Brooks: Diplomacy and the Borderlands gents, and frequently requested direct information from his subor- dinates in European capitals on the progress of the mediation scheme. Hardly had Pizarro's instructions left for Washington when a despatch from Onis reached Madrid telling of his dealings with Adams in December, and warning of the dangers of United States recognition of the insurgents and invasion of the Floridas. Imme- diately Pizarro wrote that Onis should take all possible steps to prevent the recognition, and repeated his statements concerning the probability of European mediation.' The best policy, he said, would be to strive for a prompt settlement of pending disputes on the basis of the authority Onis then possessed, so that the United States would not be encouraged to use the threat of possible recog- nition as a diplomatic weapon. It did in fact serve as such, for it appears to have been one of the major factors finally influencing Spain to make the concessions on the western boundary which were incorporated in the Adams-Onis Treaty. Onis was told that if the United States recognized any insurgent nation he was to break off the negotiation immediately and leave for Madrid; and that if Adams declined to agree to Onfs' boundary offers the negotiation should be transferred back to Madrid. Onis had in fact chosen the latter course, apparently through subter- fuge, long before receiving this instruction. It will be remembered that in his note to Adams on March 23, 1818, Onis said that he must refer to his government for instructions because of the con- fusion in river names. On the receipt early in April of Onis' account of his futile con- versation with Adams on January 10, Pizarro sent more advice. Although he showed his own understanding of the situation, he was not authorized by the Consejo to give the minister much more latitude.' He left to Onis' judgment, based on circumstances at Washington, such questions as whether or not that minister should avoid making proposals to Adams. He noted three great dangers- war, recognition of the insurgents, and further invasion of the Floridas-and ranked them in that order of importance. Much as he wished to settle affairs amicably in order to ward off dire consequences, Pizarro could not yet authorize sufficient com- promises on the western limits. Onis had said that he thought Adams would offer two million dollars for the Floridas, leaving the