Brooks: Diplomacy and the Borderlands 183

larations, his colleague in Madrid might be playing a double game."
At the same time, Adams was convinced of the friendly attitude of
Pol6tica, as well as of that of Count Pozzi di Borgo, the Czar's
ambassador at Paris.
 These ministers evidently had instructions from St. Petersburg
to favor the treaty, as is indicated in Nesselrode's letter to Pol6tica
of November 27, 1819, and in a despatch of the preceding month
sent by George W. Campbell, then minister of the United States in
the Russian capital." Both emphasized Nesselrode's belief that
Spanish ratification was necessary in order to preserve peace.
 Tatistcheff, apparently likewise instructed, officially gave his
support to the Adams-Onis agreement. He assured Forsyth that he
"personally believed the ratification necessary and proper for
Spain, and certainly the policy of Europe required it to be done.""
He addressed a note to the Spanish foreign office in which he cited
the probability of occupation of the Floridas and Texas by the
United States, their recognition of Buenos Aires and Chile, and
their aid to other insurgents in the event Spain failed to accept
the treaty." Meanwhile, Tatisteheff's personal influence at Madrid
was on the wane. He had been instructed to support British policy
there and thus lost favor with Ferdinand. In October, 1819, he de-
parted, never to return."
 Interesting speculation can be undertaken concerning the effect
on Russian policy of the expansion of the United States to the
Pacific. During the negotiation, news of Adams' desire to draw the
boundary to the Coast could not have reached St. Petersburg in
time to arouse protest before the signing of the treaty. Nesselrode's
views have been shown to be friendly toward the United States
after that time. But within seven months after the ultimate rati-
fication of the treaty, in September, 1821, Alexander issued his
famous ukase claming exclusive jurisdiction on the North Coast
above the Fifty-first Parallel. Such an avowal, which drew imme-
diate protest from Adams, seems paradoxical in view of the pre-
vious cordial attitude. It appears, however, to have resulted not
from studied Russian foreign policy, but from a temporary coup
of the Russian American Fur Company, which naturally would
have liked to extend and protect its commercial domain. That the
Czar's government did not commit itself to upholding the ukase is
made clear in the reports of the United States minister, Henry