“trade dispute’? means any dispute or differ-
ence between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, connected
with the employment or non-employment, or
the terms of the employment, or with the
conditions of labour, of any person.

Mr. Harney conceded that the expression
“non-employment ” in the definition embraced a
dismissal, but argued that in order to constitute
a trade dispute over a dismissal a dispute or differ-
ence as to the dismissal must arise between the
remaining employees and the employer, and not
between the dismissed employee and the employer.
In the present case there is no dispute or difference
between the remaining employees (none of whom
are members of the Union) and the plaintiffs.

If Mr. Harney’s submission on this point is
sound, the defendants would not be entitled to the
benefit of sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Trade
Unions Act, 1939, as amended, which apply only
in the case of acts done in contemplation or fur-
therance of a trade dispute. It is important
therefore to determine whether or not a trade
dispute exists. Should such a dispute be found to
exist, it would then be necessary to consider the
real effect of. sections 6A (2) and 7 of our Statute
on the common law relating to conspiracy and
nuisance. For the time being it is sufficient to
observe that at common law a combination wilfully
to injure, which results in damage to another, is,
with certain qualifications, actionable (Sorrell v.
Smith, 1925, A.C. 742; Corbett v. Canadian
National Printing Trade Union, 1943, 4 D.L.R.
44), and that watching and besetting, if it result iu
damayve may also be actionable as a nuisance, as
an interference with the ordinary comfort of exist-
ence and the enjoyment of premises (Lyons ¢ Sons
v. Wilkins, 1899, 1 Ch. 255).

As a starting point for his submission Mr.
Harney adverted first of all to the United Kingdom
legislation as contained in the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act, 1875 (388 & 39 Vict.,
c. 86), the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7,
c. 47), the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10
Geo. 5, c. 69), and the Conditions of Employment
and National Arbitration Order, 1940 (S. R. & O.
1940, No. 1305); he drew attention to the absence
of any definition of the expressions “ trade dispute ”
or “workmen” in the 1875 Act, and to the
significant difference between the definition of
“workmen” in the 1906 Act and the definition of
“workman ”’ in the 1919 Act and 1940 8. R. & O.

In the 1906 Act ‘ workmen” is defined as
meaning “all persons employed in trade or indus-
try, whether or not in the employment of the
employer with whom a trade dispute arises”. In
the 1919 Act and the 1940 5. R. & O. “ workman”
is defined as meaning “any person who has centered
into or works under a contract with an employer,
whether the contract be by way of manual Iibour,
clerical work or otherwise, be expressed or implied,
oral or in writing and whether it be a contract of
service or of apprenticeship or 2 contract personally
to execute any work or labour.”

Mr. Harney next cited a number of cases to
show the interpretations placed by the courts on
the expressions “‘ workman” and “ trade dispute”
prior to the 1906 Act and also in cases after the
passing of the 1919 Act; he then submitted that
the definitions of “trade dispute” and “ work-
man” in the Leeward Islands legislation were the
same us those in the United Kingdom Act of 1919
and S. R. & O. of 1940; he hoped in this way to
find support for his proposition that if a dismissal
is lawful (ie., if the period of notice required by
law is given or payment in lieu thereof made) there
can be no trade dispute over it between the dis-
missed employee and the dismissing employer.

The first observation which should be made
on Mr. Harney’s submission is that while the
definitions of “trade dispute” and “ workmen”
in our Trads Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry)
Act, 1939, are substantially the same as the cor-
responding definitions in the United Kingdom Act
of 1919 and S.R.& O. of 1940, no similar
definition of “workman” or “ workmen ” is to be
found in our Trade Unions Act, 1989, which, for
the purposes of the present proceedings, is the
relevant Act. The definitions contained in our
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act,
1939, are expressly stated to be for the purposes of.
that Act, and I am unaware of any authority,
statutory or otherwise, for incorporating them into
the Trade Unions Act, 1939, which is a separate
Act altogether. The only definition of “ work-
men” in the Trade Unions Act, 1989, is that the
expression ‘includes labourers ’’.

The differences in these particular statutory
definitions do not of course have to be taken into
account in considering the cases decided prior to
the passing of the 1906 Act when there were no
such statutory definitions, but even so I can find
nothing in any of the cases cited by Mr. Harney
(whether before or after 1906) which, in my
Opinion, supports his broad legal proposition that
a trade dispute cannot arise between a dismissed
employee and his employer out of a dismissal in
accordance with law. The cases on which he relied
principally were Lyons v. Wilkins (1896) 1 Ch.
834, Quinn «. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495, Doran v.
Lennon, (3945) LR. 815, and R. V. National
Arbitration Tribunal, Lx Parte Horatio Crowther &
Company Ltd., (1947) 2 All E.R. 693.

Now, in Lyons v. Wilkins (supra) the defend-
ants, officers of a Trade Union, after unsuccessfully
attempting to induce the plaintiffs, who were
leather bag and portmanteau manufacturers, to
raise the wages of their work-people, ordered
a strike against the plaintiffs and picketed their
works. They also endeavoured to get one
Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer for the
plaintiffs, to cease to do work for the plaintiffs, and
on failing to do so they ordered a strike of and
picketed his works. The Court of Appeal held
that the picketing of Schoenthal’s works and the
strike against him for the indirect purpose of
injuring the plaintiffs were illegal acts. A. DL.
Smith L.J., at p. 834 of the report, said: