VanSikle. FIV', in Wnd grervin.- LS-Cnadiwr Tomato Wars can be con~.riicinlii tested wilh a Wald test in must lO.'tt c.r packages. A three-commodity appliation)i of the above speciflicalion was applied to the U.S.- Canada greenhouse tomato dispute. The group I commodities consisted of two )i pe of fleld- grx '.n tomatoes fi ine ripened and mature green.-): the group II LornmmdiI.i was green- house tomatoes. The an.ily..is demonstrated unambiiguou-'l that the group I (field gro wn) and group 11 (greenhouseI .ornimodilic' were not intcgraIcd with each other. Cnrierlcly. the vine-ripened and nature green tomatoes were indeed integrated within the ficll-erown group." Herein lies the inconsiistent in marker ealu-iron of like prJOdutwi relative to the ITC determination. The procedure in the earlier U.S.-Mexican case demonstrated that the tine-ripened and mature green tomatoes were indeed an integrated market. The ITC"' deci- sion in ihe case was consistent with this in.d- ing. The rcsulhs for ihe Li S.-Canada green- house tomato case found ithu the greenhouse tomatoes were not integrated with licdJ-grn n tomatoes. However, the ITC chose to rule that the relevant market was ll tomatoes, field- grown and grecnhIou-c. obio'u'-ly in conflict with the econometric results. The latter pro- cedure has the advantage thii the determina- tion ot "'narkLt" is as ev.alumiied by private transactions in the market place. Conclusions The U.S.-Canada grenhou.c tomato case sdoe prli ide an interesting case study for ap- plication of trade law related to .nliilumping peiiiiont filed in the United Slates. i.nt is provided here is an overview ot the process that was 'ill1wed and the logic thai was fol- lowed to test economic oncplt. This over- view points to two weaknesses in he proce- dures ftIlli'ed by the ITC in determining injury. The fir't and most obvious is the ap- "1 Vi'Sn.likl. John J. "Intgrgnti and Behavior in the U.S. Market for Fresh Tnmates." Petitionrcr PoIt- He.-nng Brief. Greenhouse Tomates fron Canada. Inm. No. 7T1 .T-9'25 March 25, 2002:6. proach used to determine like product in these types of cases. The statutes identify those fac- tors that should be considered by the ITC in decrmnmiing like product but gie no guidance on how to weight the various components into a determination or how to p.,I luJrdwni when it is Lquclstioedl F.mpirical evaluation of the extent of market inlcigrritoii l Cti Cmin.riLii-iCi a illustrated wih the above models is an alter- native market-based approach that the ITC could uiili,/ An argument that might be po- ited against tih treatment is the data require- ments to conduct such tests. The ITC is gisen statutory authority, however, to collect data Irom the industry to help in judging injury. Such dlaa collccilon could be mandated to in- clude the necessary data to test for like prod- uct frum all pltiMle products that could be piopolcd as %imilar to the subject merchan- dise, The second weakness suggested in Ihis re- view points to the use of the COMiPAS model for j.idinn injury. The COMPAS model uss the Amlinkltn Ir.incwork to estimate the ef- l'-l of dumping on the dornem-ii inlduiry. Al- ston et al. pointed out the wcakncsses in this model and demonstrated how it could lead to false conclusions in jutdginig injury. To its credit, the ITC relies on more than the (-'M- PAS model and encouragee. peritioner- and re- spo ndenl. to submit economic analyses that demonstrate the level of injur% to an industry from dumIping. The breadth and complexity of cases that come before the ITC make it diffi- cult for them to conduct thC 'e anlv.se inter- nally. The title i this paper implies that an econ- onmist makes sensc of the U.S.-Canada tomato trade di(pme What has been a-ouiplllhicd is to provide an overview that might allorw some trade economists to understand the process in- volved in deter mining the outcome in a trade dihpuLe. Although the paper might have failed at making sense out 1o the US.-Canad tomato irrade dispute, it does raise a number of weak- nesses in the decision fra-mework u Nd by the ITC.