Notices, It igs hereby notified for general , information that His Excellency the Governor has issued a Commission to » the Hon. P. D. MACDONALD, C.M.G., appointing him to be Governor’s Deputy during his absence from Antigua whilst visiting Montserrat 5 from the 12th to the 17th January, 1956. The Secretarial, Antigua. 9th January, 1956. 13/00283 ’ In pursuance of the powers con- ferred upon him by Section 3 (2) of the Antibiotics and Therapeutics Substances Act, 1950, No. 9 of 1950, and Section 29 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1955, No. 12 of 1955, the Governor has appointed the Senior Medical Officer, Antigua, to be the Licensing Authority in the Presidency of Antigua for the purposes of the Antibiotics and The- rapeutic Substances Act, 1950, as from the 12th January, 1956. The Secretartat, Antigua. 6th January, 1956. 51/00102. It is hereby notified that Mr.S. E. ‘MERCIER has been appointed to be a Justice of the Peace in and for the Presidency of Antigua. Colonial Secretary's Office, Leeward Islands. Sth January, 1956. 43/00005,. It ig notified for general informa- tion that the tender for the supply of 5,000 half-bags of flour for the month of February, 1956, has been awarded to Megsrs. 8. R. MENDES Ltd. Agents for the St. Lawrence Flour Mills Co. Ltd. of Montreal, Canada, in respect of the Daily Bread brand of flour at $4.56 (Can.) . per bag C. I. F. Antigua. Administrator's Office, Antigua. / 5th January, 1956. x VOL. LXXXIV. AAW ARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. ublished by Authority. Ae lzTH JANUARY, 1956. . No. 3. It igs notified for general informa- tion that the Reports of the British Caribbean Pre-Federal Commissions have been released for publication on the 2nd January, 1956. 2. Copies of the Reports are available on sale at the office of His Honour the Administrator in Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and the Commissioner of Montserrat at the following prices:— Pre-Federal Fiscal Commission Report— 72 cents; Pre-Federal Civil Service Commis- sion Report— 72 cents; Pre-Federal Judicial Commission Report— 36 cents. Administrator's Office, Antigua. 2nd January, 1956. C. 18/00038. Application for Naturalization as a British Subject. Notice is hereby given that AN- THONY JOSEPH EID of George Street, Plymouth, Montserrat, is applying to the Governor for naturalization, and that any person who knows any reason why naturalization should not be granted, should send a written and signed statement of the facts to the Commissioner of Montserrat on or before the 3lst January, 1956. By Order, Js. H. CARROTT, Ohief Clerk. Commissioner’s Office, Plymouth, Moniserrat. 22nd December. 1955. OONFIRMATION No. 4. The Secretary of State for the Colonies has informed the Governor that the power of disallowance will not be exercised in respect of the undermentioned Ordinances:— OF ORDINANCES, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla. No. 5 of 1955, “The Liquor Licence (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955.” No. 11 of 1955, “The Factories Ordinance, 1955.” BrE.7>Fr CYF7 KX No. 5. The Governor has, this day, been pleased to assent to the undermen- tioned Ordinances:— Montserrat. No. 10 of 1955, ‘The Prisons Ordinance, 1955.” Jan. 7 Virgin Islands. No. 13 of 1955, ‘“‘ The Interpreta- tion of Laws (Amendment) Ordi- nance, 1955.” Dec, 30, 1955 No. 6. The following Ordinance, Statutory Rules and Orders and Public Service Commission Instructions, Antigua, 1956, are circulated with this Gazette and form part thereof: — ORDINANCE. Virgin Islands. No. 9 of 1955, ‘“‘“The Protection of Trees und Conservation of Soil and Water (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955. 3 pp. Price 5 cents. STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS. General Government. No. 1 of 1956, ‘The Leeward Islands Federal Executive Council (Cessation) Order, 1956. 1 pp. Price 3 cents. No. 2 of 1956, ‘The Pensionable Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956.” 1 pp. Price 3 cents Antigua. No. 4 of 1956, ‘‘ The Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956.” 5 pp. Price 8 cents “The Public Service Commission Instructions, Antigua, 1956. 9 pp. Price 15 cents Saint Christopher Nevis & Anguilla. No. 5 of 1956, “‘ Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into operation the Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla Constitution and Elec- tions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956.” 1 pp Price 3 cents No. 6 of 1956, “ Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into operation the Public Service Com- mission Ordinance, 1956. 1 pp. Price 3 cents MONTSERRAT. LEEWARD ISLANDS. THE LAND sean enn AC (No. 11 of 1944). DECLARATION Declaration dated December 21, 1955, made under section 3 of the 8 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. Land Acquisition Act, 1944 (No. 11 of 1944) for the acquisition of certain lots of land in the Presidency of Montserrat required for public pur- poses. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the Governor in Council with the approval of the Legislative Council of the Presidency of Montserrat con- siders that the lots of land described in the Schedule hereto, being portions of Trants Estate situate in the parish of Saint George, in the said Presi- dency, should be acquired for public purposes, namely, for the erection of an airfield in the said Presidency, for the construction of an approach road to the said airfield, and for the erection of the necessary air port buildings. / SCHEDULE. Lot 1. ALL that lot piece or parcel of land being a portion of Trants Estate situate in the parish of Saint George in the Presidency of Montserrat and containing by estimation 17.22 acres and measuring and bounded on the north-west side, measuring 3,000 feet and bounded thereon by lands of the said T'rants Estate, on the south-west measuring 250 feet and bounded by the sea, on the south-west measuring 3,000 feet and bounded by lands of the said Trants Estate and on the north-west measuring 250 feet and bounded by lands of the said Trants Estate, or howsoever otherwise the same may be abutted, bounded, known, distinguished or described. Lot 2. ALL that lot piece or parcel of land being a portion of Trants Estate situate in the parish of Saint George in the Presidency of Montserrat and containing by estimation 1.06 acres and measuring and bounded on the north-east 356 feet and bounded thereon by lands of Trants Estate, on the west measuring 400 feet and bounded by lands of the said Trants Estate and on the sonth-west measur- ing 260 feet and bounded by lands of the said Trants Estate, or howsoever otherwise the same may be abutted, bounded, known, distinguished or described. Lot 3. ALL that lot piece or parcel of land being a portion of Trants Estate situate in the parish of Saint George in the Presidency of Montserrat and containing by estimation 0.86 acres and measuring and bounded from the main public road known as Trants Byway 1315 feet long and 20 feet wide bearing 75 degrees to an exist- ing windbreak, and thon 563 feet and 20 feet wide to Lot 2. This road is bounded on both sides of its entire length by the lands of the said Trants Estate, or howsoever the same may be abutted, bounded, known, distin- guished or described. Js. H. CARROTT, Clerk to the Legislative Council. Ref. Ne, 7/00123. TRADE MARKS OFFICE, ANTIGUA, 29th December, 1955. THE ARBORITE COMPANY LIMITED of 385 Lafleur Avenue, Town of LaSalle, Province of Quebec, Canada, have applied for Registration of one Trade Mark consisting of the following :— ARBORITE in Class 17, that ig to say:— Decora- tive surfacing panels for surfacing walls or other surfaces such as counter or table tops, or other articles of furniture. The Applicants claim that they have used the said Trade Mark in respect of the said goods for six years before the date of their said Application. Any person may within three months from the date of the first appearance of this Advertisement in the Leeward Islands Gazette, give notice in duplicate at the Trade Marks Office, Antigua, of opposition to registration of the said Trade Mark. CECIL O. BYRON, Acting Registrar of Trade Marks. In the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands. ANTIGUA CIRCUIT. A.D. 1956. Notice is hereby given that in pur- suance of Rules made by the Chief Justice under Section 16 of the Wind- ward Islands and Leeward Islands (Courts) Order in Council, 1939, and duly approved as therein provided on the 16th day of October A.D. 1941, the Honourable the Puisne Judge selected for the sitting of the Court in the Antigua Circuit has appointed the day of the month on which the ensuing Circuit Court shall git as follows, that is to say:— The Antigua Circuit on Monday the 30th January, 1956, at 10 o’clock in the forenoon. Dated the 6th day of January, 1956. CECIL O. BYRON, Acting Registrar of the Supreme Court. INCOME TAX NOTICE. The Income Tax Ordinance No. 7 of 1945 (as amended). PUBLIC OFFICERS AND PENSIONERS. Any public officer or pensioner liable to pay income tax whose income including that of his wife consists solely of his and/or her emoluments as a public officer or pensioner or other allowance from [12 January, 1956. public funds, shall deliver a true and correct return of his whole income to the Commissioners not later than the 3lst day of January, 1956. (Section 67 and 8. R. & O. 1946, No. 13). OTHER PERSONS. Every person (including a com- pany) liable to pay income tax shall deliver atrue and correct return of hig whole income not later than the 31st day of March, 1956 (Section 67 and 8. R. & O. 1946, No. 13). AGENTS, TRUSTEES, ETC. Any person haying the direction,. control or management of any property or concern, or being in receipt of income; on behalf of any person, whether resident or non- resident, as attorney, factor, agent, trustee, curator or committee should make and deliver to the Commissioners a return in respect of such property, concern or income not later than the 3lst day of March, 1956. (Sections 28 and 29). GENERAL. Any person may be considered to be “liable to pay income tax” if his income from all sources exceeds one hundred and twelve pounds ($537.60). All claimg for deduction from income tax must Fe substantiated by the production of receipts or other bona fide evidence. PENALTIES. Any person liable to pay income tax who fails to make or deliver a return within the prescribed period shall be guilty of an offence against this Ordinance and shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceed- ing one hundred pounds, and in default of payment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months. Section 68. Any person who makes or delivers a false return or keeps or prepares any false accounts or particulars concerning any income on which tax is payable shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds, or to imprison- ment with or without hard labour for a term-not exceeding six months. (Section 64). E. G. O. M. BERRIDGE, for the Commisstoners. RAINFALL FIGURES. Centra] Experiment Station, Antigua. Month. 1952, 1953. 1954, 1055, 1956. Jan.to 7th .30 64 92 186 3.64 » 12 January, 1956.] THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. | 9 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS. APPELATE JURISDICTION. Between:— Ivan Epwarpbs Appellant. vs. JosePpH E. Byron Inspector of Police Respondent. 1954. No. 1—ANTIGUA. Before:— JACKSON C.J. GORDON J. LEWIS J. (Acting) 1955. December 12, 15. Mr. S. T. Crristian for the appellant. Mr. R. H. Lockgarrt for the respondent. JUDGMENT. This appeal is from a judgment and order of Date, J., affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Magistrate, District A, on a charge that he on the 18th May, 1953, being the driver of a motor car when abont to stop did fail to draw up us close as possible to the side of the road so as to allow aclear roadway for passing traffic contrary to Reg. 19 (11) of the Vehicles and Road Traffic Regulations 1946. The charge arose out of a collision in Market Street on the 18th May, 1953, between two vehicles, motor car A.G. 808 driven by the appellant in a southerly direction and motor truck A.G. 159 driven by one Ernest Joseph in the opposite direction. Ernest Joseph was charged with driving without due care and attention under Sec. 53 of the Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance 1946. Both cases were heard together by consent of the parties. At the close of the case for the prosecution, after a submission by Counsel for the appellant, that there was no case to answer, had been overruled, the defendant Ernest Joseph gave evidence. The appellant, relying on the submission made earlier, declined to give any evidence and was convicted and fined $5.00 or 14 days Hard Labour. In his judgment the learned Judge adopted the findings of fact by the Magistrate which, inter alia were as follows:— (i) In the position where vehicle A.G. 808 stopped there was a space of 7ft. between the left front wheel and the Bast kerb of Market Street and a space of 7ft. 10 inches between the left rear wheel and the East kerb. (ii) That there was no evidence that at the time of stopping, there was any reason why A.G. 808 could not have pulled up next to its left hand kerb instead of 7ft. away from it. (iii) That A.G. 808 came to a halt just before the collision 1.e. that when the front of A.G. 159 passed the front of A.G. 808 the latter was at a standstill. It is clear from the reasons given by the Magistrate that the conviction was based on the fact as found by him that the appellant stopped his car Just before the other vehicle reached him. In arriving at this conclusion he relied on the evidence of Sgi. Roberts and James Dor. It would appear that the learned Judge was also of the opinion that the evidence established a prima facie case against the appellant and accordingly dismissed the appeal. A close examination however reveals that the evidence of Sgt. Roberts and Dor does not lend support to the conclusion at which the Magistrate arrived. Whether the appellant’s car stopped before or after the two vehicles came into contact, is a vital point in the case. 10 THE LEEWARD ISLANDS GAZETTE. [12 January, 1956, Sgt. Roberts in his evidence stated that in the course of his investigations on the spot immediately after the accident, that both the appellant and the other defendant told him that the vehicles collided in passing. James Dor in his examination in chief stuted ....... “As they came together Edwards (appellant) stopped, truck went on—I called on Goodwin and I saw truck hit against car. When cur stopped I saw the driver looking in shop........ The head of the truck had passed the head of the car before the car stopped.” The sworn statement of Goodwin, another witness for the prosecution, that when the appellant’s car stopped the truck was about 30 ft. away, was contradicted by the witness Dor and the Magistrate appears quite rightly to have disregurded Goodwin's evidence on this point. The accepted evidence shows that the appellants’s car stopped after the two vehicles had come into contact. In these circumsances, if the appellant is guilty of an offence it would incline more to that of driving without due care and attention than to the offence of which he has been convicted. In this appeal the notes of evidence sent up by the Magistrate omitted the evidence led for the Defence in the case against Joseph. We wish to emphasise that in cases where persons are tried together the whole of the evidence has to be considered on the appeal and should form part of the record. The appeal is allowed the Judgment and Order of the learned Judge reversed and the conviction and sentence set aside. The appellant shall have his costs here and in the Courts below fixed at twenty guineas. Donatp Jackson. Chief Justice. K. L. Gorpon, Puisne3 Judge. A, M. Lewis, Acting Puisne Judge. 15th December, 1955. ANTIGUA. Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islunds, by Z, M, BLACKMAN, Government Printer —By Authority, 1956 [Price 64 cents including Supplement.} Supplement to the Leeward Islands Gazette Of Thursday, the 12th of January, 1956. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS. ANTIGUA CIRCUIT. Suit No. 45/1955. Between: JoserpH Rrynorp O’Nkeat and GERTRUDE O’NEAL and Vere Cornwati Birp Epmunp Hawkins Laker NoveiLe Ricwarps Ernest WILitAmMs Brapiry Carrorr Joun IrELAND Levi JOsErH JOSEPH SAMUEL and Lionri Hurst Before:— DATE, J. Plaintiffs. Defendants. HY. ee K. E. Harney and H. L. Haryry for plaintiffs. i. Barrow for defendants. JUDGMENT. The two plaintiffs carry on business in part- nership under the name of O’Neal’s Drug Store at the corner of Long and Thames Streets in the City of St. John; in the adjacent building, at the corner of High and Thames Streets, the plaintitf Gertrude O’Neal also runs a curio shop. All the defendants, with the exception of Joseph Samuel, are members of the Executive Committee of The Antigua Trades and Labour Union, a union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1939. The plaintiffs’ Indorsement of Claim is for (1) an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from unlawfully watching and besetting the business places of the plaintiffs; (2) damages for injury to the plaintiffs’ trade by conspiracy in pursuance of which unlawful means were used. Before coming to the other pleadings I will set out a general history of the case to provide the appropriate background to the issues which have now been joined between the parties to this suit. In May 1949 one Avery] Winter was employ- ed as a clerk at the Drug Store on a weekly basis. She continued working there until Saturday 11th June, 1955, when she was summarily dismissed by the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal and paid one week's wages in lieu of notice; no reason was given for the dismissal. Sunday 12th June was, of course, a dies non. On Monday 13th June the defendant Ireland, a Field Officer of The Antigua Trades & Labour Union of which Miss Winter is a Member, went to Miss O’Neal and asked for the reasons for Miss Winter’s dismissal. Miss O’Neal refused to give any. Thereupon, according to Miss O’Neal, Mr. Ireland demanded one year’s pay for Miss Winter, and this also was refused. Representations were then made by the Union to the Labour Commissioner of Antigua about Miss Winter’s dismissal, and conciliation meetings under his chairmanship were held at the Labour Department between representatives of the Drug Store and representatives of the Union on 28rd June and 7th July. At both meetings the Union’s representatives asked for the reinstate- ment of Miss Winter. The representatives of the Drug Store said that in dismissing Miss Winter without giving reasons and paying her a week’s wages in lieu of notice they were acting within their legal rights, and that they were not prepared to consider the claim for reinstatement. At the second meeting a written undertaking was signed by Miss Winter to the effect that nothing said there would be used by her in any case of slander or libel; the representatives of the Drug Store then stated five reasons which they said were the only reasons for the dismissal. These were examined and severely criticized by the Union’s, representatives, who expressed the view that they proved nothing against Miss Winter and did not justify her dismissal. As the representatives of the Drug Store persisted in their refusal to reinstate Miss Winter, the Chairman inquired whether they would be prepared to consider settling the matter on a basis other than reinstate- ment, to which they replied in the negative. The voluntary negotiations having broken down, the Union approached Government for the appointment of a Board of Inquiry under the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act, 1939, section 8 (1) of which reads thus: “8 (1) Where any trade dispute exists or is apprehended the Governor may, whether or not the dispute is reported to him under this Act, inquire into the causes and circum- stances of the dispute, and, if he thinks fit, refer any matter appearing to him to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Board of Inquiry (hereinafter referred to as the Board) appointed by him for the purpose of such reference, and the Board shall inquire into the matters referred to it and report thereon to the Governor. ” By instrument dated 16th August, 1955, the then Acting Governor of the Leeward Islands appointed a Board of Inquiry “to inquire into the causes of the dispute that arose over the dismissal of Miss Averyl Winter by the proprietors of O’Neals’ Drug Store, St. John’s, and to report there- on to the Governor and to submit to him such con- clusions, recommendations and observations as the Board sees fit.” At the Inquiry, which was held on 24th August, Mr. E. E. Harney, representing the plaintiffs, submitted in limine that there was no trade dispute between Miss Winter and the Drug Store and that the appointment of the Board was, consequently, invalid. The gist of his contention was that the relationship of employer and employee had been legally terminated by the giving of a week’s wages to Miss Winter in lien of notice, and that there could therefore be no trade dispute within the meaning of the Act under which the Board was operating. The Board ruled that “the terms of reference contained in the instrument dated 16th August 1955 which gave the Board its validity showed prima facie that there was a trade dispute existing between the proprietors of O’Neals Drug Store and Miss Averyl Winter and therefore the Board had full power and authority to inquire into the dispute.” At this stage Mr. Harney sought and was granted permission to withdraw from the Inquiry, and the plaintiffs took no further part in the proceedings, but the minutes of the meetings at the Labour Department, which contained inter alia the reasons given by Miss O'Neal for the dismissal of Miss Winter, were produced in evidence and closely examined. In its report submitted to the Acting, Governor on 31st August, 1955, the Board, after setting out its findings, expressed the opinion that there was no moral justification for the dismissal of Miss Winter 2 and, using “ asa norm one of the accepted principles of good industrial relations, that is the principle of mutual respect and tolerance of human rights between employer and workman”’, recommended that the proprietors of the Drug Store be asked to pay her a sum equivalent to thirteen weeks’ wages “as a compensation for her dismissal.” Under cover of a letter from the Administrator of Antigua dated 6th September, 1955, a copy of the Report was sent to Mr. Harney for the information of his clients and himself “and such action with the view to a settlement of the dispute as may be deemed advisable.” In the letter the Administrator also informed Mr. Harney and his clients that the Acting Governor agreed generally with the recommendations of the Board. The plaintiffs ignored this communication, and on 16th September the Administrator caused the Report to be published in the local press. The following day the plaintiffs’ business premises were picketed. The pickets are still there This would, I think, be a convenient stage to set out paragraphs 5 to 10 (the most important paragraphs) of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim dated 21st October, 1955:— “5. The first seven named and the last named defendants and each of them wrongfully and maliciously conspired and combined amongst themselves (with intent to injure the plaintiffs and thereby compel them to submit to the demand of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union to pay compensation to one Avery] Winter a former clerk in O’Neal’s Drug Store who had recently been lawfully dismissed from her employment by the plaintiffs) wrong- fully and without legal authority to watch and beset or cause or procure to be watched and beset the said business places of the plaintiffs and the approaches and entrances thereto in such manner as was calculated to intimidate customers and prospective purchasers. 6. In furtherance and execution of their said conspiracy and combination the said first seven named and the last named defendants and each of them wrongfully and without legal authority caused or procured the defendant Joseph Samuel and other persons to the num- ber of 12 or thereabouts (hereinafter referred to as the pickets) wrongfully and without legal authority to watch and beset the said business places of the plaintiffs daily from the 17th day of September, 1955, in such a manner as is calculated to intimidate customers and prospec- tive purchasers and to obstruct the approaches thereto. The first seven named and the last. named defendants and each of them in acting as in this paragraph stated acted for the pur- pose of intimidating and preventing customers and prospective purchasers from entering the said business places and purchasing therein. 7. The first seven named and the last named defendants on several occasions on the 17th day of September, 1955, and on divers other occasions thereafter attended outside the said business places of the plaintiffs or in the vicinity thereof and gave encouragement to the said pickets. 8. The defendant Levi Joseph and the pickets have by threats and acts of violence and intimidation and coercion prevented divers customers and prospective purchasers from entering the said business places and pur- chasing therein. : PARTICULARS. (1) On the 17th day of September, 1943, the defendant Levi Joseph led a steel band and a number of pickets carrying placards:to the said business places of the plaintiffs and surrounded same blocking the approaches and entrances thereto and shouting in a threatening manner to per- sons who attempted to enter the said business places ‘* Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store, A strike is on.” (2) On the said 17th day of September, 1955, and on several days thereafter the defendant Joseph Samuel who is well known to the general public as a local constable paraded up and down outside the said business places ringing a bell and shouting “ Dont buy froin O’Neal’s Drug Store people. You no hear you no foo buy from this Drug Store.” And when people asked why not ? defendant Samuel told them that the police will lock them up. (3) The said defendant Joseph Samuel on the 19th day of September, 1955, assaulted a person whose name is un- known who was attempting to enter one of the business places for the purpose of purchasing therein, (4) The said pickets carrying flags and pla- - cards with slogans such as ‘‘ Hold the line the workers security is challenged ” written thereon attend daily around the said business places and in a menacing and threatening manner surround and obstruct persons especially old men women and children who attempt to enter the said business places shouting at them ‘ Hold the Line.” (5) The defendant Levi Joseph on the morning of the 24th September, 1955, and other pickets conducted themselves in a boisterous and disorderly manner marching up and down in front of the said business places shouting ‘“ Hold the line” —“ Dont buy from this Drug Store, Workers must be respected.” 9. In the alternative the defendants and each of them wrongfully and maliciously cons- pired with intent to injure the plaintiffs to create a nuisance and did in pursuance of their conspiracy create a nuisance by the con- tinuous shouts and other noises of the pickets and by obstructing the approaches to the said business places of the plaintiffs thereby seriously interfering with the comfort of the plaintiffs and the ordinary enjoyment of the said premises by them. 10. By reason of the premises the plaintiffs have suffered damage—Loss_ esti- mated at $500.00 up to this date has thereby been incurred. The plaintiffs claim against the defendants and each of them: (1) Damages (2) An injunction restraining the defendants their servants and agents from unlaw- fully watching and besetting the business places of the plaintiffs.” The Defence filed denies any tortious acts on the part of any of the defendants and continues as follows:— 6b Dina sis ab ateemtetetieleciela’s eis gene ibinesleses oe ewe ese casas Tee errr rrr rere errr rrr rere ere errr eee ccceresccce If any of the defendants or any other person did any of the acts complained of in the Statement of Claim and_ particularly in paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive thereof in pursu- ance of any conspiracy or unlawful purpose or in any unlawful manner as alleged (which the plaintiffs do not admit) or at all then each and every defendant for himself denies that such acts if any were done with his knowledge or consent or that he authorised in any way or connived at the same. 9. A Trade Dispute has since the 11th day of June, 1955, existed between the Antigua Trades and Labour Union mentioned in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, and the plaintiffs. In furtherance and in respect of the said dispute the premises of the plain- tiffs have been picketed. Such picketing has been at all times carried out in a lawful and peaceful manner. None of the said pickets or other persons mentioned in paragraphs 6 to 9 inclusive of the Statement of Claim are the servants or agents of the defendants or any of them. If any of the pickets or persons so mentioned acted in any of the unlawful man- ners alleged (which is not admitted) the defendants deny that they or any of them authorised or connived at or consented to or permitted such acts to be done.” At the trial of this action Mr. E. E. Harney, for the plaintiffs, repeated his submission made to the Board of Inquiry as to the non-existence of any trade dispute within the legal meaning of that term. Both in our Trade Unions Act, 1939, and Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act, 1939, ‘trade dispute”’ is defined thus:— “trade dispute’? means any dispute or differ- ence between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of the employment, or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Mr. Harney conceded that the expression “non-employment ” in the definition embraced a dismissal, but argued that in order to constitute a trade dispute over a dismissal a dispute or differ- ence as to the dismissal must arise between the remaining employees and the employer, and not between the dismissed employee and the employer. In the present case there is no dispute or difference between the remaining employees (none of whom are members of the Union) and the plaintiffs. If Mr. Harney’s submission on this point is sound, the defendants would not be entitled to the benefit of sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Trade Unions Act, 1939, as amended, which apply only in the case of acts done in contemplation or fur- therance of a trade dispute. It is important therefore to determine whether or not a trade dispute exists. Should such a dispute be found to exist, it would then be necessary to consider the real effect of. sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Statute on the common law relating to conspiracy and nuisance. For the time being it is sufficient to observe that at common law a combination wilfully to injure, which results in damage to another, is, with certain qualifications, actionable (Sorrell v. Smith, 1925, A.C. 742; Corbett v. Canadian National Printing Trade Union, 1943, 4 D.L.R. 44), and that watching and besetting, if it result iu damayve may also be actionable as a nuisance, as an interference with the ordinary comfort of exist- ence and the enjoyment of premises (Lyons ¢ Sons v. Wilkins, 1899, 1 Ch. 255). As a starting point for his submission Mr. Harney adverted first of all to the United Kingdom legislation as contained in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (388 & 39 Vict., c. 86), the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 47), the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 69), and the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940 (S. R. & O. 1940, No. 1305); he drew attention to the absence of any definition of the expressions “ trade dispute ” or “workmen” in the 1875 Act, and to the significant difference between the definition of “workmen” in the 1906 Act and the definition of “workman ”’ in the 1919 Act and 1940 8. R. & O. In the 1906 Act ‘ workmen” is defined as meaning “all persons employed in trade or indus- try, whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade dispute arises”. In the 1919 Act and the 1940 5. R. & O. “ workman” is defined as meaning “any person who has centered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract be by way of manual Iibour, clerical work or otherwise, be expressed or implied, oral or in writing and whether it be a contract of service or of apprenticeship or 2 contract personally to execute any work or labour.” Mr. Harney next cited a number of cases to show the interpretations placed by the courts on the expressions “‘ workman” and “ trade dispute” prior to the 1906 Act and also in cases after the passing of the 1919 Act; he then submitted that the definitions of “trade dispute” and “ work- man” in the Leeward Islands legislation were the same us those in the United Kingdom Act of 1919 and S. R. & O. of 1940; he hoped in this way to find support for his proposition that if a dismissal is lawful (ie., if the period of notice required by law is given or payment in lieu thereof made) there can be no trade dispute over it between the dis- missed employee and the dismissing employer. The first observation which should be made on Mr. Harney’s submission is that while the definitions of “trade dispute” and “ workmen” in our Trads Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act, 1939, are substantially the same as the cor- responding definitions in the United Kingdom Act of 1919 and S.R.