ANNEX E: TARGETING THE FOOD INSECURE IN MALAWI


1. Principles of Targeting

 The ideal targeting mechanism would have the following characteristics: it would identify
all those who should be included in a program while excluding those who should not be eligible;
it should be administratively simple and inexpensive to implement; it should not identify more
participants than there are resources to cover; it should be politically acceptable to government;
and it should fit in with the notions of equity prevalent in the communities concerned. There is
nowhere in the world that such a mechanism has been implemented. All targeting mechanisms
are compromises between the various characteristics listed above. Mechanisms which are simple
and cheap to implement tend to either include too many recipients or exclude some of the most
needy of the target group. Mechanisms which have high levels of precision tend to be demanding
on information and expensive to administer.

 There is an extensive literature on targeting which puts considerable emphasis on trying
to find "self-targeting" mechanisms, i.e. programs and projects which will, by their very nature,
primarily attract only the intended beneficiaries. These have the advantage of reducing
administrative costs for targeting. Examples are the delivery or subsidisation of commodities
which are almost entirely consumed by low income groups of the population, and FFW programs
where the combination of providing a food wage, and the level of that wage, mean that the
program is not attractive to better-off households.

 There is no obvious self-targeting mechanism available in Malawi for either chronic or
transitory food insecurity programs. This is in part because of the relatively high percentage of
the population who are food insecure. It is very difficult to find a project which would only be
attractive to a subset of that population. As discussed in Annex G, FFW programs tend to be
oversubscribed, and the work is rationed out in an ad hoc way which may or may not promote the
objectives of the program. There is relatively little information on consumption patterns of the
food insecure, but they seem to differ from the food secure principally in terms of amount. In
any case, it would be undesirable to introduce an explicit food subsidy. Commodity targeting
would only be relevant in terms of using a less attractive commodity to make a food transfer
program less attractive to the better-off.

 This means that targeted programs to improve food security in Malawi will have to use
some kind of information based process as a targeting mechanism, with the administrative
complexity this implies.

2. Experience of Targeting in Malawi

 The main experience with systematic targeting in Malawi has been in connection with relief
programs. Up until the development of FEWS starting in 1993, the onus was on the 24 District