106 University of California Publications in History
thermore, the commercial interests of the two countries competed
in Spanish America. The United States feared that England might
acquire territory there, or at least gain a large share of the trade.
At the same time the administration was cautiously sounding the
degree of agreement between the two rivals in their political atti-
tude toward the insurgent Spanish colonies, a process which led
to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.
 Great distrust of the late enemy was evidenced in the public
opinion of each nation." Any intervention of England in non-Eng-
lish affairs would be resented both at Washington and throughout
the country. The United States, opposed to the reactionary monar-
chical trend in Europe, was beginning to feel the pride which later
developed into the spirit of "Manifest Destiny," and felt fully able
to stand on her own feet diplomatically. This sentiment boded ill
for any attempted interference on the part of England.
 His Britannic Majesty's government did, however, play an ac-
tive part at Madrid. One can find in the mass of correspondence a
narrative of rivalry between the British and the Russians for con-
trolling influence. Though the latter held the lead for most of the
period with which this study is concerned, the British ambassador,
Henry Wellesley, conducted highly important negotiations.
 The close association between Spain and England had naturally
grown out of their alliance against Napoleon. After his defeat and
the return of the old regime at Madrid, the intimacy suffered be-
cause of Ferdinand's intrigues and because of British policies.
There was, nevertheless, an important treaty of alliance signed in
1814, on which Spain later was to base its appeals for English aid.
In that agreement, the two Powers promised "to endeavour to for-
ward, by all possible meanS, their respective interests," though the
alliance was not directed ostensibly against any other Power.'
 One of the first means suggested for profiting by the alliance,
and one favored by some Spaniards, including for a time Onis, was
a plan of provoking the United States to an attack upon Spanish
territory. In such an event, England might be drawn to the de-
fense of Spain. An alternative scheme was to cede the Floridas to
England, which would inevitably antagonize the United States
toward the latter. These dangerously ingenious ideas were largely
developed by Jose Alvarez de Toledo, the former rebel who had
become Onis' confidant.' More cautious heads governed at Madrid,