82 University of California Publications in History futile dealings with Cevallos, and later actions of Adams, had necessitated the removal of operations again to Washington. (It will be seen that in the ensuing negotiations Washington was the center of affairs until March, 1818, and again after July of that year.) Of the eight possible programs discussed, there should be noted the first and second, both of which Pizarro favored; the third, which was adopted by the Consejo; and the eighth, which came nearest to the ultimate settlement achieved. The first was a plan to offer the Floridas to England in exchange for her assistance in restoring Louisiana to Spain. The plan visual- ized a political balance in North America which would confine the ambitions of the United States and would give Spain and England the power of disciplining the United States in the west by shutting off the navigation of the Mississippi and the rivers flowing through the Floridas. This plan, which admittedly was of questionable practicability because of Spain's weakness and England's apathy in the matter, showed the influence of Don Jos6 Alvarez de Toledo, the former Texas revolutionary leader. Toledo had made his peace with Onis, given valuable counsel, and been sent to Spain, where he was par- doned by the King. His advice was subsequently sought by the for- eign office, and one of his opinions detailing the possible Spanish seizure of Louisiana was cited in this discussion." The second project, which likewise had the favor of Heredia and Pizarro, included the settlement of all issues through the mediation of one or more friendly Powers, on the basis of the uti possidetis of 1763 but recognizing the validity of the Louisiana Purchase. This arrangement was simultaneously suggested by Onis, the lat- ter's despatch reaching Madrid after the presentation of the Ex- posicin." The third, which became the basis of the offer made by Pizarro to Erving, was also much like one of Onis' alternatives. It was an exchange of the Floridas to the United States for all the territory west of the Mississippi. This indicates a confusion over whether or not Spain was to continue in the position that the purchase of Louisiana was invalid. For, whereas in the second plan the recog- nition of that transaction was to be given as something of a con- cession, here it must be considered to have been admitted. Without