organization. This heightens their ability to exchange information

and feedback in both directions. An individual with such a dual role

can be considered a "linking-pin," as he links two organizations.1

 In practice, the precise balance between central and local

control will change as some problems are reduced and others appear

more pressing. An example of the types of changes that are needed

can be seen in the farmers' associations of Taiwan. To assure that

they were controlled by farmers, the general manager of each local

association had been elected by the association's board of directors.

However, this election process became entangled in local factional

politics. When one faction controlled a farmers' association, it

tended to divert benefits to its members; members of other factions

were reluctant to participate. To reduce these problems the govern-

ment decided in 1974 to appoint directly the general managers of

local farmers' associations. This "solution" will, of course,

eventually recreate the original problems of excessive centraliza-

tion, and at that time, perhaps a new "solution" will be needed.

 If extension systems are expected to serve the rural poor,

perhaps the most important factor in the centralization-decentrali-

zation issue is a political analysis of the balance of forces at

central and local levels. If the central political system has

important political reasons to improve the conditions of the rural

poor, and if the local political systems are highly inegalitarian,

then a more centralized system may serve the rural poor better. If


 Allen Jedlicka, Organization for Rural Development, pp.
98-108.