plots, developing insights of interest to their professional colleagues

in universities and international research centers. This seems the most

promising strategy for higher professional, social, and economic status.

In contrast, conducting extensive on-farm trials, spending much time traveling

in the field, and talking with extension agents and farmers is less attrac-

tive to scientists and may present a serious role conflict.1

 Coordination and feedback between research and extension is also

related to the level of basic physical and institutional infrastructure.

Agricultural scientists often feel their job is done when they have

developed a superior seed variety, or ascertained that a particular

chemical can deal with particular pest. Extension agents may be eager

to popularize the seed or chemical. But thetaskof multiplying the seeds

or manufacturing or importing the chemicals is not done by either the research

or extension organization. It can easily be overlooked or mismanaged, with

the result that researchers are annoyed that their suggestions are not being

adopted, while extension agents are frustrated that they are not getting

inputs from research.
 There is much room for experimentation and innovation with regard

to policies that can maximize scientists' receptivity to feedback. A

general value system and specific incentives which support and reward

scientists who orient themselves towards farmers may be useful. The

challenge is to do this without cutting a country off from international

scientific exchanges--which tend to stimulate and reward scientific

excellence and simultaneously break feedback loops with farmers.




 Swanson, "Coordinating Reasearch . .," p. 10.