& O. of 1940, no similar definition of “workman” or “ workmen ” is to be found in our Trade Unions Act, 1989, which, for the purposes of the present proceedings, is the relevant Act. The definitions contained in our Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act, 1939, are expressly stated to be for the purposes of. that Act, and I am unaware of any authority, statutory or otherwise, for incorporating them into the Trade Unions Act, 1939, which is a separate Act altogether. The only definition of “ work- men” in the Trade Unions Act, 1989, is that the expression ‘includes labourers ’’. The differences in these particular statutory definitions do not of course have to be taken into account in considering the cases decided prior to the passing of the 1906 Act when there were no such statutory definitions, but even so I can find nothing in any of the cases cited by Mr. Harney (whether before or after 1906) which, in my Opinion, supports his broad legal proposition that a trade dispute cannot arise between a dismissed employee and his employer out of a dismissal in accordance with law. The cases on which he relied principally were Lyons v. Wilkins (1896) 1 Ch. 834, Quinn «. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495, Doran v. Lennon, (3945) LR. 815, and R. V. National Arbitration Tribunal, Lx Parte Horatio Crowther & Company Ltd., (1947) 2 All E.R. 693. Now, in Lyons v. Wilkins (supra) the defend- ants, officers of a Trade Union, after unsuccessfully attempting to induce the plaintiffs, who were leather bag and portmanteau manufacturers, to raise the wages of their work-people, ordered a strike against the plaintiffs and picketed their works. They also endeavoured to get one Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer for the plaintiffs, to cease to do work for the plaintiffs, and on failing to do so they ordered a strike of and picketed his works. The Court of Appeal held that the picketing of Schoenthal’s works and the strike against him for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiffs were illegal acts. A. DL. Smith L.J., at p. 834 of the report, said: ‘“Was there any trade dispute between Mr. Schoenthal’s workmen and himself? None at all What the Union did was not done in furtherance of a trade dispute between Schoenthal and his men; but what they did was to call out Mr. Schoenthal’s men in order to prevent him from working for Messrs Lyons, and thus to compel Mr. Schoenthal who was willing to work for Messrs. Lyons not to work for him, and by this means to injure Messrs. Lyons in their trade if they did not obey the edicts of the Union.” In Quinn v. Leathem (supra) the respondent, a flesher, carried on business in Lisburn, having as one of his constant customers Andrew Munse, who kept a butcher’s shop at Belfast; and the respond- ent had in his employ assistants who were not members of the trade union of which the appellant was treasurer. The members of the union amongst themselves adopted an unregistered rule that they would not work with non-union men nor would they cut up meat that came froma place where non-union hands were employed. After unsuccess- fully attempting to compel the respondent to employ none but union men, they compelled Munse to stop taking meat from the respondent under threat of calling out Munse’s men (who were members of the union) if Munse did not cease dealing with the respondent. Held: the words “trade dispute between employers and workmen” in section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, did not include a dispute on trade union matters between workmen who were members of a trade union and an employer of non-union workmen who refused to employ meinbers of a trade union. The facts and decision in Doran v. Lennon (supra) are summarised at pp. 476 and 477 of Citrine’s Trade Union Law as tollows:— “In Doran v. Lennon the plaintiffs were the owners of retail drapery shops and of 2 boot shop. Asa result of their refusal to pay statutory bonuses which the union claimed were payable to the drapery and boot employees, the union called a strike, giving inadequate notice and thus causing a breach of contract by the employees. The strike was settled after five days, but the terms of settlement did not cover the defendants, who were boot employees and to whom the plaintiffs maintained that the bonus Order did not apply. When the defendants presented them- selves for work the plaintiffs refused to reinstate them, on the ground that their employment had been terminated by the breach. Four months later the union, conceding that the bonus Order did not apply to the defendants, demanded their reinstatement. This was refused, but was repeated two months later. The request was again refused and the 5 defendants proceeded to picket the plain- tiffs’ premises. In an action by the plaintiffs for an injunction to restrain the defendants from ‘ watching or besetting’, Overend, J. held that there was no trade dispute and that the protection of the 1906 Act (sic) did not apply. He said: ‘If it were otherwise, then every employee of a commercial firm, who broke his contract and was dismissed for cause, would be entitled to picket his late master’s premises and yet claim the protection of the statute’.” We now come to Ex Parte Crowther and Co. Ltd. (supra) in which workmen employed by a company of chemical manufacturers through their trade union had for some time been pressing for changes in wages and conditions of service; the company always resisted these demands; then on 26th March, 1947, the company were told by their suppliers that their supplies of salt would be cut by 50%; on 28th March notice was given by the company to all workmen employed on the manu- facturing side of their business terminating their employment as from 4th April. No question arose as to this being in any way a notice otherwise than in accordance with the contracts of service and the men were discharged from the company’s service on 4th April. The matter was then reported to the Minister of Labour and he referred it to the National Arbitration Tribunal under the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, and they made an award. The company then moved for « certiorari to remove the award into the King’s Bench Division for the purpose of having it quashed. Lord Goddard, C.J., said:— “Tt was submitted by counsel for the company that as at the date of the reference due notice had been given to the workmen to terminate their employment and their employment had thereby been terminated, there could be no trade dispute to refer, because there could not be a dispute or difference on any subject between these employers and workmen as the workmen were not in the service of the employers, and he reinforced this argument by reference to the definition of “ workman” which he submitted contemplated an existing contract of service so, as he put it, that there must be some contract on which the reference could “ bite.” I cannot agree with that submission. If effect were given to it, it would mean that any employer, or, indeed, any workman, could nullify the whole provisions of the Order and the object of the regulation under which it was made by terminating the contract of service before a reference was ordered, or even after the matter was referred but before the trubunal considered it, It is, in my opinion, quite clear that there was here a trade dispute existing at any rate down to the date of the dismissal of the workmen. That is not in issue, and whether the workmen were discharged for the bona fide resson that supplies were cut down or whether they were discharged because the company ‘vere not willing to accede to their demands is, in my opinion, immaterial. If there was a trade dispute it can, in my opinion, be referred to the tribunal whether or not the dispute has resulted in workraen being dismissed or in their having discharged themselves. The object of the regulation is stated to be for preventing work being interrupted by trade disputes. If the em- ployer locked out his workmen with a view to obliging them to submit to the terms which he wished to impose or the workmen struck in an endeavour to secure their demands, there would be, undoubtedly, a trade dispute. True it is that, unless notice was given to the workmen on strike or who were locked out, the contract of service would not determine unless and until notice was given, but because dismissal is super- imposed on a dispute which has existed up to the moment of dismissal it does not seem to me to prevent the dispute being referred, because the dismissal of the workmen in no way settled the dispute which had hitherto existed. Supposing a dispute arose whether the workers in a particular industry or branch of an industry could be, as the employers contended, dismissed at an hour’s notice or whether they were entitled, as the workers contended, to a week’s notice. There you would have a dispute connected with the terms of employment. It appears to me clear that an employer could not avoid a reference by the Minister if the matter was reported to him by discharging his workmen and saying: “They are no longer in my service, whether I rightly or wrongly diamissed them.” If an employer discharges his work- men witheut proper notice, although the workmen would have an action tor wrongful dismissal, they are not from the moment of discharge in the employer’s service, but if the contention advanced by the employers in this case be right the question of what notice workers in this industry or this factory should be given could not be settled by the tribunal. In my opinion, there was here a dispute which the Minister could refer to the tribunal and on which the tribunal could adjudicate.” Each of these cases is, I think, easily dis- tinguishable from the case with which we are now dealing. In Lyons v. Wilkins thee was no dispute or difference between the person picketed and any of the people who were working or had worked for him. ‘The same can be said of Quinn v. Leathem. In Doran v. Lennon the circumstances were peculiar; the employees’ employment was terminated by their own wilful breach of contract, and the picketing that was started several months later was not in further- ance of the dispute which had caused the men to strike. Overend, J.’s dictum, quoted above, was Clearly limited to “every employee....... icv who broke his contract’? and was so dismissed for cause. In Le parte Crowther §& Co. Ltd. (which, incidentally, was also cited by Mr. Barrow, contra) a trade dispute was held to exist over differences between the employees and the company that arose long before and down to the date of the dismissal; it seems to me that Lord Goddard’s remarks were not intended to apply to a case such as this; if they were, they would, anyhow, have to be treated as obiter, in view of the issues then before the Court. “Tt is an abuse of authorities to extract from judgments general statements of the law made in relation to the facts and circumstances of particular cases and treat them as concluding cases in which the facts and circumstances are entirely different and which raise questions to which their authors were not directing their minds at all” (Martell v. Cousett Iron Company, 1955, 2 W.LR. 468, per Jenkins L.J). This same principle was emphasised by Lord Halsbury in one of the very cases cited by Mr. Harney— Quinn v. Leathem (supra)-—where he said, at p- 506 of the report, “every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found........... .a case is only authority for what it decides. | entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.” In the instant case, Miss Winter had served as a clerk at O’Neal’s Drug Store for six years; throughout that period the only leave sl.e had was two weeks; she was promised long leave early in 1955 but it. was postponed indefinitely by Miss Gertrude O’Neal owing to the latter’: illness, and the leave was never granted. When Miss Winter was being dismissed on 11th June, 1955, she was not given the opportunity of refuting or explaining any of the things which caused Miss O’Neal to be dissatisfied with her. As regards the failure to give Miss Winter reasons for dismissing her, Miss O’Neal admitted in evidence: ‘ There could have been a possibility that she could have gone to the Union; that is among my reasons for not communi- cating the matter to Miss Winter.” In the event, Miss Winter did go to the Union, and on the very next working day the Union’s representative visited Miss UO’ Neal and complained—about what ?— about a difference over nn act done by Miss O’Neal, as employer, against Miss Winter, as employee, on 11th June, when Miss Winter was yet at work, relative to her non-employment thereafter. Miss Winter cannot, in my opinion, be said to have acquiesced in what was done on 11th June, or to have forfeited any rights or claims, simply because she failed to protest or make a scence the moment Miss O’Neal spoke to her and handed her a week’s pay in lieu of notice; she is a member of a trade union and in such matters is entitled to be rep- resented by the union, which has, or ought to have, more knowledge than she about the rights, legal and otherwise, of employees. Miss O’Neal sub- sequently attended and took part in the conciliation meetings held at the Labour Department. I share the view expressed by Mr. Citrine at pp. 476 and 477 of his admirable little book on Trade Union Law, that the fact that a dismissal. may be lawful does not prevent a dispute over it from being a trade dispute, and that the legality or otherwise of the dismissal is no more an element for consideration than is the legality of an employer’s refusal to improve wages or working conditions in the normal type of trade dispute. The words “ whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade dispute arises”’ in the definition of “ workmen” in the 1906 U. K. Act—the signifi- cant absence of which from our Act formed the main plank of Mr. Harnev’s argument—relate, I think, to sympathetic action, that is to say, action in furtherance of a dispute not between the particular employer and his own workmen, but between the einployer and workmen elsewhere—e.g., where workmen consider their own interests threatened by something being done by another employer and strike against their own employer to bring pressure to hear upon that other employer. On the evidence before ine T find that at all times material to this action a trade dispute existed between the plaintiffs and Averyl Winter, repre- sented by the Antigua Trades & Labour Union. That being so, it becomes necessary to keep in mind the full provisions of sections 6A (2) and 7 of the Trade Unions Act, 1939, as amended. These sections read as follows:— 6A. (2) An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act if done without any such agree- ment or combination, would be actionable. 