40
 Nevertheless, the program had some successes also. Some smaller

 farmers were able to buy tube wells, and many landless and near landless

 were able to get into dairying, for which land ownership is not a pre-

 requisite.

 2. Decentralization

 To guard against the dangers of centralized programs, many writers
 advocate that extension systems be decentralized and controlled directly
 by farmers. The logic of the decentralized system is that it will assure
 that extension programs fit more accurately local needs, perceptions,
 values, knowledge, and natural conditions. It is less likely to be
 controlled by urban or bureaucratic needs.

 There are several examples of such organizations. In most

 states of the United States, county level farmers' organizations have a

 major influence on the hiring, firing, and salaries of county extension

 agents. In Taiwan, extension agents are hired by township farmers'.associa-

 tions. Their salaries are directly related to the profitability of the

 farmers' associations, and this is somewhat (but not entirely) related

 to productivity of agriculture in the township.1 Thus, the agent is

 presumed to have a strong incentive towards helping to increase local

 farm productivity. In Finland, township councils control extension work.

 In mainland China also, people who perform an extension function are hired

 directly by communes and brigades. In Israel, farmers' representatives

 make up an advisory board which reviews the annual work plan of the

 extension system. In all these cases, there may be central guidelines

 concerning salaries, educational qualifications, etc., but farmers and


 Benedict Stavis, Rural Local Governance and Agricultural
Development in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell Rural Development Committee,
1974), p. 93.
 2
 Raanan Weitz and Arshalom Rokach, Agricultural Development:
Planning and Implementation, An Israeli Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1968),
pp. 391-392.