcated colonial administration: the Caliphate administration and what the British called “pagan” administration.

The concept of “pagan” administration had a special valence in British administrative policy in the Middle Belt. At conquest, the British had the option of utilizing the existing chieftaincy systems, which ranged from fairly formed chieftaincies in the Igala and Kabba areas, and the rather fragmented, weak chieftaincies, and elders’ councils of the Tiv, Idoma, Adamawa, Plateau, and Southern Kaduna corridors. But these systems hardly showed any promise of being amenable to the demands of Indirect Rule as envisioned by colonial British officers eager to collect taxes, maintain order, and establish the frameworks of colonial governmentality. The British opted for a hybrid which combined these institutions with a superstructure of the emirate system of administration. This was a unique contraption in that what was being embraced was a system with two, instead of one, African intermediate set of institutions and personnel. The British planned to supervise the emirate layer of this arrangement.

A crucial element of this colonial arrangement was the notion of tutelage and remediation. If the so-called pagan administration was a compromise birthed by expediency, the task of integrating the “pagan” areas into the northern Nigerian political mainstream—the emirate
system of the Caliphate areas—was its ultimate goal. The notion of preparing “pagans” to be more like the Hausa subjects of the defunct Sokoto Caliphate, and to thus be ready for Indirect Rule in its supposedly pure form, was germane to this system of administration. Such preparation and tutelage could only come from contact with the Muslim Hausa subjects of the defunct caliphate. The idea was to import these “Hausa” colonial subjects into Middle Belt as a full-fledged sub-stratum of the colonial administration, and to bestow on this cadre of colonial middlemen the task of civilizing and preparing the “pagans” for Indirect Rule. This strong commitment to Indirect Rule thus sought to create a unique administrative arrangement in which there was a civilizing mission within the civilizing mission, and in which there were two sets of colonials—the British and the Hausa.

This was not unique to northern Nigeria. In fact the British fondness for identifying and utilizing a “ruling race” was a defining principle of British colonialism in other parts of Africa. Lloyd Fallers’ example of how the British imported Western educated Buganda chiefs into the territories of the Busoga and the Bunyoro (in present-day Uganda), who were seen as lacking in centralized political institutions, is similar to the northern Nigerian situation. The Buganda chiefs were “mandated to remodel the political systems of the neighboring Busoga territories along Ganda lines” in order to achieve political sameness and uniformity in colonial administration.55 Roberts’ more specific exploration of Buganda “sub-imperialism” in colonial Uganda provides further analytical proof of the prevalence of the phenomenon of British enlistment of “alien” African agents of imperial tutelage.56 What was unique about the northern Nigerian case was that the Hausa colonials who were imported into the so-called pagan regions were, as we shall see shortly, not just chiefs; they included a whole coterie of specialists—interpreters, traders, Muslim scholars, clerks, messengers, policemen, bodyguards, and “political agents.” Each group of specialists was expected to contribute its expertise to this minor civilizing mission within the larger civilizing mission. This was an army of “foreign” administrative personnel, an imported sub-colonial infrastructure, which had a similar mandate as the Buganda chiefs, but which, unlike the latter, constituted a whole new layer of the British administrative contingent in the Middle Belt. More importantly, the importation of a new strata of Hausa specialists who were mandated to effect the social, economic, and political transformation of the people of the Middle Belt amounted in practice, and in its subsequent rhetorical elaboration, to a program of cultural and political make-over.

Hausa Interpreters in the Benue Valley

The adoption of the Hausa language as a colonial lingua franca in northern Nigeria was regarded in the British officialdom as a pragmatic, cheap, and expedient administrative decision.57 It also necessitated a British reliance on Hausa-speaking intermediaries and interpreters who also knew the local languages of the Middle Belt. For this reason and others, Hausa generated ambivalence in British officialdom; it was both celebrated and lamented. Its manifestation in the quotidian relational realities of the colonial situation was what one British official described as: “an unsatisfactory position [of] the European official having to commune with the Idoma through an [Hausa] interpreter.”58 He went further to record the assertion of one of his Idoma messengers, Itodu: “During his 17 years with Europeans he had not yet
worked with an admin officer who knew the language, A couple could say ‘come,’ ‘go,’ ‘bring,’ etc, etc., but no one has been here yet who could understand a complaint or follow a conversation in Idoma.”

This linguistic conundrum made the Hausa colonial interpreters an indispensable part of the colonial enterprise, furthering the friction between the British and the Idoma on the one hand and between the Idoma and the Hausa colonials on the other. The fact that most Idoma people didn’t speak Hausa and the Hausa interpreters didn’t speak Idoma very well made colonial interpretation a particularly charged arena of colonial misunderstanding.

In Tiv Division, the situation was hardly different. Hausa interpreters were part and parcel of British colonial activities in Tiv country from the time of the conquest in 1906. For that reason they emerged early as the visible and vulnerable face of British colonialism in Tivland. The destruction of the trading station of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) at Abinsi in Tivland in 1906 is generally regarded as the trigger or alibi for the British conquest of the Tiv. The events that led to the attack on the station are as interesting for our purpose as the British reaction. The Tiv and the Jukun combatants attacked the station not as a British-owned enterprise, and not necessarily to dislodge the British from their staked-out territory. They attacked it to uproot the hundreds of Hausa traders, merchants, and auxiliaries that had been imported to the station and had formed, through their association with the British chartered company, a visible underclass of colonials. The Tiv perceived the Hausa traders, workers, and interpreters at Abinsi as opportunists who were taking advantage of the well-armed RNC to exert concessions from the Tiv communities around Abinsi. Given the tense precolonial encounters between Hausa-Fulani traders and herders and the Tiv, this perception served as a Tiv rallying point against the Hausa interpreters and the British merchants who were their protectors and benefactors. About seventy-six Hausa colonial auxiliaries were killed and about 113 were taken captive in the attack. Apart from the destruction of the physical structures of the trading station, which was populated largely by the Hausa, there is no record of the targeting of British traders.

The attack on the Hausa allies and underlings of the British drew the latter into the fray. The subsequent military expedition against the Tiv was devastating, but of more significance was the fact that the declarations and activities designed to restore order and establish the rudiments of a colonial administration were supervised and mediated by Muslim Hausa interpreters, the victims of the earlier Tiv-Jukun raid who came back to Tiv territory with the British military as powerful agents of British colonialism, and with vengeance on their minds.

Makar notes that the “interpreters were Hausa, Nupe, and Yoruba.” But it is clear that interpreters who were of Yoruba and Nupe ancestry would have had to become sufficiently Hausa through their Islamic faith and proficiency in Hausa and through their familiarity with emirate administration for them to have been taken on as interpreters by the British. The declaration of victory by the British, and the plea for calm and order made to the Tiv after the end of the military action, was written and read in Hausa. It was then translated into Tiv by two Hausa interpreters, Mohammed and Maradu, Hausa Muslims who spoke Tiv. These were symbolic politics acts with probable implications for colonial power relations in Tiv Division.

Symbolic incidents like these suggest that the Hausa colonial presence in the non-Hausa speaking Middle Belt was more profound and more widespread than the narrow role of
linguistic interpreters might suggest, and that the British placed a significant degree of importance on the idea of tutelage-by-residence, an idea which was responsible for the direct importation of Hausa specialists, as well as the encouragement of their migration, to the so-called backward Divisions of northern Nigeria. In the next section, I look at the extent of the Hausa colonial presence in Idoma and Tiv Divisions.

The Hausa Colonials in Idoma and Tiv Divisions

The Hausa presence in early colonial Idoma and Tiv Divisions was a complex assemblage of personnel. It included traders, chiefs, interpreters, messengers, clerks, policemen (Dogarai), cooks, sanitary inspectors, and other colonial auxiliaries. The groups which had the most transformatory, and thus the most volatile, impact on these Divisions, were the traders and chiefs.

As stated earlier, the activities of Hausa traders affiliated to the British Royal Niger Company was the catalyst for the confrontations which led to the conquest of the Tiv area. In Idoma Division, Hausa traders were also at the center of early confrontations between the British and the Idoma. Hundreds of Hausa came to both Tiv and Idoma lands with the British, most of them traders. Mahdi Adamu has shown that in Tiv country, the British actively encouraged the Hausa—ethnic or assimilated—to settle in Katsina Ala, a town close to the frontier between the Tiv and Jukun.

This active recruitment of the Hausa into Tiv country rested on assumptions inherent in the British Hausa-Caliphate imaginary: the presence of the more economically rational and politically sophisticated inheritors of the Caliphate traditions would have a civilizing influence on the “primitive” Tiv.

In Idoma Division, a more profound version of this logic was at work. Hausa traders came in hundreds along with the British. This caused an immediate economic disquiet, quite unlike the reception granted the small number of Hausa elephant tusk buyers who used to visit the Idoma heartland in the precolonial period. Unlike the precolonial Hausa traders who came in insignificant trickles, the Hausa who came to Idomaland in the first two decades of the 20th century were what one colonial official described as “peddlers and rubber dealers.” The “opening up” of Idoma Division by the colonial conquest meant that even forests could now be penetrated to extract rubber and other economic products. These “peddlers” were visible bearers of the economic logics associated with the Hausa worldview. They carried the burden of propagating this worldview: that of instilling in the Idoma the virtues of economic rationality while banishing subsistence production and helping to create a monetized and market-oriented economy. They were envisioned by their British allies as economic proselytizers, much as other Hausa specialists were expected to propagate their specific skills and attributes.

The British belief that the Idoma, like other non-Hausa Middle Belt peoples, required a cultural and political make-over was elevated to an orthodoxy within British colonial officialdom. This orthodoxy stemmed, in part, from what was cast as a corpus of empirical observations made by British colonial officers who served in the Middle Belt and who were always willing to testify to the region’s backwardness. The sentiments of Robert Crocker, an Assistant District Officer, capture the prevailing British thinking regarding the Idoma economy. Crocker argued that Idoma modes of exchange were grossly underdeveloped, were not based
on money but barter, and thus lagged behind the protocols of economic exchange in the
Caliphate areas.

The standard leitmotif in the British characterization of the Idoma world has as its referent
the Caliphate/emirate model of social and economic organization. Thereafter, the British sought
to create an emirate-type economy in Idoma Division—an economy dominated by cash crops,
geared towards monetized exchange instead of barter, and driven by trade. This was an
economic vision which the Hausa traders were expected to promote through their acts of
buying and selling. In theory, this system of utilizing Hausa colonials to do the work of
civilizing the Idoma, made up for the massive personnel requirement that the British plan of a
wholesale make-over entailed. And since the Hausa traders were not paid a salary but thrived
on their profits, it seemed to be a reasonable, cheap way of fulfilling the British desire to make
the Idoma amenable to British colonial economics. In practice, it was convoluted, and its
consequences were serious for both Idoma-British and Idoma-Hausa relations.

For the British, the presence of the Hausa colonial auxiliaries and their activities were
pedagogical and symbolic acts that contributed to the civilization of the Idoma and prepared
them for Indirect Rule and other aspects of British colonial governmentality. The British
monitored the Hausa auxiliaries but not strictly. Consequently, the Hausa traders engaged in
trade practices that, by all accounts, bordered on economic insensitivity. Along with Sojan Gona
(unauthorized taxation and exactions), the practices of the Hausa traders, even by accounts of
colonial anthropologists and administrators, took away much of the colonial currency that
managed to get into Idoma Division, causing an inability to pay colonial taxes and to replenish
the instruments of production. This made the Hausa traders the objects of Idoma resentment.

As in the Tiv area, the opposition to the Hausa sub-colonial presence triggered the formal
British conquest of Idomaland. The destruction of the village of Odugbeho in 1899, an incident
which inaugurated the British conquest, was causally connected to the murder of a Hausa
trader by the Agatu villagers of Odugbeho. As A.P Anyebe has argued, the Idoma had a pre-
existing historical grievance against the Hausa, stemming from the failed attempt of
adventurous Caliphate flag bearers to capture Idomaland during the 1804 Fulani Jihad, an effort
which resulted in the “loss” of the two Idoma states of Doma and Bagaji. Thus the incident at
Odugbeho stemmed at once from residual resentment and new realities; realities that probably
merely reinforced old suspicions. The new reality was the perceived impoverishing economic
partnership of the British and the Hausa traders. The Idoma, Anyebe argues, “regarded the
Hausa as their old foes returning with a more powerful ally, the British.” The present crisis
reminded the Idoma of their earlier confrontations with the Hausa-Fulani: “when the Idoma
saw the Hausa they remembered with nostalgia (sic) the Fulani Jihad of the nineteenth
century.” But the newness of this crisis is also underscored by the fact that the Idoma were,
“angry particularly at the Hausa aliens that came with the British,” and by the fact that many of
the Hausa traders who came with the British were not Hausa by ethnicity but were Muslim and
Hausa speaking and were thus adjudged to be socially and economically superior to the
Idoma.

There is no evidence that the Hausa traders were the targets of Idoma angst for merely
being Hausa. On that point, Anyebe may be exaggerating the longevity of precolonial grievance.
What is implicated in these incidents of hostility towards the Hausa traders is a new regime of
partnership between Hausa auxiliaries and British officials. This formed the backdrop of the alleged economic exploitation of the Idoma hinterland by the Hausa traders, produce buyers, and currency dealers. What fueled the suspicions was a new Idoma perception of the intertwining of Hausa trading and British colonialism in Idomaland.

There is also no evidence that Hausaized Nupe, Yoruba, and Gbagyi attracted special suspicion. The fluidity of Hausa identity, which started with the spread of the Hausa trade and religious diaspora in West Africa, was accentuated by the adoption of Hausa as a regional lingua franca by the British. Thus many Muslim northern Nigerians originating in the non-Hausa caliphate areas, who were Nupe, Ilorin Yoruba, or Gbagyi, insinuated themselves to the colonial administration by performing their Hausaness. That Hausa-speaking persons who were not ethnically Hausa were able to pass themselves off as Hausa and were officially regarded as such underscores the British obsession with Hausa as marker of socio-political distinction. It didn’t necessarily exacerbate or mitigate the perception that “Hausa” traders were conspiring with the British to take out currency and products from Idoma Division and leaving peasants unable to pay taxes or fulfill other colonial obligations. What it shows is that, as Kukah argues, the Hausa language and its associative attributes was one of instruments of a subtle Hausa-Fulani hegemony. In the British administration’s pursuit of this hegemony, the Hausaized Gbagyi, Nupe, and Yoruba who served as British colonial agents in Idomaland were as much victims as they were agents of this “Anglo-Fulani hegemony.”

Once the Hausa claims of these colonial Hausa persons received colonial blessings, they assimilated, at least officially, into the colonial functionality of Hausa identity (joining ethnic Hausas recruited by the British). The British regarded them as individuals who embodied a certain socio-economic imaginary that only exposure to the Caliphate’s traditions and to Islam bestowed on a person. Within the colonial system therefore, the Idoma saw these assimilated Hausa as Abakpa—the Idoma name for Hausa people—and treated them as such. As Anyebe notes, “As far as the Idoma were concerned any black man who came with the British and spoke to the white man in any language which was Hausa…. straight away became Hausa.”

The Idoma resentment of the Hausa colonial presence was profound. Because the British neither acknowledged the problem nor took steps to assuage the suspicions and resentment of the Idoma, the attacks on Hausa traders continued. In 1906 another Hausa trader was killed at Aku, a village close to Odugbeho. A British reprisal expedition was quickly assembled. It marched on both Odugbeho and Aku, destroying them both. The following year, eight Hausa traders collecting rubber from trees in Adoka territory were murdered. As a reprisal in defense of their Hausa allies, the British attacked Adoka, killing more than twenty people, razing twenty-three Adoka villages, and confiscating the Adoka people’s livestock and food to support to expedition.

These confrontations were frequent and rife throughout Idomaland; the Idoma targeted the Hausa colonial auxiliaries, drawing reprisals from the British, leading to the destruction of more Idoma villages and more vengeful targeting of the Hausa auxiliaries in a destructive cycle of violence. In 1912, the people of Onyangede were severely punished by the British for an attack on British-backed Hausa traders and colonial scribes in Onyangede. The attack resulted in the burning down of the houses of Hausa residents of the town. The British Resident had arranged
a quick evacuation of the Hausa traders and interpreters to prepare for the British assault on Oyangede so as to remove them from the danger of further Idoma attacks.

In 1914, the Ugboju people, led by Ameh Oyi Ija, the deputy to the chief of the district, attacked the residents of the Hausa traders at Ombi, an attack which resulted in the death of “a large number” of Hausa. Four years earlier in 1910, one of the most violent rebellions against the British and their Hausa allies was put down at Ugboju. A British expedition sent to pacify the Oyangede and Ugboju people was ambushed by several Ugboju warriors led by Amanyi, the deputy Chief of Ugboju. The ambush was crushed, and the Ugboju combatants defeated. Amanyi was captured and deported to Keffi in 1912, but was restored to his position later that year. Amanyi is an interesting case study in the pitfalls of the administrative implementation of the Hausa-Caliphate imaginary, for he was a chief appointed by the British after passing through a period of tutelage under a Hausa chief appointed by the British. The story of Amanyi is also a good point of transition to the phenomenon of Hausa chiefs in Idoma and Tiv Divisions.

Colonial Hausa Chieftaincy

The second most important plank of the British implementation of the program of cultural and political makeover in the Middle Belt was the cultivation of a chieftaincy sensibility through the establishment of chieftaincy institutions deemed amenable to the demands of Indirect Rule. The aim was to integrate the Middle Belt into what was considered the political mainstream of northern Nigeria: the centralized chieftaincy system represented by the emirate tradition.

In 1933, Robert Crocker, a District Officer in Idoma Division remarked that, “in a Hausa emirate” one of the Idoma chiefs he encountered and had the “misfortune” of working with “would not be given the job of a headman on a roadwork let alone a District Headship.” He went on to describe the native court system (modeled after that of the emirate areas) as a charade and a poor, incomplete copy of the emirate/Caliphate prototype. For him, these quasi-colonial institutions in Idoma Division were undermined by an endemic problem of weak chieftaincy, and an innate Idoma disregard for order, legality, and leadership. Another Idoma chief who worked with Crocker was “a dreadful person” who did nothing but “yawn[ed] like an animal and scratch[e]d himself.” Another Idoma Chief was so ineffective as a chief that he was caught “in a much tattered cloth” being beaten by a subject of his. One Idoma chief chased down a man “with his staff of office” illustrating the “ways and doings of the Idoma nobility.” The subtext to all these characterizations was a lamentation about the absence of an emirate-type system of political and social organization, and the resultant difficulty in forging Indirect Rule. The unspoken empirical referent in these lamentations was the emirate/Caliphate chieftaincy system.

As stated earlier, the Tiv were similarly characterized as a chiefless people, lacking order, social cohesion, and political leadership. Makar has described the British attitude as a product of a preconception that was removed from actual encounters with the Tiv. This perception, which cast the Tiv as the civilizational antithesis of the Hausa emirates as well as the initial difficulty of “pacifying” the Tiv “frustrated [the British] into neglecting the study of the people’s
political institutions.” At work was the deployment of a notion of Tiv political backwardness, which was constructed against the backdrop of an established notion of Hausa-Caliphate political superiority.

If Idoma and Tiv Divisions were seen as epitomes of deviation from the preferred caliphate political typology, which was regarded as the political raw material for Indirect Rule, there was a concomitant belief in the possibility of redeeming these Divisions from their backward political histories, and in the ability of Hausa political tutelage to correct this political deficiency. Thus in both Idoma and Tiv, Hausa chiefs were foisted on the people, saddled with a finite mandate of inculcating in their Idoma and Tiv subjects the virtues of political order symbolized by a central chiefly authority.

In 1914, Audu Dan Afoda, a Nupe, Hausa-speaking Muslim who had served as an interpreter and political agent for a succession of British District officers was appointed the Sarkin Makurdi (Chief of Makurdi). The appointment of a Hausaized Nupe to govern the Tiv of the Makurdi area underlined the British commitment to the idiom of Hausa as a principle of Indirect Rule in the Middle Belt. It validates Mahdi Adamu’s assertion that “the Hausa ethnic unit...is an assimilating ethnic entity and the Hausa language a colonizing one.” Makurdi was a burgeoning colonial town on the River Benue, in Tiv territory. Many Tiv from the adjoining Tiv communities and towns migrated to Makurdi in the late 19th century and early 20th and gave it a Tiv urban character. It also became a locus of an emerging sense of urban Tiv political imagination. Between 1914 and 1926, the British government systematically brought the surrounding Tiv districts under Dan Afoda’s leadership, approving the appointment of his Hausa messenger, Garuba, as the Village Head of the strategic Tiv border town of Taraku in 1924.

In appointing Dan Afoda to the supreme position of ruler of the Tiv, the British hoped that his chieftaincy would tutor the Tiv in the ways of centralized emirate-type leadership. In 1926, the Resident of Benue Province reaffirmed the necessity of this sub-colonial tutelage, stating that Audu Dan Afoda’s chieftaincy was “still useful,” since the hope that it “would exert an educational influence [on the Tiv] is being fulfilled.” In fact in 1937, when there was a growing agitation for an appointment of a “chief of Tiv,” the Resident at the time echoed a similarly pedagogical view of the presence of Audu as a symbol and instrument of political tutelage. He believed that Dan Afoda’s mandate of politically civilizing the Tiv was not yet accomplished, since “Central Administration was yet at its infancy” in Tivland, although he also believed that “gradually as a higher education marches with a growing feeling of nationality, a real central administration may be evolved” as a culmination of this evolution toward political centralization. Subsequently, Dan Afoda was accorded further preeminence by leading the Tiv delegations to the periodic northern Nigerian chiefs meeting in Kaduna, the regional colonial headquarters.

Audu Dan Afoda died in 1945, setting off a firestorm of agitation by the Tiv for a Tiv to succeed him as the supreme chief of the Tiv. The initial attempt by the British to appoint a relation of the dead chief, another “Hausa,” and the belief among the Tiv that the Hausa had too much influence in colonial Tivland contributed to the outbreak of street riots in Makurdi in 1947. The riots quickly degenerated into open street clashes between the Hausa and Tiv populations of Makurdi. The riots were the deadly culmination of a long period of Tiv
resentment of the imposition of Hausa chiefs and a perceived colonial preference for governing Makurdi with the active participation and consultative input of Hausa auxiliaries. The Tiv, Makar posits, “[R]esented the Hausa influence in Makurdi Town although they did not object to their presence. The Tiv resented the Hausa control of the courts, political power and landed property…scarcely could the Tiv secure plots of land or find accommodation in Makurdi when they were in transit.”

The Makurdi clashes were put down by the British, and the nascent Tiv uprising was crushed. Subsequently, the British decided not to appoint a replacement for Dan Afoda, and to move away from the Hausa system of centralized leadership in Tivland in the interest of peace. Makurdi remains without a Chief until today, although the Tiv now have a central Chief, the Tor Tiv, who is based n Gboko.

In Idoma Division, the appointment of Hausa chiefs did not result in such dramatic backlashes, but they were equally contentious. In 1907, a Hausa-speaking Muslim Yoruba trader from the Caliphate town of Ilorin, Alabi, who had become Hausaized and had adopted the Muslim name Abubakar, was appointed by the British as the District Head of Ugboju. The difference between this and the Makurdi case in Tivland was that an Idoma, Amanyi, was installed as Abubakar’s political apprentice. This was a clear expression of British commitment to the civilizing influence of Hausa/emirate chieftaincy and their commitment to an administrative philosophy governed by the Hausa-Caliphate imaginary.

The Hausa Auxiliaries

Seated lower in the hierarchy of Hausa colonial specialists in Idoma Division, but almost as influential in the colonial power relations were the messengers, clerks, scribes, and policemen. Like the Hausa traders and chiefs, they were often Muslim men of emirate origin who were either ethnic Hausa or had ‘become Hausa’ in name and in self-portrayal. They were responsible for the everyday details and nitty-gritty of the colonial administration, collecting taxes, taking censuses, touring villages to compile agricultural statistics, and carrying out other duties delegated to them by their British employers and guardians.

As the administrative buffer between the British and the Idoma, these groups of Hausa colonials exerted enormous influence on colonial power relations, and, in many districts, they were put in charge of tax collection, the most volatile colonial task in much of colonial northern Nigeria. By the late 1920s, most of the Hausa chieftaincies in Idoma Division had given way to the ascension of trusted and apprenticed Idoma chiefs and headmen. The Hausa clerks, messengers, and scribes, however, remained the bedrock of colonial administration in Idoma Division until the economic depression of the 1930s, when the imperative of cost-cutting led to their replacement by cheaper Idoma colonial auxiliaries.

The involvement of the Hausa clerks in the task of tax collection sat uneasily with their already tense presence and with the peculiar difficulties that the Idoma experienced with British taxation—a difficulty caused mainly by their need-based system of commercial agricultural production and their cultivation of food crops that were much less marketable than the cash crops cultivated in the emirate sector of northern Nigeria.
The Hausa clerks did not disrupt the economic lives of the Idoma, but their role in British taxation was a dreaded one. As a result, they too, attracted a measure of hostility from the Idoma. Another source of friction was that, like the Hausa traders, the scribes and clerks led lives that were physically, attitudinally, and materially removed from their host milieus. The British set them up in separate, relatively elegant residential quarters funded by Idoma taxpayer money and built by Idoma labor. Anyebe claims that they also exhibited an air of superiority that was coextensive with the declared and codified superiority of the British. Anyebe’s description of the situation in the Igedde area is telling:

There was another strange element—the messengers, scribes or clerks who manned the courts and the administration. They were not even Igedde but ‘Hausa’ and Muslim. Like the white colonialist these black imperialists would not live amongst and mix with the people. They stayed on their own. They had their own quarters just as the Whiteman had his own Government Reservation Area……In Oju I was shown the former abode of these colonial agents near the site of Ihyo market. It is now fully overgrown with trees and grass. The Igedde hated this “Hausa” class most. They looked upon them as collaborators with the British.

Anyebe overstates the Hausa agency in the de facto residential and social segregation that resulted from the British reliance on the Hausa colonials. He also ignores the fact that, in many ways, the Hausa auxiliaries too were victims of a colonial administrative policy shaped by the racist notion of the more civilized natives helping to civilize the less civilized ones. But the hostility that he describes is real. It prompted the Igedde to take up arms against both the British and their Hausa allies in 1926. The rebellion was led by Ogbuloko Inawo, a young man reputed to possess magical powers. Ogbuloko had briefly been deputized for a Hausa colonial tax collector, a job which exposed him to the novel resentments that British taxation generated among the Idoma. Subsequently he became an anti-tax agitator, relinquishing his employment with the British to begin plotting an uprising against the British and their Hausa administrative allies. The Ogbuloko uprising of 1926-29 was the bloody outcome of built-up anti-British grievances of which the Hausa colonials were the visible and vulnerable symbols and reminders.

The uprising was so popular that it took a massive military operation by the British to crush.

Conclusion

This paper has examined one aspect of a very complex historical problem; the ideological origins and colonial administrative motivations for the political and economically consequential presence of Muslim, Hausa-Fulani colonial auxiliaries in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. While the presence of Hausa and Hausaized Muslims in the two Divisions focused on predated British colonialism, it was reified and elevated by British colonial administrative practices into a quasi-colonial community. I argued that through a long process of articulation, elaboration, and implementation, a novel corpus of significations founded on real and constructed socio-economic and political attributes of Hausa sociolinguistics was foisted on the non-Hausa speaking, non-Muslim peoples of the Middle Benue area of the Middle Belt. These impositions provoked violent backlashes in many cases. But more importantly, they complicated Idoma and Tiv engagements with British colonialism, victimizing both the Idoma and Tiv, and the Hausa...
auxiliaries—who were perceived and treated by the Idoma and Tiv as the visible and vulnerable embodiment of British colonialism.

This analysis complicates an important paradigm of African colonial studies: the consensus that colonialism was an ideology founded starkly on divide and rule, and that colonial powers created and reified ethnic boundaries and differences to suit colonial bureaucratic, documentary, and administrative aims. This important and correct observation has been well documented. However, this study shows that British colonialism sometimes prioritized a unitary and totalizing doctrine of rule, and that the British sometimes pursued cultural, economic, and political uniformity and sameness with as much vigor as they reified and accentuated the difference between African peoples in order to rule them. In the area under consideration, the British did not so much seek to formalize and codify difference as to use difference (between the Hausa-Caliphate model of social, political and economic organization and the material and symbolic universe of the Middle Belt) to achieve a measure of sameness and uniformity and in colonial administration. The aim of this project, I argue, was not to inscribe a new administrative system onto northern Nigeria but to prepare those perceived as being to “backward” for integration into the Indirect Rule system.

The aim of the British in seeking to engineer cultural and economic sameness by socializing the Idoma and Tiv into the administrative mainstream in northern Nigeria was the achievement of the highest possible degree of Indirect Rule. The aim of the more analyzed British magnification and codification of ethnic and cultural difference was the same: to establish a firm foundation for Indirect Rule. Indirect Rule was the overarching colonial obsession in both approaches. For it was precisely the thinking that the worldview and practices of the Idoma and Tiv were incompatible with Indirect Rule which birthed the idea of tutoring them into the readiness for the administrative system through the use of Hausa auxiliaries.

In this particular case, the desire to save money and personnel (which a different system of administration for the Middle Belt would have required), and a British belief in the potential of ‘native’ civilizing ‘native’ through British supervision authorized and sustained the British commitment to the Hausa-Caliphate imaginary.

Notes

1. The Hausa-Caliphate imaginary is actually a Hausa-Fulani caliphate imaginary. Starting from the late 18th century when commingling and intermarriages between the Hausa and the Fulani increased, a new ethnic category emerged. This category is linguistically Hausa but it is a hybrid of Fulani and Hausa culture. After the Othman bin Fodio Islamic Jihad, the mutual assimilation of the Hausa and Fulani accelerated. Presently, apart from small pockets of ethnic Fulani in the Adamawa area, smaller pockets of transhumant Fulani all over northern Nigeria, and the Maguzawa non-Muslim Hausa in the Northwestern states of modern Nigeria, much of the population of the pre-Jihad territory of Hausaland is made up of people who can be called Hausa-Fulani. Indeed, this is the term in use in contemporary Nigerian political and ethnic taxonomies and discussions.
Several competing definitions of the Middle Belt abound, especially since the Middle Belt is a geographically fluid existence. In general it is agreed that a conservative territorial estimation of the Middle Belt (as opposed to the idea of a Greater Middle Belt, which is a largely political construct appropriating all non-Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri peoples of northern Nigeria) comprises of Benue, Plateau, Kwara, Kogi, Southern Kaduna, FCT, parts of Niger, Adamawa, and Taraba states. Even this territorial definition is imperfect, since in all these states, there are significant numbers of Muslim non-Hausa as well Muslim Hausa peoples, who may or may not be captured by specific delineations of the Middle Belt. Similarly, “Muslim Hausa” states like Kebbi, Gombe, Bauchi, Borno, and even Katsina and Kano contain pockets of non-Hausa, non-Muslim populations that may qualify as Middle Belters in the political sense of the word, since Middle Belt identity is often politically constructed against Hausa-Fulani, Sokoto Caliphate Muslim identity. There were and still are non-Hausa, non-Muslim peoples in the Jos Plateau, parts of Bauchi, Taraba, Adamawa, and Southern Borno who historically spoke Hausa as second or third languages, and these non-Caliphate people who did/do not share in Hausa ethnicity either by inheritance or assimilation were also subjected to the British policy of cultural erasure and assimilation. The non-Hausa speaking, non-Muslim sector of northern Nigeria, on the other hand, is a narrower descriptive category which consists of districts in the former Benue, Ilorin, and Kabba Provinces, whose populations, for the most part, didn’t speak Hausa at all.

