repeated ‘‘Hold the line”, he told the picket
he “would take pleasure in kicking” him.
That is hardly a remark that one would expect
from a person in Mr. Stevens’ position under
any circumstances; and it was urged by Mr.
Barrow as indicative of animosity. It should
however be remembered that the suggestion
put to Stevens under cross-examination was
that he had said he would take pleasure in
thumping the Dominican picket; it was Stevens
himself who volunteered the information that
the word he used was ‘“ kick.”. Whatever else
may be said of the matter, it does not seem to
me to point to untruthfulness on the part of
the witness.

Having given careful attention to these and
the other arguments advanced by learned counsel
for the defence, I am, nevertheless, after the
fullest consideration of the evidence of all the
witnesses I have had the opportunity of hearing
and observing, of the opinion that the particular
incidents mentioned by .me as having been
related by Gertrude O’Neal, Linda O'Neal,
Victoria Frederick, Cardigan Stevens and _ Iris
Barrow did take place, and that their accounts
of them are substantially correct; these persons
impressed me as being essentially truthful
witnesses, whatever their feelings towards the
Union. Their evidence shows, among other
things, that from the inception of the picketing
the pickets who were sent by the defendants to
carry out the objects of the picketing, and who
were instructed in their duties by the defendant
Hurst and posted and supervised by the defendant
Levi Joseph (both of whom were present when
the whole subject of the picketing was discussed
in Hxecutive Committee), have been telling
people in forceful language that they must not
buy from O’Neal’s. The same idea appears to
be insinuated by ‘The Workers’ Voice” in the
third headline to the article of 18th September

Although none of the clerks in the plaintiffs’
employment are members of the Union, and
there is no evidence to indiente that any further
clerks are required, the picketing is still on;
up to the time of the hearing of this case no
decision had been taken with regard to its
duration. The number of pickets has been
reduced to three; at a certain stave it was six,
but never as many as twelve, as suggested in
paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.

It is clear that although the predominant
object of the picketing here is the furthering by the
defendants of their own interests, there are other
objects in mind and that unlawful means amounting
to obstruction, coercion, intimidation and threats of
personal violence have been used.

Mr. Barrow contends that even though the
pickets were employed by the defendants other
than Samuel and sent by them to picket the
plaintiffs’ premises, and even though the picketing
be held to be outside the protection of section 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, owing to the use of
illegal means, the defendants (other than Samuel

13

presumably) are not liable in law because they do
not stand in the relationship of master and servant
to the pickets and did not authorise the illegal
means in question. The implications of that
proposition, in the setting of the present case,
appear to me to be somewhat startling. It would
mean that people could employ men of straw to
picket premises and could, when damage results
and actions are brought for acts done in furtherance
of picketing, simply themselves say, ‘“‘ We authorised
the picketing in this way and not in that, therefore
we are not liable.” In my opinion the defendants
vis-a-vis the pickets do stand in the relationship of
master and servant; the pickets were engaged by
them and are subject to their control and may be
dismissed by them; these, I think, are the essential
ingredients of the relationship of master and
servant. But even if there be no such relationship,
it seems to me that on the evidence here Mr.
Barrow’s submission could not be sustained.

In Ward, Lock, and Co. (Lid.) v. The
Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society and another,
(1906) 22 T.L.R. 827, the defendants stationed
pickets to watch the plaintiffs’ printing works and
to induce the workmen employed by the plaintiffs
to join the union and then to determine their
employment by proper notices, the object being to
compel the plaintiffs to become employers of union
men and to abstain from employing non-union
men. In an action for damages for wrongfully
and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen
employed in the plaintiffs’ printing works to break
their contracts of service with the plaintiffs, and for
nuisance and for an injunction, the Court of Appeal
held unanimously that the picketing was entirely
lawful both at common law and under the 1875
U.K. Act. Special attention has been asked to

the following passage from the judgment of
Moulton, L.J.:—

“Throughout the discussion the defend-
ants have been described as seeking to
“compel” the plaintiffs to pay union
wages and to employ union men because
they tried to get all the operatives they
could into the union, so that the plain-
tiffs would find no non-union men to
employ. If this be @ proper use of the
word ‘*compel”’, it certainly carries with
it no wrongful character. In the year
1898 the Legislature forbade the employ-
ment of children under the age of 11 as
half-timers. Supposing that prior to that
Act, a “public association” had been
formed to induce parents not to send
their children as half-timers before the
age of 11. No more legitimate, and
perhaps no more laudable object of an
association could be imagined, and it
would not lose its legitimate character by
reason of its success. But its success
would pro tanto, and its complete success
would absolutely, prevent those masters
who were desirous of employing young
half-timers at, we may presume, corres-
pondingly low wages from doing so, and
would “compel” them to employ exclu-