to-face relations and social pressures they would generate. As supervision

at Comilla became relaxed and corrupt, as basic level groups were expanded

and reformed so that face-to-face relations in the group setting became

less important, the programs at Comilla became more controlled by the

elite farmers.1

 It is often the case, however, that a larger organization is re-

quired, either to obtain potential economies of scale (e.g., for purchasing

trucks, installing electricity systems) or to include all potential "free

riders" (e.g., a large irrigation system). As the group gets large enough

so that an individual's actions no longer perceptibly affect the group's

fortunes, and as group social pressures are reduced, some combination of

personal incentives, threats of coercion, and external supervision seem

necessary to assure participation.2

 Equally important, some organizational format is needed to tie to-

gether small face-to-face groups of farmers into larger units that can

provide appropriate economies of scale. In Taiwan, for example, the farmers'

associations are organized from smaller village-based groups. Moreover, they

have responsibility for tax collection and monopoly over fertilizer sales.

Thus, all farmers were compelled to deal with the farmers' associations, even

if they did not join. In addition, they had to join to take advantage of

credit, extension, and marketing services.



 1Harry Blair, The Elusiveness of Equity: Institutional Approaches
to Rural Development in Bangladesh (Ithaca: Cornell Rural Development
Committee, 1974), pp. 45-61.

 2Mancur Olson, The Logic.

 3Benedict Stavis, Rural Local Governance and Agricultural Development
in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell Rural Development Committee, 1974).