2. By assimilation I do not imply that the British wanted to convert, by fiat or process, one ethnic group into another, or that it entailed losing one’s ethnic consciousness—that would contradict the principles of indirect rule. Rather, I use the term to describe the process of making a people acquire the socio-economic and political attributes of another people for purely functional (in this case, colonial administrative) purposes.

4. Coleman, 1958, 194
10. For the scope of Hausa as a linguistic category, and for a discussion of its origins and spread in West Africa and in northern Nigeria, see Philips, Spurious Arabic, 2000. For a history of the Hausa ethnic group and of the spread of Hausa identity and influence in Nigeria and West Africa, see Mahdi Adamu, 1978.
‘Sudan’ and ‘Hausa States’ interchangeably to refer to the geographical area we now call Hausaland.


14. See for instance the Infakul Maisuri of Mohammed Bello. His own testimonies and the many earlier texts that he quotes and consults attest to this history of ethnic Hausa-Fulani intermingling in the Western Sudan.

15. The Maguzawa can still be found in small communities in Kano, Jigawa, and Katsina States of Northernwestern Nigeria. Their unique, non-Islamic culture has come under sustained assault from the governments of these states; they are a constant target of Islamization campaigns, which have converted many of them to Islam, especially many of their young ones, who see Islamization as an access to urban life. This author has observed these Islamization campaigns. Islamization has also eroded many aspects of their culture. The adoption of the Sharia criminal legal code in many northern Nigerian states in the last seven years has had a devastating effect on their way of life as several aspects of their culture, including the brewing of grain beer, were deemed un-Islamic and banned.

16. Maguzawa was used to denote non-Muslim Hausa people who submitted to the authority of the Sokoto Caliphate and paid tribute in exchange for being allowed to keep their identity and culture. The word itself is a Hausa version of “Majus” or a “Magian”, one of the peoples of the book that, according to the ethics of Jihad in Islamic doctrine, could be accorded protection in an Islamic state in exchange for loyalty and the Jizya. See Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longman, 1967), 67 fn. 18. The term “Majus” was also used by the Jihad leaders to refer to the Zamfarawa (the people of Zamfara), before the Jihad because they were seen as mostly non-Muslims as opposed to the people of other Hausa states who were constructed as nominal Muslims. See Mohammed Tukur b. Muhammad, Qira al-ahibba (1908), cited in Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, 67.

17. Pierce, 2005, p.27.


21. Arnette, Infaku’l Maisuri. Mohammed Bello’s narrative on the expeditions on the frontiers of Idomaland (Doma) is a rather triumphalist rendering of the encounters between the Agatu Idoma and the Fulani raiders in that it masks the stalemated outcome of the wars. The wars produced uneasy stalemates and fluid triumphs for Keffi, the Zazzau-controlled raiding sub-emirate in the area. The stalemates nonetheless
resulted in the partial adoption of Islam and Hausa-Fulani culture as a strategy of survival and accommodation.

22. This is a Hausa term denoting trust but which, according to John Nengel, was enunciated into a political doctrine that allowed expanding Muslim polities and migrants from different parts of the Sokoto Caliphate to coexist peacefully with the non-Muslim peoples of the Central Nigerian Highlands. The terms of *amana* included stipulated tributes paid to the neighboring Muslim polities of Bauchi and Zazzau by the non-Muslim, non-Hausa Fulani states and mini-states on the Southern frontiers of the Caliphate as well as the reciprocal offer of protection from the emirates and sub-emirates. See Nengel, 1999. Although the works of Professor James Ibrahim cast some doubt on the extent to which the *amana* system was the normative relational model on the non-Muslim Southern frontier of the Caliphate, there is evidence to suggest that amana did hold informally in some areas and over certain periods.

23. I owe this point to Professor Murray Last who drew my attention to it in a personal conversation. Also see Professor Last’s essay: “The Idea of ‘Frontier’ in the Nigerian Context,” 1982.


26. Ibid.

27. Meek, 1931. C.K Meek was the Anthropological Officer of the northern Nigerian Colonial Administration in the late 1920s and wrote for the British much of the ethnological notes on the ethnic groups of northern Nigeria. By 1931, he had risen to the position of Anthropological Officer, Administrative Service, Nigeria. One of Meek’s assistant, Bitemya Sambo Garbosa II, wrote a history of the Chamba of the Benue based on research he conducted in Donga in 1927. It was published in two volumes as *Labarun Chambawa da Al’ Amurransa* and *Salsalar Sarakunen Donga*. The two were published privately at about 1960 and were microfilmed by the University of Ibadan. For more bibliographic information on this, see Fardon, 1988, p.78 and p.345.


29. Ibid., p.145.


33. Ibid.

34. Far from being controlled formally or informally by the caliphate zone, the Idah court was in fact building and consolidating its control over Nsukka Igbo and other peoples within its vicinity. In fact, as Shelton argues, the Igala were, like the Sokoto Caliphate, an imperial power in their own right. See Shelton, 1971.


38. See Clapperton, 2005, Appendix v-vi, pp. 485-486; p.493. Much information came from Mohammed Bello himself or members of his household. The map of the Caliphate’s
Hausa core given to Clapperton and published in his journal, for instance, came from one Musa, a member of Mohammed Bello’s household.

39. Ibid., appendix v, p.485; p.491; p.493.
40. Ibid., p.515. See p.488-511, for the maps used by Clapperton to represent the Sokoto Caliphate, its many emirates, trade routes, and Borno.
41. Ibid., p.397; p.486.
42. Ibid. “Appendix 5: Contemporary maps.”
43. Baikie, 1854, p.106.
44. The word Munchi or Munci means “We have eaten[the cattle],” a Hausa expression which the Tiv allegedly used to explain to the Hausa-speaking Fulani pastoralists that their cattle had been taken. That the Tiv used Hausa to communicate with the Tiv pastoralists that they encountered is evidence of the fact that Hausa was a linguistic idiom which mediated relations between Hausa-speaking peoples and the non-Hausa speaking peoples of the Benue Valley in the precolonial period. The etymology of the ‘munci’ label is a poignant metaphor for the troubled and tense encounters which the Hausa-Fulani presence in the Tiv area produced.
45. For a full account of Clapperton’s two phase travels in the Sokoto Caliphate, see his published journal, Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa from the Bight of Benin to Soccatoo (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Carey, 1829). Clapperton made his first journey to the Hausa States, the core of the Sokoto Caliphate, in 1822-1825. He met with the Shehu with whom he exchanged gifts and signed ‘a treaty of trade and friendship.’ He died on his second expedition, which he described as a quest to discover the mouth of the Niger River. His death occurred near Sokoto on April 13, 1827 before he could accomplish this mission.
46. See Barth, 1890; Ochonu, 2001.
47. For a full account of the Lander brothers’ travels, see their published journal titled Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger, with a Narrative of a Voyage Down that River to its Termination, 2 vols. (New York: J & J Harper, 1832-37).
52. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Most of the Hausa interpreters were not ethnic Hausa but Hausaized Nupe, Gbagyi, and Ilorin Yoruba, but they were all Muslims and were chosen because of their understanding of, and/or prior participation in, Caliphate administrative practices, and because they had lived or traded in the Benue valley and had interacted with the Idoma.

61. The Royal Niger Company (RNC) was reconstituted from the National African Company in 1886 as a conglomerate uniting the major British trading firms on the Niger. The company grew through the brinkmanship of its first head, George Goldie, who oversaw the formation of the company’s army, the RNC constabulary, signed most of the treaties that gave the British a foothold on the Niger, eliminated French and German trade rivals, and engaged in informal imperial practices such as expeditions and interference in African political affairs. All this was possible because the company had a royal charter. The charter was withdrawn by the British government in 1899, leading to the taking over by the inchoate British colonial authority in northern Nigeria of the assets of the company and the compensation of its shareholders. George Goldie was succeeded by Frederick Lugard, who presided over the company’s liquidation and its transformation into a colonial administrative and quasi-military entity. Lugard also oversaw the formal annexation and routinization of the territories that the RNC had established informal colonial administrative control over.


63. These encounters involved alleged Tiv theft of Hausa-Fulani cattle and Tiv raid of Hausa merchandize along the Abinsi trade corridor. See Ikime, 1977, p.169-177.

64. Makar, 1994, p.119.

65. Ibid., p.103.


70. See NAK/OTUDIST ACC26 ‘Eastern District of Okwoga’ by N.J Brooke.


72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.


75. Ibid., p.3.

76. See Adamu, 1978.

77. Anyebe, 2002, p.64

78. Ibid., Okwu, 1976.


80. Ibid., p.66.


82. Ibid.

83. Ibid. 10/11/1933.

84. Ibid. 14/11/1933.
85. Makar, 1994, p.89.
89. H.H Wilkinson, 1937: NAI CSO 26/12874 vol. XI.
90. Makar, 1994, p.175.
92. For more detail on the day-to-day administrative activities of the Hausa auxiliaries, see the journals of Hugh Elliot (Journal of H. P Elliot, Assistant District Officer, Rhodes House Mss. Afr. S. 1336), and that of W.R Crocker (Rhodes House Mss. Afr. S. 1073, 1.). In these journals the Hausa dogarai (policemen), “mallams” (scribes and tax collectors), and messengers feature prominently in the daily records of administrative proceedings in Idoma Division. The malleability of Hausa as category is underscored by the fact that some of these auxiliary colonial actors were identified as Muslim Nupe, who were “Hausa” enough for the task of administering Idoma Division by virtue of their descent from the Caliphate tradition.
94. Ibid.
97. See for instance, Mahmood Mamdani, 2002, and 1996. In both works, he discusses the ways in which colonialism created little ethno-cultural autocracies and bureaucratized them as an essential element of the colonial system. In the former work, he argues that the Belgian colonial creation of Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities, and their bureaucratization and politicization was one of the remote causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

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The 5th Francophonie Sports and Arts Festival: Niamey, Niger Hosts a Global Community

SCOTT M. YOUNGSTEDT

Abstract: This paper explores transnational and local cultural, political, and economic dimensions of the 5th Jeux de la Francophonie (“Francophonie Games” or “Francophonie Sports and Arts Festival”) held in Niamey, Niger in December 2005. The Jeux were designed to promote peace, solidarity, and cultural exchange through sports and the arts. This paper focuses on the kinds of discourses that were represented and celebrated in the social and political arena of the Jeux. It aims to contribute to the discussion of (1) the politics of Francophonie concept, (2) the negotiation of local and global politics in the context of major sports and arts events, and (3) the representation of local, national, and global politics in public ceremonies.

The Francophonie Community Seeks Solidarity through the Universal Languages of Sports and Arts

This paper explores transnational and local cultural, political, and economic dimensions of the 5th Jeux de la Francophonie (“Francophonie Games” or “Francophonie Sports and Arts Festival”) held in Niamey, Niger in December 2005. Approximately 2,500 athletes and artists, and hundreds of their coaches representing 44 member nations of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) competed in seven sports (track and field, basketball, boxing, soccer, judo, African wrestling, and table tennis) and seven arts (singing, oral storytelling, literature, dancing, painting, photography, and sculpture). While all participants in the Jeux reside in member nations of the OIF, choices of athletes and artists were based on the excellence of their performance and not on French literacy. Roughly 2,000 foreign nationals also attended as supporters.

The Jeux produced collective exhilaration. This extravagant spectacle of global Francophonie, Nigerien nationalism, and ethnic diversity enabled participants to celebrate and examine their fluid transnational, national, and local identities. In this time of culture wars, misunderstanding between Muslims and Christians, growing divisions within France (exposed dramatically in the massive protests staged largely by African immigrants in fall 2005), hot wars, and the so-called “global war on terror,” the Jeux offers a fantastic idea: we can work toward peace, unity, and global understanding through sports and the arts—“the two universal
languages” (CIJF 2006). Several important sub-themes were also expressed throughout the Jeux, namely: a vision of universal humanity with generous hospitality offered equally to all people, the creative blending of tradition and modernity, and gender equity. These ideals were expressed through sports, but even more directly through the arts and grand spectacles. Indeed, the inclusion of arts and sports in equal measure distinguishes the Jeux from analogous events such as the Olympics and the British Commonwealth Games.

The core agenda of building Francophonie solidarity through sports and the arts created a distinctive ethos for the Jeux. Planners, participants, and audiences sought creative synergy between competition and cultural exchange. While world-class athletes vied for hundreds of gold, silver, and bronze medals and were monitored by anti-doping officials, winning was not everything. For example, as the two leading women in the marathon—Céline Comerais and Elena Fetizon, both of France—ran down the home stretch, they locked arms to cross the finish line simultaneously. Furthermore, although some artists were “in it to win it,” the arts lend themselves better to cultural dialogue than to competition and ranking. Many artists avidly discussed their work with each other. Audiences appreciated non-medal winners’ talents as much as—and in many cases more than—medal winners’ skills.

This paper focuses on the kinds of discourses that were represented and celebrated in the social and political arena of the Jeux. It aims to contribute to the discussion of (1) the politics of Francophonie concept, (2) the negotiation of local and global politics in the context of major sports and arts events, and (3) the representation of local, national, and global politics in public ceremonies. Some consider Francophonie as an exemplary form of solidarity; others see it as a symbol of conscious or unconscious neocolonialism. This paper analyzes how President Mamadou Tandja and political leaders in Niger used the Jeux to define Niger as a pillar of global Francophonie and also to represent and reinvent a Nigerien national identity of pride that would contrast with images of Niger as a country of underdevelopment and famine. The ways by which the Nigerien state incorporated and transformed different local traditions in the opening and closing ceremonies as well as in the introduction of West African wrestling—Niger’s national sport—offer the most revealing examples of how the central themes of the Jeux were negotiated through global, national, and local articulations. The paper also highlights the diverse ways that Nigerien citizens defined, presented, and perceived themselves vis-à-vis the strategic aims of international Francophonie and the Nigerien state.

The paper draws primarily from 137 structured interviews—98 in Hausa and 39 in French—including 127 with Nigeriens and ten with foreigners of six nations, conducted during two visits to Niamey: one of six weeks from May to July 2005 investigating preparations, and one of four weeks in December 2005 and January 2006 attending the 12-day Jeux and considering its immediate aftermath. Although I did not use random sampling techniques, several periods of fieldwork in Niamey since 1988 informed my decisions and allowed me to select a reasonably representative sample. The paper also relies on long discussions with the leading organizers, informal conversations with dozens of international visitors, and participant observation in six street corner conversation groups—the most important institution of public culture in Niamey (Youngstedt 2004). In addition, I monitored state and private media coverage before, during, and after the Jeux.
The African Impetus for Global Francophonie

In an unusual twist reflecting the unpredictability of flows of culture in modernity, Presidents Hamani Diori of Niger, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, acting together in 1960, were the first to propose the establishment of a formal institution to consolidate and promote international Francophonie cultural and linguistic identity, solidarity, dialogue, and cooperation among newly independent nations wishing to pursue continuing relations with France. The Francophonie movement was formally institutionalized by 21 signatory nations who established the Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) at a meeting held in March 1970 in Niamey led by Diori, Bourguiba, Senghor, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Kampuchea. In 1998, the organization adopted the name Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), and the motto “Egalité, Complementarité, Solidarité.” Today the 56 member nations of the OIF pursue four key objectives: “(1) the promotion of the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity [including ‘the elimination of illiteracy in national languages’]; (2) the promotion of peace, democracy, and human rights; (3) the support of education, training, higher education, and research; and (4) the development of co-operation to the service of durable development and solidarity” (OIF 2006).

The Comité International des Jeux de la Francophonie (CIJF) is charged to address each of these missions through organizing the Jeux every four years in collaboration with the host nation. The CIJF is explicitly devoted to building a “multilateral and interdependent Francophonie” emphasizing “North-South co-operation” (CIJF 2006). It has committed to holding at least every other Jeux in the “South” in order to show that poor countries can organize “an event of scale whereas the near total of the international competitions proceed in the affluent countries” and to allow “participants to discover ways of life distant from their own culture” (CIJF 2006). Through five specific objectives, the CIJF hopes to leave a legacy of sustainable development through sports and arts for the organizing country—especially its youth—by working: “(1) to better structure national federations with the support of international federations... (2) to carry out synergies in cultural networks, (3) to [deliver] equipment for the elite, but also for the greatest number, (4) to allow the country to acquire a know-how usable for other national and international objectives, and (5) to [ensure] that the population is identified with the event” (CIJF 2006).

The Politics of Francophonie

Francophonie offers the image of a geopolitical community that extends over five continents. The Francophonie concept has inspired diverse interpretations and lively debates around the world, particularly since the 1990s.² The Jeux offered the Nigerien state and citizens an arena consider its relationship with and the value of Francophonie.

The Francophonie concept is polysemic and can be divisive despite its imagined community ideals. Scholars typically emphasize that it can be defined in three ways: “by the use of the French language; by membership of a formal, organized community of nations; or by the acceptance and promotion of a set of values and beliefs” (Ager 1996:xi). The third definition is
the most complex and nebulous since it involves “not exclusively a geographic nor even linguistic, but cultural approach—an attitude, a belief in a spirit, an ideology and a way of doing things, inspired by French history, language and culture but not necessarily using French, aware of and responsive to the nature of the modern world” (Ager 1996:1). Emily Apter argues that Francophonie also means a “planetary cartography, a postcolonial ontology, a linguistic platform not a place…a multiplicity of linguistic life-forms…a condition of untranslatability…[and] a new comparative literature,” among other things (2005:297). Ager reviews the central problems facing Francophonie, including “the identity and culture associated with the French, threats from English and other languages, the opinion of many that France’s [meddling in the affairs of former colonies and] continuing overseas possessions are little more than the world’s last colonies, [and] the disparity between North and South in economic terms” (1996:IX).

By the time Niger had secured the right to host the Jeux in 2000, the Nigerien state had promoted the Francophonie concept for 40 years. Nevertheless, most Nigeriens held only vague notions of the idea if any at all. A massive public advertising campaign over five years inspired much discourse among Nigeriens. Many people wondered what Francophonie community or identity could possibly mean for Niger since only 20% of Nigeriens speak French. One woman outlined the contours of the reservations about Francophonie shared by many Nigeriens:

The Francophonie could not represent an identity for us Africans from the moment when the French language was forced upon us while not spoken by the majority of our population. In fact, for me, it is nothing but a continuation of colonialism, this time linguistically… The Jeux is not bad, it is even interesting, but may we insist less on the language as a sort of union and more on the cultural diversity and exchange that constitute an advantage for the country’s youth.

Diverse views among Nigeriens sometimes correlate and sometimes do not correlate with linguistic aptitude. As indicated through interviews, French-speaking Nigeriens generally approved of and appreciated the Jeux more than non-French speaking Nigeriens. However, Francophone Nigeriens were among the most vocal opponents of the Jeux, including a local French language teacher who declared, “The Francophone world is, in my view, an implicit neocolonialist pursuit. The role of the Jeux is to first and foremost spread France’s values and ideology.”

Some Nigeriens focused their critique on global inequality, or as one woman put it, “My final opinion is that Francophonie is only foolish doubletalk because the children and their mothers who live in African countries do not have work; it is necessary for Francophonie to study and fight poverty in Francophone African countries, not just organize foolish Jeux.”

While Nigerien discourse interrogating the value of Francophonie reflects concerns articulated around the world, 75% of people in my interview sample—including 70% of non-Francophones—thought that Francophonie was a valid form of global community identity for Nigeriens, at least for the duration of the Jeux. That is, for many Francophonie and the Jeux were conflated. Comments such as “Francophonie increases friendship and solidarity between French-speaking countries, and also promotes the French language. Francophonie creates unity, you see we would not understand other countries without Francophonie, now we know about
other countries as well as their people,” and the use of the idiom of kinship to capture this feeling, “The Jeux brought people together in solidarity as if they all had one mother and one father,” were representative of this perspective. Finally, a trader, sounding like a government minister declared, “Niger should be thought of as pillar of the Francophonie organization for organizing these beautiful Jeux.”

Niger Emerges from Global Shadows to Serve as the Host Nation

Contesting conventional globalization theories, anthropologist James Ferguson (1996:14) challenges the idea that globalization promotes economic, political, and cultural convergence between Africa and the rest of the world, arguing that “the networks of political and economic connection do indeed ‘span the globe,’ as is often claimed, but they do not cover it. Instead they hop over (rather than flowing through) the territories inhabited by the vast majority of the African population.” Globalization processes, Ferguson (1996:41) emphasizes, efficiently create “forms of exclusion, marginalization, and disconnection.” Niger is a prime example.

Niger has long been a desperately poor place, and conditions are deteriorating. By 2005, Niger was deemed the least developed nation on earth by the United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP 2005). Niger has largely avoided serious ethnic conflict and civil war even though it has faced the range of historical conditions that have all too frequently contributed to violent upheaval in Africa. As expressed in lyrics of a prize-winning song at the 1983 national festival, “Niger may not be land of material wealth [arziki], but our wealth is peace [zaman lafiya]” (Miles 1994:296-97).

“NigerGate” challenged Nigerien pride in their culture of peace as it attracted more international media attention than any issue in Niger’s history (Youngstedt 2003). As part of the justification for their invasion of Iraq, the U.S. and British governments, using crudely forged documents, falsely accused the government of Niger of illegally selling uranium to Iraq in order to exaggerate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Although these lies were quickly exposed, many Nigeriens fear that observers around the world will continue to link Niger with this accusation.

Due to a complex and toxic mix of factors—drought and locust invasions, poverty, global neoliberal policies, state mismanagement, grain hoarding by local merchants, and the indifference of the international community—Niger suffered a horrible famine in 2005 (Youngstedt and Grolle 2005). Remittances sent by Nigeriens in diaspora, late arriving international aid, and the completion of a relatively good harvest in September temporarily alleviated the problem before the Jeux began while failing to address key structural issues and sustainable development.

Finally, Niger’s difficult history of hosting international events needs mentioning. The only other large-scale, international gathering hosted by Niger is the Festival International de la Mode Africaine (FIMA) or the “International Festival of African Fashion.” Many protesters, representing various Islamist groups, picketed the first edition of FIMA, held in Agadez in 1998. During the second edition held in Niamey in 2000, protests turned violent and deadly and spread to other cities, particularly Maradi, leading to the decision to move FIMA out of Niger. Islamist speech was often and directly addressed at efforts from “the West” to undermine Nigerien cultural norms, as defined by reference to “Islam.” “Islamic nationalist” discourse...
cited FIMA’s pairing with bars, cinema houses, satellite dishes, and United Nations programs as evidence that the West has a detrimental agenda for Islamic Niger.

After a failed attempt to hold the third edition in Gabon in 2002, FIMA returned to Niger in 2003 and 2005. There were no reports of organized protests or violence during the 2003 Festival. The 2005 FIMA was held in Karey Gorou, just 16 kilometers from Niamey, from November 29 to December 2—just days before the Jeux opened on December 7. Months before, the Comité National des Jeux de la Francophonie (CNJF) attempted to persuade organizers to postpone the FIMA, fearing that it might again be targeted by protests and that these would spill over into the Jeux. Indeed, about 10% of Nigeriens interviewed—including Islamists and mainstream Muslims—objected to the Jeux on religious grounds. They viewed the Jeux as a trivial or dangerous distraction from serious religious responsibilities, fearing that it would attract loose foreigners to corrupt the local population through the indiscriminate mixing of men and women. An Islamist preacher complained, “The problem of the Jeux is that they [foreigners] will do sinful things like drinking alcohol, and they will do lots of it in our country.” However, the FIMA and the Jeux were held on schedule and without public demonstrations.

Nigeriens, like many Africans, are increasingly seeking to emerge from “global shadows” to make claims of “worldly connection and membership”—to be identified as “citizens of the world” (Ferguson 2006:22,23). The Jeux offered an exciting and irresistible opportunity to make such claims, and forge global economic, political, and cultural connections. Before the Jeux began, one man succinctly summarized hopes shared by most Nigeriens, “Francophonie will increase the global prestige of Niger; it will strengthen our prestige because guests will have a great time. Nigeriens will take good care of the guests, because if the guests feel happy they will return again to Niger. When they go home they will tell their friends how great Niger is and they will not forget Niger.”

The Nigerien State and The Cnjf: Remaking Images of Niger

In spite of or perhaps because of its dire poverty, in October 2000 Niger was able to appeal to Hamani Diori’s influential role in the foundation of Francophonie and the CIJF’s commitment to regularly hold the Jeux in the “South” to secure the rights to be the host nation. Still smarting from Nigergate and reeling from the famine of 2005, Niger desperately needed some good news and an international image makeover. The state and many private citizens anticipated accruing substantial benefits. A Nigerien sociologist summarized these, “The Jeux constitutes a great cultural and athletic event for Francophonie youth, profit for Niamey, new infrastructure, and important financial offshoots.” Niger provided $6.5 million, or 53% of the total conventional budget of $12.2 million (CNJF 2003:6-7). France contributed $2.9 million (24%); Canada added $2.2 million (18%); and the CIJF pitched in $647,000 (5%). In addition, the Village de la Francophonie—a complex for athletes and artists with housing, administrative offices, grocery markets, restaurants, nightclubs, pharmacies, and a bank mosque, post office, cyber café, and gymnasium—was constructed with $56 million of private financing, while private hotel and tour operators invested $8.8 million. A combination of public and private investors financed urban improvements at $8 million, and sports and arts facilities’ renovations at $3.1 million.
The timing of the Jeux in the wake of famine sparked diverse discourse. The private press was highly critical. *Le Républicain*, Niger’s most important independent weekly opened with a blaring headline, “The Opening of the 5th Jeux: Tandja invites the Famine to the Francophonie!” Meanwhile, the lead headline of *Le Canard Déchainé* read “Niger, The Food Crisis, and the 5th Jeux.”

In contrast, others believed that the Jeux might attract development support to Niger, or as one man put it, “The Jeux will allow people to understand the living conditions in Niger, to understand our suffering.”

Many international and Nigerien observers suggested that Niger had neither the management skills nor the infrastructure to host a festival of this magnitude. Their doubts were not entirely unfounded. Allegations of corruption and ineptitude led to the sacking of the Directeur Général, Almoustapha Soumaila, in February 2005. As late as July 2005, the CIJF was still contemplating moving the Jeux to Ouagadougou or Tunis while the Village was only about one-third complete. Nevertheless, the CNJF led by new Directeur Général Dr. Sériba Mahaman Lawan, convinced representatives of the CIJF that Niger was up to the task.

Working in close collaboration with the CIJF and with President Tandja, the CNJF faced a wide range of responsibilities, most importantly: (1) organizing all logistics and (2) defining Niger for international and local audiences. First, the CNJF was responsible for: offering receptions for foreign guests; organizing the construction of the Village (incorporating beautiful Sahelian architecture at international standard); building a new Martial Arts Complex and National Wrestling Museum, and substantially renovating all sports and arts facilities; building a major new road and re-paving key roads; providing security, a medical department, and insurance; and creating a workable schedule for the Jeux with enough busses to transport athletes and artists to and from the Village and competition sites.

With national honor at stake, Niger rose to the occasion. It is not at all clear that these objectives could have achieved under the leadership of Soumaila. Virtually from the moment Sériba assumed the post of Directeur Général in February 2005, rotating shifts of construction workers worked 24 hours a day until just days before the Jeux began to finish. Due to the CNJF’s relentless efforts, all events took place on time. Nigerien technicians performed competently to ensure that very sophisticated sound and lights systems operated precisely according to specifications of dancers and musicians. With justification, “work, courage, determination, and discipline” were the key words used to punctuate having hosted the Jeux as a grand event in the history of Niger and to praise the work of Sériba at a CNJF meeting on 22 December celebrating their success (CNJF 2006).

Second, the CNJF enjoyed the unique opportunity to define Niger for both international and local audiences. The CNJF appropriated symbols of a marginalized minority—the Tuareg—for constructing the Nigerien nation-state, just as the Australian Olympic Committee exploited Aboriginal imagery during the 2000 Summer Olympiad (Godwell 2000, Meekison 2000). The Tuareg Cross of Agadez was superimposed upon the OIF logo—an oval consisting of five colors representing dynamism and Francophonie unity across all continents—to serve as the primary logo for the Jeux. Dr. Abdoulaye Maga, an archaeologist and the Directeur of the national Institut de Recherches en Sciences Humaines (IRSH) chose “Jobaria”—an 18-ton dinosaur that once lived in the Nigerien Sahara as the official mascot. Maga explained that Jobaria was the
mythical ancestor of the Tuareg. Friendly-looking cartoon caricatures depicting the prehistoric
dinosaur performing in all of the sports and arts disciplines were printed in magazines and on
souvenirs such as t-shirts and baseball caps. Interviews with Tuareg revealed mixed reactions to
having their symbols used to represent Niger: some expressed pride, a few were deeply
offended, but most barely noticed given the long history of the use of the cross of Agadez as a
national and political symbol.8

Through media—including websites, newspaper, magazines, brochures, and television and
radio broadcasts—the CNJF defined Niger as a democracy, proud of its peaceful history and
harmony in cultural diversity, filled with picturesque Sahelian and Saharan landscapes, and
equipped with a modern tourist infrastructure allowing visitors to explore and enjoy the
wonderful hospitality of its people.9 CNJF productions were filled with rich historical and
ethnographic detail and beautiful color photographs and film, highlighting cultural diversity,
regional festivals, Islam and Islamic festivals, the skill of Nigerien artisans, and individual and
team profiles of Nigerien and international athletes and artists.

The CNJF, reflecting Tandja’s wishes, chose not to include a single mention of the famine of
2005 in any of its media. Indeed, throughout 2005 Tandja and state media consistently denied
that Niger was experiencing famine in addressing local and international audiences. Faced with
stinging criticism at home and abroad for this stance (which included an unwillingness to
distribute free food in order to protect local markets), Tandja was determined to successfully
host the Jeux, convinced that it was crucial for reviving his political popularity. He feared that
highlighting the famine would only jeopardize Niger’s right to host the Jeux to show off the
best of Niger, and calculated that the Jeux could bring many visitors and positive attention to
Niger, enhancing the chances for long-term international development partnerships.

Decisions by the OIF and the CNJF regarding the organization of the Jeux provoked much
discourse on the interplay of global and local politics, including passionate critique of inequality
and segregation. Ordinary Nigeriens realized that hosting the Jeux offered Niger an important
opportunity to emerge from global shadows, but many felt betrayed and left in the shadows of
the Jeux in their own nation. Their most widely articulated complaint concerned ticket prices for
competitive events—which typically ranged from $.60 to $2. This was far too expensive for most
Nigeriens as per capita daily income in Niger is about $1, leading to crowds of disappointed
people standing outside ticket booths and low attendance at a number of events. A wrestling
fan explained that this, “was not suitable because in Niger everyone knows the country is one in
which people do not have work. They should have had one symbolic, token price—for example
100 CFA [$ .20]—so that quite a few more Nigeriens would be able to attend the Jeux.”