7. It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carrics on business or hnppens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working. The classical definition of conspiracy is given by Willes J. in Mulcahy v. R. (1868) L.R. 3 A.D. 306, at p.317: ‘ A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.” Conspiracy may be both a crime and tort. The tort is constituted only if the agreed combination is carried into effect in a greater or lesser degree and damage. to the plaintiff is thereby caused. The law with regard to the type of conspiracy which renders actionable certain acts done by persons in combination which (acts), if done by an individual, would not be actionable, is complicated and has often been the subject of lengthy discussion in the highest courts. But it is now well settled that at common law a combination of two or more persons wilfully to injure another in his trade or business is unlawful, and if it results in injury to him is actionable. If the real or predominant purpose of the combination, however, is not to injure another, but to forward or defend the legitimate interests of those who enter into it, no wrong is committed and no action will lie, although damage to another ensues: there would then be what has been described as “just cause or excuse” for the action taken. The latter proposi- tion assumes the absence of means which are in themselves unlawful, such as violence or the vhreat of violence (Sorrell 1. Smith, supra). The following passage from the judgment of Viscount Simon, L.C., in the leading case of Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. and Others v. Veitch and Another, (1942) 1 All E.R. 142, at p. 149, shows the vital points to be considered: — “On this question of what amounts to an actionable conspiracy ‘to injure’ (I am assum- ing that damage results from it), 1 would first observe that some confusion may arise from the use of such words as ‘motive’ and STMEEN TONS Sicncas sere: waiipaudlaievoess There is the further difficulty that, in some branches of the law, ‘intention’ may be understood to cover results which may reasonably flow from what is deliberately done, on the principle that a man is to be treated as intending the reasona- ble consequence of his acts. Nothing of the sort appears to be involved here. It is much safer to use a word like ‘ purpose’ or ‘ object.’ The question to be answered, in determining whether a combination to do an act which damages others is actionable even though it would not be actionable if done by a single erson, is not: ‘ Did the combiners appreciate, or should they be treated as appreciating, that others would suffer from their action?’ It is: ‘What is the real reason why the combiners did it?’ Or, as LORD CAVE, L.C., puts it: ‘ What is the real purpose of the, combina- tion?’ The test is not what is the natural result to the plaintiffs of such combined action, or what is the resulting damage which the defendants realise, or should realise, will follow, but what is in truth the object in the minds of the combiners when they acted as they did. It is not consequence that matters, but purpose. The relevant conjunction is not, ‘so that,’ but, ‘in order that.’ Next, it is to be borne in mind that there may be cases where the combination has more than one ‘object’ or ‘purpose.’ The combiners may feel that they are killing two birds with one stone, and, even though their main purpose may be to protect their own legitimate in- terests notwithstanding that this involves damage to the plaintiffs, they may also find a further inducement to do what they are doing by feeling that it serves the plaintiffs right. The analysis of human impulses soon leads us into the quagmire of mixed motives, and, even if we avoid the word ‘motive,’ there may be more than a single purpose or object. It is enough to say that, if there is more than one purpose actuating 2 combination, liability must depend on ascertaining the predominant pur- pose. If that predominant purpose is to damage another person and damage results, that is tortious conspiracy.. If the predomi- nant purpose is the lawful protection or pro- motion of any lawful interest of the combiners, it is not a tortious conspiracy, even though it causes damage to another person.” Section 6A (2) of our Trade Unions Act, 1939, provides in substance that the common law which renders actionable per se damage resulting from # conspiracy to injure shall not be applicable to acts, otherwise lawful, which are done in contemplation or furtherance of « trade dispute. section is, I think, to relieve persons acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute of the onus of showing that the predominant object of their combination is to forward or defend their own legitimate interests, even though there also appear to be other objects in mind. It is im- portant to note, however, that the protection of the section does not extend to the adoption of means which are in themselves unlawful, in the carrying out of the objects of the combination. Section 7 of our Act is identical with section 2 of the United Kingdom Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and its protection applies only where the watching and besetting (or the “ picketing” as it is sometimes for convenience called) is for one or more of the purposes mentioned; it does not apply where there is no such purpose. The “ peaceful persuasion” expressly authorised is confined to inducing any person to work or abstain from working. In this connection Mr. Citrine, at p. 439 of his book, comments as follows: ‘“ For example, it 1s con- sidered that it would not cover the picketing of a theatre or retail shop with the object of persuading patrons or customers to boycott it.” At p. 440 he adds:— ¢ Although the section does not, in terms, authorise picketing with the object of peacefully persuading customers to boy- cott, this object may in effect, be accom- plished under the provisions relating to the obtaining or communicating of in- formation. The section does not require that the information should have reference to the question of working or abstaining from working. Thus, if pickets confine themselves to publishing, by word of mouth or by means of placards or handbills, accurate information as to the nature of the dispute, the section will cover them in the normal way. It is probable also that they would still be covered by the section if they were merely to ‘invite’, as opposed to ‘per- The effect of the suade’, the customers not to deal with the establishment. The distinction be- tween inviting and persuading is impossi- ble of definition. It is a question of degree, and much will depend upon the actual conduct of the pickets and the statements made. It is, however, sub- mitted that the mere exhibition of a notice setting out the facts and saying ‘In view of these facts we invite you not to deal here’ would amount to a mere. invitation.” Other passages from Citrine worth quoting in connection with this section appear at p. 427: ‘No doubt some forms of picketing, such as continually marching to and fro in front of a shop window, carrying placards or chanting in unison, might amount to common Jaw nuisances. It is in such cases that the section is of advantage to those picketing. In Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Com- missioners, (1908) 2 I.R. at p. 225, Madden, J., summarised the position in these words: ‘The effect of this section, read in the light of antecedent legislation, is in my opinion perfectly clear. It legalised for the first time by positive enactment, a course of action which might otherwise, 7f carried out in a certain manner, have amounted to a nuisance at common law, provided that such a course of action is resorted to merely for effecting certain specified peaceful purposes ’.......... All that can be said is that the section may be assumed to legalise such acts as are reasonably necessary to the carrying out of lawful picketing, even though those acts might constitute a degree of annoyance which would otherwise be sufficient to support an action at common law.” With these general observations on the law, I will now return to the evidence in this case. The Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Antigua Trades & Labour Union held on 9th September, 1955, show that the decision to picket the pluintiffs’ business premises was taken at that meeting, the resolution being in the following terms:— : ‘Be it resolved that provided up to the time of the publication of the Board’s award the dispute between Miss O’Neal and the Trade Union is not settled, the General Secretary should take the neces- sary steps to picket the business premises.” These Minutes disclose that the defendants Bird, Lake, Carrot, Levi Joseph, Richards and Hurst attended that meeting. The defendant Ireland, who is also a member of the Executive Committee, was not present, but he attended subsequent meetings when the picketing was in progress and was disctssed, and this case has throughout been conducted on the footing that his responsibility for the initiation and continuance of the picketing is no less than that of any of the other members of the Executive Committee of the Union. The remaining defendant, Joseph Samuel, ig not a member of the Committee and there is nothing to indicate that he attended any of its meetings. The witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiffs were: the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal; her sister, Linda O'Neal, Victoria Frederick and Clarine Knight, all of whom work as clerks in the Drug Store; Cardigan Stevens, Comptroller of Customs, Antigua, whose offices throughout the picketing have been close to the plaintiffs’ premises; Iris Barrow, clerk at Jos. Dew & Son, a firm in the vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises; Veronica Harris, a school girl who was sent on an errand to O’Neal’s Drug Store; Neville Lowen, a wood-. carver, who sells his goods to the plaintiffs and visits their business premises regularly; Assistant Superintendent Blaize and Sergeant Roberts, both of the Leeward Islands Police Force; and Clement Neison, a carpenter, who deals with ONeal’s Drug Store. The witnesses for the defence were: the defendant Hurst, General Secretary (and as such chief executive Officer) of the Union; Joseph Huches, a clerk of the Magistrate’s Court which occupies the upper storey of a building opposite O’Neal’s Drug Store; the defendant Levi Joseph, who holds the post of Organiser in the Union; Joseph Laurent, a former druggist of O’Neal’s Drug Store; the defendant Lake, Second Vice- President of the Union; Ernest Athill, a carpenter, and Norris Abbott, estate manager, both of whom are customers of the Drug Store. Evidence was given by the defendants Hurst and Levi Joseph to the effect that at some time after the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Union on 9th September, 1955, they engaged six persons to picket the plaintiffs’ business premises, and that these persons were given directions with regard to their duties by the defendant Hurst. On the morning of Saturday, 17th September, 1955, at 8 o’clock, the hour at which the plaintiffs’ business premises are normally opened, the pickets arrived outside the premises. That they were accompanied by a steel band, playing, and a large crowd, and posted around the premises by the defendant Levi Joseph, is beyond dispute. A good deal has been said about this steel band, for the presence of which Levi Joseph disclaims all respon- sibility. From the evidence before me I have no doubt that the pickets and the band were led to the premises by Levi Joseph in the manner alleged by Gertrude O’Neal and Victoria Frederick and that the installation of the pickets, generally, was attended by much flourish, fanfare and noise; it was apparently during this early phase of the picketing that Cardigan Stevens telephoned and complained of the din to the Commissioner of Police. I cannot accept Levi Joseph’s statements that even at the time of giving evidence in this Court he knew nothing at all about how the pickets (who had assembled at his home) happened to be accompanied by the band, and that the band simply passed by, without stopping outside the plaintiffs’ premises. The pickets were carrying placards marked: ‘Workers must be respected”; “Strike on here. Protest against unjust dismissal” ; “ Hold the line. The Workers’ security is challenged ” ; and “Join the fight against injustice.” As they walked to and fro outside the plaintiffs’ premises, the pickets repeated the words written on the placards, particularly the words ‘‘ Hold the line.” The only placard to which it seems to me any objection could seriously be taken is the one marked “Strike on here. Protest against unjust dismissal.” There was, in fact, no strike on. Levi Joseph, who was cross-examined about the wording of this placard, at first tried to justify its use by saying: “I call a trade dispute a strike eawawene .... Because I considered this the last resort I considered it a strike.” His final explanation, which was corroborated by the defendant Hurst, was that the placards were not made specially for this occasion; Joseph added that the Union does not possess any placard bearing only the words “ Protest against unjust dismissal”. This would be a convenient point to mention briefly, and as far as possible in their proper sequence, a number of specific allegations. I will make further comments on some of them at a later stage. Gertrude O’Neal states that on the morning of the 17th September the pickets, in, addition to repeating the words already mentioned, were shouting, ‘‘ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store”; she says she saw some of the pickets surround people trying to enter the store and heard Tilton Theophile, one of the pickets, threaten to knock down several persons who were attempting to enter; she did not see the defendant Samuel with any bell, but on this, as on other days, she heard him saying “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store. You no hear you no foo buy from the Drug Store’’; during the afternoon, while the pickets were around the premises, she saw the defendant Ireland standing on the Post Office gallery just opposite the Drug Store. Linda O’Neal asserts that on the morning of 17th September she heard Levi Joseph shouting “Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store, people; don’t goin there to buy”, and that later in the day she saw and heard the defendant Samuel ring- ing a bell and shouting “ Don’t buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store, people. Don’t go in there”. Victoria Frederick says that on the 17th September, some time after Levi Joseph had launched the picketing, he returned and told one of the pickets he must “shout behind people while they are going in the Drug Store”, and that pickets shouted accordingly and the people did not go into the store. She further states that she saw the defendant Ireland in the vicinity of the plain- tiffs’ premises practically all day, and