They are cohesive, often closely related to kinship groupings and other

pre-existing voluntary organization. Individual material incentives are

used to encourage participation. At the same time, collective incentives

exist and numerous political and ideological meetings reinforce group con-

sciousness. Government supervision and training is extensive, but when

government controls were too rigid, group cohesion suffered. Finally,

coercion is in the background with regard to people who contemplate excessive

private economic activities or migration away from the group.

 The other problem with groups -- for which the above solutions will

not be relevant -- is that they will be opposed by some political forces

precisely for the reasons groups are advocated. Bureaucrats may not want

groups, which can place demands on their activities. The locus of power

may be moved away from easily satisfied bureaucratic supervisors to very

demanding farmers. The rural elite may not want to see an organization of

poor people which might be used to support demands for land reform and/or

higher wages. Merchants and moneylenders may fear that groups of farmers

may undermine their monopolies in marketing systems. Foreign economic in-

terests may be worried. Urban political actors may fear that when farmers

are organized, they will develop the political power to redress urban biases

in economic plans.

 Such factors were behind the weakening of animation rurale activities

in Senegal after 1963.1 Such problems have also been noted in Niger,2 and

indeed may have virtually blocked the participatory aspects of the program



 Moulton, Animation Rurale, p. 84-86.

 2Dominique Gentil, "Les Cooperatives Nigerieness Traditions Vil-
lageoises et Modernization Cooperative," 1'Ecole Practique de Hautes Etudes
doctoral dissertation, 1971, and "Methodologie de 1'Implantation de Nouveau
Systems Cooperatif on Niger," Development et Civilizations 52-53, (April-
September 1973), cited in Moulton, p. 140-143.