Brooks: Diplomacy and the Borderlands 153

 On the other hand, had Adams followed the urging of Hyde de
Neuville in the winter of 1818-1819 and accepted the Columbia
as a limit, the United States would have had to wait some time
longer before obtaining the whole of the present state of Oregon,
most of Idaho, and a good share of Wyoming. But Onfs was con-
vinced that concessions would have to be made at least liberal
enough to allow the United States free access to the Columbia. The
departure of an expedition of three hundred men and six boats on
a journey up the Missouri (the Long-Atkinson scientific and mili-
tary parties), and the sailing of the frigate "Macedonian" pre-
sumably for the Columbia, appeared to Onis to be developments
so menacing as to make advisable a prompt boundary agreement."
 Among Onis' statements regarding the Northwest Coast is a
reference to two possibly useful ports in the region lying between
the extreme demands of the two countries. They were Trinidad
Head, in latitude 410 02' north, of which Hegeta had taken posses-
sion in 1775; and Point St. George, in latitude 410 46' north,
sighted and named by Vaneouver in 1792." Neither was occupied,
however, and it appears that Onis was simply exaggerating the
value of the territory saved for Spain in the final agreement.
 More remarkable, however ineffective, was his idea of fortifying
the mouth of the Columbia, a spot over which Spain had never
exercised actual control. Onis wrote to Pizarro in the spring of
1818 that,
there being at a very short distance from the mouth of the Biver Columbia on
the Pacife oean an island situated in the middle of said river which offer
an excellent position for a military establishment, it is of the highest impor-
tance that it be occupied as soon as possible, with the purpose of protecting
the posmemions and the commerce of the Monarchy in that region, as the United
States will not delay in carrying out its project of opening a route by that
river to the South Sea."

The plan was well received in Madrid, and the war office sent to
the viceroy of Mexico an order to put the island in a state of de-
fense "without giving the slightest motive of complaint to the
United States; it being your responsibility to justify this project
as you find it most convenient.""
 The viceroy, long troubled in trying to pacify Mexico itself, con-
sidered the plan not at all feasible. He replied that, although such
a fortification might be desirable, it would necessitate a naval force