that around 2 o'clock in the afternoon the defendants Bird, Lake, Carrott and Williams came; she saw Mr. 10 Bird speaking to the pickets and heard him tell one of them that the Curio Shop was also included in the picketing. After 3 o’clock she saw the the defendants Bird, Lake and Joseph walking in the street; they spoke to the pickets. ‘Tris Barrow testifies that on the same 17th September she went to the Drug Store to purchase something and one of the pickets shouted at her: ‘* Hold the line. Don’t go in.” As regards the 19th of September, Gertrude O’Neal says she heard some people tell the defend- ant Samuel, who is a local constable, that they would like to go into the Store to buy but didn’t want to yet into trouble with the police, and that Samuel told them they would get into trouble if they went in; there were policemen standing around at the time. Another occurrence concerning the defendant Samuel on 19th September is related by Neville Lowen and Sergeant Roberts. They say they saw Samuel go up to and touch a man who was about to enter the Drug Store, and Lowen heard him say “ Hold the line.” It is clear from the evidence of these very witnesses, however, that there was nothing hostile in Samuel’s act. It would appear that he was, as he at the time explained to Sergeant Roberts, just making fun with a friend, who sub- sequently entered the Store. Although Lowen visits the Store daily he has never been troubled by any of the pickets. In respect of the 18th of September, one matter should be noticed, that is, an article which appeared that day under prominent headlines on the front page of “The Workers’ Voice”’, the official organ of the Union. The newspaper itself shows that it is “Printed and published by the Antigua Trades and Labour Union at their Office, 46 North Street, St. John’s, Antigua”, and that the defendant Richards is its Editor. At this stage I will merely set out the article, with its headlines: — “THE FIGHT IS ON: JUSTICE OR BE DAMNED. People Must Decide if O’Neals are Above the Right And Privileges of the Worker. The Executive of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union have broken off trade relationship with O’Neal’s Drug Store and open conflict now wages. Early on Saturday morning pickets were stationed in the vicinity of the Drug Store in an effort to demonstrate to the public the resentment of the Union to the attitude adopted by the O’Neals in the dismissal of their Clerks. Endeavoured The Union have endeavoured right through to bring the matter to an amicable settlement and departed from former proce- dures by going to the extent of asking for an inquiry into the Dispute. Even though the O’Neal’s recognised at first a dispute existed and attended meeting under the Labour Com- missioner it seemed that some last minute adviser prompted them to ignore the whole question. They insulted the government by refus- ing to attend the Board of Inquiry appointed by the Acting Governor. They were notified three weeks ago of the recommendations of the Board and the Government asked the matter be settled. ‘fo the present moment they have even refused to acknowledge receipt of the findings of the Board of Inquiry so adding further insult tc injury. Principles Public opinion has been brought to play in this case. If it is felt by the O’Neals and their advisers that injustice should stand before accepted civilised principles and that human beings and causes should be treated contemptuously the public of Antigua will decide. The ‘Trades Union asked for no trouble only sought to right a wrong. If the O’Neals are stronger than the will of the people the coming days or even years will decide. The fight is on.” The next day on which special incidents are alleged to have occurred is Saturday, 24th Septem- ber. It was suggested that Saturday was chosen for special activities because in St. John’s it is the busiest shopping day. Gertrude O’Neal, Linda O’Neal and Iris Barrow all testified that the pickets were particularly noisy that morning, shouting, among other things, ‘‘ Hold the line. Don’t go into O’Neal’s”. Iris Barrow states they shouted that at her, and that around 4 o’clock in the after- noon she saw a woman on the steps of the Drug Store and heard a picket tell her “ Don’t go in there. Don’t goin. Hold the line”, and the woman went away. Linda O’Neal says she heard some of the pickets threaten to beat people if they went in, and that only a few “brave ones” dared to enter. Victoria Frederick claims that the noise was so great that morning that she found it “ confusing”. Both she and Gertrude O’Neal say they heard the defendant Levi Joseph egging on pickets to shout louder. At one stage Gertrude O'Neal telephoned to the Police Station and Assistant Superintendent Blaize came to the scene. Blaize found Levi Joseph there with two or three of the regular pickets, at the time merely walking up and down saying “ Hold the line”’, and told him of the report made by Gertrude O’Neal; Joseph said he was just substituting for a while for one of the pickets and had not done anything save what Blaize found him doing; that he understood pickets must not stand up or they would be “ watching and besetting ”. A few minutes later, when the defendant Bird was passing in a car, Blaize apprised him of the report made. Gertrude O’Neal says that after Assistant Superintendent Blaize left she heard Levi Joseph telling the pickets to make more noise, adding and demonstrating, ‘‘ This is the way it should be done”. Victoria Frederick says that at a certain stage on that Saturday, after the defendant Joseph had told the pickets to shout and they were behav- ing very noisily, she saw the defendants Bird, Lake, Hurst, Williams, Carrott and Ireland come to the corner of Thames and Long Streets. ‘The defendant Joseph went to the pickets and then to the other defendants. Gertrude O’Neal also alleges that one day, soon after the commencement of the picketing, a Mrs. Scouten, up to then a regular customer, was approaching the Drug Store when she was stopped by a picket and told she was not supposed to come in; since then Mrs. Scouten has never returned. Another incident, the precise date of which cannot be fixed, is reported by Cardigan Stevens. He says he was going to O’Neal’s Drug Store, intending to enter through one of the doors facing Thames Street, and an elderly woman of the labouring class was ahead of him going into the same door when two pickets (one a Dominican), who appeared not to realise that he was behind, “ converged ” on the woman, shouting at the top of their voices, “‘ Hold the line”; the woman didn’t bother with them, and they closed in behind her as she went into the door, the Dominican shouting at her ina most threatening and intimidating manner: “You don’t hear what I say. I say hold the line”. Gertrude O'Neal says that on 15th October a young womun coming to the Drug Store was surrounded by pickets who shouted loudly at her, and that when the woman afterwards entered the Store she was “‘almost in a state of collapse”. Cardigan Stevens alleges that on 22nd October he was at the Drug Store and saw the Dominican, already referred to, and two other pickets approach “in a threatening attitude” a woman who was in the act of going into the store, the Dominican shouting “You don’t hear what I tell you”, as if he would strike the woman; the woman got frightened and started to tremble and went back to the street. Evidence is given by a schoolgirl, Veronica Harris, with respect to something that happened on 25th October. She says she was sent from the Red Cross Depot to O’Neal’s Drug Store to collect a pair of forceps, and that as she and three other girls with her were approaching the Store one of the pickets said ‘‘ Hold the line”’; they (the girls) “took it as a joke and ran off laughing ”; as they did so they “ butt on each other and fell down”; her knee got bruised in the gutter. It appears to me that this girl’s evidence cannot be taken as proving anything against the pickets. Cardiyan Stevens further states that on Ist November he heard Assistant Superintendent Blaize reprimanding the Dominican previously mentioned, but did not know what for. Assistant Superinten- dent Blaize, however, was asked nothing about this when he was in the witness box. Il Clement Nelson’s testimony is about the 11th of November; he says he was going to the Drug Store when the defendant Samuel addressed him thus: “ Nelson, don’t you hear you must not go there to buy. You is a dog’. He states that when he left the store Samuel followed him and added: “You going to want the Union and you burning your own coals”, Finally, we come to an incident concerning the 26th of November. Linda O’Neal alleges that on that day the defendant Samuel said something which she did not hear to Mrs. Allen of Mill Reef, who then asked him what “ Hold the line” meant, and that he replied it meant that nobody is supposed to go into the Drug Store to buy; when Mrs. Allen asked why, he said: “ Miss O’Neal would not pay the girl the money. She is unfair.” Turning now to the defence, I will first dispose of the short witnesses. The evidence of Ernest Athill and Norris Abbott was to the effect that since the inauguration of the picketing they have often been to O’Neal’s Drug Store and have never been molested or in any way interfered with; they never saw any misbehaviour by the pickets. Joseph Laurent said he left O’Neal’s Drug Store in June, 1955, and in late July opened his own Drug Store in St. John’s, about quarter of a mile away from O’Neal’s; quite a few of the customers who dealt with O’Neal’s when he was there now deal with him; “things slowed down (at his drug store) around September; they improved slightly around October and November”. Joseph Hughes, whose work requires him to be at the Magistrate’s Court opposite O’Neal’s Drug Store for two days of each week, testified that that section of the Citv is a business section and is always noisy; he has heard shouting at all times; among other things, he has heard ‘* Hold the line”. The only persons called as witnesses by the defence besides Athill, Abbott, Laurent and Hughes, were the defendants Hurst, Levi Joseph and Lake. They emphasised that at no time did the Union or anyone on its behalf demand payment of compensation in respect of Miss Winter’s dismissal; payment of compensa- tion was a recommendation of the Board of Inquiry; the Executive Committee of the Union were prepared to accepi the recommendation as a means of settlement of the dispute, which they had done everything in their power to have settled in accordance with the legislative and other machinery provided for settling such disputes; the object of the picketing was discussed at the meeting of the Executive Com- mittee held on 9th September, the consensus of opinion being that it was to pass on information to the public with regard to the dispute so that no one would accept employment at O’Neal’s and so that public opinion might be brought to bear on the matter; the duties of the pickets were also discussed at the meeting and outlined to the General Secretary: the pickets were to hold placards and pass on information; the General Secretary was also instructed to take steps to ensure that the picketing is done ina 1; eaceful manner; no decision has been taken as to the duration of the picketing. In his evidence the defendant Hurst says he instructed the pickets in accordance with the directions of the Executive Committee and frequently visited them to ensure that those instructions were being carried out; he denies having ever directed the pickets to tell people not to buy from O’Neal’s Drug Store. The defendant Lake states that he also checked up on the pickets; on two occasions he went there specifically for that purpose; he passed by the pickets daily on other business. Neither he nor Hurst ever witnessed any misbehaviour. : As regards the article appearing in “ The Workers’ Voice” of 18th September, 1955, both Mr. Hurst and Mr. Lake disclaim responsibility for its composition; they do not agree it was intended to insinuate that damage would or should be done to O’Neal’s trade; they under- stand the words * broken off trade relationship ” in the headlines of the article to mean that “there is a trade dispute and relationship is broken off.’ The defendant Richards, who, as already mentioned, is the editor of the newspaper, did not testify. I have already made reference to certain portions of the evidence of the defendant Levi Joseph. He denies all the charges levelled against him, as well as having ever given instructions to any of the pickets as to how they were to carry out their duties; that, he points out, was done by the General Secretary; he maintains that he himself acted as a picket only on one occasion—24th September—and then for a few minutes only, in the absence of one of the regular pickets; he declares that he never encouraged the pickets to shout loudly and that he visited them daily and never saw any mis- behaviour; that 3rd October, at the hearing of the motion for an interim injunction in this matter, was the first time he heard it said that the object of the picketing was to vause people to stop buying from O’Neal’s, and he subsequently told the pickets and several other people that that was not the intention, but he did not mention it on his loud speaker. Neither the defendant Samuel—who was described by some of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as the head picket, and against whom specific charges of a serious nature were made—nor any of the other pickets, was called by the defence. The case for the plaintiffs is not that the defendants or any of them were heard planning to injure the plaintiffs, or anything of the sort; the plaintiffs seek to prove the conspiracy through overt acts alleged to have been com- mitted by defendants and persons employed by the defendants. Included in the defence is a complete denial of most of these acts. It would seem, therefore, that the persons said to have committed the acts should be in a position to furnish valuable testimony. Altogether, this case is remarkable for the number of persons not called as witnesses. In this connexion, however, as also in considering other aspects of the case, it must be borne in mind that the onus of proof rests upon the plaintiffs. One of the main lines of attack employed by learned counsel for the defence was the failure of the plaintiffs to call the majority of the persons said to have been interfered with, or the policemen on duty in the streets. It is common ground that throughout the picketing there have always been at least two policemen stationed in the vicinity of the plaintiffs’ premises. One explanation suggested by the plaintiff Gertrude O’Neal is that very many people in Antigua are afraid of the Union, Another explanation advanced, in so far as the first group is concerned, is that the names and addresses of some of the persons molested are unknown. As regards the police, it was apparent from the female plaintiff's gestures when replying to certain questions put to her in the witness box that she felt that the police attitude towards the plaintiffs in this matter was unfavourable; and she expressed surprise that no arrests were made on 17th or 24th September. Assistant Superintendent Blaize testified that on 17th September, the first day of the picketing, the Commissioner of Police sent a message through him to the defendant Bird complimenting the pickets “for the manner in which the picketing was carried on.” Exactly what that was intended to convey, on what evidence the opinion was based, or whether the transmission of the message became known to the plaintiffs and in any way influenced their assessment of the police attitude. is not clear. Another argument urged by Mr. Barrow was that the witnesses called by the plaintiffs are biased against the Union. Victoria l’rederick once worked at the Co-operative Store run by the Union and was dismissed; she admits that she considered the action of the Mxecutive Committee of the Union in dismissing her “very unfair.” Iris Barrow is a ‘ good” personal friend of the Misses O’Neal; some years ago Joseph Dew & Son’s, whore she works, was picketed; the dispute in that instance was over the dismissal of a clerk by her brother. Clement Nelson was at one time Chairman of the Munici- pal Workers Section of the Union; he was removed from office with the promise, he says, that he would be promoted to the post of District Steward but declined the promotion as he “saw tricks in it’; he owns to being opposed to the policy of the officials of the Union and says he will do all in his power to destroy that policy. Cardigan Stevens is another personal friend of the O’Neal family; on one occasion, during an altercation unconnected with this case, he told the defendant Ireland that he considered. the Union was doing things that were wrong; he further states that on » certain day, after the Dominican picket had made threats of personal violence to Linda O’Neal because she softly repeated ‘‘Hold the line”, he told the picket he “would take pleasure in kicking” him. That is hardly a remark that one would expect from a person in Mr. Stevens’ position under any circumstances; and it was urged by Mr. Barrow as indicative of animosity. It should however be remembered that the suggestion put to Stevens under cross-examination was that he had said he would take pleasure in thumping the Dominican picket; it was Stevens himself who volunteered the information that the word he used was ‘“ kick.”