Policies designed to create a “clean and dignified” event and isolate guests from hosts in
Niamey were seen as heavy-handed violations of the spirit of the Jeux by many Nigeriens.
Dozens of small-scale merchants were disturbed by government orders to disband their
informal tables and stalls along major roads most likely to be traveled by foreigners. Many
others were dismayed by the arrests and detentions of street corner beggars, including young
children and elderly residents with disabilities. International guests were largely segregated
from their local hosts, as athletes, artists, coaches, their families, and hangers-on stayed in the
Village and were provided with busses to take them to all competitions and for sight seeing
tours. Only about 300 Nigerien workers and business operators were permitted access the
Village, leading one trader to conclude, “The Jeux is not working…If people are to make friendships with visitors and also benefit from them, it is necessary that some of the visitors stay in the Village, while the rest stay in the city so that they can understand the people and understand Niamey.”

Keeping visitors at the Village ensured their safety, even though it inhibited face-to-face intercultural dialogue and community building—the central goal of the Jeux. The CNJF reasoned that having crime or chaos at the Jeux would have been worse than losing their right to host the Jeux. Unusually friendly and helpful Nigerien security forces were a ubiquitous presence throughout the city.

Only a few ordinary Nigeriens positioned themselves to benefit financially from the Jeux, including CNJF staff: thousands who found work, particularly in construction; and a few arts traders and private businesses, particularly those who had permits to operate within the Village or the National Museum. Most hotel and restaurant operators in Niamey were extremely angry (Ait-Hatrit 2006). Many lost a lot of money or did not reap the profits they had anticipated—recall that they invested $8.8 million in preparation for the Jeux.

Public Ceremonies: Global Ideologies, Nationalism, and Branding

Analysis of the opening and closing ceremonies and the wrestling festivities is informed by the growing literature on “mega-events” such as the Olympics. Godwell (2000:246) summarizes the central dynamics of balancing global ideologies and the branding of host cities for the Olympics,

The biggest challenge for the modern Olympics…has been to distinguish the same “product”…every four years as being a unique offering from each respective host city…Geography is co-opted, architecture symbolized, national values reframed to reinforce Olympic ideals, national politics suspended to fabricate nonpartisan support, and cultures essentialized to serve every occasion.

Historically, ceremonials are the key sites through which host cities and nations seek to address these challenges. Some scholars are highly critical, arguing that Olympic ceremonies amount to nothing more than “jingoistic hypocrisy” or are exploitative in the ways they co-opt marginalized or indigenous cultures as the Australian Olympic Committee did with Aborigines in the 2000 Summer Games hosted by Sydney (Tomlinson 2000:181, Godwell 2000, Meekison 2000, Tomlinson 2000). Other scholars heap praise on “the worth and the uniqueness of Olympic Ceremonies”, as spectacular venues for communicating “the Olympic message”, facilitating “intercultural exchange”, and promoting peace (Zweifel 1995, Carrard 1995, MacAloon 1995, Takac 1995).

If the “Olympics” are replaced with the “Jeux” in all of the above, we get a sense of the challenges faced by Niger and controversies generated by the choices made in organizing the opening and closing ceremonies. The Nigerien state clearly valued the opportunities presented in staging these spectacles. They were the only elements of the Jeux funded entirely by Niger.

The Opening Ceremonies: A Multinational Spectacle Highlighting Niger’s History
Within the constraints of the protocols established by the CIJF, the distinctive cultural elements of the opening ceremonies were defined by the CNJF in collaboration with a multinational team of experts and by the mass participation of Nigerien artists and audiences. The CNJF chose Guinean Souleymane Koly—a pioneer in contemporary African arts policy and production—to organize the opening and closing ceremonies. El Hadj Alougbine of Cote d’Ivoire and Were Were Liking of Cameroon supervised the selection of decorations and costumes. Li Lu and Wu Dianceng of China, experts in grand events, were commissioned to choreograph the dances of 800 Nigerien students.

An overflow crowd of roughly 50,000 people enthusiastically filled Stade Seyni Kountché—a gift from China some 20 years ago—and was delighted to see that it had been renovated to meet international athletic standards and now featured a brand new jumbo video screen. The audience was thrilled that no entrance fee was required, only tickets of invitation however, the process of distributing tickets was mysterious—they seemed to flow from CNJF members to their friends—and thousands of disappointed Nigeriens were left standing outside of stadium entrances. Reflecting the OIF’s mission, dozens of Nigerien youth sporting distinctive black t-shirts and working for the Control Arms campaign circulated the arena soliciting signatures for the Million Faces Petition designed to pressure members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to sign a binding international treaty to prohibit the trafficking of weapons to help build peace and security in the region.

The opening ceremonies—following rigid CIJF guidelines—began with a counter-clockwise procession around the track by participants in the alphabetical order of the official names of their countries ending on the football field. Participants stopped to greet the members of “cabin of honor,” including: President Tandja; Presidents Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria; the Prime Ministers of Togo and Chad; the Vice President of the African Union; the Secretary General of the OIF, Abdou Diouf; and Jean-Francois Lamour, the President of the CIJF and France’s Minister of Youth and Sports, among others. Athletes and artists from all countries received extremely warm receptions. The largely Nigerien audience cheered the loudest for the flamboyant Chadian contingent who included acrobats in their procession; the Vietnamese, wearing their distinctive conical straw hats reminiscent of those made by nomadic Nigerien Wodaabe; and the Lebanese, many of whom broke out of their procession to greet the audience with waves and blown kisses to celebrate their selection as the host nation for the 2009 Jeux.

Following this, precisely timed speeches—largely scripted by the CIJF—by Nigerien ministers and the President of the CIJF were concluded by President Tandja’s proclamation of the opening of the Jeux. Next, the official flag of the Jeux was raised, accompanied by the playing of its anthem. A representative of the Nigerien delegation then delivered an oath—also written by the CIJF—promising to uphold sportsmanship and honor cultural diversity, followed by the Nigerien state brass band’s rendition of the national anthem. The participants left the center stage and proceeded to fill their seats of honor in the grandstands in order to observe ceremonies designed to symbolize peace and unity.

This cultural spectacle opened with traditional, neo-traditional, and modern performances by 163 Nigerien dancers, acrobats, instrumentalists, and vocalists highlighting the concept that
the unity of Niger is found the respect for its mutually enriching cultural diversity. Next, 800 Nigerien students joyously performed perfectly synchronized dances of welcome.

The grand finale centered on music and dance in honor of the legendary Sarauniya Mangou, concluding with an extravagant 30-minute fireworks show. Sarauniya Mangou, the Queen of the Arewa of Lougou at the turn of the century, earned fame as a national heroine for her resistance to colonial domination. Known as fierce warrior and inspirational leader, she withstood a Tuareg invasion from the north and efforts of the Sokoto Empire in the south to convert her people to Islam. But she distinguished herself most prominently by courageously refusing to surrender to French forces led by Captain Voulet who attacked her country in April of 1899. Captain Voulet’s soldiers, far more brutal than previous French invaders, committed horrific atrocities across French West Africa including massacres of thousands of people in Sansanne Haoussa and Birnin Konni (Niger) that same year. Sarauniya Mangou’s most famous form of resistance was religiously inspired. As the moral and spiritual authority of the Arewa, she used magic to inspire her people and terrorize the French garrison. Indeed, Captain Voulet’s logs reveal that he retreated in fear of the Queen’s magical powers after months of stalemate and countless deaths.  

CIJF rules specify that this short ceremony should focus on peace and unity. Clearly the Nigerien state and the CNJF took creative liberties with the script. Whereas the first three hours of events focused on Francophonie, the state chose to conclude by reflecting on the history of Nigerien resistance to French colonialism led by a woman wielding non-Islamic local spiritual powers.

Different people interpreted this message in different ways. One Canadian official concluded that the focus on the Sarauniya appropriately addressed the gender equity sub-theme of the Jeux by highlighting that women are just as capable as men of creating miracles despite the Nigerien belief that women should stay at home. Virtually all Nigeriens—encountered through interviews and public street corner conversation groups—were enormously pleased and proud of the ceremonies up to the grand finale, but a substantial majority found the Sarauniya Mangou segment inappropriate. Three themes are evident among those who expressed objections. First, many people were offended by the complete lack of attention to Islam as central to Niger’s identity. For them, the inclusion of a “pagan” rite in honor of a “pagan” who had resisted conversion added insult to injury. Second, and often linked to first theme, many men were upset that a woman was chosen as the representative of the nation. Third, many men and women expressed their concern that the glorification of Sarauniya Mangou compromised the responsibility of the nation to serve as good hosts for their French guests. Indeed, many expressed their commitment to redouble their efforts to be excellent hosts.

In summary, the opening ceremonies served as key entry point through which global, national, and local players performed and negotiated all of the key themes of the Jeux. The ceremonies were, by definition, multinational as they involved participants representing the nations of the OIF. Moreover, the planning was deliberately and creatively multinational. A Guinean, a Cameroonian, and an Ivorien played key roles in directing how Nigeriens would present Nigerien cultures. Stade Seyni Kountché, a gift of the Chinese, and the hiring of two Chinese choreographers represent in concrete and figurative ways the growing influence of
China in Niger. Most of the events within the opening ceremonies explicitly celebrated Francophonie unity and peace, while the Queen Mangou segment expressed pride in Niger’s distinctive history of resistance and a call for gender equity. That is, the Nigerien state communicated its desire to be an equal partner with other nations in global Francophonie, on its own terms, sparking lively debates regarding definitions of Niger’s identity in modernity. Modeled loosely after modern Olympics ceremonies and held in a newly modernized stadium, the opening ceremonies also paid homage to the rich diversity of “traditional” Nigerien music and dance—insisting that tradition deserves a place in modernity.

Wrestling With Tradition and Modernity

African wrestling was included in the Jeux as a feature event for the first time due in large measure to the impetus of Sériba, Directeur Général of the CNJF. The celebration of the sport of wrestling—and the ways it addressed the several of the core missions of the Jeux—was every bit as compelling as the competition. This was evidenced in: (1) its inclusion as a discipline, and the value afforded to cultural exchange through wrestling; (2) the inauguration of Niger’s National Museum of Traditional Wrestling; and (3) the sportsmanship and hospitality expressed in wrestling.

A brief sketch of the modernization of this indigenous sport will help to situate its place in the Jeux. Wrestling matches are traditionally held on village market days and to celebrate harvests throughout Niger. Wrestlers grappled for honor in rural communities, their strength and confidence bolstered by magic, music, clowns, and enthusiastic audiences.

While wrestling in traditional contexts remains enormously popular, President Seyni Kountché mobilized wrestling in the mid-1970s as a means of promoting Nigerien nationalism. The Nigerien Federation for Traditional Wrestling introduced formal written rules, professional referees, and prizes that symbolize traditional power and ethnicity as well as modernity. The national champion earns a beautifully harnessed horse in a style ridden by traditional local chiefs; a grand boubou (“an elaborately embroidered flowing gown”), a turban, and sandals as worn by nobles; a Tuareg saber symbolizing both force and peace or security, now known as the “National Saber”; and an envelope of money “allowing him to meet his responsibilities as a king” (Koudizé 2005:26). Today the cash prize is about $4,000. In addition, private supporters of the champion typically provide him with an automobile, airline tickets for a pilgrimage to Mecca, money, land, and jewelry.

The first national championship was held in Tahoua in 1975. Since then, nationwide interest in wrestling has exploded. Each of the eight administrative regions of Niger has constructed beautiful wrestling-specific arenas—each affording 5,000 to 10,000 spectators excellent, close-up views of the combat—allowing them to rotate as hosts for the national championships. Annual national championships are now sponsored by national and multinational corporations, and are broadcast live on local television and radio stations. Backed by sponsors and now earning cash prizes at the national competitions and other important periodic matches, some wrestlers hire professional trainers and devote themselves as full-time professionals in the sport.
Similar wrestling traditions are practiced throughout West Africa as well as parallel professionalizations of the sport, particularly in Senegal where star grapplers occasionally earn more than $100,000 per match performing before audiences of 60,000 people at Dakar’s main football arena, Stade Léopold Sédor Senghor. Six African Championships—involving primarily Francophone West and Central African nations—have been held since 1995. Niger and Senegal have dominated, each winning thrice.

West African wrestling is largely unknown outside the region. Though some football fans disagree, wrestling is Niger’s “national sport.” The very inclusion of African wrestling in the Jeux was a source of great pride for Nigeriens. Nigeriens relished showing off their wrestling spectacle; that is, their whole complex of wrestling accompanied by music, song, dance, magic and entertainment.

Spectators enjoyed learning about traditional wrestling forms of peoples of Canada, Sudan, France, and elsewhere through daily demonstrations almost as much as the formal competition. Wrestling by indigenous Canadians drew the most attention. This form of wrestling is seldom practiced today, though interest in it was resuscitated at the recent Arctic Winter Games (Canada 2005). Four Inuit—Dennis Raddi and Lucky Pokiak from the Northwest Territories and Tony Eetuuk and Joseph Nakoolak from Nunavut—attended the Jeux, proudly demonstrated their wrestling style, and invited Nigerien and other African wrestlers to join them. Their coach, Steven Baryluk explained, “as a former wrestler, I am interested to see other wrestling traditions. These Games will bring many of them together in one place. It’s an incredible opportunity” (Canada 2005).

Niger and the CNJF strategically chose the auspicious occasion of the Jeux to inaugurate its National Museum of Traditional Wrestling. The Museum—filled with pictures and artifacts of Niger’s celebrated wrestlers, wrestling musicians, singers, clowns, and wrestling broadcasters—was designed to commemorate wrestling history, declare wrestling as a core element of Nigerien cultural identity, celebrate the inclusion of African wrestling in the Jeux, and mark Niger’s affiliation with the International Federation of Wrestling Associations (FILA).

This celebration on 14 December was presided over by President Tandja who cut a ceremonial ribbon, President of the National Assembly Mahamane Ousmane, Prime Minister Hama Amadou, Minister of Youth and Sports Abdoulrahamane Seydo, and many other important government members. Seydo praised wrestling as Niger’s national sport, highlighting the value of “fair play” in wrestling. Niger’s most famous wrestling singer, Elhadji Sagolo, came out of retirement to perform with Mamane Sani Léko, also known as Kourégué de Zinder, Niger’s most prominent wrestling drummer. Nigerien spectators were particularly thrilled by the attendance of the majority of their national champions of the previous 30 years and a grand champion Senegalese wrestler, Ambroise Sarr. Daniel Robin, a delegate of FILA, commented on the global universality of traditional wrestling, praised Niger’s distinguished history of wrestling, and presented a FILA plaque to Tandja. Tandja seized the opportunity to present himself as a man of the Nigerien people by recalling his experience as a wrestler in his youth. Tandja then officiated two symbolic demonstration matches lasting just a few seconds each, one between Kadadé Zambo (a great Nigerien wrestler of the 1970s) and Balla Kodo (Niger’s national champion in 1981); and one between Salma Dan Rani (Niger’s national champion in 1976 and 1979) and Ambroise Sarr (whose career peaked in the 1970s).
The Jeux provided a spectacular forum to prove the superiority of Nigerien wrestlers before a global Francophonie audience. Nigerien wrestlers outperformed a strong Senegalese contingent at the Jeux, delighting local fans. Niger earned the team gold medal as well as four individual medals (two gold, one silver, and one bronze). Senegal secured the team silver medal, and four individual medals (one gold, one silver, and two bronze). However, winning was not everything in the Jeux.

On the first day of the competition the French team led by their traditional musicians, was graciously welcomed into the arena. In fact, they received more sustained applause than any team, even the Nigeriens. The French experienced the misfortune of drawing Niger in the first round. Within seconds of the first match in the lowest weight category a Nigerien grappler lifted his French opponent high into the air and threw him head first to the ground. A hush fell over the crowded arena, as many people feared that he had broken his neck. To the relief of everyone, he arose and respectfully congratulated his foe. The largely Nigerien audience warmly greeted the brave French wrestler when he returned to compete the following day.

This single thrashing was perhaps the most discussed issue in the entire wrestling tournament, rivaled only by Nigeriens’ proud discourse on the superiority of their wrestlers. Within hours, many private radio stations and street corner discussion groups were commenting. They emphasized that it was extremely bad form to treat guests so harshly—that the Nigerien wrestler should have shown mercy.

Nigeriens were thrilled by the very fact that France chose to participate in African wrestling. One avid fan’s words captured the feelings of many Nigeriens, “The Jeux helps people come together as one. The gathering increases ties of friendship and solidarity between different kinds of people. Francophonie creates knowledge, for example seeing White, Christian Europeans wrestling. This was very surprising; wrestling is not a European custom. We were happy, we laughed, that Europeans wrestled.” This was highly appreciated and was interpreted as an unexpected demonstration of respect for African tradition. For throughout the history of contact between France and Africa, cultural diffusion has largely been asymmetric. Frenchmen have assiduously avoided letting Africans see them physically toil, but here they were courageous and sweating in an intimate meeting of bare-chested bodies on dusty Nigerien sand.

The Closing Ceremonies: Reinventing Tradition For The Nation And Francophonie

For the closing ceremonies, the CNJF chose to transform and adapt local pageantry traditions to serve a particular construction of Nigerien nationalism and Francophonie. Variations of this ritual complex involving noble cavalry processions with music have been practiced on both sides of the Sahara for centuries. French colonial explorers witnessed similar events, from North Africa and the Sahara (where synchronized rifle shots are featured) to Sahelian states such as Borno. They used the term “fantasia” to describe them. Thus, the CNJF labeled the closing ceremonies of the Jeux a fantasia, rather than using a local term, such as the Hausa hawan dawaki (“the mounting of the horses”), the Arabic harqqa barooda (“moving gunpowder games”), or the Hindi-Urdu durbar (“royal gathering”) as it is known in Northern Nigeria due to British imperial history.
To appreciate the ways by which the CNJF reworked the fantasia requires an understanding of its traditional functions and practices in Niger and Northern Nigeria. Fantasias are designed to celebrate Islam, to demonstrate allegiance to Emirs, and to foster community solidarity (Apter 2005:173). Fantasias undoubtedly incorporated some elements of the equestrian and pageantry traditions of local pre-Islamic and non-Islamic communities, but for centuries have been organized primarily to mark the culmination of the great Muslim festivals, Eid al Fitr and Eid al Kabir (or Karamar Salla and Babbar Salla, respectively, in Hausa—the lingua franca of the region). Local chiefs and nobles symbolically proclaim their loyalty to Emirs during fantasias through saluting them with raised swords, praise singing, and the circulation of symbolic capital. Gifts are offered to the Emir who may reciprocate by bestowing titles or with larger or smaller gifts to express his relative favor. This tradition of well-staged statecraft also serves to unite different local ethnic groups within an overarching state.

Salla days begin with early morning prayers at communal grounds on the outskirts of town, followed by processions of splendidly adorned horsemen, camel jockeys, warriors, dancers, musicians, praise singers, body guards, jesters, and standard bearers to the public square in front of the Emir’s palace. Here each village takes their assigned place before the Emir arrives last of all with his magnificent retinue. Then the action begins as groups of horsemen and camel riders race across the square at full gallop, swords drawn, polished and glinting. They charge to within a few feet of the Emir before pulling up their mounts abruptly to salute him with raised swords. Dancing, drumming, singing, and feasting continue throughout the day and into the night.

While traditional fantasias remain important, during the past century various actors have reworked them to serve other functions. Colonial powers, heads of secular states, and various imagined communities reinvented tradition by replacing Emirs with their own representatives in the position of power while keeping the script intact. The British Raj modified durbars—court rituals of Mughal emperors roughly analogous to fantasias—by inserting English officials as Indian rulers in what became “the colonial ritual par excellence” (Apter 1996:457-58). The term “durbar” was “transplanted from India to Africa through none other than Lord Lugard himself” (Apter 1996:458) who grew up in British Colonial India. Soon after witnessing the fantasy, “Lugard staged his first African durbar [in 1906] to inaugurate the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria...[and]...Thirteen years later, a durbar held in Kano marked Lugard’s appointment as Governor-General of Nigeria” (Apter 1996:458). Later, durbars were staged to honor British royalty, including a durbars in 1925 in Kano in honor of Edward, Prince of Wales, and another in 1956 in Kaduna to pay homage to Queen Elizabeth. Independent Nigeria has continued to stage durbar to honor visiting heads of state, including Margaret Thatcher of Britain, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi of Libya.

President Obasanjo and the modern, independent, capitalist, petro-state of Nigeria mobilized the durbar in 1977 to serve the interests of Pan-Africanism and the Nigerian state by using it project pride in indigenous culture and an image of “national unity out of ‘ethnic’ diversity” (Apter 1996:457). He hosted a grand durbar, including participants representing most ethnic groups of Northern Nigeria, 4,000 horses, 500 camels, and 2,000 dancers and musicians that functioned as the closing ceremony of the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC). In addition, a huge durbar was performed in 2004 to celebrate the 200th
anniversary of the Sokoto Caliphate, and attended by many heads of state, including Tandja of Niger. Finally, a number of nations, particularly Morocco and Cameroon, have marketed fantasies to attract international tourists.

The fantasy is not as widely performed in Niger as it is in Northern Nigeria or the Maghreb. For example, fantasies have not previously been staged in Niamey, as it is a new city that is not part of a traditional Emirate. In contrast, Damagaram—Tandja’s home—enjoys the historical reputation of hosting the largest fantasies in Niger. Furthermore, unlike other nations, Niger has little history of mobilizing the fantasy for nation-building or tourism promotion. One exception is the performance of fantasies during Cure Salée—a traditional festival that has, in some respects, been nationalized by the Nigerien government, and marketed to international tourists.12

The fantasy for the Jeux was held at the old Hippodrome on the outskirts of Niamey. A highly animated audience of about 60,000 people stood four hours in the blazing mid-afternoon sun in an enormous flat field, while a few hundred dignitaries—Tandja, visiting heads of state, OIF, CIJF, and CNJF officials—enjoyed seating on plush couches under a small, tiered, shaded pavilion. The prelude featured an amplified music performed by Mamar Kassey, currently Niger’s most internationally famous Afro-Pop-Jazz band. They were an ideal choice given the CNJF’s desire to emphasize a Nigerien nationalism rooted in harmony through diversity as Mamar Kassey fuses Hausa, Zarma, Fulani, and Songhai performers, rhythms, and instruments as well as electric bass guitars with western jazz, Moroccan, and Latin influences.

Athletes and artists led the Fantasia’s processions—funneled through a ceremonial gate with Nigerien and Francophonie symbols. They received loud, sustained cheers before taking comfortable seats under the pavilion. In contrast to the opening ceremonies that included the full contingents of all countries, only about 250 performers representing a dozen nations participated. Then, Tandja declared the official closing of the Jeux in a very brief speech.

The Fantasia continued with the entrance of 200 Tuareg men from Tahoua wearing elaborate costumes, carrying Nigerien flags, and riding splendidly adorned camels. More than 500 dancers, musicians, and clowns—typically in troupes of one to three dozen—representing all ethnic groups of Niger, followed them. Among the highlights were a contingent of fifty beautifully dressed Tuareg women who rode in on decked-out donkeys, and a group of Wodaabe women who carried painted calabashes overflowing with cooking utensils and grain—a traditional symbol of bounty—atop their heads. Herds of goats and sheep decorated with colorful cloth and mirrors dangling from their horns joined the festivities. Next, 300 mounted horsemen—led by a Kanuri contingent from Diffa and a Hausa group from Northern Nigeria—entered the main arena. Many men and their horses were adorned from head to toe in silver armor, while others in sported vibrant, colorful, traditional clothing. Many equestrians doubled as musicians, playing a wide variety of drums and horns. The ceremony concluded with camel and horse charges toward President Tandja, visiting dignitaries.

The CNJF modified three core elements of the fantasy while retaining its essential script and vibrant pageantry. First, the fantasy was secularized. The procession moved from a vacant field to the hippodrome’s pavilion, not from Muslim prayer grounds to the Emir’s palace. Second, representing a secular republic, Tandja occupied the position of power rather than an Emir. Third, this modern fantasy addressed national and global Francophonie communities,
instead of a local Emirate. Like the opening ceremonies, the fantasia represented the honoring of cultural diversity as the heart of Nigerien nationalism and the value of cultural relativism for Francophonie.

While the opening and closing ceremonies shared a multicultural vision, they differed in important ways. In contrast to the opening ceremony’s limited seating, amplified music, jumbo video screen, fireworks, and emphasis on OIF scripted speeches staged in a modern stadium in the city center; the closing ceremony featured unlimited standing room, traditional music, and dust in an old, not particularly well maintained, hippodrome in a poor, outlying neighborhood. Furthermore, the audiences were very different. Whereas virtually all foreign athletes, artists, coaches, and visitors attended the opening ceremonies, only about ten percent made their way to the fantasia. Indeed, it seemed that the CNJF anticipated that foreign guests might avoid standing in an open field in the midday sun or would have begun returning to their homes before the closing ceremonies, and therefore designed the fantasia, with Tandja at the center, primarily for Nigerien consumption. In any case, Nigerien spectators were thrilled, and Niamey buzzed with excitement for weeks afterwards as people reflected on the fantasia and watched televised reruns. The fantasia clearly emerged as the most popular event of the Jeux among Nigeriens.

Conclusion

In her opening address to Canadian athletes and artists, Chef de Mission Madeline clearly articulated the core aims of global, national, and local participants in the Jeux:

These Jeux are also a symbol of fraternity and solidarity between people. This goal is particularly significant this year, as Niger is recovering from a food crisis. In the current circumstances, it is important to show solidarity with this country and to participate in the Jeux in the spirit of the founders. Apart from the challenges and how important it is for Niger to host this international event, the experience has allowed this country to acquire the infrastructure necessary for hosting the Jeux. The 5th Jeux should also serve as a springboard for the country’s development. If for no other purpose than to put Niger on the map and to allow Nigeriens to rise to the challenge with dignity and pride, the 5th Jeux are worth the experience. If the only thing we accomplish is to participate in this gathering with Sahelian Africa and to become better citizens of the world, then these Jeux will have achieved their goal Duchesne (2005).

Using Duchesne’s benchmarks, the Jeux was successful in many ways. Remarkably, the world’s least developed nation hosted more than 4,000 visitors from 44 nations in a well-organized gala promoting Francophonie cultural dialogue and unity through the superlative performances of world-class athletes and artists who demonstrated exemplary sportsmanship and tremendous respect for the aesthetic expressions of extraordinarily diverse cultures. During the Jeux a transformed Niamey buzzed with excitement and movement. Most Nigeriens were honored to host guests, and were pleased that the Jeux offered their nation the opportunity to be recognized as a vibrant culture and place in the modern global imaginary. If nothing else, for two weeks the global Francophonie community joyously celebrated being together and their most noble values, setting aside often strained or ambivalent relations between the French metropole and former colonies, as well as divisions between Muslims and Christians. Nigerien
hospitality highly impressed international visitors. Virtually all foreign nationals (interviewed by me or quoted by the Nigerien or international media) expressed only effusive praise for Niger and Nigeriens. This achievement should not be underestimated, even if it is unclear whether the Jeux contributed to long-term Francophonie cooperation and solidarity or sustainable development in Niger.

The Jeux provided Nigeriens a key space for creative reflection, engagement, debate, and response to: the Francophonie concept and its value for Nigeriens; competing definitions of Niger’s national identity; the political economy of global and local inequality; and the nature of articulations between tradition and modernity. While the first three sets of concerns continue to be negotiated, the interests of the Nigerien state and Nigerien citizens converged in the celebration of traditional Nigerien cultures — proudly asserting their validity in global modernity. The CNJF did not privilege popular Nigerien rappers, Niger’s burgeoning mobile phone industry, or another marker of modernity. Rather, they chose — to the delight of most Nigeriens — to highlight traditional pageantry, music, dance, and wrestling.

Notes

1. I sincerely thank the West African Research Association (WARA) for generously granting me a Post-Doctoral Fellowship for this project. I gratefully acknowledge the extensive, critical suggestions offered by the Editorial Committee of African Studies Quarterly and two external reviewers. I thank colleagues Ousseina D. Alidou, Susann Baller, Bruce Deacon, Djibrilla Garba, and Cheiffou Idrissa for their very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Saginaw Valley State University students Sarah Holdwick and Terry Coffey for help with translating interviews and statistically analyzing them, respectively.

2. Nigeriens and French speakers around the world continue to grapple with Francophonie. Since the Jeux, divisions have reached a boiling point as a multinational group of famous authors who write in French published a manifesto in Le Monde in 2007 declaring that their proposal to “Uncouple the language from France and turn French literature into ‘world literature’ written in French” will serve as “death certificate for Francophonie” (Riding 2007). Nicolas Sarkozy, who shortly thereafter became the President of France, responded in Le Figaro by declaring “Francophonie is not dead” and that the global prestige of the French language is “intact” (Riding 2007). Abdou Diouf, former President of Senegal and now the Secretary General of the OIF, meanwhile accuses France of lacking interest in Francophonie and of perpetuating condescension toward Francophones. In a similar vein, author Laila Lalami (2008) wonders “how many native-born Frenchmen identify themselves as ‘francophones.’ We all know it’s a term for The Others.”

3. These include: an exploitative colonial regime that intentionally manipulated ethnic rivalry, three decades of one party or military rule, recurring droughts, a long series of ineffectual and sometimes damaging development programs implemented by international donors, grinding poverty exacerbated by Structural Adjustment Programs, and a valuable natural resource—uranium.
4. Founded and directed by the world famous Nigerien fashion designer, Alpahdi, FIMA
“was supported by the United Nations Development Program as an effort to support the
fashion industry and artisanal workshops in Niger…the festival’s stated intention was to
create jobs, attract tourism by televising Niger’s exotic landscape globally, and to raise
money for Niger’s development” (Cooper 2003:491).
5. Soumaila was selected as the CNJF Directeur Général in 2000. He was contracted to
remain in this post until the completion of the Jeux. In July 2005, the CNJF was printing
advertisements in Le Sahel, the daily newspaper of the state, asking private citizens to
volunteer to rent rooms in their homes to accommodate visitors.
6. After earning his Ph.D. in Sports from the Université de Clermont-Ferrand (France),
Sériba worked for Niger’s Ministry of Youth and Sports. He has produced and directed
two films on wrestling: 20 Ans de Lutte Traditionnelle au Niger (1997) and The Kings of
Arena (2000). After the 5th Jeux he was named Directeur des Jeux de la Francophonie by
the OIF.
7. The cross of Agadez was used by French colonial officials, as the badge of UN military
observers in Western Sahara, and today “the government of the Republic of Niger uses
the cross of Agadez as the centerpiece for the National Order of Niger pendant…as part
of insignia for government projects, on postage stamps, and in currency designs”
(Loughran and Seligman 2006:259). Its presence in Niger is ubiquitous; appearing on
sculpture in traffic circles and public parks, as an ornamental motif on walls and
wrought iron fences, and as the design on state manufactured soap bars. Furthermore,
the cross of Agadez enjoys fame as one of the most recognizable symbols of Africa, as it
is available for sale in hundreds of markets in West and North Africa, Paris, Florence,
and New York as well as more than 100 websites (Loughran and Seligman 2006:261).
8. Tele-Sahel, Niger’s state channel, and two private stations—Tal and Ténéré—provided
extensive television coverage. In Niger and in Europe, French channels TV5 and Canal+
also provided television coverage; while Radio France International and the BBC offered
radio broadcasts.
9. Nigeriens have recounted various versions of this history to me. On 26 May 2006
Niger’s Ministère de la Culture, des Arts et de la Communication submitted an
application to UNESCO seeking recognition of Lougou as a World Heritage Centre
(UNESCO 2006). They proposed to include sacred monuments and sites, the cemetery
of queens, the site of the battle of 1899, and the residence of the current Sarauniya.
10. While there are several ways of defining “national sport,” I argue the wrestling is
Niger’s given its indigenous status, mass audience appeal, and Nigeriens’ recognition of
their superiority in the discipline—even though many more Nigeriens participate in
football.
11. Cure Salée literally means, “Salt Cure.” Once a year, toward the end of the rainy season,
thousands of nomadic Tuareg and Bororo gather in the region of Ingal and Teguidda
N’Tessoumt—famous for its rich salt and mineral deposits that are crucial to the health
of their livestock. The gathering is one of the few occasions where so many nomads
meet in one place to celebrate community identity and discuss social and political
concerns. The Nigerien government recently began determining the exact date of the
festival—though this is not always respected by nomads—in order exert its power and facilitate the attendance of tourists.

