196 University of California Publications in History

tage of Europe's distress, as had been done in Jay's and Pinckney's
treaties;" this time the distress was Spain's almost alone. But after
the Napoleonic Wars the Powers of Europe were so anxious to
keep the peace and to develop their maritime commercial lanes that
they courted the favor of the United States assiduously and were
willing to give her a free hand with Spain. All kept clear of a
negotiation in which they might have had to defend a weak ally
against an ambitious and growing republic, whose prominence in
American commerce and politics made her a nation which no dis-
creet Power would antagonize. All were poignantly aware of the
greatly stimulated national consciousness after our "second war
of independence," a consciousness which was to develop into the
feeling of "Manifest Destiny." Accordingly, England, Russia, and
France in some degree neglected their own possible territorial
ambitions in the Americas and instructed their ministers at Wash-
ington to strive for cordial relations.
 Thus Spain was forced to stand on her own and to negotiate as
best she could, with a weak absolutist regime at home and a re-
bellious empire overseas. Even so, she retained Texas through the
firmness of her negotiator, obtained a definite frontier in the hope
of protecting her colonies, and secured release from embarrassing
financial claims. The opponents of ratification blindly ignored the
circumstances of the negotiation and Spain's desperate position
in the Americas. Eventually common sense and necessity forced
approval of the agreement reached by Onis and Adams.