. Whatever else may be said of the matter, it does not seem to me to point to untruthfulness on the part of the witness. Having given careful attention to these and the other arguments advanced by learned counsel for the defence, I am, nevertheless, after the fullest consideration of the evidence of all the witnesses I have had the opportunity of hearing and observing, of the opinion that the particular incidents mentioned by .me as having been related by Gertrude O’Neal, Linda O'Neal, Victoria Frederick, Cardigan Stevens and _ Iris Barrow did take place, and that their accounts of them are substantially correct; these persons impressed me as being essentially truthful witnesses, whatever their feelings towards the Union. Their evidence shows, among other things, that from the inception of the picketing the pickets who were sent by the defendants to carry out the objects of the picketing, and who were instructed in their duties by the defendant Hurst and posted and supervised by the defendant Levi Joseph (both of whom were present when the whole subject of the picketing was discussed in Hxecutive Committee), have been telling people in forceful language that they must not buy from O’Neal’s. The same idea appears to be insinuated by ‘The Workers’ Voice” in the third headline to the article of 18th September Although none of the clerks in the plaintiffs’ employment are members of the Union, and there is no evidence to indiente that any further clerks are required, the picketing is still on; up to the time of the hearing of this case no decision had been taken with regard to its duration. The number of pickets has been reduced to three; at a certain stave it was six, but never as many as twelve, as suggested in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim. It is clear that although the predominant object of the picketing here is the furthering by the defendants of their own interests, there are other objects in mind and that unlawful means amounting to obstruction, coercion, intimidation and threats of personal violence have been used. Mr. Barrow contends that even though the pickets were employed by the defendants other than Samuel and sent by them to picket the plaintiffs’ premises, and even though the picketing be held to be outside the protection of section 7 of the Trade Unions Act, 1939, owing to the use of illegal means, the defendants (other than Samuel 13 presumably) are not liable in law because they do not stand in the relationship of master and servant to the pickets and did not authorise the illegal means in question. The implications of that proposition, in the setting of the present case, appear to me to be somewhat startling. It would mean that people could employ men of straw to picket premises and could, when damage results and actions are brought for acts done in furtherance of picketing, simply themselves say, ‘“‘ We authorised the picketing in this way and not in that, therefore we are not liable.” In my opinion the defendants vis-a-vis the pickets do stand in the relationship of master and servant; the pickets were engaged by them and are subject to their control and may be dismissed by them; these, I think, are the essential ingredients of the relationship of master and servant. But even if there be no such relationship, it seems to me that on the evidence here Mr. Barrow’s submission could not be sustained. In Ward, Lock, and Co. (Lid.) v. The Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society and another, (1906) 22 T.L.R. 827, the defendants stationed pickets to watch the plaintiffs’ printing works and to induce the workmen employed by the plaintiffs to join the union and then to determine their employment by proper notices, the object being to compel the plaintiffs to become employers of union men and to abstain from employing non-union men. In an action for damages for wrongfully and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen employed in the plaintiffs’ printing works to break their contracts of service with the plaintiffs, and for nuisance and for an injunction, the Court of Appeal held unanimously that the picketing was entirely lawful both at common law and under the 1875 U.K. Act. Special attention has been asked to the following passage from the judgment of Moulton, L.J.:— “Throughout the discussion the defend- ants have been described as seeking to “compel” the plaintiffs to pay union wages and to employ union men because they tried to get all the operatives they could into the union, so that the plain- tiffs would find no non-union men to employ. If this be @ proper use of the word ‘*compel”’, it certainly carries with it no wrongful character. In the year 1898 the Legislature forbade the employ- ment of children under the age of 11 as half-timers. Supposing that prior to that Act, a “public association” had been formed to induce parents not to send their children as half-timers before the age of 11. No more legitimate, and perhaps no more laudable object of an association could be imagined, and it would not lose its legitimate character by reason of its success. But its success would pro tanto, and its complete success would absolutely, prevent those masters who were desirous of employing young half-timers at, we may presume, corres- pondingly low wages from doing so, and would “compel” them to employ exclu- 14 sively persons of 13 years old or upwards. Yet no wrong would have been done to such masters; and in, the same way no wrong would have been done to the plaintiffs in the present case if the defendants had succeeded in persuading every printers’ assistant in the country to join the union and they had rendered it impossible for the plaintiffs to get men to work for them on the terms they desired. The error arises probably out of an incorrect use of language. It is inaccurate to say that the masters have a right to employ men on any specific terms. They have only a right to employ such, if any, as are willing to accept those terms, and no wrong is done them by any one who by lawful means lessens the number of those willing to accept them. The right of the plaintiffs to try to persuade a man to accept and the right of the defendants to try to persuade a man to refuse appear to me to be rights of freedom of individual action equally lawful and equally deserv- ing of the protection of the law, so long as the means employed are lawful and right. Both become unlawful if the means employed are wrongful.” Ward, Lock & Co. (although decided before the 1906 U.K. Act) is, I think, good authority for saying that even though the effect of picketing be to compel the plaintiffs to do something they have a legal right to refrain from doing, that of dtsel/ would not render the picketing unlawful. But it would be a mistake, I think, to assume that Ward, Lock & Co. decided any more than that. In that ease the pickets did nothing beyond obtaining or communicating information. The ground on which the Court allowed the appeal is indicated in a later passage of the judgment delivered by the same Lord Justice: “but in my view that which decides the question is that there is no evidence of any improper or illegal acts, or, indeed, of any acts whatever, by any pickets sent by the defendants during this period. There oan, therefore, be no pretence that the plaintiffs have established anything which would give to them a good cause of action in respect of the picketing complained of. I wish to add that, in my opinion, there is throughout a complete absence of evidence of anything in the nature of picketing or besetting which could constitute a nuisance. It appears that the discharged workmen loitered about for a day or two after leaving work—a thing which is not unlikely to happen—and that they were at times joined by others, but there is no sugges- tion even by the plaintiffs’ witnesses that any annoyance or molestation took place, and the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming.” This quotation from the judgment of Moulton, L.J., shows the vast difference between the facts in that case and the facts as I find them here. In the present case there were acts of obstruction, coercion und intimidation and threats of violence. Furthermore, there is abundant evidence of “ per- suading”’ (as opposed to “ inviting”) other than persuasion of any person ‘to work or abstain from working ” (q. v. sec. 7 Trade Unions Act), and the repeated shouts and other noises of the pickets and the degree of annoyance inflicted on the plaintiffs by the pickets’ general behaviour clearly went beyond what was reasonably necessary to the carry- ing out of lawful picketing; as regards this further aspect of the picketing, the evidence, in my opinion, points conclusively to at least connivance on the part of the defendants. On the first day of the picketing one of the defendants who had attended the Committee meeting at which the method of picketing was discussed, instructed the pickets that they were to “shout behind” people who were ubout to enter the store; he himself took part in loud shouting on more than one occasion; at a certain stage he actually demonstrated how the shouting should be done and made the pickets shout more loudly than they were then doing. ‘As already mentioned, the defendant Samuel is not a member of the Executive Committee of the Union and did not attend the meetings of the Committee. It is not however disputed that he combined with the other defendants for the purposes of the picketing of the plaintiffs’ premises. That some damage has been caused to the plaintiffs by the unlawful means from time to time used in this case is manifest. But it was argued by Mr. Barrow that the plaintiffs having failed to. aver in their pleadings that the defendants ‘“‘threaten and intend” to repeat the illegal acts complained of, are not entitled to an injunction. Mr. Harney replied that the Statement of Claim was drawn up in accordance with Form 13 at page 38 of volume 7 of Lord Atkins’ Encyclopaedia of Court Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings and that that particular Form, which is stated to be based on the claim for conspiracy to injure by unlawful means in the well-known case of Lyons (J) & Sons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255, contains no such averment. Mr. Harney also invited attention to the wording of his Statement of Claim (dated 21st October 1955), and particularly to paragraph 6 thereof wherein it is alleged that the wrongful acts have been done “daily from the 17th day of September, 1955.” In my opinion a pleader desiring an injunction should always, ea abundanti cautela, insert the conventional words leading to an application for an injunction, but the authorities show that failure to insert them will not be fatal where an intention to repeat the illegal acts complained of can be readily inferred from the nature of the case or the facts already pleaded. (See, for example, Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles, 20 Ch. D. at p. 195). I think the inference can here be drawn. In a case of the kind now before me the damages are at large; once actual financial loss is proved (and that has been done), the Court may award a sum appropriate to the whole circum- stances of the tortious wrong inflicted (Prati v. British Medical Association, 1919, 1 KB. 244). As regards the extent of the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiffs through the picketing, evidence was given by Gertrude O’Neal of a substantial decrease in the volume of their trace since the commencement of picketing. One would have thought that the plaintiffs, who are now pressing for heavy damages, would have come prepared with properly made up account books to support their claim. Even when Mr. Barrow called for such books, however, they failed to produce satisfactory accounts to show their actual sales subsequent to and immediately preceding the institution of the picketing. The evidence of Clarine Knight that since the picketing she has “missed” regular customers, can hardly be regarded as impelling. She mentioned only two names, and there is no proof nt all as to the real reasons of these two persons for ceasing to buy from O’Neal’s. Mr. Barrow suggested that they may, for reasons altogether. unconnected with the picketing, have transferred their patronage to the new drug store opened by Laurent, formerly druggist at O’Neal’s. Laurent’s testimony was to ~ 0 the effect that others have done so. I am not unmindful of yet another possibility, and that is that some people, without ever having gone near to the pickets, may nevertheless feel that Miss Winter’s cause merits their support and may of their own free will have taken away their patron- age from the plaintiffs’ stores. There will be judgment for the plaintiffs against the defendants jointly and severally for £80 and an injunction will be granted restraining the defendants their servants and agents from watching and besetting the business places of the plaintiffs situate at the corners of Long and Thames Streets and High and Thames Streets, St. John’s, The defendants must also pay the plaintiffs’ costs excluding the costs of and incidental to the joining of the defendant Hurst as a defendant, the Court having already ordered that those costs should in any event be paid by the plaintiffs, and excluding also the costs of and incidental to the two applica- tions for an interlocutary injunction, in respect of which each party must bear his own costs, the plaintiffs having failed to obtain such interlocutary injunction partly through their own fault. W. A. Date, Puisne Judge. 3rd January, 1956. ANTIGUA. Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M, BLACKMAN, Government Printer—By Authority. 1956. [Price 20 cenis.] No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water. [L.8.] I Assent, K. W. Bracknurne, Governor. 7th December, 1955. VIRGIN ISiLANDS, No. 9 of 1955. An Ordinance ‘to amend the protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water Ordinance, 1954. KNACTED by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands. 1. This Ordinance may be cited as the Protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955, and shall be read as one with the Protection of Trees and Conservation of Soil and Water Ordinance, 1954, hereinafter called the Principal Ordinance. 