Second, they developed within the constraints of small, fragmented farms, and in accordance with
farmers' preferences to invest in soil conservation individually or in cooperation with an adjacent
farmer rather than in large, cooperative groups.

Third, economic factors determine adoption patterns. Soil conservation investments are simply
one activity among a range of farmers' economic concerns. Farmers assimilate available
information to decide how their time and money can be spent most productively. Their
opportunities and constraints are not identical, so the same activity is not equally profitable for
all farmers. For example, farmers' alternative investment possibilities, their tenure status, the
number of plots they own, and the resources at their disposal are some of the factors that determine
whether soil conservation investments will be attractive to them. As a result, farmers owning
similar land with the same erosion problems may invest in soil conservation at different rates. For
some farmers, SWC investments may not be profitable at all. Farmers are like other economic
agents they must choose among alternative investment possibilities, some of which may be more
profitable than soil conservation.

Evidence suggests that farmers perceive that soil erosion causes on-site losses, yet most do not
invest in measures to control it. This raises questions about the appropriate level and form of
government intervention to promote soil conservation. Economic theory suggests that govern-
ment should only intervene if at least one of two conditions hold: first, if farmers are constrained
from acting in a privately optimal way, or second, if private and social profitability diverge.3

There are good reasons why these conditions may hold. First, farmers may lack complete
information regarding on-site costs of soil erosion, or they may be reluctant to make investments
with positive but variable, long term returns. Second, if farmers cannot capture all the benefits
from investment in soil conservation, then they lack the incentive to invest at a socially optimal
level. This is the case if the costs of erosion are mainly off-site (i.e. downstream), or if land tenure
is insecure. These various conditions constrain farmers' investments in different ways, each
requiring separate measures, ranging from education to credit to subsidies.

The Indian government has demonstrated its commitment to investment in SWC programs. We
do not specifically address the appropriate level of government intervention. Instead, we focus
on ways to make SWC programs more cost-effective. We believe that understanding indigenous
SWC practices and adoption patterns is crucial in this effort. Specifically, we document
indigenous soil conservation practices and the logic behind them, and then identify conditions
under which farmers invest in soil conservation and constraints inhibiting such investment.
Finally, we suggest ways to overcome those constraints and create the conditions under which
private investment will increase.

Specifically, we propose a set of hypotheses about economic factors that determine both the
design of SWC technologies and whether people invest in them. We examine the preliminary
evidence for each in more detail. We conclude with recommendations for SWC programme
officials, policy makers, and researchers.


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