Brooks: Diplomacy and the Borderlnds 83

valid title to Louisiana the United States would have no territory
west of the Mississippi to "exchange." But the question is largely
one of words. After the failure of Labrador at Vienna it is elear
that Spain never considered that she could effectively maintain her
allegation that the United States did not own Louisiana.
 In discussing this third plan, it was pointed out that the Spanish
Interior Provinces would be safeguarded by placing the border of
the United States far from their centers of population. The United
States, besides gaining the valuable ports of the Floridas, would
avoid the possible danger, if her population spread farther west-
ward, of a dismemberment of the Union. However, it was pointed
out that it would be difficult to obtain approval of such a plan at
Washington because of the ambition of the United States to reach
the Pacific and conduct commerce overland to the Columbia River.
 This last point, like the opinion that expansion might so weaken
the Union as to cause its dissolution, was based directly on the writ-
ings of Onis, and particularly upon his despatch of March 3,1817."
 An important advantage which the third plan assertedly would
give was the opportunity of sounding the possibilities of aid from
England and France while the United States was studying the
offer. In this respect, Erving's allegation concerning the Spanish
desire for time was correct; but with respect to delay per se, the
Exposici6n said: :
in [this asheme] an admissible proposition is offered by Your Majesty, and
the censure avoided that we have been tergiversating for many years and seek-
ing evasions to prolong the dissension."

 Furthermore, it was pointed out that, in the event the United
 States did not accept the exchange proposed, Spain would then
 have a pretext for moving the center of negotiations back to Ma-
 drid, which, it was known, would please Erving as well as Pizarro.
 Both would play more important r6les in any settlement reached,
 and both sincerely thought more could be accomplished at Madrid
 than at Washington.
 All the remaining plans comprised further concessions which,
 it was feared, might have to be made to the United States if none
 of the first three iwas acceptable. Some interest attaches to them
 in that they show the vague ideas of the writer on the geography
 of the country west of the Mississippi.