SWC. They lease or sharecrop out their land because they do not have the resources (such as
bullocks or manpower) to cultivate their land, let alone invest in SWC.

It is likely that absentees who own large tracts do not find land care problems worth their time and
worry. That they are absent to begin with suggests that they have alternative employment with
higher returns than farming. In this case they will not devote their own labor to soil conservation.
They may hold land as a source of long-term security, not for agricultural production per se, and
so are unconcerned if erosion reduces productivity.

Preliminary surveys by the authors suggest that even eroded land appreciates in value at rates that
make it an attractive asset. Moreover, differences in land values between eroded and protected
land appear to be small compared to differences in productivity between the two. This can
probably be attributed to the fact that most farmers perceive the damage from gully erosion to be
largely reversible. Farmers also suggest that land is a prized but increasingly scarce asset, so that
even degraded land commands a good price. In any case, this phenomenon would clearly reduce
the incentive for absentees to invest in erosion control measures.

The prominence of degradation problems on the land of absentees has important policy
implications. If erosion on such land imposes costs on society, then policies should be introduced
to encourage better care. Policies should have any of four objectives. First, they should allow long
term tenancy arrangements without threatening the landlord's ownership rights. Second, they
could induce absentee landowners to adopt soil conservation measures or grow trees on it. Third,
if erosion on their land damages neighbours' fields, the neighbours should be given access to the
land to introduce soil conservation measures. Such arrangements have been found in some of the
study villages in the case of runoff management and gully control. Fourth, policies could
discourage tenancy by introducing policies to encourage absentee landowners to sell their land.
However, tenancy provides some farmers with land that they could not obtain by other means, so
more research is needed to assess the likely consequences of discouraging tenancy. A tax on land
owned by nonresidents might encourage sale to full-time farmers.


Hypothesis 5: Characteristics of the Land

Costs and returns of soil conservation vary with characteristics of the land. Therefore we can
expect the greatest investment in soil conservation on land where its costs are low and its returns
are high. Costs vary with the location of the land in relation to materials needed for soil
conservation; returns to soil conservation vary with the quality of the land.

Location: Soil conservation is least expensive on land that has abundant sources of needed
resources. For example, where soil is deep and stones are sparse, earthen bunds predominate.
This is the case in the flat plains where soil is fairly deep. On the other hand, very rocky areas,
such as the hilly zones of the Deccan Plateau, tend to be full of stone bunds. Where soil is shallow
and stones are scarce, as in Aurepalle, bunds tend to be very small.16

This pattern of investment implies that soil conservation programmes should take advantage of
local materials for constructing bunds. Farmers in the stony, shallow soil areas of Kamlapur


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