union and in such matters is entitled to be rep-
resented by the union, which has, or ought to have,
more knowledge than she about the rights, legal
and otherwise, of employees. Miss O’Neal sub-
sequently attended and took part in the conciliation
meetings held at the Labour Department.

I share the view expressed by Mr. Citrine at
pp. 476 and 477 of his admirable little book on

Trade Union Law, that the fact that a dismissal.

may be lawful does not prevent a dispute over it
from being a trade dispute, and that the legality
or otherwise of the dismissal is no more an element
for consideration than is the legality of an employer’s
refusal to improve wages or working conditions in
the normal type of trade dispute. The words
“ whether or not in the employment of the employer
with whom a trade dispute arises”’ in the definition
of “ workmen” in the 1906 U. K. Act—the signifi-
cant absence of which from our Act formed the
main plank of Mr. Harnev’s argument—relate, I
think, to sympathetic action, that is to say, action in
furtherance of a dispute not between the particular
employer and his own workmen, but between
the einployer and workmen elsewhere—e.g., where
workmen consider their own interests threatened by
something being done by another employer and
strike against their own employer to bring pressure
to hear upon that other employer.

On the evidence before ine T find that at all
times material to this action a trade dispute existed
between the plaintiffs and Averyl Winter, repre-
sented by the Antigua Trades & Labour Union.
That being so, it becomes necessary to keep in mind
the full provisions of sections 6A (2) and 7 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, as amended. These
sections read as follows:—

6A. (2) An act done in pursuance of
an agreement or combination by two or more
persons shall, if done in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable
unless the act if done without any such agree-
ment or combination, would be actionable.

7. It shall be lawful for one or more
persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf
of a trade union or of an individual employer
or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or
place where a person resides or works or carrics
on business or hnppens to be, if they so attend
merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from
working.

The classical definition of conspiracy is given
by Willes J. in Mulcahy v. R. (1868) L.R. 3 A.D.
306, at p.317: ‘ A conspiracy consists not merely in
the intention of two or more, but in the agreement
of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.” Conspiracy may
be both a crime and tort. The tort is constituted
only if the agreed combination is carried into effect
in a greater or lesser degree and damage. to the
plaintiff is thereby caused.

The law with regard to the type of conspiracy
which renders actionable certain acts done by persons
in combination which (acts), if done by an individual,
would not be actionable, is complicated and has often
been the subject of lengthy discussion in the highest
courts. But it is now well settled that at common
law a combination of two or more persons wilfully
to injure another in his trade or business is unlawful,
and if it results in injury to him is actionable. If
the real or predominant purpose of the combination,
however, is not to injure another, but to forward or
defend the legitimate interests of those who enter
into it, no wrong is committed and no action will
lie, although damage to another ensues: there would
then be what has been described as “just cause or
excuse” for the action taken. The latter proposi-
tion assumes the absence of means which are in
themselves unlawful, such as violence or the vhreat
of violence (Sorrell 1. Smith, supra). The following
passage from the judgment of Viscount Simon,
L.C., in the leading case of Crofter Hand Woven
Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. and Others v. Veitch and
Another, (1942) 1 All E.R. 142, at p. 149, shows
the vital points to be considered: —

“On this question of what amounts to an
actionable conspiracy ‘to injure’ (I am assum-
ing that damage results from it), 1 would first
observe that some confusion may arise from
the use of such words as ‘motive’ and
STMEEN TONS Sicncas sere: waiipaudlaievoess There is the
further difficulty that, in some branches of the
law, ‘intention’ may be understood to cover
results which may reasonably flow from what
is deliberately done, on the principle that a
man is to be treated as intending the reasona-
ble consequence of his acts. Nothing of the
sort appears to be involved here. It is much
safer to use a word like ‘ purpose’ or ‘ object.’
The question to be answered, in determining
whether a combination to do an act which
damages others is actionable even though it
would not be actionable if done by a single

erson, is not: ‘ Did the combiners appreciate,
or should they be treated as appreciating, that
others would suffer from their action?’ It is:
‘What is the real reason why the combiners
did it?’ Or, as LORD CAVE, L.C., puts
it: ‘ What is the real purpose of the, combina-
tion?’ The test is not what is the natural
result to the plaintiffs of such combined action,
or what is the resulting damage which the
defendants realise, or should realise, will
follow, but what is in truth the object in the
minds of the combiners when they acted as
they did. It is not consequence that matters,
but purpose. The relevant conjunction is not,
‘so that,’ but, ‘in order that.’ Next, it is to
be borne in mind that there may be cases
where the combination has more than one
‘object’ or ‘purpose.’ The combiners may
feel that they are killing two birds with one
stone, and, even though their main purpose
may be to protect their own legitimate in-
terests notwithstanding that this involves
damage to the plaintiffs, they may also find a
further inducement to do what they are doing