156 University of California Publications in History Whether by turning about and offering to yield to the Colorado, as he was authorized, Onis could have obtained a diminution of the United States' pretensions in the Northwest sufficient to reach an agreement, one cannot say. He obviously considered the Texas question settled and therefore did not tender the concession that he had been empowered to make. Adams, consequently, did not know precisely to what extent Onis' instructions would permit him to compromise." Adams regretted yielding the claim to Texas more than most of the Cabinet members, but considered the concession necessary to an agreement. Despite the insufficiency of these instructions, Onis set out to negotiate further. On January 10 he called on Hyde de Neuville, only to become more than ever disgusted with that minister's efforts to make him agree to Adams' ultimatum and declaration that the United States would not concede a single point. Un- daunted, however, the Spaniard wrote Adams on the next day, say- ing that he would be able to reopen the conversations with a view to further compromise." No sooner had Onis taken that step than he heard that Hyde de Neuville had new instructions which directed him to aid the Span- iard in reaching a suitable settlement of the affairs as promptly as possible. This was a distorted report of the Frenchman's instruc- tions of September 1, 1818, quoted in the preceding chapter, tell- ing him to act as a conciliator. Onis remarked, however, that he would not trust French aid far, for he believed that France's real aim was to ingratiate herself with the United States as a means of "combatting the ambition of England."" Adams, in a conference on January 15, 1819, told Onis that the people generally thought that he had been too liberal, and that, far from making new propositions, he could only renew those of Oc- tober 31. Onis, therefore, submitted his revised scheme the follow- ing day, acting on his own initiative regarding the northwest boundary because he believed that concessions were essential in order to avoid serious trouble. His note was short, inasmuch as he simply repeated his former proposal (that of November 16) and made the additional statement that he would accept the course of the Columbia as the line westward from the head of the Missouri." Onis, in urging this solution, assumed a confidential tone with Adams, telling him of the stupidity of the men who made up the