It is remarkably easy to establish a group that lacks internal

cohesion. A group may be composed of people living in a particular

locality or along a river, or road. The size of the group may be ar-

bitrarily fixed according to the number of people likely to be served by

a warehouse, or according to the ideal economies of scale for a cattle

dip, tube well, or for farm credit. In such a case, it may be that the

indigenous patterns of social interaction and trust -- kinship, friendship, temple

membership, tool sharing groups, voluntary credit or funeral societies,

political factions, etc. -- may not be congruent with, and may be com-

pletely unrelated to the lines of delineation which seem rational to ad-

ministrators concerned with fertilizer, irrigation, range land management,

or animal health. They may accidently throw together into a group people

who are strangers, or who have been feuding for generations. Naturally,

such a group will not function in the desired manner.

 Another problem occurs in hierarchical societies characterized

by extreme inequality and strong patron-client relationships. In such

a situation the social inequalities will probably shape the character of

the group. The powerful patrons or their representative will dominate the

group and use its resources to reinforce their positions. Information,

credit, inputs, and other resources expected to spread throughout the group

are likely to be commandeered by the rich and powerful. The group becomes

a new locus of profit, control, and corruption. These problems are, of

course, reinforced by the general tendency of power to concentrate in the

hands of leaders and organizers of groups -- the "iron law of oligarchy"

described by Michels. When all these factors are combined it is not in-

frequent that groups really become tools of exploitation for the rich,
and that the poor prefer to avoid the groups, whenever possible.