from the beginning. In many countries of Latin America (such as Brazil

and Honduras) rural, urban, and bureaucratic elites have been highly sus-

picious of any groups in the countryside, especially if they are controlled

by poor farmers. Often these political instincts have a sound basis. In

many cases opposition political groups, including Marxist groups and

Christian Democratic Parties have, in fact, had vigorous campaigns to or-

ganize rural groups. They hoped these groups would support their political

movements in elections, in political demonstrations, or in other ways. To

organize such groups, political movements may promise land reform, higher

prices, or other benefits. Naturally this can frighten rural and urban

elites. Far-sighted elites may in fact see some reason for reform, but

not all will. Some will fear that any extension program that encourages

or tolerates groups controlled by poor farmers will be too dangerous be-

cause it could be used by political opponents.

 Obviously these issues applied historically in the colonial systems.

There are sound political reasons for the failure of the colonial extension

systems in South Asia and Africa to allow real power to devolve to farmers'

groups. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine how the farmer acquisition

systems in the United States and Finland could have evolved if British or

Swedish and Russian rule had continued.

 It is inevitable that the establishment of group activities

among farmers, which seems necessary for many facets of extension work,



 Robert Charlick, "Power and Participation in the Modernization of
Rural Hausa Communities," University of California at Los Angeles Ph. D.
dissertation, 1974.