by feeling that it serves the plaintiffs right.
The analysis of human impulses soon leads us
into the quagmire of mixed motives, and, even
if we avoid the word ‘motive,’ there may be
more than a single purpose or object. It is
enough to say that, if there is more than one
purpose actuating 2 combination, liability must
depend on ascertaining the predominant pur-
pose. If that predominant purpose is to
damage another person and damage results,
that is tortious conspiracy.. If the predomi-
nant purpose is the lawful protection or pro-
motion of any lawful interest of the combiners,
it is not a tortious conspiracy, even though it
causes damage to another person.”

Section 6A (2) of our Trade Unions Act, 1939,
provides in substance that the common law which
renders actionable per se damage resulting from #
conspiracy to injure shall not be applicable to acts,
otherwise lawful, which are done in contemplation
or furtherance of « trade dispute.
section is, I think, to relieve persons acting in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute of
the onus of showing that the predominant object
of their combination is to forward or defend their
own legitimate interests, even though there also
appear to be other objects in mind. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the protection of the
section does not extend to the adoption of means
which are in themselves unlawful, in the carrying
out of the objects of the combination.

Section 7 of our Act is identical with section 2
of the United Kingdom Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
and its protection applies only where the watching
and besetting (or the “ picketing” as it is sometimes
for convenience called) is for one or more of the
purposes mentioned; it does not apply where there
is no such purpose. The “ peaceful persuasion”
expressly authorised is confined to inducing any
person to work or abstain from working. In this
connection Mr. Citrine, at p. 439 of his book,
comments as follows: ‘“ For example, it 1s con-
sidered that it would not cover the picketing of a
theatre or retail shop with the object of persuading
patrons or customers to boycott it.” At p. 440
he adds:—

¢ Although the section does not, in terms,
authorise picketing with the object of
peacefully persuading customers to boy-
cott, this object may in effect, be accom-
plished under the provisions relating to
the obtaining or communicating of in-
formation. The section does not require
that the information should have reference
to the question of working or abstaining
from working. Thus, if pickets confine
themselves to publishing, by word of
mouth or by means of placards or
handbills, accurate information as to the
nature of the dispute, the section will
cover them in the normal way. It is
probable also that they would still be
covered by the section if they were
merely to ‘invite’, as opposed to ‘per-

The effect of the

suade’, the customers not to deal with
the establishment. The distinction be-
tween inviting and persuading is impossi-
ble of definition. It is a question of
degree, and much will depend upon the
actual conduct of the pickets and the
statements made. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the mere exhibition of a
notice setting out the facts and saying
‘In view of these facts we invite you not
to deal here’ would amount to a mere.
invitation.”

Other passages from Citrine worth quoting in
connection with this section appear at p. 427: ‘No
doubt some forms of picketing, such as continually
marching to and fro in front of a shop window,
carrying placards or chanting in unison, might
amount to common Jaw nuisances. It is in such
cases that the section is of advantage to those
picketing. In Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Com-
missioners, (1908) 2 I.R. at p. 225, Madden, J.,
summarised the position in these words: ‘The
effect of this section, read in the light of antecedent
legislation, is in my opinion perfectly clear. It
legalised for the first time by positive enactment, a
course of action which might otherwise, 7f carried
out in a certain manner, have amounted to a
nuisance at common law, provided that such a
course of action is resorted to merely for effecting
certain specified peaceful purposes ’.......... All that
can be said is that the section may be assumed to
legalise such acts as are reasonably necessary to the
carrying out of lawful picketing, even though those
acts might constitute a degree of annoyance which
would otherwise be sufficient to support an action
at common law.”

With these general observations on the law, I
will now return to the evidence in this case.

The Minutes of a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Antigua Trades & Labour Union
held on 9th September, 1955, show that the
decision to picket the pluintiffs’ business premises
was taken at that meeting, the resolution being in
the following terms:— :

‘Be it resolved that provided up to
the time of the publication of the Board’s
award the dispute between Miss O’Neal
and the Trade Union is not settled, the
General Secretary should take the neces-
sary steps to picket the business
premises.”

These Minutes disclose that the defendants
Bird, Lake, Carrot, Levi Joseph, Richards and
Hurst attended that meeting. The defendant
Ireland, who is also a member of the Executive
Committee, was not present, but he attended
subsequent meetings when the picketing was in
progress and was disctssed, and this case has
throughout been conducted on the footing that his
responsibility for the initiation and continuance of
the picketing is no less than that of any of the
other members of the Executive Committee of the