3.
with $50,000,000, and Somalia with $20,000,000. 1 don't think it has a thing to do with any really genuine affection that the U.S. has for the Kenyans or the Somalis or the Sudanese. It has everything to do with what those governments have done in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Brezinskiand some of the people of old as well as the people of new, tend to perceive the world as a great chess board at which there are only two players, the Soviet Union and the United States. The rest of those little nations are merely pieces on the board to be moved around at will by them. I think in the final analysis it's a terribly disastrous policy. It grows out of a kind of western arrogance that is fed by western racism. We see countries but we don't see people in them. And we don't pay much attention to the objectives of these countries and what they want to do. And when you reduce countries and people in them to a subhuman status, then you don't understand what's going on in them, and when the governments get toppled that you installed, you're surprised. We were surprised by Iran. We are surprised by a lot of things. Kissinger said that the whites in Rhodesia and Mozambique and Angola would be there to stay in control, and I think perhaps before the statement was out of memory, all three white regimes fell apart. We don't have the sort of sensitivity to help us to understand what's going on in countries, and I think that's a major U.S. failing in foreign policy. It has gotten us in the position sometimes out of which we just don't know how to get.
For instance, U.S. foreign policy officials concede and admit that the CIA installed Mobutu in Zaire. We installed him in the same way we installed the Shah of Iran, and we've maintained him in the same way, and we know that a good percentage of our foreign assistance dollars to Mobutu ends up in a numbered bank account in Switzerland. That is the price you pay to keep governments on a tether. But in the final analysis, if governments are not responsive to the interests of their constituencies, those governments fall. Often times they fall on the U.S. as they did in Iran. And you get yourself in an embarrassing situation, as policy makers admit. For instance, where should we go in Zaire? You see, you can't take Mobutu out. If he falls, what is there to put in his place? I mean, there's always the thing about trying to engineer other governments. And it demonstrates sometimes how much we cherish democratic institutions at home, but how really little regard we have for democracy when it comes to notions of self-determination in other countries around the world.
I think this takes us to the situation in southern Africa. And I think
it's here that the Carter administration, against the tradition of U.S. foreign policy, deserves some fairly high marks especially on Zimbabwe and on Namibia. On South Africa, the Carter team did not do well. I think what the Carter administration did not sell well was the tremendous victory they got, together with the British, in Zimbabwe by holding the sanctions and keeping the pressure on until a formula was found to bring about a government that's representative, free, democratic, and led by the people who really made the fight there to win freedom for that country. And what it has resulted in is a government that still has good relations with the U.S., a government that this country needed to have good relations with. The same thing is true for Namibia. I think Andy Young and Don McHenry and President Carter deserve some credit for the carefully crafted four-year process of establishing the western power plan for democratic elections in Namibia. And one had hoped that that country would