16 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [19 January, 1956,
Against this decision the present appeal has been brought, on the following grounds:—

(1) That the learned Judge misdirected himself and was wrong in law in holding that the
Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, was bound by the decisions of Cools-Lartigue, J., given
in the cases of Christian vs. [Hill (Leeward Islands Gazette of 13th March, 1947 at page
97) and Osborne vs. Silcott (Leeward Islands Gazette of 10th April, 1947, at page 121)
for the following reasons—

(a) The learned Judge was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal for
the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands in the case of Maude Thibou and Arthur
J. Bowery (Leeward Islands Gazetie of 8th February, 1951 at page 38) affirming a
Judgment of the Acting Chief Justice, sitting in the Supreme Court in its appellate
jurisdiction dismissing an appeal from a conviction and sentence of a fine of £50 and
in default of payment thereof impriconment for three months with hard labour made
under section 23 of the Licensing Act, 1879, as amended;

(6) It was not brought to the notice of Cools-Lartigue, J., (whose decisions in
the cases in question were based on the English cases of In Re Brown (1878) 3
Q.B.D. 545 and In Re Clew (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 511 that there was no provision in
the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act (Cap. 61) or in the Licensing Act, 1879,
analogous to sections 16 and 19 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12
Vict. c. 43) which authorises the issue of a warrant of distress in the first instance on
conviction for an offence where the Statute creating that offence provides no mode of
levying the penalty ;

(c) That in view of ground (1) (0) the learned Jucige could not otherwise than
be satisfied that the said decisions of Cools-Lartigue J. were given per incuriam, and
consequently he was wrong in law in holding that he was bound by the said
decisions;

(d) That the learned Judge erred in not stating what was the ratio decidend? in
the cases of Brown and Clew which had made him come to the conclusion, after close
examination of the cases, that he was bound to follow the decisions of Cools-
Lartigue, J.

(2) That, if it should be held that the learned Judge was bound by the aforesaid decisions of
Cools-Lartigue, J., the said decisions and/or the judgment of the learned Judge appealed
from are wrong in law in so far as it was thereby expressly or impliedly held that, by
virtue of the provisions of section 61(1) of the Licensing Act, 1879, or of any other ~
provision or decision, prior to ordering imprisonment in default of payment of a penalty
under section 23 of the said Act, as amended, the Court must first order a distress to be
made; for the reasons stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of ground (1) and for the
following reasons:—

(a) the judgment of the Magistrate was in accordance with the provisions of
section 120 of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act;

(b) the said provisions of section 61.of the Licensing Act, 1879 were impliedly
repealed by section 120 of the Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act, 1891 (now .
chapter 61 of the Revised Federal Acts of the Leeward Islands);

(c) the said provisions of section 61 of the Licensing Act, 1879 are, by virtue
of section 11(2) of the Leeward Islands Act 1871 to 1950, void for repugnancy to
the provisions of section 120 of the said Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act.”

The respondent filed a cross-appeal urging that the learned Judge was wrong in law in holding
that it was open to the Magistrate to convict the respondent of the offence of keeping liquor for sale
since her husband and herself were occupying the premises where the rum was kept and her husband
was convicted of the offence of keeping the liquor for sale at the same premises.

At the hearing the learned Crown Attorney argued only grounds l(a), 2(b) and 2(c) as set
out in the Notice of Appeal.

Mr. Christian, who appeared for the respondent, took an objection in imine that the Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. He submitted that section 14(1) (d) of the Leeward Islands and
Windward Islands Courts Order in Coungil, 1939, as amended by 8. R. & O. No. 7 of 1941, referred to
in the notice of appeal, applied only to civil appeals, and also that sections 196 and 197 of the
Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act (Cap. 61) as replaced by section 4 of the Magistrate's Code of
Procedure Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1946, which give to a party aggrieved a right of appeal to this
Court, and to this Court jurisdiction to hear the appeal, did not apply to the Crown, since the Crown
was not a party aggrieved.