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(CIJF) “Site Officiel du Comité International des Jeux de la Francophonie.”

[www.jeux.francophonie.org](http://www.jeux.francophonie.org), 2006


(CNJF) “Site Officiel du Comité National des Jeux de la Francophonie au Niger.”


(OIF) “Site Officiel de l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie.”


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BOOK REVIEWS


When in 1976, Wole Soyinka presented us with *Myth, Literature and the African World*, and in 1986, Ngugi wa Thiong’o offered us *Decolonising the Mind*, both writers indeed set in motion the relative beginning of what has become a recurrent debate in African critical discourse; namely, the search for indigenous African theorizing. Soyinka and Ngugi are however not alone in this on-going and self-conscious effort to move beyond colonial mentality and archives. Innumerable works by African(ist) scholars have sought to bring into focus the need to “return to the source” in order to adequately explicate the African experience in letters and conceptualization. Colonial distortions of facts aside, the psychological implications of depending on the very “agency” of domination to assert Africanness (another term that is no longer reflective of belonging but problematized within varying identitarian and ideological convictions or negations) are not only damaging but raise fundamental questions regarding patrimony and power. Aimé Césaire could not have been more direct when he surmises in *Discourse on Colonialism* that the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer can only be conflictual. By its very definition, agency is a process that serves as a medium of activating change. Any postcolonial theory that articulates the subject on the surface without cultural and critical specificities runs the risk of facilitating some form of mental recolonization. And this is why Andrew Apter’s *Beyond Words: Discourse and Critical Agency in Africa* should be welcomed.

Although still anchored on anthropological orientation and theoretical sophistication of previous seminal works, namely, *Black Critics and Kings* (1992) and *The Pan-African Nation* (2005), *Beyond Words* boldly injects an innovative critical vista into the discourse on Africa by a sensitive and informed cultural studies scholar. In proposing to transcend Africa’s colonial past through a focus on ethnographic practice that takes socio-political contexts into paramount account, Apter advances a critical model in which the agency or thought is indigenous as opposed to the colonial. From ritual performances to the centrality of the panegyric in political discourse, *Beyond Words* transcends traditional anthropology’s “colonial” orientation, by using praise poems and African cosmology to re-read African thought system in a trans-disciplinarily constructed and indigenously rooted frame. In six cogent chapters, Apter goes beyond a modest collection of essays per se, but offers something more systematically defensive in the sense of how “critical agency in Africa opposes the very conditions in which Africa is pathologized and the mechanisms by which the “Dark Continent” is continually reinscribed” (ix). Theoretically grounded and culturally provocative as his previous works are, Apter’s *Beyond Words* provides a classic and much desirable interfacial text between anthropology, cultural studies, and critical theory.
Likewise, *Beyond Words* testifies to an effort to present African culture as a speech act that derives its nourishment from local, ritualized, and political languages in order to engage the global without any trepidation or inferiority complex. Whether its approach is recasting ethnosophistry as engaged by V. Y. Mudimbe and Paulin Houtondji, revisiting Tswana-Zulu-Xhosa praise poetry as political criticism, establishing ambivalent connections between Swazi praise and insult, invoking the gendered nature of Yoruba songs of abuse, or revisiting Dogon comological system as symbolic and oppositional discourse, its central argument lies in what the author calls the “relationship of Africanist anthropology and empire” as a measure to not only indigenize colonial culture but challenge it using African frame of reference and knowledge system. It is quite refreshing to read this book and even question the “Africanist-ness” of the author for one hears the voice of an acculturated anthropologist in the positive sense.

When Apter states, “what is hidden is philosophical” (17), “Does not this most “radical” of critical positions in fact recapitulate the logic of colonial conquest—the negation of the other by a magisterial discourse that masquerades as its antithesis?” (30), “praises are the expression of public opinion and provide an effective means of social control” (39), “female elders are honored and feared for their secret knowledge and hidden self-contained powers” (70), and “what is interesting anthropologically is how the very decolonization of cultural tradition based on the rejection of imperialism proclaimed by FESTAC involved the nationalization of colonial tradition by the postcolonial state” (146), he departs from the traditional Western/colonial scholarship that was imposed on African studies by subjecting that same approach to rigorous critique through practical and contextual application.

In sum, *Beyond Words* further contributes to the decolonization of Africanist scholarship and should be a welcome addition to emerging critical interventions on contemporary cultural studies. I would have loved to see some references to North Africa and East Africa to provide a truly representative treatise about African critical agency, but with every work, the scope cannot be as exhaustive and representative as desirable. Andrew Apter has demonstrated his mastery by focusing on areas of African experience where the oral tradition may be said to be more pronounced.

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African scholars who have first hand experience of political developments in the continent since independence in the late fifties constitute all of the contributors to this collection of essays edited by Julius Ihonvbere and John Mbaku. This is a companion volume to the earlier *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle* (Praeger, 2003). It provides a gory assessment of the performance of African states since decolonization, focusing particularly on the failure of the African elite to deliver on the promises of independence. It
paints a very sordid and unflattering picture of the lackluster performance of the post-colonial state (neo-colonial states) in most African countries, and the increasing alienation of these states from the civil society. The editors of the volume, both of whom have written extensively on African political economy, blame the current state of African political and economic terrains on the unpatriotic ambition of the new elite, whose primary goal is the pursuit of personal wealth at the expense of their people. The primary objective of this volume, according to the editors, is “to determine how best to proceed with the continent’s transition to democratic governance and economic systems that enhance wealth creation and sustainable development” (pp. xi).

The authors, in the introductory chapter, offer bold solutions to current African crises and suggest new paths to African future, which they claim could only be found in a transition to “democratic constitutionalism”. This magical transition to “democratic constitutionalism”, according to the authors, will offer new dimensions to African efforts in nation building including but not limited to peaceful co-existence of population groups, promotion and nurturing of entrepreneurship, and the establishment of adequate structures for the sustainable management of the environment in addition to protecting individual rights of the citizens and their properties (pp. xi).

While most of the ideas (or recommendations) proposed in this volume are hardly novel (see the UN Millennium goals), there are many arguments in the various chapters that will certainly open new debates about the failure of the African states particularly in those socialistic enclaves that offered so much promise to Africans during the revolutionary phase of the decolonization of the continent. Of course, I am referring here to formerly progressive states like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

According to the editors of this volume, one of the central goals of many African independence movements was to transform African states into people focused states. Unfortunately, with the attainment of independence, these lofty goals were soon jettisoned, and the various neo-colonial states that emerged in Africa after independence were soon transformed into institutions that solely benefited the economic aspirations of the new elites. These elite(s), the authors argued, soon abandoned the platforms upon which independence was fought and instead, engaged in activities that were plainly unpatriotic, using the inherited colonial structures, laws, and institutions in the pursuit of personal accumulation of wealth and capital. On top of it all, the authors argued, popular forces were abandoned, radical opposition forces were subjected to repression while the democratization agenda of the nationalist elite soon degenerated into personal rule, one party state, and military oligarchies. Institutional reforms pursued by the new African elite(s), according to the editors, only reinforced elite power to plunder national resources for personal gain leaving the masses behind in extreme poverty and political doldrums (pp.4). Personal oligarchical rule soon replaced participatory democracy with patrimonialism becoming the norm throughout the continent.

Covering a period of fifty years of political independence, the contributors in their different chapters, showed how the achievement of political independence quickly degenerated into chaos with flagrant violations of human and property rights, and increasing marginalization of women, and minority nationalities, from effectively participating in resource distribution and politics. Political independence, the editors contend, soon led to the suffocation of the civil society, economic plunder, and the ‘denigration of popular forces’” (pp.2-5). The adoption of
“statism” (state intervention in the economic sphere) as a model for economic development, by some African leaders, failed to deliver the promises of the nationalist elite especially promises of reduction of poverty and the development of all sectors of the national economy. The adoption of “statism” as a favored model for economic development, the editors further contend, “actually exacerbated the many problems that have plagued the continent since colonialism” (p.5).

The editors, however, concur that the neo-colonial states (states under the artificial control of local elite), in the continent, were never hegemonic, and clearly lacked the legitimacy to enforce the rules that would promote the development agenda of the nationalist elite. By hegemonic, I presume the editors mean the lack of state autonomy from the former colonial bosses and the various local oligarchies including the national and comprador bourgeoisies. The new elite governed, the editors further argue, to the extent that they can garner brute force to maintain order in addition to exploiting old primordial loyalties to sustain themselves in power. Elite rule thus became a macabre of authoritarian dictatorships and personal dynasties like the case of Mobutu Sese Zeko in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), and other military despots across the continent.

The authors attribute the failure of the states and democratic transition in Africa, to the lack of institutional arrangements that would provide for peaceful co-existence among different ethnic nationalities, and the absence of adequate mechanisms for creating structures that would allow for popular participation in politics. They recommend “democratic constitutionalism”, (which I take to mean the ‘good’ old western liberal democracy that has failed Africa woefully in the past), as the surest way of guaranteeing “bottom-up” reconstruction of the post-colonial states into state forms that would enfranchise the masses. “Democratic Constitutionalism”, the authors insist, would provide African states with “laws and institutions that would enhance peaceful co-existence of population groups, adequately constrain state actors (my words), and provide the environment for the creation of wealth that the people need to meet their needs (sic.) (pp.8). The overall task set for the contributors, in the various chapters, is to engage in analysis that would provide the basis for the transformation of the post-colonial states in Africa into independent states that would “provide transparent, accountable, and participatory governance structures and resource allocation systems that guarantee economic freedom” (pp. xi). Case studies are drawn from Zambia (Ihonvbere), Cameroon (Natang Jua), Nigeria (Isumonah), Benin Republic (Kunle Amuwo), The Gambia (Abdoulaye Saine), Liberia (George Kieh, Jr.), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Osita G. Afoaku), Malawi (Ihonvbere), South Africa (Roger Southhall), Eritrea (Kidane Mengisteab) and Zambia (Sam Moyo). Many of these chapters were already published in one form or the other; nevertheless all the contributors should be commended for their rigorous and thorough analysis of the failure of the post-colonial states in Africa. The bulk of the research in this volume was based on both primary and secondary sources, and the bibliographical entries covered a wide range of scholarship that had been produced on Africa over the past twenty or so years by noted authors. That much said, there are some unanswered questions in this volume, especially issues of theoretical concerns. Besides the theoretical questions, the eleven-point recommendations by the authors in the introductory chapter are nothing new; they are precisely a rehearsal of the UN Millennium goals.
The recognition of the gender issues by the editors, and the necessity to address these issues, is very laudable indeed given the fact that most African scholars (including this reviewer), have marginalized such issues in their works. However, situating the African crises in the context of corruption and the attitudes of the elite towards personal accumulation misses the crucial point of the reasons for the failure of modern African states to transition into independent statuses.

Historically, the granting of independence was largely a farce as independence only encompassed the transfer of political power to local elites whose charge was to continue to pledge their allegiance to the former colonial powers. With the exception of revolutionary states like Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, and to some extent, petty bourgeois states like Ghana and Tanzania, under Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, political independence in much of Black Africa only reinforced the historic link of dependence between the former colonies and the imperialist metropolitan states of Europe. It is the same neo-colonial structure that essentially produced the likes of Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda, Omar Bongo in Gabon, Gerry Rawlings in Ghana, and Sani Abacha in Nigeria. Therefore, analyzing the crises of transition in Africa in terms of elite conduct is ahistorical at best, and such analysis only reinforces the mentality that Africans are incapable of ruling themselves. By underplaying the structural determinants of the African problematic, Ihonvbere and Mbakwu, situate their work within the theoretical framework that is characteristics of petty-bourgeois scholars like Larry Diamond, George B. Ayittey, and other political modernization theorists.

It must be stressed that the neo-colonial states, in their present forms in Africa, are playing their historic roles of perpetuating European domination (and in the case of South Africa, Boer hegemony), and they can only be transformed through popular uprisings and not by any “democratic constitutionalism” as proposed by the editors of this volume. However, this popular transformation of both the economic and political terrains in Africa will be determined largely by the extent to which Euro-American imperialism, which relies on the fostering of global apartheid (driven by white supremacy ideology), will allow such a radical transformation in Africa.

Despite my reservations about the theoretical underpinnings, the editors of this volume, and its previous companion one, should be enthusiastically applauded for this project written entirely by Africans themselves, especially for their boldness in raising critical issues about the African conditions which are often taken for granted in western academic circles. This volume, and its companion volume, will be useful for scholars and students interested in the complicated politics of Africa and its crisis of political transition. It would also most certainly be a good resource text for students in Africana studies, politics, African history, African historiography, and African political economy.

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Bibliography


Given the spotlight on the roles of religion in public life thanks to the panic and anxiety that have accompanied the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America, no other times could have been more appropriate for the publication of this collection of critical essays by the experts. In setting the scene for the book, Miles is quick in arming the reader against what appears to be the mammoth disguise of the September 11 terrorist attack that turns to blur the intellectual pursuit of explaining the intensification of political Islam in West Africa. Skillfully, Miles provides the theoretical springboard that is underpinned by such dominant perspectives as the Westernization discourse, the centre-periphery dichotomy, the Occident/Gulf divide, the modernization paradigm, the much-trumpeted Islamic threat and the globalization theory. The authors of this collection were tasked to address three main themes namely, the local perceptions and ramifications of Al-Qaida’s attack on the United States of America (USA) and the USA-led invasion and occupation of Iraq; the rise of Islamism and the ongoing trends regarding Islamist politics in West Africa; and the politicization of Islam in West Africa and the resulting implications for the dynamics between governments and societies.

As regards the local perceptions and ramifications of Al-Qaida’s attack on the USA and the USA-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the contributors provide a variety of answers. Vine traces the root of the growth of “Wahhabism” (p. 91) in Mali to the activities of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat). Loimeier explores how an Islam-based local resistance against some state institutions in Nigeria benefited from the globalizing effects of the high-profile notoriety of the Taliban regime. Charlick, Jourde and Darboe demonstrate to the reader a common pattern in the reactions of Muslims in Niger, Mauritania and The Gambia, respectively. Muslims in these countries saw the attack on the USA as a befitting punishment for the enemies of Islam. The Muslims in these countries, therefore, identified with the Muslims under the USA-led invasion.
Contrary to this foregoing pattern, Villalón explains how Senegalese Muslims refused to be drawn to the religious enthusiasm that the 11 September attack ignited amongst Muslims when their public opinion questioned the Islamic credentials of the perpetrators of the 11 September attack. Charlick and Jourde lead the reader to understand how Muslims in Niger and Mauritania mobilised grassroots support to show their dissatisfaction. The grassroots mobilization offered the governments of these countries the opportunity to suppress the Islamists in the form of arrests and detentions. In the case of the government in The Gambia the pattern was different. Darboe brilliantly establishes how the overt Islamic identity of the Jammeh administration carved a peculiar state-society relation on the issue of terrorism. The Jammeh government provided a forum for the Islamists to praise the attack when the regime was in a dire need of political legitimacy. As soon as the government encountered economic problems in the face of a soured relationship with the Arab world, it abandoned the Islamists and joined the fight against global terrorism.

Of the three broad themes of this collection, the best treated is the growth of Islamism. The contributors principally attribute the growth of Islamism in Niger, Nigeria, Mali, The Gambia and Senegal to the internal dynamics in the struggle for religious supremacy between the traditional Sufi brotherhoods such as the Qadiriyya, Sanusiyya and the Tijaniyya among others on one side and the reformist groups such as the Salafist groups and Jama’at Izalat al-Bid’a wa-Iqamat as-Sunna (the Movement Against Negative Innovations and for Orthodoxy) on the other. The contributors establish a connection between the different socio-political landscapes and the intellectual and theological dimensions that guided the struggle dialectically. They note how this internal struggle between the Islamic groups played out in the religio-cultural struggle in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Mauritanian case offers an exception to this pattern of internal struggle among Islamic sects. With the strong Islamic character of the Mauritanian state, Jourde roots the dynamics of the growth of Islamism in the state/society relations on one side and the inter-ethnic or racial relations on the other. Concerned with the need to protect their regime, the ruling elites defined what true Islam is and arrogated the task of protecting it to themselves. Jourde explains how ethnic and racial consciousness engendered by the antagonistic relationship between the Moorish and Futanke groups has led to checkmating any religious development that would enhance the cultural standing of the other.

In connection with the interplay between politics and religion, the contributors provide fascinating accounts of various scenarios in their counties of expertise. Without a doubt, the contributors show that the border between politics and religion is porous, allowing the interpenetration of religion and politics. First, Charlick explores how the Nigerien Muslims’ insistence on the traditional interpretation of women’s role in society began to question the corporatist character of the state. Second, he establishes the impact of Muslims’ grassroots mobilization on governance. He demonstrates how this mobilization which was informed by a deep-rooted suspicion over the sincerity of the West in funding and championing “immunization against polio” (p. 31) and “protection against the spread of HIV/AIDS.” (p. 32) was blurring the true theological stance of Islam on issues such as the economic roles of women, birth control and discrimination against women. In Loimeier’s paper, the reader sees how the extension of Shari’ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria represents the most formidable onslaught on the character of the secular governance. Despite professing secularism as the core
of the Malian state, Vine painstakingly explains how the various regimes had depended on the religious leaders to boost their political legitimacy. Jourde’s exposition on Mauritania is characterized by a notorious intrusion of politics in religion with the state’s promulgation and implementation of “Mosque Law…which defined mosques as public spaces subject to the control of the state.” (p. 115). In the case of The Gambia, Darboe leads the reader to understand how politicians and religious elites forayed into the religious and political spheres, respectively in order to exploit resources therein for their respective enterprises.

The principal weakness of this edited book is that it does not cover all the 16 countries of West Africa. The question of representation is even more pertinent when the reader is confronted with the status of Islam vis-à-vis politics in countries that have strong Christian character at the political level such as Ghana, Togo, Benin and Ivory Coast among others. Nonetheless, the greatest achievement of this collection is to question the need for a call for an internal debate within Islam. The call sees the necessity of an internal debate within Islam that can generate innovative ways that can be adopted by Muslims societies in order that they can comfortably go with the imperatives of the secular and human rights regimes of the contemporary world. With rich data, the collection demonstrates that the internal debate has been going on in Muslim communities ever since they first encountered colonialism. If the debate is slow in generating the appropriate response for a smooth cohabitation with the secular order, then that is another matter.


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Brown Waters of Africa is the second volume in John P. Cann’s planned trilogy of works that examine the Portuguese counterinsurgency in its former African colonies. This book explores the role of the navy in these campaigns from approximately the late 1950s until the end of hostilities in 1974-75. Cann closely examines the naval anticipation of and response to the largely overlapping insurrections in colonial Angola, Mozambique and Guinea in order to highlight the importance of the naval effort, which to date has been historiographically overshadowed by the ground campaigns. The author skillfully reconstructs the Portuguese navy’s creative efforts to overcome a general state of unpreparedness, a lack of trained personnel, decades of statutory neglect, a “blue water” (deep sea) focus and acutely limited resources and transform itself into an effective, primarily riverine, or “brown water,” counterinsurgency outfit.
The book squarely accomplishes its objectives, which include tracing this under-examined campaign, examining the navy’s imaginative, flexible and adaptive approach and highlighting the marine force’s myriad contributions. The author explains that “the military job of the Portuguese Navy was to control the waterways in enemy areas, inhibit insurgent movement, counter these small groups through ambushes in the riverine areas, project power ashore, and supply villages and troops.” Cann’s detailed examinations of the three theaters explore the execution of these various tasks. He also superbly captures the changes over time within the Portuguese navy’s martial and political approaches, offering explanations for both successes and failures. The author instructively places these developments within broader continental and geopolitical contexts to help readers better understand the local and international dimensions, ramifications and implications of the campaigns, which at times circumscribed the navy’s efforts. Cann also cogently portrays the dominant Portuguese army as a conservative impediment to the forward-thinking navy, providing concrete examples of cases in which the former impeded the endeavors of the latter, thereby undermining its own objectives.

*Brown Waters* would be well received in a collegiate-level military history course. Yet, it might just as easily be plucked off the shelves of a mainstream bookstore and enjoyed for its accessibility and well-documented accounts of pivotal campaigns, decisions and maneuvers. For those readers who are not well-versed in the respective martial and political strategies associated with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the author deftly weaves explanations into the text, drawing upon his own experience as a U.S. Naval Officer.

Cann’s evidentiary base is broad. He fruitfully mined little-used naval archives and augmented the written record with over a dozen interviews of Portuguese veterans (*fuzileiros*) of these naval campaigns. He also draws upon a wide collection of secondary source material, which enables him to include useful comparative scenarios, such as the French and American riverine campaigns in Indochina. However, for all of its strengths, the evidence that Cann marshals is ultimately unable to gauge the efficacy of the Portuguese navy’s efforts because the insurgent perspective is never considered. Consequently, the authors’ claims of naval successes come across as speculative, perhaps predicated on uncritically adopted declarations made by his Portuguese informants. Did the Portuguese navy really “control the waterways and deny the enemy usage of these passages,” or did insurgents simply exert more care when using them, intentionally avoiding engagement, as the author occasionally acknowledges? Testimony from former insurgents would potentially either confirm or challenge Cann’s claims; in their absence, readers are left to ponder these assertions on their own, with little supporting evidence.

This evidentiary lacuna also problematizes Cann’s examination of the campaign to win the “hearts and minds” of the colonized population. While he correctly asserts that the political component of any counterinsurgency campaign is crucial, readers are presented with examples of the Portuguese opening new schools and clinics and vague and unsubstantiated allusions to “trust-building” and “new political and economic freedoms and financial prosperity” that the indigenous population was supposedly enjoying in the 1960s and 70s as evidence of Portuguese success on this front. If the population was the ultimate prize, as Cann compellingly argues, he doesn’t make a strong enough case or supply sufficient evidence to convince us that the Portuguese actually won this battle. In fact, most scholars of Africa will object to Cann’s broader portrayal of the colonized population’s relationship with both the colonial regime and the
liberation movements. In this version, the Portuguese navy was comprised of “humane explorers, agents of bringing improvements to the lives of those whom they met,” heroically “protecting and supporting” indigenous communities against the insurgents, who aimed to “intimidate and subvert” them. In practice, repression at the hands of the Portuguese via violent pacification campaigns, brutal forced labor schemes and unremitting vigilance is what sparked the insurgencies in the first place; the time was well past when allegedly “humane” measures could turn the local population against their brothers-in-arms who were busy trying to remove the colonial yoke. Cann also extends his decidedly Cold War-inspired analysis to those neighboring nations that provided sanctuary to the insurgent movements. While the author’s strategic and military assessments of this support are insightful, he needlessly denigrates the sympathizing African heads of state, including Touré in Guinée, Kaunda in Zambia and Nyerere in Tanzania. For all of the dashed dreams, broken promises and ill-fated economic manipulation for which post-independence African leaders were responsible, the reality remains that Portugal oversaw the marginalization and devastation of African populations more intensely, more thoroughly and for a much longer time than did any of these indigenous administrations. Innumerable typos also detracted from the book, though this fault rests with the publisher, not the author.

Cann’s book is at its best when it focuses on the naval campaign and the remarkable exploits of this undermanned and underfunded branch of the Portuguese military. Detailed accounts of the navy’s endeavors in northern Angola in the wake of the 1961 uprising in the colony and the superb reconstruction of the invasion of Conakry in 1970 – Operation Mar Verde – are but two examples of what render the book such a valuable scholarly contribution. Thankfully, the majority of the book stays true to its primary purpose, featuring only occasional tangents to distract the reader from the otherwise interesting and well-organized narrative.

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Shireen Hassim analyzes women’s political participation in South Africa during a dramatic period of that country’s history in Women’s Organization and Democracy in South Africa. Relying on extensive archival research, secondary sources, interviews and participant-observation, Hassim focuses on women’s organizations and the emergence of the women’s movement from approximately 1980-1999. She not only addresses debates about the relationship between women’s struggles and broader political struggles, but also the relationship between the contesting ideologies of feminism and nationalism.

The book’s structure follows the emergence of the women’s movement, and women’s organizations with the women’s movement, as an important social movement in South Africa. She specifically focuses on organizations such as the African National Congress’ (ANC)
Women’s League, the Natal Organization of Women (NOW), the United Women’s Organization (UWO), and the Women’s National Coalition (WNC). Hassim provides an excellent discussion of her use of the terms “women’s movement” and “women’s organization” in the context of her research, as well as larger academic debates. An important and recurring theme in her work is the acknowledgment that women frame their actions in terms of a wide range of identities, including class, race, and geographic location. Hassim recognizes the delicate balance between oversimplifying the concept of “women’s movements” and deconstructing their nuances to the point of denying the potential for such solidarity to exist.

Hassim relies on Maxine Molyneux’s conception of autonomy to frame her discussion of the emergence and challenges of the South Africa women’s movement. Molyneux argues that successful women’s organizations must constantly hold a strong bargaining position if they are not to be co-opted by larger movements (i.e. nationalism) and external political environments have to be conducive to the achievement of feminist goals, in order for women’s movements to succeed. She also provides three categories of analysis of autonomy, which Hassim, in turn, applies to her case study of South Africa: “the nature and extent of autonomy of women’s organizations, their internal capacity to direct goals and strategies, and the nature of the external political environment within which women’s organizations were located” (p. 12).

With regard to these three categories, Hassim does an excellent job addressing them across her analysis in the subsequent seven chapters of the book. She argues while some women’s organizations pursued forms of associational autonomy, many were increasingly unable to find a balance between the demands of the women’s movement and anti-apartheid movement. Throughout the book, and specifically in chapter one, she questions the opportunities and costs of nationalism for the women’s movement. She credits the opportunity for participation in the nationalism liberation struggle for enabling activist women to “link race, class, and gender oppression and to universalize the demand for gender equality within the vision of national liberation” (21). The increasing adoption of the women’s movement by the nationalism movement, however, also reveals questions about “whether and in what ways the project of national liberation and that of women’s liberation were congruent” (p. 21).

In addition, Hassim raises an interesting discussion about the relationship among inequality, identity, and women’s interests with women’s movements. More than inequality between black and white women, she argues women’s interests in the South Africa women’s movement “were articulated in far more complex ways, with no direct correlation between racial identity and political identity” (p. 44). Nor do first world and third world concepts of “gender rights” and “gender needs” provide adequate explanation for Hassim’s case study. Rather, she suggests broader struggles against oppression (anti-apartheid movement) can trigger multiple aspects of women’s identities for mobilization. On the other hand, she also uses chapter four to demonstrate the link between “rights-based” struggles and substantive equality. For Hassim, the gender politics of South Africa provides an example of ways in which “rights-based actions can facilitate and enhance struggles to meet needs” (p. 45).

In concluding her discussion of the South Africa women’s movement, Hassim places the women’s organizations in her analysis on a continuum of autonomy, ranging from weak and directed collective action to strong, independent action. The ANC Women’s League and Federation of Transvaal Women are placed on the directed end of the continuum, while the
UWO and WNC are classified as stronger and more independent (p. 249). Part of her conclusion also consists of assessing the current shape of the women’s movement in three distinct arenas: “policy advocacy at the national level, an intermediary arena of networks and coalitions, and grass-roots level of community based women’s organizations” (p. 254). Hassim acknowledges that there has been a decline in women’s effectiveness in Parliament (although not unusual and points to US as similar case) and strong women’s organizations are the key to revival of the women’s movement influence.

Moreover, she calls for a reinstatement of “real politics” into democracy discourse and a “debate about who articulates needs and how they become integrated into policy choices” (p. 265). Hassim’s work certainly provides a starting point for such a debate. She uses a “detailed historiography of South Africa women’s movement” to engage theoretical debates between feminism and nationalism and practical discussions of struggle for social policy change (p. 246). Her book would be excellent for use in women’s studies, history, political science, or sociology classrooms, particularly for those interested in social movements and political mobilization.

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During its colonial rule of ethnically diverse Rwanda, Belgium supported the minority governing Tutsi, which ensured the majority Hutus’ continued second-class status. After granting Rwanda autonomy in 1961, Belgium reversed course and incited Hutus to rebel against the Tutsi aristocracy. Ethnic tensions peaked in October 1990 when civil war erupted between the Hutu-led government of President Juvénal Habyarimana and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front. The conflict officially ended in August 1993 when the two sides signed the Arusha Accords creating a power-sharing government.

Then on April 6, 1994, a surface-to-air missile downed a plane carrying Habyarimana, killing everyone on board. Hutu extremists immediately blamed the Tutsi for the assassination. Within hours, a government-backed Hutu militia systematically set about murdering both Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Over the next 16 days, more than 250,000 perished. By the time the killing ended in mid-July, the number had reached 800,000. Even by the grim standards of the twentieth century, that deadliest of all centuries, the Rwandan genocide stands out for its sheer intensity.

Despite clear warning signs, the Clinton administration remained silent throughout the genocide, focused on other matters. Perhaps most shockingly, the administration actually lobbied for the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Rwanda, thus allowing the killers to go about their deadly task unimpeded. America’s behavior marks an especially ignoble chapter in the country’s history.
Explaining how U.S. diplomacy operated and why it failed to act despite the many signals of impending genocide is the goal of Jared Cohen in *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*. A Rhodes Scholar, Cohen joined the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in 2006 at age 25. There he provides counsel on “counter-radicalization,” youth, and education, especially in the Muslim world. Before taking this position, Cohen held internships in the U.S. government that afforded him access to U.S. officials who served during the Rwandan genocide. He also traveled to Rwanda to interview key officials on both sides of the genocide.

Cohen argues the main reason the United States failed to intervene stemmed from the backlash generated by its disastrous experience in Operation Gothic Serpent (August 22 - October 13, 1993), a military undertaking designed to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. During the Battle of Mogadishu (October 3-4, 1993), later turned into the film “Black Hawk Down”, 18 American special operations forces lost their lives. This event transformed U.S. foreign policy. Afterwards, Congress renounced sending American forces in harms way unless the nation’s vital interests were clearly at stake. Unwilling to challenge Congressional opposition, the Clinton administration ruled out military intervention.

In addition to Congressional restraints, the administration faced other challenges, including an attempt to restore civilian rule to Haiti and to end the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The White House deemed these missions more important than intervening militarily in Rwanda. Moreover, the highly publicized deaths of Kurt Cobain (April 8), Richard M. Nixon (April 22) and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis (May 19), as well as public interest in the completion of the Channel Tunnel (May 6), the inauguration of Nelson Mandela (May 10), and the arrest of O.J. Simpson (June 17) pushed Rwanda to the margins of international consciousness.

The U.S. bureaucracy also prevented a response. State Department lawyers cautioned U.S. officials to avoid using the term “genocide” when describing the killing in Rwanda in the mistaken belief that it might obligate the United States to take action. Pentagon officials saw their duty as implementing policy, not creating it. Absent orders from the civilian leadership, the military establishment refused to take up the issue. Cohen also faults U.S. officials for erroneously thinking that intervention automatically meant sending military forces. Few considered actions such as delivering a stern public warning to stop the genocide, publicizing the names of the killers, or even jamming the radio the Rwandan government employed to orchestrate the killing. By failing to think creatively, U.S. officials missed a chance to save thousands.

