In Bangladesh, however, it seems that this approach is not adequate.

 Frequently, the defaulters are the larger, powerful farmers who are immune

 to village social pressures and may, in fact, have a vested interest in

 the collapse of institutional credit, which might compete with their own

 money-lending activities. In such cases, it would seem that the application

 of police and judicial power, involving the seizing of mortgaged properties,

 is necessary to supplement social pressures. Alternatively, different groups

 might be set up of small, medium, or large farmers, so that members have

 roughly equal status. In general, Adams reports that groups established for

 the sole purpose of obtaining credit lack viability.
 For landless laborers, group activities in the form of labor

unions can be extremely useful in improving not only wage levels but also

working conditions (including stability of employment, dignity of treatment,

etc.) This has been amply demonstrated in Kerela, India, among other places.

 In some cases local groups will form spontaneously, as expansions

of previously existing voluntary organizations. This is most likely to

happen where land ownership is reasonably egalitarian and where government

is tolerant of local organization. The Grange movement in the U.S. and

the cooperative movement in Denmark are two examples.

 In most cases, however, active government support for all these forms

of group activities is needed. Careful, thorough supervision and checking

from higher levels and the effective utilization of police and judicial

power seem necessary to nip in the bud the first indications of corruption.

Training programs are also useful to assure competence in organizational

management as well as technology (e.g., bookkeeping, etc.). Government regulations

that require groups to be composed of homogeneous farmers (i.e., all small,

medium, or large) can be helpful in preventing patron-client relationships