2. Subsection (2) of section 4 of the Principal Ordinance is hereby amended by the insertion between the word “Council” and the full-stop at the end of the subsection of the following words and comma “as to the necessity for making the order, the extent to which it should be made and the conditions which it should include’”’. 3. Section 8 of the Principal Ordinance is ? i _ * : hereby amended by the deletion therefrom of the words “after due notice has been given to the owner or occupier thereof” and the substitution therefor of the words ‘‘ without notice’, VIRGIN ISLANDS, Short title. 8/1954. Amendment of seotion 4 (2) of the Princi- pal Ordinance, Amendment of section 8 of the Principal Ordinance, VIRGIN 2 Protection of Trees and No. 9 of 1945. IsLanps. Conservation of Soil and Water. Substitution 4. The following is hereby subitituted for ofseotion 10 section 10 of the Principal Ordinance:— of the Prinoi- pal Ordinance. “Liability for 10. (1) Where after the publication of offences coni- - : . mitted after ®n Order declaring any private land or por- publication of tion thereof to be a protected area or a protection f ee 7 : 7 sth .. orders. orestry area or a water area, as the case may be, any person commits on the said land or portion thereof any act contrary to the provisions of this Ordinance, the person committing such act and every owner or occupier of such land or portion thereof who in any way directly or indirectly contributes to the commission of such act shall be guilty of an offence. (2) An owner or occupier of any land or portion thereof shall be deemed to have contributed to the commission of an offence on the said land or portion thereof contrary to subsection (1) of this section if he does not with all due diligence and to the best of his ability give such information or evidence within his knowledge us may lead to the discovery of the person so oltending.”’. Amendment of 5. Subsection (1) of section 12 of the section 12(1) Dpinas ; - bharalhe i of the Princ, Etincipal Ordinance is hereby amended by pal Ordinance. (a) the insertion of the word “ author- ised” between the word “any” and the word ‘‘ person” appearing in line 1; (6) the insertion of the words “ protected area or” between the word “any” and the word “forestry’’ appearing in line 3; and (c) the addition after the full-stop at the end of the subsection of the following: “In this subsection ‘authorised person’ means the Commissioner or the owner of the protected area, forestry ares or water area concerned, or such persons as they may respectively depute. ”. No. 9 of 1955. Protection of Trees and - _ $8 Virein Conservation of Soil and Water. ISLANDS. 6. Section 14 of the Principal Ordinance is Amendmentof - 5 ‘ 7 section 14 of hereby amended by the Principal : . . Ordinance. (a) the insertion of the words ‘and approved” between the word “made” and the word “under” appearing in line 1 of subsection (3); (6) re-numbering subsection (3) as sub- section (+); and (c) the insertion of the following as sub- section (3) of the section— (3) No regulation made under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall have effect unless und until it has been approved by a resolution of the Legislative Council.”. H. A. C. Howarp, President. Passed the Legislative Council this 20th day of September, 1955. H. O. Creque, Clerk of the Council. ANTIGUA Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. BhnackMay, Government Printer.—By Authority. 1956. 47/00213—550—1.56. [Price 5 cents. } LEEWARD ISLANDS. GENERAL GOVERNMENT. STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS. 1966, No. ‘1. Orper or tHe Governor DaTeD January 9, 1956 DECLAR- Ing THAY THE Executive CouncIL ror THE COLONY CONSTITUTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE Roya Iystruc- TIONS OF 1936, AS AMENDED, SHALL CEASE. TO EXIST. 1. Short Title. This Order may be cited as the Leeward Islands Federal Executive Council (Cessation) Order, 1956. 2, Date of Cessation of Existence of Execu- ive Council. From the 18th day of January, 1956, the Executive Council for the Colony of the Leeward Tslands constituted in pursuance of the Royal Instructions mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall cease to be the Executive Council for the Colony. SCHEDULE. Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and Commander in Chief of the Leeward Islands and dated the seventeenth day of November, 1936. Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet and dated the twenty-eighth day of December, 1939. amending the aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936. : Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet and dated the twelfth day of July, 1943, amending the aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936. Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet and dated the thirtieth day of December, 1950, amending the aforesaid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936. Additional Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet and dated the twenty-second day of February, 1952, amending the aforessid Instructions of the seventeenth day of November, 1936. Dated this 9th day of January, 1956. K. W. BrackBURYE, Governor. ANTIGUA, Printed at the Governmnet Printing Oflice, Leeward Islands, by BE. M. BhackMan, Government Printer.—By Authority. 1956. 18/00052—-500—1.56. [Price 3 cents.] LEEWARD ISLANDS. GENERAL GOVERNMENT. STATUTORY RULES AND ORDEKS. 1956, No. 2. PENSIONABLE OFFICES. The Pensionable Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, dated January 11, 1956, made by the Governor in Council under section 2(1) of the Pensions Act, 1947 (No. 12/1947). 1. SHORT TrTLe. This Order may be cited as the Pensionabte Offices (Amendment) Order, 1956, and shall be read as one with the Pensionable Offices Order, 1954 (S. R. & O. 1954 No. 56) hereinafter called the Principal Order. 2, AMENDMENT OF FIRST SCHEDULE TO THE PRINCIPAL ORDER.- The First Schedule to the Principal Order is hereby amended as regards the Antigua Establishment as follows:— (a) by the insertion-under the caption ‘ Administration” of the words “ Financial Secretary’? beneath the words “Crown ny, Attorney ”; (b) by the deletion of the caption ‘‘ Agriculture and Veteri- nary” and the substitution therefor of the caption “ Agriculture, Veterinary and Fisheries ”’; (e) by the insertion of the words “Fishery Officer” beneath the words “ Accountant, Peasant Development Services ”’. Made by the Governor in Council this llth day of January, 1956. , A. E, PENN, Clerk of the Council. ANTIGUA. Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer—By Authority. 1956, ; 59/00005 —480—1.56. [Price 3 vents.) LEEWARD ISLANDS. ANTIGUA. STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS. 1956, No. 4 Tus Pusnic SERVICE ComMIssioON REGULATIONS DATED 3rp JANUARY, 1956, MADE BY THE (1OVERNOR UNDER sEcTION 9 oF tHE Pupiic Service Comission OrpI- NANCE, 1955 (No. 15/1955.) 1. Short Title. These Regulations may be cited as the Publie Service Commission Regulations, 1256. 2. Interpretation. (1) In these Regulations unless the context otherwise requires— “Commission”? means the Public Service Commission the establishment of which is provided for under section 5 of the Publie Service Commission Ordi- nance, 1955; “ Instructions” means the Instructions from time to time issued under the hand of the Governor in accordance with regulation 6 of these Regulations; “ ublie office’’ means any office of emolument in the I ; ; publ service; “public officer” means the holder of any public office and includes any person appointed to act in any such office: “public service” means the service of the Crown in respect of the government of the Presidency. (2) References to a member of the Commission shall, unless the context otherwise requires, include references to the Chairman or acting Chairman. 8. Membership of Commission. The Governor shall by writing under his hand appoint a Chairman (not being a public officer) and not more than two other persons to be members of the Commission. At least one member of the Commission shall be a person who is not a public officer or a retired public officer. 2 4. Tenure of Office and terms of Service of Commission. -(1) Members of the Commission shall hold office during the Governor’s pleasure and subject thereto the Chairman shall hold office for such period not exceeding two years as may be prescribed in the instrament by which he is appointed ; provided that a person shall, if qualified, be eligible for re-appointment from time to time as a member of the Commission. (2) The Governor may appoint any person to act in the place of the Chairman or any other member of the Commis- sion in case of his temporary absence or inability to act as such Chairman or other member. (3) Any member of the Commission may, if he is not a public officer, at any time, and, if he is a public officer, with the consent of the Governor, resign his office by instrument in writing addressed to the secretary of the Commission who shall forthwith forward the same to the Governor through the Administrator and from the date of the receipt by the secretary of the Commission of such instrument such member shall cease to be a member of the Commission and the vacancy caused by such resignation or by the Geath of a member or by the removal cf a member shall be filled | ry the Governor by the appointment of another person for the remainder of the term of office of the member whom he replaces. (4) The appointment, removal or resignation of any member of the Comuission or of its secretary shall be notified in the Gacette. (5) Out of such funds as may be ue ided by the Legislative Council to cover the expenses of the Commission, the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Commission shall be . e a a * aw paid the sum of fifteen dollars for each meeting of the Com- mission which be attends, and every other member of the Commission, not being a public officer, shall be paid the sum ’ I pe of ten dollars for each meeting of the ‘Gonithission which he attends; provided that the maximum amount payable in any month shall, in the case of the Chairman or acting Chairman, be sixty dollars and, in the case of any other rember, be Yi ) forty dollars; provided further that 10 sublic officer hall he y I paid any remuneration as a member of the Commission. (6) Members of the Commission, other than publie officers, may be paid travelling and subsistence allowsaness at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by the Governor for attendance at meetings of the Commission or for travelling for other purposes connected with the functions of the Commission. 5. Oath of Office. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall on their appointment as such take an oath or make an affirmation, each according to his conscience, in the form in the Schedule to these Regulations. Such an oath or affirmation shall be administered by or made before a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace. 6. Issue of Instructions. The Governor may by writing under his hand from time to time issue Instructions to the Commission prescribing the manner in whieh it shall perform its functions and for carrying into effect the purposes and provisions of these Regulations. 7. Record of Meetingsand Decisions. Minutes of all meetings of the Comrnission shall be recorded and kept by the Secretary. Copies of such minutes duly confirmed at a subsequent meeting shall as soon as practicable thereafter be forwarded to the Administrator for transmission to the Governor. All recommendations made by the Commission shall be submitted to the Governor through the Administrator. 8. Quorum and Voting. At any meeting of the Commission the Chairman or acting Chairman and any one member shall form a quorum for the transaction of business. The Chairman or acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote. All decisions of the Commission shall be by a majority. of the votes of the members present and voting. Provided that the Chairman or acting Chairman, as the case may be, shall have a second or casting vote whenever the voting shall be eyual. 9. Consultation with Persons other than Members. The Commission in considering any matter or question referred to it for its advice may consult such Heads of Government Departments or other public officers or other persons as the Commission may consider proper and desirable. 10. Appointment of Secretary. The Adminis- trator shall nppoint a Secretary to the Commission. 4 11. Protection of Members from Legal Proceedings. The Chairman and any member of the Commission shall have such and the like protection and privileges in cave of vny action or suit broneht against him for any act doe or otitted to be done or words spoken in the execution of his duty as is by law given to any Judge of the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands in the exercise of his judicial office. 12, Improper Influence. Any person who other- wise than in tie course of his duty directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person in ‘any manner whatsoever influences or attempts to influence any decision of the Com- mission or of the Chairman or of any member shall be guilty of an offence and upcit summary conviction shall be lable to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months; provided that nothing in this regulation shall prolibit any person who may properly do so from giving a certificate or testimonial to any applicant or candidate for any public office or from supplying any information or assistance upon formal request by the Commission. z 15. Wilfully supplying False Information to Commission. Auy person who, in connection with an appieation by any person for employment or promotion in the public vervice or with any matter upon which it is the duty of the Comiiission to advise the Governor or any Head of a Government Department under these Regulations, wilfully gives to the Counnission or to any member thereof or to any persou or body of persons appointed to axsist the Commission in the exercise of its functions or the discharge of its duties any Informaticn which is false by reason of the falsity of, or by reason of the omission of, 2 inaterial particular, shall be guilty of an offence and upon summary conviction be liable to imprisonment for a period not execeding six months or to a fine not exceedine one thousand dollars. , i4. Commencement. These Regulations shall come ito operation on the 19th day of January, 195€, 5 SCHEDULE. Regulation 5. OATH OF OFFICE. I, - , having been appointed to act as Chairman swear ~ — of the Public Service Commission, do — — member solemnly and sincerely that I will freely and ithout fear or favour declare and affirm "~~ vely @ w Mt a , affection or ill-will, give my counsel and advice inf connection with all such matters as may be referred to the Public Service Commission under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956, and that I will not directly or indirectly reveal such matters to any un- authorised persons or otherwise than in the course of duty. SUQMATULe. cee cece eect eee eee eee ee nee e eee crane een neees Sworn —_____—-hefore me this day of 19 Declared Ter err errr ere err Pere ree reer ere eee cece eee eee Magistrate or Justice of the Pores. Dated this 3rd day of January, 1956. K. W. Bracksurnr, Governor. ANTIGUA Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. BLacxmMAN, Government Printer. _ By Authority. 1958. A.C. 13/235—-525-—1.56. Price 8 cents. ANTIGUA., The Public Service Commission In- structions, 1956, made by the Governor under Regulation 6 of the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956, (8. R. & 0.1956 ope this 8rd day of January, 1 ; PART I. PRELIMINARY. 1. (1) These Instructions may be cited as the Public Service Commission Instructions, 1956. (2) These Instructions shall apply to all members of the Public Service except as provided in paragraph 15. 