14

sively persons of 13 years old or upwards.
Yet no wrong would have been done to
such masters; and in, the same way no
wrong would have been done to the
plaintiffs in the present case if the
defendants had succeeded in persuading
every printers’ assistant in the country to
join the union and they had rendered it
impossible for the plaintiffs to get men to
work for them on the terms they desired.
The error arises probably out of an
incorrect use of language. It is inaccurate
to say that the masters have a right to
employ men on any specific terms. They
have only a right to employ such, if any,
as are willing to accept those terms, and
no wrong is done them by any one who
by lawful means lessens the number of
those willing to accept them. The right
of the plaintiffs to try to persuade a man
to accept and the right of the defendants
to try to persuade a man to refuse appear
to me to be rights of freedom of individual
action equally lawful and equally deserv-
ing of the protection of the law, so long
as the means employed are lawful and
right. Both become unlawful if the
means employed are wrongful.”

Ward, Lock & Co. (although decided before
the 1906 U.K. Act) is, I think, good authority for
saying that even though the effect of picketing be
to compel the plaintiffs to do something they have
a legal right to refrain from doing, that of dtsel/
would not render the picketing unlawful. But it
would be a mistake, I think, to assume that Ward,
Lock & Co. decided any more than that. In that
ease the pickets did nothing beyond obtaining or
communicating information. The ground on which
the Court allowed the appeal is indicated in a later
passage of the judgment delivered by the same
Lord Justice:

“but in my view that which decides the
question is that there is no evidence of
any improper or illegal acts, or, indeed,
of any acts whatever, by any pickets sent
by the defendants during this period.
There oan, therefore, be no pretence that
the plaintiffs have established anything
which would give to them a good cause
of action in respect of the picketing
complained of. I wish to add that, in my
opinion, there is throughout a complete
absence of evidence of anything in the
nature of picketing or besetting which
could constitute a nuisance. It appears
that the discharged workmen loitered
about for a day or two after leaving
work—a thing which is not unlikely to
happen—and that they were at times
joined by others, but there is no sugges-
tion even by the plaintiffs’ witnesses that
any annoyance or molestation took place,
and the evidence to the contrary is
overwhelming.”

This quotation from the judgment of Moulton,
L.J., shows the vast difference between the facts in
that case and the facts as I find them here. In
the present case there were acts of obstruction,
coercion und intimidation and threats of violence.
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence of “ per-
suading”’ (as opposed to “ inviting”) other than
persuasion of any person ‘to work or abstain from
working ” (q. v. sec. 7 Trade Unions Act), and the
repeated shouts and other noises of the pickets and
the degree of annoyance inflicted on the plaintiffs
by the pickets’ general behaviour clearly went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to the carry-
ing out of lawful picketing; as regards this further
aspect of the picketing, the evidence, in my opinion,
points conclusively to at least connivance on the
part of the defendants. On the first day of the
picketing one of the defendants who had attended
the Committee meeting at which the method of
picketing was discussed, instructed the pickets that
they were to “shout behind” people who were
ubout to enter the store; he himself took part in
loud shouting on more than one occasion; at a
certain stage he actually demonstrated how the
shouting should be done and made the pickets shout
more loudly than they were then doing.

‘As already mentioned, the defendant Samuel
is not a member of the Executive Committee of
the Union and did not attend the meetings of the
Committee. It is not however disputed that he
combined with the other defendants for the purposes
of the picketing of the plaintiffs’ premises.

That some damage has been caused to the
plaintiffs by the unlawful means from time to time
used in this case is manifest. But it was argued
by Mr. Barrow that the plaintiffs having failed to.
aver in their pleadings that the defendants
‘“‘threaten and intend” to repeat the illegal acts
complained of, are not entitled to an injunction.
Mr. Harney replied that the Statement of Claim
was drawn up in accordance with Form 13 at page 38
of volume 7 of Lord Atkins’ Encyclopaedia of Court
Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings and
that that particular Form, which is stated to be
based on the claim for conspiracy to injure by
unlawful means in the well-known case of Lyons
(J) & Sons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255, contains
no such averment. Mr. Harney also invited
attention to the wording of his Statement of Claim
(dated 21st October 1955), and particularly to
paragraph 6 thereof wherein it is alleged that the
wrongful acts have been done “daily from the
17th day of September, 1955.” In my opinion a
pleader desiring an injunction should always, ea
abundanti cautela, insert the conventional words
leading to an application for an injunction, but the
authorities show that failure to insert them will
not be fatal where an intention to repeat the illegal
acts complained of can be readily inferred from the
nature of the case or the facts already pleaded.
(See, for example, Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles,
20 Ch. D. at p. 195). I think the inference can
here be drawn.