Beyond explaining how America’s lumbering bureaucratic process enabled genocide to occur unobstructed, Cohen also identifies specific individuals who, by either committing sins of omission or commission, allowed the genocide to go forward. President Bill Clinton had the power to overcome the bureaucratic gridlock, but chose not to expend his political capital. Secretary of State Warren Christopher knew little about Africa and seemed to care even less. Dick Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council, was adamant that preventing genocide fell outside his professional responsibilities. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who knew Africa well, declined to act because he did not see Rwanda a priority. The U.S. ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson claimed not to know...
genocide was unfolding, even though he grew up in the region, spoke a regional language, and witnessed the initial stages of the killing.

There were, however, courageous individuals who risked their careers by speaking out. Prudence Bushnell, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, arose at 2:00 a.m. each morning to call the warring factions in Rwanda, going so far as to falsely claim to speak for President Clinton. Another was Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, the Force Commander of the UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda. Although outgunned and outnumbered, Dallaire and his staff labored to save as many people as possible. There were others who also took risks, but they were low-level officials who lacked the clout to goad the bureaucracy into action.

Alongside the book’s strengths are a few weaknesses. Cohen’s almost step-by-step account of U.S. policy during slows the narrative considerably. His account is also repetitive, as he retraces his steps time and again. Acronyms also abound, forcing the reader to repeatedly consult the three-page list of abbreviations. The book is certainly not for the lay reader.

Despite these reservations, policymakers would profit from reading Cohen’s book. They would see human costs of a policy stridently indifferent to moral considerations. And as we again face genocide, this time in the Darfur region of Sudan, the current and succeeding administrations should ponder whether inaction in the face of mass murder is a price the world can afford.

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It is always a pleasure to find insightful Anglophone treatises on the Casamance region of Southern Senegal, and *Masquerades of Modernity* is an excellent new addition to this relatively small body of literature. De Jong skillfully frames his material in relation to prominent themes in social theory including modernity, globalization, and the challenges of ethnographic writing and authority. The dialogue with contemporary sociological and anthropological concepts and the erudite but accessible nature of the writing make the work an engaging read.

The argument is based on extensive field research. While intriguing tidbits and anecdotes about the research are scattered throughout the text, a more comprehensive and focused discussion of methodology would have been useful. De Jong avers that sacred forests and masquerades are central to the power dynamics and social politics of the Casamance. Contemporary manifestations of masquerades are not expressions of tradition; they are discursive responses to changing conditions. Masquerades, like other rituals and secrecy, are thus part of the ongoing renegotiation of social life and have many functions such as shaping, reinforcing, and marking identity boundaries.
As the group most commonly associated with southern Senegal, the Jola (or Diola) are most prominent in the text, but there is some comparative material and considerable discussion of the Mandinko (or Mandinka). Although the Wolof commonly symbolize the subordination to northern Senegal that is central to the rationale behind Jola revitalization movements and the Casamance secessionist struggle, the Mandinko represent the immediate Other who are juxtaposed against “Jolaness” (my term). De Jong delves into the fascinating identity politics between the Jola and the Mandinko, and like most researchers and local residents, he emphasizes Mandinkoization of the Jola at the expense of the reverse concept. While both scholars and locals emphasize the dominant narrative of Mandinkoization, the cultural exchange has been bilateral; many persons commonly identified as Mandinko engage in practices associated with Jola lifeways and worldviews. The specific nature of such exchanges vary by locality and sub-populations concerned. In neighboring Gambia Mandokization is even more pronounced, but Jola customs have also influenced members of other groups. There are also cases of Mandinko patrilineages in Jola dominated villages who over the course of two generations have largely adopted what are considered to be “typically Jola” lifestyles, for instance.

Significant portions of Masquerades and Modernity discuss Islam and gender. As De Jong alludes to, religious affiliations are deeply intertwined with identity discourses, and Islam in particular is a key construct for identity formation and inter- and intra-group differentiation. He also examines inter-generational tensions, cleavages between the sexes, and the gendering of identity politics. Masquerades and ceremonies are variously interpreted as Jola, Mandinka, and/or Islamic, and the differentiation in interpretations and narratives strongly correlate with ethno-linguistic identities and attributes such as age and especially gender. Masquerades are also said to facilitate the maintenance and reproduction of gerontocratic authority and gender-based and other social hierarchies.

The text is rich with allusions to fascinating phenomena. These include the aforementioned role of masquerades in promoting social control, the potential commodification of ceremonies and the interplay between the secret, sacred masquerades and (profane) tourism, and much more. There are numerous possibilities for further theoretical development of the case material by elaborating on existing points and applying through elaboration of existing points and application. The analysis of ritual and performance could but does not address Victor Turner’s (1969) work on those subjects and his concepts such as ritualized inversion of status hierarchies. The work also offers ample opportunities for examining or applying other models such as Barth’s (1969) work on inter-group boundaries.

In conclusion, this stimulating and rich monograph is strongly recommended for both neophyte and seasoned regional specialists, and it may also be of interest to scholars and students of Africanist anthropology, modernity, globalization, and secrecy. Modernity and Masquerades would also be a good potential text for upper-level undergraduate and postgraduate courses on modernity and ritual.

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From the art historical perspective of traditional African art, the distinction between the systems of thought and the supporting visual traditions among the continent’s ethnic groups, especially living within the same geographical region, is more of artificiality than reality. Yet that given African ethnic group may have certain peculiar traits that set it apart from its immediate neighbor is not contested. For instance, prior to, and even after, the partition of Africa by European powers following the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, there have always been traces of intercultural exchanges, borrowings, and assimilations. As this relates to the ethnic groups or subgroups in central Africa, Manuel Jordán’s *Makishi: Mask Characters of Zambia* underscores this “unity in diversity” nature of traditional African arts.

Echoed in the foreword by Mary (Polly) Nooter Roberts (p. 6), Jordán states clearly the two-fold aim of the book. First, it sets to complement and update existing scholarship by offering more insight into the form, function, and context of makishi visual traditions prevalent among the ethnic groups in the ‘three corners’ region of northwestern Zambia, northeastern Angola, and southwestern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also intends “to develop an alternative form of categorization highlighting a variety of individual mask characters by their defined physical attributes and those that become evident in performance” (p. 16).

Targeting very large, diverse audiences from across disciplines, Jordán divides the study into three sections, all strongly attesting to, and confirming his in-depth knowledge of the Zambian makishi masquerades traditions. Jordán’s rich primary information sources were mainly Zambian natives and practitioners of makishi, which included the mask makers and performers and the mukanda camp leaders. Also of great inestimable value was the author’s persistent and unending study of visual traditions of the peoples in northwestern Zambia and surrounding territories for “nearly twenty years” as noted in the preface by Allen F. Roberts (p. 8). The reader is particularly overwhelmed by Jordán’s role as not just an observer in the makishi contexts, as is often the case among scholars researching the visual traditions outside of their own cultural boundaries, but also as someone with insider knowledge, based on his life-long unrivalled mutual relationship with the local narratives.

The first section of the book spells out the concepts and general contexts of makishi, explicating the masquerade characters, in which the author proposed four for the Zambian makishi—sociable, ambiguous, aggressive, and royal. Jordán’s makishi typological model is based on the masks’ physical (formal) attributes combined with their behavioral, performative...
contexts (p. 23). Jordán deserves commendation for offering this clear, straightforward, and all-encompassing *makishi* character categorization, especially when compared to the two previous less clear-cut and somehow loose classifications by art historian Marie-Louise Bastin (1982) and historian Patrick Wele (1993).

The book’s second section concerns essentially the *makishi* from the collection of the Fowler Museum at UCLA, representing the sociable, ambiguous, and aggressive characters functioning exclusively in the *mukanda* initiation process. The royal-type *makishi* character is conspicuously missing in the collection. This is an attestation that royal-type *makishi*, according to Jordán, is not only rarer than the *mukanda* initiation-related category, but is as well “considered the most sacred of all *makishi*” (p. 31). Jordán’s in-depth analysis of the collection, in which he frequently interjects with his own firsthand information and personal field photos concerning the *makishi* contexts, is praiseworthy. The section also clearly confirms and authenticates the suitability and reliability of Jordán’s quadruple categorization of the Zambian *makishi* characters.

However, the catalogue photos (in this second section of the book) were accompanied by only the pieces names/titles, locations, medium/mediums, and dimensions. There is no information on the names of artists and dates the *makishi* were made or collected. Such vital information, if available, could foster reader’s better appreciation of the donors’ efforts, Jay and Deborah Last, which had led to the Fowler’s acquisition of “a collection of such breadth and depth from a single region” (p. 6). More importantly, according to Jordán, owing to the secrecy nature of *mukanda* initiation, the primary context for *makishi*, Zambian tradition compels the immediate destruction of the masks after use “so that they are not discovered by women or the uninitiated” and to enable the *makishi* with the camp return “to the world of the ancestors” (pp. 28). Thus, information concerning the masks’ acquisition dates and/or circumstance(s) could shed some light into two important contemporary issues concerning traditional African art. First, are the *makishi*, like other traditional African art, also forfeiting their sacred values and sanctions against their access to the public, in making them collectible? Are the masks, as is now the case with virtually all other traditional African sacred art, not immune to commoditization and/or commercialization? Nonetheless, Jordan and the Fowler Museum should be well commended for providing this powerful and well-illustrated book with over eighty color pictures, making it stand-out when compared to the usual black-and-white photos of traditional African art collections/publications.

The third and last but not least important section of the book concerns the performance contexts of *makishi* (in the *mukanda*-related and royal ceremonies), which with few exceptions, were collected by Jordán from 1991 to 1993 and in 1997 and 2004 in northwestern Zambia (p. 57). The section provides Jordán the avenue to expand on not only the *makishi* characters represented in the catalogue from the collection of the Fowler Museum, but also on the author’s initial *makishi* character categorization (social, ambiguous, aggressive, and royal). Here the information provided by Jordán underscores and corroborates his impressive familiarity with Zambian *makishi*. However, at least a brief juxtaposition of *makishi* with other visual traditions in the region, such as divination-related art, the theme for the author’s doctoral dissertation, would have better corroborated the ‘unity in diversity and/or complexity nature of traditional African art evident in the *makishi* traditions of the peoples in central Africa.
On the whole, *makishi: Mask Characters of Zambia* is a well researched and primary information laden book. It is particularly of great interest to learn how the character or demeanor of a given *likishi* or *mukishi* (singular of *makishi*) could be better understood by observing not only the mask’s physical and behavioral attributes, but more importantly by also comparing and contrasting such attributes with that of others. It is as well remarkable to learn that the masks’ surface decorations, especially the scarification marks, have status and maturity allusions and that “they also contain codified information that may be “read” or understood at different semantic levels” (p. 40). I strongly believe that this well established fact would put to rest, such argument as to whether or not Africans have any aboriginal forms of writing.

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Langmia’s book is a contribution to the rapidly emerging literature on the use of the Internet by Diasporic communities worldwide. It has been observed that the Internet is a medium quintessentially suited to Diasporas because they share transnational, trans-temporal and trans-spatial dimensions. Just as cyberspace has no physical location, the Cameroonian Diaspora has been spread across the globe. Cyberspace is ideally suited for the reconstitution of lost networks and the development of new ones that cross old lines.

Langmia analyzes the way in which the Internet has become the public sphere for the Cameroon Diaspora. Essentially his Ph.D. dissertation, he sets out two goals in this work: to apply [neo-Marxist philosopher Jurgen] Habermas’ concept of the public sphere to the study of the use of the Internet by the Cameroonian Diaspora and to study gender differences in the Cameroonian public sphere.

Langmia does this by posing two research questions: What do the dominant themes of Cameroonian Internet discourse reveal about the political views of Diasporic Cameroonians? What are the gender differences in the dominant themes in Cameroonian Internet discourse?

He conducts his research by doing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of two months of discussions on four Internet discussion groups frequented by the Cameroonian Diaspora. Coming from the discipline of linguistics, critical discourse analysis studies language and discourse in social institutions, drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory and critical linguistics and focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power are constructed through written and spoken texts in communities, schools and classrooms.

With regard to his first goal, Langmia concludes that Cameroonians in the Diaspora have used cyberspace to advocate meaningful change in their home country and that the Internet has become a democratic public sphere, “for both Cameroonian men and women to come together and question the role of their government and opposition leaders on the kind of policies and goals they envision for Cameroonians at home and abroad.”
In coming to this conclusion, he does not engage in any critical discussion of the applicability to the Internet of Habermas’ definition of a public sphere separate from the life of family and work and the state as a place for free communication and discussion of ideas. Ideally the public sphere should be marked by open access, equal status of participants and rational analysis of alternatives. A debate has arisen as to whether the virtual public sphere of the Internet does indeed create such as ideal public space. Does the Internet public space embody new politics? Does it lead to a democratization of views? Does discourse on Internet discussion sites constitute rational analysis? Do all have an equal voice to state their views? Langmia does not raise any of these issues.

On the second theme he concludes that men and women discussed the dominant political themes differently, that the Cameroonian Diasporic women on the Internet were more in favor of the incumbent president than men and that they were more constructive than men in their criticism of the opposition parties.

The book overstates its reach in its claims to employ feminist theory. Especially bizarre is the blurb on the back cover of the book that states, “The study builds on Habermas and other leading feminist authors’ conceptualization of the democratic public sphere . . ..” Habermas would be very surprised to be classified as a feminist author! Feminist theory is highly critical of Habermas’ blindness to gender issues and his negative assessment of the feminist movement and his androcentrism.

Langmia’s discussion of gender issues does not constitute what is generally regarded as gender analysis. He doesn’t deal at all with questions of differences in gender socialization, of why men dominate Cameroonian debates. At times Langmia seems to blame women for not using the opportunities that the Internet offers to realize the equal status that they have been awarded in the Cameroonian Constitution. As he observes, “The Internet has come with manifold advantages for both parties to form dependent and independent systems of communication that give each person the freedom to express his/her views with little or no constraint. The question then is whether Cameroonian women are using it to their advantage.” He does not ask whether there are differences in computer skill levels or linguistic or educational attainment between Cameroonian men or women in the Diaspora, or, perhaps more importantly, whether women have equal access to the Internet, especially in terms of their multiple roles and workloads.

Langmia supplements Critical Discourse Analysis with a review of the literature on immigrant use of the Internet in the public sphere, women and minorities’ use of the Internet, and virtual versus physical reality of the Internet. The author says that little research has been done on the role of the Internet is the formation of the Diasporic public sphere especially as related to Africa. However, he seems to have missed the sources most relevant to his research: Victoria Bernal’s article on the Eritrean digital Diaspora that focuses explicitly on the issue of the public sphere would have been particularly useful to Langmia’s analysis (Bernal 2005). Other sources on the African Diaspora in cyberspace that he might have looked at include Camilla Gibb’s perceptive study of the Ethiopian Harari community in Canada on the Internet (Gibb 2002) and Amina Loukili on the Moroccan Diaspora on the Internet (Loukili 2007). He also would have profited from looking at Terence Lyons’ work on African Diasporas and homeland politics on the Internet, dealing specifically with conflict in Ethiopia (Lyons 2004,
2007) that show how rigidities in Diasporic communities can have negative implications for homeland politics. This might have tempered Langmia’s optimistic view that Diaspora discourse on the Internet provides “solutions” to Cameroonian political problems, as he states, “Cameroonian Diaspora in the Diaspora have decided to use the Internet to air their grievances and provide solutions to the political predicaments of their country” (p.11).

The book is marred by many cases of awkward language (e.g. “English alphabets”, “a man of 71-years’ old”, “pile of vocabularies”) and would have profited greatly from editing. This book will be of interest to the growing audience of Diaspora studies and media studies. Its gender analysis is of a caliber to merit recommending it to those interested in gender studies.

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References


The genocide in Rwanda was unparalleled in its transparency, expediency and brutal intimacy. Neighbors slaughtered neighbors, most often with machetes. As a result, Rwanda’s "ordinary killers" have increasingly become the subject of both popular and critical attention: Raoul Peck’s film "Sometimes in April", B.B. Diop’s novel Murambi: A Book of Bones, J.P. Stassen’s graphic novel Deogratias, Jean Hatzfeld’s testimonial collection Machete Season or Yolande Mukagasana’s interview/photography collection Les Blessures du Silence. In their glossy coffee-table book, Straus and Lyons capitalize on the fascination with mass murderers, while
aiming to offer a deeper, more personal and realistic perspective about Hutu killers, culled from their field research in Rwandan prisons in 1998-2002. Straus, a former journalist turned political scientist, concomitantly published *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* stemming from this research. Photographer Robert Lyons previously published the collection *Another Africa*, which included text by Chinua Achebe.

This volume consists of 60 pages of interview excerpts with incarcerated Rwandan perpetrators, and a section of 50 black and white photographs portraits of Rwandan killers, victims, witnesses and judges. However, the interviews do not correspond to the photographs, as this collection pulls together two disparate projects. As such, this "representational experiment" (p.16) aims to create a series of "accidental encounters that allow readers to confront the genocide in unforeseeable ways." (p.17) As Straus explains, "the book does not make sense of this raw material but allows readers to make their own discoveries." (p.14) To provide some cohesion and context, the primary material is complemented with a short reflection by photographer Lyons, as well as a brief introduction by Straus, which outlines his anthropological methodology and provides a succinct summary of the history of Rwanda.

In his introduction, Straus explains that this project was compiled as a rebuttal to stereotypical, sensationalist media representations of Africa, yet ironically, in this lavish, glossy tome, with heavy virgin paper and wide margins, the reader also consumes morsels of these killers’ chilling experience, as well as aestheticized portraits of Rwandans on display. Lyons’ photographs manifestly counter clichéd images about Rwanda, such as bloated bodies floating in rivers or piles of corpses on roadsides. Moreover, Lyons’ set-up encourages viewers to interact with the Rwandans on display. Since the portraits are without caption, as readers examine the head-shots of Rwandans set against a neutral background, they must discern if this individual is a perpetrator, victim or witness, by reading their facial expression and posture. If they flip to the back of the book, their suspicions are either confirmed or challenged. In so doing, Lyons manifestly seeks to emphasize that physically, killers are "ordinary people." Yet subtly and disconcertingly perhaps, this line-up and mug-shot exercise may also serve to reaffirm the racist stereotype that any Black person could be a threat.

Certainly, the most fascinating part of this collection are Straus’ interviews with these "pedestrian killers" (p.17). As in his critical study, Straus dismisses the genocidal masterminds, the Rwandan elite or intelligentsia, and focuses on mob mentality: "ordinary, unremarkable" folks “swept up in a tide of unanticipated violence” (p.24). In 2002, Straus interviewed 230 imprisoned local killers from various regions in Rwanda, this collection contains excerpts from 23 of these interviews, some 2% of his material (p.20). All of Straus’ interviewees are male Hutu prisoners who have been either convicted or tried. As such, Straus’ explains, they have less incentive to lie. However, throughout the interviews, readers are exposed to a "mix of truth, self-interested reconstructed memory, fantasy, exaggeration, distortion, speculation and lies," as they attempt to unravel the complex and unfathomable question – why? (p.20). Why did these ordinary people become killers?

The killers’ testimonies resist any simple or uniform explanations for the genocide, but rather confirm a multiplicity of scholarly theories (eg. Straus, Prunier, Des Forges, Uvin, Mikondo), including the mob effect, pillaging, obedience to authorities, economics, hate propaganda, personal gain and individual rivalries. Interestingly, the oft-cited roles of the West
and the radio RTML are downplayed in these testimonies, as are, manifestly, the inculpatory
issue of ethnic divisionism and remorse: all of the subjects claim they had no issues with their
Tutsi neighbors, and demonstrate shame and guilt for their actions. All claim to have killed
fewer than 10 people, most often admitting to only one or two murders. Most of the accounts
are structured in the same way: they typically start with the catalyst for the genocide – the plane
-crash of president Habiyarimana – and detail the first few days of the genocide. A select few
mention previous pogroms of the Tutsi (1959, 1963, 1973) or in the preparatory genocidal
campaign in the 1990s. Notably, in contrast with Hatzfeld’s testimonies, very few of the killers
describe the killings as “work.” Rather they deploy military vocabulary: the Tutsi were
"enemies"; they were at "war"; they had to "defend their country." Since these interviews were
collected before the release of some 60 000 prisoners after 2002, aside a brief aside there is
nothing in this text about gacaca or the return of these killers to their communities. (p.23).

While interested readers will certainly appreciate this volume, sedulous scholars may be
disappointed by its brevity, its haphazard assemblage or its marketing aesthetics. Those
wishing to learn more are encouraged to read Mukagasana or Hatzfeld. With its photographs
and interviews, this compilation closely resembles Mukagasana’s Blessures du silence, a relatively
unknown text, because it has not been translated from French. Yet Mukagasana, herself a Tutsi
survivor, interviews killers, survivors and witnesses alike. By contrast, Straus and Lyons’
collection reflects the Western, outsider perspective; the interviews are translated thrice
(Kinyarwanda, French, English) and we learn nothing about the Rwandan translator’s subject
position. Hatzfeld’s impressive Machete Season is an even more detailed killer testimonial
collection, and is complemented by survivor interviews (Life Laid Bare) and by interviews by
both killers and survivors after the release of prisoners (). In all, Lyons and Straus’ text offers an
engaging and accessible introductory glimpse into the psyche of the genocidal killer.

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The African Manufacturing Firm: An Analysis based on Firm Surveys in Seven Countries in
PP.

Spanned over thirteen key chapters, besides two introductory and concluding ones, this
book by Mazumdar and Mazaheri aims at providing a comprehensive examination of the
African manufacturing sector (only organized) in Sub-Saharan Africa through data made
available by the World Bank’s RPED (Research Program in Enterprise Development) surveys
for the period 1992-96. The authors have made a genuine effort in examining carefully the
entirety of available data and thereby have come up with a detailed analysis of the African
manufacturing firm. Beginning with various aspects related to the economic structure and
production relations in the African manufacturing firm, the analytical exercise focuses on
examining various factors of production along with providing a detailed analysis of the dynamics of firm behavior, and its competitiveness and export performance.

In an informative introduction, the authors provide an economic profile of the (focused) seven African economies viz. Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in the first chapter. As background to the study, this chapter examines their status in terms of their economic development attainments, fiscal and monetary situations, and their external and manufacturing sectors. Chapters two and three are devoted to the examination of the economic structure and production relations in the manufacturing sector of these economies. Chapter two specifically reveals that the African manufacturing sector is biased towards large firms – a result derived primarily due to the specific nature of the data. Nevertheless, the authors do not deny the existence of dualistic structures in the African manufacturing sector. Chapter three specifically aims at examining the relative productivity of small manufacturing firms vis-à-vis large ones so as to explore “the popular thesis of ‘small is beautiful’” (pp. 63).

Chapters four to eight constitute the subject-matter of the third section that is focused on examining various factors of production in the African manufacturing firm. Chapter four examines the aspect of entrepreneurship in these firms. The aspect of finance (capital) is covered by the fifth chapter and the aspect of labor is covered by the sixth chapter. Similarly, the seventh chapter examines the impact of regulations and infrastructure relative to other problems faced by the firm. It is found that credit constraints have the most affect followed by infrastructure and regulatory constraints. Chapter eight examines contract flexibility and enforcement in the African manufacturing firms and reveals various methods in the form of guarantees and penalties used by firms to avoid the problems besides highlighting various other aspects of contract enforcement and flexibility in these firms.

Chapters nine to twelve reveal the inherent dynamics in the behavior of the firm. Chapter nine analyses capacity utilization whereas chapter ten focuses on examining technical efficiency. Other aspects of investment and growth are examined in eleventh and twelfth chapters. Chapter nine reveal a low degree of capacity utilization in manufacturing firms in comparison to the international standards, with large dispersion among the firms. Chapter ten reveals inter-country differences in African manufacturing firms’ ability to attain their potentials of technical efficiency by using the stochastic frontier production function approach. Chapter eleven looks at the dynamics of investment in these manufacturing firms by revealing various insights related to the magnitude and the financing of investment besides diagnosing the determinants of investment. Similarly, chapter twelve provides a time-series analysis of the growth of the manufacturing firms. Amongst other aspects, it explores the determinants of growth of these manufacturing firms. Similarly, competitiveness and export performance is examined at length in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters. The fifteenth chapter finally concludes the inferences derived from the detailed empirical analysis of the African manufacturing firm.

From a careful study of this volume, it is learned that the authors through a detailed examination of the African manufacturing firm have provided insights into various operational aspects of these firms. Given the state of knowledge on the manufacturing firms in Africa, this book containing detailed analyses is a welcome output. Nevertheless, there are a few reservations. Since employment is one of the desirable outcomes of the industrial process, the
analysis remained more or less confined to examining labor only as a factor of production and no effort has been made to highlight the human aspect of labor. What could have been more desirable is to let the readers know about the type of employment generated by the manufacturing firms in Africa. There is also a large prevalence of informal sector in Africa. In such a situation, the given analytical exercise does not reveal much about the linkage of (organized) manufacturing firms with the small (household) manufacturing firms. The authors make it clear at the outset that given the nature of data, the analysis focuses on organized manufacturing. But, as the authors have done some adjustments with data in few chapters like twelfth focusing on growth, here too they could have supplemented the findings with other data source revealing the plight of working masses in manufacturing firms in Africa. Such a suggestion is relevant only to extend the scope of the study to readers like this reviewer who besides industrial performance are also interested in looking at the aspect of labor.

Nevertheless, the book really reveals a commendable research effort of the writers. The writers have made a novel attempt to provide a detailed and rigorous analysis of the data available from World Bank’s RPED surveys (covered in three waves) for the period 1992-96. Moreover, the authors also tried to locate their findings in a comparative perspective with other studies and relevant literature. This exercise increased manifolds the usefulness of the study. The questions explored are equally relevant and hold significance mainly for their relevance in providing policy inputs to strengthen the manufacturing base of Africa. Owing mainly to its detailed analytical exercise, this book deserves a wide readership. I will be of great use to those who wish to know more about Africa, its economy in general and the manufacturing sector in particular. Specifically, it is of relevance to policy makers, researchers and academicians working in the area of industrial economics.

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Schooling and Difference in Africa: Democratic Challenges in a Contemporary Context.

Five decades after political independence, African countries continue to search for democratic ways of delivering social services to its populations. One of the most important but least addressed issues in this challenge is that of educational equity, specifically how schooling in Africa can serve diverse student populations in equitable ways. Although African societies are characterized by some of the most blatant diversities—for example, socio-economic class, ethnocultural, linguistic, and religious diversities, to name a few, relatively little attention has been paid to issues of diversity and difference in schooling in Africa. Attention to diversity and difference is particularly important because of how the issue impinges on power and equity as significant factors in determining learning outcomes and social opportunities for students. A review of the literature reveals some previous work on inequities, exclusionary practices, and
unequal access to education in African countries. Overall, however, it is fair to say that this is an area that still needs to be explored further in research on education in Africa.

*Schooling and Difference in Africa: Democratic Challenges in a Contemporary Context,* by George Sefa Dei et al, makes a significant contribution to this area by researching and discussing several different aspects of student diversity and difference — ethnicity, gender, religion, class, language, disability — and how these are perceived and addressed in African schooling systems, specifically schooling in Ghana, a country similar to many other African countries in terms of the multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual nature of the society. The book emerged from a three-year empirical study in which the authors, all of whom share a passion and belief that equal access to education is important, set out to investigate how schools in Ghana deal with difference and diversity within and among student populations. Their stated objective “is to offer understanding of and engagement with African education in postcolonial times through the stimulation of critical discussion regarding the relevance of responding to ethnic, gender, class, linguistic, and religious differences within African schooling” (p. 5).

The bulk of the research employed for this book centers around analyses of data from several sources including interviews with students and other stakeholders from diverse backgrounds of difference, policy documents, and classroom observations of teaching practices. The results are reported in eleven chapters of thick, multifaceted descriptions, with each chapter undertaking a relevant and in-depth description of a specific aspect of diversity and difference in schooling from the perspectives of different stakeholders in schooling in/from Ghana. Through these thick descriptions, readers are able to feel, see, and hear the world the authors inhabited during the course of this study. This review of the book is based on how well the authors/researchers provide an understanding of inclusive schooling in an African context and whether this understanding produces possibilities for educational inclusion and equity in school settings in Africa.

Chapter 1 presents cogent reasons why attention should be paid to diversity and social difference in schooling processes in Africa, buttressing the argument around issues of equity, equal access, and social opportunities for all students. Measures which have been taken to address diversity issues in various African countries and the remissness that needs to be addressed are also provided in this opening chapter. The chapter, therefore, usefully sets the context for the study and the book. Chapter 2 describes the research procedures employed, identifying anti-colonial and anti-racist discursive frameworks as the theoretical and conceptual lenses through which the research data were examined and analyzed. While some may question the place of such methodological details in a book like this, these details lend tremendous credibility to the book as a product of a research study. Furthermore, research is not a neutral process and it behooves researchers/authors to provide readers with their own positionality within the research processes and how they come to analyze and interpret the data they collect.

Understanding notions of difference, minority, and majority in African contexts requires an understanding of how local subjects themselves perceive and articulate these concepts. Chapters 3 and 4 provide local perceptions and articulations of these concepts from the vantage points of respondents’ cultural, ethnic, gender, and class backgrounds and geographic locations in Ghana. These backgrounds are presented as clear determinants of how the respondents understood issues of diversity, difference, minority and majority locations. Chapters 5 through
10 focus on essential elements of diversity and difference considered to be of critical importance in multicultural, multiethnic societies, namely ethnicity, gender, class, (dis)ability, language, and religion. In some ways, the chapter divisions can be artificial. For example, ethnicity, class, and access to language (Standard English, the language of opportunity) often become interwoven, particularly when we consider that, in Africa, access to social opportunities is sometimes facilitated or even determined by membership of particular ethnic groups. Similarly, attitudes and beliefs about gender and sexuality are firmly rooted in religious beliefs. Still, that the divisions allow the authors to focus on one element at a time, thereby providing a closer and more in-depth analysis.

Ethnicity, in particular, brings up issues of power and privilege and, as the authors point out, although there have been some strides in the elimination of educational disparities based on race and ethnicity (e.g., in primary education in Zimbabwe and Tanzania) disparities along ethnic lines still continue in many other African countries. (p. 25). Chapter 5 examines how ethnicity and power issues are played out in Ghana’s education system. The data suggested a substantial difference in educational opportunity and resources among students who come from the provinces where the ruling elite originate and students who do not. Individuals and groups are ethnicized for rewards and punishment, with significant consequences for national development and national unity. The topic of gender, that cogent determinant of access to education in many African contexts, is taken up in Chapter 6 where respondents reflect on the gender-based inequalities in the Ghanaian schooling system. The authors’ thesis is that gender is central to schooling if education is to promote social development (p. 150). They, therefore, examine the gendered dimension of schooling with a critical lens, focusing on the social and cultural construction of power, access, equity, voice, and transformative possibilities (p. 151). Results of their analyses suggest that the gendered dimension of schooling cannot be underestimated. Economic factors play a determining role in the educational aspirations and attainments of students. In the developing countries of Africa, economic factors “determine whether one can or cannot become a student in the first place” (p. 202). Chapter 7 explores this important source of educational inequality. Poverty related issues such as access to textbooks, basic nutrition, and local transportation to school are examined through the eyes of the respondents. In Ghana’s education system, like elsewhere, students from wealthy families have better chances of school success than those from poorer families.