2. In these Instructions unless the context otherwise requires:— *“ Administrator” shall have the same mean- ing as in the Ordinance; “appointment? means the conferment of an office of emolument in the public service, whether or not subject to subsequent confirmation, upon a person not in the public service; the grant of permanent and pensionable terms of service in 4 public office toa person recruited and serving on contract or agreement in a pensionable or non-pensionable public office; the re-engagement of a person on contract or agreement for a further period in the same or another public office; the permanent transfer to an office in the public service of a member of the Civil Service of the United Kingdom who is serving on temporary transfer in an office a the public service; the paid appointment of a public officer to act in any public office other than the office to which he is substan- tively appointed; Title and Application. Interpreta- tion, 2 “the Chairman” means the person appointed under regulation 3 of the Public Ser- vice Commission Regulations, 1956, as Chairman of the Commission and shall include an acting Chairman ; “the Commission” means the Public Service Commission appointed under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956; “Governor” shall have the same meaning as in the Ordinance; . “Member” means any person appointed under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1956, as Chairman or Member of the Commission, and_ shall include any person appointed under those Regulations to be a temporary Member; ‘office of emolument’”’ means any pensiona- ble or non-pensionable post which is shown under a Personal Itmoluments sub-head in the current Hstimates of the Presidency ; “officer in charge of prison discipline”’, “ the Keeper”, ‘subordinate officer” and ‘‘ Visiting Justices” shall have the same meanings as in the Rules and Regu- lations for the Government of Prisons made by the Governor in Council on the {8th day of August, 1909, -as amended ; “promotion ”’ means the conferment upon a person in the public service of a public office to which is attached a higher salary or higher salary scale than that attached to the public office to which he was last substantively appointed ; ‘“ public office’, “ public officer” and “ public service’? shall have the same meanings as in the Ordinance; “the secretary? means the person appointed under the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1946, as secretary of the Commission ; 3 ‘‘ salary ”’ means basic salary; ce ” . scale” means a salary scale as from time to time set out in the Listimates of Revenue and Expenditure; “the Ordinance’? means the Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1955; ‘transfer’? means the conferment, whether permanently or on secondment upon a person in the public service of such publie office other than that to which he was last substantively appointed which involves no question of an imme- diate promotion. 8. (1) The Commission shall advise the Governor or the Administrator on such appoint- ments, promotions and transfers of public officers as are required to be submitted to the Secretary of State, or the Governor, or the Administrator for approval: Provided that this function shall not in any way affect the power and authority of the Secretary of State to fill any post of the class referred to in paragraph 11 (1) of these Instruc- tions in accordance with the provisions of Colonial Regulations. (2) The Commission shall when required advise the Governor or the Administrator on— (a) disciplinary procedure in accordance with such instructions as may be issued by the Governor; (b) all recommendations that an officer should be retired on the grounds of general inefficiency ; (c) such other functions as are vested in the Governor by the Ordinance. 15/1955. Duties of the Commission. Control of reoruitment, 4 Principles relating to selection for first appoint- ments and promotions. Advertisement of vacaricies. Principles and procedure apPplicahle to selection for promotion. 4 PART II. 's (INCLUDING PROMOTIONS AND URANSFERS), APPOINTMEN 4. In order to discharge its duties under paragraph 3 of these Instructions the Commission may exercise control over and may be required to approve all schemes for admission to any public office by examination, for the award of scholarships for special training and facilities for courses of instruction, and over all other methods of recruit- ment, including the dppoinmucne snd procedure of Boarils for the selection of candidates. It may prescribe the manner in which applicaticns for (rovernment appointments should be made and arrange for such examinations as may be consid- ered necessary to be held before any candidate is admitted to the public service. (1) In making recommendations for first ae to the public service, the Comunission shall be guided by the principle that prior consideration shall be given to the claims of suitably qualified local condidates. (3) In making recommendations for pro- motions within the public service, the Commission shall be guided by the principle that prior consideration shall be given to the claims of suitably qualified public officers serving in the Presidency. 6. Where the Commission considers it necessary to advertise the existence of a vacancy in the public service, the requirements of the vacant post and the qualifications necessary for it shall be settled by the Governor or. the Administator. The Commission — shall publish the advertisement, and shall consider any replies received thereto. 7. (1) Ino making recommendations for promotions in the public service the Commission shall consider the clainis of public officers on the basis of official qualifications, experience and merit. 5 (2) Recommendations for promotion shall state whether the perscn recommended is the senior officer in his department eligible for promotion and where this is not the case detailed reasons shall be given in respect of each person in that same department over whom it is proposed that the person recommended should be promoted. 8. Where the General Orders require that progress to a higher point in a salary scale is dependent on the results of an efficiency bar examination, the Commission shall arrange and conduct the said examination in accordance with a syllabus prepared by the Commission and published in the Gaceite. 9. The principles and procedure for mak- ing recommendations for paid acting appointments shall be the same as that prescribed in these Instructions for making a promotion. When recommending an acting appointment it shall be stated whether or not the officer recommended for acting appointment is in every way qualified to perform all the duties of the office in which he is to act. 10. When it is necessary to make an appointment, promotion or transfer, the proce- dure prescribed in paragraphs 1] and 12 of these Instructions shall be followed except that, where any delay involved in carrying’ out such procedure is likely to cause serious inconveniences, the Governor or the Administrator shall report the matter to the Chairman who may as a matter of urgency recommend an acting appointment without regard to that procedure. li. The procedure governing recommenda- tions for appointments, promotions and transfers in the public service shall be in accordance with the following classification :—- (1) Crass A--Posts of which the mitial salary is not less than $4,800 per annum and the filling of which reqnires the approval of the Secretary of State. Efficiency bar examination. Principles relating to acting appointments. Departure from procedure in special circumstances, Procedure relating to appointments to be filled otherwise than by examination, j (a) As s00n as & vacancy occurs or is known to be impending, the Governor or the Administrator shall notify the secretary and furnish him with details of the requirements of the post, the qualifi- cations necessary, and the emoluments attached thereto. (6) The Commission shall consider public officers in the Presidency, in accordance with the privciples in para- graphs 5 and 7 of these Instructions. (c) If in the opinion of the Commis- sion there is no local public officer suitably qualified for appointment to the post, the Commission may seck the advice of the Public Service Commission in any other British Caribbean Territory or may con- sider other local candidates not in the public service. (d) The Commission — shall make recommendations to the Governor for filling the post in order that the Governor may submit his recommendations to the Secretary of State. (e) Tf the Commission is unable to recommend the appointment of a candidate it shall inform the Governor xaccordingly stating the steps which have been taken to ascertain whether a suitable candidate is available and the reasons why a recom- mendation cannot be made. (2) Crass B— Posts above scale [ in the Salary Scales of the Civil Service, the filling of which requires the approval of the Governor. (a) As soon asa vaecaney occurs or is known to be impending, the Governor or the Administrator shall notify the secretary and furnish him with details of the requirements of the post, the qualifi- cations necessary, and the emoluments attached thereto. 7 (6) The Commission shall consider public officers in the Presidency, in accordance with the principles in para- graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions. (c) If in the opinion of the Comnnis- sion there is no public officer in the Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill the post, the Commission may then consider other public officers outside the Presidency and, if necessary, advertise the post in accordance with paragraph 6 of these Instructions. (d) The Commission shall then make recommendations to the Governor for filling the post. (3) Crass C—Posts in the graded ser- vice (scales [ to XIV in the Salary Scales of the Civil Service) and other posts, the filling of which requires the approval of the - Administrator. (a) As soon as a vacancy occurs or is known to be impending, the Administrator shall notify the secretary and furnish him with details of the requirements of the post, the qualifications necessary, and the emoluments attached thereto. (6) The Commission shall consider public officers in the Presidency, in accordance with the principles in para- graphs 5 (2) and 7 of these Instructions. (c) If in the opinion of the Commis- sion there is no public officer in the - Presidency who is suitably qualified to fill the post, the Commission may then con- sider other public officers outside the Presidency or candidates selected as a result of examinations in accordance, with paragraph 12 of these Instructions, or may advertise the post. Vacancies to be filled by examinations. Representa- tions from individuals. Cases not covered, Savine's, 8 (d) The Commission shall then make recom mendations to the Adminis: trator for filling the post. 12. Where vacancies are to be filled according to the results of examinations in conformity with any approved scheme of recruitment the procedure set out in paragraph 11 of these Instructions shall not apply. The Governor or the Administrator shall notify the vacancies to the secretary and the Commission shall arrange for the holding of neces- sary examinutions in accordance with the scheme of recruitinent. PART TIL. MISCELLANEOUS. 18. The Commission shall not consider representations from individuals (including individ- ual officers) nen when required to do so by the Governor or the Administrator. 14. Any case not covered by these Instruc- tions shall be reported to the secretary and the Commission may refer the case to the Governor who may issue instructions under his hand as to how the case shall be dealt with, and the case shall be dealt with accordingly. 15. Nothing in these Instructions shall— (a) apply to any member of the Gover- nor’s personal staff; (6) apply to any Judge of the Supreme Court or any Magistrate; (¢) apply to any office or rank ina Naval, Military or Air Force constituted by ov moued under any enactment; (7?) apply to any appointments to and promotions in the Oversea Audit Service; 9 (¢) affect the powers and responsibility conferred upon the Commissioner of Police by the Police Act, 1951, as amended, and any 12/1951. regulations made thereunder, in respect of appointments, promotion and discipline of all ranks of the Police Force below the rank of Tuspector; or of the powers and responsibility conferred upon the officer in charge of prison discipline, the Keeper or the Visiting Justices by the Rules and Regulations for the Govern- ment of the Prisons made by the Governor in Council on the 18th day of August, 1909, as amended, in respect of discipline of subordi- nate officers. 16. These Instructions shall come into Commence- operation on the 19th day of January, 1956. cia Dated this 8rd day of January, 1956. K. W. Bracksurne, (rovernor. ANTIQUA. Printed at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands, by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.—By Authority. 1966, A.C, 13/235—375—1.56. [Price 15 cents.] LEEWARD ISLANDS. SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS. 1956, No. 5. Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into operation the Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956. BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS. A PROCLAMATION. Kk. W. BLACKBURNE, Governor. WHEREAS hy section 6 of the Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla Constitution and Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956 (No. 2 of 1956) it is provided that the said Ordinance shall come into operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by Proclamation published in the Gazette: NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE, a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George. an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do by this my Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation on the 19th day of January, 1956. AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi- dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give their ready obedience accordingly. GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty’s reign. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN! Printed at the Governmnet Printing Office, Leeward Islands. by BE. M. BLACKMAN, Government Printer.—By Authority. 1956, ~~ 480—1.46. (Price 3 cents.) , ae ¥. LEEWARD ISLANDS. SAINT CHRISTOPHER NEVIS AND ANGUILLA STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS. 1956, No. 6. Proclamation dated 12th January, 1956, bringing into operation the Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1956. BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE LEEWARD ISLANDS. A PROCLAMATION. Kk. W. BLACKBURNE, Governor. WHEREAS by section 1 of the Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1956 (No. 3 of 1956) it ig provided that the said Ordinance shall eome into operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by Proclamation published in the Gazette: NOW, THEREFORE, 1, KENNETH WILLIAM BLACKBURNE, a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor and Commander in Chief in and over the Colony of the Leeward Islands and Vice Admiral of the same, do hy this my Proclamation declare that the said Ordinance shall come into operation on the 19th day of January, 1956. AND all Her Majesty’s officers and loving subjects in the Presi- dency of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla and all others whom it may concern are hereby required to take due notice hereof and to give their ready obedience accordingly. “ GIVEN at the Government House, Antigua, this 12th day of January, 1956, and in the fourth year of Her Majesty's reign. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN! ANTIQUA. Prinved at the Government Printing Office, Leeward Islands. by E. M. Buackman, Government Printer.— hy Authority. 1956 —480-—1.56. | Price 3 cents} - a. —_ os