Hypothesis 6: Stepwise Investment


Where it is technically feasible, most farmers build soil conservation structures in stages, rather
than all at once. This not only postpones costs, but also reduces them to the extent that future costs
are discounted. Short-term financial constraints are mitigated, and risk is reduced.

Stone gully plugs that trap silt, as shown in Figure 4, illustrate this principle well. Such structures
are commonly 2.5 meters high and 2 meters thick. They harvest silt that moves through the gully,
gradually building up a fertile plot. Because the silt accumulates slowly, at first only a small
structure is needed, but it must be enlarged every 1 to 3 years. The investment needed to build
such a structure is thus significantly reduced at any given point in time. Our observations show
that construction of ordinary field bunds follow a similar pattern.


Hypothesis 7: Willingness to Cooperate

Soil conservation sometimes requires collective action by farmers. This is the case when an
erosion problem transcends farm boundaries. Farmers' willingness to cooperate is an important
determinant of soil conservation investment in these cases.

There is a tendency to neglect severe erosion problems in big gullies that cross boundaries. This
may be due to the magnitude of the investment needed to control the problem. In fact, the cost may
be increased by the need for cooperation: cooperation is not cost free, but rather requires time for
organization and administration. It also may impose psychic and social costs on people who
prefer not to associate with other members of the group from other communities.

On the other hand, our observations show that there is much potential for cooperation by two
adjacent farmers or four farmers sharing a common boundary as long as the activity relates to that
boundary. In these cases they tend to follow certain local "rules" or "norms" set by the village.

However, for technologies such as contour or graded bunds that cross farm boundaries, group
action is not undertaken. A major problem with such technologies is that their benefits and costs
are distributed unevenly among the affected people. On the research station or in large scale
agriculture, such uneven distribution is acceptable as long as overall productivity rises suffi-
ciently. Under Indian conditions, however, it means that some people gain from SWC technology
and others do not. Those situated at the end of graded bunds where central waterways are
constructed, for example, lose, and they have an incentive to undermine the system. In general,
SWC technologies are likely to fail if they divide benefits unevenly but require nearly universal
cooperation to make them work. In this case, equity becomes a prerequisite to efficiency.

Clearly, the conditions under which farmers will cooperate with each other need to be understood,
and alternative approaches to encouraging cooperation should be explored. In addition, SWC
programmes in India should focus whenever possible on technologies that require minimal
cooperation. A good technology that can be introduced on individual farms is likely to give better
results than an excellent one that requires significant cooperation among farmers.


GATEKEEPER SERIES NO. SA34