Ableness is another area where, historically, people with disabilities have faced serious and persistent forms of discrimination and exclusion and, among some African ethnic groups, elimination. Interviews with physically disabled students in Dei, et al’’s study revealed deep feelings of alienation and marginalization which are reported in Chapter 8. Constructive solutions are suggested by the students for schools and policy makers. Language issues in education in Africa bring up historical questions, among others. Chapter 9 challenges the dominant role of the English language in both the Ghanaian society and its education system. While the authors acknowledge the challenges embedded in developing fair and equitable language policies in multilingual African contexts, they nevertheless urge the continuation of a search for viable African solutions to the problems and concerns emerging from linguistic plurality. Chapter 10 takes up notions of religion and spirituality which are presented as distinct although inter-related aspects of human life. The perpetuation of a religious hierarchy
in Ghana, which privileges and gives pride of place to the colonial missionary Christian religion to the exclusion of Ghanaian indigenous religions and students who practice them, is deplored in this chapter. As religion and spirituality play an important role in the learner’s engagement with the learning process, educators and school administrators are urged to consider ways of delivering education that allow learning to happen in the context of religious and spiritual education in the schools (p.254).

Chapter 11, the final chapter, concludes the book with a comparative look at issues of diversity and difference in the Ghanaian and Canadian education systems, arguing that African schools are well placed to learn from strategies for inclusive approaches to education in other pluralistic contexts, while understanding their own unique contexts and histories (p.305).

Overall, the book does deliver on its twin objectives of interrogating existing approaches and practices that alienate minority students in Ghana’s education system, and providing research-based educational knowledge that could be used effectively to inform debates on educational change and guide policy initiatives on fundamental structural changes. It is interesting that the book remains almost silent on sexual orientation as a marker of difference in African schooling. Views about sexual differences, which have roots in religious and cultural beliefs, would have enriched the discussions on religion and gender (including the sexual harassment of girls by teachers and male students) and thrown much needed light on this topic in an African schooling context. Also, in comparing the multicultural scenes in Canada and Ghana, I question the authors’ claim that Canadian multicultural policy “allows all its citizens to flourish as individuals.....,” considering Canada’s woeful failure to deliver on the social equality dimension of multiculturalism. (p. 300). Castles points out that multiculturalism as a public policy has two key dimensions: recognition of cultural diversity and social equality of members of minorities. Clearly, education has a central role to play in both. With regard to the first, multicultural education is based on the idea that students come from diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds which should be respected and maintained by building diversity into school curricula, classroom practices, and the organization of the school. The second aspect, social equality, requires that students are not disadvantaged or isolated due to differing cultural and social backgrounds. This requires measures such as special instruction in the main language for students from other linguistic backgrounds and measures to compensate for differences in educational experience due to migration and other factors. Recent studies conducted by this author on the educational needs and barriers for Canada’s Aboriginal and African refugee students and school drop-out among Black students in Canadian schools revealed that schools in Canada have failed to meet these responsibilities on both fronts due to reductions in the state’s funding to schools, among other reasons. One can hardly refer to citizens (students) as “flourishing” under such conditions.

In a similar vein, the authors are invited to reflect on this question: To what extent is the lack of attention to diversity and difference in schooling in African countries due to (a) leaders’ or policy makers’ limited understanding of what constitutes inclusion and (b) the lack of resources to address the needs of diverse students, as opposed to the authors’ perception that diversity and difference are ignored or seen as a problem or as a pernicious disease in African schooling contexts? (p. 7; p. 12). Where resources are severely scarce it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to provide inclusive education even when understood and desired. As the authors
themselves admit, state cuts in educational funding throughout the world have been “at the expense of issues of equity and social justice” (p. 9). One can only imagine how Africa, which has still not benefited from the spread of economic globalization and information technology, would respond to demands for inclusive education.

These concerns notwithstanding, the book is a major contribution to the field of diversity and schooling in the African context, a context that is still largely under-researched in terms of diversity and difference in education. By exploring diverse and salient aspects of inclusive education in an African setting in a single volume, this book significantly extends and broadens educators’ understanding of the construction of inclusive educational environments, especially in light of the limited African perspective in the available scholarship on this important aspect of contemporary education. It is based on sound research, informed by a broad scholarship on its subject matter, and is a timely addition to contemporary curriculum and pedagogical discourses of educational reform. The parallels and intersections between Ghanaian and Canadian understandings and practices of inclusion/exclusion in schooling make this book highly relevant for education in these two contexts and beyond.

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Notes


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The collection of essays being reviewed consists of seven case studies of local patterns of violence drawn from experiences in ten countries – South Africa, Brazil, and the six countries of the Chad Basin (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, Niger, and Central African Republic), and two theoretical essays.

In the Preface the authors present a problem – is there “anything distinctive about (the) contemporary predicament (of post-colonies in Africa, Asia, Europe & Latin America), about the kinds of criminality, coercion, corruption, conflict, even chaos often attributed to them?” (p. vii). A presumption which they reject, that the answer to the above question is yes. And a paradox that law, rather than morals, ethics, or custom has become the measure of action, even as its spirit and letter are violated.

The editors argue that the corruption and crime in post-colonial countries are “discernible elsewhere as well, if not perhaps as acutely or as vividly – or living under a legal alias,” for instance, campaign contributions to politicians by interested businesses (p. 39). The case studies belie this easy symmetry. Several discuss local circumstances of, at best, governance without legitimacy. The gang and drug violence, and arbitrary police behavior in many of America’s inner cities no doubt is similar to that in the urban slums of the postcolony. However, for the vast majority of Europeans and Americans there is little or no direct experience or even exposure to violence other than as a media event. In the countries described in this collection and much of the post-colony, it would appear a significant percentage of people are personally, even physically affected by violence.

The conviction with which the editors of this volume, along with Derrida, Agamben, and Benjamin, identify law with violence, or even as violence, occludes the real difference between force, the effect of the physical coercion of the law, and the other forces and effects of law (p. 31). Violence at its core expresses violation. It is best understood as a morally condemned use of power. It is a normative concept; power, force, even coercion are descriptive. What is violated when force or coercion is exercised by properly constituted authority in a reasonable, culturally common sensible manner, bounded by duly adopted rules? If all law is violence, why bother with concerns about legitimacy and due process?

How then to see the “disorder,” the violence of the title and as described in the case studies? There is physical violence and political-economic corruption or structural violence in every society and system of government. Certainly, all governments and societies are capable of “extraordinary evil,” however, the frequency, duration, and breadth and depth of violence varies from place to place and time to time. Similarly with its causes and cures. For instance, looking at violence from the perspective of the perpetrator of the violent act, is it ordinary criminal behavior or something of more systemic significance? Is the violence resistance to or rebellion against government abuse; or to development and modernization; or to the impact of neo-colonial economic and ecological decisions? Or is it more properly seen as an internal
matter, a civil war, over property, (think diamonds for instance); or about identity (think kin, ethnicity, or religion)?

Violence is defined or delimited by law-- the life of the law is the lived experiences of people. And experience as either colonized or colonial affects, distorts, even corrodes people’s personalities, values, and their institutions. Thus understood, neither law and its concomitant disorder or violence, nor the postcolony can be defined, they can only be illustrated. That is the value of the seven case studies in this collection; they provide a concrete text and context to study.

How the same violent phenomenon can be seen differently by its perpetrators, its victims, and by the law is powerfully illustrated in Rosalind Morris’ study of rape in South Africa over the last 30-40 years. As in many societies, crimes against women receive scant attention from law enforcement. Under apartheid and in other racist systems the one exception is an attack on a woman of the dominant ethnic or racial group by a male of the oppressed group.

The Truth & Reconciliation Commission, in its efforts to get past the past, distinguished political violence including rape from personal or random acts of violence also including rape. Its records are replete with testimony showing the general difficulty of such distinctions in what was essentially a civil war; and the absurdity of such a distinction when the violent act is rape. Since then, as a semblance of “normalcy” has been established, violence against women has been seen as either a public random act of ordinary crime, or as a private intra-family act which again is of little or no concern to the police. In 2000, “less than 50 percent of all reported rape cases (went) to trial, and . . . less than 8 percent of these led to convictions” (p.85).

The Comaroffs’ more theoretical study of the public and police obsession with criminality and disorder in South Africa focuses on spectacle, a reliance by the government on both dramatic state conducted and mass media enactments of crime and punishment. Police actions, presentations and performances, museums, detective novels, TV crime shows, and gangster films are used to “construct a minimally coherent world-in-place…” (p. 292).

There are two studies of situations in Brazil that illustrate how the rhetoric of rights can be perverted or “counterfeited” by officials and others to justify oppression (p.13-16). One by Teresa Calderas of three circumstances in which notions of rights, justice, violence, and crime were central: efforts by poor urban dwellers to have their “rights to the city” recognized; efforts by human rights advocates to advance the rights of prisoners in the midst of a crime wave; and the hip-hop generation’s articulation of community in an environment of corruption, police violence, and high unemployment. The other is by Nancy Scheper-Hughes on the killing of street children by local “guardian angels” in the northeast of the country.

They perhaps more significantly show what might be called the primacy of order. In conditions of extreme disorder and threat all else becomes secondary. This quest for order often manifests itself as a withdrawal from the public square, from politics into the quotidian, thus presenting a challenge if not a threat to representative democracy. Another reaction to extreme disorder is to grab hold of a fundamentalism, perceived of as a fixed certain truth. This phenomenon and its challenge to the law are presented in Peter Geschiere’s study of witchcraft in Cameroon and South Africa. Tragically, even merely perceived rather than real disorder can have the same or worse effects, such as the death squads’ attacks on street children.
Patricia Spyer’s study of a 1999 outbreak of communal violence in Ambion City, Indonesia is a thick description of the “swirl of images, vocabularies, sound bites, slogans, and vectors” operating just before, during, and to end the violence (p. 99). Spyer describes its focus on the climate within which the acts studied occurred as one of “hyperhermeneutics — or a compulsive need to interpret and mine just about everything for hidden meaning . . .” (p. 206 ). Charles Tilly’s study of the mechanisms of violence – network based escalation, setting based activation, and brokerage - is a necessary supplement to this otherwise very valuable study of “climate, ambiance, atmosphere and milieu” (p.190).1

Janet Roitman’s study of “The Ethics of Illegality in the Chad Basin” recognizes that unregulated economic activities and gang-based road banditry are crucial to the urban economy, as well as to the financing of local administration. She focuses on how the participants in these legal and illegal activities see these acts and themselves. The participants in the economy of the Chad Basin were, as they saw it, engaged in “practices that, while not lawful (hence illegal), are nonetheless not forbidden . . . Neither outlaw nor moral activity, their practices are rather a means to participate in prevailing modes of accumulation and prevailing methods of governing the economy ” (p.249). Roitman concludes that because the self-evaluations of the interlocutors are derived from the behavioral standards of the official government, the practices, even those of resistance “are necessarily generated out of states of domination” (p.265).

The theoretical essay which ends this volume is rough going. Mbembe certainly makes a credible case that the large scale changes discussed in the Introduction and throughout the case studies operate across Africa in different ways. At the same time, he sees deep convergences that have resulted in a politics marked by “more concentrated forms of power and accumulation, rooted in brute control over life and death” (p. 7). His argument is that this current warlike form of politics is grounded in the psycho-sexual idiom of Bataille. The essay begins its analysis of “politics as a form of expenditure” by affirming “following Bataille’s discussion of the exclusionary act, that the war like act in contemporary Africa contains an erotic dimension. It is an aspect of anal eroticism, just as sovereignty is … one particular form of sadism” (p. 299). These eroticized and militarized figures of speech continue throughout the essay, leaving one to wonder just how one would go about (re-)establishing a more peaceful politics.

The editors see “great historical tsunamis” occurring in the twenty-first century (p. ix). They identify a shift from Weber’s bureaucratic government to a more privatized government-by-franchise. They see this privatization eventually encompassing the police and military. They also see a diminishment of the political and its replacement by the legal; the substitution of rule for practical reason. Similarly, they see policy matters becoming increasingly viewed as technical challenges reducible to single right answers. And they see all of this taking place in an increasingly commodified culture and an identity politics (p. ix-x).

Finally, the Comaroff’s see these tsunamis “breaking first” on postcolonial shores or “if not first, then in their most palpable, most hyperextended form” (p. ix). That being the case, the postcolonies become especially valuable sites for the study of social theory. Essays like those herein, and similar “re-storying(s)” of empirical studies of how the law affects and is effected by people and institutions as they make decisions about social practice become essential material.
for critical legal analysis. The key notion when all is said and done, is that of Montesquieu, that
the laws of one country could not be simply transported to another country without causing
great harm.

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Notes

   2003.

Performance and Politics in Tanzania: The Nation on Stage. Laura Edmondson. Bloomington,

This fascinating book adds to an ever-growing literature on contemporary identity in
Tanzania, tracing the contestation of national identities and national politics through the lens of
popular Dar es Salaam theatre. What is essentially a history of three performing groups –
Tanzania One Theatre (TOT), Muungano Cultural Troupe and Mandela Cultural Troupe – is
laced with observations about the way in which the country’s transition since the collapse of
*ujamaa* socialism has impacted upon popular understandings of politics, development and the
nation.

Two themes recur through the book. The first is that, in the author’s own words,
‘nationalism works’. Although many of the social and political dynamics through which
Tanzanian nationalism was constructed during the 1960s and 1970s have been dismantled or
pulled apart, Edmondson finds that the nation is alive and well, and all the better for its
contestation. In this sense her work echoes that of Kelly Askew, who has argued that “through
their shared performances, the citizens of a state congeal and bring the nation - however
variegated – into being”. That the nation means different things for different people is hardly
extraordinary, but nevertheless carries significance in Tanzania simply because of the civil strife
its citizens have observed in the countries around it.

The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party in Tanzania have certainly played on the
idea of stability amidst such regional turmoil, and have consistently invoked the language of
nation-building and continuity, even as their policies have changed fundamentally from the
*ujamaa* era. A shift towards a more pro-market, multi-party politic has not been reflected in a
shift of support away from CCM.
What Edmondson seeks to show is that, under the surface of this steady support for the status quo there exists a deeply politicised undercurrent, wherein political ideas are fiercely contested, and ‘Tanzanian’ values unpacked. This is where the book is strongest, as the author shows how fundamental binaries are explored within the arena of popular theatre. *Vichekesho* (comic skits) play out arguments over the value of tradition versus modernity, village versus city, local versus national, and, inevitably, poverty versus wealth. At times these arguments read like a soap opera, weaving in and out amongst engaging storylines about families, friends, love-lives, sex and death.

The author wastes no time in setting out a distinction between the three groups – TOT as representing the power and privilege of CCM; Muungano and Mandela as the struggling opposition. The way in which *vichekesho* are resolved on stage reflects this relationship, often resulting in TOT lauding the trappings of the modern, sophisticated Tanzanian over characters representing ‘traditional’ or ‘village’ behaviour. Conversely, Muungano and Mandela’s plays emphasise the struggle of the ordinary Tanzanian amidst the moral minefield of money, sex and urbanity.

Within this context, notions of ‘fidelity’ and ‘truth’ are hinged to electoral loyalty to CCM, and the message of songs such as *mambo sasa* (matters now) evoke the language of unity and togetherness. The promulgation of ‘Tanzanian-ness’ as unity in the face of regional disharmony has long been an effective campaigning tool of the ruling party, so in this sense Edmondson tells us little new. The value of her account is rather in the detail of how political values are disseminated as everyday scenarios within popular sketches and songs.

Herein lie the real strengths and weaknesses of the text. Its achievement is in bringing political contestation in Tanzania to life for the reader through a very enjoyable series of vignettes and commentaries. It is clear that the author developed a deep and nuanced understanding of the groups she analyses, and I for one felt almost as upset as she obviously did at the demise of Muungano and Mandela as vigorous and active players on the Dar es Salaam scene in the early 2000s.

The theoretical reflections drawn by Edmondson on her experiences are less well-formed, however. Her principal observations – that politics permeates public performance, and that nationalism is subjective – are relatively uncontroversial, and have been addressed before with some distinction in Tanzanianist literature.

Where the author does propose a theoretical framework it is given a level of depth through her fieldwork, but not enough analytical rigour. In page 7 of her introduction for example, the author declares that “I employ a variety of terms throughout this book such as collaborative nationalism, alternative nationalism, strategic nationalism, and cosmopolitan nationalism” (original italics) – all of which remain relatively underdeveloped during the next six chapters in terms of their relationship to established perspectives on the origins and reproduction of national identity. Does her work chime with a constructivist perspective, wherein nationalism is socially engineered from both above and below? Does it correspond to more post-modern ideas of fragmentation and hybridity? Or might Edmondson have developed Lonsdale’s application of ‘moral economies’ to expressions of Tanzanian-ness? I would suggest that Charles Taylor’s work on ‘modern social imaginaries’ might be a good fit with her observations, but these avenues are left largely unexplored.
What this leaves the reader is a part-historical, part-discursive account of a tumultuous time in Tanzania’s post-colonial history, observed at the coal-face of change in urban Dar es Salaam. The empirical content of the book adds depth to established accounts of political liberalisation in the country, and shows that the remoulding of Tanzania post-ujamaa is conducted as much through popular culture and everyday life as it is through economic and developmental discourses. To this end Edmondson concludes her account by venturing that, under the ‘boring’ surface of party politics in the country, democracy and nationalism are still vehemently contested in a ‘messy’ and ‘vibrant’ fashion. Whether or not this really does defy theoretical frameworks as the author suggests, readers of this book will certainly have fun judging for themselves.

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This diverse collection contributed by NGO activists and academics revolve around the very unitive focus of youth in Africa, whose problems are seen as sensitive barometer of crises in various African societies. Indeed the besetting temptation to avoid when commenting on youth is to wallow in Afripessimism, though the commitment of these writers to the subject of study is such that redeeming features are to be found in unsuspected places, even in Sierra Léone (where there is now a remarkable social recovery). There is then the aim not to fall back on ‘the bleak picture’ (p. 2), but to do justice to the many positive exceptions of youth, and to their versatility, survival skills, agency, and intentionality of action, while paying due attention to real inter-generational tension and violence. The contribution to scholarship then is correct the Africanist discourse that has denied them this justice and promoted the perception of their being problematic in essence. Youth are not only socially undesirable, unemployed, or criminal, but also engaged in the creative growth of popular aesthetics, new religious movements, local NGOs, the appropriation of ICT, sports, and politics. The editors identify three main academic responses to counter despair (pp. 8-10): to demonstrate the agency of youth; to devise interventionist policies to transform situations; and to set out descriptive-analytic accounts to explain current scenarios.

The aim of this collection is thus to present, though a variety of cases, a comprehensive overview of all crucial socio-cultural and historical factors involved in the youth experience in contemporary Africa. There is a predictable diversity in theme and approach but all contributions are based on original fieldwork and attempt to address the conflict-generating processes, test hypotheses on generational tensions, and assess the the political impact of youth problems in society. (p. 10)

Have these objectives been met?
One of the contributions, Murray Last’s on Hausa youth, comes out of a long engagement with a people or part of Africa through history and social science, but most of the contributors are themselves relatively young, or at least nearer the beginning of their academic career. Of these, Thomas Burgess on youth in Zanzibar, goes to the archives, but lack of years and of historical sources are not surprisingly par for the course in this study. How interview material is considered to be representative of youth is seldom clarified, and when this is spread over a few far-flung parts of Africa, united only in their descent into violent conflict, suspicions of superficiality arise. One of the most memorable contributions is that by Yves Marguerat for his personal encounter with Lomé street-boys. Though inviting them into his home might raise ethical issues of fieldwork, the reader is given an insight into thinking seldom transmitted, even in this book, by distanced academic work or by scheduled interventions. Because of the alienation and the violence it is not straightforward to reproduce the thoughts of those who are not prepared to articulate them easily to an outsider.

Inevitably agency is not always identified and the ‘bleak picture’ restored. Jok Madut Jok writes out of a long war-torn situation, yet he could have criticized Sharon Hutchinson on the Nuer and found some hope in the rise of the church and local autonomy as the herds are regenerated. Simonse concludes that with pastoralist youth, ‘there is no basis on which sustainable governance and security can be built’ (p. 263), yet fails to observe that there has never been so many young pastoralists as today, and they have a meaningful autonomy that could be the envy of many youth.

Compared with Western youth, the religious factor is a significant one. Murray Last (p. 51) finds that Islam empowers the young and gives them a special expertise. Revivalist movements may assist youth to find a future in a failing society, precisely because of the requirement for a ‘total break with the past’, but this may also further rupture it. Pentecostalism has often been mentioned as a means for youth to relate to globalizing trends with their fleeting promise of empowerment, but African youth are involved in many different kinds of traditional religions, world religions, and new religious movements that may react against either for the imagined good life. Religious commitment usually crystallizes in the life-stage of youth, so could have been addressed as more central in more of the contributions, when religion mediates change in Africa and is so often associated with marginalization, identity, and violent conflict or its prevention.

Inter-generational tension and the violence of youth is directly addressed by two contributions, each focusing on East African societies that have had age-class systems, which normally function to express, yet manage, tensions between formal generation-sets. Simon Simonse communicates to the editor that such social order has broken down, victimizing women, and making pastoral societies ‘internal war zones’ (p. 29). Ignoring the relatively effective system of social control, he defines Karamojong ngikaracuna as warriors, when actually the word means those who pull at the aprons; they are kept down as children. It is not an ‘age-grade’, for most youth have to wait many years for initiation, and so seniority in the traditional polity. The distinction he needs is between the warriors (ngikajok) and the bandits (ngikokelak). Neither have to be initiated, but one acts for the benefit of traditional society, while the other acts outside it, often bringing trouble to it. The first are accountable to the elders, the latter are outlaws, who would include pupils who ‘collect their school fees by staging ambushes on the...
road’ (p. 254). The latter is a witness to the failure of modernity, not the traditional polity, as is
the government becoming entangled in conflict, ending up (he might just as well have said
‘beginning’) ‘as just another warring party in a cycle of revenge’ (p. 254). Simonse also descends
to alarmism on the spread of ‘warlordism’ and ‘the omnipresence of arms’ causing conflicts ‘to
become more deadly and more difficult to solve’ (pp. 252f.). Employment in NGO projects has
allowed him to see misplaced European concepts and technology as determinative and this
piece is quite the worst academic contribution he has made. All my publishing on Karamoja has
tried to show the vanity of this kind of interventionist superiority.

Peter Kagwanja is a Gikuyu emigré, who has often written on youth and politics in Kenya,
and his paper deals with another popularly demonized group, the Muingiki, who are a sharp
reaction to the intense moderning direction of the Agikuyu. They ‘embraced a vision of
generational transfer based on a traditional Kikuyu system Ituika (‘break’), which guaranteed a
transfer of power from the elders to the younger generation’ (p. 83). He writes of them in terms
resurrecting the defunct generation-set system, ‘Imagining themselves as the Iregi warriors of
old’ (p. 103). He commends the self-discipline at which the movement aims: ‘its crusade against
drunkenness, drug addiction, broken families, prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases and
HIV/AIDS has been highly successful’ (p. 97). He concludes optimistically. ‘The road to
democracy in the future lies in strengthening the social movements of the youth and a break
with the prevailing powerlessness and marginality of the youth in politics.’ (p. 106). This would
domesticate their violence, but the trouble is that there still remains a strong drive towards
modernity among the Agikuyu and even the Muingiki, for unlike the Karamojong there can be
no return now to a generation-set system. Nevertheless this is the best academic contribution he
has published for its insight into social forms, and a reminder of the postmodern poverty on
relating the generations so that they can serve one another for the common good.

There is then a predictable diversity in quality as well as in theme and approach, but that
too denotes the life of youth in Africa. If they are your interest, have a dip here!

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**Transforming Museums: Mounting Queen Victoria in a Democratic South Africa. Steven C.

A very rich book that tells so much more than what its title announces, *Transforming
Museums: Mounting Queen Victoria in a Democratic South Africa* explores in ten rigorous chapters
the cultural mutations that occurred in South African society just before and after the end of
Apartheid. The year 1994 is set at the official turn of history: when democratic elections were
held in South Africa. Professor Steven Dubin, from Columbia University, focuses on South
African museums — from art galleries to science museums — as they remain the dedicated
places where national identity and collective memory were and still are being constructed and
narrated. From the first pages, it is clear Steven Dubin has an excellent knowledge of the recent
theories in social sciences and in museum studies. He presents the four main concepts which are used throughout the book: 1) the transformation of discourses related to South African history and society in museums; 2) the politics of representation of the various groups; 3) the politics of reception by the diverse audiences who visit the new exhibitions; 4) the social and collective memory (p. 5).

The book's odd title echoes a painting in the Tatham Art Gallery, "State Coronation Portrait of Queen Victoria", which is immense and, say, embarrassing, because it symbolizes at best the colonial era in South African history. Moreover, this work celebrating the British power is so huge it can not be easily removed or stored. Hence, this painting brings very bad memories to many groups and individuals (p. 5). Colonial traumas have to be explained and re-visited, not censored. Hiding the past could have been perceived as a denial of the true facts of history. As a solution to this dilemma, Steven Dubin refers to a "marriage of convenience" (p. 246): a new painting from 2003, showing former Zulu King Cetshwayo kaMpende, was exposed nearby. A b/w reproduction of that noble work by Helene Train is shown in Chapter 9; I believe it is so interesting it could have been on the book's cover, although it is a sharp contrast with the title of the book (p. 252).

The author recognizes as well the fact that nowadays, "South Africa is an extremely complicated, challenging, and perplexing society to make sense of" (p. 4). In order to understand this complexity, the author uses various sources and perspectives; he refers to scholarly publications, speeches, interviews and even many anecdotes (as the "State Coronation Portrait of Queen Victoria" affair). Among numerous elements and debated issues, there is an overlooked quote from President Nelson Mandela, who in 1997 inaugurated the Robben Island Museum that was built on the site where he was himself prisoner during 18 long years. On that very day, Mandela insisted on the fact that still in 1997, 97 percent of the displays in South African museums "reflected a colonialist and apartheid point of view" (President Nelson Mandela, quoted by Steven Dubin, p. 2). Some curators who were present refused the critique. For instance, Marilyn Martin, from the Iziko Museum in Cape Town, declared that she felt "no guilt", but "some anger because President Nelson Mandela has never been to [Iziko Museum]" (p. 2). During the last two decades, the museums in South Africa have faced a dilemma regarding their national history: not to forget the past, not to reproduce colonial ideologies, but nevertheless trying to acknowledge the unfair practices that occurred in a recent past. Steven Dubin situates his book's aim in just one sentence, with an idea so important and central that it is repeated twice in the book:

"The apartheid legacy is most apparent in cultural history, natural science, and natural history museums, where the ideology was interwoven into the narratives that their curators composed, and it dictated the decisions they made about what to highlight, and how they chose which phenomena 'innately' belonged where" (pp. 4 and 242).

Transforming Museums does not only focus on "ancient" works from the Victorian era displayed in "old" museums, however, for many new institutions are presented and studied here, especially in Chapter 8 and 9. Human rights appear as a conducting theme in some recent exhibitions in the "new" South Africa (p. 163). Another of the main issues is the burden of the European heritage in South African institutions for new audiences who mostly want to discover "the other side" of the South African culture, as put by Ann Pretorius (from the
William Humphreys Art Gallery) who simply asked while being challenged: "What do you want us to do? Throw out all the white people? Throw out all the European legacy?" (p. 35).

As we can see thorough all chapters, many questions and some former debates still remain unsolved or re-emerge unchanged, for example when Steven Dubin concludes that "South African museums face a delicate balancing act today: how to shed the ideological corsets of the past without replacing them with similarly restrictive fashions" (p. 255). Moreover, former classifications of South African groups like the Zulus and the Bushmen were once useful to name and distinct different groups, but nowadays most historians and curators using these categories from the past must be aware that by doing so, they also reproduce the not-so-old segregated terms from the Apartheid era.

Among many qualities, Steven Dubin's book is interdisciplinary, and therefore would be suitable for various readers, even undergraduates beyond the network of African Studies. These could include those in sociology of art, museology, social sciences, ethnicity, but also in cultural and citizenship studies. Perhaps some open-minded art historians could appreciate as well its innovative approach and contents. To my view, Transforming Museums is so coherent and salient that its strong theoretical framework could even be adapted to other contexts and inspire some younger scholars who would like to study state-building, national identity and collective memory in other countries.

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Ruth Finnegan's body of work in the field of African oral literature is foundational, and this book stands as another vital contribution, one which no scholar in the field will be able to ignore. A collection of variously updated older essays, framed by a new preface and epilogue, this work is overtly retrospective of the history of the study of oral literature in Africa, yet fundamentally targeted, as becomes evident in the book's final sections, towards assisting, if not affecting, a paradigm shift in the study and conception of the oral in Africa.

Arguing that the study of African oral literature has expanded so much since her foundational Oral Literature in Africa (1970) that she could not possibly address such changes comprehensively, Finnegan's expressed intent at the outset of this volume is "to extend, contextualise and in some respects qualify [her earlier positions] from the perspective of later research and thinking" (p. 1). And, indeed, Finnegan does achieve this, bringing a broad range of sources from disciplines as diverse as linguistics, performance studies, anthropology, new media, and literature to bear on key issues such as the recording and transcription of performance events, the textuality of oral utterances, and the centrality of performativity in
many oral forms (with her title strongly echoing J.L. Austin’s 1962, *How to Do Things With Words*). Yet, qualification itself is a somewhat modest goal, and if it were truly the prime value of this book it would be difficult to consider it to be more than a historiographic supplement to her earlier groundbreaking works. And, indeed, Finnegan’s intentions can at times prove somewhat slippery and confounding in the book’s early sections. In that this volume is surely targeted at a specialist audience who are already aware of Finnegan’s existing contribution to the field, reading some of her earlier essays, many of which are republished here with only minor changes (including, most conspicuously, the first chapter of *Oral Literature in Africa*), one may wonder at some points where and when the bite of this volume will manifest beyond modest qualifications, or whether, in fact, this book should be billed more as a ‘Ruth Finnegan reader’ than a monograph.

Yet, while this volume never loses its retrospective stance, sometimes to the detriment of highlighting the urgent relevance of some of its points, as the blurb on the book’s cover promises this work does come to a “provocative conclusion.” The more pointed arguments of the final sections of the volume are of tremendous import, and in many ways justify the particular make-up of the volume as a whole, in that Finnegan’s somewhat quiet approach to these more timely issues proves to provide a rich context in which to consider them. The most notable conclusion that Finnegan comes to derives from her seemingly innocuous initial observation that “Africa is celebrated above all for the treasure of her voiced and auditory arts, and as the home of oral literature, orature and orality, and the genesis and inspiration of the voiced traditions of the great diaspora” (1). Yet, as this volume progresses Finnegan demonstrates that this notion is ultimately dubious, not only empirically in the study of expressive forms, but also ethically. Finnegan links the continuing characterization of ‘Africa-as-oral’ to the age-old binary dictating the overall conception of Africa as fundamentally Other. She argues that, whether applied in denigrating terms to characterize Africa as ‘primitive’ and the like, or more romantically by those wishing to champion orality as Africa’s ancient and distinct domain, the primacy placed upon the oral as that which defines Africa distorts the dynamics of expressive forms themselves (of which words are only but one, albeit often important, factor), and fastens Africa time and again in the slot of absolute difference. Concomitant to this argument is Finnegan’s disavowal of the broader world-wide “linguistic myth,” defined as “a cognitive language-centered model of the nature and destiny of humanity,” and which ties the evolution of humankind to its relations with words (p. 206). Whether tethered to notions of writing and the printing press as fundamental leaps forward in human nature, or in the championing of orality as Africa’s patrimony, the very infatuation with the word as the key portal through which human evolution can be judged disturbs Finnegan.

Of course, these observations are not entirely new (nor does Finnegan claim they are), with earlier studies such as Vail and White’s *Power and the Praise Poem* (1991) having forcefully made these points. Yet, Finnegan uses these observations in an original way, pushing towards a more dynamic approach to African expressive forms. This reconceptualization requires an understanding that, “[s]peech may have been pictured as the essential human attribute but it does not stand on its own: it is inextricably intertwined with other modes of human interaction, gestural, bodily, visual, artefactual, tactile” (p. 209). Thus, tapping into the general turn towards interdisciplinarity in the academy, Finnegan argues that ‘oral literature’ is itself an illusory,
incomplete, and drastically confined characterization of the dynamic and multisensory nature of expressive forms in Africa. In this light, *The Oral and Beyond* points not just beyond Africa to art forms and scholarship generated from abroad, or beyond the ethnocentric stereotypes which studies of the oral seem to inevitably buttress, but also fundamentally beyond the oral as the defining characteristic of African expressive forms. In this manner, this volume is a strong antidote to the conceptual and ethical stagnations produced by what Isabel Hofmeyr (1994) has decried as dominant and ever-lurking ‘literary formalisms’ in the study of verbal arts. Ultimately, *The Oral and Beyond* translates and synthesizes many of the best past and contemporary insights of a range of disciplines within a perspective only to be derived from the half-century of Finnegans own career, and pushes the study of oral literature beyond its contemporary boundaries.

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This study is a complex comparative history of how colonialism affected warriorhood and its aesthetic practices among the Nigerian Idoma and the Kenyan Samburu communities in the early to middle British colonial period from the 1880s to the 1930s.

In the first part, Sidney Littlefield Kasfir argues that colonial literatures created a discursive field around the institutions and practices of warriorhood in what became the British colonies of Nigeria and Kenya. The inscriptions differed in the two locales and resulted in radically different governing policies. And because these policies, according to the author, had a direct effect on artisanal practice related to warriorhood, they set the conditions for artistic and technical innovation. In the second part, Littlefield Kasfir turned to a close scrutiny of the power and limitations of the Idoma sculptor and the Samburu smith within a larger cultural script of Africa practice.

Among the key art-historical issues the book addresses are the ways artisanal knowledge (that of Samburu blacksmiths and Idoma sculptors), embedded in particular cosmologies and cultural scripts was related to systems of objects such as weapons and masks; and how these undergirded cultural practices. It discusses the classificatory problems generated by the fact that western museums and collectors began to subsume these objects into their own systems of classification. It also introduces the idea of warrior theatre, using the metaphor of the script to describe the construction of masculinity through body arts, masquerades, dance and behaviour.

In this book, Littlefield Kasfir explores an unexpected source, colonial authority, and traces the ways widely different late-nineteenth-and-early twentieth-century Europeans impressions of Nigeria and Kenya and the subsequent British colonizing policies toward their improperly understood subject peoples intervened in and altered the objects and practices of the Samburu and Idoma African artists.

This book is, of course, about real people, the warriors, the artists and the blacksmiths and how they designed strategies and made choices to circumvent the authority of colonial rule and
to create new forms. It is also partly an attempt to comprehend these two cases’ shared experience of colonial power and their construction of masculinity within its confines in these widely different situations.

This work on cross-cultural encounters versus the implementation of colonial policy is based on a rich and diverse set of sources. For the nineteenth century colonial period, the author used missionaries, travelers and settlers’ accounts, novels, colonial government reports and the popular press. She also relied on Hollywood safari firm genre for the 1950s. More importantly is Littlefield Kasfir’s use of objects as sources. The assertion that objects are constituted as texts has gained some level of acceptance in art-historical, archaeological and ethnographic research. Objects or artifacts are increasingly considered as valuable forms of historical evidence. But differently from other sources, objects, like masks, spears, pots, textiles and photographs, are stable, difficult to falsify, and exist in ways that are easily separable from the interpretations attached to them. In addition, objects have a non-discursive quality as inert things with geographies and histories, which make them sites for contestation and ongoing revision. They are, therefore, interesting sources and adequate analytical tools.

Drawing on Robert Farris Thompson’s principle that icon defines itself as act: both Idoma and Samburu assemblages of form and performance are kinds of masks. She also draws on Herbert Cole’s notion of African art as processual in order to understand the ways blacksmiths and sculptors were able to create new forms in the face of repressive colonial regulations. Through doing so, Littlefield Kasfir structured her study, which spans the early colonial to the postcolonial time periods and two cultures, in four parts which discuss warriors and warriorhood, the artists and artistic processes involved in representing them, the objects themselves and the commodification and subsequent globalization of objects and of warriorhood itself.

At a more thorough level, this story can be read as a story of innovative aesthetic practice in the face of a radically transformed patronage system. The core thread running through both the historical and aesthetic narratives concerns representations: first, the widely divergent British official representations of warriorhood in the two places; second, the changing representation of warriorhood’s objects as art or ethnographic specimen and finally as commodity; and in the end, the image of the warrior himself, on movie screens, on postcards and seen from a Land Rover in safari. The earliest are written inscriptions such as travel accounts, memoirs and colonial reports. The more recent ones are produced in the camera’s eye. All of them, however, speak to iconic power and the use of representations as a rhetorical medium in both colonial and postcolonial spaces.

British popular and literary representations of Kenya and Nigeria acted as filters in the enforcement of colonial policies, but uncovering the aesthetic account that lies beneath the historical one means recuperating not only artisanal knowledge but also the practices that embodied that knowledge.

With the imposition of the Pax Britannica came the inevitable aestheticisation of warfare and warriorhood in which the former enemy cranium became a carved mask and the warrior himself a performer of masked dance or masquerade that represents but no longer actually is the successful outcome of fighting an enemy. But in neither Samburu nor Idoma culture has the pre-colonial order been overturned or cast off decisively. Colonialism seems to have created a
larger overlay on the indigenous center-periphery model, in which all African centers were now also peripheries to the European metropole from which power and policy derived.

This intriguing history of how colonial influence forever altered artistic practice, objects, and their meaning, questions mainstream ideas about artistic production and impression.

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In July 2008, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy implemented the next stage in his pet project to build a geopolitical Mediterranean Union linking Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Maghrebian critics were quick to voice their suspicions at this EU-endorsed plan which revived bitter memories of French colonialism, especially given Sarkozy’s grandiose allusions to ancient unity under the Roman Empire. Libya, in particular, objected to the project with Moammar Qaddafi highlighting the cultural differences between Europe and the Maghreb:

Do we share a culture with Europe? Absolutely not. We each have our own culture. In Scandinavia, people walk around naked. Can you walk around naked in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, or Libya? They would stone you and throw you into a mental hospital. But in Scandinavia, it is common to see people walk around naked. That’s their culture. Is it conceivable for a union to be formed between somebody naked and somebody who considers this to be crazy? This is an example of the differences between our cultures. We don’t even share the same religion (The Middle East Media Research Institute, July 15 2008).

This passage neatly encapsulates an inversion that has taken place in Franco-Maghrebian relations, for in his contrast between Maghrebian sanity and European insanity Qaddafi utilized the same cultural logic that characterized French colonial-era thinking about the Arab Other. This is therefore a propitious time to be examining the traumatic relationship between France and North Africa. In his thoroughly researched and intellectually ambitious study, Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa, Richard C. Keller does precisely this by showing how the political relations between metropolitan France and its North African colonies were to a large extent mediated through the field of psychiatric medicine.

Building on the work of Jean-Michel Bégué and Robert Berthelier in the history of North African psychiatry, Keller traces the idea of the Maghreb as an exoticized space of insanity and irrational violence. Situating his subject in a wider historical field, Keller demonstrates how, from the late-nineteenth century until the decolonization of North Africa, psychiatry maintained the cultural and racial rift between colonizer and colonized. Citing the legacy of the great reformer Philippe Pinel, French psychiatrists represented themselves as humanitarians seeking to modernize the barbaric conditions that the mentally ill endured in the Maghreb. Yet this ideology of emancipation disguised the implementation of an asylum-based model of
confinement that worked in tandem with colonial exploitation – expressed through the concept of mise en valeur – and discourses of scientific racism.

The North African context was further complicated by religious sectarianism: as both Arab and Muslim, the North African male was labeled by French psychiatrists as innately irrational and incapable of adapting to French civilization. This undermined official assimilationist policies and further distanced the populations of the Maghreb from French metropolitan identity. As the discipline of ethnopsychiatry developed from the 1920s, the ‘primitivism’ of the Algerian mind was frequently used to justify French authoritarianism, heralding an independence struggle in which psychiatry featured on the frontlines.

Focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on the Algiers School of French North African psychiatry, Keller draws on the stories and day-to-day realities of psychiatrists and their patients to frame his analysis of a complex social field involving the mental state of colonial settlers, North Africans, and Europeans. At the centre of Keller’s narrative lies the Hôpital Psychiatrique de Blida-Joinville, an asylum southwest of Algiers that began admitting patients in the late 1930s. Run by the Lyon-trained neuropsychiatrist Antoine Porot, Blida represented a turning point in the ‘biopolitics’ of colonial and metropolitan psychiatric care. Rejecting easy dismissals of the Blida hospital as a coercive element of colonial authority, Keller highlights the progressivism and latent utopianism of a project that sought to place Algeria at the forefront of psychiatric innovation. “With its emphasis on reform and professional reorganization, the progressivist rhetoric that surrounded colonial psychiatry testified to the ways in which colonialism was about science, modernization, development, and process as much as it was about exploitation” (p.80). In this revisionist vein Keller brings in the work of Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour to support his thesis that French psychiatry was a discipline in crisis which used North Africa as a space for medical experimentation and professional renewal.

The use of mental stereotyping as a weapon in the colonial mission is familiar to many, but Keller complicates the matter by arguing that in French North Africa psychiatry could also act “as a tool for the emancipation of the colonized, an innovative branch of social and medical science, an uncomprehending therapeutic system, a discipline in crisis, and a mechanism for negotiating the meaning of difference for republican citizenship” (p.4). This approach places Keller in dialogue with the powerful critique of Frantz Fanon, who in The Wretched of the Earth (1961), attacked colonial psychiatry, and the attitudes of Porot in particular, as nothing less than medical racism. Fanon, it is crucial to note, resigned from his position as Head of Psychiatry at Blida in 1956 to devote himself to the struggle for Algerian independence. Perhaps the principal achievement of Colonial Madness is Keller’s contextualization of the Fanonian critique, for by placing Maghrebian anticolonialism within a broader history of psychiatric theories, institutions, and practices, he complicates any simple reading of the role of psychiatry during the Algerian war. In later chapters Keller branches out from case histories and psychiatric treatises and uncovers in Maghrebian autobiographies, fiction, and cultural memory “the development of an intellectual culture of resistance that took medicine and psychiatry as its object” (p.162).

If Keller’s narrative is sometimes difficult to work through, this is chiefly due to the complexity of issues and wealth of detail offered. Colonial Madness would therefore be best appreciated by the advanced student. In demonstrating the extent to which mental health issues

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i2-3reviews.pdf
regulated the colonial and postcolonial relationship between France and North Africa, Keller has fashioned an important work that is as much a history of ideas as it is a social history or history of psychiatry. The cultural logic deployed by Qaddafi, it is shown, has a fascinating context.

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...the 1980s, Yorubaland (Southwestern Nigeria), like most African societies, continue to experience a mixture of a depressed economy, increased encounter between modernity and tradition, and the challenges of globalization. *Yoruba Bata Goes Global* analyses these issues. Undoubtedly, a book on a Yoruba art form, *bata* drumming, it situates this old but esteemed vocation within the context of local, national and global studies. Rather than merely describing *bata*, a double-headed percussion instrument with one cone larger than the other, and used mainly for religious and secular purposes in Yorubaland, and its position in Erin Osun, nay Yoruba society, the book revolves around mini-histories of peoples, places and events: Lamidi Ayankunle, Iyaloja compound, Erin Osun, Yorubaland, art-tourism, client-p(m)atron relationship, Nigeria under the Structural Adjustment Program, ‘World Music’ and Euro-American fascination (curiosity) with African ‘tradition’ all of which are integrated to provide a grand narrative.

Members of the Iyaloja compound, Erin Osun pride themselves as bearers of a family heritage that dates to the heyday of Oyo kingdom in the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Following the collapse of Oyo, people who survived the evacuation of Erin-Ile during the early nineteenth century Yoruba wars took refuge in the southern forests and established Erin-Osun safe from marauders. In this new location they continued the family tradition of entertainment: drumming, dancing, and masquerades. These are some of the few Yoruba vocations perpetuated in specific lineages thus the prefixes ‘Ayan’ and ‘Oje.’ As Klein points out, contrary to the perception in the West, not every African is a drummer. Indeed there are degrees and processes of becoming an ‘Ayan.’ A good Iyaalu drummer might not play the bata or *omele* well. An Ayan progresses from playing the most basic drum and graduating with *iyaalu* or *bata*. So one of the major features of the Ayangalu family, like most Yoruba, is deference to senior lineage members including Lamidi Ayankunle, a major subject in the book.

In the mid-1970s, Nigeria was so swollen with petro-naira that a Nigerian ruler declared ‘money was not Nigeria’s problem, the problem was what to do with it. One way of disbursing ‘excess’ money was to encourage ‘local tradition’ as epitomized in the much celebrated 2nd Black Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC ’77). After FESTAC provincial administrations in Nigeria periodically sponsored ‘cultural’ shows at which Lamidi made his primary ‘public’
appearance and which he sees both as a dialogue between tradition and modernity but also his recognition/acceptance as a culture conductor. This recognition builds upon Lamidi’s awareness that the world is interested in Yoruba ‘custom’. In the 1950s, Ulli Beier and Susanne Wenger, two German artists cum cultural revolutionaries settled in Osogbo, near Erin Osun. There they developed and encouraged local artists and trained new ones. This was the beginning of a lasting global collaboration of Yoruba and Euro-American artists and cultural brokers. While Wenger revived and reinvented Osun grove at Osogbo, Beier opened doors for Yoruba artiste to perform in Germany and other European capitals.

The adoption of the IMF/World bank induced SAP by the Nigerian military-led government in 1986 set in motion a spiral decline in the quality of life. The Nigerian currency depreciated rapidly against Western currencies leading to skyrocketing commodity prices. Those who thrived during this period were people with access to the dollar, sterling, and other high value currencies. Access to money depended partly on establishing links with ‘Ilu Oyinbo’ (overseas) and there many artists and non-artists went—many permanently.

The book identifies, rightly, that the outcome of global artistic collaboration and economic depression redefine Yoruba ‘tradition’ in various ways. For instance, Osun Osogbo grove, as it currently exists, is tradition as imagined by Wenger. Similarly, Yoruba artistic performance overseas is structured in ways that appeal to Western buyers so as to repackage this art form. In effect, cultural brokerage becomes a two-sided mirror with which ‘whites’ reinvent Yoruba traditions in ways akin to Yoruba’s representation of European behavior.

In some ways, global collaboration is beneficial to the parties involved. It provides valuable market and sorely needed income for Erin artists and raises the demand for and value of successful cultural brokers. These are genuine needs in an era when the internal Yoruba market is incapable of supporting local art forms. Individual, especially young bata performers were willing to circumvent tradition and negotiate their own path to stardom. With diminishing market for bata, young Erin artists favored the incorporation of Fuji, a more popular and youth-oriented music tradition and American hip-hop dress. Meritocracy took ascendancy over hereditary privileges as in the Yoruba proverb owo ni so egbon d’aburo (money turns the senior into the junior kin.) The local saying aso nla ko ni eniyan nla (big cloth/dress does not make a big person) was stood on its head. Overseas travelers usually had enough money (at least temporarily) to live ‘big’ and appropriate senior status. The importance of clothes as physical manifestations of status and socio-economic inequality is shown in the quality, cost, size, and the design of clothes. Therefore, more than an exploration on an art form, anthropologists Klein gives insights into Yoruba material culture, the politics of representation and how people make ‘fashion’ statements.

Yet there are problems and perceived bastardization of ‘tradition.’: More than a few people became ‘emergency’/’overnight’ cultural traditionalists to smoothen their overseas visa applications and foreigners and diaspora Nigerians became ‘beautiful brides’ with countless local suitors. Brokerage also resulted in: the exploitation (real and imagined) of Erin-Osun art/ists by local and global bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and collaborators in the name of cultural and global advertisement; the endangerment of bata drumming by the encroachment of ‘World’ music—okuta-percussion and Fuji music; the breakdown of social relations whenever culture entrepreneurs chose to circumvent kinship norms; and the over-commercialization of culture.
Overall, Klein provides an insightful description of the persistence, invention, and transformation of tradition, opportunities and problems of collaboration, generational tension, family life, apprenticeship, and the challenges of everyday life in an era of socio-political transition and economic depression. Of particular interest are the glossary (pp. 191-93) which provides information on local terminologies that many readers might be unfamiliar with as well as a long list of primary and secondary sources, especially photos, encoding various aspects of the narrative and interviews conducted over nearly a decade with Erin Osun artists, their clients and patrons and local chiefs. This book will appeal to a broad audience of scholars and lay people.

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FESTAC 1977 and indeed, the entire gamut of Pan-Africanism or Negritude stem from the experience of slave trade, slavery and colonialism. Apter’s book could be viewed from the historiographical tradition of a-historical Africa (Afro-pessimism) that re-affirms the influential notion of a dark continent bereft of a history except the activities of the Europeans, civilizing mission of colonial rule and the failure of the post-colonial state.

Divided into eight chapters, this book is an account of the author’s frustration with African (Nigerian) condition which he described as his ten year odyssey “personal note.” It’s a fascinating combination of autobiography and odyssey “in search of the primitive (?)…the deeper into the bush one went, the more authentic the culture one found” (p. 2). To Apter, FESTAC 1977 represented not the celebration of African culture but the appropriation of a colonial tradition. He discusses afresh a Nigeria steeped in savagery but civilized by colonialism.

According to Apter, “Nigeria’s black and African world was clearly an imagined community, national in idiom yet Pan-African in proportion. Artistic directors and cultural officers invented traditions with pre-colonial pedigree” (p. 6). Apter notes that FESTAC was a mere reproduction of colonial culture which incorporated Africans into indirect rule. FESTAC denotes the appropriation of colonial culture and the failure of postcolonial state capitalism. FESTAC’s commodification of culture masked ethnic cleavages and the lack of indigenous production of indigenous culture.

Apter explains the paradigm of failed state-predatory violence, endemic corruption, lack of interest articulation and a national bourgeoisie. To him, FESTAC was “directed from above and dispersed from the center-it became a model of mystification and false historical consciousness.”

Regatta and Durbar were indigenous as claimed by the Nigerian leaders and communities, historically it emerged as central mechanisms of colonial interaction. Apter demonstrates that Regatta developed between European traders and Africans on the coast and up the inland waterways while Durban emerged as a form of power relations between British officials and
northern Emirs during the consolidation of the northern protectorate. In his analysis, the Benin sculptures were described as ‘fetishes’ of colonial knowledge, power and desire. The colonial roots of traditional costume exhibition were emphasized and FESTAC was described as the expansion of colonial precedent.

In a constructivist episteme, FESTAC was explained not in terms of innovation but replication of colonial culture. The genealogy of FESTAC was colonial exhibitions and commemorations. On the contrary, in order to ensure loyalty, colonial authorities maintained certain institutions beneficial to the traditional rulers and the imperial power. It was an effective cooptation technique employed by the colonial state. The continuation of Durban was to legitimize colonial order through traditional institutions.

FESTAC illuminates how the state produced culture and locality from above. To Apter, FESTAC was a demonstration of state failure and corruption rather than a celebration of African culture and heritage. Apter uncritically absorbed the first generation of colonial civil servants trained by the British from the emerging corruption of the post-colonial state when in reality they instituted corruption and nepotism in public service. In terms of chronology, he attributes the phenomenon of corruption to post-coloniality.

According to him, the aim of FESTAC was the remapping of blackness and the African world. Its ambition was to seek “common generic and genetic origin in Africa.” But more than the question or origin, the collective memory slavery and colonialism brought blacks together within the matrix of cultural consciousness and renaissance. The logic of FESTAC converted differences into expressions of common heritage and identity. On page 79, he stretches that “FESTAC’s narratives of black unity and heritage, it converted Nigerian oil into black culture and blood, and transformed the nation into a privileged homeland.”

He underscores the social distance between the state created national culture and the people. He documents ethnic imbalance, the near exclusion of some groups and over-representation of others in the process of “ethnic substitution.” Apter explains structural tension between federal and state levels of cultural politics and administration. FESTAC, as Apter notes, valorize ethnic division and alignments in the post-civil war era.

He identifies key processes of cultural commodification and denunciation of the festival by renowned politicians, intellectuals, musicians and dramatists. There was equally the question of power struggle and ideological tussle between Nigeria and Senegal over the cultural project; and tension between succession and usurpation.

In a profound way, Apter demonstrates that FESTAC was characterized by fiscal recklessness and corrupt enrichment. Oil money gave rise to patronage networks and distribution rather than production within the national economy. FESTAC was a ‘festival of awards and contracts.’ It should be noted that the ‘spending spree’ itself was a legacy of political patronage and social distribution under colonial economy, access to markets was controlled and determined by the state.

With highly selective information, especially the impact of Structural Adjustment Programme on socio-economic lives, Apter explains the emergence of the economics of greed as a mode of survival without considering the international dimension of financial crimes and corruption. The Great Nigerian scam, predatory regimes of fraud and financial dissimulations
of the 1990s, occurred in different economic context of neo-liberal reforms, capitalist tendencies and massive improvisation of the masses.

Using failed state paradigm, the dislocations of neoliberal reform attracts less attention in Apter’s book. There is undue emphasis on unstable identities, misleading images, failed elections, tragic pipeline explosions, petro-shortages military coups and cultural phenomenology of the 419 scam. There are printing errors, Dogorai (Dogarai) on page 194 and Ugoji (Udoji) on page 202. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the book is an excellent example of indepth fieldwork. It’s recommended to students interested in African cultural issues, challenges of development and oil politics.

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Is reviewing a print-only research guide in an online-only journal anachronistic? It shouldn’t be. As an Africanist librarian colleague aptly puts it, “while Google may be pretty good for Goethe, it is not nearly as good for Gao” (Henige 2005:2). My own library experience and nearly ten years of teaching graduate students effective methods to pursue their own library research on African-related topics supports my belief (along with generations of librarians) that quality printed guides such as this one remain valuable and have a significant, continuing role to play in scholarly research on Africa. This is true even as academic libraries themselves become increasingly digital, virtual and, it may seem at times, infinite. Research in the library, with the advice of a specialist librarian if available and using high quality print resources in combination with the catalog and an array of useful tools now available online, shouldn’t be unfamiliar, unusual, or anachronistic for Africanist scholars. This is especially true for beginning researchers and anyone working outside his or her established area of expertise.

Electronic full-text, indexed or abstracted resources accessed at home and in the office are, of course, a great benefit to most researchers. They save us time, gas, and the inconvenience of multiple trips to the library as we rush to complete complex work on deadline. A vast and diverse array of online resources enriches our professional and everyday lives while enabling entirely new kinds of research. My own work and that of people I assist every day is enhanced by quick, easy access to scholarship via powerful web search engines, free library catalogs online, links to scanned books, subscription databases and electronic journals with hypertext-citations. While I’m not an early technology adopter, I advocate and promote the usefulness of a range of electronic tools and resources, especially as they begin to mature and become reliable for researchers in the fields I support.

It may be difficult to imagine that the solutions to all one’s research problems aren’t available online. This is especially true at any major academic university in the developed world, where it’s likely that on behalf of faculty and students the library spends several million
dollars each year providing access to research resources and the tools to locate these effectively. However, it’s worth reflecting on what might be lacking from connected computers, because print publications (old and new) are sometimes the best tools available despite the prevalence, convenience, and astonishing growth of electronic resources. Importantly, the disadvantages of relying solely on online searches (for scholarly research, especially in interdisciplinary or area studies fields) may remain hidden.

There is no single, comprehensive or best online index for all of African Studies. It’s easy to overlook a standard work or an important set of foreign language sources within a web search engine’s often overwhelmingly large number of returned results, the order of which are based on a fine-grained, full-text keyword analysis automatically sorted by “relevance.” Technical and proprietary issues can undermine online searches in purely scholarly tools too, as when an otherwise effective query appears to be conducted on scanned page images as displayed to the reader (e.g. in JSTOR), but which in fact is implemented on hidden plain text files that remain inaccessible to the end user and which are generated by notoriously error-prone optical character recognition (OCR) software. While some such problems may be effectively addressed in the future, others may persist for various reasons (including potential conflicts of interest in search engine companies’ business models). In any case, scholarly standards require researchers to understand a defined aspect of the literature completely and with great confidence; it’s incumbent on us to practice the most reliable methods available to assure adequate intellectual coverage and eliminate gaps in literature reviews and research writing.

Employing a library reference collection for searches, especially one that has been developed and managed with a focus on African Studies, is an important part of an effective, reliable and highly complementary overall strategy to the many available online search approaches. The value of reference materials “to find the best information quickly” is widely misunderstood and underappreciated (Mann 2005). It’s a misconception that reference sources should simply find something factual on a particular topic. This former (always low level) function of library reference services now largely has been replaced by online tools, which generally is a good thing. The more important role of reference work in the scholarly research process has not at all diminished: with proper training and perhaps occasional professional guidance, a researcher can learn to identify the best quality information from reliable sources with great efficiency. Within one’s own field of expertise such tools are not generally necessary. However, beginning scholars, non-specialists and advanced researchers outside of their area of expertise can all benefit greatly from the support provided by a specialist librarian or a high quality, printed reference guide and a good reference book collection. Relying on the expert guidance of an author such as John McIlwaine (Emeritus Professor of the Bibliography of Asia and Africa as well as the 1998 winner of the ASA’s Conover-Porter Award for Excellence in Africana Reference) is a particularly good way to get started with a few of the best quality resources available.

Printed sources in specialized, financially risky markets such as reference publishing for African Studies are becoming scarce, while lucrative, large market, general resources proliferate online and on library shelves (Zell 2005). Can the purchase of such a specialized guide be justified (at a list price of $260) in light of the convenience, popularity and general coverage of so many other reference tools? For any library with a modest African Studies collection or with
a reasonably large general reference section, McIlwaine’s guide proves its worth beyond a
doubt. It can serve multiple purposes for a range of users and will save readers time while
guiding them quickly to some of the best information sources online and in library print
collections.

The introduction to McIlwaine’s guide is a valuable review of the publishing history of
African Studies reference works. He offers a survey of essential sources and complementary
works that itself could be used to create the foundation of a good reference collection. Several
excellent internet guides are included (e.g. those of Karen Fung at Stanford, Yuusuf Caruso at
Columbia and Peter Limb at Michigan State University), all admirably comprehensive, reliable
starting points for specialized African Studies research on the web. A good reference guide such
as this one also can be of great value in identifying “flagship collections” in unexpected places,
hidden collections under one’s own nose and archival resources available for interlibrary loan
in microfilm format, allowing one to limit the need for expensive and time-consuming research
trips to distant archives or libraries. It has further value as a checklist of resources to confirm
coverage or to remind oneself of valuable standard sources online and in print.

The guide itself reflects McIlwaine’s long and distinguished experience in the service of
generations of researchers, developing and using some of the world’s foremost collections for
scholarship on Africa, Asia and British relations with these world areas. The preface and
introduction clearly outline the guide’s purpose, scope, coverage, goals and organization.
Entries, arranged regionally and topically, then by author or title, frequently incorporate brief
comments from independent reviews, traced to their sources in over 80 journals. It sets a very
high standard indeed for future reference book authors.

Coverage is for sub-Saharan Africa from 1938 forward for non-arbitrary reasons clearly set
forth but also to save space for material not covered in the first edition, which therefore remains
valuable itself. Excluded from consideration are bibliographies, single language dictionaries,
handbooks for specific organizations, compilations of laws and treaties, indexes and abstracts in
favor of other reference sources. Included and considered are many statistical compilations,
organizational directories, biographical sources, encyclopedias, historical dictionaries, atlases
and gazetteers, handbooks and yearbooks, and a number of specific series such as those by the
War Office and Admiralty of Britain and similar series from France and Germany. Unlike the
preceding edition, sources on the biology, habitat, geology and earth sciences relating to Africa
are included, with particular attention to flora and fauna. The organization is practical,
convenient and logical, with excellent indexing, clear headings and multiple points of access
making it a pleasure to browse while still providing quick access to authors and titles. There is
no question in my mind that this will be a valuable addition to reference collections worldwide
and will prove its value many times over even as online sources become even more prominent
and available for African Studies researchers.

Daniel Reboussin
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Notes
1. Relevance rankings are based on a search engine’s proprietary, “black box” algorithm—another topic all together, but one that deeply concerns some writers, who question the commercial motives, scholarly appropriateness, language coverage and cultural sensitivities of the engine’s software engineers and their corporate employers. For example, Meng (2008) notes “the conflict-of-interest inherent in Google’s business model” and asks “are Google’s customers really the individuals searching for information, or are they the advertisers who actually increase Google’s revenues and stock value?”

References


Henige, David. 2005. “Coping with an information world measured in terabytes.” pp. 1-5 In Evalds and Henige (eds.).


This elegant investigation of consumption in Zanzibar in the nineteenth century deserves a wide audience among Africanists as well as readers interested in the politics and cultural tensions within consumption. Like so many other scholars, Prestholdt critiques facile understandings of “globalization”. He notes how Western discussions of consumption abroad still rely uncritically to the racial and political hierarchies of the age of high imperialism, by contending that Europe and North America remain the standard by which others are ranked.
Thankfully, he does not simply stop at that rather obvious point. Instead, he furnishes a holistic and creative set of approaches to understanding the social and cultural meanings and struggles embedded in Zanzibari and European discussions of consumption. His essays skillfully introduce a wide range of issues related to consumption that both reflect the state of the current literature and press research in new, exciting directions.

Several themes are particularly novel and important here. One subject that Prestholdt deals with in an apt and provocative way is the local understanding of Zanzibari consumption. Though a close reading of European accounts and nineteenth century Swahili poetry, the author contends that local people believed several aspects of an individual’s personality could become enthralled by the need to acquire goods. Although obtaining foreign and local goods was seen as a key element in social success and a vital element in patronage, Zanzibaris also feared that desires to acquire goods to attain the dreams and fantasies of respectability that came with them could overwhelm right judgment. On the other hand, Zanzibaris derided the unwillingness of foreigners to perform their respectability through consumption, particularly different Indian communities. People thus had to walk a fine and constantly changing balance as they bought and used goods to display their taste.

The effects of Zanzibari consumption were felt far beyond East Africa. Much as David Richardson has noted the importance of West African consumption of imported goods for the British economy, Prestholdt traces out the changing fortunes of Indian and American companies who exported cloth to Zanzibar. Changing local tastes drove American and Indian companies to alter their merchandise and their methods of marketing. While Massachusetts firms struggled to retain their foothold over local cloth commerce between the 1840s and the American Civil War, Bombay-based textile mills gradually took over the Zanzibari market in the late nineteenth century. Local people could thus have a dramatic impact on production outside Africa, rather than being merely passive pawns in global flows of goods and money.

Another innovation in this study is how slavery and commoditization were intimately linked in nineteenth century Zanzibar. Prestholdt terms the symbolic subjection of slaves treated as objects that denoted the tastes and authority of their owners. Owners could impose their own narratives of backward and faceless chattel redeemed by civilized townspeople by renaming and redressing slaves. Colonial officials and missionaries claimed to be opponents of the horrors of the slave trade, but in reality, they also enjoyed providing names and outfits for Africans rescued from bondage. Some former slaves, such as David Livingstone’s African associate Jacob Wainwright, adopted European tastes and dress through their travels in England, East Africa, and India.

Other topics covered are far more familiar. Rulers and ordinary people in mid-nineteenth century Zanzibar shared a taste for imported European goods and architectural styles with their counterparts in Egypt, Madagascar, Siam, Morocco, Hawaii, and other independent kingdoms. Since mobility was a crucial element of life for slaves, traders, clerics, and most other people living on the island, interest in foreign goods permeated through different social classes rather than remaining solely the purview of the powerful. However, these objects and styles reflected local understandings of global connections rather than acquiescence to the supposed innate superiority of European consumption patterns. Prestholdt coins the term similitude to describe how Comoros Island communities could try to develop bonds with visiting English ships.
through consuming English goods, adopting English dress and manners, and through speaking English. This tactic succeeded in building a sense of solidarity between local people and the English particularly before the mid-nineteenth century. However, East African coastal consumption practices became by the mid-nineteenth century an object of scandal and mockery by English and other European visitors. By deeming local consumption of foreign goods a sign of “semi-civilization,” they could present the region’s negotiations with other parts of the world as a failure and a sign of African inferiority. Only Europeans could legitimately claim to be modern in their view. Such sentiments naturally fit will with other justifications for colonial expansion. Historians have certainly treated the same issues in many parts of coastal West Africa, but the author does review them in a thorough way.

There are only a few minor complaints this reviewer can make here. One wishes this book had more clearly tied together internal debates over consumption with struggles over social status, as Jonathan Glassman and Laura Fair have done in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian coast. Perhaps Fair and Glassman’s work led the author to believe these subjects had already been covered, but the agency of slaves and ordinary people at times fades from view. Indian-Zanzibari and Omani-Zanzibari connections do enter the discussion at times, but a further exploration of these links would have even further cemented the author’s hopes of analyzing local understandings of global connections. Despite these quibbles, instructors of courses on imperialism, consumption, and African history for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses should seriously consider using this book. It reads very well and addresses issues of critical theory in a very lucid manner. All in all, this is a major new contribution to the fields of African history and consumption.

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This book seeks to "...provide a broad overview of the character, transformation, initial growth, and final decline of South Africa’s economy, and an interpretation of the major factors that explain these developments" (p. xviii). It does not contain original research, but rather aspires to be a synthesis of information already in existence. If I remember correctly, it was Harrison White who thanked his professional colleagues in the “Acknowledgments” section of his Identity and Control by stating that all ideas are already present in networks from which we borrow, thus legitimizing once again the important role of “synthesizers” in social science. Feinstein’s synthesis is astonishing and of high quality, and the book’s main arguments are skillfully argued.

The author first makes observations about South Africa’s economy in an international context. Most notably, growth in South Africa appears to have been slow up to 1870; from 1870 to 1913, there was "...the early development of globalization," with expansion and prosperity.
throughout the world economy; from 1913 to 1950, the world economy fared poorly, though South Africa did well through the 1930s gold boom and during World War II; 1950 to 1973 was a "...'golden age' of dynamic growth"; from 1973 to 1994, there was a general decline in economic performance, and South Africa shared in the "stagflation" (pp. 4, 7). It should be noted that there was quite extreme income inequality between whites and blacks during these periods.

"A strategy of conquest and disposition was pursued energetically by both Dutch and British settlers..." (p. 34). White farmers, the British government, and from the 1870s on, mine-owners, though divided over many issues, were united in their suppression of independent African polities as a means to achieve their objectives. To illustrate this, the author next provides a detailed look at the case of the Pedi, a Sotho-speaking tribe in northeastern Transvaal that clashed with the Boers and later the British, in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The author next considers the use of African labor by whites in more detail. African labor on white-owned farms took four forms: (1) rent tenancy, whereby whites with too much land rented the land to Africans; (2) sharecropping, in which Africans were allowed use of land and a place to live in return for half or more of their crop; (3) labor tenancy, in which Africans agreed to provide a given amount of labor in return for housing accommodations and a small plot to cultivate for themselves; and (4) wage labor, which was extremely popular by the 1930s and predominant after World War II. Employment in mines started to pose serious competition with agriculture for labor by 1890. The mining industry wielded much power over workers, through a system of fixed-term contracts, penal sanctions imposed on workers that broke such contracts, and controlled compounds where workers would live for the duration of their employment. Although initially high, wages became rather low with little recourse by workers, as the industry sought profit.

Discrimination by color had been present since the beginning of the colony, but the explicit use of discrimination did not take place until the mining boom. The national government first did so in 1911 through the Mines and Works Act. The Act was intended to regulate mines for safety purposes, but the government took advantage of it to impose color bars, the "...fundamental reason for [which was]...the desire of white miners to protect their jobs and their very large income differentials" (p. 75). Specific lists were created of skilled trades and occupations reserved for Europeans, including mining specific occupations as well as generic trades required for the repair and maintenance of equipment and buildings. However, conflict arose: due to the gold standard, mines received a fixed price for gold, and thus could only profit by managing expenses. Because Africans were paid low wages, the mining industry had an incentive to allow Africans to participate in white semi-skilled and skilled work. Needless to say, white workers sought to maintain their privileged position, and there were a series of white union organized strikes. Major strikes occurred in 1913, 1914, and 1922.

The role of the country’s natural resources in its economic development (from the 1860s on) must be considered. Unlike other areas that depend upon the export of minerals for growth, South Africa was successful in exploiting, most importantly, its gold, and its diamond resources to promote general growth. The author describes the character and expansion of the mining industry in detail, but it suffices to note here that both the gold and diamond industries grew rapidly upon the discovery of the minerals, and that production was concentrated in the hands...
of a few large companies. It was not long until agriculture was dwarfed by these industries in terms of exports.

Later on, manufacturing would become more important for the economy. Ever since the colony’s founding, there was almost no domestic manufacturing industry. Despite a brief pickup in activity during WWI, the industry did not experience sustained growth until 1924. In this pivotal year, the government decided it was in the country’s interest to diversify beyond the "wasting asset" of minerals and into manufacturing. Protective tariffs were imposed, and the government set up and owned an electric and a steel company, thus ensuring the requisites for a mature industrialization. The state also owned the railways. The results were generally successful, as specifically detailed by the author (p. 126).

Next the author considers the country’s economic performance from after World War II to 1994. The performance from 1950 to 1973 was decent, with a 2.2 percent per annum growth in real GDP and about 3 percent in labor productivity. Mining continued its strength during this period due to the discovery of new gold mines, an increase in the price of gold, and a new demand for uranium. Manufacturing, too, was strong with the help of foreign investors and the demand from the mining industry, though dependence on government protection and assistance remained. A financial sector developed alongside these industries. Finally, commercial agriculture was able to improve its efficiency from the mid 1960s through increased mechanization. However, subsistence farming in the reserves showed no improvement, and South African farming was still sub-par by international standards. The author discusses each of these topics individually in more detail.

The period of stagflation in the early 1970s affected South Africa severely; in fact, real GDP per capita growth was -0.6 percent from the period 1973 to 1994. Other problems included soaring inflation, high unemployment, and a balance of payments problem caused by foreign aversion to the country’s apartheid policy. There are three main economic explanations for the country’s decline during this period. First, there was the impact of gold. The richest gold mines by this time were becoming exhausted. Additionally, gold had lost its special place in the international monetary system with the demise of the gold standard, and prices started to plunge in the 1980s. The second cause is "...a succession of adverse external economic and political changes" (p. 202). This included a worldwide slow-down in growth from the prior "golden age," a surge in oil prices that created inflation, and a weakening exchange rate that made it harder for manufacturers to export. Finally, the low efficiency and high costs of production in the industrial sector became more significant as the country increasingly relied on this part of the economy to drive growth.

International hostility to apartheid was also starting to cause problems for South Africa. Apartheid as a policy, involving the subjugation of blacks, was implemented in 1948 when the National Party won elections. The party pursued a policy of reversing African urbanization, which, despite the efforts of earlier governments to control it, had proceeded. Of course, such a policy would empower white domination, but it ran afoul of the needs of industrialization. "The government relied primarily on enforcement of an elaborate set of laws and procedures..." to this end, which in part involved non-whites carrying passes which restricted their movement (p. 154). "At the core of the apartheid system was a colossal bureaucratic apparatus of influx controls and labour bureaux, backed up by the oppressive powers of the police" (Feinstein,
The government spoke of a plan to encourage socioeconomic development in the "homelands" (reserves), though nothing much came of this. Africans were further suppressed through these measures: blacks were prevented by law from striking, and were excluded from collective bargaining with their employers; further legislation was enacted to displace blacks from more categories of jobs, so that these could be reserved for whites; and African education was taken over by the national government in 1953, offering a sub-par education designed to prevent competition with whites. The government at the time maintained that apartheid was a system that would encourage economic growth and one that was in the Africans' best interests. However, there was considerable debate and dissent from this view among whites.

Criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy started to gain traction in the mid-1980s. In 1985 and 1986 the European Community, the Commonwealth, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other governments voted to ban trade with South Africa in many products. "Restrictions or bans were also placed on government and bank loans to South Africa and on private investment" (p. 224). A general level of political hostility also made it difficult for South African exporters looking to expand into new markets. The author states that although the trade sanctions had only minor effects, the financial sanctions were much more damaging. Changes in the labor market also put pressure on the economy. Black labor unrest spilled into strikes in 1972, 1973, and 1974. Blacks eventually achieved large real raises in their income, greater than the rate of productivity growth per worker. The policy of job reservation was also being eroded, and the black labor participation rate increased. All of these factors, in addition to a dismal GDP growth rate and the obviation of labor by capital, led to high rates of unemployment.

The author finally describes the demise of apartheid. The government started a gradual retreat from the policy in the 1970s when its economic cost became more apparent. A commission was established in 1977 to look into labor reforms. It recommended that Africans be allowed to unionize, that job reservation be abolished, "pass laws" be eliminated, and an increased focus on African education and training. These policies were in fact phased in over time, though education, while improving, remained inferior to that received by whites. "By 1986 many of apartheid's major economic institutions and policies had been dismantled," thought blacks still were ".denied access to decision making over all aspects of economic and political life (p. 244). The country finally transitioned to a non-racial democracy in 1994.

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Watching a documentary on the siege of Leningrad, a friend (of African descent) muttered to me during a particularly lethal battle, "Would you look at those Europeans? They're worse
than Africans!” The popular myth that Africans are brutally tribalistic surely is a legacy of European stereotypes of the “savage” in need of “civilization” (and, of course, colonization). “Hotel Rwanda,” “Blood Diamonds,” and “Last King of Scotland” all depict Africa to Western movie-goers as a site of extraordinary cruelty. Charles Taylor’s alleged cannibalism, pre-pubescent child soldiers slaughtering their parents, mass rape in Central Africa, torched huts in Darfur, election warfare in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and al-Qaeda operatives plotting catastrophe are the footage of Africa that appears on Western television (if Africa appears at all). These have not helped to improve Africa’s vicious image. However, as the World Wars, the Transatlantic Slave Trade, and forced labor under European colonialism evidenced, Africans do not hold a monopoly on inflicting massive violence.

The goal of the edited volume States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa is to explore the tragedy of violence in contemporary Africa. For decades in some regions and centuries in others, Africans fought – and eventually won – the wars of liberation. Now that Africa is free, why do one-third of all the current wars in the world take place there? To answer this question, political scientists such as myself might begin with the international level of analysis. The contributors to States of Violence are overwhelmingly anthropologists, however, and instead they employ a micro-level, ethnographic approach. Most importantly, they astutely sidestep the problem of whether a particular episode of African violence is political and instead focus upon the relationship of the state to such violence.

Much more common in the post-Cold War era than conventional wars are low-intensity, identity-group conflicts between or among a hodgepodge of actors, varying from armies to thugs. Examples of this politically ambiguous violence in States of Violence include teen gangs in the Western Cape and vigilante youth groups in Nigeria. It is not always clear whether such violence is an expression of political or personal animosity. Nor is it clear whether the motivation for the violence is advancement of the ethnic group, or merely self-enrichment. The distinction between crime and political violence becomes blurry. A strength of this volume, States of Violence, is that it tackles the complicated interplay of today’s micro- and macro-level violence.

The editors had an unenviable task of collating wildly different subjects and genres into one volume and should be commended for the effort. “Mau Mau” (liberation fighters in colonial Kenya) is the image that introduces the volume, but I am not sure why or how well it works. The chapters in States of Violence were originally conference papers and are disjointed stylistically and substantively. Some of the authors write in abstract jargon and other authors write crisply. Some chapters draw from long periods of field research; the descriptions of Zimbabwe veterans and neighborhood relations in Guinea-Bissau are especially strong. The provocative chapter on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission clearly involved over a decade of research (and participation) by the author. Three books would probably not do justice to her findings, much less one chapter. However, some of the authors rely exclusively on archival sources and some appear to use no data at all. A few authors “read” suffering as “text,” as in literary criticism, which left me uneasy both methodologically and morally.

The uniting themes of “memory” and “youth” that the title promises appear inconsistently. Not every chapter directly addresses youth and not every chapter directly addresses memory. Additionally, as the editors themselves admit, the case selection is peculiar. Of the eight
Empirical chapters, two are on Sierra Leone and two are on South Africa. With exception of Rwanda, there are no case studies of Central Africa, East Africa, the Horn or North Africa. Surely there has not been an absence of violence in these regions to study.

One trait common to all these disparate pieces, however, is that none of the research involves quantitative methods. The work stands as a refreshing contrast and complement to the plethora of statistical investigations of conflict that already exist. Moreover, the individual topics that appear in this volume are not ones that have already received excessive scrutiny.

Different chapters of States of Violence will appeal to social scientists who research the specific communities described therein. It is quite possible that conflict scholars in general will find the ethnographic approach of this volume interesting (for instance, the chapter on gangs in South Africa would be a useful comparison with gangs on other continents). It would be an unlikely choice for a textbook in an African Studies course because there is too much emphasis on two regions of Africa at the expense of the rest.

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Patrick McAllister’s latest book draws on over twenty years of fieldwork in South Africa and brings together the fruits of a long publishing career on Xhosa ritual, oratory, and beer. Xhosa Beer Drinking Rituals: Power, Practice and Performance in the South African Rural Periphery is a compilation of participant-observation ethnographies that convincingly demonstrates the social significance inherent in Xhosa beer drinking rituals. Through an analysis of the preparations and practices of beer drinks, with special attention to the content and pattern of speech and performance during the rituals, McAllister successfully presents Xhosa beer drinking rituals as an index of Xhosa speakers’ simultaneous cultural adaptation and resistance to colonization and postcolonial apartheid experience.

Originally charged with uncovering the connection between labor migration and rural life among the Xhosa during the twentieth century, McAllister’s research grew from the work of Philip Mayer (for whom he was an assistant in the 1970s) and led to questions about the Xhosa’s preservation of rural tradition in an increasingly urban and capitalist South Africa. These considerations of tradition and cultural independence in the climate of colonialism and apartheid illuminate the importance and complexity of ritual and recreation, specifically beer drinks.

Xhosa Beer Drinking Rituals argues that the transition from primarily rural agrarian work to urban wage labor effected a transition from a kin- to community-based economy for Xhosa speakers. These economic changes were reflected in cultural practices as well. McAllister identifies the prevalence of large communal beer drinking rituals over smaller, family-based animal killing rituals, since the beginning of colonization. Therefore, beer drinks were and are
not static cultural practices; rather they continually change and improvise to meet present conditions. Thus McAllister posits the significance of beer drinks as a gauge of Xhosa cultural reaction and meaning.

McAllister reminds the reader that the beer drinks he found so common during his fieldwork were far less prominent before the colonial era. He finds the shrinking size of homesteads, caused by compounding factors of land shortages, migrant labor and disease, coincided with a changing agricultural focus from sorghum to maize that demanded brief but labor intensive periods of harvesting and clearing. These factors all led to a community-based economy requiring cooperation to complete tasks, and often engendering remuneration for the help of neighbors. In this context, beer brewed from excess maize was more available, and communal beer drinks as compensation for community labor were more frequent. Eventually, then, McAllister argues that beer drinks came to reinforce a kind of “traditional” significance in a relatively new Xhosa lifestyle.

One particular form of beer drinking ritual is posited as a lens to view the Xhosa reaction to colonialism and urbanization. McAllister uses the umsindleko—a beer drink celebrating the return of migrant workers—to demonstrate that Xhosa speakers both accepted the necessity of their young men sojourning for wage labor in urban centers and yet resisted urban, colonial, and capitalist invasions into traditional, rural, Xhosa culture. To McAllister, the celebration of migrant laborers safe return to the village in a traditional forum is a hidden transcript of the Xhosa; he argues that it is the resistance of colonial and urban domination by protecting, even while refining, the rural habitus which signify an independent Xhosa culture manifested in beer drinking rituals.

By revealing the beer drink as both a vehicle of cultural change as well as a symbol of cultural tradition, Xhosa Beer Drinking Rituals is important for a reconsideration of Xhosa speakers’ adaptation to colonization and apartheid. But the choice of subject—beer—as a source of autonomous culture, also marks significant scholarly contribution. The sympathetic description of Xhosa beer drinks forms a counter-narrative to the body of literature on alcohol in Africa, which has predominantly associated a rise in the use of alcohol during the colonial period with socially destructive habits. McAllister’s book emphasizes that the process of ritual is more important than the product of beer. This presents a more general challenge to western epistemology which tends to privilege the text at the expense of the spoken word, and thus often excludes the importance of the ritual of speech that McAllister suggests is the most important source for analyzing the trajectory of the ritual.

The wealth of McAllister’s first hand accounts and original photographs personalize his series of narratives and make for an engaging read. However, Xhosa Beer Drinking Rituals is most valuable for specialists in the fields of African anthropology, sociology, and cultural history, who will take interest in the evolution of McAllister’s research and conclusions, and appreciate his interaction with noted scholars and theorists such as Mayer, Mary Douglas and Pierre Bourdieu. Although the relatively sparse documentation in endnotes will not be of great help for graduate students crafting research agendas, Xhosa Beer Drinking Rituals will certainly stimulate discussion in graduate seminars surrounding the subjects and methods of researching indigenous African experiences in the colonial and postcolonial eras.
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In July 1860, the schooner *Clotilda* carried to Mobile, Alabama, the last African slaves imported into the United States. Sylviane Diouf carefully reconstructs the experiences of the 110 captives from their origins in Dahomey to their life on the outskirts of Mobile. Half were women. Half were under fifteen years old. Through an impressive study combining a historian’s analysis of archival and published sources with an anthropologist’s fieldwork in Africa and Alabama, Diouf provides a narrative of the *Clotilda* Africans and an insightful discourse on race within the United States.

Diouf begins with a rich description of conditions along the Bight of Benin and in the American South. As sectional tensions heightened and as rising slave prices generated class fissures among white southerners, voices calling for resumption of the international slave trade, closed in the United States since 1808, grew louder. Illegal importation likely brought thousands into bondage each decade of the antebellum period, particularly through the Republic of Texas and along the Gulf Coast. The trade persisted through a combination, according to Diouf, of "Southern justice, Northern complicity, and Federal apathy" (p. 23). Nevertheless, a federal crackdown after the seizure of the *Wanderer’s* over 200 captives in 1858 inspired Mobile slaveholder Timothy Meaher to import a shipment of Africans on principle. Involved in economic enterprises ranging from shipbuilding to cotton cultivation, Meaher arranged for Captain William Foster to sail to Dahomey. British efforts to foster palm oil production and wean the Dahomey economy from the profitable international slave trade in the early 1850s actually increased the domestic trade. By the late 1850s, King Ghezo, lured by Napoleon III’s "free immigrants" scheme in Martinique and Guadeloupe, the resurgence of the Cuban slave trade, and American slaveholders’ smuggling efforts, openly resumed the trade. Diouf reminds readers of the international similarities of these slave societies, noting for instance how slaveholders used threats of sale – from being sold "down the river" in the United States to being sold overseas in Africa – to maintain stability. Furthermore, both African and European societies shared a sense of cultural superiority, considering the other ugly and cannibalistic.

Particularly striking is Diouf’s revelation that the *Clotilda* Africans occupied an often overlooked racial middle ground in the United States. The Africans, arriving when only one percent of American slaves recalled an African ancestor, struggled against perceptions of their primitiveness. Naked as they stepped from the *Clotilda* (a practice meant to reduce filth during a voyage that averaged 45 days and on which temperatures below deck could reach 130°), they adapted clothing given by their masters into African garb, such as using shirts as baggy pants. Whites and African Americans frequently ridiculed the *Clotilda* Africans, many of whom bore symbols of seemingly barbaric traditions such as ritual scarring and filed teeth. With emancipation, the Africans – in a pattern similar to ethnic immigrants later in the century –
pooled resources, bought land, and developed an enclave called African Town north of Mobile. Diouf meticulously scans conflictive evidence to identify the locations from which these slaves came. As Diouf demonstrates, local customs formed their ethnic identities and contributed to the creation of their new pan-ethnic identity in Alabama. Diouf astutely notes that the slave trade produced a "tragic succession of separations" that united – whether in the pens of Ouidah, the hold of a ship, or the Alabama plantations – diverse individuals facing uncertain futures (p. 58). These Africans "used their Africanity as a cement transcending cultural differences" even while "to outsiders, they were all the same, Africans, with the negative connotations the term often implied" (p. 156). African Town, for example, was surrounded by a fence with eight gates as traditionally appeared in towns from which most of them came. They replicated their homeland by selecting a community leader, judges, and laws. Here they created the first African community in the United States since the maroon colonies of the seventeenth century, a place that "was a black town on the surface and an ethnic one at its core" (p. 156). Suspicion of the Africans by neighboring blacks encouraged community cohesion. Yet "their very Africanity played in their favor" as whites and blacks perceived them as "'heathens,' savages, most likely cannibals, whose reactions one could not predict and should fear" (p. 101). Such trepidation in others was reinforced by the Africans' strong sense of community which allowed them on several occasions to usurp white supremacy and African American codes of conduct. Whites tread lightly around the "novel situation" of having a cohesive group of Africans in their midst (p. 101). Likewise, the Africans looked with suspicion on African Americans given African constructions of race which identified lighter skinned blacks with whites. The Africans, in turn, informed white officials of activities within surrounding black districts, thereby gaining valuable allies within white society.

Diouf's work skillfully blends established scholarship into her analysis, situating the Clotilda Africans in their transatlantic world. The story is one of cultural survival and transition. Members of the community enlisted in the Federal army during the Civil War, supported organizations seeking pensions for former slaves, sued railroads, and survived the convict-lease system. By the time Cudjo Lewis, the last survivor of the community, died in 1935, the Clotilda Africans had inspired numerous stories and even investigative visits by author Zora Neale Hurston, among others. Mobile absorbed African Town in 1948, yet numerous descendents remain, promoting their unique history. Although Diouf largely focuses on the Clotilda Africans, her study calls for more attention to these subsequent generations and their transformation into African Americans. African American perceptions of these Africans deserve more examination as well. Nevertheless, by restoring ethnicity to the discussion of black America, certainly a timely issue given the rise of Barrack Obama, Diouf provides a stimulating account not only of the last slaves to arrive in the United States but also of the meaning of race in America. Her book suggests numerous launching points for further research. In the meantime, Diouf's highly accessible study will certainly stimulate intense discussion among academics, students, and, hopefully, Americans in general.

Anthony J. Stanonis
Queen's University, Belfast

Professor Mann is a well known scholar across the Atlantic. Her latest volume about Lagos (Nigeria) is no doubt a meaningful contribution to scholarship. The uniqueness of her latest study is its clarity, succinctness, and lucidity. Grounded in facts and knowledge of existing literature in the field, Mann set out to re-explore areas studied by leading scholars such as Robin Law, Sandra Barnes, Pauline Baker and Martin Lynn to mention a few. Mann’s work is both rich in oral and archival sources collected over a decade in Nigeria, England, and the United States of America. These sources are meticulously woven with secondary sources in the field. Although she could be regarded as one of the pioneers of serious scholarly study of Lagos and its environs, she nonetheless presents a detailed historiographical analysis of the state of knowledge.

This made it easy to read and comprehend Slavery and the birth of an African city. Mann introduced a unique angle in analyzing the causes and consequences of the trans-Atlantic slave trade; the post-abolition period – emphasizing transition from slave procurement to trade in palm kernel -linking the narrative of international slave markets to those of the regional suppliers and slave dealers. She vividly shows how Lagos was transformed from a satellite of the Benin Kingdom into a wealthy and successful town. The introduction of international slave trade and its profitability was significant in this transformation. Mann tells readers how the traditional ruling class and peoples of Lagos adapted to the new situation and how wealth transformed social stratification and class in Lagos.

The book is instructive in that she was very meticulous in her documentation of sources and demonstrates her familiarity with local idioms and customs – an outcome of her momentary residency in Lagos and continuous relationship with Lagosians since 1970. She paints a vivid picture of central characters, both local and foreign, in emergent urban Lagos before the beginning of the twentieth century. Further, the book organization is unambiguous and allows the reader to easily comprehend issues and events to be discussed. It is well sequenced, and clearly outlined for all readers. Divided into eight chapters, Mann focused on three main questions – how the slave trade was conducted’ who profited from it; and what those who benefited did with their new income. Her answers to these questions illuminate readers’ knowledge about the complex nature of the trade – slave trade and the trade in palm kernel that followed in post-abolition era.

Generally, the work detailed the role of the upper and lower class; the rich and the poor; the leaders and the followers. But more importantly, it chronicled how Lagosians adapted and responded to the new way of life – “Legitimate Commerce” and the “New Lords” (British). Her assertion that Lagosians were not passive is rooted in evidence - and the objective interpretation of the evidence; this is a challenge to Eurocentric views about the nature and dimension of the Atlantic trade and general Euro-African encounter that gave birth to colonialism.

Despite few typos and spelling errors, the book is a lucid historical narrative detailing events, issues, and personalities that contributed to emergent urban Lagos. Perhaps the period
covered and the title should reflect 1603 to 1900 instead of 1760-1900. The reason is that earliest history of Lagos can now be conveniently date to 1603 as Mann would agree. The period 1760-1800s remained a watershed in the transformation of Lagos and that she adequately elaborated to readers. This is indeed the African side of the events eloquently told by a Caucasian, who other than the color of her skin, can be referred to as an honorary Lagosian.

Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani
Morgan State University


In The Silence of Great Zimbabwe Joost Fontein fashions a learned narrative about contested heritage. Working in Masvingo District in southern Zimbabwe, where the Nemanwa, Charumbira, and Mugabe clans reside, he charts the alienation of African associations and expressions bound to contemporary Great Zimbabwe. Palpable disenchantment among African communities, each with their own contingent historical representations of the place, derives from interpretive violence to the site. By unmasking the dynamics of the “silence of unrepresented pasts” and the “silence of anger,” the author hopes that the voices of the countryside might once again be heard and appreciated, reestablishing the sacredness of Great Zimbabwe and its multiple significances.

Rosemary Joyce elsewhere laments that archaeologists often speak for communities, usurping local agency. Fontein escapes this critique by fulsomenly engaging Zimbabweans and quoting passages from local (frequently oral) texts that empower and enrich his narrative. To capture competing historical perspectives and document as yet “unrepresented pasts,” in the first half of his text the author draws on the “performances” of local chiefs, village leaders, respected elders, and spirit mediums, among others. Each, he argues, articulates a past whose legitimacy is couched in the authenticity of their “performance of the past”: an ability to “perform their narratives and social roles” in line with local standards (p. 41). In this manner, Fontein demonstrates the crucial role of individuals and social groups in making pasts as well as the dynamic nature of interacting voices and negotiated histories at Great Zimbabwe. As a place alive with history, its pasts are regularly remade, as his presented historiography outlines. Fontein’s study exemplifies ethnographic archaeology: practice that employs ethnography to explore the social dimensions of archaeology’s own enterprise. To reflect on archaeologists’ roles in silencing pasts of local genesis, the author details how colonial antiquarians with prevailing racial attitudes, such as Carl Mauch, distanced Zimbabweans and their perspectives by claiming a foreign, non-African origin for Great Zimbabwe. Moreover, and certainly more novel, Fontein impugns professional archaeologists for appropriating knowledge of the past at the site and hindering multivocal accounts. The ‘objective’ renderings of archaeologists, asserts
Fontein, are rooted in claims of “professionalism” that do “symbolic violence” to other ways of knowing (p. 12). By locating the principal problematic of Great Zimbabwe in its origin rather than in the memories constitutive of the place’s shifting importance through time, but especially in the present, archaeologists dismiss as inapplicable local Zimbabwean experiences and expressions.

In the second half of the volume, the author contends that archaeology, rooted in Enlightenment notions of time as linear and progressive, plays a pivotal role in producing the “silence of anger” penetrating Great Zimbabwe. As residents attest, the absence of sacred voices and everyday sounds once perceived to emanate from the surrounding landscape marks the site as desecrated. The author demonstrates that linear narratives, in contrast to local memories, view the past as increasingly distant, robbing the site of its historicity. But, Zimbabweans not only constitute pasts “through a sense of place,” memories, traditions, and ancestors, but “[P]lace itself, and what should be done with it, is perceived, imagined and constructed through a sense of its past” (p. 78). Herein Fontein identifies a primary significance of local historical renderings that disturbs the historical treatments and heritage plans of archaeologists and historians alike. Shared discursive and spatial landscapes at Great Zimbabwe interact with other political and politicized discourses of scale. Using documentary and other materials, including those from Zimbabwean archives and UNESCO headquarters in Paris, the author interrogates the power struggles of competing stakeholders that spawned the “silence of anger.” Fontein finds that the post-independence Zimbabwean state, too, marginalized perspectives of local clans, most strikingly through its association with international institutions promoting world heritage. Drawing from Partha Chaterjee’s theories of the postcolonial state, he explains that the independence movement, by seeking to escape from colonial Rhodesian mythologies about Great Zimbabwe, placed faith in European modernization, the very state model that reinforced western notions of time and ‘objectivity’ that legitimated archaeology while undervaluing local “performances of the past” (e.g., pp. 132-133). Fontein casts this maneuver as the “anti-politics of world heritage” (p. 188). In effect, internationalism de-politicizes claims to the “universal value” of Great Zimbabwe which further entrenches the authority of the state and “professional” interpretations of the monument.

This thoughtful volume of ten chapters (with numerous black and white images) is theoretically informed and readable. Instructors and students of archaeology, heritage studies, African history, and postcolonial studies will find much worthwhile in its pages. By valuing and enlisting Zimbabwean perspectives, Fontein critically assesses the actions, memories, and words surrounding the contested landscape of Masvingo District. The author overcomes what anthropologist Sherry Ortner labels “ethnographic refusal” by tailoring a genuinely multi-vocal account in which the historical representations of groups and influences of stakeholders find meaning in relation to one another.

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